

ds

ARBITRATION COMMITTEE

The way in which the arbitration committee dealt with the boilermen dispute is certainly interesting. In the first place, the block managers were first called in for consultation by the administration and they in turn decided to consult the block delegates before asking the boilermen to go back to work. These block delegates had been selected to write up, and have the people approve, a community council charter to establish self-government within the project. Actually, the delegates had no power to act in behalf of the people, or were they in an official capacity which gave them a right to arbitrate a labor problem of this nature. They ignored completely the Fair Labor Board, ~~under~~ under which such a problem should have been arbitrated. The block delegates were consulted by the block managers as to the wisdom of having the boilermen go back to work on the old terms because the demand for extra workers was not met by the administration. Some block delegates--notably Yoshito Fujii--felt that the administration was not sincere in refusing additional workers on the ground that the labor quota sent from Washington could not be exceeded. The block delegates felt that there were still possibilities of achieving better results by further bargaining. Consequently, they took over the problem from the block managers, and formed a committee from among their own members to handle the dispute.

The committee decided to wait until Mr. Stafford returned

before starting discussions with the administration, since Davidson, Acting Project Director, had failed to meet the demands of the boilermen. The committee decided that at least an increase of one worker per block should be requested (J 1/7/44 #14). The committee also wrote a memo to Mr. Stafford stating the functions of the committee. Although the members of the committee were block delegates, they chose to take the role of an "arbitrator". (J 1/7/44 #15).

On January 7, the first meeting was held with Mr. Stafford as soon as he had returned to the project. The committee asked for a continuation of the former schedule and the addition of one extra worker per block. The justification for this demand rested on the fact that the janitors were over-worked. On the memo, it was stated that the project residents were in sympathy with the workers because of:

1. Overwork for the janitors
2. Excessive call for voluntary work
3. Unreasonable cut of employment by the project

The people's basic dissatisfactions, however, were not incorporated into the justifications. Also, Green's arrogant attitude, which constituted the major weakness of the administration, was not mentioned at all.

Stafford took the stand that he could not exceed the budget set by Washington, and that he wanted to know how much work the

janitors were willing to do.

The committee insisted that it was possible for the project director to make adjustments concerning the budget here on the project. Stafford replied that he could not exceed the budget in this case without getting Washington's approval. When the committee asked whether Washington would grant a request for an increase of 35 workers, Stafford stated that he would be willing to transfer their request verbatim. This was decided upon.

The committee also asked Stafford to send a memo to the boilermen to ask them to come back to work. Stafford's stand was: "I didn't ask them to quit work, why should I ask them to come back." In turn, he asked the committee to transmit his memo to the boilermen, asking them what sort of services they were willing to provide. The committee even though it was an arbitration committee, refused to comply until they received a reply from Washington.

The committee met the following day. Doi, a member from the east end of the project, reported that there was water shortage in his section and that if this continued, conflicts would arise within the project. He advised the sacrificing of "face" (whose face?) for the sake of unity. He also reported that he had told a few blocks that water could be conserved by building fires in the block stoves and turning off the running taps. The committee decided that it was best to have fires in the block stoves "to avoid disunity and suffering".

The committee feared that the janitors might not approve of their decision. Representatives of the janitors were consulted, their approval gained, before it was finally decided that fires would be built in the laundry room and latrines.

There was some hope on the part of the arbitration committee that Washington would consent to the increase of workers which they demanded. There was fear, however, that if the demands were not met, internal conflicts would develop among block residents. On the evening January, Myer sent a reply to the project stating that 164 persons for janitorial services were more than sufficient. It also stated that the adjustment of the situation would have to be made on the project on the basis of 44 hours of work per week. The committee accepted the refusal for an increase of workers and chose not to bargain for an adjustment here on the project, which was still possible on the basis of the answer from Washington.

The committee was desirous of arriving at a solution of the dispute as soon as possible in order to avoid "internal conflict". It took up Mr. Stafford's memo of January 7 and made the following request to Stafford:

1. Formal withdrawal of 24-hour service
2. Workers return to work on the "old schedule"
3. All original workers to be returned
4. No discrimination after return
5. Change of schedule to reduce the work week from 48 to 44 hours.

The committee felt that this request would be satisfactory to the administration as well as the boilermen.

There was some fear that the boilermen might not go back to work. The latter wanted it to be made clear that they were not responsible for the block stoves. The committee made an attempt to get Stafford to state in writing that the janitors were not responsible for frozen pipes and fire hazards but failed. The boilermen, however, could not see any reason for not going back to work on the old schedule, and they accepted the administration's offer. The walkout was ended.

As soon as the boilermen went back to work on the 10th, the arbitration committee had the problem of negotiating for tenders for the block stoves on their hands. Fujii, the chairman, argued that this was a problem of "safe-guarding of government property" since it involved toilet facilities and water pipes. He seems to have forgotten that the problem of the boilermen and that of the block stoves were separated for convenience of arriving at a solution for both problems, and that the boilermen were to return to work pending further adjustment. Arguing that the safeguarding of government property was rightfully the function of the block managers, the arbitration committee decided to turn the problem over to them and washed their hands of the matter entirely. On second thought, after writing a memo, the committee decided not to send it, and the problem was merely ignored.

The arbitration committee made no formal report to the people of the results of the proceedings either through verbal or written reports. Attention instead was shifted to the coming election of councilmen.

Summing up the points of interest of the arbitration committee, we have the following:

1. How it took over the problems from the block managers.
2. The stand it took as an arbitration, rather than a negotiation, committee.
3. Its poor demands submitted to the administration.
4. Requesting boilermen to go back to work pending solution of the dispute.
5. Refusal to transmit Stafford's message.
6. Its fear of resentment on the part of block resident because of water shortage.
7. Its giving in to administrative demands.
8. Its attitude toward the boilermen.
9. Its memo to the problem of the block stoves over to the block managers.

Before commenting on the action of the arbitration committee, the brief history of the block delegates will be reviewed. The block delegates were elected, one from each block, (late last year?) to help organize a community council. On December 28, the charter was ratified by the people. An election

committee had been selected, and no duties remained for the block delegates to carry out. However, some of them were called in for consultation on the boilermen dispute prior to the walk-out. When the walkout actually took place the administration called in the block managers to act as arbitrators in its dealing with the boilermen. The block managers in turn consulted the block delegates before asking the boilermen to go back to work on the old schedule pending Stafford's return to the project. It was at this time that the block delegates took over the task of the arbitrator from the block managers.

Some interesting comments can be made about the way in which the block delegates took over the problem from the block managers. First, it should be remembered that the block managers constitute the "old leadership" in power since the beginning of the Minidoka Project. Generally speaking, their power and prestige were maintained by upholding administrative orders and enforcing them without too much questioning. The block delegates, in favor of self-govern~~ment~~, constitute <sup>the</sup> "new leadership", which would gain more power than the block managers with the formation of the community council. Whereas the block managers were appointed by the administration, the block delegates were elected by block residents. The latter, therefore, represented the people more than did the block managers. The rivalry between the two leaderships was indicated at the time the people turned down the community council charter the first time it was presented, at which time the block managers, as well as the ad-

ministration, discouraged the establishment of an elected council. The act of the block delegates in "taking away" the boilermen dispute from the block managers might be interpreted as another tussle in that rivalry. It might also indicate to some extent the growing strength of the new leadership over the old. This is somewhat indicated by the fear on the part of several block managers during the boilermen dispute that they might be beaten up.

The block managers demanded an increase of workers, but were soon willing to accede to the administration's proposal that they ask the boilermen to go back to work on the old schedule. The block delegates took over the problem on the charge that the administration was not sincere in its refusal for additional workers. Here, the block managers were indirectly accused of giving in too easily to the administration, a charge hinting that the block managers were stooges of the administration, while they, the block delegates, represented the people. The block delegates can be said to have taken advantage of the antagonism existing among the people against "cooperation" with the administration on the part of leaders.

In reality, however, the arbitration committee selected by the block delegates, was not greatly different from the block managers. Except for the initial insistence upon further negotiations, the claim of the committee that they represented the residents was largely an empty one. The arbitration committee also repeated a pattern of behavior for which leaders in

Minidoka have been accused. They undertook the settlement of a dispute which might as well have been left to the administration, the boilermen, and the block managers. They undertook a task which was not within their function and which was already being handled by another body which had been asked to handle the matter and which had greater jurisdiction over it. The repeated behavior pattern in this case is the excessive extension and display of authority. This has been observed generally throughout the project in various departments and has been a major source of friction. This has been observed to exist to an extraordinary degree in the Housing Division, which employed Yoshito Fujii, chairman and ruling figure of the arbitration committee. It is certainly not an accident that this pattern of behavior is repeated at this point. In the criticism of a Tulean in view of the stand taken by the committee, it undertook an unnecessary task (iran sewa o yoita).

The committee, claiming that it was a representative of the people, chose the role of an arbitrator. In other words, it used its "representativeness" as an excuse for protruding itself upon the scene, and thereupon proceeded to set itself up as an arbitrator of a dispute in which they were a third party. When the committee set itself up as an arbitration committee and denied that it was ~~not~~ a negotiation committee, it ceased to look upon the dispute as a struggle between the people and the administration. The people lost the struggle in the very beginning because the leaders did not champion their cause.

In calling itself an arbitration committee, the block delegates again revealed the behavior pattern already mentioned. It set itself up as a third party above the people and the boilermen. It chose for itself a role of the superior man--the judge, the community leader, the wise man. The acceptance of this role is especially interesting in light of the speed with which the stove problem--the basic issue in the boilermen dispute--was thrown on the lap of the rival block managers. The memo, however, was not sent. At the time they accepted the role of arbitrators there was hope among evacuees that for once they would win a victory over the administration. Davidson seemed to be at a loss to know what to do, and showed signs of weakness. Anyone who won this battle for extra workers would be hailed by the people as a leader. It is difficult to deny that this possibility of victory and consequent glory did not motivate some of the block delegates to undertake the task of settling the dispute. When they ended up with a dispute (stove problem) which they knew they could not win for the people, they quickly dropped it. This situation can be looked upon as an experimental situation where both the presence and absence of a factor is tested, although the experiment is a very crude one.

In setting itself up as an arbitration committee, the committee "straddled a fence", rather than side with the administration or identify itself with the anti-administration movement. The reasons for leaders taking such a position, of

course, are not difficult to fathom. They could not have sided with the administration without incurring the wrath of the majority of the population. Neither could they have gained an advantage over the block managers by giving in to the administration immediately. On the other hand, they could not have championed the cause of the people--a strike--without being looked upon by the administration as "agitators". This is exceedingly plausible when it is considered that the people have lived in fear for many months of being "reported" to the administration for being anti-administration or pro-Japanese. It would have been difficult also because the dispute on the surface was a boilermen's dispute, and outsiders who intruded upon the scene would have been accused immediately of being "agitators". Under the circumstances, the only role that could have been safely taken was that of arbitrator. And the block delegates were not anxious to take a risk.

It should also be noted that here in Minidoka, unlike in Tule Lake, it was possible for leaders to take a role other than that of champion of the people. In Tule Lake a pattern had been set whereby the leaders always negotiated for the people and on important matters referred the final decision to the people. Here in Minidoka this pattern has not developed as yet, and instead, there developed a leadership which did not respond readily to the voice of the people. Consequently, the role of arbitrator was the more "normal" and expected role of the evacuee leader.

If the leaders had accepted the role of the negotiator and encouraged the spread of the strike, they would have been playing a role which was not practised in the project.

Having accepted the role of arbitrator, the committee was faced with the predicament possibly faced by all leaders on the project. On the one hand, they faced the administrative staff, which had power to make the major decisions within the project. Even if the administration understood the feelings and attitudes of the people well, the task of the leader would not have been simple because of necessary restrictions imposed upon the evacuees by circumstances beyond the control of the project administrative. On top of this, however, there existed the further difficulty of a wide difference in viewing the same problem or situation. To give one example, administrative officials generally viewed orders issued from Washington as being final. Many evacuees, however, felt that the same orders should be modified in the light of local project conditions, taking into consideration, especially, the needs of the evacuee residents. Evacuees who did not fall into line with the views of the administration were likely to be considered uncooperative and even dangerous. Since the leaders derived their position of leadership by being in good graces with the administration, they stood the chance, not only of losing their status on the project if they opposed the administration, but even of being "placed on the black list" on the charge of being "dangerous".

To the leaders, therefore, the the administrative officials were people with power whose wrath they feared.

If the leaders could side with the administration and carry out its wishes, even though they did not agree with their merits, their task would not be difficult. But such a stand would inevitably bring them in direct clash with the desires of the evacuee residents and would incur their resentment. This was evident in the case of the block managers. Unless the leaders championed the cause of the people they were likely to be considered stooges of the administration. Their very contact with Caucasians in some instances would arouse resentment on the part of the people. Any attitude of superiority over the rest of the people would only add to the existing resentments. Since these leaders had to live in blocks in close contact with the other residents, any resentment of this sort was to be feared. Since their power and status to some extent depended upon their popularity with the residents and the amount of respect the residents had for them, they could not ignore the attitude of the people toward them if they wanted to continue in leadership positions.

That the arbitration committee faced this sort of dilemma is quite evident. On the one hand, it made the charge that the administration was insincere in refusing extra workers and to Stafford it stated that it had "every confidence in the administration". It refused to act as a negotiation committee and did nothing to encourage a general work stoppage, but at the same

time it made demands for extra workers and refused to transmit Stafford's first message to the boilermen until it heard from Myer. When Washington turned down its demand for extra workers, and when residents showed signs of dissatisfaction with the lack of hot water and water shortage, it quickly acceded to administrative demands. When the committee was faced with the stove problem on their hands which the people wanted to have solved, it decided to drop it on the lap of the block managers without battling the matter out for the people.

The committee made a demand for extra workers. This can be interpreted as an act in which the committee championed the cause of the people and showed that it did not feel that the administration was sincere in refusing an increase of workers. Where the boilermen asked for two extra workers per block, the committee offered the suggestion for a return to the old schedule and the increase of one worker per block. Stafford refused any increase of workers, and the committee decided to appeal to Washington. In other words, the committee was not satisfied with the answer of the highest authority on the project, and took the matter up with the final authority. This was a repetition of the pattern of behavior observed in previous negotiations. When satisfaction could not be obtained from Green, the supervisor of the maintenance workers, the matter was taken up directly with Stafford. Again when Davidson did not give in to demands of the boilermen, the matter was taken up to Stafford.

