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GRANADA PROJECT
Amache, Colorado

November 11, 1943

AIR MAIL

Dr. Edward H. Spicer, Chief
Community Analysis Section
War Relocation Authority
Barr Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Spicer:

In answer to your memorandum of October 16 and earlier requests, we can state the following information concerning private enterprise on Granada Relocation Center:

A. List of Enterprises:

1. 3 or 4 Barber Shops
2. 3 or 4 Beauty parlors
3. 1 Lapel pin manufacturer and decorator
4. 2 Photographic developers and printers
5. 1 Fish, poultry and ice peddler, on contract with the co-op
6. 1 Sewing machine repairman, on contract with the co-op
7. 1 or more distributors of beverages
8. 1 Shoe repairman
9. 30-60 dressmakers and embroidery workers
10. 2 or 3 chiropractors and perhaps 4 or 5 masseuses and masseurs
11. Several amateur part-time carpenters, cabinet makers, and furniture makers.
12. 1 Koto-maker
13. 1 or 2 artists
14. Several teachers of music, vocal, dancing, instrumental (samisen, koto, principally)
15. Several teachers of flower manufacture and arrangement
16. Several language teachers, both for English and Japanese
17. Ministers
18. 2-5 labor recruiters, some of whom reside in the Center, others of whom visit the Center from time to time to recruit workers.

B. Extent of Patronage:

General:

Compared with the total volume of business done by the residents of the Center, the patronage is small, but it is widely distributed. Practically every family in the Center makes use of some one or more of such private enterprises' services. Part of this is due to the failure of the Cooperative Enterprises to furnish such services. Part of it is due to the attitude taken by the salespersons and purveyors of services in dispensing the services to the populace. Part of it is due to the fact that beauticians and barbers and some others can make more money for themselves by selling their services directly to their customers than they can by working for the Co-op.

1. Barber shops: Although the sanitary facilities of such enterprises are less adequate than are those of the Co-op, the customers are also better off financially, since the enterprisers can usually provide the service for less money because of not having to pay rent nor maintain standard prices part of which is to be returned to co-op members as dividends. Thus, barbers charge 25 cents a haircut privately as compared with 35 cents by the Co-op barber shop. These barbers after paying expenses can still keep far more money than the \$16 or \$19 a month which the WRA would pay them for working for the Co-op, or the Co-op would pay them in accordance with WRA wage standards. Moreover, the Co-op barbers feel this, and are quite exclusive in their treatment of clients, and not too observant of the regulations concerning working hours. Partly as a result of this, and partly because of the strong popular demand, an appointment list three days in advance has often represented unserved customers at the Co-op Barber shop. The work there is usually of no better grade than by private entrepreneurs. Photographs E-446 and E-447 Granada show typical scenes.
2. Beauty Shops: The Co-op does not maintain a Beauty Shop at present, but plans to have one soon. It would be governed by considerations similar to

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GRANADA PROJECT
Amache, Colorado

December 3, 1943

Dr. Edward H. Spicer, Chief
Community Analysis Section
War Relocation Authority
Barr Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Ned:

Please find enclosed our "Report on Tule Lake Disorders" and two copies of erratum slips or corrections to Granada Community Analysis Report No. 2. We are at present engaged in several pieces of work:

(1) A "prescription" which will solve the problem of how to get the residents of the center to perform the work necessary for its maintenance and operation, requested over a month ago by Mr. Harbison.

(2) Establishment of a new, revised, enlarged, and revived relocation organization on the project, consisting of evacuees and staff. Dr. Okubo of my staff has been taking an active part in getting the evacuee group organized and under way, and I've been doing the liaison work with the staff for the group.

(3) Acting as go-between in a dispute between the newspaper or rather one of its non-reportorial staff and the Block Managers.

(4) A report on the hospital and its difficulty in securing nurses' aides.

(5) An analysis of the past year of work on the farm, to determine strengths and weaknesses, and make recommendations to avoid repetition of errors from the standpoint of social psychology.

(6) A Report on the Segregation Process at Granada has been weighing on my conscience for some time. I have all the data collected, but have had no time to organize and write the report. Miss Maye Oye, who came from Tule Lake, wrote a report from the standpoint of the evacuee who was moved from Tule Lake here--an excellent, well-balanced report. A well-educated issei has supplied us with his view of the process of evacuation and relocation and segregation altogether, with special emphasis on segregation. This trilogy should be forwarded to you at once, but I can only do three things at a time, and so will have to take the report in order of urgency.

Full reports on these topics will be sent as soon as possible. The first should be completed tomorrow. The second is already incor-

porated in a letter to Mr. Barrows, signed by Mr. Lindley, and in negotiations and activities going forward from day to day. The third has been a headache for the last five weeks, and bids fair to blossom out into a full-fledged hearing or trial. I've been having quite a time keeping in good graces of both sides, but have managed it fairly well so far. The fourth is partially completed, but awaits developments. The fifth is a long-term project which will take a month or more. In addition we are getting ready for a comprehensive study of the ecology of the Center. Attending meetings, etc., takes up time, as does liaison and negotiatory work. We also enclose minutes of the Council meeting, and will try to send these and the minutes of Block Managers' meetings regularly hereafter. A transcript of the hearing of a labor dispute, with comments and analysis, will be forthcoming soon. Looks as though we'll have an opportunity to move out to the Center about the fifteen of December. Mr. Arnold of the Washington Relocation Office is hear, and we're meeting with him frequently. Mr. George Corwin of the National YM just left. Dr. Hekkelman of the Methodist Church Board is here preaching in nihongo and eigo. I was ill last week for three days--overwork and underrest and a nasal infection. The staff carried on well. One is in the hospital, and the others are doing some studying in preparation for carrying out our program. Mr. Johnson approved an increase in the number of research assistants to 5, plus a senior clerk and a clerk-stenographer. This is quite necessary in view of the rather full program we have built up. I hope this rather rambling but staccato report will help keep you informed of our activities, and that the reports enclosed are of some assistance.

Respectfully yours,

John A. Rademaker
Community Analyst

GRANADA PROJECT
Amache, Colorado

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Re Draft
L 5.76
April 20, 1944

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dr. Edward H. Spicer, Head
Community Analysis Section
War Relocation Authority
Barr Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Ned:

Within a few days you will receive official communications covering most of the contents of this letter, but I think you should have immediately some of the background which explains the long delay since our last report.

Enclosed you will find an analysis of reactions to the draft. I wrote it several weeks ago, and asked Mr. Lindley whether it wouldn't be a pretty good thing to mimeograph and distribute inside the Center, among Councilmen and Block Managers particularly. He read it and clipped a couple of sheets of paper to it, on which were written the words:

"Report is largely rationalization; purporting to know the thinking that motivates all action or lack of action.

Is rambling and repetitious, Would suggest condensation.

Do not agree with the repeated statements regarding the difficulty of obtaining accurate information.

The recognition of the persecution complex once stated does not need to be re-stated throughout. March 27, 1944

JGL"

I have not had the time to go over it and rework it to his satisfaction, nor do I feel that his criticisms are valid, except perhaps for the second one. Hence I'm sending it on as is. He referred me to Elmer R. Smith's article in the Pacific Citizen, on the "avoidance of convenience." I read it, felt it did not get to the bottom of the matter, and sat down to write the Memorandum to him dated March 30, herewith enclosed. After thinking the matter over carefully, it seems to me that the analysis of reactions to the draft ought to include (1) a statement of the setting and the mechanics--very brief; (2) the analysis of motivations, much as I have it in the original analysis, and (3) the ideas included in Elmer Smith's article and in my own memorandum. Together that would make a good analysis of reactions to the draft, if I'm still sane. I have set myself the job of creating that synthesis within

the next few days, and will send it on when I get it done. Somehow or other I lose fire when I get my ears knocked down too many times in a row. Perhaps the idea of using the "Motivation" analysis to try to wake up the community was not valid. How can we do a real job on waking up residents who want to stay in the United States after the war to the fact, that their best opportunity is now and that objections to the draft get them only unfavorable publicity, not their rights? Another report, written March 10, has also undergone considerable fire, partly because it deserved it, but mostly because it did not fit in with Mr. Lindley's needs and feelings at the moment. If the original thesis had been more palatable--that we haven't done a good job in figuring out ways to make the evacuee residents aware of the place their actions hold in the entire picture of American and world society, and to make them attentive to such factors as well as to their own emotional needs and aspirations--there wouldn't have been such a strong backfire to the rest of it. However, after the first revision of the original had failed to secure his approval--chiefly on the same grounds--I got pretty disheartened, and the many other things which demanded my attention secured it to the detriment of finishing the report on the selective service, which should have been in your hands long ago. I have, however, determined to stay with the damn thing and get it revamped to take out all the errors and objectionable statements and get it to you over his desk as an official report, come hell or high water--and it's raining vigorously here, right now.

In the meantime, we prepared a very unofficial and informal set of suggestions for our Relocation Officer, Mr. Knodel, and got them to him in time for him to take them to the Chicago conference of Relocation Officers. I enclose a copy. Please don't think it's a report. It does, however, contain a few ideas and reactions to suggestions floating around here.

We have been pestered in the project by the community reaction to the draft, and particularly by one individual who has a good deal of ability as a leader and a good deal of desire to stand literally upon all his and all other evacuees' legal rights. His efforts in trying to prevent any "persuasion" of nisei who felt disinclined to answer their draft calls succeeded in stymying several constructive efforts which were going on at the time, and diverting official action into ineffective channels. He was warned by Mr. Lindley to lay off his obstructionism, and he countered by resigning from the Council, stating that he was forced to do so because his loyalty had been questioned. He now is thinking, I believe, *of beginning a test case to bring into court the question whether WRA has the legal authority to send evacuees to Tule Lake on the basis of leave clearance hearings, or to hold evacuees who are on the

* on the basis of the questions he has asked me and other persons, and the remarks he has made in the Center, none of which directly stated that this was his intention,

"stop list" in centers if they want to leave. The Council contains many members who feel that they should not let the administration browbeat this man into resigning, and a promise of organized opposition to the administration on this point is brewing. I have advised Mr. Lindley of what is in the air, and it's up to him how he handles it. I am sure, however, that if he adopts a policy of "to hell with the Council and Ed Kitazumi's backers in it," that organized opposition will ensue. If he takes a calmer course, as I think he will, he will make plain to the Council that he is not questioning Kitazumi's loyalty on the basis of what he did as a Councilman, but as an individual. He used to work in the Project Attorney's office, having attended law school for a year, and was fired for failing to show confidence in the Project Attorney and because the Project Attorney was unable to feel confidence in him. He claims that he never disobeyed an order from the Project Attorney. I really feel that he often has a justifiable point and worthwhile idea. However, he has a personality and a manner which has managed to antagonize practically every staff member with whom he has come in contact, and a good many evacuees to boot. He cannot depend on staff aid in staging his suit, therefore. This really a pity, because I think that the questions he wants to raise are questions which involve constitutional rights of which evacuees have been deprived unjustly on several occasions at least, if not in general. Several evacuees who would be ideal for raising those questions are on the project, but they are cooperative and have made no motion toward resorting to legal appeals. These persons would have staff aid, and all sorts of testimony to bring out the issues validly and on all fours. They would be much better subjects for such a trial than would Kitazumi, particularly because I should hate to see the sort of tactics which he uses glorified by success in raising constitutional issues and thereby give him a status of "champion of the people's rights." His policies are, I feel, short-sighted in ignoring the influence on West Coast public opinion if Supreme Court rulings turned all evacuees loose completely. I'm afraid it would usher in an era of vigilante bands for illegal social control of all races in California, for instance, as due notice all "Japs" of what would befall them if they dared come back to California. However, that's my personal opinion, I guess, and some evacuees differ strongly with it. I enclose a memorandum requested by Mr. Harbison, then chairman of a 3-man committee named by Mr. Lindley to consider the Council's attitude toward the draft, which will explain the earlier phases of this problem. I regret that problems such as these have occupied our attention fairly constantly, and have postponed work on other important reports.

Mr. Lindley, asked me to compile a statement on visitors to the center during the two weeks ending April 8. He sent a copy of this report to Mr. Myer, I believe. I enclose another copy. You should note most,

I think, the report on Minoru Yasui and that on Hugh Macbeth. The latter is a colored attorney who visited the Center as counsel for some of the arrested draft evaders. He impressed several people on whose judgment I feel that I can rely as a first class "American nationalist" on the color line. In your opinion, I think all social analysts should cover him carefully, but unobtrusively, whenever he visits a center.

There is another matter which is giving me great difficulty. A job for which I've been angling for several years has opened up at the University of Hawaii. It is doing part-time work in race relations there--and from what I've heard they are in something of a mess just now as a result of the immigration of many workers from the mainland Pacific Coast--and part-time teaching, on a permanent basis. The salary is a little less than here, but the position represents a definite professional advance over my pre-war status, and offers quite a challenge to constructive operation in the field of racial reconciliation during the next few years. I hate like hell to leave here, though, because I really feel that I have been accomplishing some very worthwhile things. Then too, I know a lot of people intimately, and feel the ties of friendship. The cause of racial justice and collaboration with regard to the Amacheans is also far from fully solved. Relocation is still an unfinished business, and probably will be for some years yet. Present trends in this center indicate forcefully to me the decline of constructive opinion and leadership among the evacuees, and the need for more effective work on the part of the administrative staff. I have just gotten to the point of working effectively with Mr. Lindley--in spite of the differences just rehearsed, he does ask for and follows my advice on numerous occasions, including some pretty critical ones. But I confess that my ability to convince many members of the staff that they will have to understand and make use of certain psychiatric principles if they want to continue to administer this program and these people successfully is inadequate. Furthermore, I find that my own ability to devise or foresee the proper techniques for handling some of the critical problems which come up also falls short of what it should be, even though I manage to make myself pretty useful. Feeling that the situation will soon be such that I will be able to be of greater usefulness in the other place, I accepted the position, effective September 1. In order to reach there in time and get a little rest and visit our folks, we shall have to leave here between July 1 and July 15. I hope that my successor can arrive before I leave so that I can hand on what knowledge I have to him.

