

REPORT

Chapter XII.

Forms of Collective Behavior

A. The Evacuation as a Collective Movement.

Thomas and Znaniecki have described the stable, well organized and socially solidary society as one in which the rules of the society are commonly understood and there is little deviation from these accepted rules. In such a society, the social values upheld tend to be uniform, but more important, the individual experiences of the members of the society are sufficiently similar to cause the attitudes appearing in a situation to be relatively similar. A disorganized society, then, is one in which the common rules of behavior have loosened, and individuals and groups no longer respond uniformly to common situations. The insight, that an organized human society is possible only because humans are able to learn and hold common rules of conduct, seems basic to the writer for he finds nothing to controvert it in the existing sociological or psychological literature.

A review of the history of evacuee communities since the break-up of their home communities reveals the nature of the disorganization that has been an outstanding characteristic of the new communities. Established routines of living which individuals had followed for years past were disrupted in toto by the crisis of evacuation. The framework of society provided at the outset in the assembly centers and the relocation centers was not even skeletal -- a bare foundation was offered, but no more --, and it was rather the responsibility of the evacuees to recreate a full and organized community life. Even the external conditions and facilities for living were so different and meager that a complete reconstruction of personal habits was required for adaptation to the centers. Perhaps the most fundamentally disorganizing factor was the throwing together in close proximity of several families under conditions which

Forms
of
Collective
Behavior

Collective Behavior

required them to live, roughly speaking, as one large family. Considering the disagreements about rules of conduct which appear in a single family, the problem of creating workable rules of conduct for a combination of several families at once can be seen as enormous. One need not burden the argument to demonstrate how deep seated has been the disorganization affecting the lives of the evacuees. And the main effort of the evacuee communities has been to bring some kind of order out of the disorder, to move from a condition of disorganization to organization, for there is nothing so distressing to human beings as the inability to anticipate and understand the conduct of others.

However, there is a need to conceive of the changes in the relocation centers as more than an effort to move from a condition of disorganization to one of organization. It seems desirable to think of this change as a form of collective behavior, or a collective movement, for there is an underlying unity within the disorganization of the evacuee communities that is not explained by the concept of disorganization itself. That is, the disorganization in the relocation centers is not quite like the disorganization in the slums or other areas of transition where there is heterogeneity of population and the people are not held together by a common set of ideas concerning their collective situation. But in the relocation center, even though disorganization may exist, there is a common bond of feelings and resentments about the forces that brought about their present condition, and a homogeneity of population that gives foundation to this communality of feeling. In fact, one may say that if feelings of dissatisfaction, insecurity, fear, resentment, anger, and new desires, are felt, they are, to a large degree, felt as a group rather than individually. Unlike those conditions of disorganization in which the breakdown of accepted social rules leads only to individual efforts at readjustment which are frequently in conflict with each other, the disorganization in the relocation centers leads to a collective effort to readjust, and even where individual efforts at readjustment dominate, the common background of experience of the evacuees tends to produce a con-

Collective Behavior

vergence of the individually determined interpretations of their situation. It is this collective character of adjustment that makes it desirable to think of the whole evacuation migration as a collective movement.

Several conditions contribute to the collective character of the evacuee communities. In the first place, the evacuation was a discrimination between those who are of Japanese ancestry and those who are not. Hence, the isolation and segregation of the Japanese immediately produced an in-group feeling that clearly distinguished them from those outside the relocation centers. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the Japanese of the Pacific Coast already had an in-group feeling that was intensified by the forced migration. In the second place, the evacuation resulted in a herding together of people who had formerly been scattered over wide areas, and they were placed together in such close proximity as to produce a condition approximating that of a crowd. Moreover, life in the centers calls for a frequent massing together of population because of the limited and centralized facilities -- mass feeding, mass movements on busses and trains, mass meetings, mass entertainment, and mass work --, all of which impress upon the population the collective character of their life. Finally the unique and common experience of the evacuees, of being ousted from their former homes, of undergoing the humiliation of being placed behind barbed-wire fences like criminals, and of suffering the inconveniences of assembly and relocation centers, produces a condition of responsiveness to each other among the evacuees that is highly conducive to collective forms of behavior. Again, certain basic wants of everybody are taken care of by the government. No individual need fear starvation, cold, etc., although the group may.

It is a common observation that people identified as a collectivity tend to be extremely sensitive to each other's behavior. This is true not only in crowds, mobs, and audiences, but also where a collective body has suffered a uniform disturbance even though that collectivity may not be as completely localized as in a crowd. Under such a circumstance, personal adjustment is frequently influenced to a large extent by the conduct and actions of others such that the adjustment of a

Collective Behavior

group may not be understood in terms of individual adjustments alone. The present chapter deals with the collective efforts of the evacuees at Tule Lake to establish new rules of conduct and understanding where none have existed previously, which involves that part of the individual's psychology that is especially responsive and sensitive to collective influences. Defined in this way, the present chapter purports to consider much that has already been discussed in previous chapters, and permits to dwarf the analysis of rumors, fads, and other forms of collective behavior which alone were originally assigned to this part.

Collective Behavior

4.

this part. The intention is, however, to confine the discussion of the broader aspects of collective behavior only to that which will provide an adequate setting for the understanding of the more detailed aspects.

B. Social Unrest in Tule Lake

Blumer speaks of social unrest as the genesis of elementary collective behavior. He declares:

Under what conditions does spontaneous and elementary collective behavior arise? Seemingly, under conditions of unrest or disturbance in the usual forms of living or routines of life. 1.

He further goes on to define social unrest.

When people have impulses, desires, or dispositions which cannot be satisfied by the existing form of living, they are in a state of unrest. Their experience is one of feeling an urge to act but of being balked from doing so; . . . This inner tension, in the absence of regulated means for its release, will express itself usually through random and uncoordinated activity. This is a mark of restlessness. . .

It is only when restlessness is involved in circular reaction, or becomes contagious, that social unrest exists. One may view social unrest as the socialization of restlessness. . . . Its display (the display of individual restlessness) awakens a similar condition of restlessness on the part of others, and there occurs mutual reinforcement of this state as the individuals interact with each other. 2.

One of the dominant characteristics of the people in Tule Lake is their state of unrest, of a dissatisfaction and boredom with their existing mode of life and a desire to do something different. Evidence of this is the unusually great amount of job mobility among the evacuees, a point which is discussed in the chapter, Economic Organization. Not only is there statistical evidence of a high job mobility, but conversations with persons in various positions frequently bring out articulate expressions of dissatisfaction with the present position and a wish to try something different. It may be said that the amount

1. An Outline of the Principles of Sociology, edited by Robert E. Par, page 225.

2. Ibid., page 226.

Collective Behavior

of occupational change is due to the ease with which new jobs may be acquired in the relocation center, and the absence of the worry of unemployment. If the same condition of economic security held in other communities, it may be that there would be an equally rapid turnover of workers. However, the very fact that jobs may be changed causes a restlessness among the workers, and each change of a worker tends to affect his fellow workers with a similar impulse to change.

I get so mad at A. that I feel like quitting. Some day I'm going to do it, too. 1.

Oh, the other kids haven't any training and they don't know what they're doing. And I'm not learning anything either. I feel like quitting. 2.

Expressions like these are so common that one hardly need spend a week at Tule Lake to gather a folio full of them.

School age youths are probably as reflective as anyone of a general state of restlessness, and this seems to be the case with Tule Lake school children. Every child to whom the question, "How do you like the school here?" was put, answered typically, "Aw, it's all right, but it's not like the schools back home." These replies were characteristic during the initial period of public school organization during the months of October and November, but it is said that in the last weeks of the first quarter when class conditions were much improved, that the children responded much more favorably to their school work. One child came out with the blunt statement, "I don't feel like studying hard here. In the schools back home I used to try to beat out the white pupils, but here there's nothing like that to make me study."

In Seattle during the pre-evacuation days when the Japanese of that city were constantly disturbed by the impending possibility of evacuation, an experienced kindergarten teacher at the Japanese Baptist Kindergarten made the

1. Miyamoto Notes, November 23, 1942.

2. Miyamoto Notes, December 3, 1942.

Collective Behavior

6.

observation that the youngsters showed increasing signs of restlessness during those days, and that it was harder to keep them interested in a single activity for any length of time. The nurseries here at Tule Lake have not been comparably organized and it is difficult to make a comparative statement regarding the children attending these schools. However, nursery teachers frequently complain about the difficulty of getting children to maintain order, and even of getting the parents to cooperate. Whatever the causes of restlessness among the nursery children, disorganization and restlessness seems more generally present here than in the kindergartens and nurseries on the outside to which the Japanese have been accustomed.

The most complete evidence on the existence of social unrest in Tule Lake, however, is the various complaints and expressions of dissatisfaction about life in this project, which have been discussed in other chapters. Almost from the first day the canteens were opened there have been numerous complaints about the high prices at the stores and the excessive expenditure of evacuees. By comparison with prices on the outside it seems doubtful that the prices were excessive, but relative to the wages which the evacuees were receiving, it seems not unlikely that the balance of trade between the wholesalers and the community was unfavorable. Complaints against the WRA were even more numerous, outstanding among them being those over the payment of wages, issuance of clothing, and the issuance of partitions and lumber. Equally widespread were the bickerings against the cooks and their manner of cooking, and the resentment against the WRA mess management for their inadequate provision of food. The extent of tension over these issues and of unrest created by them is indicated by the series of eruptions that took place over the theater problem (concerning use of canteen profits), farm and construction crew strikes, and the messhall strike.

7.

The psychological basis of this unrest may perhaps best be understood in the wishes that dominate the thought of the people. W. I. Thomas, in various places, has pointed out the importance of the wish in directing the organization of personality and its action. The wishes of people in the relocation centers is a profitable area of research, especially in the study of personal and collective adjustments, for they point out the goals of satisfaction which the evacuees are seeking and the areas of life to which the evacuees are particularly responsive. Restlessness frequently occurs where wishes are strongly impelled by a need for realization, but the action is obstructed so that immediate satisfaction cannot be had.

A dominant wish of the people of Tule Lake is that the evacuation had never taken place and that they were back in their former homes. One mother relates how her child suddenly burst out crying during the course of an innocuous conversation. After much coaxing, the child revealed that she wished she were back in San Francisco among her old schoolmates and in their former home.¹ One frequently hears nostalgic discussions of the interesting life in the "old home town," coupled with an expression of a wish to return to it; but such wishes take on an urgent quality when they are associated with anxieties about returning to the Pacific Coast after the war. At an Issei meeting, a Nisei apparently representing a group of Issei, arose and asked Mr. Shirrell:

In our block there are many Issei who have been discussing the question of whether or not we shall be able to return to our former homes in the post-war period. I wonder what your personal opinion is? ²

The same question was asked of Walter Tsukamoto at a JACL meeting, to which

1. Miyamoto Notes, November 15, 1942.

2. Miyamoto Document, Issei Meeting, November 5, 1942.

8.

Collective Behavior

Tsukamoto replied with a much more definite air of assurance than did Shirrell to the former questioner, that the evacuees would be able to return to their homes. Discussion of this question is frequent, in particular because of the bearing of the answer upon the formation of plans for the future. A final example of such wishful thinking is the remarks of an Issei who had just returned from a meeting at which Mr. Coverly stressed the desirability of relocation to areas outside the Western Defense Command.

What does he think we are? He must think us fools. He asks us to go out to places we know nothing about -- where we have no idea of the jobs we can get, where we have no way of knowing what attitude the people will have of us -- even if we have to sacrifice to get there. Why should we make sacrifices further? Haven't we made enough sacrifices already? I hear that a sister of Sakamoto's was critically wounded the other day, and her husband killed, by some fanatic (a true statement).