The same behavior is observed on the part of the aggressive individual who, when told by the secretary that, for instance, a pass to go to Twin Falls cannot be issued, he demands that he be allowed to see her boss. If the man in charge still refuses him a pass, he is likely to look up some higher official, who sometimes grants a pass which is refused by his subordinate. Since the possibility that the higher authority will grant a privilege or request which a lesser one refuses, it is not strange that matters that could be settled on the project are taken up with Washington. In this boilermen dispute this appeal to Washington was to be expected because the project director maintained that only Washington had the power to change the labor quota that had been decided upon.

One of the interesting points of the demands sent to Washington was the ineffective wording. Nothing in the demands made the increase of workers seem imperative. While the dissatisfaction of the people with excessive call for voluntary work and with the sudden employment cut was mentioned in the message, it was not pointed out why this necessitated an increase of workers. It was not pointed out, as it might have been, that the boilermen dispute was only an indication of the basic dissatisfaction felt by the people against the administration. The fact that Green had been the cause of the dispute was not mentioned. No threat was made that if the people did

not have hot water, many of the workers would refuse to go to work. It was not pointed out that the boilermen could not go back to work without making arrangements for the block stoves, which would require extra workers even if the rest went back to work on the old schedule. Instead, the only appeal made was that the janitors were being overworked. This sort of approach to a dispute was noticed among the residents, too. Instead of backing up demands with any kind of threat, they preferred to appeal to the sense of pity and justice of the authorities. This weak attitude on the part of both the leaders and the people seems to be characteristic of Minidoka, except for some "rowdyism" displayed by the more "radical" element of the population. The accusations of Tuleans against Minidokans that they "lack guts", that they are always giving in to the administration, and that they are afraid to talk back to Caucasians seem to indicate the behavior pattern in question. In this regard, if the people in Tule Lake before segregation are to be compared with the people in Minidoka the former can be said to have presented a much stiffer attitude toward the administration than the latter.

Assuming that this submissive sort of attitude is characteristic of a large number of people in Minidoka, the question remains as to how it was that this was brought about. This submissive attitude characterized most of the Japanese, both Isseis and Niseis, during the period between the bombing of Pearl Harbor and evacuation. The Japanese during this period

were seized with the fear that they would be picked up by the FBI for being un-American. In the assembly center, the Nisei were given the privilege of helping to administer the camps, while the Isseis remained in the background, still afraid to protest against the administration. The question is, why was it that in Tule Lake that the people, especially the Issei, set the pattern of opposing the administration at every turn, and here at Minidoka the people, both Isseis and Niseis, continued to fear the administration? This could not have been due simply to the difference in background of the people in Minidoka and in Tule Lake because people from the Northwest who went to Tule Lake accepted the behavior pattern that was developed there. Since it would take too long to develop the ramifications of this problem, the task will be reserved for another occasion.

Of course, it is possible that the weak stand taken by the arbitration committee was not the direct result of an attitude toward the administration developed over a period of time. It is possible that the members on the committee simply lacked experience in handling disputes, which is a fact. The people from the Northwest do not have the history of extreme race hatred that the Japanese in California have had to face. Disputes with Caucasians in California gave the Japanese there a training in getting the best of them. It also gave them a suspicious attitude toward Hakujin in general which brought out their weak points in a situation readily. It is possible that the committee members lacked this sort of experience. Obviously

a detailed analysis of the leaders would help to clarify this problem.

Another point that should be commented upon is the request of the committee to Stafford that the boilermen be asked to go back to work pending further negotiation. This request definitely shows that the arbitration committee did not intend to make its request for extra worker effective by staging a general work stoppage. If the boilermen went back to work, the other workers who had stopped working would lose their reason for not working. Again the accusation can be made that the committee was more anxious to fulfill its function as arbitrator than to win the fight against the administration.

Stafford refused to ask the boilermen to go back to work, but he wanted the arbitration committee to find out how much work the boilermen were willing to do. This the committee refused to do until they received a reply to their request sent to Washington. Here the committee refused to carry out its function as an arbitration committee. At the point, the committee, and not the boilermen, had taken up the fight with the administration for an increase in workers. The committee was not neutral. This abandonment of the role of arbitrator for that of the negotiator might have been for the benefit of the boilermen alone. The committee probably desired to see the people win their demand for extra workers. However, this act can be interpreted as similar to that of a busybody who wants

to put his own finger into other people's pies. Both the acceptance of the role of arbitrator and its temporary abandonment have in common the execution of an act which might have well been left to others.

Before the answer to the committee's request came back from Washington a situation developed within the project which lead to the acceptance of the administration's plan. Water shortage developed in one end of the camp, and one of the arbitration committee members decided to forestall trouble by taking it upon himself to tell block residents that it was permissible to build fires in the stoves and turn off the running taps in order to conserve water. The committee had once condoned the strategy of putting out fires, but, discovering that this was causing resentment on the part of the people, rescinded this order. In other words, the committee did not have the backing of the people, and they realized it acutely when the water shortage occurred. It was pointed out before that the committee did not identify itself wholeheartedly with the people. On the other hand, the committeemen feared the wrath of the people, according to their own confession.

One question that can be asked at this point is why the committeemen feared the wrath of the people. Why could not they have acted like some of the other leaders who used their authority in such a way as to anger a large number of people. Why shouldn't they feel as secure, say, as the Housing Adjustment

Board, which has been greatly criticized for what it has done. One factor that might be pointed out is that these committeemen were block delegates, elected by block residents. They could not retain their leadership status without support from block residents. The fact that an election for councilmen and block commissioners was coming up soon might have influenced these committeemen into being careful about incurring the wrath of the residents. Also, under any circumstances, it would not be pleasant living in a project where the residents were hostile.

Another interesting point is the fact that the committeemen allowed themselves to drift so far away from the people. They did not even think of consulting the project residents on the strike, neither did they keep them well informed of the progress of the negotiations. When the water shortage developed the committee did not know how much support it had among the residents. It certainly had sufficient support to carry on their negotiations further than they did. This gulf between the committee and the people is a result of the aloofness maintained by the committee and not lack of interest on the part of the people.

It is not surprising, therefore, that when Myer's reply came, the committee was anxious to reach some sort of settlement immediately. Myer refused the increase of workers, but left the way open for further negotiations on the project. This latter the committee ignored, and accepted Stafford's

offer to allow the boilermen to go back to work on the old schedule. Further bargaining for workers to care for the block stove was deferred. The committee made a feeble attempt to get as good a bargain as possible for the boilermen, but were too anxious to reach a solution to accomplish very much. Stafford refused to put down in writing that the janitors would not be responsible for the block stoves and refused to include in the settlement the removal of Green from his position as supervisor of the maintenance workers. Dissension between the people and the leader can be said to have been the cause of the willingness of the committee to give in.

The attitude of the arbitration committee toward the boilermen is not very clear. It is definite that there was lack of complete sympathy with the boilermen on the part of the committee members. The later felt that the former's claim that they were being overworked was not true. Also, they knew that over a dozen workers were on the janitor payroll who were presumably doing nothing. One arbitration committee member stated that the boilermen were like spoiled infants. Some fear was also expressed by committeemen that the boilermen would not be pleased with the solution that the committee was suggesting. It was the committee which asked the boilermen to go back to work in order to provide hot water for the project residents. There are indications that there was a definite gulf between the committee and the boilermen. In this regard the committee was the mediator and less the negotiator for the boilermen.

Probably the act for which the arbitration committee would be most criticized by project residents would be the way in which it disposed of the block stove problem. Having arrived at some sort of solution for the boilermen, they were left with the problem of finding someone to care for the block stoves. It was the intention of the administration to get the janitors to care for them, in part at least. The arbitration committee allowed the boilermen to go back to work on the understanding that the janitors would not have to take care of the block stoves. The administration had also hinted that the protection of government property, and the problem of pipes freezing and of fires starting from the stoves could come under this category, was the responsibility of the administration. Clearly, the arbitration committee could not consider its task of arbitration complete without carrying on further negotiations to make some arrangements whereby the block stoves would be looked after. Instead of undertaking this task, however, the committee decided that this should be handled by the block managers. This is clearly a case of shirking of responsibility which the committee did not relish carrying out.

The question arises, why the committee, which was so eager to offer its services as mediator, wash its hands of this problem so quickly? In that short span of time the members were worn out by the strain of meetings. They also realized that the administration was willing to negotiate till summer-

time, if necessary, by which time the problem would solve itself. Perhaps, the incentive was not great enough. It would have meant entering into a fight which was already lost.

Or perhaps the committee's sense of responsibility was not strong enough. It was already shown that it did not associate itself closely with the people. It is not strange that they would not take it upon themselves to negotiate for a stove problem which they themselves created by allowing the boiler-men to go back to work on the old schedule. Probably it was both the lack of incentives and sense of responsibility which caused the committee to throw the stove problem on the lap of their rivals.

It is interesting to speculate to what extent the coming election for councilmen affected the decision of the committee to abandon a losing fight. Of the 12 <sup>members</sup> of the arbitration committee all but one was nominated for councilmen. Of the 11 so nominated 4 declined their nomination and 7 accepted. This is a larger percentage of acceptance than for the nominees as a whole, which was 16 out of 38, or more than half. Stories have gone around about two of the arbitration committee members who have been campaigning for themselves. Undoubtedly, the coming election had some effect on the councilmen, but how much and what kind of effect is difficult to establish.

24

## MINIDOKAN OPINION FAVORING THE WALKOUT

Minidokans were split from the very beginning on their stand for or against the boilermen walkout. At first, however, the dominant views expressed among them were those favoring it. Two general sentiments were expressed by those who favored the walkout:

1. The boilermen are not asking for too much.
2. The keto shouldn't be allowed to make fools of the Japanese all of the time.

Of the two opinions, the first was more commonly expressed than the second.

The first opinion was expressed by the following individuals. The boilermen themselves clung to this argument in demanding more workers (J 1/4/44 #1, January 4, meeting minutes. "Roman Beauty", a rather talkative individual, quick-tempered, from the Puyallup Valley, expressed this opinion. Another individual who was heard giving this opinion was Tatsuta, a talkative bachelor, seasonal worker, with typical filthy habits and a drinker and gambler (1/6 #4). Another was a cook, talkative, apt to make hasty decisions, a frequenter of the block boilerhouse (1/6/44 #3). The block manager of Block 12 expressed a similar opinion.

The second opinion was less commonly expressed, but there were indications that it was an underlying reason for favoring the walkout. This view was most definitely expressed by the Block Manager of Block 12, who felt that the boilermen issue was not quite so important as to whether the "character" of the Japanese was recognized by the administration. Consequently, he was in favor of not giving in until the demand of

the people for an increase in workers was met by the administration. The Block Manager was an import merchant from Hawaii and thought about matters in more abstract terms than did most of the other evacuees (J 1/6, #8). The boilermen themselves seem to have refused to go back to work, not so much because the administration demanded too much work of them, but because it did not "give in" at all at the January 4th meeting. Members of the Housing Adjustment Board, although not participants in any of the meetings, felt that the main reason for the boilermen quitting was that the hakujin had made fools of the Japanese. Some men in Block 12 were heard expressing the opinion that it was a good thing the janitors quit to show the keto that they couldn't get away with what they wished and make fools of Japanese all of the time (J 1/5 #1).

Comparing these two opinions, it is evident that the former is much more concrete than the latter. The issue arose out of the fact that the boilermen were asked to do, what they termed, excessive work, and the walkout was based on this claim. It was not on this basis alone, however, because at the time they walked out they were only asked to do as much work as they wanted to--pending further adjustment. The more subtle reason for the walkout was the second one, which was not always expressed, but which was more often implied. While the complaint that the boilermen were being required to do excessive work was clearly understandable to anyone, the struggle between the administration and the people was not easy to visualize, except to those who were used to abstract thinking.

Those who were consciously dissatisfied with the administration might have been able to consider the boilermen walkout as an issue between the administration and the people, but they did not seem to constitute the majority in the project.

Comparing the individuals who expressed the two opinions, certain speculations can be made. In general, either an intelligent or unintelligent person could have expressed either opinion. The clear statement made by the block manager expressing the second opinion as the main issue at stake could only have been made by a person used to dealing with abstract thought. According to his own account, his statement was the result of concentrated thinking. A similar statement was made by men of Block 12 as they milled around, but it was seemingly something they felt, rather than something they thought through. The former arrived at his conclusion intellectually, whereas the latter sensed it emotionally.

Those who favored the walkout, according to the data available, seem to be of a definite sort. The inakomono (country people), the boilerhouse crowd, bachelors all seem to have favored the walkout very definitely. The workers around the warehouse area showed that they were in favor of the walkout. More men than women were heard expressing opinions favoring the walkout. Kibeis, too, in general, favored the walkout. Among the common block residents these can be termed the less favored and dissatisfied element in the population. At the same time, the charge can be made that, as a whole, they are also likely to be less educated and less intelligent to some degree than

the rest of the population. Members of this group generally complain about things more, talk more, attend meetings and express their opinions frequently. This segment of the population might be termed the dissatisfied group, since dissatisfaction seems to be a common factor among these individuals. It should be remembered that others at the opposite extreme and satisfied also favored the walkout, but the dissatisfied ones favored it more.

Here are two examples of individuals who were not in the dissatisfied group, but who favored the walkout and desired a definite victory over the administration. One is a block manager, who carries himself with an air of superiority. There is good basis for this attitude, besides the fact that he is a block manager, since he is educated and was working for a large Japanese export firm. Consequently, he is a merchant from Japan, and not an immigrant, a distinction which he seems to show in his general aloofness from the block people. He backed the walkout, in spite of hardships that the people might have to suffer on the basis that this was an opportunity to win recognition for the "character" of the Japanese people. He felt that the issue was more than just one between boilermen and their supervisor, and that the future of the Japanese in America was involved. He also felt that for such a cause the people should be prepared to suffer whatever inconvenience necessary.

