

February 26, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

The Secretary of War directs that you dispatch a telegram to the Commanding General, Ninth Service Command, Fort Douglas, Utah, substantially as follows:

"The Secretary of War directs that you temporarily increase the strength of the 320th MP escort guard company by one repeat one officer and fifty repeat fifty men so that upon request of the project director Tule Lake Relocation Center, Tule Lake, California, a military guard may be established at Camp FWS-3 formerly Biological Survey Camp BF-3, Tule Lake, California. While there is no assurance that the WRA will require this guard, it is desired that the Army be prepared to execute the plan."

William P. Scobey  
Colonel, G. S.  
Executive



February 17, 1943

To: John H. Provinse, Chief, Community Services Division  
Subject: Excerpt from February 8 report of Anthony E. O'Brien

I think you will be interested in the following excerpt from the February 8 report of the Project Attorney at Tule Lake:

"2. Community Government. I went to Klamath Falls and obtained the subject list of the so-called 'civil' ordinances of that city. These related to licenses, sanitation, traffic, etc. Saturday morning, I met with the ordinance committee and talked with them for two hours on the operation of Community Council through the medium of standing committees; on procedure at Council meetings and on the passage of ordinances. They were to start the first of this week and spend their entire time drafting a code.

"In the meanwhile, I assigned Sakae Hayashi to pull out the title index of all the misdemeanors under the California Penal Code. This work will be completed tomorrow and will be turned over to the ordinance committee to allow them to determine what ordinances they think should be adopted for this Project. Throughout all of this work, I have been constantly at odds with Dr. Jacoby. He insists that the Council need not pass, as an ordinance, any misdemeanor contained in the Penal Code of California. I insist that they should; that the primary duty of enforcing the State law is upon the District Attorney and the local courts; that in all municipalities, in order for city prosecution, there must be city ordinances which may or may not coincide with the State law. I cannot see how the clerk of our Judicial Commission can stand before the Commission and arraign a defendant by reading from the California Penal Code. My idea is that we should parallel these misdemeanors, as our own ordinances, and enforce nothing but our own ordinances



before the Judicial Commission. All other crimes should be enforced by the Project Director or the outside courts, State and Federal. If I am in error in this stand, I wish you would promptly advise me for I feel I have practiced enough criminal law to be fairly sure of my position.

"Perhaps you feel that I have dwelt too much on the crime situation here. However, I understand now that organized gambling is present here, ~~not~~ that commercial or at least semi-commercial prostitution exists here, and that the juvenile delinquency situation is becoming serious. For instance, across the road from the Project, we have a hill for the residents called Castle Rock. We have had considerable snow lately and the evacuees have used the hill for sliding and skiing purposes. Their sleds and toboggans are, of course, homemade. I would not even question as to where the wood came from with which to make them, for I already think I know; but I learned today that a large number of sleds and toboggans have bottoms of tin. One piece of tin, four by eight feet, five gauge, was stolen from the Government machine shop. Some of the other tin came from splitting and using used stove pipe. Where the balance came from, you may guess. With tin probably one of the scarcest metals in the United States today, and with the Congressional investigation staring us in the face, I can no longer look on the theft of Government property as a joke. Unless we have some adequate method of law enforcement and apprehension of offenders, I am afraid that I shall fall in with the rest and just take the attitude that the old procedure is all right and not bother about it any further. Saturday night a gambling raid was conducted and paraphernalia and players were arrested but, as usual, nothing has been done about it. The worst



ordeal the offenders face is a trial before the Judicial Commission without any ordinance against gambling and probably the usual Tule Lake result. I hope that you will speedily provide an answer to Mr. Coverley's appeal to the Director, prepared by me and forwarded to Mr. Coverley for signature today."

We have not seen Mr. Coverley's letter that is referred to in the last paragraph of the excerpt. With respect to the difference of opinion between Mr. O'Brien and Dr. Jacoby I believe that Mr. O'Brien is correct. Under Administrative Instruction No. 34 the Judicial Commission is given jurisdiction over only those offenses that are prescribed by regulations of the Community Council. The Tule Lake Charter, it is true, purports to give the Judicial Commission jurisdiction over all offenses which are less than a felony under California law and it is undoubtedly this provision that Dr. Jacoby relies upon. Since the inclusion of this provision in the Charter was unauthorized by the Administrative Instruction I do not believe that it should be relied upon as giving jurisdiction to the Judicial Commission. There is no reason, however, why the Community Council could not, if it wished, adopt a blanket regulation of the same nature and we have so advised Mr. O'Brien. This may sound like something of a technical point but I believe that it has substance behind it since we have envisaged the Community Council as the legislative body for the centers and contemplate that the Charter should by prescribing regulations itself limit the discretion of the Community Council in that respect.

/s/ Philip M. Glick

Solicitor



CONFIDENTIAL

Feb. 26, 1943

Mr. Harvey M. Coverley  
Project Director  
Tule Lake Relocation Center  
Newell, California

Dear Mr. Coverley:

I have just sent you the following teletype:

"Reurteletype and telephone conversation with Glick. Filling in questionnaires is required of all male citizen evacuees of military age by Supplement 3 to Administrative Instruction No. 22 Revised, issued January 30. Refusal of any such evacuee to register is a violation of WRA regulation, punishable by administrative proceeding by Project Director. You therefore had clear authority to make the arrests you refer to. Your advice to sheriff of Modoc County that prisoners are being held on WRA responsibility is proper. More complete discussion of your questions being airmailed today."

The situation with reference to your authority to make these arrests is rather confused, because of the fact that I have learned since my return to Washington that the War Department and the Selective Service System did not come to a complete agreement along the lines that were earlier discussed between my office and the office of Assistant Secretary of War McCloy. I shall outline in this letter briefly only those points that relate directly to your questions.

The War Relocation Authority was given to understand that the War Department would request the Selective Service System to issue a regulation making the filling in of the questionnaires involved in the current registration compulsory for all male citizens of military age. In turn, WRA announced its intention of providing for the filling in of the questionnaires by all evacuees in relocation centers 17 years of age or over. This was the understanding when Mr. Provinse, Mr. Glick, and I left Washington for the recent field conferences. This was also the understanding communicated to you. While we were in the field, Mr. Rowalt, as Acting Director, issued Supplement 3 to Administrative Instruction No. 22, Revised. You will notice that Section I of that Supplement adds a new section II to Administrative Instruction No. 22. Paragraph B of the new section Section IX, you will notice, begins with the statement "Beginning with a day in February 1943 to be announced by the Director, each Project Director shall arrange for each male United States citizen of Japanese ancestry in the relocation center who has reached his 17th birthday to execute DSS Form 304A and Form WRA-126a."



I have learned, however, that the Selective Service System subsequently was informed by certain officers in the War Department that the filling in of the questionnaires by male citizens of military age was not to be made compulsory under the Selective Service Act. The Selective Service System therefore did not ~~not~~ issue a regulation requiring the filling in of the questionnaires.

At the time, therefore, that you and Major Marshall sought to require certain male citizen evacuees of military age to complete the questionnaires and they refused to do so, they became guilty of violating a regulation of WRA, but their mere refusal to complete the questionnaires did not make them guilty of violating the Selective Service Act.

You have, of course, authority under our Administrative Instructions to arrest evacuees for disobeying orders or instructions issued by your office, to hold a disciplinary hearing, and to impose suitable punishment. Under the revised Administrative Instruction on this subject, an advance copy of which I mailed you yesterday, the maximum punishment you can impose in such a disciplinary proceeding is 90 days confinement in jail or suspension of certain compensation privileges, or both.

The FBI officers referred to in your teletype are right, therefore, in saying that the mere refusal to fill in the questionnaires is not a violation of the Selective Service Act, but they are quite wrong in denying that you have authority to make arrests under the circumstances. Your statement to the sheriff of Modoc County that the prisoners are being held on WRA responsibility is correct.

The fact that the FBI is responsible for making investigations concerning offenses against the Selective Service Act and related acts in no way modifies or qualifies your authority to institute disciplinary proceedings for violation of your instructions.

So far I have discussed only the mere refusal of the evacuees to fill in their questionnaires. I sent to all Project Directors a few days ago a teletype calling attention to the fact that an act of Congress makes it a crime to interfere with the enlistment or recruitment service of the United States for its armed forces. If any of the people whom you have arrested were guilty, in addition to refusing to fill out the questionnaires, of conduct that tended to interfere with the filling out of these questionnaires by other male citizens of military age, you should turn that evidence over to the FBI agents for transmittal to the United States Attorney. It will be the responsibility of the United States Attorney to determine whether the evidence warrants prosecution for interference with the enlistment and recruitment service. It is still possible, therefore, that some of the evacuees who have been arrested may need to be turned over to the Federal courts for prosecution for this offense.



D. S. Myer, Feb. 26, 1943

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Your last weekly report discusses your arrest of Junich Nimura. It does not, however, discuss the arrests of the other 35 or 36 evacuees, nor does it give any summary of the evidence on which those others were arrested. I believe your weekly report was mailed before those additional arrests were made. I am unable, therefore, at this time to advise you whether the persons arrested should merely be given a disciplinary hearing before you and then permitted to return to Tule Lake after serving any term in jail that you may impose, or whether it would be better for the evacuees to be transferred to another relocation center or to Moab. I believe it would be best for you to reexamine the entire situation in the light of the further information supplied in this letter, and then to proceed as you think best. If you want any advice before taking action in the case of the 35 or 36 evacuees, submit to me a summary of the evidence as to what they did, together with indications of whether the persons arrested are married or single, whether they are kibel, which of them have children, and similar factors, with a statement of your recommendations. We shall be glad to consider your report and recommendations and advise you further.

You are authorized to give a copy of this letter to the FBI agents referred to in your teletype. I wish also that you would show this letter to Bob Cozzens.

Sincerely,

Director



CONFIDENTIAL

February 27, 1943

TELETYPE (307)

Harvey M. Coverley  
Tule Lake Relocation Center  
Newell, California

Confirming our telephone conversation February 26 and your wire same date, FBI investigation should be completed and I hope they will be able to file charges against a number of those arrested. In the meantime have your plans definitely laid for disciplinary procedure by Project Director to dispose of any or all cases not covered by FBI Justice charges. This may take the form of a sentence not to exceed ninety days for breaking of WRA regulations or you may determine that they should go to isolation center at Moab. Check recent administrative instruction sent you airmail letter this week concerning actions which are essential. These procedures have been signed since they were mailed to you. These actions should be announced in the center so there is no question regarding actions taken and the reasons therefor. You should proceed with the arrest and removal of any individuals who are interfering with the program or who refuse to comply with regulations. Suggest aliens mentioned your wire be processed for internment by Justice Department immediately if feasible. Steps must be taken to complete registration of male citizens by March 10. Please outline for me in wire your proposal for completing registration by March 10 including detailed procedures as to how you would require registration in case of refusal. I will either approve your suggestions or advise you immediately of counter suggestions. Suggest no other ultimatums be issued until cases of those now under arrest have been disposed of and results announced. It is my recommendation that after above steps have been taken that an orderly procedure be laid out block by block or group by group and arrest and removal of those who refuse to comply with orders as has been done with those now in jail. I would make this a small enough group to begin with so that cases can be handled expeditiously. This, I believe, is what you had in mind when we talked on the phone yesterday. I am assuming that questionnaires from draft boards regarding reclassification are simply belated questionnaires in relation to classification in the 4-C category. This is the only explanation that Selective Service has to offer. Have just talked with Mr. Ladd of FBI giving him complete story of problem at Tule and requested that this be clarified with FBI agents working on the problem. Mr. Ladd has assured me that this will be done immediately.

/s/ D. S. Myer



CONFIDENTIAL

February 27, 1943

AIRMAIL SPECIAL DELIVERY

Mr. Harvey M. Coverley  
Project Director  
Tule Lake Relocation Center  
Newell, California

Dear Harvey:

Attached is a copy of a teletype just sent to you. You may want to check it with the original which may have been garbled.

We get all kinds of reports and rumors here and, of course, there is much information we don't get. I had a report this morning that Major Marshall had stated there were fifteen teachers at Tule Lake who had been teaching anti-militarism. You may know about this. If you do I would like to have the facts. If not, I would suggest that you quiz Major Marshall on any information he may have. It is also reported that four Kibei entered the registration quarters on Friday, a week ago yesterday, and tried to stop the registration by stating there would be no more registration. They gave a fifteen minute harangue on the subject and seemingly tried to entice Major Marshall into taking some physical action against them. The Army office here is wondering why they were not arrested on the spot. I am wondering what the facts are regarding this particular incident. We have been informed that they are among those arrested on Saturday or Sunday but there is still some question in the minds of Colonel Scobey whether action has been taken in the cases of those who tried to interfere with registration.

We also have reports that death notices have been posted in washrooms threatening death to all those who register, and that mimeographed memoranda have been put out urging people not to register.

All of the above reports have come to us through Colonel Scobey's office as reported by Major Marshall. I am not being critical because we do not have all these details and I am presuming that you are fully informed about these reports, but I am sending them to you for confirmation.