I have thought deeply about the situation here, and it seems to me that what we need most is a competently trained psychiatrist who also has training in social analysis, one who is able to play politics with the staff efficiently enough to get them to adopt his suggestions as to how to handle the administrative problems which involve the attitudes of the residents. In other words, we need a man who can understand the needs and personalities of the staff members, so that he can influence them effectively, and who can understand the evacuees' psychological needs and social patterns enough to be able to know how to work with them effectively. I must admit that my abilities do not cover the former very well, and that as time goes on my ability to do the second is also diminishing. The public opinion and attitudes which one meets among evacuees are becoming, in my judgment, more and more psychopathic. The abler members and best leaders have been relocating gradually, and recently rapidly, as a result of the draft and the beginning of the issei relocation, leaving the less able, the less well-balanced, in ever larger proportion and influence. How can we stop the ever-tightening spiral of frustration, self-pity, and egocentric interest to the

gradual exclusion of all else? I do not know. I wish I did. It would be the greatest contribution anyone could make to the happiness of the evacuees in the future if we could find some way to wake them up to the fact that the world moves, and they are standing still, that their self-rehearsed list of injuries, their feelings of resentment, are as harmful to themselves as so much narcotic drug. I know that many say to themselves until they believe it, "Japan will win the war, and then we will get our revenge. Then we'll show those goddamn bastards back in California what's what! And the rest of the United States too!" The rumors which fly around representing that the war will end in two months, that the American navy has been all sunk twice over, that Japan is stronger than ever, that Japan will take India before long, that China is about to surrender, etc., are practically all based on this sort of wishful thinking. Others avoid committing themselves on who should or will win the war, and only hope for an early peace which will permit them to go back to California. Certainly a majority of these refuse to face the fact that California has changed, and stoutly claim that whatever the changes, they can still go back and make out all right in their old communities. Perhaps they can, but probabilities point otherwise. Neither of these groups is going to relocate until they can go back to California safely, or until it is evident that Japan has actually lost the war and that they will never be able to make a success in California. Our suggestions to Mr. Knodel cover this point about the psychological influence of not being able to go back to California, but I want to point out here that this is a part of the psychopathology of community attitudes, i.e., refusal to face the facts until they are forced by circumstances to do so, resentment at efforts to get them to do so, and feelings of frustration because they know within themselves that they are not ^{feeling} and cannot face the facts of their future realistically with a hope of success. They ask how to arrange for enough money to feel secure enough to venture out. They receive a pretty run-around and pass-the-buck type of advice, but little if any definite information or advice which they are able to use in their present mental condition.

Well, just how are families going to get out if they haven't resources enough to keep the kids fed and clothed for a few months till the head gets on his feet again? How can we give the head enough self-confidence to get out and try? How can we give him back the vigor he needs, when he is 60 or 65 or 70 years old and not too energetic after a lifetime of hard work? I don't know. I don't know that we can really expect him to, if we're honest with ourselves. But each month, as the energetic, capable leaders and abler thinkers go out, those who are left have screwier ideas, suffer more and more from egocentrism, narrow horizons and self-pity, and have less and less ability to grasp fundamental ideas, to grapple with problems of center operation and control, and to collaborate with the administration. Yet they demand more, as the moderates and understanding leaders leave. Their demands are less tactfully phrased, and they are less willing to compromise, or to follow WRA program. They are more jealous of their right to be consulted in the formulation of administrative policy which affects them (something which is pretty sadly neglected here, in fact), and less capable to participate in the formulation of such policy than was the community a year ago. They are more inclined to feel offended at "picayune" slights, to fight with each other, to run to administrative officers and to tell tales about each other, many of them pure fiction, in order to "get even" with an imagined or real enemy. The only compensating process seems to be the gradual and slow recovery of many issei from the traumatic experiences of evacuation and center life, so that many are really beginning to approach the capability of relocating again. Many residents have not been able to achieve this point as yet, however. To top it off, the staff is still as stupid in some ways

as they were when I arrived. In some ways they have improved, but in the basic matter of relations between staff and evacuees they are worse. This is partly because of the loss of some able and liberal staff members to the armed forces. The staff quarters are convenient, landscaped, and the staff has a recreation room and nice furniture; most blocks don't even have a recreation room, leave alone furniture. Resentment by evacuees is rising, of course. Mr. Lindley is faced with the dilemma of offending the evacuees thus or losing more and more of the haldkujin staff members who put their personal comfort and their feeling of superiority to their charges above the duties they owe WRA or the evacuees. He is definitely choosing to hold those members of his staff. On the other hand he is not doing all he could--and certain subordinates are doing far less--to hold those members of his staff who have a more equalitarian philosophy. In the matter of council-administrative relationships there has been definitely much deterioration, which has accompanied the deterioration in the quality of the council members as the better ones have relocated and as others have become disgusted when the administration failed to support and collaborate with the council and felt the council ought to do all the collaborating and supporting, and none of the participation in policy formation. If the block managers manage to maintain their present hold on the people, perhaps they, as issei leaders who will mostly refuse to relocate for quite a while, can keep some semblance of order and effectiveness in the community. If many of them cannot hold this (seven blocks revolted, five successfully, in the recent vote-of-confidence elections), or if many of the pro-administration managers relocate, as several promise to do, I can guarantee some pretty warm times around this place in about four months or so. It seems to be a race against time between the two processes of building up the confidence and faith of the disillusioned, emotionally unbalanced and mentally ill until they can be restored to mental health and emotion balance again, and the relocation of those who attain this condition. If the first goes faster, the community improves, and becomes better able to deal with its problems, to the ultimate solution of relocation. If the second (relocation) proceeds more rapidly than does recovery of this type, then the psychological tone of the community residents declines, and they are less capable of assuming responsibility for solving their problems, including self-government and participation in policy formation. That has been the case during the last half year particularly, and as a result the residents need more understanding, more skillful and psychologically wise assistance from the staff than ever before.

I do not, however, see any great chance of increased efficiency or understanding on the part of the staff in meeting that need. To point out what I mean concretely, I am going to take you into my confidence in discussing the personalities of each of the staff members with whom the community analyst has to deal, and who influences administrative policy on the project. These vignettes are the result of my own experiences with these persons, and of my knowledge of how they operate both before and behind the scenes when working with evacuees and with other staff members.

1. James G. Lindley is, on the whole, a capable, exceptionally well-balanced leader. He works too much on emotion and not enough on well-thought out fundamental policy consistently maintained, but he keeps his head in difficult situations and doesn't get stampeded into many inept acts. He makes mistakes but is admirably ready to admit them and to make amends. He has good insight, and is willing to listen to reason, even after bawling one out pretty stiffly for several minutes--perhaps particularly on such occasions--and is on the whole

liberal and humane in his interpretation of his instructions and his duties. No one with a real grievance is denied justice by him that I know of. He has several subordinates who try to influence him one way or another, and on occasion he succumbs to pressure sufficiently to fail to deal openly with those whose advice he does not choose to follow. He has thrice stated that he would call me into conferences on vital problems after hearing my advice, and then failed to call me at the proper time because other staff members had persuaded him that my ideas were incorrect, thus failing to give me an opportunity to rebut such arguments as were presented to him. On two occasions he has shown to other staff members reports to you which I submitted to him for approval, which were marked "Confidential". Inasmuch as such reports sometimes contained suggestions and reports which might be construed to reflect upon the staff members to whom they were shown, I consider that he should have asked me to clear the matter with such a staff member, or should have at least told me what he meant to do before doing it. I no longer have confidence that reports handed to him marked "Confidential" will be so treated. Therefore I usually go over confidential reports with him personally, and take them with me at the end of the interview and mail them directly to you at once if they have his approval. If they do, ^{not} I either send them like this or change them to meet his suggestions. Even with this defect, I regard him as by far the best administrative official on the staff. If he ever leaves, the residents will be treated much less humanely and justly by the staff who remain. His chief difficulty is in getting his subordinates to follow orders, to keep them from backbiting each other, and to get them to do their work properly. One part of his difficulty is the habit of several subordinates, particularly Johnson, Chief of Community Management, Turk, Chief of Community Activities, Roth, head of Public Works, and Carstarphen, Chief Medical Officer, of presenting to him one-sided and biased descriptions of situations on which action is needed, and get him to step off on the wrong foot because they don't know or won't tell him the whole story. He usually listens to the complaints which follow, and after some see-sawing, usually gets the tangle straightened out to everyone's satisfaction except that of the guy who got him in Dutch. He appreciates the need for keeping sources of my information confidential, and supports me in my efforts to do so. He does not always see eye to eye with me, but is usually open and above-board in disagreeing with me, which I like. I do the same with him, and he accepts that relationship very well. He does not consider that the social workers and community analyst are as important persons to have living on the project as are maintenance men such as carpenters, plumbers, or electricians. I think, however, that he has grown to appreciate the community analyst's services somewhat more of late than he did when I first arrived. At least he orders the staff to listen to me, commends some of my ideas, and seems to use the suggestions I make, in many instances.

2. Henry Halliday, Chief of Administrative Management, is a real administrator, but too often a literalist. He goes down the line according to Hoyle on administrative matters, and tries to get everyone else to do the same. He has good judgment in handling administrative problems, but frequently lacks the humaneness and understanding which characterizes Lindley. He works on administrative expediency and instructions more than Lindley does, but adheres to administratively sound relationships more. This is an asset where the organization is staffed by competent personnel, but where weak sisters are included, Lindley's technique of steering close to correct administrative procedures, but skipping some of the rules, works better. In my own case, I could get nothing worthwhile done if Lindley enforced the plan of making me work up through Johnson, my immediate superior. Lindley permits me to work around Johnson rather than through him, which enables us to get many things done which would otherwise be impossible.

He appreciates the service, and so do I. He frequently tells Johnson what I'm doing, and so do I once in a while, but I usually say little. Halliday would insist, if he could, on following regulations in the matter. Nonetheless, he exercises good judgment in most cases, and gets along pretty well. He is a capable speaker, a good leader, and a considerate, if "regular" administrator. Many evacuees like him, many do not. By some colleagues he is regarded as a swell guy, and by others as an awful pain in the neck. I concur with the former view--he is intelligent, he listens carefully, he understands, and if he accepts the idea suggested, he is ready to implement it at once without trying to stall around about it. On the other hand he does not give nearly so much allowance for psychological factors as does Lindley. What psychology he does follow, however, is on the whole sound and always sincere. He does not handle his relationships with the evacuees as well as he might, and on several occasions I have tried to give him some help on them. He has used some of the suggestions, but rejected most of them flatfootedly on the basis of his disbelief in trying to collaborate with evacuees who are apparently "not interested in cooperating, but in heckling." He has accepted others, particularly in the field of motivating evacuees to perform work on the project, with good grace and intelligence. He is usually liberal in his philosophy, but is an ardent advocate of following instructions from the top in authoritarian lines in a bureaucracy such as this, and staying in line with orders even when one does not believe in them, but advocates that one squawk loudly in such a case, while following the policy set above. I'd rather put a little more stress on the need for securing information, suggestions, and plans from the bottom, in a more democratic fashion, on which to base the policy set at the top of the structure than he does, but I realize that if that is done as an automatic and vital part of the process of forming policy, that he is right in the rest of his convictions about following such policy. Too often I have seen a neglect of the valuable tips and suggestions which originate in the field of actual application of the policy, and the formation of policy which omits consideration of important psychological and other necessities if the policy is to be successfully carried out. I get along quite well with Halliday whenever I can get to talk with him before an issue blows up to him to lay the ground for a correct approach. This means foreseeing possible squabbles and talking the underlying problem over with him beforehand. I disagree with a principle which he has declared is basic policy with the Civil Service Commission, namely that if one has a weak sister in one's organization, one should cultivate him, not fire him. If he's capable of development, yes, but not if he is manifestly incapable of that or of doing his work effectively while he is developing. However, that's not his own conviction, but a policy which he seeks to apply for the Commission in his personnel work, apparently.

3. W. Ray Johnson, Chief of Community Management, has made my work pretty difficult. He has quite set ideas on religion, morals, and administration, practically none of which are sound. His religious bigotry, his ignorance of the fundamental facts about Buddhism, his inability or unwillingness to learn, or to change his preconceptions about it, and his administrative authority have all been a real handicap to the community. He conceives of psychology to consist of preaching and penitence, and does much of the former. He always construes his instructions narrowly, conservatively, and without taking the least chance of doing more than he is specifically ordered to do. Time and again he has turned down applications for much-needed and deserved relief on the ground that he was not authorized to grant it when authorization clearly existed, and when Lindley and Read Hanson, Fiscal Section Head, authorized it without question or hesitation. He is one of the least competent administrators I have ever seen in a position of such importance. He does not know how to follow instructions, how to give them, or how to organize or supervise their achievement. The only reason I can see for keeping him in the organization is that he was appointed at Joe Smart's request, and that he has a glib tongue

and can put up a plausible and impressive front in many situations. He has enough intelligence and will-power to know that he can avoid certain types of criticism by acting conservatively, and that if he meets determined opposition in the organization he has to go easy. He fails to see much of his own inconsistency, and tries to cover up his own shortcomings by trying to throttle all criticism of his actions or those of his favorite subordinates. He has on numerous occasions tried to muzzle the reporters and editors of the Pioneer, the Council, and individuals who said anything that remotely resembled an adverse comment on himself or some of his subordinates, and has practically no regard for the freedom of expression of those who do not agree with him. He has a desire for power, and struts around whenever he is acting project director in a way which tells clearly that he is thinking of his own importance rather than his responsibilities. He is the project's outstanding hypocrite, now that Don Harbison has resigned. He tells one person one thing and then tells a different story to others. He has several times protected favorite block managers and other subordinates with false statements.