"White Collar" is a member of the leading family in the block, which controls the activities of the young people. He is around 30, married, and has two children. He and his family

maintain the highest social standard among the Niseis, dressing up nicely, for one thing. Since they are from Seattle and the majority of the block people come from the valley, the former have the distinction of being city people. In spite of this superior social status within the block, "White Collar" and his family favored the walkout. "White Collar", for instance, talked about the "strike" being "effective", since people refused to go to work, and was for "holding out" against the administration. He was definitely against the rowdy activities carried on, and gave the impression that he understood that the struggle was between the boilermen and the administration and that the rest of the people should back up the boilermen.

02

## MINIDOKAN OPPOSITION TO THE WALKOUT

From the very beginning there was lack of unified support from the people for the boilermen walkout. As a member of the arbitration committee expressed it, many of the boilermen were not liked by the people, anyway. Although complaints against the boilermen during the walkout was less frequently heard and recorded, its existence even at the very outset was evident.

A woman was heard complaining even before the walkout that she was against a strike when she had children. One lady (J 1/3 #8) gave a rather complete account of her reasons for being opposed to the strike. A quiet man expressed the fact that all of the people in the block were not behind the strike and that they thought that the janitors were only being lazy. People were heard expressing the opinion that the boilermen should go back to work while the negotiations were being carried on.

From these records, two general complaints against the boilermen can be abstracted:

1. The janitors are only being lazy.
2. The people are the ones that are suffering.

The first is an indication of lack of sympathy for the boilermen themselves and the second shows a concern for personal comfort.

These opinions were expressed most often by family men and by women. In general, they were people who had families and were concerned about the welfare of the community and their children. They were people who were most likely to be

law-abiding, to respect community rulings and customs and to hold respectable jobs. In general, they were people who considered themselves respectable and more favored members of the community and who were interested in maintaining the status quo. (These are generalizations based on rather scanty information on hand. They are based more on observations made previously.)

What can be said about the antipathy of some people against the boilermen? Many boilermen and janitors have been classed as being lazy, abnoxious, irresponsible, uncooperative. Mr. M. the janitor in the block, and his family, for instance, are heartily disliked for being "lazy and sloppy". Mr. S., the boilerman, is not highly regarded, either. Within the block they are usually not the ones who are asked to accept leadership positions and whose opinions are highly regarded. Depending on the individual boilerman, sometimes there is little antagonism toward him at all, as is the case with the eldest boilermen in this block, who is an exceedingly quiet man. With other individuals actual contempt is felt against boilermen. This sort of contempt is not generally expressed by the boilerhouse crowd and the rest of the more "radical" segment of the population. Those who are conscious of a superior status because of background, education, occupation, wealth, etc., may feel this contempt for boilermen more than those who are merely conforming to acceptable community ways. This split in the conforming and non-conforming elements of the population is evident all

through the history of the settlement of the Japanese in America, where stabler elements in the community were constantly required to patch up violent incidents even involving killing, to run gamblers out of town, etc. It is also evident among growing Nisei--some groups gamble and take up non-conforming ways, whereas other generally remain obedient to their parents throughout their childhood and youth, and carry on this type of adjustment to adulthood.

What are the implications of the complaint that the people are suffering? Few people like to suffer, but some people are less willing to suffer than others for a cause. It is understandable that those people with children to bathe and washings to do would be the most inconvenienced by lack of hot water. They are the ones who would run the greatest risk in terms of possible loss of comfort, if the hot water were turned off indefinitely. For this reason it is not surprising that complaints against the strike was most often heard expressed by women and by quiet family men. Additional reason for the unwillingness to suffer was expressed by some as their not knowing why they were suffering. Some could not see that the walkout was a fight between Japanese and the administration, but it seemed more a fight among Japanese--the "coyote's" (rowdy element) attack on the people. More specifically, some could not understand why they should not have a fire in the various stoves, be able to get hot water from the mess hall, and even have the boilermen on their job pending further negotiation with the

administration.

This complaint against the carrying on of the walkout, which seemed to be fairly general, contains more significance. It serves to illustrate the common complaint against people here in Minidoka that they are not unified. For one thing, some have shown that they are more in sympathy with the administration than with the walkout. The janitors who went back to fire the administration area boiler, only to be forced to quit his work, and another who continued on duty while the rest of the janitors and boilermen had walked out, illustrate this sort of adjustment. There seems to be more than just a few individuals who favor the administration more than the people. Somewhat illustrative is the lady in one of the divisions who goes around turning off the light, saying that it is a waste of electricity, and refuses to let others take things home, even when the supervisor condones it. Some seem to feel that they can get the best treatment at the hand of the administration if they cooperate with it. This, however, is better brought out in the settlement of the walkout, when some Minidokans felt that by accepting the administration's proposal they would be able to obtain extra workers which they could not get by staging a walkout.

Another implication of the protest against the walkout is that the incident was not the result of a general dissatisfaction among most people in the project, but the walkout does not seem to have received the support of all such dissatis-

factions. One of the most often expressed complaint was against the block managers. During the walkout, some people made disparaging remarks at the block managers, and the warehouse crew dumped bones on the ground in front of one mess hall instead of delivering meat proper because the block manager was an inu (dog). However, the negotiations for a settlement was left up to the block managers first and then block delegates, neither of whom bothered to consult the people. This dissatisfaction against the leadership, and other complaints, such as the tendency toward a greater amount of non-paid voluntary work, do not seem to have affected certain segments of the population sufficiently to make them lend support to the boilermen walkout. Definitely lacking here in Minidoka is a general anti-administration, anti-Caucasian feeling which was characteristic of Tule Lake.

It is possible that the lack of unity among the people on the boilermen issue was caused by the fact that the people were not informed properly of the issue. At no point were the people consulted as to the stand they wished to take on the incident--to hold out or give in. Only fragmentary reports to the block people were made by the block manager or the block delegate, leaving many people in the dark as to the progress of the negotiations. This lack of information was damaging to the unity of the people because they were suffering the lack of hot water and fire in stoves, often without knowing why they were suffering.

MINIDOKAN ON FORCING AD BUILDING WORKERS TO QUIT

On the first morning of the walkout, according to a number of reports, a large group of young kids from the warehouse area stormed the administrative section. They threatened the boilerman who was keeping the boiler going for the heating system for the men's dormitory (2). The crowd forced him to quit work, lock the boilerhouse, and go home. This particular boiler was thereafter kept going for the duration of the walkout by the Caucasian residents themselves.

The reaction among the people to this report was generally in one direction. In one block where people were largely sympathetic to the walkout and there was hardly any censure of the acts of the young kids. In contrast there was definite antagonism against the same boys when they came to put out the fire in the block stoves. In fact, there was definite approval among many people in the block for the act of the young kids toward Caucasians. The concensus of opinion was that the keto should be made to suffer the lack of hot water. Even a quiet Issei leader felt that the janitors working in the administrative area should be made to quit work. Some said that if the keto weren't made to suffer they would never give in. Some pointed out that most of the apartments in the administrative area were heated with oil burners. This brought up the comment that the Caucasians fixed up things nicely for themselves only. Some expressed the opinion that the keto was unfair to the Japanese. Some pointed out that Caucasians should be paying

## Minidokan on Forcing Ad Building Workers to Quit

2

outside wages to the janitress working for them. Comments were made that where their own comfort was concerned they were unwilling to enforce employment cuts (referring to the janitresses who were not taken off the payroll when some of them threatened to quit.) Some went to the extent of thinking of ways and means of making the keto suffer--such as turning off the electricity or punching holes in their oil tanks. More basic dissatisfaction was expressed by one woman, who said:

"They take our property away, and try to tell us that we are being treated with free food, free housing, and free hospitalization. And then if we complain, they say: 'If you don't like it, go out'".

In general, it can be said that the people approved of the young kids forcing the Ad Building boilerman to quit his work. This approval rested on the fact that Caucasians would be made to suffer. Some saw their suffering as a means of winning the dispute. Others, however, seem to have considered their suffering at the hands of the Japanese in the light of the injustices that the Caucasians had imposed upon the Japanese people. Those who approved of the use of force on the Ad section boilerman constituted an overwhelming majority of the people. There might have been some, such as the boilerman himself, who might have disapproved of the use of force, since the understanding at the January 4th meeting was that those who desired to work were free to do so. There might have been still others who were

against the use of any sort of force or threat, but who did not dare express such an opinion.

A significant contrast, however, is offered by the fact that some of those who did not approve of the young kids putting out fires or forcing the kitchen crew to refuse to furnish the block people with hot water wholeheartedly approved their storming the administration area. This seems to be based on the fact that in one instance the block residents stood to lose, whereas in the other it was the Caucasians who would have to suffer. In this regard, the accusation that Caucasians are unfair to the Japanese is significant. There are also indications that the discriminatory process of evacuation has a part in condoning the acts of the young kids toward the Ad Building boilerman. There is added reason for approving such an act since the boilerman can be considered as a "scab" and therefore an inu of the administration.

20

MINIDOKAN REACTION TO REFUSAL OF HOT WATER

On the second day of the walkout, some young kids came around to the mess hall and gave out orders that hot water was not to be given to the block people from the kitchen faucet. This order was presumably issued by the same group of boys which had put out the fires in the stoves. Both were reported to be a part of the coal crew and \_\_\_\_\_'s gang. The reason for this order was reported as the fear that if mothers had hot water they would not go to the Ad Building to complain about the lack of it to the administration. This order was obeyed in each block, and cut off the last source of hot water for the block people, except what they could boil for themselves at home.

In one block, mothers with babies were being allowed to take hot water from the kitchen before the order not to was issued.

An Issei said:

"I don't see anything wrong in giving hot water to the block people. The water could be given, and if they want the mothers to go up to the Ad Building to complain about not having hot water, they can be asked to go. There is no sense in making the block people suffer. If you don't do what they tell you to do, they're going to do what they did to Block 8. They brought meat and flung it on the ground near the garbage can. The next time they might bring less food, and finally no food at all. The coal crew and the warehouse crew are working together." This was spoken by a member of the crowd that habit-

ually gathers at the boilerhouse. Probably other members of the block felt this way, too.

A Nisei fellow said: "If those kids do things like that the people are going to be made at them. What they ought to do is to come and explain the matter and ask the people to cooperate. Better than that, they should get representatives of the blocks together and then present the issue to the administration. This way, they're just making the block people suffer."

At the meeting of the block managers and block delegates, it was decided that it was best not to allow hot water to be taken from the kitchen. The reason for this was that if the block people showed weakness by going after hot water to the kitchen, the negotiations would be difficult to carry out. Also, all the block people and in some blocks, even all of the mothers with babies could not be furnished with hot water, and it was explained that if only a part of the population used hot water from the kitchen it would be unfair to the others.

Another point of view was expressed by a chef who maintained that all of the block people could not be furnished hot water from the kitchen and that he, as the chef, had full power to deny hot water to the block people. He refused to give hot water to the block people even from the first day.

Summing up the various reactions, we have:

1. Why should the block people be made to suffer.
2. It's best to obey because of possible retaliations.

3. Why didn't the kids ask the cooperation of the block people?
4. It's best not to show any weakness, and let the women of the block complain to the administration.
5. The mess hall has the right to refuse hot water.

The first three reactions were noted in connection with the quenching of the fire in the stoves. The fourth is the point of view presented by the young kids and by the leaders arbitrating the issue. The reasoning seemed to be that if the situation were made acute for the people, the administration would be more likely to give in on the demands of the people. It was felt that if the women of the block went up to the administration and complained, it would help win the demands. This was a step appealing to the sympathy of the administration, and would involve showing the weakness of the people. This act of women storming the administration can be construed as showing the weakness of people much more than the act of getting hot water from the kitchen. Denying the latter on the ground that it would indicate weakness on the part of the people would seem unreasonable, unless weakness is interpreted as meaning the inability of the people to accept inconvenience without complaint. From the standpoint of strategy, it would seem that the people would have been much more unified if they had been allowed to get hot water from the kitchen and not complain to the administration about the lack of it. It can be said that an attempt was made to win de-

mands by making the people suffer, and having them appealing to the administration for relief.

The stand on the part of a chef that he had the right to refuse hot water indicates a conflict within the block which has been noticeable before in certain blocks. The complaint that the block people should have some control over their own mess hall puts the problem in a nutshell. As this particular chef pointed out, he is in full charge of the mess hall in accordance with instructions from the Steward Division. The interesting point here is that he chose to use his authority against allowing block people to take hot water from the mess hall at a time when the people were greatly in need of it. If he had chosen, he could have given hot water in limited amounts, say, to mothers with babies, since it was being done in some blocks. This is only another example of officiousness on the part of people with some degree of authority.

MINIDOKAN REACTION TO PUTTING OUT FIRES

On the morning of January 5, some young boys in their late teens and twenties went around to each block committing, what some have termed, "rowdism" or "hoodlism". They went to see first that the boiler was not going, and then checked up on the stoves in the men's latrine and in the laundry room. Where the latter were going, they were put out with a bucket of water. Their explanation for their behavior was:

"What the hell. Let the pipes freeze. Then they'll do something about it quick". They acted in a menacing manner, but committed no further violence and went on their way. The boys reputedly were members of the coal crew. One fellow in particular, slightly older than the others, was the spokesman for the group and seemed to be the leader. The act of putting out the fire in the stoves, however, was reportedly carried out on the suggestion of another individual, an Issei.

The reaction to this act of rowdyism on the part of the young kids was largely negative. In Block 12 where most of the people favored the walkout, the following remarks were heard:

"They're certainly showing a lot of energy".

"It's best not to have any violence on a strike".

"It's best not to stick your neck out too far."

"I don't like the idea of kids like that going around and putting out the fire. If the boilermen want to have a strike, all right. But when anyone starts to mess around with government property, he is laying himself open to serious charges".

Minidokan Reaction to Putting Out Fires

"If pipes burst they are going to be difficult to replace".

For the next several days, block residents in general were afraid to make a fire in any of the stoves. Even when a fire was built by boys in order to keep warm when playing in the laundry-room, they did it fearfully. When it was discovered that a fire was being built in the women's latrine, the Issei leader in the block put it out, saying that he didn't want the block to be retaliated upon by the young kids.