I have just read Mr. Cook's report of February 22 to Mr. Baker, and I note on page 4 of this report a statement regarding the beating of Teiho Hashida on the night of Feb. 22. This definitely states that the beating was done by two Kibei. I am wondering if the perpetrators were apprehended and if not, why not, in view of the fact there seems to be definite information that they were Kibei.

I fully appreciate the problems you are having to face as the new Project Director and we want to give you every assistance we can from this end. Communication is not easy but we will do our best to render services from here if we can be of assistance.



D. S. Myer, Feb. 27, 1943

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I am sorry we got you out on a limb regarding the arrests but I had been definitely informed that this was compulsory under selective service and was greatly surprised and disappointed when I was informed otherwise. However, you are still within bounds and I hope the cases can be cleared up rapidly and that you can proceed to get your registration completed by March 10 as outlined in my wire, or in accordance with any plans you and Mr. Cozzens feel are sound. It is now definite that the problem is ours to get the job done but I am sure we will have full collaboration of the Army in accomplishing it. We should check with them step by step but there is no question about where the responsibility lies under present conditions. It lies with the War Relocation Authority.

For your information we are attaching copy of a memorandum dated February 26, from Colonel Scobey to the Adjutant General concerning military guard for the Biological Survey Camp at Tule Lake.

Yours very truly,

/s/ D. S. Myer  
Director



CONFIDENTIAL  
FOR PERSONAL ATTENTION

March 6, 1943

Mr. Dillon S. Myer  
Director  
War Relocation Authority  
Barr Building  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Myer:

I have just received two confidential communications from you, both dated February 27. One was addressed to me personally and the other was apparently sent to all project directors. I will comment on both in this letter.

There are, as you have heard, a number of teachers at this project who are opposed to war as a means of settling international disputes and who would probably refuse to perform war service if they were required to do so. There are both men and women in this group. So far as we have been able to ascertain, however, they have not been teaching anti-militarism. Furthermore, all but two of them have cooperated loyally in the registration program. The two who refused were requested to resign and did so. There have been rumors that some of those who were participating in the registration were using the opportunity as an avenue for pacificistic propaganda. I have investigated these reports and find little basis for them.

With reference to the report that four kibel entered the registration hall on February 19 and attempted to stop the proceedings, may I say that no such report has even been made to me. I believe it is true that four young men (nisei) did talk to Major Marshall in the registration hall on that date. One of them was quite vehement in his arguments against registration but Major Marshall did not recommend that any action be taken and did not seem to think that an arrest was necessary. All four of these young men later turned out to be among the residents of Block 42 who were arrested at 5:00 P.M. on Sunday, February 21. It is also true that a few threatening posters were found. Two of these appeared in Block 42 just before the arrests above mentioned. None have appeared since. Only one other such poster has been reported. None have appeared recently. It is also true that a mimeographed circular was scattered around the center, urging people not to register. You have been fully informed in Mr. Cook's reports regarding both of these developments. We now have in confinement a person believed to have been implicated in the distribution of the mimeographed circular. We have not obtained a confession, however, or any admittance that he participated in any aspect of the preparation, reproduction or distribution of this circular.

I gather from your letter that you feel you are not kept fully informed about these reports. I endeavor to keep you informed through my weekly reports, those sent in every day or two by Mr. Cook and by frequent telephone calls.



With reference to Mr. Cook's report of February 22 in which it was stated that the beating of Teiho Hashida was done by two kibel, this was probably somewhat premature. At the time his report was prepared no one knew what or how many persons attacked Mr. Hashida. You will recall, however, that on Friday, February 26 and Saturday, February 27, thirteen persons were arrested on suspicion of being implicated in several beatings or attempted beatings. Twelve of these persons have pleaded guilty to the charge and have been sentenced to terms in the Modoc Tounty Jail. Among them are three persons we are fairly certain were involved in the Hashida beating. One of these three is believed to be the leader. None of the three, however, have confessed specifically to being involved in this case. We have reason to believe that there are two other persons still at large who participated in that affair.

It is realized we have made many errors ourselves but I cannot help feeling that in the case of the Tule Lake Project the plans furnished us for the registration program were too indefinite. Mr. Hayes returned from Washington with a clear impression that the registration of male citizens was to be performed under the Selective Service regulations. The forms used were issued by the Selective Service Systdm. A number of inferential statements in the instructions also led to that conclusion and as you stated, you yourself also believed this to be a fact. As a result, we placed ourselves in a position which might have been very precarious had we not proceeded somewhat cautiously and sceptically.

That, however, is probably not the most serious difficulty into which we have been led. In Mr. Rowalt's letter of February 1, he stated categorically at the end of the third paragraph that "the registration will be compulsory except in the case of those who have requested repatriation." Acting on this statement and the instructions which accompanied it, we proceeded to answer a flood of questions on this point accordingly. Later on <sup>we</sup> were somewhat embarrassed to be informed that for male and female citizens at least, an application for repatriation did not excuse them from registration. Announcement of this only increased our problem as it convinced many dubious evacuees that the government was not acting in good faith. Now, however, we are confronted with an even more perplexing difficulty. We have at all times stated that the registration was compulsory. Both Mr. Cozzens and I repeated this statement several times last evening at an issei meeting where we faced a critical audience. We were repeatedly asked what penalty would be imposed for failure to comply with this compulsory ruling and dodged this question by stating that the penalties had not yet been announced. Now our position is further weakened by the fact that the registration for other than male citizens is not compulsory.



Harvey M. Coverley, Mar. 6, 1943

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Frankly, I do not know how we are going to get out of this predicament without so great a loss of face that we would have no further control over the project. This morning before breakfast Mr. Cozzens and I were discussing desirable penalties to be imposed upon the issei who refused to register, such as suspension from work and pay privileges for periods up to ninety days. Since we have committed ourselves so definitely on this point, I am at a loss to know how we can gracefully retreat without disaster.

I am certain that a large proportion of our issei are not going to register. They are stubborn, obstinate and still profoundly distrustful of the War Relocation Authority. They have little faith in our good intentions and are convinced that there is some trick behind the entire registration program. How this feeling was nurtured I cannot say for sure but I believe you have a good idea. I am anxious for you to realize the serious effect on WRA of a failure to stick by our commitment on the compulsory nature of the registration and impose some type of penalty. When I am sure that you realize this effect, I will do my best to carry out loyally any directive you give me. I feel sure Mr. Cozzens concurs in what I have said in this paragraph.

Please let us hear from you as soon as possible as we will be in a most difficult situation as to our relations with the evacuees until a decision is reached.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Harvey M. Coverley  
Project Director



APPENDIX C

February 20, 1943

Mr. L. L. Low  
Sheriff of Klamath County  
Klamath Falls, Oregon

Re: Junichi Nimura

Dear Sir:

The above named resident of this Center is confined in your County Jail pursuant to an arrangement made between your District Attorney and our Project Attorney, whereby persons apprehended by our Internal Security Division for offenses against the rules and regulations of this Center may be confined while awaiting disposition of their cases.

Mr. Nimura's activities here have been referred to the United States Department of Immigration and Naturalization for its action. In the meanwhile I, as Project Director, though the executive power vested in me, through channels, by the President of the United States, have power to arrest, detain and hold persons who violate the regulations of the Relocation Center. The War Relocation Authority will be responsible for the arrest and detention of this man and this letter may serve as your commitment justifying his detention.

Very truly yours,



February 26, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. John C. Baker, Chief

SUBJECT: Attempted Beating by Gang of Mr. Ohmura

That beatings will continue for some time was indicated again last night when Shigeto Ohmura's apartment was stormed by approximately fifteen to twenty men and boys in an attempt to beat him up as a result of Mr. Ohmura's conversation with members of the FBI on Wednesday. Mr. Ohmura's loyalty was not in doubt. Mr. Ohmura, 46, and his wife, 46 were born in this country and are one of the few Japanese-American families in this group who are niseis. They have two children, May, (20) and Paul (17).

The raid on Mr. Ohmura's house took place shortly after midnight, after a number of project officials had made a tour of inspection of the project. The gang broke out all windows in Mr. Ohmura's apartment and smashed in a panel of the door. May blew a whistle. This made considerable commotion in the neighborhood and one of the members of the department of Internal Security received a tip about the attempted beating after he had retired. Members of Internal Security department and a number of wardens went at once to the scene and, as a result of the tip, began an investigation which resulted in the arrest of three of the boys involved in this attempted beating. They are: Tetsu Yamamoto, Bob Hirakawa, and Takamoto, first name not known. They are kibeis and none of them are part of the initiating group. They, like others, were asked if they wanted to participate in the beating of an Inu (dog). Yamamoto on questioning, said he volunteered because "something welled up in him on mention of the word Inu, which is used as "informer." He fled when the first window was broken, he said, because he knew and liked Ohmura.

These boys were questioned by the chief of the department of Internal



Security and others until eight o'clock this morning and removed shortly after to the jail in Tulelake.

Mr. Ohmura is the man whose name was <sup>on</sup> both posters on which were depicted tombstones, one representing a Christian tombstone, the other an Oriental tombstone, a report of which has already been sent in.

(The following item was omitted from the report of February 25, until the incident could be verified by the Department of Internal Security. The writer reported this incident to the Department of Internal Security yesterday morning after verifying it to the best of his ability.)

On the night of February 24, the foreman of the coal crew was beaten. This was, apparently, in retaliation for having worked with a number of volunteers to unload a car of coal, although prewarned not to do so. Unlike Father Dai (Kitagawa) and Rev. Andrew Kuroda, ~~as was~~ who were beaten the evening of February 22 with clubs, as was Mr. Teiho Hashida, this foreman of the coal crew was knocked down and brutally kicked. He returned to work the next day very stiff and his body very sore from the beating, but he did not require hospitalization, neither did Father Dai and the Rev. Kuroda.

Mr. Hashida has been removed to his home because of lack of hospital space and is confined to bed, and will be for about a week.

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Typewritten instructions advising colonists not to register were accidentally discovered in the village yesterday and an investigation is now underway as to their origin. (See Appendix A). These instructions appeared on legal size paper to which another two inches more of paper had been added to contain all the subversive ideas propagated by the writer.



These instructions were discovered in this manner: The principal of the high school brought to the registration hall a woman who was not well and returned her to her messhall in his car. After a few minutes' conversation with a number of people in the messhall of Block 33, the chief, whose nickname is "Bacon", approached the school principal to explain his predicament.

"I am a loyal American. I am an issei, but I am loyal. My wife did not want me to register and threatened to leave me if I did. She is under the influence of her mother. When I registered she gave me our infant baby and went to live with her mother saying that she wanted to repatriate to Japan."

Bacon then pulled a paper from his pocket and asked, "Are these from the Administration?" The school principal read them over and said, "They most certainly were not."

To make a long story short, this paper eventually was turned over to the project director.

Bacon explained that ~~by~~ this paper and a carbon copy were given him by an individual who said, "Show this to everyone in your block."

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Yesterday afternoon the parents of a number of boys who were arrested on Sunday and taken to the Klamath jail came to the Office of the Project Attorney to talk over the situation and to ask what could be done to aid their boys. The parents showed great concern and said they would be willing to do almost anything. The Project Attorney explained that they would greatly aid other parents of boys, and perhaps their sons and the registration program as a whole by doing what they could to further registration rather than block it. He suggested that these



parents contact other parents and explain to them that these were Government orders and there is no way of defying the Government short of running afoul of the law.

/s/ John D. Cook

Reports Officer



*from Harry Mayeda's file*

Tule Lake Project  
Newell, California

March 2, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Harry Mayeda

SUBJECT: Resolution - Citizens of United States  
Japanese Ancestry

There is enclosed a copy of a document received by me through the mail on March 1 which purports to have been prepared by "Citizens of the United States of America, Residents of the Tule Lake Relocation Project".

Inasmuch as no names are signed to this document and no source is indicated, I will appreciate it if you will advise me whether or not this resolution was sponsored by all of the American citizens of Japanese ancestry in this Project or any duly constituted representative body.

Harvey M. Coverley  
Project Director

Enclosure-33751



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Mr. Harvey M. Coverley  
Project Director  
Tule Lake War Relocation Center  
Newell, California

Date: March 1, 1943  
From: Citizens of United States  
Japanese Ancestry  
Residents: WRA Tule Lake  
Tule Lake War Rel. Ctr.  
Newell, California



## TEXT OF RESOLUTION

We, the citizens of the United States of America, residents of the Tule Lake Relocation Project, Newell, California, in order to perform our duties as loyal citizens of the United States and in order to uphold the principles of democracy as established in the Constitution of the United States do hereby state that:

Whereas, we the citizens of the United States have been asked by our Government to pledge our unqualified allegiance to this country.

Whereas, we have accepted in good faith and in full cooperation the extraordinary orders of the United States Army.

Whereas, we feel that we have given our fullest cooperation to this program of evacuation.