Why should the Government have evacuated us? Imagine people like myself trying to do sabotage. What a fool idea! If we had been permitted to stay where we were, we'd be contributing much more to the United States today than we are now. Even my Caucasian friends thought this a big mistake. At least, if they had permitted the Nisei to remain back there, they could have carried on the business and we'd have some place to go back to in the post-war years. I

The question, "Why should the Government have evacuated us," occurs repeatedly among the evacuees, and it implies a wish that the evacuation had not taken place. Certainly, the quotation given above reveals something more than a rhetorical question; it is framed in a way that strongly suggests a wish that all that had taken place had not occurred.

The formulation of the wish greatly varies, for the wish may be hidden among statements that have nothing to do with desires for the future. But statements that have nothing to do with desires for the future. But statements of the kind seen in their fullest implication reveal the wish that motivates the speaker.

Collective Behavior

Another wish, that is most common among the Nisei though it probably exists in less articulate form among the Issei as well, is the desire to be freed from the restrictions of the relocation center. Many of those who went out to work in the beet fields bluntly declared that their main reason for going was to get outside the relocation center. Mr. Shirrell reports a case of a young man who was given a job in the home of a minister in the Midwest but who quit the position two days after he arrived, declaring, as he left, "I took this job because it was the only way I could get out. That's the only reason I had for taking it." But there are many more who have been unable to get out thus far who express a similar wish, and, in fact, as the remaining ones observe others going out, their desire to be freed of the center becomes even more intense. Persons who are dissatisfied with their present condition in Tule Lake all tend to express the desire to leave in one form or another. In answer to the casual question, "Well, how are you getting along these days?" a girl replied, "Aw, terrible. I feel worse than I did a month ago." This curt and innocent conversation reveals little about the girl's mind in itself, but information from other sources reveals that her unhappy home life has been aggravated by the evacuation and that she has long been wishing to get out to some eastern college though she lacks the means by which to go.

Growing out of the dissatisfactions of their present condition of life is a widely prevalent wish to somehow get back at the keto who were the original cause of their present misery. Examples of this wish have been multiplied endlessly throughout the progress report and it is needless to further elaborate the illustrations. The maliciousness, intractability, distrust and vengeance with which many evacuees regard the Caucasians are all in some way related to the desire to see the fulfillment of this wish. More prevalent among the Nisei is the desire to reply to the many accusations cast at the

Collective Behavior

evacuees by newspapers and magazines. Every article and news item that casts unfair aspersions upon the Japanese arouses a quick interest to see what it is all about, and provokes a desire to reply to the author and annihilate his stupidity. Only the fear of further retaliation restrains most Nisei from sending their replies. Perhaps the most widely publicized news item to cause concern among the Nisei was the letter to The Oregonian from Governor Sprague of Oregon in which he declared in substance, "If the evacuees wish to prove their loyalty, they should go out to the sugar beet fields to alleviate the shortage of manpower." Much cursing occurred among the Nisei against the willful prejudice of the Governor against the Nisei, many expressed a wish that he could somehow be shown the unfairness of the evacuation and the miserableness of life in the centers, and some wrote directly to him in reply.

Among other wishes of importance that may be mentioned are the Nisei's wish that the Issei and Kibei would not be so irrational and distrustful of the Caucasians, the Issei's wish that the Nisei should realize the stupidity of their trust in the Caucasians, the wish to somehow gain control of the administration of the project so that its inefficiency might be removed, and the wish that the war would end quickly and bring to a close this humiliating chapter in their lives. All of these wishes are related to persistent and acute problems in the lives of the evacuees, and all of them are obstructed from realization by the magnitude of the task involved. It may be added that it was at the height of the Issei-Nisei conflict over the theater issue that the respective wishes of the Issei and the Nisei mentioned above appeared most frequently, and as the Issei gradually demonstrated their greater authority a number of leading councilmen quit their posts, and many of them began to speak of leaving the Project. It was also during the series of disturbances of August and September that the major efforts of the Nisei to organize a

Collective Behavior

movement, in part to control the irrational eruptions within the community, appeared. The evidence is that "the wish gave father to the thought," to use a commonplace phrase, and that the thought directed the ongoing action towards its goal of gaining control over the community.

Closely associated with these blocked wishes, however, are the feelings of insecurity that have arisen as a result of the inability to act adequately towards the situation of the relocation center. Feelings of insecurity apparently arise when there are feelings of personal inability to control a problematic situation, either due to external limiting conditions or to personal inadequacy, though it be especially urgent that the situation be controlled. The problems of insecurity have already been discussed in a paper, Prevalent Fears in Tule Lake, where the problems are considered under the following item headings:

A. Fears about the Post-War Future.

1. Financial conditions of the future.
2. Post-war treatment of Japanese.
3. Post-war jobs.

B. Fears Concerning Immediate Needs

1. Possible food shortages.
2. Clothing shortage.
3. Shortage of fuel and inadequacy of winter shelter.
4. Inadequate protection from fire.
5. Inadequate protection from violence.
6. Inadequate protection from animals and bugs.

C. Parental Fears for the Children.

1. Education of the children.
2. Control of manners and language in the center.
3. Control of morals.
4. Control of children's associates.

D. Other Personal Fears.

1. Immobilization within the relocation center.
2. Stagnation, the development of a WPA attitude.
3. Another evacuation out of the Western Defense Command.
4. Strangers and sectionalism.
5. Problems of marriage.
6. Lack of administrative control.

Collective Behavior

This paper, written for administrative purposes, lacks care in its analyses, but most of the prevalent fears of the time when the paper was written were recorded, and some of the concluding remarks seem still pertinent.

The fundamental reason for the widespread anxieties is the newness of life in a relocation center, and the absence of established routines in daily living. With the passage of a year's residence, many of the fears mentioned, such as those of further evacuation or of bugs and animals, will have disappeared. In fact, barring the appearance of severe crises, most of the anxieties may evaporate and be replaced by habitual expectations. For the present, however, it must be recognized that life for the Tule Lake people is filled with incalculable elements simply because they have never experienced a similar situation before.

The fears catalogued are, by no means, all the fears that exist in the community, or will exist. With each change in the condition of livelihood here, new feelings of insecurity may appear, or old fears may fade out. The fears of the people are considerably influenced by changing events, and while one may dominate the people's thoughts at one time, another will dominate later. Thus, no final list of dominant fears among the people in Tule Lake can ever be compiled, and constant check would be required to note the shifting winds of public concern. Some fears, such as the concern about the post-war future, are more important than others in that they are deep-lying disturbances that have great influence in determining present day orientations.

In retrospect, it seems that too much emphasis has been placed upon the development of "habitual expectations" that will erase the insecurity of the present, for the greater emphasis needs to be upon the persistent feelings of insecurity aroused by the uncertainty of the post-war future. Objectively viewed, there is little in the life of the relocation center that should cause anyone deep concern, for it is now seen that there is adequate food, shelter, fuel, clothing, and even enough pay to sustain the families within the center. But the feelings of insecurity are probably much less^{than} these concerning the life at Tule Lake, even when people express extreme disgruntlement with it, but rather are they more concerning the future when it will become necessary to leave the centers and try to adjust to a "hostile" Caucasian world, with only limited funds.

Collective Behavior

These frustrated wishes, feelings of insecurity, and the general condition of disturbance, all of which are individually felt, are important features of the collective life of people in Tule Lake. One senses a general mood of depression among some people that unfits individuals for systematic work and activity. Among others the feelings of frustration are evidenced in the forms of irritation and anger. Among still others the chief expression is that of wandering and transitory interest and activity in one thing after another accompanied by a feeling of inability to concentrate on any one thing for long. At present there is much concern in the community about boys' gangs, and even girls', that may be found wandering about the Project late at night apparently without any definite purpose in their wandering. It is difficult to determine how extensive such gang wandering is though it would be desirable to know, for the phenomenon occurs in most communities and its appearance may not be exceptional here, but if it is beyond the "norm," it is remindful of the abnormal wandering that occurred among youths in Russia during the first years of Bolshevism, in Germany during the chaotic period just prior to the rise of Naziism, and in America during the years of the last depression. The condition here, however, does not show any single dominant characteristic such as that of the inertia of life reported by Lazarsfeld for the town of Marienthal under unemployment. Rather does it seem more characteristic of persons here to shift rapidly from moods of depression to those of anger and hostility, and back again.

The important fact for this chapter is that these moods when expressed by one individual tend to find a natural and sympathetic response in others. To be sure, there are many forms of personal expression that are unique and individual and have little influence on reproducing a similar collective expression, but such dominant wishes, feelings of insecurity, and frustrations

Collective Behavior

as I have mentioned are felt in a more or less degree by everyone in Tule Lake, and they have a contagious character under the intimate interactional life of this closed community. No better illustration of the contagiousness of these feelings can be offered than in the effect of community unrest upon our own research group that was acting as participant observers. Our research group should have been among the least affected of all people in the community by any signs of unrest in others, for our purpose here was defined, we were participating sympathetically but, presumably, objectively, and the very condition of unrest was an object of interest to us. The journals of each investigator, however, will no doubt reveal an increasing personal demoralization from June until the peak of community unrest in September, an increasing difficulty in separating personal emotions from objective research and a consequent inability to maintain an interest in the investigation alone, and occasional expressions of a desire to get away from it all. If it may be said, even Sakoda who was probably the most constant in maintaining the research interest occasionally gave expression to disturbed feelings.

The hypothesis may be offered that the function of collective interaction even under the condition of unrest was to offer a catharsis for the tensions that had accumulated in the Japanese communities since the outbreak of war, to produce random efforts at the solution of their mutual problems, and to organize the collective body by creating certain dominant moods and dispositions that served to unify the orientation of individuals.

C. Factors Affecting Suggestibility and Excitability

Certain conditions affecting collective suggestibility and excitability must be re-emphasized though they have been mentioned on several occasions previously in different connections. Of outstanding importance is the uniformity of critical experiences which all evacuees have undergone. To begin

Collective Behavior

with, there are the basic racial-national differences between the Japanese and all other groups in the United States, the uniform cultural background of the Issei and the similar marginal experiences of all Nisei, and the history of Japanese immigrant life in America punctuated by occasional anti-Japanese agitations, that unifies the background of all members of this group. The experiences undergone on December 7th, during the imposition of Governmental restrictions, during the Tolan Hearings, at the time of evacuation, in the assembly centers, and finally here at Tule Lake, were undoubtedly marked by considerable individual differences and dissimilarities, but equally beyond question are the similarities of their experiences when collectively viewed. This common pre-condition offers a setting for the calling forth of uniform psychological reactions, as of resentment, hostility, anger, anxiety, depression, and excitability, when the latent individual tendencies are stimulated by their expression in others. Another condition that tends to make of the Tule Lake population a unified collective body is the uniform, almost monotonously uniform, life setting of the center and the centralized control under which the whole community is administered. Thus, if food shortage is felt at one point in the community, it is likely to be felt at all other points at the same time; if hot-water boilers break down in one block, they are not unlikely to break down in several other blocks roughly at the same time; if an administrative ruling is felt to be unjust by one individual, it will probably be felt ^{unjust} by everyone else. The uniformity of conditions here described is perhaps too much exaggerated, but the exaggeration serves to highlight a condition that does exist to an important degree, and points to the need to study the relationship of common experiences to collective action.

The studies in the psychology of suggestion emphasize the importance of one condition that is required for the production of this reaction, that the

Collective Behavior

subjects have previously experienced the response called for by the suggesting stimulus. The uniformity of experience of evacuees tend to to call out some uniform responses to the relocation center situation, and the discovery of feelings in others that coincide with one's own, tends to reinforce ones own tendencies. When there exists this community of feeling and thought, there is a tendency to accept uncritically the prevalent views in the collectivity, and it is this which forms the basis of suggestibility among the people of Tule Lake. If the weight of majority opinion takes its toll even among the geniuses, it must bear heavily upon the common people of this community.