Fear was also expressed by some that if the pipes burst of lack of heat in the latrines and in the laundry room, the block would be inconvenienced. In Block 12 when a window remained open in men's latrine and some of the pipes froze, but did not burst, a fire was built in a washtub in order to defrost the pipes. The Issei leader and the boilerman of the block saw to it that the water was kept running at night. Some could not understand why the people had to go without heat and suffer, when the negotiations could be carried on even though the stoves were going.

There were some, however, who expressed the view that the pipes should be allowed to freeze. Their reasoning was that unless the administration feared that the pipes froze they would not give in to the demand for extra workers. These people felt that the others who attempted to keep the pipes from freezing were too "soft" and lacked "guts".

The block managers and block delegates decided to not to

## Minidokan Reaction to Putting Out Fires

keep fire going in stoves and to keep the taps running instead. On January 8, however, they decided to allow fires to be made in the stoves and turn off the running taps in order to conserve on water, which was beginning to become scarce. Some people pointed out that the putting out of the fire was a hasty act in the first place, and that it was senseless to make the people suffer. Others, however, felt that the heating in the stoves was a sign of retreat on the part of the Japanese.

In general, the reaction of the Minidokans to the putting out of the fire in the stoves can be summed up as follows:

1. Don't start a fire because the young kids will retaliate.
2. The kids are acting "tough" and are being hasty.
3. Don't start a fire. Let the pipes burst. Otherwise, the ketos won't do anything about the people's demand.
4. If the pipes burst, the block residents will suffer.
5. Why are they making the Japanese suffer like this?

The act of rowdism on the part of the young kids put a new factor in the walkout dispute. The young kids were not applauded for their act of putting out the fire in the stoves. Rather, they were greeted generally with resentment and with fear. Their swaggering and menacing manner only provoked resentment. This is understandable in the light of the manner in which they carried out their act. They had little right to come into anyone else's laundry-room and put out the fire.

The least that they could have done was to explain why they were putting out the fire and to ask for the cooperation of the block residents. Along with this overbearing manner are associated other characteristics which are thought typical of the "rowdy" boys or "hoodlums", as others prefer to term them. They are thought to lack intelligence and foresight, and this act of putting out fires can be construed as a hasty act on the level with their intelligence. They are also thought to be capable of unnecessary violence, and they were censured for attempting to freeze pipes. Some who favored a general work stoppage to make the strike effective were opposed to the use of threat and violence even to win the strike.

Coupled with resentment against the young kids was a fear of consequences if their wish were not obeyed. Block residents were afraid that the block might be treated like Block 8 where bones were dumped on the ground. The young boys expressed fear that they would be beaten up by "\_\_\_\_\_ and his gang" if they started a fire in the stove. This fear is understandable in the light of the general understanding that such young kids went around in gangs, they picked a fight with a quieter individual on the slightest provocation, received help from his gang when he was unable to face a situation, and was likely to remember a resentment an unreasonable length of time.

This fear of the young kids seem to have been fairly general among the block residents. Even the janitors and boilermen did

not show that they were in sympathy with them and did not fear them. Quite definitely there was a gulf between the rowdy kids and block residents, both old and young. Within the block, some of the young kids gambled in the laundry room, but they, too, expressed fear of "\_\_\_\_\_ 's gang". This gulf between the conforming members of the community and the "rowdy" non-conforming elements has existed in the past, and is not surprising in this situation.

This act of rowdyism has not been adequately explained satisfactorily. Who gave them the directions to put out the fire; why was this direction given; on what authority was this done? These questions again give rise to the accusation that there was insufficient communication between the leaders and the people. Not only that, this incident indicated a lack of unity in carrying out the protest against the administration. It seemed as though someone was trying to direct the walkout from the warehouse area, using the younger kids as a strong-arm group, in totally disregarding the people and their leaders. This situation gave rise to the accusation of Tuleans that this was a poorly conducted strike.

The stand that if the people went without heat in the stoves and if they allowed the pipes to burst, they themselves would have to be inconvenienced was taken by more than a few block residents. Many could not see any benefit in staging a strike in the first place. Others felt that it was not worthwhile allowing pipes to freeze in order to win the demand for an

extra worker if it meant inconvenience for the block people. This stand seems to be characteristic of the more conservative segment of the population. This is quite understandable because they are more concerned with the comfort of their family than with a fight with the administration which they do not strongly feel or which they have not been made to visualize ~~strongly~~ acutely. This concern for comfort might be termed a wish for security, if Thomas' four wishes are employed.

This leaves us with the only statement in favor of the putting out of the fire in the stoves. Those who were heard expressing the opinion that the pipes should be allowed to burst were definitely of the "radical" or "latrine philosopher" variety. There is little doubt that this observation is not the result of biased sampling. They are the sort of individuals who have the least to lose from destruction of block property. They have the greatest interest in seeing the strike succeed, since they are the ones who feel most that the real issue is the fight against the keto. They, more than the quieter and more conservative elements of the population, are likely to condone the use of violence and the destruction of property. Because they are more likely to be rash and lack foresight they are less likely to consider the consequence of burst pipes, which might be irreplaceable. At any rate, for one reason or another, the more "radical" elements are the ones most responsible for the statement: "Let the pipes burst!"

di

## WORK STOPPAGE

The morning following the boilermen's decision to walk out on their jobs, workmen around the warehouse area quit work completely or slowed it down considerably. The divisions affected included the coal crew, the garbage crew, the garage, and central service. At the Central Service office, a sign read: "No hot water, no work", and this seems to have been the official reason for not working. By the following day, the coal crew was persuaded to do some work by allowing them to take showers at the hospital. The garbage crew and the garage workers seem to have held out for the week's duration of the walkout. It should be noted that this work stoppage was centered around the warehouse area where the rowdiest element of the population was concentrated. This included Kibeis of a rowdy sort, rowdy Niseis, and also some Isseis, who were likely to be looked upon as troublemakers. Here we find the most "radical" elements **boldly** coming out and supporting the walkout by open work stoppage.

The reason for this move is very probably the desire to make the walkout effective. As one man stated, to make the strike effective, it should be done the "Tulean style". Behind this move seems to be a greater desire than that of merely getting better working conditions for the boilermen. The larger issue of the fight of the people against the administration seems to have been felt by those taking part willingly in this work stoppage.

In contrast to the warehouse area workers, who stopped work, other workers hesitated to join this movement. Within the warehouse itself, the auto-shop continued its activities. The warehouse crew continued to deliver food to the mess hall. The continued activity of the electric shop was explained by one worker as being based on a necessity of keeping up repairs. Carpenters continued to go to work. Some did not work, but merely warmed themselves by the fire, whereas others ignored the walk-out and worked on the construction of apartment for Caucasian staff members. Hog ranch and poultry farm workers continued to feed the animals because, according to one report, they felt sorry for the living creatures. A janitress in the Ad section was not quite sure whether she should go to work or not and seemed to be wavering between the two moves. Block people told her that she needn't resign her job, but that she shouldn't go to work. This type of hesitation to quit work was evident even among the maintenance workers themselves. This was noticeable at the January 4th meeting, and was indicated again when they showed a willingness to go back to work without winning their original demand for extra workers.

A flagrant disregard for the decision of the majority of the maintenance workers was shown by the janitors of the administration area. The boilerman there was working until he was forced to close up the boilerhouse and go home. Thereafter, the Caucasian bachelors were required to fire their own boiler for a while. The Ad building janitor, although threatened with violence,

refused to quit his work, and was reported to have taken care to see that the building was fully warmed up when Stafford returned to the project. All other Ad building workers went to work, but not all of them in defiance of the walkout. Some were heard expressing the opinion that if the janitors wouldn't keep the stoves going they would have a good reason for staying away from work.

In regards to the work stoppage, it can be said that the most "rowdy" or "radical" elements were the only ones who carried it out to back up the boilermen. They had in their favor the excuse that if they could not have hot water, they did not want to work and dirty themselves. The carpenters and hog and poultry farm workers, however, could have given a similar excuse for not going to work. There is a possibility that the work stoppage in the warehouse area was "organized", and that one individual or a group of them, ordered such a work stoppage. The fact that work stoppage was limited to the workers in the warehouse area supports this assumption. This is also indicated by the fact that acts of "rowdism", such as quenching fires in stoves, forcing the Ad area janitor to quit work, and ordering mess halls not to give hot water to block people, all seem to have been carried out by warehouse area workers.

A general work stoppage, at least by the outdoor workers, on the ground that they could not work if they did not have hot water was probably the only way to make the demand for extra workers effective. The fact that there wasn't a general support for this is only an indication of the lack of general support

for the fight of the people against the administration. When the Washington office turned down the demand for extra workers the alternative steps were: accept the administration's solution and have the boilermen go back to work on the old schedule, or hold out for extra workers, in which case the demand should be made effective by making the work stoppage more widespread. The arbitration committee gave in to the administration demand, feeling that the people were not behind them wholeheartedly. One quiet man possibly illustrates the sentiment of many more who were opposed to extreme measures. When it was suggested to him that to win the demand for extra workers, a general strike might become necessary, he said, "They'd better not try anything so serious as that, when they don't know anything about it." As one Minidokan pointed out, the strike failed not because the arbitration committee mishandled it or the boilermen went back to work, but because the people were not united and strong enough.

So

MINIDOKANS ON SOLUTION

For six days, the people went without hot water in the shower room and laundry room. On the fourth and fifth days, water became scarce and there were complaints heard in various blocks. On the evening of January 9, the boilers were once again fired by the same boilermen, and the people learned that the dispute was settled. The boilermen and janitors, it was generally reported, went back to work on the old schedule, meaning that they did not have to do more than they used to do and that the block stoves were not their responsibility at all. They were to receive pay for the duration of the arbitration. Their Sunday schedule was changed so that they would not have to work overtime.

The reaction of the people to the solution was again divided. Some expressed satisfaction with the settlement, others were grossly dissatisfied with it. Many people who were relieved to hear that a solution was reached were relieved because they were once again able to have hot water. As one leader put it, the solution could have been worse had the block people had to go without hot water for a longer period. A Tulean Issei said that people in his block seemed satisfied to get hot water once more and were afraid to press charges against the boilermen and janitors to do this work because they were afraid that the latter would refuse to do any work. The very lack of opinion against the boilermen going back to work indicated general satisfaction with the solution reached.

Some felt that the solution was not a poor one because the dispute had ended in a 50-50 draw. As one leader point out, the results could have been better and it could have been worse. As matters stood, the people were able to get hot water and the boilermen were able to win their demands. Of course, the block people had to keep the stoves going by themselves, but this was not very important, anyway, some said. The solution was considered decent in the light of the fact that the administration had the upper hand in the matter. Some, therefore, felt that the Japanese had not done so badly in this dispute.

The vast majority of the people accepted without protest, the arrangement that the maintenance workers would have to keep the six block stoves going. They accepted meekly this arrangement whereby the block people would be responsible for the stoves and they would have to bargain separately with the administration for additional workers to keep the stoves going. Some felt that this was not such a difficult task, anyway. Very few people felt that the maintenance workers should be made to take care of the stoves. Many felt that there was still a chance for getting additional workers if further negotiations were carried on with the administration, and the problem was presented to the block managers to be taken up with the administration. Some felt that Stafford refused to increase workers because he wanted "to save face", but that he would allow additional workers after about a month.

Against those who were generally satisfied with the solution reached were those who expressed dissatisfaction. One ground

on which dissatisfaction was expressed was that the people had lost--that they had backed down. They had started out to get additional workers and failed to get them. Others expressed the same dissatisfaction by saying that they had suffered for nothing. Others pointed out that no arrangements had been reached for the stoves.

Some of the dissatisfaction was directed at the boilermen and janitors who went back to their former jobs. Very few felt that they should be held responsible for the block stoves. Some remarked that the maintenance workers were individualistic and looked after their own needs only. Some pointed out that the motive of the boilerman had been purely selfish from the very beginning. Others merely remarked that the maintenance workers were the only ones who profited by the suffering of the people.

The boilermen and janitors went back to their former jobs without much hesitation. Hatate, the supervisor, made the statement that as long as they were asked to go back to work on the old schedule, they could not very well refuse to go back to work. Many janitors did not feel too apologetic about going back to work on the terms they did. Some hint of embarrassment on the part of janitors was noted at one block meeting when a representative of the janitors stated that they hadn't meant to make the block people suffer. In another block, the janitors stated that they didn't go back to work merely because of selfish interest. Some took care of the block stoves just as they had had been doing in the past. Others, however, were not even apologetic for the fact that they went back to work without

having made arrangements for the block stoves and refused to touch them. Some advised the block people to negotiate on their own for additional workers.

To sum up the reaction to the solution of the boilermen walkout:

Satisfaction:

1. Satisfied with having hot water again.
2. The dispute ended in a draw.
3. The block people should be responsible for the stoves.
4. The administration may furnish additional workers if further negotiations are carried on.

Dissatisfaction:

1. The Japanese backed down.
2. The janitors profited at the expense of the block people.

The fact that many people were satisfied merely with having hot water can be interpreted in various ways. It can mean that the material comfort is of greater concern to the people here than is the spiritual comfort of defeating the administration. Stated in a different fashion, it might mean that the people here were not antagonistic sufficiently toward the administration to feel disappointed when the spiritual satisfaction was not obtained. This in turn might be due to any number of factors, such as the lack of experience with race discrimination, lack of knowledge of the facts of the boilermen walkout itself, etc.

Here we are treading on very uncertain grounds. In connection with the materialistic trend noted here, it might be pointed out that the people in general have been accused of not caring what went on within the project as long as it didn't concern themselves directly. This has been pointed out as being truer of Seattle people than Portland people, who were, it is said, more likely to "get together" on matters. Whatever interpretation is given to the fact that many people expressed satisfaction in merely being able to get hot water once more, it seems to be a significant observation.