Whereas, we have temporarily surrendered many of the rights and privileges of citizenship which we have heretofore enjoyed.

Whereas, the Government through the Federal Reserve Bank has failed to protect the people.

Whereas, we suffered losses of homes, properties, work, freedom of movement, separation from friends, and all things we felt dear to us without protest.

Whereas, we wish to prevent in the future, the mass evacuation or confining of citizens without trial.

Whereas, we feel that there is only one class of citizenship in this country and a loyal citizen of one race should not be treated any different from another.

Whereas, we believe that some of these things mentioned above constitute a violation of our civil rights.

And whereas, we believe sincerely and honestly in the principles of freedom of Speech, freedom of Worship, freedom of Press and freedom of Assemblage as embodied in the Constitution and its amendments.

Therefore, be it resolved:

1. That we ask Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, that after a thorough investigation by the Military Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other Federal Authorities that persons that are cleared should have absolute freedom of movement and the choice of returning to their homes.



2. That we request President Roosevelt to give us assurance that he will use his good office in an endeavor to secure all constitutional and civil rights as American citizens.

3. That the security for the Isseis be assured.

4. That we ask President Roosevelt to use his good office to bring favorable impression to the public regarding the loyal citizens.

5. That we ask that those Isseis considered by the Government as being not disloyal to this Government be classified as "friendly aliens."

6. That we have Government note the advantages of the good publicity to be gained by disbursing Nisei soldiers into the Army at large rather than by forming a separate combat team; and that the Government further note that the education of Caucasian soldiers can be made through deep comradeship that grows between soldiers facing a common task and thereby educate the American public.

7. That the Government recognizing that we are fighting for the Four Freedom as embodied in the Atlantic Charter should apply these democratic principles to us here at home.

8. That we believe that if satisfactory answers can be given by a Government spokesman, preferably the President of the United States, to these questions, we can go and fight for this our country without fear or qualms concerning the security of our future rights. If satisfactory answers cannot be given, we believe that the constitutional rights have not been upheld and we see no reason why we should register without due knowledge of our citizenship.

And be it further resolved, that we respectfully ask for immediate answers to the questions in the resolution.



CONFIDENTIAL  
AIR MAIL

March 10, 1943

Mr. D. S. Myer  
Director, War Relocation Authority  
Barr Building  
17th and Eye Streets, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Myer:

During the past month it was my privilege to visit Manzanar during the beginning of registration, Gila the following weeks, and to spend the next two weeks at Tule Lake. Problems were naturally encountered at Manzanar and at Gila. None appeared to be very serious.

The Tule Lake problem is one which has really baffled everyone. The condition there and the refusal to register, in my opinion, can only be laid to a number of incidents which preceded the registration period. From observation, it is my belief that there are a number of groups of disloyal people within the Center proper. These groups, through the management prior to January 1, had an opportunity to grow and prosper. The Planning Board of Issei, which augmented the Council, placed the full operation of the Project in the hands of the Issei. It was a very clever means used by them to circumvent the type of internal government proposed by WRA.

In the past the evacuees at Tule Lake have won every argument which they had with the administration. When registration came along, the leaders of the subversive group were opposed to it and, therefore, have used every means possible to again drive the administration back and show the administration that the evacuees were running the Center.

Mr. Coverley has done everything within his power to carry on the registration in an orderly manner. One demonstration after the other was put on by the evacuees who opposed it. Action was necessary if any law and order were to be maintained.

My personal observation on the Project was that Mr. Jacobs, who was head of Internal Security, is a grand individual. However, I personally do not believe he is an internal security officer. He is too soft-hearted and, in many cases, yields under pressure. In my opinion, he is not the leader type of individual necessary for that type of position. He has however, worked night and day and practically made himself ill. Yet, in the number of months he has been there, real lists of individuals who were opposed to administrative policies and opposed to the administration in general were not available.

Another problem which seemed to exist at Tule Lake prior to Mr. Coverley's arrival on the Project, from all appearances, is that everyone trusted the evacuees, granted all kinds of freedom, and as nearly as I could see things were handled in a very loose manner.



R. B. Cozzens, Mar. 10, 1943

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I realize that Major Marshall mentioned in one of his communications to Colonel Scobey that he believed there were school teachers on the Project who were conscientious objectors and who were interfering with the recruitment program. Mr. Coverley worked diligently while he was there attempting to run down such rumors and was unable to get any real proof that these objectors had actively participated in obstructing recruitment. Yet at three different times during interviews with Kibei we were told that school teachers or women on the staff stated that they did not have to register and that the Government would not make them register. When we attempted to find out who, the person being interviewed conveniently forgot and could not even recognize the person. I talked with one or two school teachers on the Project, and they told me that there were a number of people on the Project who were very definitely opposed to registration. Yet I was unable to obtain any names. There are, ~~yet~~ however, a number on the Project who are known to be conscientious objectors; and while we were unable to get any real facts, it is my belief that a number of these persons are taking sides with certain evacuees against the administration. Due to the shortage of teachers, I realize that this again is difficult problem and is one which has been handed to Mr. Coverley or one which he inherited. I am positive that he is doing everything possible to iron this out and remove people as fast as he is able to clear information.

I only point these things out as I believe you should realize the serious handicaps and difficulties which Mr. Coverley encountered when he entered Tule Lake.

Very truly yours,

/s/ A. S. Olsen  
R. B. Cozzens  
Field Assistant Director

Dictated by Mr. Cozzens  
but not read by him.



WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
WASHINGTON

Mar. 17, 1943

Mr. Harvey Coverley  
Project Director  
Tule Lake Relocation Center  
Newell, California

Dear Harvey:

I have your confidential letter of March 10, in which you provide a report of the happenings up to March 10, and am very glad indeed to have this report. There are three or four points on which I wish to comment.

If a trial board is appointed for the trial of those who would usually be tried by the Project Director, I believe the trial board should be made up of personnel who are not responsible for administrative phases of the project management. It is my judgment that anyone who is dealing directly with the project, other than the Project Director, would run a great chance of injuring his effectiveness at the project if he were to serve as part of such a trial board. I have no objection to having someone designated to conduct the trials other than the Director, either an individual or a committee, but I think they or it should be someone off the project. It would be my judgment that Mr. Bernhard, for example, might well substitute for you in conducting these trials. If it seems desirable to have a committee, then we should consider who else might be available to assist in doing the job.

You propose in your letter that you secure additional facilities where you can locate a number of people who might need to be removed from the project soon, and specifically ask authorization to obtain custody of another camp nearby known as No. BR-43. I doubt if this is the proper solution to the problem with which we are now faced. It is my recommendation that we process the 105 or 110 people who are now outside the center, that we let the results be known in the center, that you go ahead with completion of your registration without further arrests or removal of anyone except those who commit overt acts, and that no further action by way of other arrests be taken at least until the 24th of March. On the other cases we may find that some of those who have not registered may come around and ask for the opportunity to register before you have completed the job. In this case, they should be allowed to register but a statement should be made on the form that they did not register previous to March 10, and they should be asked to make a statement as to why they did not register within the time limit set. In case they do not register at all, a form with their name on it should be sent in with a statement that they refused to register, so the records will be complete.



no 11

I doubt very much whether the suspension of work and pay privileges would be effective under the conditions that now exist at Tuze Lake. With such a large group of people this might lead only to additional trouble because it would give them plenty of time to instigate trouble if they were not busy. Furthermore, the chances are that many of them are not employed at the present time. Ultimately each case should be heard individually and should be given a penalty under the penalty provisions already set up -- perhaps a jail sentence -- or removed from the center to an isolation center if there is an available spot to which to move them, or segregated as a group. The latter is still a possibility but is something on which we are not ready to commit for the reason that there are many complicating factors. The matter of the physical problem itself is important. However, in my judgment, it is not the most important. It is my belief that any mass movement should not be made until we are able to announce a policy which would remove discrimination from a large group of people and would allow them, if they care to do so, to go about their business as other citizens or law-abiding aliens are allowed to do at present.

We are working on a major policy change and hope within a week or ten days to get some action, one way or the other. I have addressed a letter to Secretary Stimson outlining our recommendations and if approval is given it would have a drastic effect upon the policies of WRA generally and upon your specific problem.

In the next to the last paragraph of your letter you quote Major Marshall as saying that your figure of 25% is considerably lower than any of the other centers. This is not true. I think perhaps your figure may be lower than Manzanar and perhaps Gila. There may be one or two others in the same class, but some of the centers had a very small percentage of male citizens who answered no to questions 27 and 28. For example, at Granada, out of approximately 1300, 105 said "no" to begin with and by the time the forms were submitted there were slightly over 30 who still maintained that position. They have about the same proportion at Heart Mountain. I have not as yet had a final report on this from Minidoka, Central Utah, or the two Arkansas projects.

I am pretty much in agreement with the thoughts expressed in the last paragraph of your letter in which you indicate you have not yet found the real ringleaders. This is the reason I am reluctant to move a large mass of people. I think there is a much better chance of locating the ringleaders if we do not move a large group immediately. In other words, I believe this is the time to stop and consolidate lines in relation to those already removed from the project and to take ample time to study the situation at the project as well as nationally, and to make our move only after thorough consideration. Ultimately something must be done about the more than 600 who did not



register but two, three, or four weeks time might elapse before this action is taken without any serious results provided we do the other things in the interim period.

Yours very truly,

Director

P. S. Since this was dictated, I discussed the matter with you on the tactical on March 15. I have no objection to your designating Mr. Flemming to act for you in conducting the trials, as you suggested.



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WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

March 17, 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Philip M. Glick, Solicitor  
War Relocation Authority  
Barr Building  
17th and Eye Streets, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Phil:

I find I must make two reports on my experiences at Tule Lake. This one might be considered the official one since it is restricted to the legal phases of the Tule Lake affair. The second report, which will soon follow, will be highly unofficial since it will deal with matters which are admittedly none of my business as an attorney for WRA. However, you have often invited comments which deal with the administrative side of WRA--and I have never been readier to comply!

I am sending this letter to you in duplicate but am sending copies of it to no one else, since there may be much of this report which ought not to be circulated.

Before I reached the project, the following had occurred:

Thirty-four evacuees were being held at the CCC camp, about 15 miles from the Tule Lake Relocation Center. These 34 included people who had refused to register and who, in addition, were suspected of influencing others not to register and otherwise causing trouble at the center in connection with registration.

Ten evacuees were being held at the Klamath Falls jail. Originally, 12 had been taken to that jail but, after being interviewed by Tony O'Brien and by representatives of the FBI, two were released.

Twelve evacuees were being held at the Alturas County jail. Originally, three had been arrested for assault and battery; one of them gave very considerable



Philip M. Glick--2

information, naming others--and he was then transferred to Minidoka and ten more were arrested. The 12 had been charged with "rioting" under the State statute, and had all pleaded guilty and been sentenced. All were represented by counsel appointed by the court.

I inquired about the conditions under which the 34 were being held at the camp, and decided that for the time being those 34 represented no problem. If the relocation center system and theory were correct at all, then those 34 could certainly be held in a subsidiary relocation center, some miles from the main center, under practically the same conditions. The only difference I could see were (a) they were separated from their families; (b) they were subjected to a somewhat harsher discipline --but not seriously so; (c) they were being required to work; (d) some of the communications sent to them by friends and relatives (verbal messages, notes, letters, packages containing notes, etc.) were being censored.

"(a)" did not seem to me to be of any great consequence, considering the fact that the whole camp arrangement was temporary. "(b)" included nothing unreasonable. For instance, the barracks were not as good as those at the center, and the area available to the evacuees was smaller; but the differences were those of degree rather than kind. "(c)" bothered me very much. I checked with Harvey Coverley at once, asking him whether he had had any word from Washington on the question of requiring the men to work. When he said that he had not received any word on the subject, I told him that I felt that there was no legal basis for forced labor at the camp any more than elsewhere and that I was therefore suggesting that he inform Mr. Powell (in charge of the CCC camp) to assign work only to those who wanted to work. I pointed out that it would probably be only a matter of time until someone refused to work; then we would have the issue raised directly. We would find ourselves on the wrong side of that issue--and would have to back down. Coverley said that he thought I was right; that as a matter of fact he had heard that day that there were rumors of a strike among the evacuees at the camp. I then urged that he take action as soon as possible because if such a strike occurred I could see nothing but a victory for the evacuees--and at a time when the administration would least desire to lose any skirmishes.



Philip M. Glick--3

I even went so far as to say that perhaps the men ought to be told that they did not need to work unless they wanted to work but that no doubt, with almost no exceptions, they would prefer to work. At any rate we agreed that forced labor should end at once. Nevertheless, when I went to the camp the following morning I found all the men working and that there had been some trouble with one or two of them; that they had nevertheless been required to go out into the fields with a group. On my return to the project I reported to Coverley on my day's activities, and also spoke to him again about forced labor. He said that he would see to it that it was stopped. However, with the press of other work and the constant tension at the center, the situation remained unchanged for several days. I felt, however, that there was nothing further I could do. I very much wanted to put my suggestion in the form of a memorandum to the Project Director but I felt that it was dangerous material for any memorandum and I did not want to dictate it to any stenographer on the project.