Another unusual condition of this community which adds to the uncritical attitude is the relative absence of communication with the outside world. Apart from the brief period of migration during the sugar beet season, there is relatively little movement in and out of the community; the town of Tule Lake is, in fact, a closed community. Newspapers, radio accounts, magazines, and letters afford some understanding of the events of the outer world, but the understanding gained in this way compares poorly with that which is gained through solid experience. Evacuees who had gone out to attend to business matters in their former communities or to work in the sugar beet fields often came back with reports to show that many points of discontent among the people here are unjustified in view of similar conditions of difficulty on the outside. At a time when the evacuees were complaining about the poor quality of meals within the center, beet workers returned to say that the meals here were good by contrast with what the ordinary citizen on the outside could get. Such information, however, has had little influence upon the dominant trends of thought within the community due to the infrequency of such communication and the lack of sympathy among evacuees to any statements contrary to the view that they are being mistreated. The lack of information and experience

to contradict the prevailing views promote the tendency towards uncritical acceptance of the spontaneous reactions within the community. A problem that is raised by this condition of a closed community is: Under the condition of limited external influences upon this community, how does change come about within the community, and how and towards what end does this change get direction?

Apart from the lack of information and experience relative to the outside world, there is no less a lack of information and experience about important areas of life in the relocation center. Shibutani has already discussed in his chapter on "Communicative Institutions" the difficult problems of communication that exist within this community. The Tulean Dispatch, the block managers, the councilmen, the various agencies, and the mass meetings, which are the main channels of communication between the Administration and the people, are inadequate for the people's understanding of much information that affect their lives significantly. On the other hand, because of the insecure position of the evacuees and the integrated and intimate structure of community organization, information received at one point in the community frequently arouses news interest throughout the whole project. Under the circumstances, there is a considerable dependence among evacuees upon informal channels of information, and, in a sense, the individual is confronted with the alternatives of either maintaining a critical attitude and being restrained from direct action by his ignorance, or of accepting informal information and assume the risk of gullibility.

There is a special reason why the need of information is keenly felt among evacuees. In recalling conversations held among people of this community, an unusual amount of it seems to deal with references to future action -- perhaps it should more correctly be said, with reference to future action that would alter the life career of the individual significantly. (This hypothesis

Collective Behavior

could be tested statistically by noting the percentages of conversations, selected at random, dealing with various topics. A technique might perhaps be worked out for measuring news columns for items bearing upon future significant actions. There are obvious problems in the use of such techniques.) The hypothesis is supported by the widespread dissatisfaction with present life conditions, which leads one to the supposition that evacuees would give much thought to possible future action that would relieve the present discontent. Moreover, almost all adult evacuees are profoundly conscious of the crisis that confronts them at the end of the war, and not a little of their thought is given to the preparation for this future. Programs for the distant future are always more difficult to formulate than programs for the present or the immediate future, and their formulation requires much more information and understanding than in the latter cases. Given these anxieties and the keenly felt need to know about the future, it seems likely that the evacuees would feel much dependence upon collective opinions to guide them in the formulation of their personal programs.

Some evidence is offered on this point in the popular forms of questions that arise in conversations. Among them are:

"How soon do you think the war will end?"

"Do you think you'll go to Japan at the end of the war, or will you stay here?"

"What do you think of Chicago as a place to relocate to?"

"Do you think the Nisei will be inducted into the Army? How soon is it likely to occur?"

"What are we going to do if they take our sons into the Army? We're getting too old to make any post-war readjustments!"

"Do you think we'll be able to go back to our old homes at the end of the war?"

19.
"What do you think will be the attitude of Caucasians towards us if we relocate in the Midwest? What will be their attitude at the end of the war?"

"Do you think they'll open up some of the bigger universities? Do you think it would help Bob in the post-war years if he had a college education?"

"Suppose we start a Co-op here, isn't it possible that the wholesalers would refuse to sell to an evacuee-operated store?"

"How much is it going to cost to build the theater? I heard that it couldn't be built for less than \$15,000."

No doubt, some of these questions are typical of all people living under wartime conditions. Others have reference to such a distant future that many persons give up the attempt to seriously think about them. But there is no doubt that the evacuees, living under the strange conditions to which they have been introduced by the mass migration, find many more problems with reference to the future than ordinarily appear; and it is important to see that these problems are confronted collectively. The essential nature of a crisis is that it upsets existing routines, and sets up problems for the individual or group to solve. And unlike some crises, the evacuation crisis is prolonged and has many phases to it -- the initial evacuation, the adjustment to the relocation center, further relocation, and adjustment to the post-war world -- such that the evacuees must be in a constant state of psychological mobility and such that it calls for the utmost foresight and mental awakesness, as when Daniel Boone tracks in "bad Injun country." Unlike the ruggedly individualistic Daniel Boone alone in the wilds, however, the evacuees finding themselves in their own wilderness, seek out each other's intellectual and moral support (not to mention physical support) in trying to solve their problems. The "hunch" is offered that the psychological dependence of evacuees upon each other for intellectual support in solving their problems makes for an increased suggestibility throughout the community.

Collective Behavior

The result of living in a community of this kind is that one soon finds himself in an atmosphere of belief in the collective opinions, and one finds oneself losing the self identity by which he keeps himself once removed from mass opinions. The favorite appeal of the Issei of the community is, "For the sake of the welfare of the community, you should think as we do and do this thing as we do it." Conformity to accepted social rules, acceptance of higher authority, and restraint upon personal independence, are strong characteristics of Japanese culture that are still applied in the Japanese communities of America. Uniformity of behavior is much more definitely condoned than is individuality of behavior, though the uniformity may be bought at the expense of an independence of thought. In time one may become so engulfed by the prevalent collective opinions as to lose perspective of these opinions in terms of the wider world community. To be sure, opinions within the community are not undivided, and the conflicts that have torn the community have existed because there were at least two sides of each issue presented; but even the most vigorous antagonists noticeably tire of constant conflicts and tend to give way to each other.

In a similar way, individual feelings of irritation and excitement, induced by underlying anxieties, fears, frustrations, resentments, and anger, often find a sympathetic response among a larger group of persons. During the farm strikes of August, it was decided by the farm committee mediating the strike to have farm crew meetings at the farm instead of on the project, and this rule was adhered to even if the workers went out to the farm only to hold a meeting. This rule was formulated after the committee experienced one mass meeting on the project, when a few excited extremists created such a tension within the whole group that the mass meeting almost burst out of the control of the committee. It was not alone at the strike, but during the

Collective Behavior

whole period of disturbance that a tone of irritability and excitability existed within the community. This excitement was especially characteristic of the Issei and Kibei, while the Nisei were affected more reflexively than by any spontaneous feelings aroused among themselves. At present no adequate explanation can be offered as to the underlying tension among the Issei and Kibei that caused them to act in this way, and as to the reason for its relative absence among the Nisei.

D. Rumors in Tule Lake.

For the purpose of this paper, rumor shall be characterized as information that may be either true or false that is offered and further communicated without verification among an extensive portion of an interested collective body. Usually the information is of a nature that strikes the imagination of the people who listen to and spread the rumor, and has a special value to them, which accounts for the tendency of rumor to spread rapidly. Because of inadequate verification, rumors tend to be inaccurate information or do not present a complete picture of it. The basic psychological mechanism to promote rumors is suggestibility, and conditions of life that induce suggestibility are also likely to cause the appearance of many rumors. It is perhaps in those circumstances where verified information is lacking, and rapid changes of event do not permit time to verify information, that rumors appear most frequently.

Rumors, so defined, are not readily distinguished from "good stories" except perhaps by the greater rapidity with which rumors are diffused, and even "good stories," when diffused among a large portion of a populace though at its slower rate of spread, are on a similar level with rumors. The only distinction between rumor and gossip is that the latter is some personal information about someone else and affects the individual hearer only to the extent that

Collective Behavior

it may arouse a critical attitude towards others, but a rumor is information that affects the individual listener himself in some direct or indirect manner. These differences, while they do not offer clear-cut distinctions between rumors and other related forms of information, offer a working definition of rumor that may be elaborated and then further analyzed.

An outstanding characteristic of the Tule Lake community during the first six months of its existence has been the frequency with which rumors have appeared among its people. A complete list of all the rumors that have appeared would undoubtedly require several pages for their cataloguing and a volume for their analysis, but here only a sample of the outstanding rumors, stated in their typical forms of expression, is offered. These rumors are classified according to a few major groupings under which all of them seem to fall.

1. Rumors about relocation.

- a. I hear that all the evacuees here at Tule Lake are to be evacuated again, this time to Arkansas. Do you think it's true? (The Arkansas Traveler Rumor)
- b. I hear that Manzanar is just a reception center, and that all Japanese will be evacuated from California soon. The Army wouldn't want us to remain in the Western Defense Command.
- c. The reason the WRA wants to push the relocation program is because they find it costs too much money to run the projects. (Perhaps an inference rather than a rumor.)
- d. The Puyallup Assembly Center is to be relocated in Tule Lake. (Same for Portland, Tanforan, Stockton, etc.)

2. Rumors of food shortage.

- a. This country is running short of rice and we probably won't have any pretty soon. (Women started the practice of drying left-over rice for future use following this rumor.)
- b. The warehouse is completely empty and there's only one day's food left on the project. I heard it from a fellow who works at the warehouse.
- c. We're supposed to get 42¢ worth of food each day per person, but we're getting only 35¢ per day according to a cook I know.

Collective Behavior

- d. I hear the mess crews are going to strike. (Quite some time before the actual strike, when meetings were being held.)
- e. The canteens are running out of canned goods.
- f. Yah! They've put in the Pilcher system. That's why we haven't been getting as much food the last week as we used to. Pilcher is the guy who's at the bottom of it.
- g. The storage plant is running out of meat, and I hear we're not going to get any more for some time.
- h. Today's meat was horse meat. Our chef says he can tell right away because it looks different. I could hardly eat my dinner.
- i. Some people are saying that the horse meat comes from England, and they say it soberly, too.
- j. A lot of cooks are taking stuff home from the messhalls without saying anything to anyone about it. It cuts down on the individual ration.

3. Rumors of other shortages.

- a. I hear we're supposed to get lumber for porches, but I don't see any. When are they going to give us lumber?
- b. I hear there won't be any more soap pretty soon.
- c. What's this story I've been hearing, that we have to pay for all the clothing that's been issued to us by the WRA? Boy, if that's the case, they can have their old junk.

4. Rumors of informers to the F. B. I.

- a. It's said that the fellow who rendered the "ahodarakyo" at the outdoor entertainment has been taken in. Someone "informed" on him. Sure he was taken in. We should get rid of inus who tell on others.
- b. Sure, Kasebuchi is the guy who told about the "ahodarakyo" performance. Someone saw him talking to Jacoby about it right after the performance.
- c. There are a lot of inus among the Nisei.

5. Rumors about Tsukamoto.

- a. Tsukamoto and the JACL crowd down at Walerga pocketed all the Walerga paychecks. That's why we're not getting anything.
- b. Tsukamoto and Iki cleaned up just before evacuation charging the Japanese exorbitant sums because they had the evacuees at their mercy.
- c. I understand Tsukamoto said at the council meeting that it wasn't necessary to consult the Issei concerning the theater question and that the Council should go ahead with its own decision.