Some people were heard saying that the dispute was a draw without knowing very much about the proceedings of the arbitration committee with the administration. More significant is the remark of a leader that the solution could have been much worse, and the air of finality with which he said that the administration had the upper hand in the matter. Here we seem to detect a feeling of helplessness on the part of the people. This seems to be borne out by the half-hearted way in which the negotiations were carried out. The people seem to have the concept that the administration is formidable, although there was ~~some~~ enthusiasm on the part of both leaders and the people that a victory over the administration was possible. The important point to note here is the fact that many people were satisfied with the solution of the dispute and that they were satisfied even without a complete victory.

Most Minidokans seem to have accepted the terms of the solution that the block people, and not the maintenance workers, were

to be responsible for the block stoves. This quiet acceptance of the terms of the agreement is significant because it means that the action of the maintenance workers in going back to work was condoned by a large number. It also means that the leaders were not blamed by many people for failing to look after the needs of the people. It could also mean that a large number of people did not see this dispute as the struggle between the people at large and the administration, but merely as a divisional dispute between boilermen and their supervisor. If the struggle had been viewed as one between the people and the administration, the boilermen and the leaders should not have allowed the problem of the block stoves and that of the boiler to be separated. The independent action of the boilermen was condoned, showing a definite lack of pressure for unified action upon a problem.

Many people felt that there would be a good possibility of having the administration provide additional workers after the settlement of the dispute. The boilermen advised the block people to carry on their own negotiation, and many block leaders felt that if they did so some results could be obtained. The interesting point here is that even when additional workers were refused after a walkout and partial work stoppage were staged, many people still felt that they could win their demand through quiet negotiation. This might be interpreted as gaining demands not through the use of force, but through cooperation. To use another terminology, where an attempt at dominance failed, it was felt that submission would succeed. Going without hot water and sending a delegation of women to complain to the administration seem

to be a submissive type of reaction. It is not idle speculation to say that these reactions are often found when the weak is struggling against the strong. It is possible that this apparent naivete is due to lack of experience with group conflict situations. There is certainly lack of insight into the administration when the remark is made that the demand for extra workers is reasonable and, therefore, should be met by the administration, or that the administration refused to put on additional workers merely to "save face".

The complaint that the Japanese "backed down" in the dispute is indication that some viewed it as a struggle between the people and the administration. It is difficult to say with the information on hand which segment of the population felt this way. Certainly it would have to be people who looked upon the struggle as a fight between the administration and the people. The disappointment was acutely felt by some. This could be due to the fact that this was Minidoka's first real project incident, and the attempt to "buck" the administration. That there was dissatisfaction towards the political set-up among the people is evident from the intense dislike of the majority of the people for the block managers in general. Some Minidokans probably felt that this was a good opportunity to show the Tuleans that they too were capable of showing the administration that they could not be kicked around all of the time. There was probably hope that with a victory over the administration the increasing trend toward restrictions

on the people, such as employment cuts and voluntary work, could be arrested.

It is not surprising that many people complained that the janitors alone profited, while the people had suffered and nothing concrete was gained for them. What is surprising is that the antagonism toward the janitors and boilermen wasn't greater than it was. From one point of view, the boilermen could be looked upon as having been "bought out" or appeased by the administration, thus hamstringing the larger struggle with the people at large. The boilermen won their demands by making the people suffer, and did not choose to fight for extra workers for the block residents. The block residents on the whole did not censure the janitors too harshly for this act--in fact, it was endorsed by many. Very few expressed the opinion that the boilermen and janitors should be made to keep the stoves going because they had sabotaged the fight of the people for extra workers. Here are definite lack of unity among the people and an indication of individualism. The boilermen also have failed to uphold their "honor", when they went back to work without winning their demand for extra workers. They ran the risk of possible "loss of face" when they went back to work without getting something for the people as well as themselves. Perhaps, the lack of employment on the project was too acute. Perhaps, they were afraid that others would take their jobs. Perhaps, they didn't have enough in common with the people to care too much about maintaining their "face" with them. These, too, are speculations which should not be taken seriously without collaborating evidence. The fact remains that the janitors "got away with murder".

82

ROWDYISM BY CENTRAL SERVICE GANG

When the January 4th meeting of janitors and boilermen ended with each maintenance worker answering the roll call with a "no", indicating that he would not go back to work, there were a number of workers who were not present at the meeting or who left it early enough to avoid having to answer the roll. It is now agreed upon by most observers that many maintenance workers wanted to return to their jobs. Since some had not answered the roll call, it was possible that they would go back to work, since return to work was left up to individual discretion. The other fear of the maintenance workers was that the administration would recruit other workers to take the place of those who quit. There was also a general fear that unless something drastic were done the boilermen would lose their fight. Calculations based on these premises were upset by an outbreak of a series of rowdyism which seemed "designed" to frustrate the attempt on the part of the administration to break the strike.

I In the morning of the walkout a group of 20-30 young men gathered at the Central Service office, walked out to the administration area and forced a boilerman to lock up the boilerhouse and leave his work. Other Ad area janitors were threatened, but managed to return to work. A smaller group of young men later in the morning made the rounds of the project, saw to it that the fire in the boiler was out, and then put out any fire in the laundry room and latrine stoves with buckets of water.

With the slogan "no hot water, no work", the coal crew, the garage workers, and the garbage crew refused to work. The following day, some young kids, reputedly members of the coal crew, went around giving orders to the cooks not to give hot water to any block resident. Any block which did not conform to these demands by the young men were threatened with violence or tampering with the supplies to the mess hall. One block, whose block manager was considered an inu, which was accused of not complying with the demands of the gang of young men, was delivered meat with a large proportion of bones, which was dumped on the ground in front of the mess hall.

It should be noted that all of these acts centered around the warehouse area and the Central Service office and the participants were mostly young men around 20-25 years of age. The coal crew was most often mentioned in connection with the acts of rowdyism, and reference was made to a tough worker in the coal crew and his gang. Their behavior was typical of the so-called rowdies--swaggering manners, willingness to pick a fight on the least provocation, issuing of curt orders, use of threat. The workers in the warehouse area who took part in the rowdyism and work stoppage can be characterized generally as possessing to a greater or less degree these traits of a "rowdy". In terms of social status, they are placed towards the bottom of the social scale. In terms of acceptability of behavior, they are definitely among the non-conformists in many of their ways.

It has been the belief of more than one individual that the acts of these young men were directed by an individual or small group of individuals. This allegation is partially substantiated by one report that an Issei directed the boys to extinguish the fire in the stoves. The highly purposive and organized nature of these acts of rowdyism add to this suspicion. This idea becomes more plausible when the behavior of those controlling the Central Service organization is examined. Suspicion narrows down to two individuals. There is a possibility that there are some other "brains" behind even these two men, but no direct evidence of the existence of such an individual is known.

#### Apparent Motive of the Rowdy Behavior

In no sense can the rowdy behaviors be considered aimless. All of them when analyzed, can be considered to have been aimed at winning a quick victory over the administration. The hope of the administration was that it would be able to get other workers to replace those that had walked out on their jobs. They were also afraid that unless some sort of solution was reached immediately, pipes would burst. The use of threat of violence and of retaliation through the tampering with food delivered to the mess hall made it impossible for anyone to keep the boilers going. Forcing the Ad building boilerman to return home was a step to keep him from returning to work, and one which was directed at all workers, regardless of whether they worked in the block or in the administrative area. This prevented

the breaking of the strike by other workers. Putting out the fire in block stoves served two purposes. On the one hand, it discouraged people who wanted to volunteer their services to keep the stoves going. On the other hand, it was a step toward causing pipes to freeze. This latter reason was given by some of the rowdy kids themselves for putting out the fire in the stoves. It was felt by some that unless the pipes were allowed to freeze the administration would be reluctant to give in to the demands of the boilermen. This can be construed as a means of prodding the administration into action. The refusal to let block people fetch badly-needed hot water from the mess hall kitchen was designed to make the people prod the administration into action. The aim of this move is evident in the statement attributed to the rowdy boys: "If the mothers of the block get hot water from the mess hall, they won't go up to the Ad building and make complaints". There seems to have been a desire first to prod the residents into the recognition of the strike, and second to get them to take action against the administration. Work stoppage by the Central Service workers served the purpose of making the strike more serious for the administration, than it otherwise would have been. All of the acts of the rowdy boys, then, can be said to have been directed toward making the strike effective.

Nature of the Rowdy Acts

The nature of the rowdy acts, however, served to defeat their own (apparent) purpose. Instead of winning support of the people for the strike, they caused mostly resentment and dissatisfaction toward the strike. One peculiar nature of these rowdy kids was the strong distrust shown toward block residents in general. Instead of asking block residents to cooperate with the strike, they merely threatened them with retaliation if they built fires in the stoves. Instead of asking the block residents to complain to the administration about the lack of hot water, they tried to force them into making complaints by making it impossible for them to get hot water, except by boiling it at home. Another characteristic of the rowdy acts was the use of force rather than of persuasion. The young kids never asked block residents to observe an order, but the former flung the order at them and told them that it had better be observed. They did not even come close to consulting the block residents for their opinion. The rowdy acts can also be considered hasty and not well thought through. Putting out the fires in the stoves did not cause freezing of the pipes. Block residents, fearing that any broken pipes would merely be inconveniencing themselves, kept taps running in order to prevent freezing. Attempts to make the people complain to the administration for lack of hot water boomeranged because it made the people resent the continuation of a strike which made the people suffer. The disorderly way in which the order to keep

Rowdyism by Central Service Gang

6

fires out in the block stoves was reversed is an indication of the hastiness in which the order was first given. Making it impossible for boilermen to return to work, for others to replace them and spreading of the strike to other divisions made the strike effective. Making the block residents suffer weakened the fight against the administration.

Summary

Some of the characteristics of the rowdy act of the Central Service workers can now be enumerated:

1. The use of force and threat.
2. The aim to defeat the administration.
3. The lack of common bonds with the people in general.
4. The hastiness of the acts.

Analysis

How then can these characteristics of the rowdy acts be explained? One of the simplest explanations, one that the administration is most likely to adopt, is that the whole series of acts were instigated by a small group of agitators who had a grudge against the administration. It is difficult to verify this point of view because the leaders, as the administration admits, are not known definitely. It is quite apparent, however, that all of these acts were aimed at one purpose, and lends support to the idea that they were directed by leaders. This does not explain why the boys participated so willingly in carrying out acts which was frowned upon both by the administration and by

## Rowdyism by Central Service Gang

7

many residents. While it is undoubtedly true that some leaders participated from behind the scene, they alone do not explain the nature of the acts.

One fact that impresses an observer is the spontaneity with which the whole series of acts were touched off. From the accounts available, no coaxing was necessary to persuade the young boys to storm the Ad building or to put out the fires in block stoves. This suggests that the boys were "set" to carry out rowdy acts of this nature. It is reasonable to presume that the Central Service workers acted in the way they did, not merely because of the prompting of an older leader, but because of a preparedness on their part.

One factor which should be considered in explaining the rowdy acts is the ways of behavior considered acceptable by the boys participating in these acts. The nucleus of the group seems to be a gang, or perhaps gangs, of young fellows in their late teens ~~and~~ or early twenties. It is known that within such groups the acceptable modes of behavior are generally diametrically opposite to those of the society in general. Their acceptable ways include a variety of acts, such as drinking, smoking, gambling, pilfering, swearing, ignoring common courtesies of speech, wearing dirty, flashy, or otherwise conspicuous clothes, etc. They ~~are~~ often expected to show a willingness to fight a matter out rather than to use persuasion. They are expected to frown upon those who always obey social codes, who go to church, who dress up, who go in for books and education. While the extreme-

## Rowdiness by Central Service Gang

ness of the non-conformity of behavior depends upon the particular gang or group, there are indications that those involved in the rowdy activities are among the extreme in non-conforming behavior. In fact, the workers in the warehouse area--truck drivers, coal crew, garbage crew, garage mechanics, warehouse workers--are generally characterized by behavior considered by others as rough and unrefined.

These non-conforming group ways make some aspects of the rowdy behavior understandable. The threatening attitude, the use of force, the rough language used can be considered acceptable ways of behavior for these boys. Their readiness to make the people suffer and to destruct community and government property are also in line with ways considered acceptable by the group. It should be recalled that the law-abiding segment of the population is the object of antagonism by the non-conforming groups. For this reason, too, it is not surprising that the group was anti-administration. Attributing these acts to group ways, however, does not explain the situation completely, such as the hastiness of the acts. Also, it does not explain the existence of the group ways themselves.

Another factor that might be considered is the social status of the rowdy boys. The status of these boys within the community is generally very low. In terms of occupations, they are in jobs which are considered manual labor. The job of the coal crew, for instance, is considered one of the dirtiest and least preferred jobs on the project. Because of their low status, they are likely to be antagonistic toward those in

higher positions than they. This would explain in part their willingness to make the people suffer, but would not account for other aspects of the situation.

Another factor that might be considered is intelligence. In general, the lower the IQ, the lower the status of the occupation pursued. It is generally thought that the intelligence of the rowdy group is lower than that of boys who, say, go on to college, enjoy reading serious books, or getting white collar jobs. If this is true, it is possible to account for the hastiness of the acts by the general intelligence level of the group. If the activities of the group were directed by older leaders, the intelligence of the leaders could account for the lack of foresight shown. Actually, however, this factor of intelligence in and of itself explains very little.

Another way of viewing the situation is to conceive of forces at work held in equilibrium, which is upset by a crisis, thus making some forces more effective than usual. The forces can be either social or individual in nature. A stable society can be thought of as one in which the equilibrium has been maintained steadily, while an unstable one is one in which equilibrium is difficult to maintain. In time of crisis the equilibrium maintained is likely to be upset, and this walkout can be conceived of as just such a crisis in which the nonconforming element of the population, which is usually suppressed by the more conforming segment of the community, momentarily gains an upper hand.

For the purpose of this analysis, the balance of forces between the conforming segment of the population and the non-conforming, "rowdy" elements should be studied. The conformists, in comparison to the non-conformists, are, in this case, greater in number and power. They decide what is considered right or wrong in a community and what is to be the acceptable modes of behavior. They have the power to reward those who conform to community ways through social functions, marriages, jobs, etc. They have decreed, so to speak, the acceptable mode of dressing or of use of language. Persuasion is considered desirable; the use of force, except by those with authority, is outlawed. Hard work, education, cooperation with members of the community are encouraged. Their attitude towards the non-conforming "rowdies" is that they are of an inferior status, that their behavior is wrong, that they are not intelligent.