I was glad that no serious incident arose before the order went through countermanding forced labor. When it did go through, only a few men stayed in their barracks; practically all of them went out in work crews.

"(d)" bothered me greatly--and still does. My advice was never asked, and therefore the question as to whether communications addressed to the evacuees at the camp--or sent by them--could be censored was never directly presented. I knew that the censoring was going on; portions of letters were read to me, etc. However, I did not take up the subject with the Project Director or anyone else--except for my teletype inquiry to you and our mention of it in one of our telephone conversations.

I now feel, Philip, that word ought to be sent by you to the Project Director (or perhaps to Tony O'Brien) to make sure that letters sent through the mails be delivered without censoring; that the censoring process be restricted to packages, notes, and letters not sent by mail--if there is to be any censoring at all. I think the matter ought to be checked into and if it is still going on, as I think it is, ought to be stopped. Do you agree?

As to the evacuees at the Alturas jail, I was not concerned at all. They had been represented by counsel



appointed by the court; they had pleaded guilty; they were now serving their sentences. So far as I could see, they presented no problem.

I was very much concerned, however, with the ten evacuees being held at the Klamath jail. They had not been booked. No formal charge had been placed against them. There was of course plenty of suspicion and some definite accusations had been made that they had been instrumental in making trouble at the project. They certainly had failed to register and, in addition, had probably not only advised others not to register but had been active in discouraging registration generally. Nevertheless, they had been held at Klamath for about five days when I arrived at Tule Lake on Friday, March 5. They had been questioned by Tony at length and had also been questioned by the FBI. No report had been received from the FBI and there was some suggestion therefore that these men ought to be held until we knew that the FBI was willing to have them released from the jail. I insisted, however, that we should not wait longer--particularly since we were not actually releasing those men so that they could not be apprehended again, but would merely be moving them to the camp. I did delay the matter a few hours because I wanted to talk to Harvey Coverley first, with a view to keeping those men segregated from others at the camp, and I also wanted to determine what he thought the reaction of the evacuees at the Tule Lake center might be when those men were released from Klamath--whether they would think that the administration was backing down, for instance. In that case I would nevertheless have recommended that the men be taken out of jail, but we might have worked out some other way of indicating no change of heart on the part of the administration. However, Coverley had no qualms on either score and the men were therefore removed from jail and taken to the camp.

A few days later I was informed that two evacuees had been arrested the previous day and were in the Klamath jail. I went at once to the Project Director and talked the matter over with him, suggesting that the men be moved to the camp, and explaining the risks involved in keeping a man jailed (as, for example, an A.C.L.U. habeas corpus case, suits for false arrest against Coverley himself and others). However, Coverley did not want to release them



Philip M. Glick--5

and he finally said: "All right, I'll take a chance. I've taken so many chances already I might as well take one more. Tony is coming back from San Francisco tomorrow morning and I'll ask him to stop at Klamath and question those men and then we'll probably move them over to the camp after that." I discussed the possibility of moving those men to the camp and nevertheless keeping them segregated from the others, since I recognized that that was the point in favor of keeping the men in jail. It appeared, however, that there was no practical method of following this suggestion, and the men were therefore held until after Tony returned and had questioned them; we then advised Joe Hayes, as Acting Project Director, to move the men to the camp and that was done.

I spent the bulk of my time in interviewing the evacuees at the CCC camp who had not previously been interviewed by Tony. For the most part, I interviewed those who, so far as anybody knew, were not in position to furnish any information against other evacuees but who were at the camp merely because they had not registered. I explained to Coverley that coming in from the outside, with no previous contact with the individuals involved, not knowing one leader from another, nor any of their connections, associates, roommates, etc., I was in no position to break down any evacuees's story. Coverley and Tony both agreed that I should leave to Tony the questioning of those evacuees who were thought to have information which they had not yet given. Therefore, although there were a few exceptions, almost all the men I ~~exam~~ crossed-examined were men who were not involved in a plot (so far as anyone knew) but had merely refused to register).

I attempted to do several things: My chief purpose was, of course, to be able to make a recommendation to the Project Director as to what disposition ought to be made of each evacuee I questioned--at least so far as one can judge a man from a single interview lasting from five or ten minutes to an hour and a half or two hours. I tried always to get on a friendly, and in some cases even semi-confidential, basis with the men I interviewed. I tried to get some of each man's background; and to ascertain what was motivating him. I also tried to size up each man as to his potentiality for troublemaking. Naturally, whenever possible, I tried to win the man over to a more cooperative



Philip M. Glick--6

attitude--but my net total out of about 30 examinations was three registrations, attributable to a combination of factors. Finally, I saw to it that in every case the evacuee admitted at least to having broken a WRA rule and therefore to being subject to discipline. In every case I followed Tony's precedent of informing the person being questioned that, if I asked anything which he did not wish to answer, he needed merely to say so. Occasionally, but rarely, I swore the evacuee to tell the truth. A stenographer took notes on every interview, although, not being a court reporter, she was not able to take down every question and answer. I think, however, that every essential item was covered, even when the evacuee and I were carrying on a conversation rather than an examination--except in the case of two or three evacuees who indicated a desire to talk to me alone, outside the presence of a stenographer.

Many of the examinations had not been written up when I left the project to return to San Francisco. I expect to receive them in a day or two, and will then go over them and send them to the Project Director, forwarding a copy of each to you.

At the close of each examination and after the evacuee had left the room, I dictated my impressions and my recommendation for the handling of that case before interviewing the next evacuee. Such recommendations made on such a cursory review of the facts and of the man must of course be taken for what it is worth. All additional information will of course be considered by the Project Director in making disposition of each case.

Tony O'Brien and Kent Silverthorne are continuing along the same line, in order to be able to furnish the Project Director with a recommendation in each case. There will, however, be additional cases. More evacuees will be sent to the camp and will need to be questioned. Depending on how many evacuees are to be sent to the camp for failure to register--or arrested on more serious charges--the process may take anywhere from one week to a couple of months. I am wondering, therefore, whether this arrangement cannot be followed:

Let the present method of processing each case be carried on so far as all evacuees now in the CCC camp are



Philip M. Glick--7

concerned, and also as to those additional ten or 15 more who will be sent there as a result of specific charges against them as trouble makers. There will then be about 450 to 500 evacuees who must be dealt with because of their failure to register. There will be no other charge to be placed against those men. Let the Project Director set up a "court" at the CCC camp. Let those evacuees be brought before him one at a time for this short procedure:

Each will be told that he is accused of failing to register, and he will be asked whether he wants an attorney to represent him. Nine out of ten of those men will not ask to be represented (at least until the word gets around that it will be more inconvenient for WRA if they ask for representation). Each will then be asked whether he registered or not, and certainly there will be few, if any, who will deny that they refused to register. Then let the Project Director immediately pronounce "sentence".

Let there be an attorney present to represent those evacuees who ask for counsel. I doubt that this will delay matters at all, since the fact still remains that there will undoubtedly be a plea of guilty to the charge of not having registered.

The sentence--except in special cases concerning which the Project Director may have some reason for handling the matter differently--should be uniform: a period of segregation at the CCC camp.

I think the Project Director could dispose of 450 cases in four or five days at the most. If that is too long a period, I see no reason why the men could not be called in in groups of ten or more--following the same procedure as if each were being tried separately. There is no special evidence to be heard in those cases--no special circumstances to be considered. By this method the whole affair could be disposed of in a day.

What do you think?

Sincerely,

(Signed) Edgar  
Edgar Bernhardt  
Principal Attorney



WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
Tule Lake Project

March 30, 1943

TO: Mr. Harvey M. Coverley,  
Project Director

SUBJECT: Evacuee Registration as of March 30, 1943.  
subject

Total Male Citizens Registered. . . . .	2294
" Female Citizens Registered. . . . .	2239
" Male Aliens Registered. . . . .	1795
" Female Aliens Registered. . . . .	<u>1430</u>
Total Registered. . . . .	7758

673 Male Citizens answered "NO" to question #28.  
(Few of these cases disapproved because of repatriation applica-  
tions.)

328 Female Citizens disapproved because of the same reason.

These figures are 70 under the total given last week as we found after checking that we could not compensate for the difference in figures given by Lieutenant Carroll. However, indications are that we will come close to the eight thousand mark after cleaning up on those unable to register due to illness and infirmities.

Frank C. Smith, Chief  
Housing and Employment.



CONFIDENTIAL

March 17, 1943

Mr. Philip M. Glick, Solicitor  
War Relocation Authority  
Barr Building  
17th & Eye Streets  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Philip:

I still am convinced that I cannot render an adequate report of everything that happened here in writing but pursuant to your orders I will endeavor to do the best I can.

Joe Hayes returned from Washington following the registration conference and reported to our meeting of Division Chiefs. I must say that Joe was unable to answer a good many questions that propounded to him. Nevertheless the registration was set up by a committee composed of Mr. Coverley, Mr. Hayes, Mr. Fleming and Mr. Smith. I was not invited to participate and naturally did not.

The plan of the registration was essentially this: The schools were to close and each Caucasian school teacher with her assistant as interpreter was due to preside at a Block Manager's office and handle the registration by blocks. The Army registration was to be handled by the Army team at centrally located registration points. Preceding the registration Lt. Carroll, Commander of the Army team, read a prepared statement at meetings held in each ward but stated that any questions would be answered by the registrar. This of course precipitated a series of private meetings throughout the Project wherein innumerable questions concerning the registration were raised. It was a fertile field for agitators.

With Mr. Coverley's approval I went to San Francisco to confer with United States District Attorney Hennessy on the alien registration cases, arriving there on February 15. Registration was to commence on the 17th. Edgar and I saw Hennessy on the 15th and then at Robinson's request I remained in San Francisco discussing with him and his staff evacuee property problems from the Project standpoint.

I returned here on the 19th and was advised that one Junichi Nimura had been picked up and put in the Klamath Falls jail. Mr. Coverley asked me to question him. I discussed the matter with Mr. Kristovich, Assistant Chief of Internal Security, and from him got the memorandum which he had addressed to Mr. Shirrell on October 19, 1942 concerning this man. It appeared that at a joint meeting of the Planning Board, the City Council and representatives of the Administration and the Army, Nimura arose and gave the speech of which I have already told you and which resulted in his apprehension. I questioned Nimura and was satisfied that he was definitely anti-administration and probably pro-Japanese. I was accompanied to the jail by John Hally, Deputy Collector of Internal Revenue from San Francisco, and an interpreter. I am enclosing herewith a copy of the statement I took from Nimura together with Kristovich's



Tony O'Brien, March 17, 1943

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memorandum. On my return I called San Francisco and talked to both Mr. Zirpoli and Mr. Hennessy. They advised me to write a letter stating the facts and enclosing the statements which I took. This I did and as you know Nimura was, in due time, picked up on a Presidential Warrant and sent to San Francisco. I am enclosing a copy of my letter to Mr. Hennessy.

In the meanwhile things were happening pretty rapidly. The scheduled registration of February 17 was a complete flop. Major Marshall and Mr. Coverley decided to select various blocks known to be centers of agitation and force the registration in those blocks. Block 42 was selected as the first guinea pig and ordered to register on Thursday, February 18. There were 54 boys of military age in the block. Mr. Coverley prepared a list of their names and at noon on the 18th he and Major Marshall spoke to the residents of the block. The Major, laboring under the misapprehension that registration of the men of military age was being held pursuant to a regulation of the Selective Service Board, told the block that these men had to register. Mr. Coverley then read off the names of the 54 men in the block. On Friday, February 19, Major Marshall, Mr. Coverley, Dr. Jacoby and myself went to the Block 42 mess hall at noon. At that time only 19 boys had registered leaving 35 unregistered. The Major made a much stronger speech and reiterated his assertion that all men of military age had to register. Mr. Coverley again read the list of the 35 names and asked each one to answer present when his name was called. Not a single man answered present although some women stated that certain individuals were not present. About 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon we heard that a delegation was marching to the Administration Building from Block 42. The military Officers and several members of the staff stood in or near the Administration Building and watched the crowd approach. They stopped twice and some speeches were made and they finally reached the building. In the meanwhile Mr. Coverley had told Dr. Jacoby to receive not more than five of the group as a committee to ascertain what they wanted. Dr. Jacoby sent Kristovich to the door of the building to head the crowd off. They approached Kristovich and when he told them that Dr. Jacoby would not receive all of them they refused to appoint a committee. They offered Kristovich filled out repatriation blanks for themselves and families. They then handed him a paper which stated:

"To the Board of Selective Service: We the undersigned do not wish to sign to selective service, but to repatriate we will sign any time. So until then there won't be any business."

Under this sentence appeared the typewritten names of 34 boys. The crowd then yelled "Banzai" and departed.