24.
Collective Behavior

6. Rumors of radio broadcasts from Japan.

- a. It's said that a lot of people are getting broadcasts from Japan. It wouldn't be any problem to make powerful sets with the equipment here.
- b. The Japanese Government has announced over the radio that it wants the evacuees to stay in the relocation centers.
- c. A Japanese hospital ship has been sunk. It was the Arabia Maru, one of the biggest ships. Must have carried a lot of soldiers. The American planes just bombed it full of holes so it must have gone down in no time. It's said that the Japanese Government announced over a world-wide broadcast that this ship was leaving with the wounded, so everyone knew about it, yet it was bombed and sunk. God, what beasts these Americans are. Worse than the Chinese.

7. Rumors about Japanese language jobs.

- a. Those Japanese sergeants were probably sent out to parade around here in their army uniforms and encourage young fellows to join.
- b. I understand the jobs open at Portland are for spy work.

8. Rumors about the Community Enterprise and Co-op.

- a. The Community Enterprise is wringing people's pockets dry. People are spending more than they earn.
- b. The canteen workers save the good things for themselves and do favors for their friends, but they hardly pay attention to the rest of the customers.

9. Rumors of graft.

- a. Kendall Smith must be taking some cut on the profits of the canteen. Why should the prices be so high if he weren't?
- b. Kendall Smith and Sumio Miyamoto left the Project as soon as the Co-op came in because they were getting away with their graft before the people found out about them.
- c. Pilcher sold meat that was requisitioned to this camp and got his cut that way. That's why sometimes the meat wouldn't come in.
- d. Shirrell must have been in on the graft with Pilcher and Peck. Why should he have got angry, otherwise, when we accused Pilcher of graft.
- e. Sure. All those Caucasians are getting some cut out of this thing. Why should they come up to a place like this if they weren't getting something out of it?

Collective Behavior

10. Rumors about the falsification of news.

- a. The newspapers that are sent here from the outside are all special editions just for Tule Lake.
- b. All the stuff that goes into the Tulean Dispatch is censored. Anything the WRA doesn't want us to know, they cut out.
- c. All the stories about the Americans taking Guadalcanal are so much propaganda to keep up the spirit here. Did you see the pictures in the Examiner of the Marines landing? How could they get the pictures over here so soon?

No claim can be made of completeness in this list of rumors or even of the major headings, and some of those listed perhaps cannot strictly speaking be called rumors. However, this list offers some idea of the kinds of stories that get around in the Tule Lake community, and if some of them were not of great importance to the people here, yet stories like these formed the basis of orientation that prepared people for response to other rumors.

In order to give a more complete account of the mechanism of rumors, three rumors are described in fuller detail.

The Arkansas Traveler Rumor. -- This rumor has probably been the most widespread of all the stories. It originated early in the history of the community, has been repeatedly denied by the Administration, and yet has persisted up to the present.

The first appearance of this rumor is noted early in June, shortly after the arrival of the advance crews from Portland and Puyallup. The story got about that Tule Lake was probably just another intermediate stop-over point before the evacuees were removed further inland. There is no information as to the source of this rumor, but possible reasons for the plausibility of the idea is offered in certain of the background conditions. (a) The Project was then in a very primitive state of preparation and, because of the slowness of the procurement procedure, it may have seemed that little effort was being made by the WRA to make this into a permanent center. (b) The WRA as a government agency did not take control of the relocation centers until the first of July. Manzanar had originally been designed for a reception center, and the rumor was prevalent that it was then still a reception center. (c) The rumor is based on the idea that Tule Lake being in California is probably still too close to the Coast for the Army's comfort. The bombing of Dutch Harbor early in June, the Japanese raid on Neah Bay in Washington, the single plane raid over Oregon and the dropping of incendiary bombs on its forests, and the struggles at Attu and Kiska, were all much in the minds of evacuees. Supporting these sensational news stories were the prevailing Issei opinions of the invincibility of the Japanese Navy, the likelihood of its invasion of the Pacific shores of America, and the general success of the Japanese military forces in the Pacific during the initial period of the war.

Collective Behavior

It seems that the rumor was persistently maintained by the raids in Oregon and at Kiska. No definite correlation of the events and the rumor can be shown, and certainly no causal relation can be said to exist, but after the Oregon raid, some persons remarked that the Army would perhaps see fit to remove the Tule Lake evacuees further inland. The Kiska affair seemed to give many Issei the conviction that the Japanese forces were already practically in the United States.

About August, the rumor developed that the Tule Lake people were to be sent to Arkansas, and later there were declarations that residents here had received letters from their friends in Arkansas to the effect that room was being made for Tule Lake evacuees. The latter rumor seems to have first occurred during the latter part of September. In the meantime, a rumor developed at the public school shortly after its opening, among teachers as well as pupils, that the Tule Lake people were going to Arkansas. The following item appeared in the Tulean Dispatch of September 25, 1942.

SHIRRELL QUENCHES REMOVAL RUMOR

"It's Silly!"

That's how Director Shirrell dismissed the current rumor about the government attempting to move Tule Lake colonists to "some other place."

Tracing down the rumor THE DISPATCH discovered the wild talk having its origin in the school area, where it was argued the fact that the administration is not supplying the school with essential furniture, such as chairs and tables, is because the Tule Lake Colony will be cleared of its population in "about a month."

For some time the argument had prevailed that the reason the Tule Lake evacuees were to be evacuated was that this project was to be turned over to the Army for their use in housing troops. In the latter part of October it was thought that substantiation of this view had been discovered when a large number of crutches were observed being shipped into the warehouses. Don Elbertson later pointed out that what these observers had seen were the folded clothes racks that were to be used by the colonists for drying clothes within their rooms during the cold winter months.

By the end of the year, in December, the force of the rumor had been largely dissipated. There were no longer frequent references to the possibility of further evacuation, and there were no longer any events to indicate its plausibility. But even now one hears on occasion some persons raising the question as to whether or not we might be evacuated again to a point further inland.

Rumor of Denial of Nisei Citizenship.-- On September 26, 1942, the City Council held a special meeting to discuss the theater question, and entered upon a heated discussion over this problem. Just before the adjournment of the meeting, Walter Tsukamoto asked for the floor and, midst a deathly silence, made the following announcement.

At the outdoor forum sometime in July, certain speakers made some fine statements about the need of the Nisei to gain the support of outside groups in proving our Nisei citizenship. They also told us on the basis of various reasons that Congress would not dare to deprive the Nisei of their citizenship. Those were fine words. But I have information here that shows that the House of Representatives has already voted and passed a bill to deprive the Nisei of their citizenship and to intern us for the duration. The information further goes on to say that the Senate Committee is considering the bill and views it favorably. Let me ask you, what are you going to do about this? Are you going to take it sitting down; or are you going to do something about it? 1.-7

7

This sudden onslaught from an unexpected quarter noticeably upset the Council, and though the councilmen were obviously concerned, only a very lame discussion followed Tsukamoto's speech. Talk of the theater issue, which had been uppermost in the councilmen's minds during the early part of the afternoon, disappeared, and the citizenship question became the dominant subject of discussion. It was evident that most of the councilmen regarded the announcement as unbelievable, yet in the absence of contrary information, they were impelled to believe Tsukamoto. Chairman Wakayama wished to know where Tsukamoto had received the information, and Tsukamoto read from the official organ of the American Civil Liberties Union in which the statement appeared.

Throughout Sunday and Monday, September 27 and 28, the rumor originated in the Council spread among both the Issei and the Nisei. Small groups of Nisei in the washrooms, at the messhalls, and in front of the canteens, were observed discussing the question. Invariably, the news was at first received in stunned disbelief, but as the source of the rumor was defined and the story gained currency, there was a general tendency to assume the truth of the information and to try to act upon it.

The group least inclined to believe Tsukamoto's announcement was the faction that distrusted Tsukamoto most and followed the newspapers closely enough to know that nothing about a Nisei citizenship bill had appeared in the daily news. Because of this skepticism, one of this group sent a telegram to San Francisco inquiring into the truth of the statement, and on Monday the report came back from Bessig that the news announced by Tsukamoto had been erroneous. This statement was published in the Tulean Dispatch, and by the end of the week, all concern about the question had disappeared among a bulk of the Nisei.

Over the week end while the rumor was still unconfirmed, however, a considerable atmosphere of tension developed among the Nisei. In the absence of any means of verifying the information, though most Nisei received the news as incredible at first, most of their concern turned to wondering what they might do in this crisis. Some Nisei girls remarked that they were unable to eat because of their mentally upset condition. In brief, it may be said that the rumor had all the effects of a true statement.

footnote?

Collective Behavior

Rumor of the sinking of a Japanese hospital ship.-- This is a rumor that was overheard in the washroom. It is not known how widely the story spread, nor what the source of the story was, but it reveals the credulity of some Issei towards such information. The person revealing the story was an Issei of about fifty years of age who apparently had little formal educational training. The two listeners were of a similar type.

1st speaker: "Did you hear that a Japanese hospital ship was sunk? It was the Arabia Maru."

2nd speaker: "What ship was that? The Arabia Maru? Wasn't that a Nippon Yusen Kaisha ship that used to come to San Francisco? How did it happen?"

1st: "Yah, it's a big ship, and it was loaded down with wounded Japanese soldiers. A good many must have been killed. They say the Japanese Government made a world-wide broadcast before the ship left to announce that it was carrying a lot of wounded soldiers. But the Americans paid no attention to the announcement apparently; their planes bombed it full of holes. There's no question of it; these keto are beasts."

2nd: "Why, they're barbarians, aren't they?"

1st: "Yah, they're worse than the chankoro (Chinks)."

2nd: "They're absolutely unreasonable."

1st: "It's a big ship so it seems there were quite a few on it. There's no doubt all of them must have been killed."

3rd speaker: (interposes from the showerroom) What ship did you say? The Arabia Maru? That's the one that came to Seattle once, isn't it?

1st: Yah, the Arabia Maru used to come to the Pacific Coast. It's a big boat. It must have been made over into a hospital ship.

2nd: Why, they're absolutely unreasonable!

1st: I tell you, they're barbarians!

We may begin our analysis of rumors by first considering the three case examples of rumors. As has been previously remarked, the rumor of a further evacuation to another place has been the most widespread and persistent, and this raises the problem of why this rumor should have been so persistent. It

may be said that the rumor persisted because the occasions for the rumors, such as the lack of equipment, the Japanese raids upon the Pacific Coast, the letters from Arkansas confirming the possibility of transfers, and the observation of crutches being stocked in the warehouses, kept turning up to give new impetus to the story. But such an explanation is clearly inadequate for none of these events taken by themselves need lead to the interpretation that further relocation is in store for the people of Tule Lake. Lack of equipment and the slowness of procurement might well have been interpreted simply as an inability of the WRA to provide adequately under the wartime conditions of procurement; the passing observation of clothes racks being piled into the warehouse need not have led to the assumption that the racks were crutches for soldiers.

Probably, the truth of the matter is that there was no single reason for all the believers of the rumor that inclined them to a susceptibility to the story. Each individual for his own reasons found the rumor plausible, but under the interaction within the community, the collective view developed that the people of Tule Lake might have to evacuate again to another center. The most general thing that can be said of all the people is that they were sufficiently concerned about the problems of further evacuation so that they listened to the story, that is, gave it their attention. Considering the experiences of the evacuees, this concern over further relocation is understandable. Despite their immigrant background, the Japanese of the Pacific Coast have not been characterized by a migratory habit; yet, in the past year they have been required to move at least twice from their homes. The tension created over the first evacuation was probably considerable among many families and one may note the resentment against such forced movements in the oft-repeated phrase, "they forced us out of our homes." Moreover, many persons expressed the feeling that, even in the uncomfortable circumstances of the assembly centers, they became attached to the life there, and it may be that

Collective Behavior

people, especially old people, cannot make frequent transfers of attachment without suffering considerable personal disorganization. But a more important reason for the concern over this rumor is the inability to plan the future, the extent of work to put into the home, the instructions to send to all one's business connections, and the amount of one's stored property to have sent out, without knowing where one's established home is to be. Undoubtedly, a long list of such reasons for concern could be offered, but the general existence of such concern is undeniable.