On the other hand, the non-conforming "rowdy" element of the population is small in number and lack power. For one thing, they are generally limited to boys in their late teens and early twenties. (This is an age range in which the boys can break away from the control of their parents and when they have not yet fully felt the pressure of the community and the responsibility of married life which comes with increasing age.) Their status in the community is low, generally by virtue of their being non-conformists. Usually they do not get the better jobs in the community, and are most likely to get unskilled jobs or such jobs as mechanics, which do not require a great deal of edu-

cation. The ways that they maintain standards are often conflicting with those of the acceptable community standards. For instance, they often dress in dirty clothes, and use profane language. The use of force is considered the acceptable way. They stay up till late and gamble for big stakes, both of which are frowned upon by the people. Some of their modes of behavior seem to be reactions to their predicament and methods of maintaining an equilibrium between their ways and the ways of the dominant and conforming segment of the population. They often go around in gangs, which is a means of maintaining security in the face of superior forces. They resort to the use of force probably not only because it is outlawed, but also because it helps to make up for their lack of power. Their conspicuous mode of dress and speech is sometimes considered a means of compensating for their lack of status. Their attitude toward the rest of the population is one of defiance and resentment. Stealing or destroying their property, breaking up their social events, as well as defying their social codes is within the realm of the activities of the rowdy boys. They maintain this same sort of attitude toward the administration, which has a status even higher than any possessed by evacuee groups.

What then are some of the forces at work between the conforming and non-conforming segment of the population? On the one hand, there is effort made to maintain the status quo-- i.e., the balance of power in the hands of the conforming group.

On the other hand, a corresponding effort to upset this status quo is made by the non-conforming group. On the one hand, the acceptable ways of the community are enforced, while on the other hand, a less stronger force is exerted to break down these ways and to maintain non-conforming ways. On both sides there is resentment against the other, which is likely to show up in actual retaliations when opportunities are offered. Between these opposing forces some sort of equilibrium is usually maintained. Sometimes, the non-conforming element is well suppressed. At other times, it is left alone by the rest of the population, as long as it does not become too obnoxious. But usually the balance of power is held by the conforming segment of the population, which leaves the non-conforming elements dissatisfied with the status quo.

Life in the relocation center has caused a change of situation which has upset the equilibrium of forces, but it has not changed the general relationship between the conforming and non-conforming segment of the population. Camp life has caused loose work habits, tendency to condone pilfering, increased gambling among the youth. All of these indicate the loss of control by the conforming segment of the population over the non-conforming elements. With many of the real leaders of the community interned, persons without real leadership ability have been able to worm into positions of responsibility. In general, however, the conservative forces has been able to retain a great deal of their

former balance of power. The rowdy kids, consequently, have been able to get only menial jobs, such as truck drivers, coal crew, mechanics, warehouse workers, garbage crew. Their gambling activities have generally been limited to their own group, and they have not interfered very much with the social activities of the other more conservative youngsters.

It should be remembered that many of the people were dissatisfied with the tendency of the leaders to cooperate with the administration rather than the people. This dissatisfaction was voiced most often by the dissatisfied element of the population, and this was probably true of the rowdy boys. In other words, in their dissatisfaction, they were both for and against the people. They were with the people in being dissatisfied with the leaders and the administration, and they were dissatisfied with the people because of their own lower status. In this light, the activities of the rowdy boys begin to become understandable.

The boilermen walkout received the support of many individuals of both high and low status. But it was the dissatisfied individuals who supported the walkout the most enthusiastically as a means of upsetting the status quo. Some saw the status quo as the domination of the Japanese by Caucasians, others viewed it in terms of the pro-administration leaders, still others thought more of increasing tendency toward voluntary work. The young rowdy kids were among the first to lend their support to the walkout, and their motive was apparently to win the strike

against the administration. They were getting a chance to express their dissatisfaction against the administration. Their resentment toward the people was shown in the process of attempting to win the strike. They approached with them an overbearing manner, used threat and force to make them do their bidding, attempted to cause damage to their block property, increased their inconvenience by refusing to let them have hot water. While all of these acts were carried out presumably to win the walkout, they are not understandable unless they are conceived as expressions of resentment by the rowdy group towards the conforming segment of the community.

How did the boilermen strike make it possible for the balance of power to be upset in favor of the rowdy elements? Since most of the people were in favor of a victory over the administration, the support of any individual was welcomed. Since the people felt helpless against the superior power of the administration, the use of force in order to effect a victory was also welcomed. Since the more conservative people feared taking any drastic action against the administration for fear of retaliations, the leadership of those willing to take the risk in leading a movement to win the walkout was welcomed. For these reasons and probably others, the domination of the rowdy elements was not quickly opposed.

The action of the rowdy elements in forcing the Ad building boilerman to quit and their starting a work stoppage on the project

was general hailed as a source of strength for the people. On the other hand, when the people were made to suffer by having to go without hot water, without heat in the latrines, and without jobs, they began to resent the action of the rowdy boys. This was especially true of those who were not in sympathy with the walkout in the first place. Consequently, as the walkout was prolonged, the voice of dissatisfaction against the rowdy kids increased. There were talk in some quarter of taking action against the "cayote" rather than against the inu. For fear of retaliation, however, nothing was done. After the boilermen walkout was settled, however, the relationship between the conforming segment of the population and the non-conforming element returned to their former basis. There had been only a momentary upsetting of the balance of power between the two groups.

ds  
Minidoka  
Report on Boilermen Walkout

TULEAN REACTION TO BOILERMEN WALKOUT

Tuleans showed as much interest in the boilermen walk-out as did most Minidokans, if not more. The former did not agree on their stand for or against the walkout, some being for it and others against it. Their interest in the boilermen dispute, however, was characterized by unanimity in criticizing the poor manner in which the dispute was being conducted. Whether they were for or against the walkout, they pointed out certain shortcomings on the part of those presumably responsible for the way in which the strike was carried out. Besides/ this, Tuleans were incensed when they were blamed by Minidokans <sup>for</sup> ~~pro~~ instigating the strike. Both of these showed a definite cleavage between Tuleans and Minidokans. The greatest divergence in views was observable between the two groups of people in connection with the solution of the dispute. Where Minidokans seemed to be relatively satisfied with it, Tuleans showed that they were plainly disgusted with the way in which the dispute had ended.

Many Tuleans were in favor of the walkout in spite of the many criticisms they made about it. At the time of the walkout, surprise was expressed by some Tuleans when they learned that the Minidokans showed enough "guts" to oppose the administration. One married nisei with a baby stated that he could go without hot water for a while, but he pointed out that the strike wasn't being conducted in the right manner. Another said: "As long as we've come this far, we

should help the boilermen. If the whole project goes on a strike, we'll strike, too." A Nisei girl working in the Administration Building said: "I don't understand these Minidokans. You don't get anywhere by sticking with the 'Hakujins.'" A Nisei from California said: "Even if the strike fails, all of the time, we should show the 'Hakujins' that they can't kick us around." Enthusiastic support for the walkout was highest at the beginning of it, and as the dispute continued criticisms from Tuleans increased. When the solution was announced, criticisms reached their highest level.

Some Tuleans were against the walkout from the very beginning. One Issei woman, for instance, pointed out that the janitors were merely being lazy. The same fact was pointed out by a quiet intelligent internee. A quiet couple said that they would be in favor of a fight against the administration, but they were opposed to a strike which made only the people suffer. An Issei leader from Tule Lake said that he was not supporting the strike because he felt that there was no chance for victory, anyway. Some of the Tuleans were not opposed to the strike itself as they were to the fact that it was a strike in which the Japanese alone suffered.

The Tuleans' interest in the "strike", as they most often termed it, was in the abundance of acute criticisms made against the way in which it was being conducted. Minidokans appeared relatively naive in the eyes of the Tuleans. Complaints of the Minidokans ~~were lodged by those~~ opposed to the dispute

generally were based on the grounds that the people were being made to suffer. The criticisms by Tuleans were more extensive. Practically all who expressed any opinion on this subject agreed that the strike was being very poorly conducted. For one thing it was very frequently pointed out that the Japanese were taking it out on themselves. For another, the wrong time of the year had been chosen. The right thing to do, it was pointed out, was to make the Caucasians suffer. Many felt that this should be accomplished by having a general work stoppage, a la Tule Lake. A few felt that pipes should be allowed to freeze. The Issai leader who felt that the strike was lost from the very beginning pointed out that the people had not protested about the employment cut in the summertime and that it was too late to complain now. Others pointed to the fact that there was poor planning and organization. The people were being shoved around, for instance, by young kids, and the people weren't organized to support the walkout. Many pointed out that the people were not consulted on the matter even once, and that they were not even properly informed by the leaders as to ~~what~~ what was what. Some of the criticisms fell directly on the Minidokans themselves. Some said that they were too "soft" and did not have "guts" and were afraid to let the pipes freeze or go on a general strike. Others said that they were too "loyal" (meaning cooperative) and volunteered their work where they did not have to. They were accused of not being unified and of being too individualistic. They

did not care, some said, about what concerned the people as a whole as long as they themselves were satisfied.

Most Tuleans expressed indignation when Minidokans accused them of having instigated the strike. They pointed out that there was hardly any Tuleans among the boilermen. When the administration accused the Tuleans of having organized the strike, they retorted that no Tuleans was directly involved in it (except for a Seattle lawyer who acted as an advisor to the boilermen). One Issei resented the flattery from a Minidokan that people from California were "courageous", and retorted that it didn't make much difference because there weren't many people here from California. When an Issei woman from Tule Lake was told that she was probably used to strikes, she retorted that in Tule Lake they never had strikes in which the people had to suffer. These accusations were received in the same indignant manner as the accusations that Tuleans were having had influence on young boys. Tuleans did admit, however, that they had an indirect influence in bringing about the walkout. They admitted telling the Minidokans that they gave in to the administration too often and did not make enough demands. They pointed to the volunteering which the Minidokans acceded to, and to the lack of firewood and clothes-racks and other things which Tuleans were able to get through unified action.

Tuleans were plainly disgusted with the way in which the boilermen dispute had been settled and were at a loss

to understand how such a solution had been reached. Their reaction first was that the people had lost the dispute, since the administration had refused to increase workers and the boilermen had gone back to work. The people had lost the fight and the settlement could not have been any worse, in the mind of Tuleans. Their real surprise came when they discovered the terms under which they had gone back to work. The boilermen were to be paid for the time they did not work. Their Sunday schedule was arranged so that they would be working 44 hours a week (less than before). There would be no discrimination against the workers who went back to work. All of these terms were acceptable to the Tuleans. The block stoves, however, were definitely not to be the responsibility of the boilermen, but were to be tended by the block people. This last term angered the Tuleans because the boilermen had gone back to work without having made arrangements for the block stoves, too. It was not only that the janitors had been ~~making it impossible for the people to win their demand~~ ~~for~~ selfish. They had broken the strike by going back to work, making it impossible for the people to win their demand for extra workers. They had allowed the administration to "buy them out" with lenient terms for themselves. They had gone back to jobs which they had once quit, not because they were asked to, but because it brought personal advantages to them. This act made Tuleans cry, "Shame, (darashi ga nai) selfish, backstabbers." If the demands could not be won, Tuleans agreed the boilermen should not

have gone back to work--they should have let someone else take their jobs. In Tule Lake, they said, they would have been beaten up if they had gone back to work under such terms. If they just had to go back to work, the least that they could have offered the block residents were profuse apologies for having returned to work without winning their demands after making them suffer and intentions of making up for it by tending the stoves themselves.

In the minds of the Tuleans, since negotiations backed up by a walkout had failed to produce extra workers, there was no sense in carrying on negotiations for tenders for the block stoves. In the first place, the administration could not be expected to do something which they refused to do under pressure from the people. They did not care whether the people suffered from cold as long as this did not affect their position in any way. The only things that the administration would fear, in the conjecture of one Tulean, at least, were the possibility of pipes freezing (which was not likely), of a fire hazard, and of extreme dissatisfaction on the part of the people. To the Tuleans the boilermen and stove dispute had come to an end. In the second place, to go up to the administration to ask for additional help when they failed in their "demand" for the same thing would be shameful. The people would only be laughed at by the administration. The Tuleans felt that there was no sense in the people's making fools of themselves in that way.

The Tuleans charged the Minidokans with being individualistic and selfish. The boilermen were grossly selfish in looking after only their own needs. The other Minidokans who allowed the boilermen to get away with this sort of act displayed a lack of interest in community affairs, according to the Tuleans. One Tuleans stated that when he first came here he found out that here each man was for himself. He declared that it was a waste of time to become a leader of the people because they never got together on a matter.

It is clear that where Tuleans supported the walk-out they did so on the ground that it was a dispute between the people and the administration. Many people opposed the walkout precisely because only the people were being made to suffer. Some of the criticisms that they expressed also showed that they viewed the walkout as a "strike", in which the people or the boilermen were attempting to win certain demands from the administration. Disappointment was expressed by Tuleans when the settlement was reached because these demands were not won and the people lost the fight.

The abundance of criticism on the part of the Tuleans is indicative of both the split between the Tuleans and Minidokans and also differences in their views toward the same incident. The split between Tuleans and Minidokans is shown by the excessive criticism of the walkout by Tuleans. Even those who were in favor of the walkout

criticized it severely. They played the role of the kibitzer who does not hesitate to point out flaws in the move made by a protagonist in a battle. Some criticisms were hurled directly at the Minidokans, charging that they were too "soft" and lacked "guts" and indicated the existence of some antagonism between the two. This excessive criticism on the part of Tuleans could be viewed as possibly a defensive measure. This reaction would not have been expected if the Tuleans were well-integrated into the community and indicated, possibly, the lack of full acceptance here felt by the Tuleans.