We held a meeting in Mr. Coverley's office and it was suggested that these 34 boys be picked up at once. We knew that our Internal Security could not do it alone and Mr. Coverley again, and again, telephoned the FBI in San Francisco for help. We then conceived the idea of borrowing a squad of Military Police not for the purpose of arresting the men but for the purpose of protecting our Internal Security Officers while they made the arrests. Lt. Miller was in charge and agreed to send a squad and trucks were sent to get them. In the meanwhile Major Marshall heard of this and countermanded the order pointing out that the military could only enter the Project in the event that they took over. You no doubt know of the series of telephone calls, telegrams, etc., that followed and they finally resulted in our getting permission to use the soldiers. This was cleared on Sunday noon.

Both John Cook, the Reports Officer, and myself were in our apartment the whole afternoon but we were not even advised in what was transpiring. I went for a walk about 4:30 and ran into Capt. Maples and was advised by him that the Army had just entered the Project and was headed for Block 42. I commandeered a car and went down to the block. When I arrived the soldiers were in position surrounding the entire block. The people were milling about inside and the boys were getting into the truck as their names were called. The people insulted the soldiers in Japanese and threw gravel, sticks, etc., at them. The soldiers had been ordered, however, that they should not fire unless one of them was knocked down and consequently the operation was carried out without violence. When I arrived Joe Hayes told me I should leave but on second thought asked me to get into his car. We took the men out of the Project and they were divided into two groups, one group was sent to the Alturas jail and the other to the Klamath Falls jail.

Then, for the first time, Mr. Coverley told me I would have the job of interviewing every single one of them and if possible make a case against them. I accordingly secured the Court Reporter at Klamath Falls and started taking statements on Monday, February 22. Monday afternoon an FBI man from Portland arrived and sat in and listened as I took statements. Monday night Mr. Gleisteen and Mr. Jacoby, FBI agents, arrived in Klamath Falls. I talked with them and asked them their plans but got no satisfaction whatever.

Monday night Tom Yego was attacked in his apartment but not injured and Mr. Coverley sent him to Klamath Falls enroute to Idaho. I asked the San Francisco man to talk with Tom as I felt he had some information but they refused to even see him. The Portland man and I talked to Tom until 2:00 o'clock in the morning. Tuesday morning we drove out to the Project and met with Mr. Coverley, Mr. Cozzens and the Major. Gleisteen then proceeded to bawl us out for havint taken statements before they arrived. In the meantime Mr. Pieper, head of the FBI in San Francisco, had telephoned the Sheriff and the District Attorney at Alturas and advised them that they were holding our people without any charge brought by the Federal Government and that



they were holding them on their own responsibility. This created a telephonic furor that took two days to subside.

Bob Cozzens then advised Gleisteen that we were going to continue our investigation for our own purposes. Gleisteen was obdurate and a compromise was finally reached whereby I was to continue my questioning in Klamath Falls and they were to proceed to Alturas and do the questioning there. By working far into the night I finished Klamath Falls on Tuesday but had to wait until the following Monday before we received word that the FBI was through in Alturas and that we might proceed.

In the meanwhile seven of the boys who had been missed because of absence on Sunday were picked up and placed in the Klamath Falls jail. These I also questioned on Tuesday. I am enclosing with this report all of the statements that have been completed to date. They will give you the materila, from and content of these interviews.

On Monday night, February 22, a man named Hashida was severely beaten by a mob and put into the hospital and a man whose name I do not recall was slightly beaten. This was the same night as the attack on Tom Yego. Monday morning two drawings of tombstones, one Buddhist and one Christian were tacked on the door of Mr. Omuhra/<sup>who</sup> was friendly to the registration and who lived in Block 42. I used these tombstones in my questioning without results: (By the way the FBI boys from San Francisco took the statement handed Kristovich and the drawings of tombstones and of course have not returned them.)

On Thursday, February 18, Mr. Ohmura's apartment was attacked. The Mob carried sticks, stones and pop bottles. Ohmura's door was locked so they broke the windows in the apartment and splintered the door. One of Ohmura's daughters had a whistle which she blew and the gang thinking it was the police fled. About 5:00 o'clock Friday morning Kristovich called me and told me they had picked up three boys they suspected were participants in the Ohmura gang. I went over to the Recreation Building where we questioned them at some length and finally got admissions from them to this effect.

Jacoby had been up all night and I was somewhat tired so after reporting to Mr. Coverley we got a few hours sleep and at 1:00 o'clock Friday afternoon went down to the Tule lockup where we had removed these boys to further question them. Jacoby felt that one boy, Masatoshi Hirokawa, seemed willing to talk and seemed willing to name some of the people. We questioned him from about 1:30 until 6:00 Friday afternoon. At 6:00 o'clock I called Mr. Coverley and told him that I felt that this boy might give us an entree to the whole plot back of the resistance to the registration if he were given sufficient assurance that he would be protected. I suggested that he arrange a meeting



with himself, Major Marshall, Bob Cozzens and Lt. Carroll and that I would bring the boy to his house for questioning. I had to drive around with the boy for an hour and a half waiting for Mr. Coverley to finish dinner but at 7:30 the meeting was arranged. We questioned the boy until 11:00 and I broke the story. What he told us I will include as part of the result of all of our investigations.

He named ten of the boys who participated in the Ohmura beating and that night after dinner a flying squadron of we Caucasians, using about four cars, invaded the homes of this gang and picked them all up. We questioned them all the rest of the night and obtained admissions from all of them that they had participated in the Ohmura attack. They were taken to Alturas Saturday morning, as were the three from Tule Lake. We also took Hirokawa to Alturas where he remained Saturday night in separate quarters. On Sunday he was given a special pass and grant and sent to Minidoka.

On Monday I made arrangements with Mr. Lederer, District Attorney in Modoc County, to arraign the boys who admitted participating in the attempt to beat up Mr. Ohmura. With Mr. Lederer's aid, we obtained an attorney for them, who consulted with them and advised them of their rights. He also appeared in court on their behalf. On Monday afternoon they were arraigned before a Justice of Peace on a charge of participating in a riot under the California law. They all pleaded guilty and were bound over to Superior Court. Shortly afterward, they were arraigned before Superior Judge Wiley, with their attorney and again entered pleas of guilty. I was present and supplied an interpreter, and we explained each step in the proceedings. The Judge then ascertained, by questions, which of the men carried sticks or other weapons and which were unarmed. He sentenced those who were armed to six months each in the county jail, with 3 months suspended conditioned on good behavior. The balance he sentenced to four months each, with two months suspended. Before the expiration of their sentence, we will process these men before the Project Director and probably recommend that they all be sent to Moab.

I neglected to say that I am not sending copies of this report to the other project attorneys. I feel that it is the type of report that you might wish to delete before forwarding on to other projects. I leave this entirely to your judgment. I am, however, sending one copy to Edgar Bernhard in San Francisco.

Based on the information given us by Hirokawa we began picking up persons named by himas Kibel and Issei leaders who were chairmen of, or who sponsored, secret meetings resisting registration. I questioned all of these men and in every case they admitted participating in such meetings or were implicated by others. As fast as these men were questioned they were taken from the Klamath Falls jail and placed in the CCC Camp which was by that time ready for occupancy. The original 34 boys from Block 42 had likewise been placed in the CCC Camp.



Tony O'Brien, Mar. 17, 1943

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Bob Cozzens introduced the plan of ordering certain known Kibei to the registration headquarters and upon their arrival they were questioned by male registrars, including the Army team. If they refused to register they were immediately transported to the CCC Camp. As soon as word got out that this practice was being followed the Kibei began volunteering themselves as candidates for the CCC Camp. Almost every afternoon a large group would march up to the Registration Building headed by the candidates, with suitcases packed, and would send the boys off in the trucks with a chorus of "Banzais". I did not see much of this as I was spending most of my time in jail questioning the alleged leaders of the plot.

Throughout the week of March 1st to 6th various anonymous tips as to ringleaders continued to pour into the Project Director and to Dr. Jacoby. These were carefully analyzed but no action was taken on them unless they happened to be some of the Kibei who were refusing to register. In this manner the population of the CCC Camp continued to increase until it reached 108 on March 5.

Mr. Coverley was much disturbed as to what should be done with these prisoners. He had had letters from various organizations demanding explanations and was sceptical as to his rights. I endeavored to reassure him but he kept pestering me for an answer and I finally suggested going to San Francisco for the purpose of finding out what we were supposed to do by conversing with the FBI, the U.S. Attorney and yourself via the Tactical Line. There is no reason to repeat the questions which I asked, or the answers which you gave to me.

While there I wrote my confidential memorandum to you concerning the Administrative Staff here and conferred with Lt. F. M. Robinson of the Office of Naval Intelligence. I do not know how he heard I was in San Francisco but he came in and wanted me to give him all the details as to what had transpired. I discussed the matter with you and you advised me to be guided by Bob Cozzens' wishes. Bob stated that the Office of Naval Intelligence had been the only outfit that had given us co-operation both in Washington and San Francisco and told me to give him all the information that I could. I thereupon talked to him for the better part of a whole day and he photostated the transcripts which I had with me and which I forwarded to you. He also asked if he might come to Tule Lake and obtain additional information and I told him I had no objection.

I forgot to mention that Edgar Bernhard arrived on March 5, the day before I went to San Francisco, and proceeded immediately in the processing of the Kibei boys who had been taken to the camp for refusal to register.

I returned to Tule Lake on March 12 and was advised by telephone that three more men had been picked up and placed in the Klamath Falls jail. They were alleged to be leaders of various meetings, etc. One of them had been released before I got back and as I told you in my letter of yesterday neighbor



Edgar or I were consulted about picking these men up, nor was Edgar asked to sit in at the questioning in Mr. Coverley's office. Edgar and I both had been concerned about putting anybody in jail if we could arrange to question them somewhere else before their removal to the CCC Camp. Our concern was based on the fact that many of these men were picked up on purely anonymous hearsay evidence and might subsequently have to be released. Nevertheless the three under discussion were picked up without knowledge. I told Mr. Coverley that I would not question them without knowing the facts and that I could not question them without an interpreter. I then drove to the Project and back and took their statements on Friday. As I have told you one was definitely a pro-Japanese alien and the other would not do any talking. He also was an alien, however.

Mr. Coverley left for San Francisco so Saturday Edgar and I prevailed on Joe Hayes to remove these men to the CCC Camp. Saturday, as you know, Edgar and I talked with you and he asked Kent to come up in his place and bring two stenographers with him. Saturday night Dr. Jacoby told me that he had found another man who seemed willing to give us some information. I went to Tule Lake and arranged for a hotel room. We picked up this lad and questioned him from 7:30 to 11:30 that night. When I returned to the Project I found there was a feud raging between the Lieutenant in charge of the CCC Camp and our Dr. Petticord over medical services to the boys at that camp. I stayed up until 4:00 a.m. ironing that matter out and it was ironed out successfully.

Sunday afternoon Edgar and I went over the whole situation again and Sunday night Edgar, Dr. Jacoby, John Cook and myself held another seance at the Tule Lake Hotel with our latest informer. The information we received from this man will if substantiated break the back of the Tule Lake rebellion in my opinion. It confirmed the other information we had received and gave us additional data pointing to the real leaders of the rebellion.

During my stay in San Francisco Masaki Nakano, one of the leaders of the gang who attacked Ohmura began to show signs of a mental crackup. He wrote rather weird letters to me and Dr. Jacoby and finally the Health Officer at Alturas called and stated that he was definitely getting worse. Dr. Jacoby and Dr. Petticord went to Alturas and Nakano told them that if he were released he would divulge further information. His mental condition was getting serious and pointing toward a nervous breakdown. Arrangements were made with the authorities for his parole from jail and he was returned last Saturday and placed in the hospital. He divulged further information adding to the final picture.

Monday Kent, Miss Smilow and Mrs. Cavanagh arrived from San Francisco and we made arrangements for a private office on the project. Edgar and I went over the situation with Kent during the morning and in the afternoon they went over the CCC Camp to take a few statements in order to acquaint Kent with the work.



Dr. Jacoby and I met with Joe Hayes to talk over plans to pick up the men named by our informer on Sunday and together with those named by Nakano. Our plan was to pick up a number in the afternoon and another bunch Tuesday morning and possibly a third bunch Wednesday. Almost simultaneously I was advised that Lt. Robinson and Lt. McGill of the Office of Naval Intelligence would arrive on Tuesday morning and that Senator Wallgren would arrive at the same time. We decided to postpone our raids until after they had left. Hayes called a staff meeting and advised them to be ready to answer any questions the Senator might ask and to have their material ready.

Tuesday morning I teletyped you regarding a personal report in Washington and prepared a letter to you concerning the American Civil Liberties Union and a letter for Hayes' signature to Besig. I then went to Klamath Falls and met the two Naval Lieutenants. We went over the situation again for about an hour and came back to the Project. They were here for about ~~an hour~~ three hours going over material we had collected and statements we had taken and they talked with Dr. Jacoby. They had to go back but Lt. McGill expects to come back within a week to obtain additional information.