There were also some rather general reasons for the plausibility of the rumor to those who listened to or believed in it. This rumor had its currency mainly among the Issei, though some Nisei impressed by the talk of the older generation participated in its diffusion. A large number of the Issei have been hitherto convinced that the Japanese military forces would sooner or later attack the Pacific Coast, and on the basis of such an assumption, it seemed clear to them that Tule Lake was too close to the Coast for an internment camp. In other words, it seemed incredible to the Issei evacuees that the Army would permit the continued presence of such a large contingent of Japanese within California when the object of the evacuation was to remove the Japanese from these military areas. It seems not unlikely that in the minds of many Issei, there were vivid images of a large Japanese fleet off the shores of California already to bomb San Francisco. Moreover, the Issei show their distrust of the WRA no better than in their continued disbelief of Mr. Shirrell's repeated denials of the truth of the rumor. Either they were inclined to think that Mr. Shirrell was hiding something from them, or that Mr. Shirrell was ignorant of certain plans being formed by the Army.

The second case example, the rumor about the deprivation of Nisei Citizenship, was no less a rumor though the source of the information was known. The fact that the information was unverified until the story had spread, that

Collective Behavior

it aroused vivid images and caused considerable talk among the Nisei, and that the announcement spread rapidly, all give it the character of a rumor. Of special interest is the manner in which Tsukamoto offered the information, with the dramatic flourish of one who is revealing something that others do not know but would very much like to know. The information serving the basis of a rumor is often conceived to be surrounded by a veil of secrecy, and there is frequently a special pleasure for the person who reveals it to others for the first time. If Tsukamoto fell into error in announcing his story before making further verification of it, it was undoubtedly because he was acting as a newspaperman with a "scoop" would act -- he was anxious to be the first to reveal it to the community. It is of interest to note that the news story that formed the basis of Tsukamoto's announcement appeared in the Pacific Citizen (official JACL organ) before Tsukamoto made his announcement, yet he chose to read from the paper of the American Civil Liberties Union, no doubt because of the esoteric value of this gesture.

It may be doubted whether the story would have held any plausibility for the Nisei in normal times; probably the impulse under peacetime circumstances would have been to check upon the story more carefully first before revealing it to others with any feeling of assurance, even if it had appeared in the ACLU paper. But following evacuation, it seems conceivable that anything may happen to the Nisei and their citizenship. The rate of spread of this rumor was somewhat restrained by the fact that the announcement was made on Saturday afternoon, and it was not until the people returned to work on Monday morning that there was a rapid acceleration in its diffusion.

A second feature which gave plausibility to the story was that Tsukamoto himself made the announcement, and that he read the information from a newspaper. A certain authoritativeness was attached to the information by Tsukamoto's prestige as an informed leader of the Nisei, and there was further

Collective Behavior

support in the fact that the information was at hand in black and white. If there was any skepticism among the listeners, it seems to have appeared only among those who, by their knowledge of political and newspaper practices, doubted the possibility of such a bill advancing to such a point without getting its share of publicity in the California newspapers.

The third case example is offered only to illustrate the gullibility of the Issei in regards to any propaganda favorable to the Japanese point of view. Throughout the conversation of about ten minutes, no question of the source of the information was raised. Since it is unlikely that any American news communique would offer such information, the source of the information, if there was any informed source, must have been a Japanese broadcast received here on a contraband set. It has long been the case with Issei that they lean over backwards in their skepticism of the American press, but that they have the utmost faith in the validity of Japanese news. The attitude is well illustrated in the claims of an Issei newspaperman in Seattle, a Keio University graduate, who declared in the heat of an argument that Japanese news releases could be trusted to the extent of ninety-nine per cent accuracy.

By contrast, the distrust of the Issei of anything American is incredible to the Nisei almost to the point of exasperation. It raises an important question as to the reason for this basic distrust of things American among immigrant Japanese, for most Issei have been in America at least twenty to thirty years which seems long enough for the Japanese to have lost any sense of foreignness about America. In Japan during the Meiji era up to the 1930's, there was a strong wave of Western influence particularly among the cosmopolitan class of people, and the rise of the military class in recent years was, in large part, a revolt of the Japanese against the intrusion of western civilization into Japan and a revival of the most reactionary phases of Japan.

Collective Behavior

Whatever the outcome of the present war between the Allies and Japan, it may be doubted that the rising tide of western civilization in Japan can ever be stemmed, but it seems significant to note the present reaction, or it may better be called the present distrust, of things Western in Japan. The strange fact is that this same distrust of America exists among the immigrant Japanese, and it is this, more than anything else, which makes them susceptible to Japanese propaganda.

What is true of both the immigrant Japanese and the Japanese of Japan in their process of acculturation to the West is that in neither case has the acculturation taken place on the level of interpersonal relations with the people of the West. To be sure, the immigrant Japanese have necessarily had contacts with Caucasian-Americans, but the contacts have been principally in the area of symbiotic relations. Few, if any, among them have had sufficient interpersonal relations with Caucasian-Americans to assimilate not only the external features of American life but also the internal feelings, sentiments, emotions, tastes, beliefs, and mental associations upon which the superstructure of culture is founded. All this raises the theoretical question of the relation between interpersonal contacts and acculturation; in our present paper it raises the problem of the nature of the distrust among Japanese evacuees and the part it plays in their adjustment to the relocation center.

Another feature of interest in the third case example is the apparent interest among the listeners in trying to place the Arabia Maru as something associated with their past experience. By focusing the image of the ship in their minds, and recalling the feelings of pride and satisfaction aroused at the sight of a big Japanese ship, the reaction of the listeners is made the more violent. The strength of the rumor lies not only in the fact that a

Collective Behavior

Japanese hospital ship had been sunk, but even more in the fact that the ship that was sunk is associated with their past experience.

Now, if we consider the list of rumors described above, some of the characteristics of prevalent rumors in Tule Lake may be analyzed. It is clear that the information in the rumors affect the lives of the evacuees rather immediately; the news is of a kind that arouses the concern of the evacuees or outrages their mental state. The extent to which a rumor will spread is determined by the number of persons who will be concerned about the information. Thus, the rumor that the Puyallup Assembly Center people would be relocated to Tule Lake aroused its main interest among the former Puyallup evacuees now residing in Ward 1, although the rumor was of wider concern because of the competition to get one's friends into this center. The rate of spread is determined by the frequency of contacts among people, and the news value of the rumor, that supplies the motive to tell it to others. The conditions of life in the relocation center facilitate both these factors in the rate of spread, for the closeness and intimacy of life results in a large amount of contacts, and the uncertainty of life gives news value to many kinds of information that normally would not arouse interest. Apparently, rumors may appear in the relocation center on almost any topic; but the widespread rumors and the persistent rumors are indices of the major pre-occupations of the people. Among the most important places where rumors are spread are (a) at work, (b) in the washrooms, (c) in the messhalls, and (d) in the laundry and ironing rooms, and (e) in the informal gatherings of neighbors.

Rumor is information, though unreliable information, and serves the same function as any information. It permits the further pursuit of thought from the point at which thought had been interrupted by the lack of information;

Collective Behavior

and hence rumors enter into the plan of action of individuals. The communication involved in rumors is based on suggestibility, that is, a rumor focuses an image in the mind of the listener that may have been only vaguely present previously. The plausibility and acceptability of a rumor rests almost entirely upon the past experience of the individuals who listen to it, and if one consider the assumptions underlying each of the rumors that has appeared in Tule Lake and relate them to the experience of the evacuees, it is easy to see how legitimate were the interpretations that resulted. For example, behind the rumor of a rice shortage was the observed fact that the warehouses were actually getting empty (about the middle of August), that meals were increasingly inadequate, and the known fact that wartime United States was suffering from a food shortage. Given these facts, families began to stock several sacks of rice in their homes and women started to dry left-over rice for the lean seasons. Whether rumors are accepted or denied, the vividly symbolic nature of rumors impresses the mind with certain ideas, and if a rumor is persistently iterated, it may loosen the contrary convictions of even the toughest minds.

We have already mentioned that rumors seem to appear more frequently among the Issei than the Nisei, This is perhaps in part due to the superior training^{of} the Nisei in the scientific attitude and the greater dependence of Issei upon authoritarian control, but more important were the limitations of communication between the Issei and the administration and the general distrust of the Issei for all Caucasians. The unwillingness of Issei to believe Caucasians and anything written in English necessarily limited their source of information and required that they seek other authorities for their knowledge. In large part, rumor served the function of official information for the Issei, and filled in the area of knowledge, for them, that had hitherto

Collective Behavior

been a blank. It might be said that manufactured information was superior, as far as the Issei were concerned, than that which came to them through the American newspapers and the official WRA communications. The Issei "know" that graft exists among the Caucasian administrators, and rumors supply the information to verify their suspicions; the Issei "know" there are informers among the evacuees, and rumors serve to search the latter out.

It is the circumstance in which plans of action must be formed, yet trusted information to aid in formulating the plans are absent, that rumors appear. To put it another way, it may be said that rumors appear where people are preparing for some action, yet where there is insufficient information by which to act. The evacuation crisis and all the consequent upsets in the routines of life laid a fertile foundation for the cultivation of rumors, for it was necessary that evacuees look ahead and plan for the future, but the strangeness of their new situation and the swiftness of change of life conditions prevented the gathering of sufficient "sound" information by which to plan. The WCCA and the WRA contributed to the confusion throughout this period by their lack of clarity concerning policy and procedure. And it was a fruitless effort to attempt to destroy rumors, as the WRA attempted to do, by giving the people the "correct" information ^{after the confusion already existed.} / could sweep away rumors as long as people placed no confidence in the source of the information.

E. Gossip As Informal Control

No effort is here made to define the term "gossip" rigorously. Most generally put, "gossip" is a discussion of personalities. The discussion usually involved a revelation of information about a person or group, that purports to show the inner character of the subject of the discussion; and there is generally a tone of disapproval towards the conduct of the subject. Because of the dangers involved in discussing personalities before strangers, gossip usually takes place among an inner circle of friends who have each other's confidence.

Collective Behavior

There is a place for the consideration of gossip as a form of collective behavior, especially with reference to Tule Lake. Because gossip usually takes place among an intimate group of friends, it may seem that gossip has little influence on collective action. However, gossip, far from being limited in its sphere of influence, may conceivably influence the conduct of a large mass of people. Gossip usually appears where the conventions of a society are being defied by some deviant person, or, more frequently, in those areas of conduct where only vague rules of behavior have been defined and there is a tendency to coerce others to one's own interpretation of conduct. Thus, gossip is influenced by all the collective tendency to select out certain modes of behavior, and, in turn, gossip may influence the collective tendency. Here at Tule Lake, there is a special importance that needs to be attached to gossip as a collective mechanism for the selection of certain rules of conduct. Because the life condition in each block of the project is so similar to that of all others, the problems of social relations within all the blocks tend to be similar. That is, in every block the same problems arise concerning conduct in the washroom, laundry, recreation hall, messhall, and in one's own apartment, and the kind of gossip that goes on in each block concerning these situations has a surprising similarity. Collectively viewed, the gossip in each block may have an enormous significance in determining the rules of conduct in the whole community.