Mr Johnson's wife is pretty neurotic, which handicaps him further. I get along with him in a hale-fellow-well-met fashion, but do as little business with him as possible, going directly to Lindley with all my reports, and seldom going to him with anything of moment unless he asks me to. Doubtless my rating sheet will reflect the practice. My chief business with him has been discussing the problems he mentions to me, and trying ineffectually to get him to use a little sense in deciding how to handle matters. Discussions and expositions with him and to him have been equally ineffective in changing his conceptions about human relationships in important fields. He frequently goes over the heads of his subordinates to their subordinates, tries to over-ride the judgment of his section heads (to the point where Dr. Carstarphen has reportedly refused to take any instructions from him), has never called a staff meeting of section heads under him to consult with them before announcing or while trying to determine policy, and frequently tries to vent his spite against some staff member or evacuee. The Terry-Johnson feud is documented in your files, I believe. He has been trying his best to get rid of Terry's appointees and ring in some lesser lights who would be more amenable to his suggestions, and less capable of handling the positions. So far the school principals and Lindley together have stopped him from doing too much damage, although Terry's successor is much more conservative than Terry was. He doesn't play ball with Johnson much better than Terry did, however, although he is more diplomatic.

Johnson has been butting into the Public Welfare Section continuously since I got out of it. The chief reason for my taking it over was to prevent him from wrecking the section's organization and driving out its staff before the new appointee could arrive, and I managed to do that pretty well, without getting into an open fight with him about the matter. He is trying to save the government money by ordering reduction in public assistance at a time when the people's savings are depleted, more unemployable old people are in the center than ever before, and when a heavy load of permanent clients who are certainly eligible for public assistance under the WRA regulations or plain humanity cannot possibly be reduced, and are constantly being added to as more families run out of savings, vigor, or health. Yet he asks for reductions.

My worst difficulties with him have been to avoid his orders to act as FBI or Internal Security agent. So far I have managed to refuse gracefully except for the case of investigating the 6G block squabble last fall. No damage resulted, but that was not his fault. If by any chance anything happens to Lindley, and it's a choice of Halliday or Johnson as new project director, for God's sake pull for Halliday. Johnson by all rights should have our support because of his superior experience in dealing with social matters and his concern in them, but he is so terrifically incompetent, prejudiced, and inept in administration that it would be a poor day indeed for the evacuees if he should become project director.

4. Warren Tomlinson, Chief of Internal Security. He is a good policeman, but hardly well enough gifted with insight into human beings to make a good police officer. He has been exceedingly difficult to deal with on the matter of keeping our sources of information confidential, and has several times tried to get me to divulge such information to him or to the FBI. I have usually played safe by giving him some information which I knew he already had, and telling him I didn't know anything else, that I never keep records of who tells me what, and that my memory is untrustworthy. I have carefully seen to it that the facts correspond to these statements. He's a nice fellow to get along with, except for the fact that he thinks that everything about police work, juvenile delinquency, community organization, etc., was known to the Wichita Kansas Police Department and taught to him there in its Police Schools, and that therefore he knows it all too. He really doesn't begin to know much about anything except crime detection and legal evidence. He is, however, good at these, and is a good organizer and has a good department. I regularly talk with him to get the latest news on detected juvenile delinquency, etc., and pass the time of day very pleasantly, and sincerely. If you take him for what he is, he's O.K., but don't expect too much of him. He is brusque but ordinarily honest and human in his relationships with me and with evacuees, who hate him pretty universally. He plays ball with Johnson pretty much. I object most about his attitude toward the treatment of juvenile delinquency and toward his insistence upon his right to prohibit any meeting or gathering of which he, personally, does not approve. He does this by refusing to sign a permit to hold the meeting. Each meeting must be sanctioned by a permit, which by project regulations must have his signature.

5. Harvey Turk has been in Washington during the past month, working on the review of leave clearance hearings. He is Chief of Community Activities. He knows nothing at all about group work, nor does he know how to organize community activities except for motion pictures and athletics. He usually manages to get most of his program unco-ordinated with those of the educational section. He is a willing worker, and spends long hours on the job. He has the refreshing virtue of knowing a little psychology. He is an advertising man and knows that you can't sell the evacuees a program which they don't want and expect them to buy it or like it or to come to listen to your salestalk, nor does he hesitate to say so. His ineptness in handling human beings is reflected mostly in his extreme sensitiveness to any criticism, implied or direct. He feels quite insecure, and is repeatedly subjected to attack by his friends and his wife for trying to help the Japanese Americans. I think he really does his best to try to help them nevertheless. I frequently get his support in staff meeting discussions on how to approach the evacuees. I never criticize him, although several times he has done great damage to programs I was trying to achieve. At the 4th of July Carnival last year he opened the celebration by telling the audience not to ask where their money was going to be spent, that he felt it was none of their business, and that high-pressuring him wouldn't get them anything, or words to that effect. The result can easily be imagined. His suitability for his present job is decidedly questionable. He usually acts as Acting Chief of Community Management during Johnson's absence. As such he has usually done better than the regular chief. His signatures, approvals, and actions have been prompter, more reasonable, and more conscientious. His insight into handling human beings remains decidedly below par for either job.

6. Dr. Lloyd Garrison, Supt of Schools, gets along very well with me and I with him. He is a realist, somewhat conservative, and a capable administrator in most respects. He has a good sense of humor, and gets along well with his staff and his colleagues. He tries successfully to cooperate with other sections, and frequently asks my advice in certain situations, usually following it. His philosophy is much less progressive than is Terry's, but is still much more progressive than Johnson's, Turk's,

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or Tomlinson's. He has never refused me any assistance I have requested, but has asked me to modify a group work program for a boy's gang on one occasion when it was difficult for me to do so, and difficult for him to let the situation go unaltered. We adjusted the matter pretty well, in spite of some unwarranted interference from Turk. Garrison is an excellent man to tie to. He is a good fighter for whatever position he decided to take, and a good politician. Is more interested in his career than in the people he administers.

7. Herbert Walther, High School Principal, is very progressive in social philosophy in some respects, but reactionary in some others. He is erratic, due to a pretty strong aspiration for the limelight. Cannot tolerate much competition, particularly from his teachers. Looks upon school discipline and the treatment of juvenile delinquency as an institutional problem of morale rather than as a therapeutic problem of behavior. Is inclined to be a bit egotistical, and I have found him undependable in carrying out campaigns of education in psycho-social principles with the rest of the staff. He has opposed the principles as often as he has supported them, in my experience, but considers himself a real liberal or progressive. He may be. He does a lot of reading--good reading--and is far from being the most objectionable person to deal with, but I never feel that I can trust him implicitly in going down the line for socially valid principles of administration, especially when the going gets tough, unless his own program is vitally involved. He usually supports these principles, however, and is a good man to play politics with, since anything done in his school has to channel through him or he'll stop it. His wife is very good.

8. Dr. Enoch Dumas, Principal of the Elementary School. Swell guy. Progressive, reliable, and intelligent. Knows the score and works exceedingly well with me. Has several times asked for my advice and provided some information I needed. I never have been disappointed by him or in him, but I have had to disappoint him rather badly. I'm afraid, by not giving him some help he asked for and still needs. I'll try to get down to work on it, but it has me stumped. He still works well with me, and I with him. His wife is very good, and reliable. He is an excellent administrator. Is well-balanced, and easy to get along with personally. Consistent and laudable in his practice as well as understanding of psychology and his efforts to increase his understanding and use of psychology in handling his child and parental problems. A new man could be guided by him better than by anyone else I know of.

9. Jacob Gerrild, the new Public Welfare Counsellor, is good-hearted, a good politician, but slow and painstaking on detail. He came to the U.S. from Denmark when he was 22, and has a slight accent. He has been handling a very difficult job with mediocre success. Johnson has been hounding him on many matters, particularly finance, and trying to impose his own philosophy on Gerrild. Gerrild has had to fight back diplomatically, and has done well at that, but has had to give in on several occasions which either John Moore or I would have fought back on through Lindley. Johnson maintains that administrative policy is moving persons from one block to another to eliminate block squabbles is none of the business of the Housing Unit of the Public Welfare Section. I don't see how the hell Housing can run if it has to have its plans upset periodically by dicta from the Division Chief which do not even pass through the hands of the immediate superior of the Housing Unit (the Counsellor), or even through the hands of the Superintendent of Housing. I've been trying to back up Gerrild in opposing Johnson's charges and attacks upon the functions of the Section, and whenever we have taken the matter to Lindley we have won out. Gerrild has much difficulty in comprehending the work of the Section, and of the other Sections. He is now in Washington, and you may have had a chance to meet him there. He gets onto it in the end, but slowly. He occasionally forgets to confer with his staff on vital matters such as new personnel, which doesn't help him in his work with them, particularly since John Moore was always very careful to do so. He is a

good hand-shaker, but has not been able to make as good impression upon the evacuees as did John Moore. However, the latter was exceptionally brilliant in his grasp of the work. Gerrild frequently comes to me for advice and follows it implicitly, always supports me in staff meetings. I went out of my way to see that he got started right and made good contacts. He'll do, in the long run, even if he is slow.

10. Sara A. Brown, Associate Counsellor in charge of staff training and supervision in the Welfare Section. An excellent person who knows the situation, is realistic, and does a good job. She tries to do too much of the actual case work, because she has an inadequately trained staff, but does it very well. Is indispensable in working through problems with finance, relocation, etc. Has the grave defect of losing emotional control when she gets overtired, which is too frequently except when she takes a day off a week to rest up in. She usually can't, because of pressure of work, and gets too tired. Work excellently with the analyst, does a lot of cooperating, and is tremendously helpful. So are her assistant counsellors, Margaret Means and Elizabeth Evans. Should be relied upon by the new man.

11. Robert McFarling, Associate Counsellor in charge of the Family Relocation Counselling Unit. Excellent man, always cooperates well. Has a good background in psychopathic work, social work, and counselling. Unobtrusive, but very effective. Is doing an excellent job of tackling the approaches to the real solution of psychological blocks to relocation. Has a staff consisting of good cooperators also, Mrs. Leonna Lilljeberg, and Mr. John Ter Borg. Lilljeberg has a good sociology and social work background, and knows the score. Rev. Ter Borg is an old missionary from Japan, where he missioned for the Dutch Reformed Church. Is somewhat narrow and unimaginative, lacks the case work approach to relocation, and will probably do as much harm as help to relocation. Has been shifted halftime to supt. of housing, to minimize what damage he does to the Family Counselling program. Knows Dutch and nihongo, and gets along well with me. (Miss Evans and an elementary teacher, Miss Irene Rieser, also old missionaries, both know nihongo about as well.) His tactlessness and narrowmindedness are distinct obstacles, however. MacFarling is an excellent man to tie to, and to work with.

12. Walter Knodel, Chief Relocation Program Officer, is an excellent politician. Background in WPA employment, and came without an increase in salary. Smooth talker, and has the most colorful line of lingo I have ever heard. Carries weight in administrative circles, and works well and intelligently with me. Has a good approach to and rapport with evacuees. Is the most intelligent and capable of the relocation officers. Reports are that he has just been drafted for the navy. I hope not, for his successor would be much less apt. Good man to work with all around. Has good judgment, but is sometimes just a bit brusque. One has to be careful that he doesn't misinterpret things one says, to make one's meaning clear. Is one man who can stand criticism if given constructively.

13. Willis Hanson, who will step up into Knodel's place is Walt steps out, has a good liberal philosophy. His heart is in the right place, and he honestly tries to help the evacuees, but his personal manners are so terrifically rude and villifying when he is talking with the average evacuee that he has offended a tremendous number of evacuees in the center. Was once called down by the Council for his treatment of evacuees. He really has a blistering tongue and biting tone when he doesn't like what someone is doing or saying, and he doesn't hesitate to use either. He usually works well with me, especially in philosophy, but his point of view on techniques is abominable. He maintains that no privacy is necessary in discussing relocation or case work problems, and maintains an open-desk office, at which his clients are supposed to tell all their financial and family affairs where other evacuees can hear them. Nothing that goes into or comes out of his office is confidential, and this

must be borne in mind when dealing with him. His assistant, Lewis Fanslan, is of the same type. Both are genial, and we get along well, but both are badly out of place in inspiring confidence and faith in the WRA relocation program in evacuees. Mario Vecchio, formerly outside employment officer, is much better in this respect. He does not use the "When in hell are you going to get out of here?" approach used by Hanson to evacuees, but does some pretty good calm counselling. I have worked well with him, and he with me. We get along very well. No friction, openly between community analysis and relocation, except for Willis Hanson's tactics.

14. Joe McClelland, Reports Officer, also works well with analysis. He is an excellent source of news, and has a good liberal philosophy. Usually stands with me in staff meetings. However, he doesn't have much appreciation for such ventures as the motivation report herewith enclosed. He fails to realize the psychological or social significance of many facts which he knows well. Is a valuable ally in demanding just and liberal treatment for evacuees, and for demanding humaneness in their treatment. Is the project's outstanding champion of the evacuees' rights of free speech, and frequently takes a bad rap for it. Sometimes inclined to get a little excited when he should not do so, and say more than he is supposed to. Has so far kept confidences very well, whenever asked to do so, but not on some matters when there was no specific request to keep the matter confidential. On the whole one of the best men on the project to tie to.

15. Don Horn, Project Attorney, is a native of Lamar, and practiced there. He is a genteel, though reserved fellow, and is easy to get along with personally. I have some doubts of his abilities as a lawyer, and more concerning his ability to make use of pretty pertinent advice I have given him in handling problems which could be so handled as to avoid the rousing of the ire of the Community Council, or in such a way as to be sure to rouse it. Is genuinely curious, and uninformed; about the background of the evacuees on the Coast. Treats evacuees considerately and humanely, and is always a gentleman. We exchange reports frequently, and he is absolutely reliable on confidential material. I often read his weekly reports and those he receives from other project attorneys. I think a round robin of such weekly narrative reports for community analysts would be a darn good thing.