The criticisms are also indicative of the fact that Tuleans have a definite concept of how a strike should be conducted. The acuteness and abundance of criticisms made by the Tuleans might be due more to the difference in views between the two groups rather than to the antagonism that exist between them. As was mentioned before, all indications are that Tuleans look upon this dispute as a fight (struggle) between the people or a segment of the people with the administration. The criticisms made by the Tuleans bear out this interpretation. One criticism made was that the strike was not succeeding because it wasn't being carried out "Tule style," with a general work stoppage. Another was that the Japanese were taking it out on themselves rather than on the Caucasians. They seemed to find difficulty in explaining to themselves why the Japanese should be made to suffer unnecessarily.

They also felt that the Japanese should stick together closely. Another criticism that was frequently made by Tuleans was that the leaders did not consult the people even once on the walkout and did not even keep them decently informed of the proceedings of the negotiations. From these criticisms we get a good picture of the Tulean's concept of how a protest against the administration should ~~with~~ be carried out. The people should unite against the administration in striking. The strike should be carried out against the administration and care taken not to let the people suffer. The leaders should consult the people on important matters and keep them well informed of the progress of the negotiations. It might be added that the Tuleans felt that the way to win a strike was by showing strength and not weakness.

The accusations against the Tuleans that they were the instigators of the strike indicates the sort of concept that Minidokans have of Tuleans. They are generally thought of as being "rowdies", and to many Minidokans (and administrative officials) it is not strange that Tuleans stirred up trouble for them. Tuleans, however, are also thought of as "having guts", meaning that they are not afraid to oppose the administration. For this reason it is not strange to find a Minidokan approaching a Tulean leader and telling him that the Tuleans made it possible to stage a strike and that people from California were good because they were courageous, or another to say

that Tule Lake people are good because they are for the people. While some Minidokans accuse the Tuleans of stirring up trouble, the more dissatisfied but timid ones (as X pointed out) want the Tuleans to wage their battle for them. Also, because Minidokans have found that their own leaders in the past have favored the administration more than the people some rely upon Tuleans to champion the cause of the people. In this regard, it should be pointed out that the most dissatisfied elements among the block residents generally have welcomed the Tuleans most cordially. This can be viewed as those without power in a group banding together for strength.

The general attitude of the Tuleans toward the settlement reached brings out both their marginal predicament and their preconception of what they considered an acceptable solution of the dispute. Many Tuleans played a dual role--backed up the walkout as a fight against the administration and at the same time criticized it severely. While they favored a victory over the administration, they refrained from giving Minidokans much credit for staging the sort of fight that they did. When the settlement of the dispute was announced, Tuleans were greatly disappointed because the Japanese had lost. At the same time the Tuleans were inclined to say: "The Minidokans aren't capable of even staging a decent strike." and to get some satisfaction out of this thought. During the walkout some Tuleans experienced close relationship with

boilermen and arbitration committee members. After the settlement a decided gulf was created between Tuleans and Minidokans. Any hope entertained at the beginning of the walkout that this incident might serve to bring Tuleans and Minidokans closer together was shattered by the irreconcilable difference in their views on the settlement reached. The Tuleans were not greeted as saviours, nor were the Minidokans praised for staging a<sup>un</sup> successful strike.

The settlement brought out very clearly some preconceptions that Tuleans had about how strikes should be settled. For one thing, they emphasize loyalty of the people to the group cause. In this dispute that cause was the gaining of extra workers, or the winning of the struggle against the administration.

The Tuleans' disappointment when the boilermen went back to work without winning their demands was to be expected since they looked upon this as a defeat on the part of the people. But what surprised was that the boilermen went back to work in total disregard of the group cause. Not only was the fight itself lost when the boilermen went back to work without winning their demands, they did not see to it that the needs of the group--tanders for the block stoves--were taken care of. The leaders also did not see to it that the people gain their demands. Tuleans were surprised when the Minidokans remained relatively unconcerned about this flagrant disloyalty of the boiler-

men to the group.

Another preconception of the Tuleans revealed by their reaction to the settlement was that of "honor". This concept of "honor" rested on the loyalty of the ~~group~~ individual--unselfishness. It also rested upon a high valuation of "principles" rather than of personal gain. In the walkout the boilermen left their jobs because of a "principle"--demand for extra workers. They could not very well go back to their jobs if they did not win their demands without "losing face". But to return because it was more convenient and comfortable to them was additional reason for loss of "honor". But to achieve personal gains and sacrifice the cause of the group, in the minds of the Tuleans, was downright treachery. It was for this reason that some Tuleans felt that the people should turn upon the boilermen and force them to tend the block stoves or to quit their work. That the Minidokans did not see matters in this light was again a source of surprise to Tuleans.

ds

## Caucasian Reaction to the Boilermen Dispute

The reaction of Caucasians to the boilermen dispute differs somewhat according to the individual and also to his position. The project director and the Community Analyst probably would take differing views of a situation both from the standpoint of differences in training and in position. Nevertheless, a somewhat striking similarity in views of many Caucasians can be discovered when their reactions are compared to those of the evacuees in general. While it is important to attempt an explanation of the differences, in this section the main emphasis will be laid on the similarities which can be compared with a similar analysis of the people. Whether such comparisons are valid or not will not be considered at present.

For the purpose of our analysis Green, Supervisor of the Maintenance workers; Davidson, Assistant Project Director; Stafford, Project Director; John Bigelow, Reports Officer; Hohn de Young, Community Analyst; Jerome Light, High School principal; and Rev. Thompson, Methodist minister might be considered since data is available concerning them. Even *if* the sampling is high selective, the data is still useful to us because we are interested in offering possible explanations for facts concerning these people. Hohn de Young's position is especially interesting because he is supposed to represent neither the administration nor the evacuees, and in his work he is required to criticize both of them.

Green Supervisor of the Maintenance workers, has been

reported to be highly arrogant in his dealings with evacuees. Back in October when it first became necessary for someone to keep fires going in the six block stoves because of the cold weather, he issued a memo instructing the boilermen and janitors to do their share of the work if they did not want to be fired. It was again Green who precipitated the boilermen walkout by demanding them to work on a three-shift basis instead of two without increase in the number of workers. The statements that he made were interpreted as having been a threat to fire those who did not comply with his request.

When the boilermen decided to quit work at the end of the year Stafford was away for a vacation, and in his place he left Davidson, Assistant Project Director in charge of the Project. Davidson first requested that the boilermen continue work until the fourth. Evidently he did not realize the seriousness of the situation until he went to the meeting he held with the maintenance workers. The stand that he took was that an increase in the number of workers was impossible because Washington had already determined that the number of workers in the division would have to be reduced. He asked the boilermen to return to work pending further adjustment within the budget set by Washington. To back up his plea he pointed out that the representatives of the block residents (block delegates) were probably interested in seeing the maintenance workers go back to their jobs, there was employment shortage within the project, and

finally that the administration might have to turn off the water in order to keep the pipes from bursting.

The following day he called in the block managers to discuss the situation. He refused flatly to increase the number of workers. He offered to remove Green as supervisor of maintenance workers, but covered this up by announcing that this change had already been in effect on January 1, Then he prevailed upon the block managers to consider a plan whereby the maintenance workers would go back to work on the old schedule pending further adjustment when Stafford returned to the project.

On the following day a group of women stormed into his office to demand hot water. He attempted to explain the situation to the women, and started off by saying:

"We're in war. Man power is very important and It's very essential that everybody work efficiently and work the full 8 hours a day. It was worked out throught the Washington Office that everybody must work 8 hours a day, therefore, instead of having four men in the block we have to reduce down." Davidson maintained that the proposed three shifts could be worked out with the present quota of workers. He told the women that if they wanted hot water they should get volunteer workers, other workers, or the old workers to do the job. He told the women that he would send their petition to Washington providing the men went back to work. The women, angered, went out and sent their petition to Washington themselves.

The rest of the negotiations were carried on by him-<sup>1</sup>self with the arbitration committee, which refused to deal with Davidson.

Stafford maintained that the number of maintenance workers could not be increased because of budget limitations set by Washington. He was willing to give up the three shifts, and allow the boilermen to return to work on the old schedule. In doing this the stove problem was to be divorced from the boiler problem. The former, he hinted, involved fire hazards and damages to government property because of cold weather, and was the responsibility of the administration. He strongly maintained that he himself could not increase the number of workers and allowed the arbitration committee to send a petition (an extremely weak one) to Washington. On the same teletype message, however, he stated the stand taken by himself--"The premise of Minidoka's administration's position is one of budget limitation." He refused to make any more concessions than those he had already made, and the matter was settled by the maintenance workers going back to work on the old schedule as he had suggested. He expressed willingness to prolong the negotiations until summertime. He refused to do anything more to stove problem.

In spite of the apparent skill with which Stafford handles the boilermen dispute, he was not entirely satisfied with the outcome. He felt that the administration had lost some prestige by his having returned to the project when he had left Davison in charge. Henceforth, the people

would not be satisfied until they saw him about ~~the~~<sup>the</sup> matter. He had also been forced to make concessions in order to settle the matter.

He also felt certain that some Tuleans were behind the boilermen walkout because Minidoka had been a quiet center until the Tuleans came in.

Hohn Bigelow, Reports Officer, was not involved in the boilermen dispute directly, but he had on his hands voluminous minutes of meetings and also wrote several accounts of the dispute for the Irrigator and the Twin Falls paper. His accounts were purely chronological in nature. Statements that he made to the writer during an interview were more revealing of his attitude. He did not know, he said, why the people would want to cause a great deal of trouble over such a small matter. It could only give them the satisfaction of getting the best of the WRA. On the other hand, it would make relationships with the people on the outside difficult. It would add discomforts to the lives of the people. The administration had to do what it did because of orders from Washington. The WRA couldn't help its position because it had given the public to understand that it wasn't a "weak sister."

De Young, the Community Analyst, viewed the work stoppage as being serious, showing that he was not in sympathy with it. He felt that the arbitration committee was going too far when it did not believe Stafford's stand that he could not increase the number of workers because of budgetary limitations. He felt that the dispute

would not have occurred had the administration handled the matter more skillfully.

The day following a series of outbreaks of "rowdyism" on the project, Jerome T. Light, High School Principal, circulated a mimeographed statement among his students. In this he censured the use of force in achieving an aim, claiming that it was not the American way of life. (J. 1/6/44# 10)

Rev. Thompson, Methodist minister, did not know the details of the boilermen walkout, but he had his own ideas on the subject. In a conversation with the writer he stated that the conflict had been caused by Tuleans. He also thought that the walkout was foolish because it created a bad impression on the outside. He spoke at quite a length about achieving the ideals of democracy in Europe after the war.

Each individual shall now be commented upon separately. Green's arrogant attitude toward evacuee workers is not typical, since he is often pointed out by evacuees as being the worst one in the administration. He differs from some of the others in that he shows openly his dislike of Japanese and his feeling of superiority over them. He does not differ from others, however, in his use of authority to give orders to his men. His use of threat in handling his men is an extreme instance of reliance upon his authority. It is doubtful that he would have used this threatening attitude if evacuees were able to retaliate against him effectively. His whole attitude is that of a person in a position of power ordering about his subordinates.

Evacuees have found Davidson much less objectionable than Green. In dealing with the boilermen, his attitude was that Washington orders had to be carried out. Here he was relying upon Washington orders for guidance rather than to evacuee needs. In all fairness to him, however, it should be pointed out that he was willing to study and discuss the problem thoroughly. He showed, however, that he was willing to make only minor concessions. He was not willing to increase a single worker, he did not want to discard the three-shift proposal, and was only willing to remove Green as head of the maintenance workers. Davidson was not as blunt as Green, but he used some threats in order to attempt to get the boilermen to go back to work. He threatened to turn off the water, pointed out that there was employment shortage on the project, and remarked that

the block residents were anxious to have the boilermen continue on their jobs. In dealing with the women who came to see him he showed his basic stand. It was wartime. Washington ordered the people to work 8 hours a day, etc.

Stafford seems to have sized up the situation much better than either Green or Davidson, and he handled it with greater skill. His basic stand was that he could not change the budget set by Washington. He made only one major concession in the beginning and did not make any more. He offered the boilermen the opportunity of going back to work on the old schedule. Not only was he not willing to give in to any other demands, he did not intend to do anything for the people in regard to workers to tend the block stoves. His stand was definitely one of allowing minimum adjustment of needs. He was also opposed to allowing evacuees to gain concessions through bargaining. In other ~~words~~ words, he believed that the administration should tell the people how matters should be run within the center. Stafford handled his negotiation skillfully avoiding <sup>open</sup> ~~some~~ threats, allowing the arbitration committee to send a petition to Washington, showing willingness to negotiate until summertime if necessary. He came to the conclusion that Tuleans were behind the strike, indicating that he considered Minidokans cooperative and satisfied with the present state of affairs.

Bigelow elaborated on the basis <sup>upon</sup> which the administration carried out orders from Washington. The WRA had to deal

with the outside public which was given to understand that the WRA was no "weak sister". In other words, public pressure from reactionary sources was considered important in setting the policy on the project. He also pointed out that the relationship with the outside public would suffer if the dispute were prolonged. Here again the people are expected to conform to public opinion on the outside. In his inability to understand how the dispute became as large as it did when it did not mean any improvement in physical comfort he shows a lack of insight into the feeling of the evacuees.

De Young showed definite sympathy with the stand of the administration that the number of workers could not be increased. He criticized the administration for poor handling of the dispute, and he gave the employment cut as a partial cause of the walkout. However, he was not in sympathy with the work stoppage which occurred in the beginning. While he showed some insight into the basic causes of the walkout, he did not sympathize with the evacuees in their attempt to get extra workers. He was not anxious to see the status quo in the relation between the administration and evacuees upset.

Jerome Light's statement that the use of force was undemocratic indicates that he believes the status quo here to be in conformity with his ideals of democracy and the use of force to upset this relationship was wrong.

Rev. Thompson shows a lack of insight into the feeling of the evacuees when he blames Tuleans for the dispute. He assumes that Minidokans are "good" and Tuleans are "bad". The desirable relationship to him is one in which the evacuees cooperate with the administration and do not complain or cause trouble. He sees the importance of maintaining good relationships with the outside public, but not of demanding of the administration what evacuees consider to be reasonable. His talk of democracy also assumes that the status quo in the center is acceptable to him.