The sociological significance of gossip lies in its coercive power over the conduct of individuals and groups. It seems that no one likes to be talked of disapprovingly by his colleagues, except where an individual holds a deep-seated conviction that his own conduct is right and all others are wrong. In the Tule Lake community, the individual member of a block finds that his block neighbors are his colleagues in many respects, for he is placed on the same

Collective Behavior

level with all others in the use of the block facilities. Hence, he feels himself strongly coerced to abide by the socially approved conduct of the block, not only in the use of the public facilities, but even in his private conduct in so far as the prying eyes of the neighbors may detect flaws of behavior. Most of the following illustrations of the mechanisms of informal control operative in gossip are taken from incidents in Block 5, but it seems not unlikely that similar examples can be found for almost any other block in the project.

Because of the varying habits of cleanliness and carefulness in the use of washrooms among different families, the conduct of different persons in the washroom is one of the favorite topics of gossip on Block 5. One of the major matters of concern to women of the block has been the mode of disposal of sanitary napkins. At first the main outcry was against those who threw their napkins into the toilet and consequently plugged the drain. Gossip had it that the farm women were chiefly responsible, but no one ever proved the truth of this contention. Talk about the need for some control over the situation was intense after the plumber threatened not to make further repairs following the second or third incident. Apparently the gossip was effective within limits for further instances of the error was stopped for a time. No public announcement was made concerning the undesirability of throwing the napkins into the toilet. A rubbish can was later placed in the women's washroom strictly for the disposal of sanitary napkins -- at least, the Issei women's club of the block decided that the can should be used strictly for the single purpose. Here again, no public announcement was made of this decision, nor was any sign posted to indicate the purpose of the rubbish can. It was discovered by some of the older women, however, that the rubbish can was being used for the disposal of garbage as well as for the napkins, and two women delegated themselves to ^{the} task of discovering the culprits. The incident is related in detail by a third woman who received the gossip con-

cerning the problem from one of the self-delegated women.

Mrs. S. told me today about the problem of the disposal can in the women's washroom. The can was to be used only for the disposal of sanitary napkins, but she and Mrs. I. had on frequent occasions found garbage in the can and they decided to find out who was disposing it there. They felt sure that it must be some Nisei girl, but they didn't know who it was, so Mrs. S. hung around there to find out who was responsible. She told me that she saw N. come in this morning with something wrapped in newspaper, so she and Mrs. I. waited until N. had left and went to the can and unwrapped the newspaper to see what it was. It turned out to be garbage. Mrs. S. is a terrible gossip, you know, and she talked quite a bit about it to me, of how thoughtless these Nisei girls are. I thought the proper thing was to tell N. instead of running around unwrapping other people's disposals, so I told N. thinking that would be kinder than to let the women gossip about it. N. said she knew nothing about the rule concerning the disposal of sanitary napkins, and said she was glad I told her. I'm an old woman and I don't think it embarrassed N. for me to tell her. 1

A humorous ending to the whole problem is offered in the sign that has appeared recently in the women's washroom, that says:

DO NOT THROW
UNSANITARY NAPKINS
IN THE TOILET

Whatever were the older women's reasons for not posting signs from the first to control the problem, it seems that the gossip was a no less effective, though a slower, method of control. Had N. failed to conform with the rule laid down by the older women, the gossip undoubtedly would have served as a process of public opinion to arrive at some effective plan of action. It may be added that the male janitors of the blocks are frequently key persons in promoting the concern about sanitary napkins, for they object to the careless habits of some women.

Apart from gossip about unintended errors of conduct, gossip is more frequently directed against those whose conduct is subject to criticism

Collective Behavior

because it is thoughtless and careless.

Lots of times I've gone to take a shower and found the showerroom floor flooded with water because the drain was clogged. It's usually caused by the women washing their hair under the shower. It gets matted over the drain. More than once I've taken a stick to clear away the drain hole, and once when I was doing it, I saw that one of the girls had just got through washing her hair. She just looked at me and didn't even say "thank you" or anything. Some people don't seem to care how dirty the showerroom floor is. I think it's that Mrs. A.'s daughter who causes it to flood most frequently. She's terribly careless. 1

The floor in the showerroom gets terribly dirty. Some women take baths in tubs and then when they're through they just dump the tub of water so that it covers the floor. It's especially bad when the women take tub baths in the first booth next to the doorway. The partition of that booth doesn't quite reach the floor, and when someone tips over a tub, the dirty water just streams out over the floor of the doorway. Once Mrs. S. was in there and she did that, and I was standing on the other side undressing, and the water poured out so much that I almost got all wet. Once the janitor was cursing because someone had let the water run all over the washroom outside. I think it was A.'s daughter. 2

It is generally the case that women complain more often about washroom conduct than do the men, which is perhaps in part due to the greater tendency to gossip among the women, but also because of the greater fastidiousness of taste among women. Gossip seems to arise frequently with reference to matters of taste, propriety, and proper sensitivity to a situation, and this form of discussion probably serves as a kind of clearing house for the standardization of taste and sensitivity. Thoughtlessness is simply a lack of sensitivity about the wants and wishes of others, and gossip often does reveal, in an indirect way, the wants of others, and calls the matter to the attention of people.

No less than washroom conduct, the behavior of persons in the messhall comes in for a large share of discussion among the block people. The dis-

-
1. Miyamoto Notes, December 21, 1942.
 2. Miyamoto Notes, January 8, 1943.

Collective Behavior

cussion of others is usually focused upon those sitting at one's own table who are not members of one's family, for contacts are then intimate enough to reveal minute habits of others and may arouse conflicts over details of behavior.

Mrs. K. looks like a rather dainty girl, but her table manners are surprising. The first thing after she reaches the table, she remains standing and reaches for all the dishes of food. She takes so much for herself and her child that there's usually not enough left for the S's or the M's, and they have to ask the waitress for more. 1

The H's are such big eaters, it's terrible sitting at the same table with them. The other day there were just enough meat balls for each person at the table, but a couple of the H's took two pieces each and there weren't enough for us. The cook said there wasn't any more, and the waitress had to hunt up some meat balls from other tables. Gosh, they eat like pigs. 2

Not only does gossip take place concerning table manners, however, but in the intimacy of the dinner table, people reveal much about themselves that offer sources of gossip about each other.

I don't think T. cares much about her little boy, B. T. just dishes out some things for B., then takes some for herself, and starts eating without paying any further attention to B. B. just nibbles at his food. A mother should make the food interesting to the child, otherwise they'll never eat anything but candy, but T. just doesn't seem to care whether B. eats or not. 3

R. seems very much interested in J. She's always looking over in his direction. I don't see what she sees in him; she's much too nice for J. 4

(One of the dishwashers grabbed a waitress and made out as if he were wrestling with her. Mrs. A. turned to note the commotion, and declared loudly, "A man shouldn't touch a girl. If anything happens, he's to blame." With this joking reprimand, she left the hall, laughing.) I think it was poorer taste for Mrs. A. to say such a thing than for the fellow to wrestle with the waitress. I suppose one might expect such a remark from her; she's been married three times. 5

-
1. Miyamoto Notes, November 13, 1942.
 2. [Miyamoto Notes, September 18, 1942.
 3. Miyamoto Notes, October 17, 1942.
 4. Miyamoto Notes, November 6, 1942.
 5. Miyamoto Notes, December 29, 1942.

482

The gossip that develops among the messhall workers is particularly interesting, for their relation to the people in personal service places the workers at a vantage position in observing all the messhall habits of the diners. One might speak of the talk that goes on among them as occupational gossip, for it is especially where people thoughtlessly impinge on their work routine that gossip develops among them. For example, the waiters and waitresses are agreed that M's table is most careless about leaving food on the plates, which means that the waiters have extra trouble in cleaning the dinner dishes. Mr. S. is always observed taking sugar off the tables as he goes out, and this sort of thing causes a sugar shortage in the kitchen. Mr. and Mrs. I. are the most unreasonable complainants about the service in the messhall, so the workers have decided to give them the worst service. The A. family is always asking for special service, and the cook threatens to "kick them out" if they continue to make special demands. So the talk goes among the messhall workers. In turn, the diners have their opinions of the messhall workers and gossip among themselves concerning the shortcomings of particular workers. Such gossip may serve as the basis of a general protest when difficulties arise between the people and the workers.

Gossip in the blocks is not limited to conduct in the use of public facilities; it may appear wherever people probe into the lives of others or are concerned about the conduct of others. Among the topics of common discussion are: gambling among young boys, the conduct of a girl whose husband is away at the beet fields, the failure of some women to cooperate in the block women's club activities, newcomers and inquiries of their background, the marriage of a girl to a youth whose family is allegedly of the eta caste, the late hours kept by youths, and the poor upbringing of some children. Topics for gossip are endless in numbers, and the talk goes on interminably within the close confines of the project.

Collective Behavior

Certain persons, mainly women, are considered the chief gossipers of the block, and in their presence the practice is to be wary of what one says. Mrs. S. of block 5, for example, is regarded a great gossip. From external appearance, she is rather attractive for an Issei woman and frequently wears a smile that bodes no malice, but it is said that she has an enormous appetite for talk about other people's affairs. Mrs. I. likewise is regarded as one of those who concerns herself much with gossip. One finds her an intelligent woman, rather thin and hysterical in her facial expressions, who spends much of her energy in leading the activities of the women of the block. Both Mrs. S. and Mrs. I. are from the city, and they have delegated themselves the proprietors of moral and proper conduct within the block.

On the other hand, there are certain persons in the block who are the object of much gossip, either because they are deviants from the generally acceptable personalities, or their conduct is such that it frequently irritates the other members of the block. Mrs. A. receives an unusual amount of criticism in the form of gossip because she fails to integrate her personal conduct sufficiently to the needs of others. Mrs. T. is thought a very irresponsible wife, and it is felt that she is chiefly responsible for all the domestic difficulties that appear in the T. family. Mrs. U. gives all the appearance of a person of sub-normal mentality, and her unusual conduct, such as of begging food and money, causes frequent comments among the people of the block.

It is, of course, difficult to determine the motivation that leads a person to gossip or the satisfaction which he gains from the activity. But the function which gossip serves as informal control over people and as a mold in which new rules of conduct are determined is fairly clear.

I don't think it's a good idea for you to help your wife wash clothes. Mrs. I. remarked that she saw you helping with the wash.

Collective Behavior

And you know what a gossip she is. 1

Mother: I don't want you to work in the messhall as a waitress. I overheard Mrs. S. talking about it with another woman today. They were wondering why you had given up office work to take an ordinary job as a waitress. I think it's a disgrace to the family considering your age and qualifications.

Daughter: I tell you I'm quitting the office work because it's too hard on me. And the messhall job gives me much more time. I don't see that it matters what work I do. 2

I don't think the T's should quarrel so openly. Why, everybody in the block is talking about it. I should think they'd try to settle their affairs without letting everyone else know that they're having a fight. 3

Gossip is an especially powerful control when talk about a person gets back to the person talked about, for it then seems to one that everyone knows about his personal shortcoming, or if one feels that the gossip is unjustified, yet there is no court of appeal at which to seek justice. But even when gossip does not reach the subject of discussion, it has a definite influence upon those who carry on the gossip for it calls to attention the thoughts of others concerning certain types of conduct. Gossip is like the formation of public opinion in that open discussion of personal conduct leads to a more generalized understanding of what is acceptable behavior and what is not, but it is unlike public opinion in that gossip does not touch on large issues subject to public control, but rather attempts to control those intimate aspects of conduct that cannot be reached by formal authority.

On the other hand, gossip may also be a disorganizing factor in society insofar as it arouses interpersonal conflicts. If anything, the weakness of the chronic gossip is that he has too much social interest and insufficient personal self-consciousness. Without the latter, the person who gossips may be unrestrained in his disapproval of others, unconscious all the while that he may have shortcomings greater than those he criticizes in others.