16. John Spencer, Farm Superintendent, is a fine leader, and has been good to work with. Once he tried to push a mistake of the Mess Division off as a mistake by one of my staff, but I think I cured him of that quickly. The Mess Division can be relied on to try such tricks in the effort to get more food for less cost--a commendable service to the evacuees, even if it isn't always done openly, and sometimes is done deliberately at the expense of the showing made by the Farm Division of the value of the products produced on the project. On the whole, Spencer is one of the few Section heads who works with the evacuees who has been able to command their confidence and support and keep it. He's a good leader, and is very cooperative with us.

17. Tiny Wells, Chief Steward, is a hell-for-leather patriot to whom pacifism is treason and reluctance to buy War Bonds should be punished by dismissal. He operates his Division with a tolerable attitude toward evacuee food preferences, and open condemnation for their tastes. He is from the South, and considering this has done well to keep his racial beliefs in the background. The hospital mess was run on a Jim Crow basis, but not by him--by Carstarphen and the hospital staff. The administrative mess has accepted visitors of Japanese ancestry when I invited them, but very infrequently. No residents are permitted, even when invited and paid for by staff members, on his orders, and perhaps on his superiors' (I'm not sure of the latter, however.) He's a booze hound and runs after women, according to reports of single women on the project. After our first two-hour argument, I have worked well with him and he has not failed to cooperate with me--particularly when I handed the boss a deserved compliment on his work. He's someone to play politics with, but not to tie to.

18. Ed Runcorn, Chief of Community Enterprises. An excellent man. Considerate, humane, and intelligent in handling evacuees. An excellent man for the job he is in. A Quaker by religion, he gives more of his salary to the Friends' Service Committee and other organizations which are helping us and other people caught in the war than other members of the staff use to buy War Bonds. Nevertheless his refusal to buy War Bonds has roused the ire of super-patriots like Wells and Tomlinson, and Moore and I have several times come to his defense. Fortunately, Lindley holds with us on the point. He works very well with me, and I don't have time enough to work as well with him. I try whenever I can, and do a little, once in a while, and wish I could do more. He is a good cooperatives man--goes at it painstakingly to secure understanding and educational insight, as a foundation for future action in regard to each step of building the co-op. Has built a very successful co-operative here, although its directors are still too much imbued with the idea of a cooperative as a good way of making money without too much regard to possible services to the community which don't show black figures on a balance sheet. That's because of the pre-evacuation training of the board members.

19. Carstarphen, W.D., M.D., Chief Medical Officer. He has a good social philosophy as a medical man, but is a hellion for handling persons. Claims to know psychiatry, but seldom it ever demonstrates it. Also claims to have a sociological point of view, and sometimes does express and act on that. He rules the hospital with an iron hand, and frequently an incompetent one. Is exceedingly egotistical, and does not tolerate competition from his medical staff. Does not trust his staff, nor they him. Has little liking for the evacuees, and they have less for him. Has at least twice questioned my motives when I was talking with his subordinates, and with himself, and seemed suspicious about what I was trying to do in the hospital. I early explained my work and asked him to let me know if I could be of assistance, volunteering to work with him. The only request he ever made was a casual remark which I didn't pick up, at once. When I did later he turned me down on it quickly. When he found me talking with the head nurse on another problem an hour later he nearly ordered me out of the hospital. I'll try to patch up relationships, but he's a hard person to get along with. As long as you let him expand his ego he's as nice as pie, but he doesn't relish criticism and doesn't feel the need for suggestions even when he knows he's in serious difficulties of a psycho-social nature. His public health nurse resigned and has not been replaced, leaving a serious gap in health services in the community. No case finding or follow-up on T.B. is being done. Hospital workers have several times reported to me that medicinal alcohol is sometimes used by him for internal use without benefit of prescription. Usually he fails to support our efforts at securing the adoption of staff policies based on social interpretation of conduct.

(William)

20. Mrs. Tiny Wells, Head of Office Services, has always worked very well with me, and has done much to overcome some of the shortcomings of Johnson, et al., in getting information, instructions, and news to me.

21. Read Hanson, Fiscal Officer, has a good liberal philosophy and cooperates nicely whenever we make contact, which isn't often.

22. Ed Eakler of Employment is a good collaborator. He's a tired liberal but a well-trained man who has real ideas and tries to carry them out when not too strongly opposed. Well worth knowing and working with.

23. Joe Buckley, Statistician. A new man, and not too social in the past but really unknown to me so far. He's affable enough, and I think he'll

Well, that gives you some idea of the personalities involved in the situation. It also gives you some idea of the problems to be dealt with. With regard to the techniques I have worked out in dealing with both.

I have learned a great deal about what not to do in trying to influence administrators in a bureaucracy such as this. I have also learned a few techniques which do work. I never write memoranda to staff members--I always go and talk the problem over with them orally. If there seems to be a good chance to make the idea work, I sometimes follow it with a written memo, both to give them something to stir their memories, and also to give them a chance to mull over the idea more carefully, and provide a record for your benefit. I also find it wise to talk with several of the more influential members of the staff on anything I'm really trying to put across, so that there will be no backfire when it's sprung. I make a point to include the subordinates whose work will be affected, or should absorb, the suggestion to be put over. The process of filtering down frequently works inadequately, I find, and if I explain and discuss the matter with everyone actually involved, there is a much better chance of their understanding and following the ideas suggested. I never broach a suggestion to staff members without first talking it over with my staff and sometimes with other intelligent and informed evacuees. I always discuss with my staff all reactions by administrators to our suggestions, and we try to find out why and how together. I feel that I enjoy the wholehearted confidence and trust of my staff and that I can depend upon them absolutely for frankness, honesty, and reliability in keeping confidential anything which needs to be kept so. Unfortunately I have lost three of the staff recently, and have three left, one of whom may be drafted soon.

As I see matters now, the community analyst will either have the requisites mentioned above and be able to give the staff members and evacuees the insight necessary to work out the problems along psychiatric principles, or else his work will become more and more a matter of studying and recording the growth of penal methods in a community whose psychopathological thinking will need either guidance back to health or else restraint. I feel that restraint will be a decided mistake if it is tried, and I know that I cannot induce the acceptance of the mental therapy policy, although once in a while I can get Mr. Lindley to make concessions to it. I feel that I can be of more usefulness than merely recording the history of the community, particularly inasmuch as I shall probably be unable to reconcile myself to sitting quietly and watching the process of deterioration and breakdown of the personalities involved during the next year or three. Perhaps I'm unduly pessimistic, but I don't think so. I'm sure to get into growingly serious disputes with the rest of the staff, without real results as far as helping the residents is concerned. I cannot figure out anything that seems to work as a substitute for what seems bound to come along in a short time, under the limitations imposed by the staff thinking and WR program. Perhaps again I'm aiming too high, and expecting too much of myself, or any other analyst, but I doubt it. After all, if our program is to be of service to the

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administrators in formulating policy, it must of necessity produce ideas and suggestions which are adopted by the administrators and put into practice by them--or dissuade them from adopting unpromising policies under consideration. So far I have been moderately successful with the latter, and usually unsuccessful with the latter, and the advice I'm giving will grow less and less palatable, I'm sure. Perhaps the political and administrative set up of WRA is such that a reorientation of this sort is impossible. I know that it is more than the present staff here can do. I should like to feel that it's my fault, but I can't honestly convince myself of it. I have established excellent rapport with staff and evacuees, I understand both pretty well, but it seems to be too foreign to the staff's previous experience to accept our situation as mass psychopathology which requires other than common sense and good will to treat. Maybe a good psychiatrist can put on a few convincing demonstrations, but mine have been discounted as "exceptions" so far. A new man will take a few months to get on his feet and develop the confidence of his colleagues and of the people, and then perhaps he can either get more done than I can do, or else take a new tack on setting objectives for his work. I have often wished that all the analysts could get together and swap ideas on what we're really trying to do. John de Young suggested it and I was heartily in favor of it at the time, but have been unable to find time even to write round robin letters or even reports to you as often and promptly as I should have done.

If you can find a successor in time, perhaps you can send him out to be here for a few weeks before I leave, so that I can give him some contacts and show him the ropes a bit. I do have a considerable number of evacuee friends who can be relied on and I know the slant of many others in the community. I might suggest that you try to get Warren Dunham to get leave and come down. He has had quite a bit of experience with mental illness in mass situations, and could possibly handle the job well. Redfield will know where he is, I don't know how much background he has in minority race and nationality problems, but he has his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago and has done considerable work in Chicago on the problem of mental disease. Dr. Marvin Schafer, head of the dept. of sociology at the College of Puget Sound, in Tacoma, Washington might be able to secure leave to do the job, and could possibly make out well at it. He knows the Japanese-Americans and has been in China for several years. The job here would fit in with some of his ideas, and offer a challenge to him which he might accept. His salary is, I am sure, not so high as this one, and he wants to get out into research every once in while, so he might take it. Elmer Hedin of Halcyon, California (that's his complete address, as I have it last) would certainly be interested in the problem, and would do a good job. He has had considerable experience in educational work in the Federal Prison Service, and has also done a lot of social work among the minority groups in California. He's o.k., and has excellent balance and political ability. Knows nihongo too--better than I do. He wrote a chapter in Brown & Roucek's Our Racial and National Minorities, the one entitled Hindu Americans, and had his degree and some graduate work at

the University of Washington, majoring in Oriental Studies and minoring in sociology. Right now that's about all I could suggest, except such regular standbys as Kardiner, Margaret Mead, Lewis Lorwin, etc., who probably have better jobs right now.

In spite of the heading on this letter, I think you should feel free to show it to John Provinse, and to discuss the matter with him fully. He was the person who was good enough to hire me, and I feel that I owe him an explanation for running out on him. Perhaps this will serve that function. If you would prefer to have me write him directly, I will be glad to do so. I do not intend this letter or anything in it as an official complaint, but I feel that you and John Provinse might make good use of the information and opinion contained in it, for your own guidance. If there is anything else I can do to help matters along before I leave, I shall be glad to do so. I am supposed to be in San Francisco not later than Aug. 16, and am pretty well worn out by the work here, so I shall have to take a rest before that time. I want to take a few days to go take a look at a few Indian communities in this area, while I am here, and so I'll try to send my family up to Northwest Tacoma about July 1, take time to go around and see the Indians, and possibly one or two other relocation centers, and if possible Santa Fe internment center, before leaving myself. If it would help matters, I might take the time off for looking around first, then come back to help get the new man started, and then leave directly for Tacoma. I have about 21 days of annual leave coming, so I can do it either way. I shall have to travel up and down the Pacific Coast, and if I can do the program any good while doing, or while I'm hanging around Frisco waiting for a boat, I'll be glad to be of service. Since all the mail from and to Hawaii is still censored, perhaps I can work out a simple code to let you know what the attitudes of the hihonjin there are after I've had a chance to look around. If you already know, of course, it is unnecessary to take such precautions--perhaps the censorship won't bother with such details, but again it might do that little thing.

This is enough of a book for now. I hope that this doesn't give you too severe a shock, and that you'll be able to get a better man to take my place.

As ever, cordially yours.

John A. Rademaker
Community Analyst

Memo
L 5.76

GRANADA PROJECT
Amache, Colorado

May 18, 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

Dr. Edward H. Spicer, Head
Community Analysis Section
War Relocation Authority
Barr Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Ned:

There is a matter which is giving me great difficulty. A job for which I've been angling for several years has opened up at the University of Hawaii. It is doing part-time work in race relations there--and from what I've heard they are in something of a mess just now as a result of the immigration of many workers from the mainland Pacific Coast--and part-time teaching, on a permanent basis. The salary is a little less than here, but the position represents a definite professional advance over my pre-war status, and offers quite a challenge to constructive operation in the field of racial reconciliation during the next few years. I hate like hell to leave here, though, because I really feel that I have been accomplishing some very worthwhile things. Then too, I know a lot of people intimately, and feel the ties of friendship. The cause of racial justice and collaboration with regard to the Amacheans is also far from fully solved. Relocation is still an unfinished business, and probably will be for some years yet. Present trends in this center indicate forcefully to me the decline of constructive opinion and leadership among the evacuees, and the need for more effective work on the part of the administrative staff. I have long been working effectively with Mr. Lindley. He asks for and follows my advice on numerous occasions, including some pretty critical ones. But I confess that my ability to convince many members of the staff that they will have to understand and make use of certain psychiatric principles if they want to continue to administer this program and these people successfully is inadequate. Furthermore, I find that my own ability to devise or foresee the proper techniques for handling some of the critical problems which come up also falls short of what it should be, even though

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I manage to make myself pretty useful. Feeling that the situation will soon be such that I will be able to be of greater usefulness in the other place, I accepted the position, effective September 1. In order to reach there in time and get a little rest and visit our folks, we shall have to leave here between July 1 and July 15. I hope that my successor can arrive before I leave so that I can hand on what knowledge I have to him.

I have thought deeply about the situation here, and it seems to me that what we need most is a competently trained psychiatrist who also has training in social analysis, one who is able to work with the staff efficiently enough to be able to give them the insight and understanding they need to know to be able to handle the administrative problems which involve the attitudes of the residents. In other words, we need a man who can understand the administrative needs and personalities of the staff members, so that he can assist them effectively, and who can understand the evacuees' psychological needs and social patterns enough to be able to understand their needs and to know how to work with them effectively.