Meanwhile I met with Joe Hayes, Mr. Fleming, Harry Mayeda, outstanding Nisei leader, and Senator Wallgren. Wallgren put most of his emphasis on the question of segregation. We, of course, advised him that we were way ahead of any other Project on segregation and that we were continuing to segregate as fast as the names and circumstances could be obtained.

Kent is pounding away at processing the Kibei at the CCC Camp. Meanwhile we resumed our raids and as I write ten more Kibei are leaving the Project for the CCC Camp. Tomorrow morning we hope to get the remainder of the leaders. I propose to question them.

I think I have given you a fairly accurate chronological picture of what occurred. I shall now try and tell you chronologically what we learned about this mess.

As I have told you in another memorandum the evacuees had pretty much their own way on matters of policy with the previous administration. I have also told you of the school teacher pattern that added to this situation. I have likewise told you something of the really subversive people who held key places in this Project.

When registration was announced there were quite a few Nisei who came to me and said they were ready to register and wanted to volunteer. After Lt. Carroll had made his prepared speech and had refused to answer questions, however, the picture changed. The subversive agitators began to work in various blocks on the Project. Ward 5, in which Block 42 is located, became the worse and we had no other recourse than



to believe that most of our trouble makers resided there. The People held meeting after meeting all over the Project and were importuning the City Council and Planning Board to answer questions concerning registration. These questions were readily and eagerly supplied by the agitators. The questions are all well summarized in the so called "Pamphlet" which I am enclosing. The City Council and the Planning Board therefore began presenting the questions to Mr. Coverley and the Major until the questions reached more than 100.

We felt that the Planning Board and the City Council were stalling for time and were the instigators of the questions. It now develops that this was not the case, although there were several individual members who were agitators. The real agitators were not persons commanding respect in the community. There is no doubt the agitators patterned their activities after the Toyama, Black Dragon, pattern. They rarely came into the open themselves but used the young Kibei, with whom they were well supplied, to do the dirty work.

The impasse between the City Council and the Planning Board on the one hand and the Administration on the other continued until the 21st when the boys from Block 42 were picked up with the aid of the soldiers. That action immediately crystallized the opposition to the Administration but singularly enough most of the active opposition centered in Ward 5. There are seven wards and undoubtedly the leaders in Ward 5 felt that the rest of the Project would follow their leadership; fortunately this did not happen.

On Sunday night, February 21, a group of Kibei met in the Mess Hall in Block 4 to discuss resistance to registration. They met again on Monday night. This night a rough draft of the famous "pamphlet" was read to the meeting. There were representatives of each block present. They took notes and then returned to their separate blocks and called block meetings to discuss these notes. Hashida spoke against the "pamphlet" in his block and was promptly beaten up. We think the same gang attacked Tom Yego and the minister the same night. The Kibei met again at 3:00 o'clock Tuesday morning and were advised by the chairman of the meetings. Tuesday night they met again and completed plans for a mass meeting to be held on Wednesday night. Wednesday night the mass meeting was held in Block 23. It was presided over by the Kibei leaders. There were Kibei and Issei from each block in the Project there. The pamphlet was mimeographed by them in both English and Japanese and was given to the Issei delegates with instructions to post them in their respective block latrines. The Kibei were instructed to circulate a petition against registration in every block and some petitions were circulated but none were presented.

In the meanwhile Shizeki Abe, Chief Steward in Block 42, an acknowledged Issei leader of the rebellion prevailed upon Masaki Nakano, mentioned above, to organize a Kibei gang to beat up Ohmura. This action was carried out with the results heretofore given.



Tony O'Brien, Mar. 17, 1943

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We believe that the author of the "pamphlet" was Yoshio Yamato. He will not admit it but he was one of the principal speakers at the Block 23 meeting and we hope that the additional evidence which we expect to obtain tomorrow will pin this act on him.

Going back to Monday, February 22, when the Planning Board and City Council were unable to obtain the release of the Block 42 boys from jail they all resigned. They did this because they had been ordered by the people to secure the release of the boys and having failed felt they had no other recourse. The Flap Ugly agitators with their Kibei gangsters immediately shot up into the leadership of the blocks, particularly in Ward 5.

All of our evidence points to M. Nokamura as the arch conspirator. He is an ex-gambler and a rough character. His immediate Issei associates are Esaku Yoshida, reputedly "Eta" (low caste), and Takusaburo Yamahata, a rough violent person, Shigeki Abe, mentioned above, and a few lesser satellites. Then of course there were the Kibei leaders whom I have mentioned elsewhere. This gang operated throughout the Project but particularly in Ward 5. Everyone who opposed them, whether he be informer or not was an "Inu" (informer or dog) and was threatened with death. When a block showed indications of wanting to register a block meeting was immediately called. People had to attend or else they would be branded as "Inu". At the meeting the Issei would act as chairmen and dwell upon the contents of the famous pamphlet. The walls of the Mess Hall were lined with young tough Kibei, who also blocked the entrance. No one was allowed to speak or act in any manner contrary to the wishes of the leaders. The men were told if they did not comply they would be beaten to death and the women were told they would have their heads shaved and their brains beaten out if they did anything to aid registration.

When the young Kibei began to volunteer as candidates for the CCC Camps large banquets were held in their honor by the residents of their block. Each Kibei was served his fishhead, a custom used in Japan wherein a Japanese soldier going off to war attends and banquet and eats fishhead. The volunteer Kibei were honored with speeches and a committee was formed to escort them up to the Administration Building and send them off with a chorus of "Banzais".

(Dictating resumed Friday March 19, 1943)

Yesterday afternoon we were informed that the agitators had established "inu" tables in the various mess halls and that they were demanding that anyone that was friendly to the Administration would be forced to eat at these tables. Then they threatened the waitresses with violence if they waited on them and on some occasions served them sand sandwiches. As we successively took the leaders of the gangs from the Project the decent people began to come to the fore and demand their rights. The stewards from two mess halls in Block 44 and Block 48 came to the Project Steward yesterday and told us



Tony O'Brien, Mar. 17, 1943

about the "inu" table business. We had a long talk with them and they stated that they were going back into the Project and endeavor to unite the decent people against the Kibei gangs. They also confirmed our belief that we were getting the right men. That is they would not talk about these men as they did not wish to be informers but as we read off the list they would nod their heads with approval as each name was spoken.

I had a long talk with the former Block Manager of Block 48 yesterday and he told me that he was going to attempt the same remedy in his Block. If this activity continues and we are able to apprehend the rest of the leaders it may be that the people themselves will straighten the mess out.

Yesterday we picked up the two Issei who are supposed to be the key leaders. They are Nakamura and Yamahata. They are two of the toughest individuals I have ever had to deal with. They are crafty and of course will not do any talking about their activities. Both of them, however, refused to register and we are holding them on that technical charge while we await a reply from the United States Attorney as to whether he will bring them before an Alien Hearing Board. Too many fingers point in the direction of these men for us to ever allow them at large in this community again. I think they are exceedingly dangerous. Tomorrow we expect to pick up the balance of the leaders. This should complete the arrests for awhile.

The Project is much quieter now than it was at any time during registration and we hope to be able to open the schools next week. That is why I made the suggestion about personally reporting to you in Washington at that time. It is utterly impossible to put down on paper all the things that running around in my head as the result of this picture.

Tomorrow morning we are releasing another man from the CCC Camp. He is a harmless Issei who did too much talking and Mr. Coverley will probably punish him by imposing a sentence equal to the time he has been in the Camp and then release him as having served his time. Harry Stafford promised a reply as to whether or not he would take the Wakayama family on Monday. If he will that will release two more men from the CCC Camp. Kent expects to finish processing the men in the camp tomorrow noon and next week we should be able to stand trial them before Mr. Coverley. I think they will all plead guilty to refusing to register and he then can dispose of them by either keeping them in the CCC Camp, or sending them to Moab, or recommending their arrest for internment or prosecution. If we are lucky and do not have to pick up any more we might have this mess cleaned up by the end of next week. Kent has agreed to stay a few more days to help.

Major Marshall was kind enough to tell me in the presence of Bob Cozzens and Mr. Coverley that he was giving me sole credit for having uncovered the lead that broke up the rebellion. He said that he was going to convey this message to you and the Director. Lt. Robinson and Lt. McGill of the Office of Naval Intelligence both told me that they thought it was a



Tony O'Brien, Mar. 17, 1943  
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splendid job of intelligence work and that they were so reporting to their superiors. Naturally I felt quite pleased at these comments although I was not so pleased when Mr. Coverley told the Repts Officer that he was the one who had succeeded in getting Masatoshi Hirakawa to talk.

I am physically and mentally sick and tired of the whole business and uprighteously indignant over the situation that allowed such a thing to happen anywhere.

I am enclosing a miscellaneous batch of things connected with this letter which I have not taken time to sort out and number.

~~I am enclosing a miscellaneous batch of things~~

It has been an interesting, although trying, experience which I would not have missed for the world although I can't say I enjoyed it while it was going one. If you need a criminal investigator in and around the city of San Francisco at \$4600. a year, or better, I feel that I am eminently qualified for the job.

With all best wishes, I am,

Sincerely,

/s/ Tony O'Brien



C  
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Y

WASHINGTON

March 31, 1943

AIRMAIL

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Harvey M. Coverley  
Project Director  
Tule Lake Relocation Center  
Newell, California

Dear Mr. Coverley:

From fairly reliable sources we are currently receiving disturbing reports about the activities at Tule Lake of pacifists and conscientious objectors employed by WRA. Most such reports indicate active interference with the recent registration and army recruitment and indicate that the activities are a matter of common knowledge to other members of the appointed staff and to the evacuees. The reports vary as to the persons concerned, numbers ranging from two to a dozen, but yesterday the following individuals were named as engaged in this unacceptable activity:

Raymond Cheek - 4e	Elizabeth Janes
Bess Kirven	Goldie Nicholson
Maryette Lum	Garnet Van Buskirk
Jean McKay	Emily Light
Dorothy Phillips	Pearl Watson
Edgar Ritter - 4e	Charles Palmerlee - 4e
Harriett Yarrow	Portia Billings
Arthur Ramey	Nellie Carter
Lillie Roudabush	

Three of the individuals are classified as 4-e under Selective Service, and two of the women mentioned (Miss Nicholson and Miss Light) are described as dangerous to administration and as leaders in the anti-war propaganda organizations which is reported as active at Tule Lake. Why the Tule Lake schools are so disproportionately staffed with pacifists of such belligerent type is not understood here, but if such is the case early corrective measures must be taken. Provinse and Dr. Ade had expected to discuss the matter with Supt. Harkness at the Denver meeting next week, but earlier action seems desirable.



Please discuss the matter immediately with Supt. Harkness and recommend what should be done. Since most of the appointees concerned have been on WRA rolls less than a year, no formal charges need precede their dismissal. Records should be developed, however, and specific reasons for dismissal should be assigned, if resignations are not secured. Since the action of dismissal will be a disciplinary one, it should probably come from this office, and, if, after full investigation, you think dismissal is proper, please submit the record with your recommendation to me and I will issue the necessary termination.

The people concerned are probably well-meaning and sincere, though it would not be surprising to find on closer analysis a heavy trace of frustration and martyrdom. In any event, their presence on the project in such numbers and with such zeal for their beliefs is extremely undesirable at the present time.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) D. S. Myer  
Director

JHProvinse HP

cc: E. B. McMenamin  
Philip M. Glick  
Lester K. Ade



Tule Lake Project  
Newell, California

PDO

April 2, 1943

Mr. Dillon S. Myer  
Director  
War Relocation Authority  
Barr Building  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Myer:

As you know, our scheduled registration period came to an end one week ago yesterday. Since that time, our employment division has been busily engaged trying to ascertain some of the statistical results of the registration. Oddly enough, this has not been as easy as it would appear. Due to the fact the military team did not clear all registrations through our office, considerable confusion has resulted. In other words, the military team left here with approximately seventy Forms 304A for which we did not have Form 126A. On the other hand, we have a number of Forms 304A, for which the military team did not have Forms 304A. Furthermore, our efforts to ascertain just how many people should have registered were complicated by the fact that approximately 250 persons had left the project since the registration period began and by the further fact that quite a number of evacuees reached their seventeenth birthday during the registration period. In addition to this, we have ten persons on the project whose citizenship is not known and cannot be ascertained. Seven of these persons are males and three females. The following table, however, sets forth approximately the correct results:

NUMBER OF PERSONS REQUIRED TO REGISTER

male citizens	2960	
female citizens	2784	
male aliens	3079	
female aliens	<u>2017</u>	
Total		10,840

male 3079 / 1795.58  
alien 1539.5  
25650  
24632  
91.708  
female 2017 / 17430.00  
alien 14119  
18120



Number Registered

male citizens	2294	
female citizens	2239	
male aliens	1795	
female aliens	<u>1430</u>	
Total		7,758

Persons Unregistered

male citizens	666	
female citizens	545	
male aliens	1284	
female aliens	<u>587</u>	
Total		3,082

Of all the male citizens who registered, 673 gave a negative answer to question No. 28 on Form 304A. Of the female citizens, 328 answered question No. 28 on Form 126 revised, in the same way. If we conclude that all of the unregistered persons would have indicated disloyalty by their answers to the questions mentioned above, then we may say that 1339 male citizens out of a total of 2960 do not owe allegiance to the United States. This is almost 50 percent. Similarly, in the case of the women, the total of those unregistered plus those who indicated disloyalty is 873, or approximately 33-1/3 percent of the total. Altogether this gives 2212 out of 5744 citizens who may be considered disloyal, at least on the face of things. Inasmuch as no direct loyalty question was presented to the aliens, we cannot draw any corresponding conclusion regarding them.