1. Miyamoto Notes, July 21, 1942.

2. October 29, 1942.

3. Miyamoto Notes, December 14, 1942.

F. Concluding Remarks

This chapter is more a theoretical discussion of a possible way of looking at the evacuation rather than an account of what has actually taken place. Much of the detail of the chapter such as the significance of social unrest, the development of a social movement to contend with the problem of adjustment to the evacuation, and the presence or absence of morale, have not been considered due to the inadequacy of data at present for such interpretations. Moreover, the study of collective behavior is essentially a way of looking at social change, and it is difficult to see the importance of specific incidents except in a retrospective view, but the time span of the community is yet too brief to give an analytical account of social change in the community. However, it is hoped that the chapter may have served to raise "hunches" that may be more fully considered, and reasons have been offered to show why these "hunches" seem fruitful. The danger of this approach is, of course, that the theory may too much guide the research, and it is probably true that the present chapter has stumbled through all the pitfalls that confront an investigator who approaches his study with a specific theory.

However much we may decry theory, or the false use of it, the crucial theoretical problem in the study of social change raised by Thomas and Znaniecki still remains to be solved. The point emphasized by the authors was that change cannot be explained either as the influence of changing culture upon individuals, or as the influence of changing individuals upon culture. Clearly, not any culture can be imposed upon an individual, for it seems that he exerts a selection among the possibilities; nor do the changes in individual persons lead directly to social change. The important contribution of Thomas and Znaniecki is their insistence that both the subjective factor as well as the collective factor must be taken into account in understanding change. Their view is perhaps weakest where it attempts to show how the interaction

Collective Behavior

of subjective predispositions (attitudes) with objects (values) may bring about social change when new situations call for new definitions. It seems that two alternative theories of change are offered: (a) that change may occur when a crisis confronts a person or group and creates a demand for re-organization, and (b) that where there is a dominance of the wish for new experience, new creations may appear. What is not adequately explained in this interesting view is how and why an individual or a collectivity select out certain ways of behavior from among all the possible ways that may exist. The present discussion is an effort to extend the point of view first indicated¹ by Thomás and Znaniecki.

I assume that all human action is a search for satisfactions, that is, for consummatory responses. As Dewey has pointed out, the ends sought are generally encompassed within larger ends, such that intermediate ends become only the means to other ends. Culture, customs, institutions, social organization, and ways of behavior, may be considered means by which human beings gain satisfaction. To put it another way, forms of behavior are but agencies between predispositions and the consummatory responses. It should be added that the field to which the individual gives attention is determined by his predispositions, which means that the problem of social change ultimately must return to a consideration of the factors shaping predispositions. These assumptions follow from a common-sense examination of human nature and human behavior.

Furthermore, the point that has been emphasized throughout this chapter is that social change cannot be explained strictly by individual changes;

1. The line of thought developed here is that of Dr. Herbert Blumer. Blumer's view follows from a critical examination principally of Sumner, Cooley, Thomas, Dewey, Mead, and Park.

Collective Behavior

social change must rather be understood as a change taking place in a collectivity. To put it in an exaggerated way, when a uniform change takes place in the individual predispositions of members of a collectivity, then a new tendency in collective selections will appear and produce social change; and if we may speak of collective predispositions, it is only because human beings in a collectivity face certain similar situations, and interact with each other to arrive at common understandings of those situations. It seems especially in the crisis situations, when the individual no longer finds his old habits adequate to meet the new problems, that he is most easily influenced by others. Hence, when a crisis confronts a whole collectivity, there is generally a great deal of milling about, suggestibility, excitability, discussion, and sensitivity to other people.

One point of importance that is revealed in the reports from the various relocation centers is that there is a noticeable uniformity in the series of events that have developed in each center. In all cases we find similar complaints about facilities, provisions and pay, disappointment and distrust of the WRA, the hostile attitude towards the keto, the concern about and threats against the "informers," the strikes and slow-downs, the widespread distrust of the JACL, and the WRA concern about so-called "agitators." It is clear that the uniform reactions in the several centers could occur only because of a common collective situation and collective predispositions among all evacuees. It may be asked, for example, why the evacuees in the various centers chose to participate in strikes and slow-downs; they might rather have chosen to cooperate with the WRA until such time as conditions could be improved. The blame for the strikes and slow-downs cannot be directed alone at the "agitators" for there must have existed an underlying collective tendency towards such forms of behavior before the people could be mobilized for

Collective Behavior

mass action. Nor is it sufficient to say that inadequate living facilities, the disorganized state of the WRA administration, the lack of adequate communication to the Issei, and the evacuation itself, were the causal factors in producing these extreme forms of collective behavior. Taken by themselves these factors explain very little as to why the shape of events in the relocation centers took the form it did. The further requirement is to understand how these, and other, conditions were interpreted by the evacuees, and what satisfaction it gave them to strike and "misbehave."

One of the striking phenomenon in Tule Lake is the widespread distrust of the keto that is to be found among the Issei and Kibei, and even among many Nisei. A brief account of what keto means to the Issei and Kibei has already been offered in the chapter, Social Structure of the Community, but the importance of this term in guiding collective action justifies a further elaboration of its meaning as a collective symbolism.

We have previously declared that the term keto signifies all Caucasians, including the WRA personnel, but it is with regard to the latter group that the general attitude towards the keto is best revealed. We also declared that the term keto is derogatory, that it represents a group that is to be distrusted, resented and hated. The interesting fact is that this image of the Caucasian tends to apply to almost everyone of that race regardless of his intentions towards Japanese evacuees. That is, an irrational element enters that is difficult to explain by common-sense analyses, and is extremely difficult to control. In large part the increasing exasperation of WRA administrators with reference to the Issei and Kibei has resulted from their inability to understand the source of the distrust that exists against them. If one considers that the WRA administration, with all its shortcomings, has generally proved itself more friendly towards the evacuees than the majority of Ameri-

Collective Behavior

cans, it would seem that the Issei and Kibei might have taken a somewhat more patient view of the WRA personnel.

An outstanding example of this basic distrust, and the extent to which it is carried, is offered in the difficulties experienced by negotiating committees during strikes in attempting to explain the discussions held with the administration. At the farm strike meeting of August 17, members of the negotiating committee attempted to explain the discussion which they carried on with the administration, and the concessions they had gained, but the general attitude among most persons in the audience seemed to be that the committee had been duped into an agreement by the WRA. Of course, this committee had not been elected by the workers and hence may have lacked authority, but at later meetings of the farm crew, essentially the same committee was elected to bargain with the administration. Likewise, at the construction crew strike meeting, the strike committee explained at great length the negotiations they were carrying on with the administration and urged, at the same time, that the workers return to their places so that needed construction work would not be delayed. However, near the end of the meeting one person in the audience arose and remarked: "You urge us to go back to work, but I don't think most of us want to go back." This declaration was greeted with loud applause, and the strike continued. In both instances, the strike negotiations were successfully terminated as long as no mass gatherings were permitted to discuss the negotiations, but the extreme distrust of the keto shown in the mass meetings indicates the presence of a latent tendency of distrust that is heightened in the collective situation. During these strikes, one frequently heard the remark: "Those fellows on the committee talk big when they get up in front of us, but they probably accept anything the administration says when they're with the keto." Thus, distrust of the keto goes so

Collective Behavior

far that the strikers refuse to accept anything except a complete concession of every demand, and transfer their distrust to the negotiating committee if they fail to gain these concessions.

In the early months of July when the Issei entertainment group was seeking to have a separate department of Issei recreation created, the Issei interpreted Ted Waller's refusal to grant them this request as a fear on Waller's part that he would lose his job because the Nisei and Issei departments would then take care of themselves and no longer require his service. Waller repeatedly pointed out that his only reason for denying the request was his fear that it would look bad in public relations to have a separate Issei department, but among themselves the Issei felt that his motives were personal. Actually, the Issei interpretation was utterly irrational for there was nothing to substantiate their view, but it was impossible to convince them that the facts were otherwise. Likewise, a strong impulse among Issei is to suspect the WRA personnel of graft on the faintest grounds for suspicion, and, indeed, so convinced are the Issei that many of the administrative staff line their personal coffers illegally, that anyone who vigorously supports a contrary view is likely to be suspected of collusion with the grafters. Of course, this view of government workers is not exceptional to the Japanese, and there may, in fact, be some grounds to believe that graft does exist among them, but in the present case the suspicion of graft must be seen as a part of a wider distrust of Caucasians.

When the administration requested the evacuees to enlist in the volunteer coal crews due to the shortage of coal workers last September, the first response of many Issei was that the administration was attempting to save money by using volunteers instead of paid workers. The main argument of the Issei in rejecting the oversea's broadcast, or at least the one which dominated prior to the crystallization of a stubborn resistance against it, was

that the evacuees could not trust the Office of War Information to broadcast all the recordings of statements made by people here. The only ground on which they were willing to concede the broadcast was that the evacuees be permitted to say whatever they want, and that they be allowed to listen to the broadcast themselves. Most recently, the present WRA program of relocation that has been strongly emphasized in several speeches by Dillon Myer, Shirrell, and Coverly, has been variously interpreted by the Issei as an attempt by the keto to get the "Japs" out of California and thus prevent them from returning to their homes, an effort of the WRA to reduce the cost of housing and feeding the evacuees, or to scatter the Japanese and create a pariah class that might be exploited by the Caucasians. Such expressions of distrust of the keto and the WRA can be multiplied endlessly.

A single instance of distrust and suspicion might lead one to think that there was some direct reason for the distrust, but their constant display by the Issei in all their relations with Caucasians suggests the presence of a much more deep-seated and irrational influence causing this distrust. In fact, so profound is this tendency to distrust the keto that anyone who associates with them to any degree is also included among those to be distrusted. We have already seen the difficulties encountered by elected strike committees in attempting to explain their negotiations with the administration, yet these persons on the committees were generally entrusted with the leadership of their group. Nisei workers in the administration offices are generally categorized among the untrustworthy in dealing with any issue between the Caucasians and the evacuees. Among the chief condemnations of Tsukamoto and Iki was the view that they associated themselves too closely with the Caucasian administrators. If one uses a figure of speech to emphasize the character of this disorder, one might say that the majority of Issei show a mild paranoid tendency in their view of the keto. The problem that is established for further consideration is, then, the question, "What is the collective predisposition

Collective Behavior

that is released by the symbolic stimulus, the 'keto'?" To make the question even more incisive, one might further inquire, "Why are the Issei evacuees particularly vicious about biting the hands of their providers, the fairly reasonable-minded WRA? And why, in moments of high tension, do the Issei even think they would prefer the Army to the WRA?" (It may be added that an intelligent councilman with a brilliant record in the University, and a JACL leader, also went so far as to say, "If anyone's going to order me around, I'd rather have the Army tell me than to have the WRA give me the orders.")

So many writers on the Japanese have written of the Japanese concern about "saving face" without carrying their analysis beyond the mere indication of its presence that the phrase has completely lost meaning. Whatever "saving face" may mean, there is certainly something that roughly corresponds to the idea in the habits of the Japanese. The WRA administrators feel they have discovered it in their dealings with the Issei of Tule Lake, and Mr. Shirrell, in attempting to use the Issei's own language (universe of discourse) in explaining his reluctance to terminate Mr. Pilcher, declared, "I would 'lose face' among my own staff if I were to terminate Mr. Pilcher on the recommendation of 9,000 names signed to a petition." Perhaps, he also meant to say that he would "lose face" among the evacuees if he were to concede their petition. Certainly, there is a deep concern among Japanese regarding status, and respectability, and not only is this true of the elite society among Japanese, but it has its less clearly defined counterpart in the lower classes. One might offer the example of a certain Professor as an exaggerated case of such preoccupation.