The public opinion and attitudes which one meets among evacuees are becoming, in my judgment, more and more psychopathic. The abler members and best leaders have been relocating gradually, and recently rapidly, as a result of the draft and the beginning of the issei relocation, leaving the less able, the less well-balanced, in ever larger proportion and influence. How can we stop the ever-tightening spiral of frustration, self-pity, and egocentric interest to the gradual exclusion of all else? I do not know. I wish I did. It would be the greatest contribution anyone could make to the happiness of the evacuees in the future if we could find some way to wake them up to the fact that the world moves, and they are standing still, that their self-rehearsed list of injuries, their feelings of resentment, are as harmful to themselves as so much narcotic drug. I know that many say to themselves until they believe it, Japan will win the war, and then we will get our revenge. Then we'll show those goddamn bastards back in California what's what! And the rest of the United States too!" The rumors which fly around representing that the war will end in two months, that the American navy has been all sunk twice over, that Japan is stronger than ever, that Japan will take India before long, that China is about to surrender, etc., are practically all based on this sort of wishful thinking. Others avoid committing

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themselves on who should or will win the war, and only hope for an early peace which will permit them to go back to California. Certainly a majority of these refuse to face the fact that California has changed, and stoutly claim that whatever the changes, they can still go back and make out all right in their old communities. Perhaps they can, but probabilities point otherwise. Neither of these groups is going to relocate until they can go back to California safely, or until it is evident that Japan has actually lost the war and that they will never be able to make a success in California. Perhaps the only thing which will serve to wake them up will be an announcement by the Army that they are free to go back to California. The first reaction will be a great deal of emotional confusion and disturbance. Then requests and demands will be formulated and submitted to the Army for military protection in California for they know that the politicians who control the police and sheriffs won't be greatly concerned about giving Japanese-Americans protection. The army will probably laugh the requests off, but after 10 or 12 returned evacuees get lynched, the Army will probably find itself forced to accept the responsibility for their protection. The greatest effect, however, will be indirect. Few evacuees will actually return. The rest will no longer be able to sit back and refuse to think of relocation "until I can go back to California." They will be forced to consider and reach a decision on the question of "When should I go back to California? Or should I go there at all? Maybe New York or Chicago would be better." The greatest effect will be the breaking down of the insulation of avoidance, for it will no longer be possible to avoid the issue except by a postponement "until the end of the war." This rationalization can easily be dispelled by adding "When all the doughboys come back and there's a mad scramble on for jobs and farms?" The result will be a great increase in issei relocation, particularly, if we can find some practicable way to make finances with which to relocate, available at the project on long-time loan basis.

Right now, the dominant attitude toward relocation is a part of the psychopathology of community attitudes, i.e., refusal to face the facts until they are forced by circumstances to do so, resentment at efforts to get them to do so, and feelings of frustration because they know within themselves that they are not facing and cannot face the facts of their future realistically with a hope of success. For instance, they ask how to arrange for enough money to feel secure enough

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to venture out. They receive a pretty run-around and pass-the-buck type of advice, but little if any definite information or advice which they are able to use in their present mental condition.

Well, just how are families going to get out if they haven't resources enough to keep the kids fed and clothed for a few months till the head gets on his feet again? How can we give the head enough self-confidence to get out and try? How can we give him back the vigor he needs, when he is 60 or 65 or 70 years old and not too energetic after a lifetime of hard work? I don't know. I don't know that we can really expect him to, if we're honest with ourselves. But each month, as the energetic, capable leaders and abler thinkers go out, those who are left have screwier ideas, suffer more and more from egocentrism, narrow horizons and self-pity, and have less and less ability to grasp fundamental ideas, to grapple with problems of center operation and control, and to collaborate with the administration. Yet they demand more, as the moderates and understanding leaders leave. Their demands are less tactfully phrased, and they are less willing to compromise, or to follow WRA program. They are more jealous of their right to be consulted in the formulation of administrative policy which affects them (something which is often sadly neglected here, in fact), and less capable to participate in the formulation of such policy than was the community a year ago. They are more inclined to feel offended at "picayune" slights, to fight with each other, to run to administrative officers and to tell tales about each other, many of them pure fiction, in order to "get even" with an imagined or real enemy. The only compensating process seems to be the gradual and slow recovery of many issei from the traumatic experiences of evacuation and center life, so that many are really beginning to approach the capability of relocating again. Many residents have not been able to achieve this point as yet, however. In the matter of council-administrative relationships there has been definitely much deterioration, which has accompanied the deterioration in the quality of the council members as the better ones have relocated and as others have become disgusted when the administration failed to support and collaborate with the council and felt the council ought to do all the collaborating and supporting, and none of the participation in policy formation. (Incidentally, the staff feels somewhat strongly the limitations upon their opportunity to participate in the formulation of WRA policy in just the same way!) If the block managers manage to maintain their present hold on the people, perhaps they, as issei leaders who will mostly

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refuse to relocate for quite a while, can keep some semblance of order and effectiveness in the community. If many of them cannot hold this (seven blocks revolted, five successfully, in the recent vote-of-confidence elections), or if many of the pro-administration managers relocate, as several promise to do, I can guarantee some pretty warm times around this place in about four months or so. It seems to be a race against time between the two processes of building up the confidence and faith of the disillusioned, emotionally unbalanced and mentally ill until they can be restored to mental health and emotional balance again, and the relocation of those who attain this condition. If the first goes faster, the community improves, and becomes better able to deal with its problems, progressing to the ultimate solution of relocation. If the second (relocation) proceeds more rapidly than does recovery of this type, then the psychological tone of the community residents declines, and they are less capable of assuming responsibility for solving their problems, including self-government and participation in policy formation. That has been the case during the last half year particularly, and as a result the residents need more understanding, more skillful and psychologically wise assistance from the staff than ever before.

As I see matters now, the community analyst will either have the requisites mentioned above and be able to give the staff members and evacuees the insight necessary to work out the problems along psychiatric principles, or else his work will become more and more a matter of studying and recording the growth of penal methods in a community whose psychopathological thinking will need either guidance back to health or else restraint. I feel that restraint will be a decided mistake if it is tried, and I am afraid that I cannot induce the acceptance of the mental therapy policy, although once in a while I can get Mr. Lindley and some others to make concessions to it. I feel that I can be of more usefulness than merely recording the history of the community, particularly inasmuch as I shall probably be unable to reconcile myself to sitting quietly and watching the process of deterioration and breakdown of the personalities involved during the next year or three. Perhaps I'm unduly pessimistic, but I don't think so. I'm sure to get into growingly serious disputes with the rest of the staff, without real results as far as helping the residents is concerned. I cannot figure out anything that seems to work as a substitute for what seems bound to come along in a short time, under the limitations imposed by the staff thinking and

WRA program. Perhaps again I'm aiming too high, and expecting too much of myself, or any other analyst, but I doubt it. After all, if our program is to be of service to the administrators in formulating policy, it must of necessity produce ideas and suggestions which are adopted by the administrators and put into practice by them--or dissuade them from adopting unpromising policies under consideration. So far I have been moderately successful with the latter, and usually unsuccessful with the latter, and the advice I'm giving will grow less and less palatable, I'm sure. Perhaps the political and administrative set up of WRA is such that a reorientation of this sort is impossible. I think that it is more than most of the present staff here can do. I should like to feel that it's my fault, but I can't honestly convince myself of it. I have established excellent rapport with staff and evacuees, I understand both pretty well, but it seems to be too foreign to the staff's previous experience to accept our situation as mass psychopathology which requires other than common sense and good will to treat. Maybe a good psychiatrist can put on a few convincing demonstrations, but mine have not been very effective so far. A new man will take a few months to get on his feet and develop the confidence of his colleagues and of the people, and then perhaps he can either get more done than I can do, or else take a new tack on setting objectives for his work. I have often wished that all the analysts could get together and swap ideas on what we're really trying to do. John de Young suggested it and I was heartily in favor of it at the time, but have been unable to find time even to write round robin letters or even reports to you as often and promptly as I should have done.

If you can find a successor in time, perhaps you can send him out to be here for a few weeks before I leave, so that I can give him some contacts and show him the ropes a bit. I do have a considerable number of evacuee friends who can be relied on and I know the slant of many others in the community. I might suggest that you try to get Dr. Warren Dunham to get leave and come down. He has had quite a bit of experience with mental illness in mass situations, and could possibly handle the job well. Redfield will know where he is. I don't know how much background he has in minority race and nationality problems, but he has his Ph. D. from the University of Chicago and has done considerable work in Chicago on the problem of mental disease.

Dr. Mirra Komarovsky of New York has some psychiatric training and an anthropological background. Dr. Bernard J. Stern of the Dept. of Sociology of Columbia University can put you in touch with her. She has some personal eccentricities which might make her work here difficult, so I suggest you see her personally before making any commitment. Dr. Marvin P. Schafer, head of the Dept. of Sociology at the College of Puget Sound, in Tacoma Washington might be able to secure leave to do the job, and could possibly make out well at it. He knows the Japanese-Americans and has been in China for several years. The job here would fit in with some of his ideas, and offer a challenge to him which he might accept. His salary is, I am sure, not so high as this one, and he wants to get out into research every once in awhile, so he might take it. He has a Ph. D. from University of Chicago, 1930 I think. Elmer Hedin of Halcyon, California (that's his complete address, as I have it last) would certainly be interested in the problem, and would do a good job. He has had considerable experience in educational work in the Federal Prison Service, and has also done a lot of social work among the minority groups in California. He's o.k., and has excellent balance and political ability. Knows nihongo too--better than I do. He wrote a chapter in Brown & Rousek's Our Racial and National Minorities, the one entitled Hindu Americans, and had his degree and some graduate work at the University of Washington, majoring in Oriental Studies and minoring in sociology. Right now that's about all I could suggest, except such regular standbys as Abram Kardiner, Margaret Mead, Lewis Lorwin, etc., who probably have better jobs right now.

If there is anything else I can do to help matters along before I leave, I shall be glad to do so. I am supposed to be in San Francisco not later than August 16, and am pretty well worn out by the work here, so I shall have to take a rest before that time. I want to take a few days to go take a look at a few Indian communities in this area, while I am here, and so I'll try to send my family up to Tacoma in the Pacific Northwest about July 1, take time to go around and see the Indians, and possibly one to two other relocation centers, and if possible Santa Fe internment center, before leaving myself. If it would help matters, I might take the time off for looking around first, then come back to help get the new man started, and then leave directly for Tacoma. I have about 21 days of annual leave coming, so I can do it either way. I shall have to travel up and down the Pacific Coast, and if I can do the program any good while so doing, or while I'm hanging

around Frisco waiting for a boat, I'll be glad to be of service. Since all the mail from and to Hawaii is still censored, perhaps I can work out a simple code to let you know what the attitudes of the nihonjin there are after I've had a chance to look around. If you already know, of course, it is unnecessary to take such precautions--perhaps the censorship won't bother with such details, but again it might do that little thing.

This is enough of a book for now. I hope that this doesn't give you too severe a shock, and that you'll be able to get a better man to take my place.

As ever, cordially yours,

John A. Rademaker
Community Analyst

May 23, 1944

P.S. I have been reflecting upon the question which John Provinse asked me in Denver, viz, "Do you think that an out-and-out psychiatrist could do better than a trained anthropologist in dealing with the situation?" I'm sure I did not say all I should have in reply, at the time, so perhaps I should elaborate by saying that I have had pretty good sociological training, quite a bit of anthropology and psychology (especially in the field of Japanese and Chinese cultures) and in addition a good introduction to the field of psychiatry as it is applied in the field of social work. I have read pretty widely in anthropology, and intensively in psychiatry, but I feel that my preparation is not wholly adequate for dealing with the problems here.

To begin with, helping people to get into a state of mind and emotion which will enable them to relocate is, essentially, a social work type of job, at least when they are as uprooted and confused as are the evacuees here. One has to take the evacuee where he is, help him to recover his self-confidence, to sublimate or otherwise to overcome his feelings of aggression caused by the frustrations he has undergone, and then find ways to help him solve the material and personal problems involved in moving to a new place and setting one's household up again. All the problems involved in ordinary moving, such as a job, cost of living, housing, schooling, medical facilities, community attitudes, etc. have to be taken care of, and they usually follow the attainment of the state of mind which accompanies a feeling of present security, self-confidence, and a dissatisfaction with the limitations upon the extent of development possible in the present environment. (Note that I do not say, dissatisfaction with the present environment, but with the extent of future development possible in it. Some dissatisfaction with the present environment unquestionably forces people to leave here, and some of that is healthy disgust with the sand, the dust, the heat, the isolation and the segregation, the regulations, the communal living, etc. Some dissatisfaction is based upon fear of worse to come, and that is decidedly bad, for it undercuts self-confidence and the feeling of having successfully negotiated the last step so that the person is ready to try the next venture. That has sometimes

resulted in departures from the Center, as in the case of the draft, but our experience, as we predicted at the time, is that such departures were frequently for a short time only, and resulted in most cases in failure to relocate permanently. In the vast majority of instances, successful relocation is fairly sure only when the person starts out feeling definitely that he is capable of making a success of it, and determined to try his best to do so. The fellow who goes out with a chip on his shoulder and suspicion or fear in his mind usually comes back to the Center with a long tale of discouragement and failure--unless he receives better than the average treatment by field relocation officers and people on the outside. So if he's comfortable here, but looking for something better, he's a much better prospect for successful relocation than is someone who leaves because he hates and fears what he's going to get here, and is leaving to get away from it.)

Subject to the limitations implicit in the program, personnel, and authority of WRA, we have been working hard and effectively on the material and personal problems involved in helping evacuees move out to new communities. The humane and decent administration of the Center, on the whole, has been the most constructive force in general helping the evacuees to recover their self-confidence, and to overcome the feelings of aggression which they have been struggling with ever since February 1942 and before. Many an administrator has done more good than he ever imagined by showing a genuine personal interest in the welfare of some evacuee whom he has tried to help, and some of them have done more damage than can be measured to the cause of relocation by showing resentment, criticism, distrust, and contempt for an evacuee whose actions seemed hard to understand or to accept as honest and well-intended when they actually were, or were felt to be so by onlookers. (I admit that it is frequently difficult to tell when some evacuees are honest and well intended and when they are not. Some such regrettable incidents arise from honest and open-minded errors by administrative persons. Others stem from the attitudes and personalities of administrators more than from the actual facts of the situations with which they are dealing. Most of the undesirable results stem from the failure of the administrative officer to realize his function--to help an evacuee who has not been able to solve his pre-

blems (and who has sometimes failed to do so to the regrettable extent of including dishonest or deceptive behavior among his efforts to achieve a solution), who needs help and who is in no position to use criticism and contempt constructively and in such a way as to increase his chances of attaining self-dependence.)