At this point, it may be remarked that as of this date a total of 435 persons have applied for repatriation. We have not yet had an opportunity to ascertain how many of these persons are among those who failed to register and how many are among those who answered loyalty questions in the negative. These facts will be ascertained as soon as possible.

With reference to the 666 male citizens who failed to register, we have as of this date arrested 106 and are now in the process of trying them for their failure to obey the Project Director's instructions. Naturally the remainder, consisting of 560 persons must be treated in the same way.



Mr. Dillon S. Myer  
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We expect to begin in the next day or two swearing out complaints against these persons and warrents for their arrest.

Sincerely yours,

Harvey M. Coverley  
Project Director



WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Tule Lake Project  
Newell, California

March 30, 1943

TO:

SUBJECT: Evacuees Eligible To Register

		Left Project	Total
Total Male Citizens	2806	151	2957
" Female Citizens	2717	66	2783
" Male Aliens	3053	22	3075
" Female Aliens	2004	12	2016
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	10,580	251	10,831

Included in the figures listed above, are the departures since February 9, the first day of Registration, to March 26, when all changes in the Block Forms were stopped.

The figures listed below are the permanent hospital cases and are not listed in the Block Form

Total Male Citizens	3	2960	2294	666
" Female Citizens	1	2784	2239	545
" Male Aliens	4	3079	1795	1284
" Female Aliens	<u>1</u>	<u>2017</u>	<u>1430</u>	<u>587</u>
Total	9	10,840	7758	3082

There are ten persons whose citizenship is not known. Seven males and three females.

Grand Total 10,850



WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

April 14, 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

AIR MAIL

Lewis A. Sigler, Acting Solicitor  
War Relocation Authority  
Barr Building  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Lewis:

Attached are (1) letter of April 12 addressed to Philip, which he read yesterday when he was in San Francisco, and (2) two copies of a confidential report on Tule Lake, the original of which Philip took along with him.

He asked that I send these on to you with this note.

Sincerely,

(Signed) Ed  
Edgar Bernhard  
Principal Attorney

Enclosures



WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

April 13, 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Philip M. Glick, Solicitor  
War Relocation Authority  
Barr Building  
17th and Eye Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Phil:

You will recall my warning that I was going to submit a report on aspects of my experience at Tule Lake which could not properly be included in a report of the legal situation.

In a sense this is a highly unofficial review of Tule Lake affairs. It consists of observations which are made to you personally--but with the understanding that you are free to do whatever you see fit to do with any part or all of what I say. Naturally I am hopeful that some of the points I make--if they are worth anything at all--will have some effect on issues that arise in WRA in the future; but if--knowing much more about the matter than I know--you think the waste basket is the best place for this report, I am altogether willing to accept your judgment.

I write this report because I cannot keep from writing it. When I was on the project, my first thought in response to what I saw and heard was that, after all, things do happen in the best regulated families and projects, and no doubt I was seeing and hearing exceptional details of no real consequence. As the days went on, however, and the irregularities multiplied, my blood pressure went up until about level with the altitude of Tule Lake. I have purposely let time go by--not because I thought that anything on my desk was half as important as some of the things in WRA, of which Tule Lake may be symptomatic--but just because I thought I ought to get a little longer perspective. In addition, my trip to Gila has caused a still further delay. I believe my blood pressure is somewhere near sea level now.



Philip M. Glick, Solicitor--2

I am sure you will understand that there is absolutely nothing personal in any of what follows. I name names because otherwise this report is worthless. However, I am sure you know that I am interested not at all in any action being taken against any of the persons I name, but very much in seeing certain situations corrected and certain practices eliminated. My purpose, in other words, is to try to help in preventing future trouble--trouble with evacuees, trouble among the administrative personnel, and trouble for WRA which it seems to me will result inevitably from public criticism and Congressional criticism if some of the things which are occurring at Tule Lake are allowed to continue to occur.

I fully realize that much of what I say will be said out of ignorance and inexperience in WRA. There may well be thoroughly adequate answers for many of the criticisms I am about to voice. To whatever extent you find time to do so, I would certainly appreciate being set right to whatever extent I am wrong. In fact, if you say to me that I am wrong about any of the points I make, for a reason you are not at liberty to disclose--even that answer will satisfy me.

I am also aware that, to some extent, I am second guessing. I have the great advantage of being able to look back and criticize what went before with the benefit of a view of the situation "after the fact". I shall try therefore to restrict my criticism to those acts which I think anybody in WRA should have been able to see in advance would result badly. That still leaves me plenty of area.

I came to the project on Friday, March 5, at about 8:00 o'clock in the morning. Tony O'Brien was at Alturas, so I presented myself to Harvey Coverley. He seemed very glad to have another attorney who would go to work on the evacuees being held at the CCC camp. I asked him questions and attempted to get as much background as I could in a short time. Hayes, the Assistant Project Director, and Jacoby, the Internal Security Officer, were also present for part of our conversation. After about ten minutes, someone came in and rather hesitantly interrupted the Project Director to say: "About 200 or 250 people are marching this way. I don't know what their intentions are, but they're coming across the project."



The lower half of Coverley's windows are made opaque, and the shades are drawn over the upper half. Coverley looked out behind a shade and said with a smile: "Oh well, maybe they're just coming over to register." Hayes and Jacoby then decided that they ought to go out and meet the crowd. They came back in a few minutes to say that none of the crowd seemed to be carrying sticks or stones and that they seemed fairly tractable; that probably they were merely coming over to congratulate the boys who were about to be sent over to the CCC camp.

The crowd took its place in front of the administration mess hall, where for several days the kibeï who had failed to register were being questioned individually by Bob Cozzens, some of the male teachers, and members of the Army team. Next door to the administration mess hall, and attached to it by a short connecting corridor, was a small structure where those who wanted to register were being handled by the rest of the teaching staff and a member of the Army team.

Thus far my familiarity with the whole subject was limited (except for my necessarily short talk with Coverley) to an examination of the registration blanks. Therefore, I decided that, before going over to the CCC camp, I ought to talk to Tony O'Brien, who was expected soon, and I also wanted to listen to some of the interviewing of the kibeï and see some of the registering. Accordingly, after some further conversation with Coverley and Jacoby I walked out of the administration building and over toward the mess hall. The ~~admin~~ evacuees engaged in the "demonstration" were gathered in small groups outside the mess hall and in the open area between the mess hall and the registration hall, and also around an automobile truck, standing nearby, which contained two or three kibeï who had been questioned and were about to be sent to the CCC camp. The crowd was fairly orderly--not menacing or unruly; they looked serious and somewhat independent though not exactly insolent, as I walked through and went into the mess hall.

At each of about eight or ten tables sat a young kibeï with from one to three of the appointed personnel questioning him. I inquired of several of the interviewers whether there was any objection to my listening to them. There being none, I strolled about and heard portions of a dozen or more



interviews during the next hour. I also visited the registration rooms where the teachers were hopefully waiting for candidates--but no one was being registered.

During that first day I was at Tule Lake, I naturally talked to as many of the appointed personnel as possible, trying to soak up all the information I could in a comparatively short time. I checked my reactions with person after person, and to my astonishment certain suggestions which I very diffidently broached--being very certain that they were so obvious that they must have been considered and rejected for good reason--were received as brand new ideas which ought to be put into effect. For example:

It seemed to me to be utterly obvious that no evacuee would enjoy walking through that crowd in order to enter the registration hall. He certainly would have been booed and jeered, and he might well have feared attack. Since the crowd remained gathered around both halls to cheer the boys who were being sent to the camp, I had the stupendously brilliant idea--which anybody equipped with two eyes might have had-- of having the interviews take place in one building and the registering at another building some blocks away.

Next, as I listened to the interviews, I heard every kind of approach and noted wide variations in the treatment by different interviewers of the same conduct and the same responses by different kibeis. For instance, when Kibei A would say "I am confused. I do not know whether to register or not. I would like time to think it over"--interviewer X would reply "All right. You go back home and think it over. Come back tomorrow morning and see me." At another table kibei B would say substantially the same thing as kibei A had said, and Interviewer Y would answer "Yes? Get on the truck, you're going to the CCC camp. You can get 20 years for what you're doing." Inquiry disclosed that no more was known about the second kibei than about the first; they had both failed to register--but neither interviewer had any other information about the activities of either A or B.

You understand that if it had been determined that the time had arrived when the administration was going to "get tough", I would have found no fault with interviewer Y's method. Likewise, if it had been determined that every effort should still be made to obtain registrations and to deal reasonably with the kibeis, I would have had no fault to find with interviewer X's method. But what aroused me was that nothing had been determined.



Philip M. Gluck, Solicitor--5

As soon as I could get to see Coverley I did so and told him that I felt that there was some difference in objective among the interviewers. I described some of the interviewing and suggested that perhaps he would like to call a meeting of all those engaged in questioning the kibei so that he could bring about greater uniformity of objective and result. The meeting was called for the following morning at 8:00.

At that meeting Coverley said: "I thought it might be well for us to get together and talk over the matter of interviewing the boys. Major Marshall, would you outline for us how the boys ought to be interviewed and whether you think the interviews ought to be uniform?"

Major Marshall then described in general terms what he thought the approach ought to be, suggesting among other things that the person being interviewed ought not to be branded as disloyal or as "Japanese" too early in the interview; that it ought to be pointed out to him that others purporting to be his friends were pushing him into trouble and were not going to be there to help him after they got him into trouble, etc. He indicated that there should be a very reasonable approach until the person being interviewed gave definite indication of refusal to register. He also stressed the fact that any who were previously in the armed forces and had been discharged, or who had attempted to volunteer and had been rejected, should not be sent to the camp but should be told that they had "been pushed around enough and the Army doesn't want to push them around any more." Major Marshall added "But I do not think that we ought to impose uniformity of method of interviewing." Coverley answered, with a smile, that he didn't think so either, but that Bernhard had thought there should be. At this point, of course, I proceeded to explain, as carefully as I could, that I had only one thing in mind; uniformity of objective; that I could not imagine that any two interviewers should be expected to ask the same questions and make the same remarks, but that all who were interviewing should know whether they were trying to get as many boys registered as possible or trying to show the authority of WRA--either of which objectives I would accept if either were consciously determined upon.

When that was straightened out, I asked whether it might not be well to consider separating the place of registration from the place where the interviews were going on. Coverley said that he did not think there was any need for that. I then went into a little more detail in an effort to



explain the possible effect--on those who might want to register--of having to walk through the crowd in order to do so. I also suggested that today's crowd would probably be somewhat more unruly than yesterday's crowd--or at least that I thought this was a justifiable guess, since the evacuees could be presumed to be figuring out what to do next, just as we were. Coverley answered that there was no necessity for separating the registration from the interviewing; that the boys in the tough blocks had now been interviewed and that the demonstrating was probably over.

I then asked whether there should not be further explanation of questions 27 and 28 in the course of these individual interviews, since some of the boys seemed to be at sea as to the possible result to them if they answered "No" to either or both questions. Coverley's answer was that the boys were just using 27 and 28 as a bluff; that those questions were not the reason why they were refusing to register.

I then inquired as to whether each of the interviewers should not have a registration blank with him for the purpose of explanation if needed, and in any event for the immediate registering of those who wished to register. (I was making this suggestion partially to get away from requiring the boys who did want to register, to go from one hall to the other in the presence of the crowd after being interviewed. Also, however, it did seem peculiar to me that not a single interviewer had a registration blank with him! It was a little like a salesman asking for an order without having an order blank.) Coverley's answer was that he didn't think that was a good idea because it would take so long to register a boy who said that he was ready to register right there. I then suggested that one of the interviewers be assigned to handle such registrations, but this suggestion was not followed.

I had previously asked Major Marshall whether he thought this arrangement was worth trying: That the truck for taking the boys to the CCC camp be parked outside the project about half a mile down the road; that a passenger car--not an open truck--be used to take the boys (who were to go to the camp) from the mess hall to the parked truck; that the boys be taken to the truck one at a time; and that when seven or eight were in the truck, it then be driven to the CCC camp. Marshall saw at once that this would go far toward discouraging the crowd, giving them less to become excited over, restrict their goodbyes to one person instead of six or eight at a time,



Philip M. Glick, Solicitor--7

and cut down the goodbye to a minute or two from fifteen or twenty minutes, thus substantially reducing what might develop into mob spirit, etc. He immediately called over one of the men and told him to change the procedure. As it worked out, the man misunderstood the directions and therefore changed the method only slightly, and when I next had occasion to see what was happening I found that the old procedure was being followed unchanged. Marshall had left the building and I did not feel that I should be giving anybody orders. Therefore I brought up the matter again at the meeting, but it was not very well received, and I did not press it because by that time I had somehow become slightly tired of the meeting.