From this analysis it is possible to build some concepts which govern the behavior of these Caucasians in their relation with evacuees. First, there is a general agreement in their understanding of the relation between the administration and evacuees. The evacuees are expected to "cooperate" with the administration and abide by the orders issued by it. The administration possess the authority to govern how the evacuees are to live within the project. In terms of individual contacts, Caucasians are vested with more rights than are evacuees. This places the Caucasians in a position of superiority in relation to evacuees. While there are individual differences from the arrogant Green to the more humble Rev. Thompson, who firmly believes in democracy, the acceptable relationship between the administration and the evacuees is that final authority rest in the former rather than in the latter.

In this regard Minidokans until now have been viewed as "good", while Tuleans are considered "bad". Minidokans were thought to have acted in the acceptable way by being "cooperative," acceding to the wishes of the administration. Minidokans upheld the status quo. Tuleans, on the other hand, are thought of as troublemakers. Unlike Minidokans they make demands upon the administration and sometimes refuse to obey the administration. They upset the status quo. Here we see the working of the preconception of a fixed relationship. This relationship can hardly be called democratic in any sense of the word, but even this term has been applied indirectly to this relationship.

The concept of a fixed relationship can be extended beyond the project level in two directions. First, the administration derives its authority from the Washington Office. What Washington orders, the administration must carry out. When there is a conflict between orders from Washington and demands of the evacuees, the former is considered the acceptable direction to be followed. The "right" step to be taken is predetermined; orders from the Washington Office are not to be questioned. For the same reason in case of doubt between two possible steps to be taken the Washington Office is consulted when the decision is considered important one.

Second, both the administration and evacuees must consider the opinion of the outside public. If it does not want the WRA to "coddle" the evacuees, it should not do so. If the evacuees are expected to be thankful for whatever treatment they receive, they should not protest against the administration. The evacuees are expected to maintain a "good" relationship with the outside public, meaning behaving in a manner acceptable to the public. From this comes the admonition not to cause trouble within the center because it will have repercussions on public opinion in Twin Falls.

Consequently, there is a preconception of a hierarchy as source of authority. First, public opinion and the Washington Office, and second, the administration, and third the evacuees. This relationship is anything but democratic, but

Caucasians seem to accept it without giving it much thought.

Another tendency that is observable is for the administration to make only minimum adjustment of demands made by the evacuees when those demands are not in line with administrative instructions. The administration refused to increase workers, and made only the concessions necessary to keep a smooth relationship with the evacuees. Although Stafford maintained that tending the block stoves was an administrative responsibility, he did not intend to provide workers for this purpose because he did not think that it would become necessary. This refusal to make more than minimal adjustments to evacuee demands indicates the state of affair the administration desires to maintain.

The assumption of the superior position of the administration in carrying out administrative instructions from Washington is a rather basic point of view. The opposite view would be that administrative instructions should be gradually revised in the light of evacuee needs and local condition. This basic stand of the inviolability of administrative instructions, however, is reinforced by a lack of insight into the real state of evacuee minds. In local terminology "Hakujins do not understand Evacuee psychology." The assumption that the majority of the Minidokans have generally been content with the state of affairs within the project is one of these. Another is the belief that Tulcans instigated Minidokans into striking against the administra-

tion. The inability of most Caucasians to understand why evacuees were so anxious to obtain an increase of workers even though they suffered physical discomfort is indicative of lack of insight.

This lack of insight is sometimes caused by a difference in outlook. Evacuees believe that they are entitled to care for the duration because they were involuntarily uprooted from their homes, whereas Caucasians often feel that evacuees are fortunate in being provided for by the Government. Caucasians assume that it is natural for evacuees to work a full 44 hours a week, whereas a great many evacuees feel that they are being exploited if they work full time for only \$16. a month. These fundamental differences in viewing the same situation cause a lack of insight of one party into the thinking of the other. Among Caucasians there are individual differences in the amount of insight they possess into the thinking of evacuees, but even the community analyst, whose business it is to study both the evacuees and the administration, does not completely understand the behavior of evacuees.

Some mention might be made of the method employed to impose the administrative view upon the people. There are individual differences in the skill demonstrated in dealing <sup>(with evacuees)</sup> As an example of a man at one extreme, Green has openly shown a haughty attitude toward evacuees. Davidson has shown more tolerance than Green to evacuee demands, but he failed to satisfy the boilermen sufficiently to persuade them to

return to their jobs pending further adjustment. He employed the threat to turn off the water supply and to replace the boilermen with other workers, both of which were unsuccessful. Stafford showed the greatest skill in handling the situation. He gave in to a certain extent when he retracted the 24 hour schedule, and then held the line on all other evacuee demands. He gave the boilermen sufficient concessions to persuade them to return to work, and left the problem of tending the block stoves to the block residents and the maintenance workers. He allowed the arbitration committee to send a request for extra workers to Washington and saw to it that Washington was informed of the stand of the project administration. The factors accounting for this difference in skill in handling the same situation by three different must be studied on another occasion.

ds

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The boilermen walkout involved different groups of people, and it is possible to analyze their relationship to one another. In this way, it is possible to reconstruct at least a part of what may be called the "social structure" of the community as revealed in the walkout. Some of the groups that have participated in the walkout are:

1. Public
2. Washington WRA office
3. Local Administration
4. Evacuee leaders
5. People
  - a. Satisfied and dissatisfied people
  - b. Boilermen and janitors
  - c. Rowdy boys
  - d. Tuleans
  - e. Seattle vs Portland people.

Except for one possible device it would seem to be very difficult to compare groups so diverse in nature. That device is one which is revealed as an important factor in determining the activities of one group in relation to another. That device is to compare the groups in terms of what is generally referred to as "social status".

A general outline of the social structure of the WRA project situation is already available. In the first place, the project itself is fairly well isolated from neighbors and the "outside" world and is a highly self-contained community. Another distinct difference, which has been referred to as being semi-caste in nature, is the Caucasian-Japanese difference. Within the project, the Caucasian workers, representing the local administration, occupy a position superior to, and different from, that taken by evacuees, who are inmates evacuated from the Coast. It is the task of the administrators to carry out their duties as heads of this institution, while the rights and the privileges of the evacuees are not known at all, although it is often presumed that they are being given treatment comparable to, or better than, that accorded to internees.

Using this general outline as a basis, we can proceed to indicate some of the details which are missing.

#### 1. Washington Office

While the local administration has been fairly autonomous in many aspects of its activities, the basic and important instructions concerning administration is issued to the local administration from the Washington office. There seems to be an increasing tendency toward greater central control. The general employment cut which was begun in the summer of 1943, was ordered from Washington. More recently, the Washington

office has ordered further cuts and has also determined the maximum number of workers to be employed in each division and in certain jobs. The local administration, then, was required to take its orders from the Washington office.

The Washington office seems to have centered its policy around its relocation program, the employment cut presumably being in line with this policy. From time to time, the central office made concessions to demands made by the local project administration, as when the quota of maintenance workers for the blocks was changed from 52 to 164 for Minidoka. At other times, the Washington office had to make concessions to public opinion.

## 2. Public Opinion

Public opinion is mentioned by several Caucasians as being important in the boilermen situation. Public opinion is given as the reason why the WRA must not be a "weak sister", and also why the people should not start an incident within the center. It should be noted that public opinion is thought of having a power over the WRA, hence through the Washington office. Also, it is thought of having power more locally of refusing the evacuees to go shopping, to go to work, and to go out to live. This more local public opinion is represented by the people of Twin Falls and vicinity. Some of the local administrators are residents of Twin Falls and vicinity, and others make trips there

quite frequently. Consequently, they feel the pressure of public opinion directly. The relationship between the people of Twin Falls and the project has been fairly amicable in the past, and this has been attributed to the fact that the project furnished much-needed farm workers to the nearby farmers. The walkout was written up in the Twin Falls papers as a strike, but it does not seem to have created an adverse effect on the relationship between the project and the towns-people.

One interesting fact is that evacuees generally did not think in terms of the outside people. They appealed to the Washington office, but they did not stop to think what effect the walkout might have on public opinion. Possibly only a few who had contacts with Caucasians on the project felt that the walkout should not take place because of the adverse effect on their relationship with the people outside. Consequently, it did not mean much to the people to be told that a war was being waged and that there was a man-power shortage on the outside, and the like.

### 3. Local Administration

The Minidoka Project administration has been considered a "strong" administration among WRA administrators. By this is meant that it dictates to the people rather than to have the people themselves determine how the camp should be run. The attitude of the administration is that the administrative instructions from Washington must be carried out and that public

opinion must be respected. Consequently, the administration is determined to maintain the power to rule the center. It maintained that the quota set by Washington must be maintained, and refused to do anything for the people in regards to tenders or watchmen for the block stoves.

Within the administration, three individuals have played major roles in the boilermen walkout. At the top is Stafford, project director, who had to return to the project from his vacation in order to settle the walkout. Below him was Davidson, Assistant Project Director, who attempted to solve the walkout in Stafford's absence and failed. Below him was Green, Supervisor of the Maintenance workers, who was one of the major sources of the dispute who antagonized Hatate, supervisor of the boilermen, and rest of the maintenance workers with his arrogant attitude.

#### 4. Evacuee Leaders

Between the administration and the bulk of the evacuees were evacuee leaders, who helped the administration to administer the project. Most of them gained their position, not only by virtue of their ability to carry out leadership functions, but also by filling certain administrative jobs on the project. One of the most influential of these jobs was that of block managers, since until recently the block managers were the only leaders organized into a system. Block managers were appointed by the

administration and dominated by pro-administration individuals, such as Seiichi Hara, Tura Nakamura, Hosokawa. Until the block delegates were elected, this was the only organized group on the project with political power.

Other evacuees on the project wielded influence within the project by holding important positions, usually in a supervisory capacity. Some of them were also employed informally as "personal advisors" to the administration. These individuals and the block managers constituted what might be termed the "old leadership". This "old leadership", especially the block managers, were greatly criticized by the people as stooges of the administration, but they continued in their superior position even while their popularity among the people was declining.

In contrast to the block managers, the block delegates were elected one from each block to organize a system of self-government. They represented the people more than the block managers, but still remained distinctly aloof from them, showing that they were not mere "messenger boys" for the people. Many of the block delegates were from the "old leadership" group, and they found it increasingly difficult, in the face of pressure from the people, to give in to the administration all of the time. Those who favored the people, in contrast to the administration, constituted the "new leadership", which was rapidly gaining strength over the "old leadership". This was evident in the message directed toward Myer and the Spanish Consul last year.

During the boilerman walkout, the administration called in the block managers for consultation, but the block delegates took over the problem, leaving out of their arbitration committee any block delegate who was also a block manager. During the walkout the block managers, along with some of the old leaders, were accused as being inuis. The block delegates arbitrated the walkout to the satisfaction of the boilermen, who were allowed to return to work on the old schedule, and they were not greatly criticized for not solving the stove problem.

Between the leader and the people in general, however, there was a definite gap. The leaders went ahead and handled the walkout without consulting the people. The arbitration committee, a select group of block delegates, for instance, considered the boilermen as spoiled children. The leaders had the power to make many of the decisions for the residents as a whole.

##### 5. People

The analysis of the residents of the project on the basis of social status is difficult. In many cases the status of an individual is not definite and is open to change. For instance, one method of establishing status within the project is through a job on the project as a head of some department. There is the possibility of losing such a job or of leaving it to go out for seasonal work. Relocation will change the situation entirely. Leaders also have a certain amount of status within the project.

but they may lose it entirely by being branded an inu. Even though they may continue to wield influence within the project through a small following or through the administration, his status in the community and even his very safety is doubtful. The block managers were influential until the appearance of the block delegates. In spite of this state of flux some comments can be made on the distribution of status among the project residents.

Status can be analyzed in terms of satisfaction with the status quo, the possession of power, the feeling of superiority, approval or disapproval by others, and the like. Above others, we find leaders within the project and within the block who are generally accorded more respect than the others. Educated individuals and other people who had status on the outside are likely to be respected, especially if they are helpful to the residents. This includes former community leaders (often internees), merchants, doctors. Somewhat below them in status are individuals without particular distinction, but who upholds the acceptable ways of the community and cooperates with the residents. This includes the majority of individuals who are married and have a family. Somewhat lacking in status are individuals who are not married when they should be, those who do not cooperate with others in the block, those in menial jobs within the project. The boilermen and janitors would probably

be included in the latter group. Also with low status in the project are those who do not uphold the acceptable ways of the community, such as by gambling. The "rowdy boys" are included in the latter category. Another group which generally has a low status within the project are the ex-Tuleans, more often referred to as Tuleans. Having come only recently to the project, they have not been able to gain many leadership position or close acquaintances. Worse than that, however, they have earned for themselves a reputation for being "agitators", "rowdies", "zoot-suiters", and the like. Another group of individuals have lost status within the project by being branded as inu. This is generally true of many block managers, and also true of some people in key positions. While these individuals do not necessarily lose their jobs or influence within the project, their popularity among the residents declines, sometimes making it necessary for them to leave the project. A slight differentiation was noticeable between the people from Seattle and Portland. The former tend to consider themselves as being more conforming and refined than the latter. This distinction seems to be based largely on an urban-rural difference.

In general, it can be said that those with the low status within the project were most willing to go to the extreme in order to win the strike against the administration. They were the ones who were in favor of upsetting the status quo. On the

other hand, those with status tended to oppose the walkout, and even if they favored it, was opposed to the recourse to extreme measures.

So far the residents in Minidoka have earned for themselves a reputation for being "cooperative" with the administration. Another way of saying the same thing is to say that they were submissive. This seems to be substantiated by the general criticism of the Tuleans that the Minidokans didn't have enough "guts" to fight back against the administration, which they recognized as being dictatorial. The walkout itself represents the first major effort on the part of the Minidokans to upset the balance of power between the administration and the residents in favor of the latter. It is generally conceded that this attempt has failed, but it cannot be said that it did not achieve any results at all. The fact that the administration withdrew the 24 hour schedule indicates that it had to concede a little. That the people of Minidoka are not satisfied with their submissive role is indicated by the series of strikes that followed the employment cut in February and the attempted mass resistance to the drafting of Niseis in the same month.

This then is the social structure of the Minidoka Center as indicated by the participants of the walkout, and insight and information gained from other sources.