The technique of personal interest and conversational catharsis has been used well and effectively. More complex and scientifically developed techniques have been carefully selected, tried out, and put into operation by the Public Welfare Section, particularly by the Family Counselling Unit. The results have been gratifying in some cases, and patience-trying in others. My experience in social work leads me to feel that there is a great deal of promise of success here--success with difficult cases, with complex adjustments. I wish more of our relocation staff had had some real training in scientific social work counselling, for it would help them immeasurably and add greatly to their success in helping people relocate. I am happy to report that they have improved considerably within the time I have been here, but there is still a great deal of insight into the psychological processes of their clients which they do not have.

The major difficulty is still the penetration of the defense-mechanisms and the self-insulation-from-unpleasant-wrestling-with-exceedingly-difficult-problems which characterizes most of the issei population here. As I said above, the opening of California by the army may penetrate these, or at least shake them severely. I think it will. But there will be plenty left. The re-conditioning of those who are still trying to live in a world of fancy and wishful thinking will take more skill than I have, and more than I see on this project. The best qualified person to handle that problem is the Associate Counsellor in charge of the Family Counselling Unit, Robert McFarling. He has been doing some fine work on some cases which I've worked on, and I think he'll have some real success if he continues to get adequate support. So far he has had excellent cooperation from the relocation boys and everyone else. He has a good background in psychiatry and psychopathology. His work with individuals, however, does not have the scope needed to restore mental health to the entire community in a short time. It may be however, that individual treatment of this sort is the only effective way to break down the "convenience of avoidance", and that the Analyst can help only in working on cases. That is really the

job of the Public Welfare Section, though--perhaps they should have a psychiatrist added to their staff, and we should keep an anthropologist or sociologist in the Analyst's job, without trying to get a full-fledged psychiatrist as Analyst. Even in that case the Analyst should have some insight into psychiatric principles, however, so that he will be able to understand what is going on and so that he can lend some insight and community-wide perspective when it is needed. The more I think it over, the more I'm inclined to think that John's question was right down the right alley--providing, of course, that the Public Welfare Section gets well-trained psychiatric assistance in the near future. The Analyst's job certainly requires a broad background of knowledge concerning ethnic patterns and community organization procedures, with some knowledge of the peculiar aspects of Japanese-American cultural patterns as well as general knowledge concerning cultural principles and their psychological aspects. Under the circumstances, I'd rank my suggestions as (1) Elmer Hedin, (2) Dr. Marvin R. Schafer, and (3) Dr. Mirra Komarovsky, with the provision that I shouldn't rank Warren Dunham at all until I know how much of an anthropological background he has.

Regarding your visit to Granada, do you know about what time you might be here? In view of the excessive heat later on in Arizona, I might better take off the time to visit New Mexico and Arizona from June 7 to June 20 or so (a few days one way or another won't matter much) instead of after July 1, particularly if you think you might have a new man available by July 1, so I could be here for a week or two after he comes. If he can get here sooner, or if you intend to be here during the period I thought of taking off, or if you think I should be here to be on hand to welcome the "Jeromites" as they are affectionately called by the residents here, I can easily shift to July 1, again. However, in order to get railroad reservations for the family, I should know before long, if possible.

As ever yours,

John A. Rademaker
Community Analyst

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Japanese Relocation Papers
Bancroft Library

ATTITUDES TOWARD PROGRAMS WITHIN THE GRANADA

CENTER WHICH CONSIST OF JAPANESE ART

John O. Moore

The Problem

The question has arisen as to what attitude should be assumed toward programs of Japanese music, "Shibai" (dramatics), "Judo" (wrestling), etc.

If it is felt by the Recreation Department and the Police Department that there is a tendency for this type of entertainment to distract from "American" programs. It is further felt that there may be an organized effort on the part of a small group of individuals in this Center to exploit such Japanese culture for the purpose of creating pro-Japanese and anti-American sentiment.

The position taken in this paper is that such Japanese entertainment should be curtailed at some points and encouraged at others; that an attempt to suppress such activity would be undesirable; but that the most effective way of meeting the problem is by a concerted effort to build a program in which Japanese art will occupy no more than its rightful significance in relation to other types of entertainment.

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Analysis

Several considerations should be kept in mind in dealing with this problem.

1. Problems Involved

There are really two distinct problems; one, that of the persistence of Japanese cultural patterns; and two, the possibility that there may be certain persons within the Center who are using these patterns for subversive activities.

2. Content of Japanese Art

Some Japanese art does have a nationalistic, super-race, emperor-god theme, particularly the older plays. But not all Japanese art has this theme. Furthermore, much of this sort of thing is so imbedded in the past that the real meanings in the drama, songs, and dances are obscure even to those who understand thoroughly the Japanese language.

Like other religious-nationalistic concepts, emperor worship has been modified in meaning through successive stages of cultural development and through successive generations. All religious ideologies tend to harmonize themselves with any given social milieu.

3. Nisei Reaction

The tendency of the Nisei is to react away from art with this content probably for the reason that they do not understand it. However, to attempt to suppress it, might tend to create an interest on the part of the Nisei

that is not there at this time.

4. The Hebrew Tradition as a Parallel

One loose parallel to the Japanese cultural tradition is the Hebraic concept of the religious national state. The Jews are the chosen people of God. All other peoples, therefore, are inferior. While such an idea might conceivably be held by a few Jewish People at this time, it has been so modified over the course of history that such an interpretation of the Old Testament teachings has to be made consciously in order for people to understand it at all.

Furthermore, it is important to remember that the Jewish literature (Old Testament), in which the ideas correspond so closely with those in the Japanese culture, has been incorporated into the accepted Christian tradition of the Western World.

We also may note that intensive, long-time persecution of the Jewish race and the attempt to stamp out this thought pattern over and over again have only succeeded in dispersing both the race and the pattern more widely than ever. According to the International Bible Society, more Bibles were distributed last year than ever before. The latest and most vivid example of the failure to deal with this race and culture by persecution and suppression has been in Hitler Germany.

5. Present Reactions Against Japanese Culture.

The presence of the Japanese culture is especially irksome to us at this time for two reasons; first, that we are at war with Japan; and second, that Oriental culture is harder for us as Westerners to understand than other cultures. We therefore react against it in fear, just as any human beings tend to react away from that which is strange and unknown.

We should be honest enough with ourselves, furthermore, to admit that, generally speaking, we have made no real attempts, indeed, have had few opportunities to understand the Oriental cultures. Even though we are allies of China in this war, and even though Madame Chiang Kai Shek is taken to the hearts of the American people, the Oriental Exclusion Act still stands. And our legislatures still make passes at Orientals. This lack of understanding and these reactions are the reasons why many far-sighted and realistically minded people are predicting the possibility of this war merging into a race war. It is not fantastic to forecast that possibility. India and China as well as Japan may be lined up against the Western nations in the next war.

6. A Part of the American Pattern

We must constantly remind ourselves that this problem is not confined to the Japanese minority or to the Japanese culture within our society. The Japanese problem is only a small segment of the vast minority problem with which it is our task and our privilege to deal as a democracy. The same problem exists,

varying only in degree, in relation to other minority groups in the country.

"American" culture in fact has developed along the pattern of diverse cultures within an economic and political unity.

This is not only the fact of American culture, but is to an increasing degree the ideal of many thinking Americans. Examples of this trend in our thinking are the congress held each year in Washington to keep alive the folkways of our different peoples, the St. Paul Festival of Nations, and the International Institute of Bridgeport, Connecticut.

7. Assimilating a "Hostile" Culture.

One of the "Tightest" cultures within the United States is that existing within certain districts of the Ozark and Appalachian Mountains. This culture, existing among the "hillbillies" of these regions has become almost legendary. It is the basis for such comic strips as "Li'l Abner" and "Snuffy Smith".

Many customs of these people are a carryover from Elizabethan times. To preserve them is to enrich our life at the present. But the fact of the intense resistance of these people to the ways of democracy is also notorious. Our indulgence toward their eccentricities does not dispose of the fact that they are highly illiterate in terms of democratic participation, and are a sore spot in our body politic.

I cite this example because it brings out to some extent the necessity for a course of action. Unless we are willing to resign ourselves to the perpetual existence of an ignorant and illiterate group governed by a ruling class of the so-called "superior" elements, we must embark on a program designed to make these peoples active participants in the democratic process.

It is unlikely that such a program of education would succeed except as we start by placing a value on the cultural contributions these people can make now. Such contributions will give them the necessary status and confidence for participation in other phases of our collective life.

It is my belief that the above is true in relation to every other cultural minority.

8. Modification of Cultures

I know of no instance in history where a deliberate attempt to "stamp out" a culture has been successful. It is a truism of anthropology that cultures are changed and modified but never suppressed successfully.

Even peoples in the most subjugated conditions modify the cultures of the people to whom they are subject. An example is the effect of the Negro on the so-called American culture. While the Negro has himself taken on much of the culture of the white man, and the Negro's influence is everywhere evident in American life. It is found in our literature, music, economic, and social structure; even in our speech.

It should be abundantly clear that there is no such thing as a pure American

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culture any more than there is a pure Aryan race. It should be further evident that any attempt to establish either of these concepts is doomed to failure from the beginning.

9. Constitutional Rights

In the absence of concrete evidence that a law is being broken, the question of how far the W.R.A. can go in the denial of the constitutional rights of American citizens (the rights of freedom of speech and religion) must certainly be considered. Probably from a legal point of view, an educational approach is much safer than outright suppression.

-II-

Conclusions Concerning This Problem

Objective - Americanization

On the basis of the above factors it should be abundantly clear that our job with the Japanese is not merely one of furnishing them shelter and food and the opportunities of formal education.

There must be a larger overall objective; namely tying them into our American pattern so that they are a part of it, responsible for it, and loyal to it. In short, we must use every device at our command to establish and maintain the ideals of democracy among them.

Americanization Not An Automatic Process

We cannot assume that mere presence in this country has Americanized these people. Cultural patterns have their roots far back in the life of a people and are too deeply imbedded emotionally to be so easily dissipated.

The fact is, furthermore, that the Issei contacts with American culture have been largely in connection with business matters. Little attempt has been made by them or by us (the larger American community) to accept them socially. Their exposure to American culture has been not only a very partial one; but the exposure has probably been to the cruder aspects of our society.

While the children of these people have attended American schools, we must recognize that the public school is still an imperfect instrument of cultural transmission. Cultural traits are largely transmitted through family relationships. No reputable school official will contend that the school is more than a supplement to the home in this connection.

Also, it is a well-recognized fact that social activities in out-of-school hours do not always emphasize the finer elements in our democracy. It is unfortunate but nevertheless true that the aspects of American culture which most second generation Americans take on out of school and out of the home are both superficial and crude. There is much of the froth such as jazz, movies and the spectacle type of sports. There is little of the type of recreation demanding individual participation, group activity directed towards the development of tolerance, appreciation of different peoples, appreciation

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of our heritage of freedom, and assumption of responsibility. Unfortunately, we are derelict at this point in this Center.

Major Objective Made Specific

But how can this overall objective of tying the Japanese people into our American pattern be achieved? First of all, let us break our overall objective down into more specific ones. These should be:

1. Acceptance of differences, "by us of them", and "by them of us".
2. Understanding and appreciation, "by us of their culture", and "by them of our culture".
3. A type of social life which creates a favorable atmosphere for the growth of democratic thinking and acting.
4. "Thinking through" by the Japanese of the problems facing them as a minority racial group in becoming an accepted part of American life.
5. Facility in use of the techniques of participation in the democratic processes.

-III-
Program

There must, of course, be concrete steps to implement the above objectives.

Let us recognize at the outset that within the organizational framework under which we operate, this program or any other similar program is likely to succeed only if it is called into being by the administration and is actively backed and promoted by the administration. Volunteer programs are even less likely to succeed in a relocation center than in an ordinary community.

The following steps, then, are suggestions for a program to be undertaken by the administration:

1. An active effort to discover and eliminate from this Center any person or group who are engaged in using the Japanese culture to deter the war effort.
2. A program of education for the appointed personnel, directed toward understanding of and appreciation for Japanese people. This might include:
 - A. A brochure or mimeographed material to be distributed to the appointed personnel from time to time. (Much useful material of this nature has already been prepared.)
 - B. Presentation in staff meetings weekly of some phase of Japanese psychology or of some part of their cultural background.

-6-

- C. Regular meetings, perhaps once a month, for all employed personnel along the lines of "B" above.
 - D. A program of social intercourse for Japanese and Caucasian staff such as meals together, parties, discussions, etc.
3. A drive toward greater use of the English language. The slogan might be, "A hundred percent English-speaking community". This would include the following:
- A. Insistence that in all meetings Japanese be translated into English, and the reverse where people are present who speak only Japanese.
 - B. Formal classes in night school expanded if possible beyond the present enrollment, and all classes in night school conducted in English with translation where necessary.
- Formal English classes should involve regular presentations and discussions of problems in the American way of life.
4. Development of a block program of small group activity which would include:
- A. Parties built around participating games for both Issei and Nisei.
 - B. Small groups for the presentation and discussion of problems around the theme, "How can we as a Japanese minority win acceptance in the American Community?"
 - C. Small separate groups for youth of different ages involving play and serious discussions where possible.
- (Note: The lack of facilities for housing such groups in recognized, but it is my belief that the cooperation of people in the blocks could be secured so that barrack homes might serve as meeting places.)
5. The use of dining halls for supervised study centers for high school youth.
6. A definite course (required) for all applicants for indefinite leave. The course would again include a series of presentations and discussions woven around the theme stated above, but pitched at the level of the immediate problems facing relocationees.
7. A summer athletic program for all ages as planned. Baseball and volleyball are excellent activities through which to enlist the interest of older men.