It is impossible to enter upon a thoroughgoing analysis of the psychology of "face saving" among Japanese, but an indication of the factors involved is offered. A prominent characteristic of Japanese psychology is its acute self-

Collective Behavior

consciousness, that is, a preoccupation with the questions of how to approach and address other individuals properly, how one appears to others, and how to act towards others so that one might not lose self respect. There is far less of this kind of self consciousness among Americans: their tendency is a directness and forthrightness of action that Japanese (of cosmopolitan Japan) find both attractive and yet unrefined. An excellent illustration of this self consciousness lies in the reservedness and self control of the Japanese, at least in the formal situation, for where action is as restrained as it is with them, there must exist a large amount of mental dramatization of that which does not go out in overt action. The strong emphasis on etiquette and social proprieties among the Japanese may be an important factor in producing an acute self-consciousness, for not only must the Japanese know all the proprieties that must be rendered to his equals in a variety of circumstances, but he must distinguish carefully between superiors, equals and inferiors so that proper honorifics may be inserted or left out accordingly. When social relationships are complicated in this way, an extreme self awareness is required if one is not to commit errors of conduct. An interesting ritual practice of the Japanese is their gift exchanges. When women make social calls upon each other, it is not infrequently proper for them to take gifts, and, in turn, the other person must return in equal or better kind later. This familiar practice of the Japanese constantly requires the person to consider the relation of himself to the other, and since this sort of thing may go on endlessly, there is a continuous demand upon the individual to take stock of how others must see him. A thoroughgoing analysis of the basis of the acute self-awareness among Japanese cannot be embarked upon here, yet this brief account perhaps serves to indicate the existence of an extreme self awareness and of the conditions that promote it.

Collective Behavior

Complementing this strong self-consciousness among Japanese is their pre-occupation with status. Status is, of course, a matter of concern in any society, but the achieving and maintenance of high status has a peculiarly compulsive quality among Japanese. Self-consciousness in social relationships is bound to make one concerned with status, but added to this, it seems that the breakdown of the feudal system of Japan during the Meiji era set in operation a powerful interest in status seeking among the lower classes. It was in part as a response to this new cultural drift in Japan that many of the lower classes migrated to America principally with the hope of accumulating sufficient wealth to re-establish themselves in Japan at a higher status than when they left. If there has been a compulsiveness about the Japanese immigrants' efforts to realize economic ambitions -- which is indicated in their exclusion of almost all other interests to economic gains, and their frequently pathetic identification of respectability with the economic independence --, it is perhaps because they have defined the economic channel as the means of gaining higher status and have never redefined their situation otherwise. 1 - 2

Running deeper in the stream of Japanese psychology than this recent exhibition of status seeking, however, are certain characteristic ways of behavior that have resulted from the traditional formalism of social relations among Japanese. The function of formalism in social relationships is to relieve the person of the necessity of revealing his inner character. In fact, the whole emphasis in Japanese social relationships is upon hiding what one is internally, to mask and cloak one's thoughts, feelings, emotions, and desires. Having thus made a mystery of the inner man, yet there is a necessity of proving to others the virtues one possesses, and the Japanese accomplishes this by a calculated revelation of his best points. A familiar ritual among Japanese is for the hostess to invite guests to a "humble" meal in a "humble" home, and then to present the guests with an elaborate dinner and to receive their words of praise. The hostess's purpose in inverting her meaning is to

footnote?

Collective Behavior

demonstrate the virtue of modesty on the one hand, and to perform in a manner not to bring shame on the family on the other. It is when by some inadvertence the inner man, which the Japanese so much troubles himself to mask, is somehow exposed in all its ignoble shortcomings that the need to "save face" appears. The Japanese, then, like the genteel lady who is caught in awkward nakedness, rushes to cover up.

Here are phases so prominent in Japanese psychology that even Baedeker travellers have commented about them, yet about which no adequate analysis seems to exist. We know too little of how formalism in social relationships affects the self of Japanese, for formalism places restrictions upon the natural tendency of the self to seek communication with other selves, and thus strains the personality. There is also the need to know what the Japanese consider shameful, for the reaction of shame occurs when that part of the self which one has striven to keep unexposed has been exposed, and this is the situation in which the need to "save face" occurs. In connection with this, the relationship of status seeking to the Japanese conception of respectability needs much more elaboration than has been possible in the limited space above, for the Japanese pre-occupation with status is somewhat different than the American interest in status seeking. It might be said that among Americans one gains privileges by achieving high status, but among Japanese one gains honor and respectability by achieving high status. In Japan the social practices demand behavior of deference from those of a lower status when one approaches his superior, though this is not true of America, but beyond this, the Japanese is acutely sensitive of others' estimates of his self and he attempts to reinforce and maintain his self-respect by every manner of psychological prop.

We have briefly described the compulsive character of the money-making interest among Japanese immigrants in some of the foregoing pages. A kind of tradition has been evolved about the ambitiousness and industry of Japanese

Collective Behavior

workers, concerning which the Japanese have rightly prided themselves, but it seems that neither money making nor industry were ends in themselves for these immigrants. The Japanese are not a miserly nor even a thrifty people, for when the social occasion demands they spend extravagantly, often beyond their means. The characteristic of their spending habits is a tendency to spend rather sparingly on personal needs but to be almost lavish where social obligations and relationships are involved. Nor does it seem that they get a satisfaction out of work merely for the sake of work. One notes that the Japanese farmers, who established a tradition of diligence, patience and ambitiousness about their work on the outside, have developed a surprising indolence at their work on the Tule Lake farm. The factors contributing to this condition of indolence are so complex that one should fear to offer a simple causal reason for this condition, but to make a bold suggestion, the incentive to work seems to have its source among the Japanese in the improved status and self-respect that is to be gained through work as a means, and there was nothing in the farm work here to add either to status or self-respect. It is the concern about status that is compulsive in the behavior of Issei, and their compulsive interest in money making on the outside grew out of their definition of money as a means to the end of status. Likewise, if the Japanese are diligent, persistent, and ambitious at their work, it is perhaps because these are means by which respectability in society can be gained. To put the matter of status in another way, their persistence in attempting to achieve narrowly defined goals arises out of a need to prove to themselves as well as to others their respectability as fellow members of a society.

The evacuation set numerous barriers to the status seeking ambition of the Japanese evacuees, especially of the Issei. In the first place, it uprooted them from the economic means by which the Issei had hoped to achieve

Collective Behavior

their life ambition of an advanced status. Of course, the loss of economic means is equally a problem of security as well as of status, but it seems that what the Issei demand for their post-war future is not merely enough work to keep their families fed, clothed, and sheltered, but also the respectability which they had previously achieved through their work. Again, if we consider the distinction which the evacuation signified between the Japanese who are rejected and hence are not respected and the Caucasians who are accepted and hence respected, it is understandable what injury the evacuation did to the self conception of Japanese. There would have been no injury to the Japanese pride had they been isolated as enemies of the nation, but no deeper wound could be administered than to be treated as the least members of the nation.

The distrust of the keto is a double-edged sword. If the keto do not trust the Japanese, the keto do not deserve trust from the Japanese. But, also, by their distrust of the keto the Issei show their disdain of the keto's word and action, and in this way the Issei reinforce their injured self-respect. In every way the Issei attempt to demonstrate that they will not truckle to the keto, that we Japanese are as good as they. One suspects that in part the special hatred of the WRA lies in the fact that this agency makes itself out a kind of benevolent provider and teacher to the Japanese. The final injury to Japanese pride is to be provided for, especially by Caucasians, and it is this which is at the bottom of the general attitude among the Japanese that "the WRA owes us a living." Regardless of the amount of work the administrators offer or the concessions they gain for the people, there is little gratitude among them, except when it is a personal favor to a particular evacee. Rather do the Issei view increased pay, clothing allowance, or public assistance grants, and improvements in the community, as the rightful privilege of evacuees.

Collective Behavior

To express gratitude would be to admit the dependence of the Japanese on the Government and to show a sign of weakness in their pride. Nor are the Japanese willing to be taught or led by the WRA. Regardless of the logic of any WRA program, it is the Issei themselves who must pass final judgment upon it if it is to be accepted, and this is true even if a program is inevitable. A familiar scene in block meetings is that of a group of Issei discussing the pros and cons of programs or policies that have been virtually accepted and are inevitable, or even those which are already established, often speaking with an air of wisdom and momentousness as if they were there passing final judgment on the subject. Respectability, among Japanese, is not a matter to be lightly treated, and regardless of the deviousness or the sham of the method by which it is maintained, it must ultimately be given proper support.

Another sore point with the Issei is their loss of control over their personal destinies. The evacuation took away certain rights from the evacuees that had formerly been their "inalienable" privileges, such as, the right of free movement, the right to possess property and control it for personal use, the right to seek work freely, and the choosing their own forms of recreation. Whatever were the limitations placed upon the Japanese by the discriminatory action of Caucasians prior to the outbreak of war with Japan, ^{they} do not compare with the limitations that followed evacuation. One notes a strong tendency among immigrant Japanese to seek out individual ownership of property and of enterprises; a very high percentage of the people seem to have been individual owners and operators of their own farms and shops. Thus it seems that an unusually high value was placed on personal independence, and it was a mark of considerable achievement to them to start at the bottom and rise to positions of economic independence. The removal of control over life destinies was

Collective Behavior

probably equally as harsh a blow to the self respect of Issei as the discrimination against them by the Caucasians.

Defiance of the keto and identification with the fortunes of Japan, which are now prominent characteristics of the Issei, seem to have a definite psychological value to the Issei. Since the Japanese cannot fight the keto, they can at least defy them and prove to the latter that the Japanese are not people to be kicked about. Since the immigrant Japanese cannot war upon the United States, they identify themselves with the ancestral nation which is warring upon the United States. The sentiment of pro-Japanism among the Issei is not new, for we saw it continually in the Japanese communities throughout the past decade of Sino-Japanese wars. What is new is its open avowal before the keto and the defiance with which it is announced. And their defiant proclamation comes under circumstances when the worst retaliatory measures may be taken:

✓ p. 66
The specific manner in which the Issei express their resentment at the loss of self-respect differs. The liberal educated Issei declares, "They the ordinary man says, "They treat us like slaves and animals;" have taken our human rights"; but the trend of feeling and thought among all of them is the same. What they demand is respectability in the eyes of the world. Their opposition to every program initiated by the WRA or by the keto, their calculated rebellion against things American, and their demand for sympathy but not of pity from those outside, are all means by which the Issei reinforce their wounded pride. In fact, it is now not enough that the keto should treat them as equals; what the Issei wish is that the keto should "atama wo sagete kuru" (come with bowed heads, the proper approach among Japanese when making a request or plea to another.)

The foregoing analysis has been treated in a most unscientific spirit. It reveals all the deficiencies of a uni-causal explanation of events. Its generalizations are supported neither by evidence to show the truth of the facts nor by controls to prove that a given factor is more significant than

Collective Behavior

any others in correlation to the events. Perhaps the main shortcoming of this analysis, as a type of analysis, is its failure to also demonstrate how "informers," "agitation," strikes, and mass riots, are related to the collective situation and collective predisposition of the Issei, for in the analysis of all these related forms of collective behavior, which are new to the Japanese and hence must arise from their present situation, a greater rigor-ousness would be required in relating social psychology to collective behavior. The only point in favor of this exposition is the plausibility of the case in view of the Japanese pre-occupation with status and self-respect.

In any analysis of collective behavior in the relocation center, it is necessary to treat Issei and Nisei separately for their differences of background produce different reactions to the same situation. To make the problem even more complicated, there is a need to show how each group influences the other, the place of the Kibei within this structure, and the individual variations in each group. Obviously, such a thoroughgoing analysis requires a considerable fund of information, much more than is available at the present writing.