-7-

8. Additional films of a geographical and historical nature. These may be secured through such organizations as the University of Kansas Film Library.
9. Active work in production for the Red Cross within each block. (This will involve a change in policy by the national organization.)
10. Some of the remaining tillable land allocated to families in the center in small parcels for victory gardens.
11. A program -- say once a month -- whereby artists are brought in to give musical and dramatic programs, and prominent speakers are brought in to discuss pertinent problems.

Outstanding people could probably be secured without going out of the state. I believe that various agencies such as the Universities would cooperate. The Evacuee population would support this program financially if this were necessary.

12. A week's festival to be held sometime next summer or fall similar to the St. Paul Festival of Nations.

The theme might be, "Japanese-Americans". The object would be to dramatize in a never-to-be-forgotten way the assimilation of the Japanese into American life. Emphasis would be placed upon the American way of life and upon the contributions that these people have to make, in order that American life may be more attractive.

This might be a project for work through the summer months by the schools. ~~However~~, every person in the Center would be encouraged to participate in the program at some level.

There might be demonstrations such as the recent Arts and Crafts Exhibit and the recent Art Exhibit, plays and pageants, special musical programs, etc.

There might be patriotic mass meetings with public recognition of the men in service, with some anticipation of the problems we shall face in the post-war world.

There could be demonstrations and displays representing the contributions of various old-country groups to American life, and demonstrations and displays of what has been done and can yet be done to make the evacuation program a constructive experience.

The cooperation of groups from over the state might be secured. Persons of the calibre of Marion Anderson and Louis Adamic might be persuaded to come and participate. Other Centers might send contributions consisting of exhibits of various kinds.

Much of the value of such a project would lie in the wide participation

-8-

necessary in its preparation; also, in the fact that everybody in the community would be working together on a single enterprise, each one contributing as he is able.

-IV-

Summary

I believe that it is through some such methods as these, through active participation in community life and cooperation in a common effort that some of the nostalgia of the older folks for the land of their birth is to be at least partially overcome.

To say to people born and reared in a foreign country that they are to divorce themselves from that country is like saying that a person must divorce himself from the air that he breathed the first fifteen or twenty years of his life. To ask them to repudiate their cultural traditions completely is to say to their children that they must be ashamed of the heritage of their birth. I do not believe that American citizenship can be built upon shame.

But to say to the Issei that even though they were born in another country, the country of their adoption values their presence here and wishes them to contribute whatever is best in their past to make a new and more beautiful way of life, is to arouse in them loyalty and devotion for their adopted country. Furthermore, it is to say to their youth, "Do not be ashamed of the accident of your birth; do not be ashamed of the ways of your fathers. There have been and are now men and women of Japanese origin who have contributed much to humanity. You, too, may make your contribution. Preserve these things of beauty and goodness which have been passed down to you by your fathers, and offer them that they may be woven into a new pattern of life which because of similar contributions from many peoples is colorful and exciting and satisfying beyond the dreams even of the founders of this country or of all the peoples from the old world who have helped make it great."

AUGUST 1943

QUARTERLY GRANADA COMMUNITY ANALYSIS REPORT

The Community Analysis Section was set up at Granada on May 20, 1943. The Community Analyst has participated in the work of the Juvenile Delinquency Committee, the Public Affairs Committee. In general he has tried to make his function one of interpretation--interpretation of needs, attitudes, and habits of thought and action of evacuees to appointed staff and to other evacuees, and of appointed staff to evacuees. He has established rapport with several large and important factions among the evacuees, including both issei and nisei, and predominantly masculine and predominantly feminine groups. He has become acquainted with the operation of the machinery of administration and government, has observed the process involved. He has been able to observe a little of the "home life" of the evacuees and of the appointed personnel, and has attended a few of the after-hours functions of the Center.

Language and other cultural differences make probably a great deal of misunderstanding and confusion. While instances of this type occur frequently, yet the spirit of cooperation present, on the part of both the Japanese and the Caucasians in the Center, has been consistently great enough to make possible effective and remarkably successful collaboration in the accomplishment of a difficult task under critical conditions of strain and urgency.

Effective cooperation with the Reports Division, especially the Documentation Section, with the Public Welfare Section, with the Hospital, and with the Employment and Placement Division have been established. A questionnaire on evacuee attitudes toward relocation was carefully formulated, adjusted to supplement a schedule which the Employment Division was ready to launch, circulated, and returns of over 67% secured. About three-fourths of the filled and returned questionnaires have been tabulated, and tabulation of the others is proceeding rapidly and efficiently. They should give rather clear insight into the psychological factors which hinder the relocation program. From the replies already tabulated, and from interviews and other sources of information, it would appear that several basic problems in regard to evacuee attitudes will have to be met in the near future.

Segregation hearings and preparations have taken up a good deal of time and attention. Segregation at Granada is proceeding smoothly and with little or no friction so far. Extensive community studies in preparation for the reception of non-segregates from Tule Lake are being planned and will be executed with all possible speed as soon as tabulation of the replies from the questionnaires is completed. A memorandum on the farm program is in process of preparation.

John A. Rademaker
Community Analyst

1

Student

Re - Resettlement
Female Nisei

Age..18 years

Resettlement: My desire, at the present, is to attend the summer Classes of shorthand and typing at Amache High School. Before I relocate, I want to be prepared for my job. I either want to become a secretary or a stenographer. My intentions are the following:

- a. I want to attend a business college before I undertake any position in the commercial field.
- b. When attending school, I would like to have a job such as a typist so that it won't interfere too much with my studies. This work will also give me good practice.

SEGREGATION: In my opinion, segregation will be confusing and will disturb the residents here, when the government makes its first move. The people who want to go back to Japan will be affected in a big way. The residents here would be affected also for their friends will be leaving, when segregation does occur. Many families will naturally split up...the second generation will remain in camp while the first generation would be segregated. No, I don't think that it would occur for a while.

2

Manager of a Canning Co.

Male Issei

Age: 60 years

Resettlement: It is my desire to resettle. But my poor health and the lack of money are the reasons which keeps me in this center. With the little money I have, I don't want to take the chance. If legal restrictions and Army regulations could be removed, I would return to California and continue working in the Canning Company. During war time it is quite difficult trying to start a new business in a new locality.

SEGREGATION: I am definitely not in favor of segregation. It's an unhuman thing to do. Many families will face unhappiness for when it occurs it would definitely upset their family life. Families should be kept together and not be separated in any way. A family life is the true happiness for most married men. No, I am not expecting such a move for it is quite unreasonable. The most important thing to consider is the breaking up of homes. But if the government puts this into effect what can we do but obey.

I am a citizen of Japan; I cannot become a citizen of the United States. For many years the first generation lived here obeying and staying within the laws of the U.S. government,

living like other Americans, having the things which results to a happy normal life. All of us want to have the families together. Segregation will only break up the family life and will not accomplish much.

3

Housewife and Mother

Female Nisei

Age 26 years.

Resettlement: My husband and my three children would like to live outside if possible. Because of our children I don't want to take the chance of making a livelihood in a new locality unless my husband finds a job which will support all of us so that we may live comfortably. During war time it would be quite difficult for my husband to find a job which will support all of us. We have been trying, ever since we got here, to find a job which is suitable for him.

SEGREGATION: Segregation is all right providing that the right people are segregated. But before this happens each individual should have a hearing. In many cases the young niseis will have to go with their parents to the other camp; they are not the disloyal ones....then what will happen to them? If they are segregated, it will be quite unfair. Then, too, if they remain in camp the family will be separated. During war time I think the family should stick together. I know that I wouldn't want to have my children separated from me.

4

Student

Female Nisei

Age....18 years

Resettlement: I would like very much to settle outside. I realize that this life in here is not the normal life that a girl of high school age should live. I am a nisei---an American---I want to live a life same as any other American does with the same disadvantages and privileges, therefore I should like to resettle on the outside.

Segregation: I do not believe in segregation. Family group is considered most ideal in this country. Breaking and separating families seems to be a thing only Axis countries think of doing.

Laundryman

Re Segregation
Male Nisei

25 years old

Even 10 years before the war broke out between Japan and U.S., San Pedro was looked as dangerous spot because several hundred Japanese fisherman lived there. There, no one was found to be a dangerous person, even after a year and a half of evacuation. Today we are still kept in the camp in helpless condition without any real cause for it. Now our families are threatened to be segregated with the idea that there are disloyal ones in camps. Japanese people are buying Government bonds and stamps to help the U. S. The only reason is racial prejudice. If nisei of German or Italian extraction are evacuated or segregated like we are, there surely is trouble plenty. They are not treated like us because of Caucasian race. Because of this racial difference though President Roosevelt declared that citizenship is not of race, color, or creed as loud as he could, we are threatened to be segregated from our families. If segregation has to be carried out let each individual, as long as we are citizens of the U.S. be fully heard and examined before the hearing board and then act accordingly.

Hardware Storekeeper

Male Issei

Age 65:

Wife: 50

This couple lived in Hawaii many years ago before coming to the mainland. This man is a proprietor of hardware store in Los Angeles. Their oldest son lived with the parents in Los Angeles for 15 years. While in Los Angeles, this boy graduated from High School and then returned to Hawaii. He married and lived there when the war broke out between Japan and the United States. He volunteered as any other American citizen and enlisted in the United States Army, willing to die for the defense of his motherland.

Having received military education, he was one of those combat team which came to the mainland to join with nisei combat team. First he went to Savage. There, for the first time he noticed the difference in idea in regard to loyalty between Hawaii and mainland niseis. After studying it I found that in Hawaii, though first attacked by Japan, niseis are not isolated but treated in equal terms with any other American citizens.

Japanese as a whole, though citizen or non-citizen were trusted and treated equally with any other citizens. Thereby, generally, whole Japanese population in Island are imbued with the spirit of democracy and multiplied in spirit of loyalty and willing to enlist in army. Issei and nisei both equally show their color of loyalty and unified in one spirit. But the Japanese in mainland both issei and nisei are looked upon with suspicion and treated as such by the authorities without any evidence. From racial hatred even the citizenship of nisei are at stake. There are 2 animals, one is treated wisely and other unwisely, the

result is very clear. Such was the conclusion this young man reached after studying the situation.

This was the synopsis of the letter sent to his father from this young Hawaiian soldier of Uncle Sam. Therefore, I believe segregation is the destroyer of sanctity of home and thereby will bring very bad result. Treat a man like Mr. Lindley, this center director, does and peace prevails.

Embroidery Store Properties Male Issei Age 42

In fact there are no one who possesses a dangerous idea. But, upon presumption, there are certain dangerous elements. If they are isolated, it will bring certain uneasiness and ultimately there arises a fear of disperse among families.

Journalist Male Issei Age 60
Wife 57

Apparently an American statesman treated Japanese what they have done to Indians. What we issei could never be loyal citizens because the right of citizenship are denied in the constitution. Yet we have lived so long in the United States and have strong obligation and sentiment of loyalty to the United States equal to any other citizens.

Segregation will destroy family union and bring bad influence. If segregation must take place then only the disloyal or bad elements should be removed.

Taken for granted that there are some disloyal ones in the center what could they do--nothing.

Merchant Female Nisei Age: 37

All things whatever happen on our pathway we must have strong determination to accept them because they are of God. We should not worry about ourselves as we are because everything going on today is work of a satan.

Trade Male Nisei Age: 32

I don't believe it is fair and just to treat those who made themselves known to go back to Japan and those who signed no in No. 28 questionnaire are classed as disloyal. Because where race prejudice prevail and sway the public to believe themselves as doing right and just things we have hardly a possibility and hope of making a living in future in America. Nisei, who signed no in No. 28 and who are treated as children of enemy alien, have done so from the spur of a moment because of unfair treatment and not from correct thinking. Thus I sincerely hope and believe

they should be given a hearing before the Hearing Board before an actual segregation will take place, because fair and just treatment will bring much changes. The segregation will arouse the bad and everlasting feeling and oppression will end in failure. This you may easily take notice in different relocation center. A generous treatment is a key note to bring peace in any center.

Farmer

Male Nisei

Age: 30 yrs.

Before Japan and American war when European war started Japanese issei and nisei living in America stood up as one unit and was ready to fight. Nisei volunteered before any other racial group. But after Japan and American war started nisei soldiers who have attained to sergeant was dropped to a private and were discharged and thrown in with evacuees and treated as alien--4C classification and made them as if they are disloyal elements. Thus this treatment made them sign no to No. 28 of questionnaire and became themselves as man without a country. On the other hand their parents who spent best years of their lives for 30 years were deprived of their livelihood as there is nothing left but to go back to their country of their birth. If the United States guaranteed treated Japanese as the other races within the country accordingly to democracy principle, Japanese will never be disloyal to the United States ever here after. But on account of propaganda of those cheap politician who think of themselves and who arouse the public to gain their own end, what good will come out from this segregation? None other than racial prejudice what necessity could you find to make this segregation a reality?

HOSPITAL.

The first contingent of evacuees helped set up the emergency 20 bed hospital. It was hoped to have the first hospital building ready before September ended. It was not completed, however. The medical staff included, at the end of Sept., a Caucasian doctor serving as director, 4 evacuee doctors, 6 Caucasian registered nurses, and 10 evacuee nurses aides. No deaths occurred prior to Sept 30 and there was only one birth.

Trouble and rumors regarding ~~that~~ hospital were soon present. On Oct. 21, evacuees were criticizing the administration because a woman was rumored to have been denied immediate attention because her first name was not known; there was also a rumor of murder in the hospital area, a rumor with no basis. On Nov. 4, a center resident collapsed, and because there were no telephones in the blocks, there was much delay in getting medical attention. A complaint of this period was that the hospital would not let people sit with dying relatives.

Oct. 27, a Wash. observer reported that Duffy wanted another Caucasian doctor and a public health nurse, and that Lindley wanted a Caucasian hospital manager. Dr. Thompson of the Washington staff felt the latter was unnecessary but was sending another MD without giving Dr. Duffy a chance to interview him.

In January, 1943, there was a flare-up over the hospital due to the criticism of Dr. Thompson, WRA regional medical director. Evacuees thought him unsympathetic toward evacuee desires, ignorant of problems and unwilling to learn. He had ordered a cut in dental clinic space, stoppage of home calls and general curtailment of services.

When the Spanish Consult visited the center in Jan, 1943, of the four of 40 matters cut ~~taxes~~ which evacuees discussed with him, one was to increase the equipment and facilities of the hospital and provide better service for patients; criticism of poor administration of hospital. Patients were dissatisfied, some workers felt mistreated. Odor of sewage disposal plant.

Jan. 5: rumors of evacuee hospital workers strike. Lt. Smith "strike, but no other center job." Evacuees criticized for poor keeping of work hours; they complained that 3 days were deducted for 1 day absence.

Feb. 8: Thompson and the dentists: "general feeling of dissatisfaction prevailing throughout center in re hospital." difficulty in obtaining people to work in hospital. Too many administrators, not enough workers. Want Caucasian nurses exchanged for evacuees. Lindley disapproves of dental clinic moving to smaller quarters and dentist reduction.

Internal Security

Fire units organized early. Very popular job among evacuees looking for center jobs. First fire, Sept. 4, due to flue construction not being fire proofed,

Top Job in IS not filled on Oct. 29; present man described as adequate but no ball of fire.

Welfare:

Oct. 29: " areal bright spot." Ramsland good, 2 trained ev. assistances. Better set up unit than any encountered or heard of elsewhere. Top welfare job not filled. Was handling student relocation and wondering if students should be charged subsistence during vacation return. Also handled all leaves except employment leaves. Leave clearance was rated as fast but sloppy.

NEWSPAPER

lacks confidence of WRA administrators and council; amateur journalists; staff has more freedom than desirable; Issei literary group proposes putting out newspaper in J language. Appointed Personnel demands censorship of articles on his dept.

Morale

Troublemakers:

Nov. 11: individual evacuee entrepreneur, Shusui Matsui, agent of Japanese newspapers, who was trying to promote a banquet for outside officials at evacuee expense. Evacuees and adm. finally squelched him. He is said to have been the "korean" beaten up in the S. Anita riob.

Evacuee chiropractor suspected of being engaged in private enterprise.

Intra-evacuee trouble

Trouble at first center dance 'Assembly Center trouble?

Trouble at football game " " "

Couple of drunk Issei fight

Two young men threaten to assault Blk Mgr, and take away warden's club
(1 got 5 days in jail, other 10 days); no center feeling

11/13/42 Birth in an assembly center "women at pre-natal clinic looked unhappy. In relocation center attitude has changed somewhat--more hopeful about future. Some say jokingly might as well have then now since hospital and doctor bills are cared for, but have misgivings anyway.

Juvenile delinquency: no special board; school attendance officer acts as liaison between parents and police. 1300 youths between 8-17. Fights, petty thefts, gambling, vandalism, party crashing.

The Project Attorney too was anxious to see the charter adopted immediately. He wrote on November 14 that there was some minor lawlessness, such as minor pranks, minor sabotage, petty stealing of articles, such as food and clothing in the center. Matters were allowed to drift with the idea that some solution would be reached later. Danger that offenses would become more flagrant and that both the administration and residents would run head-on into trouble. "If it becomes more serious," he wrote, "and if there should be a 'crack-down', this would naturally cause much dissension," and it would be more difficult then to obtain the necessary cooperation between administration and evacuees. The Project Attorney thought it probable that the evacuees did not realize that the taking and destroying of Government properties is a serious offense and that because of rationing many articles and materials were irreplaceable. He took it up with the Council, and on November 28, he, the Head of Internal Security (Tomlinson), the head of Community Services (Johnson), and Igasaki (an evacuee lawyer on the Attorney's staff, soon to leave for the U. of Colo. Language School) asked the Council to appoint a temporary judicial commission. Five, including Miss Sakamoto, an evacuee lawyer on the Attorney's staff, were appointed. Any offense less than felony was to be handled at the center. It was during this week that the Project Attorney reported on a free-for-all fight at the center. The administration also had much trouble with big-time gambling, during the early period.

a football game, of big-time gambling going on in the center, and of two young men (ages 23, 25) taking away a warden's club and threatening to assault a Block Manager. The center had no judicial commission, no jail, no way of assessing fines. The two young men were taken into the Lamar courts where one man got 10 days, the other 5; the Attorney reported no ill feeling among evacuees over it. Gambling and bringing liquor into the center were recurrent

GAMBLERS: "considerable gambling in early days; profs. apprehended & disposed of."

Nov. 29---professional gamblers in the center

Dec. 30---" " apprehended

Jan. 28---9 gamblers apprehended

Nov. 11---pickpockets, "money-hungry adolescents"

In April, 1944, evacuees recommended to Mrs. Laughlin of War Refugee Board the following suggestions for improving center operation: better selection of site, better water supply, no barb wire, fence or watch towers, participation of members of the resident group in staff meetings, single family tables in the mess halls, subdivision partitions in family rooms, better recreational opportunities, adequate preparation of quarters in advance of induction of residents, etc. Mrs. L gave some excellent suggestions to the evacuees that they should help themselves by exercising more initiative and ingenuity rather than crying for things to be done for them.

Requests to Sp. Consul: wood or linoleum instead of brick floors in living qtrs; increase clothing allowance and salaries

Japanese *way work*
There seems to have been much turnover among the appointed personnel.
On September 30, there were 106 AP; October 23, 110m and in February 173 of whom
17 were temporary. ~~The size of the project staff~~ There was one AP to 41.8 evacuees.
Halliday, a Washington visitor reports, felt it necessary to fill the big jobs with
Caucasians despite the turnover in WRA personnel.

PROMINENT RESIDENTS

Nov. 4--Oldest living Nisei from Pacific Coast. Mrs. H. Arai, 58; never saw J of own age until she was 15. Parents operated 1st J bding hse in S. Francisco from 1860-1906. Married alien, 1905.

~~Nov. 17~~ Rev. Lester Suzuki

Chiyoko Matsuda, singer

Frank M. Yamaguchi, first Nisei employed at Douglas

Chiyoko Sakamoto, one of 2 Nisei women lawyers in US

Rev. Baba, Issei, age 89. Labor contractor, became minister after waging war on gambling dens at Oxnard; oldest living minister of J. anc. in U.S.

T. Shizuoka, Calif's top speaker of Japanese.

Miscellaneous: Social welfare top job not yet filled; handles all leaves except employment leave...Anon. letter to Lindley against AP & evacs...Lv. clearnace, 2000 Christians; 800 Buddhists. fast but sloppy

CASTE LINES:

Teaching staff ordered to cancel a mixed luncheon.. MP Capt. lectures on race

Dec. 5--barb wire between Ad area & rest of center to be removed because of Lindley's request

Rumor (Dec.24) that ad mess halls use food earmarked for evacuees

Lindley to Dewitt In Oct., 1944: ~~considerable gambling in early days. Professionals have been apprehended and disposed of; liquor situation well in hand; no trouble in this respect. Lindley later dispensed with services of Judicial Commission because of hesitation to act, and lack of cooperation. Lindley told evauees in early days that the center was a temporary home and that he would work for them and with them, provided they in turn worked with him. They have worked with him and the center has operated very successfully.~~

Morale

The Project Director told the Washing head of Internal Security (DeWitt) in October, 1944, that in the early days he told the evacuees that the center was a temporary home and that he would work for them and with them, provided they in turn worked with him. He felt that they had worked with him and that the center had operated very successfully.

One evacuee, writing on Oct. 15, 1942, wrote that "most of us are a little disappointed to date re the administrative personnel. We've been here over three weeks and yet no welcome, no effort to build up a sense of community. Perhaps I'm expecting too much and maybe after the Army finally approves of the contractors' job and turns the camp over to the WRA things might begin to happen. ..." He reported that Granada had had a solid week of rain with "ear splitting thunder, eye-filling lightning." The two Arkansas camps, he ~~then~~ said, were thought by evacuees at Granada to have the best physical setting. Recreation, he said was in a ~~zaza~~ sad state, and had no Caucasian director.

Recreation was a sore point for both evacuees and appointed personnel during the early period. The Project Director, in his final report, said that among the first contingent of selected evacuees who came from Merced Center, some were more set on setting up recreation than anything else. Nonetheless, they seem to have had uphill going. On September 17, a crew was reported as setting up benches and tables in the hope of getting one typical recreation hall set up before the week was out and organizing classes to train recreation leaders. They had some playgrounds ready and with youngsters playing on them. A Washington observer reported late in ~~October~~ that Terry, Supt. of Schools, and Johnson, Head of Community Services "have scrapped about the community activities program" with ~~the~~ delay as the result. Terry wanted the program under the schools, and though the schools were set up under Community Services he reported irectly to the Project Director, following a special agreement he and Lindley had since Terry and Johnson who had known each other before WRA did not get along. The Washington observer rated the recreation situation as "very poor" with "no one at Granada to front for recreation." Also two dozen potential leaders were out on the beet harvest. Adult education was handicapped for the same reason as recreation, and no English classes had been established for Issei.

~~Late~~ In November, the Women's Federation was formed; so was the Amache Coordinating Council with representatives from all the important agencies and Police, Social Welfare, Newspaper, and Documentation Sections to suggest plans for better community and better citizens.

Another Wash. observer late in October: recreation "miserable" with no organized activities worht mentioning, no leadership, and a bad need for an activities person; recreation halls used for other purposes since no one to front for recreation--contrast with Rohere is just as marked as it is (in reverse) on community enterprises. First Granada dance, Sat. night, poorly organized. Part of difficulty is Johnson-Terry conflict over jurisdiction

The second draft of the charter followed the plan suggested by Smart and Lindley. It provided for election of a representative from each of the 29 blocks, with a representative from each of the 5 districts to be elected by the group to the executive committee, which would in reality perform all the functions of the council. Lindley would appoint an adv

SCHOOL

2d Quarterly Rept. ending Sept. 30, 1942

With a total of 40 teachers either on the job or awaiting official appointment, the community school system was just getting ready to open at the close of the period. Pending procurement of construction materials for regular school buildings, one entire block was set aside to house the elementary school, the junior h. s., and the senior h. s. Classes were scheduled to start on Oct. 12.

Rating as of Feb. 1: "Severe overcrowding but otherwise very good.

Sept. 12: 16 teachers have arrived. Are meeting Sept. 12 with Dr. Takashi Terami in charge of education work at Merced and committee of 5 evacuees.

Oct. 1942: 200 babies under 1 1/2 years; 500 pre-school children.

Oct. 27 (Marks): Smart lopped off 2 elementary school auditoria in view of leave policy; no adult education yet; schools starting off pretty well. no classes in Eng. yet for foreign born

Oct. 27 (Marks): Schools opened Oct. 12. kindergarten, 77; elementary 650; JHS 408; SHS 500. Half day basis.

Most of the rec halls are being used by schools.

Pioneer:

Jan. 23, 1943: Among the centers, Granada is most advanced in schools. 10% completed; central Utah, not started; ditto Jerome; Minidoka, excav. started; Tule Lake 5% done; Poston, foundations made, Gila not started; Rohwer, construction started; Manz. not started. All evacuee labor except at Granada and Ht. Mt.

Jan-Feb., 1943: "One person had harsh words to say of the school system, esp. of some of the teachers who take a superior attitude toward the evacuees. Good deal of truancy among those of h. s. age. They say it is "waste time" to go to school. HS children seem to lack motivation for learning. This may be related to the breakdown of parental and community sanctions. Parents often do not see their children from dawn to dusk. There is also the attitude of "education for what?"

School
With a total staff of 40 teachers either on the job or awaiting official appointment, the community school system was just getting ready to open at the close of the period. Pending procurement of construction materials for regular school buildings, one entire block was set aside to house the elementary school, the junior high school, and the senior high school. Classes were scheduled to start on October 12.

The 16 teachers who had arrived were scheduled to meet on Sept. 12 with Dr. Takashi ~~Terami~~ Terami and a committee of 5 evacuees.

EDUCATION

50 Caucasian teachers, 4 principals, supt.
Enrollment, April, 1, 1943

Nursery	152
Kinder.	95
Elemen.	681
JHS	433
SHS	550
	<hr/> 1911

200 babies under 1 1/2 yrs. } Oct
500 pre-school children } 1942

RELIGION

2000 Christians
600 Buddhists

Community Enterprises

The Community Enterprises got off to a good start; by late ~~March~~ October, there were two stores, a canteen, and a 5& 10, a 3-chair barber shop, shoe repair unit, etc. Rogers who was to have charge quit, charging misrepresentation on transportati n and furnished apt. By Dec. 31, 1942, there were 7 consumer enterprises; it incresed in both number and business volume, grossing \$64,674.33 for the quarter and as the quarter ended, plans were being made to incorporate it as a cooperative. ~~It was expected that with soap and cigarettes being sold in the corner of the main hall~~ On Jan. 25, 1943, it was incorporated as Amache Consumer's Enterprises, Inc., with \$25,000 capitalization and membership in the National Cooperatives Inc. of Chicago. There were 2,387 members who owned 4,975 shares of stock and the gross monthly sales average was \$40,000. The Board of 9 Directors was elected annually by the stockholders.

Granada

Notes for Final Report

Relationships with "Outside" Towns and State