However, I finally said: "Before the meeting breaks up, I would like to renew a suggestion I made earlier. I have been here only one day and therefore know all too little about this situation. Every man here knows very much more about it than I do, and I am certainly very ready to bow to your judgment. You seem to feel that you have seen the worst of the difficulty and that it will ease up today. As an outsider, I get no such feeling--but my feeling is not worth anything alongside of yours. In spite of that, however, I'm wondering if you don't just want to play safe--and also perhaps encourage registration--by separating the two places." The answer was "It's getting pretty late and the interviewers ought to be over at the mess hall by this time. Let's let it go at least for today--and you'll see that it will be all right."

At any rate I felt that a little had been accomplished; and I went off to the CCC camp. I returned at about 6:00 o'clock that evening, and then learned that during the afternoon a much larger crowd had gathered. They had been much more unruly than the day before, had shouted "Banzai" at the boys who were sent to the camp, had cheered them on their way, etc. The following morning a place was designated for registration about a block away from the mess hall.

After that meeting I saw Coverley only a few times. I went into see him to advise him against keeping any of the men in jail. I have covered this in my previous report. I also saw him on the subject of possible escape or attempted escape from the CCC camp or from the center--to tell him that the soldiers were misinformed as to what action they ought to take. I reached this latter conclusion in the following way;



Colonel Wilson happened to reach Tule Lake when I did. I sat in on a meeting at which Coverley had Colonel Wilson meet Captain Maples, who is in charge of the soldiers at the project. One matter touched upon at that meeting was that if the soldiers were told that aman had escaped they were not to go out looking for him. I met Captain Maples by chance at a dinner an evening or two later. He made some remark about possible escapes from the CCC camp. Some hours later when I was thinking back on our conversation, it occurred to me that Captain Maples was perhaps of the opinion that he had no obligation, and in fact no authority, to stop an evacuee who was attempting to escape from the center or from the camp--even though he were present at the time the escape was being attempted. And thinking back on the meeting with Colonel Wilson, I could see how Maples might have come to such a conclusion.

Naturally such a misunderstanding, at such a time as this, could well make for trouble. Early the following morning I went to Coverley and told him that I was pretty sure that Captain Maples was under the impression that the soldiers had no authority to prevent escape, and that perhaps Coverley would like to make sure that Maples had not misinterpreted something Colonel Wilson had said. Coverley replied that he was sure Maples understood and that there was no need for talking to him about it. He added, however, that if he saw Maples in connection with something else, he would remember to speak to him about that.

The following afternoon at the CCC camp, while waiting for one of the men I was to question, the Lieutenant in command of the soldiers at the camp, struck up a conversation with me. "I never thought the Army would bluff," he said, "but we're bluffing." I said I did not understand. "Well," he went on, "I don't see why they give our men guns. They ought to disarm us--unless we need the guns for self-defense maybe. Do you know that we can't stop a man from running away from camp? If one of them tries it, we can argue with him but we can't stop him."

"Where did you get that?" I asked.

"From Captain Maples," he answered. I told him that Captain Maples had perhaps been given some wrong information by someone; I said I felt sure that at least one reason for the presence of the soldiers was to make sure that the evacuees would remain at the center and at the camp; that I should think



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that if a man tried to escape, every effort should be made to prevent it, using only such means as were necessary--for instance, that the man would certainly not be shot at unless he could not be stopped any other way, and only after he had been given full warning and after shots had first been fired in the air, etc.

"No," said the Lieutenant, "we can't stop anybody. This is the first time I ever heard of the Army bluffing; but that's what we're doing."

That evening, on my return to the center, I went to Coverley's office and told him that the Lieutenant was under the impression that he could not prevent escapes and that now I was sure that Captain Maples had misunderstood Colonel Wilson. To this Coverley answered that he was sure Maples thoroughly understood; in fact, he, Coverley, knew that Maples understood, but that if he saw him he would speak to him about it.

So far as I know, this matter was never cleared up, and I made a point of this in my previous report to you because, as I think you will agree, it could become highly important.

As you know, I was prepared to leave the project, Friday night and to have Kent Silverthorne take my place. I was convinced that with no evacuee in jail, with policy pretty well worked out, and with a procedure set up for interviewing the evacuees at the camp--I was no longer serving any special purpose at Tule Lake. When I explained to Coverley what my plan was, he astonished me by asking if I could not stay over a few days more. "We want you here," he said. "Your advice is good and we need it. Won't you work it out some way so that you can stay at least until Monday or Tuesday?"

Somehow I could not reconcile my experiences of the preceding several days with this appeal, but naturally I agreed to stay on, and made arrangements with Kent accordingly. Coverley seemed very pleased and thanked me for my decision!

From my first day on the project, I had the feeling that Coverley's consistent resistance to other people's ideas and suggestions came from a notion that to accept someone else's proposal implies some admission of failure on Coverley's part. It is as if, psychologically, he were saying to himself that if the suggestion being made is a good one, then he should have thought of it himself--and, therefore, the



suggestion must be rejected in order that there may be no such admission of failure. I really think that if some psychologist could get across to Coverley that no one man can think of everything, that to listen to suggestion is a sign of strength not weakness, and particularly in a time of such stress as he is experiencing, any constructive suggestion ought to be welcome, his whole attitude could be changed.

This resistance on Coverley's part extends even to advice on strictly legal matters. At first, I did not fully understand Tony O'Brien when he told me--among many other things--that I should not be too disturbed if Coverley acted first and then consulted me afterward. I had come from the San Francisco office where Russell Robinson and Vic Furth, alike, consistently consult first and act afterward. Imagine my astonishment when Coverley told me one day--after I had advised against any more arrests and had suggested that whenever segregation was necessary it be handled by use of the CCC camp--that two men were in the jail at Klamath Falls. What is more, they stayed there even after my very specific warnings as to the risks involved--to WRA and to Coverley himself.

As to the mere fact of Coverley's acting contrary to the advice of his advisors--I have no fault to find. If he comes to his conclusions after listening with an open mind--even in the face of the urgings of everybody on the project--I would expect his conclusions to have the wholehearted support of every man on the place. But if wholehearted support is lacking at Tule Lake, it is, I believe, because the conclusions are arrived at without listening at all. Also, when the conclusions are arrived at, they are put into operation without thinking ahead in detail as to their possible effects--what problems they will produce, what resistance they will encounter from the evacuees, what the next move of the evacuees may be, and how that next move, if it occurs, will be met.

All of this has application to the way registration was carried out at Tule Lake. As I understand it, a lieutenant from the Army team read a statement--which had been previously prepared and approved--to a meeting of evacuees from each ward. But it had been previously decided that if questions were asked, the lieutenant's answer was to be that all



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questions would be answered at the place of registration! How's that for thorough preparation, careful thinking through, and detailed readiness for the reaction of evacuees?

I am not prepared, however, to put all the blame on the Administration at Tule Lake. In fairness to that administration, and to release some pent-up spleen, I'd like to digress for a moment and consider the Washington end of the registration program. That end has been, and still is, utterly incomprehensible to me. Now there must be a great deal under the way Washington handled registration concerning which I am not informed, and I may therefore be doing Washington a great injustice. I am, of course, ready to be corrected. Thus far however, I have been looking at the matter in this light:

WRA was thoroughly aware (as shown by John Embree's "Community Analysis Report No. 2", by other pamphlets, and by plenty of other proofs) of the disillusion, the bitterness, the feeling of insecurity, the partial demoralization, the suspicions of the evacuees, and their disbelief in the sincerity of the government. Then how could WRA attempt to carry through a registration program with no more preparation, no more explanation, no more warning, than appears to have accompanied this program!

The Director certainly achieved no small victory when he won his battle for the acceptance of volunteers. But what followed? Universal registration was made mandatory on all evacuees, including those who would not have been accepted as volunteers if they had wanted to volunteer, and including, also, those who did not dream of volunteering.

Also included were evacuees who had registered under selective service--and held a Draft Board card to prove it. Why was another registration required of them? Doesn't that engender suspicion and mistrust?

And what kind of registration was required? Registration on a Selective Service blank, combined with a WRA application for leave clearance, with a duplication of information in the two blanks (without explanation to the evacuee) and with question 27, which to thousands of evacuees--and to me--meant "Are you hereby volunteering?" and with question 28 which to thousands of evacuees meant "Are you hereby enlisting?"



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The re-phrasing of question 28 in the middle of registration gives some indication of how wrong the original question was. Also the very fact of re-phrasing after registration had started, made for confusion and for increased suspicion--as was to be expected, considering the people with whom we have to deal. Am I saying, then, that I would have been opposed to changing question 28 after registration had started? Not at all. But how did registration ever start without our examining and considering every question in detail--with reactions canvassed first--before registration ever started?

WRA changed its mind in other respects also--notably in connection with repatriation. You know of course that evacuees were first told that if they asked for repatriation, they need not register. Then they were told that they could not ask for repatriation without registering--and that repatriation requests would not be accepted until after registration had been completed. I venture to say that would have made you suspicious--even if you had not lost your home, your business, and a large measure of your freedom.

Then add to the lack of preparation on the part of Washington, the lack of preparation on the part of Tule Lake--and you really have a hit-or-miss method which is foreordained to failure.

I know comparisons are not only odious but are also not entirely dependable. But with full realization that there must have been other differences also, the only two other projects about which I have had specific information in connection with registration, took four or five days of careful preparation and explanation and had practically one hundred percent registration.

I saw Mr. Bennett in San Francisco about two weeks ago. Without explaining why I wanted to know, or describing my own feelings in the matter, I asked questions about Gila. When Bennett reached the point in his narrative where he was about to describe how they took out 28 kibel, it was necessary for him to draw an outline of the Gila center so that he could indicate where the automobiles were stationed, where the men were stationed, how traffic was handled, etc. It was obvious that every detail was thought out in advance--even to the point of having food, water, and extra blankets for each evacuee taken out of the center.



My basic objection to some of the happenings at Tule Lake is the absence of willingness to think through the problems and their possible solutions, the absence of willingness to weigh one element against another, to figure out possible risks, and think out in detail and in advance how best to meet those risks. If registration were the last important problem which is to fact that project, there would be no need of looking back and finding fault; but we all know that next week and next month some other critical situation will arise. If registration at Tule Lake had been a failure because of some unforeseeable turn of event, or even through some error of judgment, I would not be disturbed; but I think registration blew up because of failure to look ahead, to plan ahead, to think through, and to prepare in advance for what might happen--and that kind of failure will be equally fatal when the next important problem arises.

Now let me pass to a phase of the administration of Tule Lake which at first glance seems to have nothing to do with registration. Actually, the longer I was there, the more convinced I became that the registration fiasco was only one phase of an underlying and pervasive breakdown in morale at that project. Let me list some of the phenomena which are illustrative of and, I think, contributory to that breakdown. Any one of them standing alone is of practically no consequence. Each of them amounts to little more than a nuisance, or a mistake, or a petty personal tiff between members of the staff--but all together, they signal a serious sag in the whole spirit of the project. And it would be difficult for me to believe that such a condition is not very well known to the evacuees and reflected in their own lack of respect and unwillingness to cooperate.

Now with full realization that each of the following is, in itself, perhaps only a detail, let me list a few items:

(1) There is a guard at the entrance to the center--on duty 24 hours a day. Anybody who drives in or out of the project has to stop his car and account for himself. How does he account for himself? That depends on who happens to be on duty. If guard A is on duty, you have to give him your name, your WRA identification number, the name of the person who signed your card, your automobile license, your destination, etc. If guard B is on duty, he says "okay" and waves you on. Please bear in mind that I was unknown to all the guards. Yet I had both of these types of treatment the first two days I was on the project.



It may be that the guard is under the jurisdiction of the Army and not under WRA--but I am sure the average person visiting the project (and the average evacuee) identifies him~~self~~ with WRA. And in any event the project administration could certainly be instrumental in tightening up what is now very loose procedure.

(2) The school teachers were pressed into service to help with registration. Two of them were conscientious objectors and therefore said they could not register men for military service. They were asked for their resignations. Twelve other teachers then threatened to resign unless the first two were reinstated. They were reinstated.

(3) The cashier in the administration mess hall is an alert, pleasant-looking, young fellow. I was told he refused to register. Yet he still holds his job--a very good job. For him, refusal to register has carried no penalty whatever--at least for the several weeks which had elapsed between that refusal and the day I left the project.

(4) You may get some idea of how the dining room account is kept from this: When I first arrived, I asked the cashier how much I should pay for my meals. At his suggestion, I paid 50 cents per meal, for one or two meals--until I found out that the correct amount was 35 cents. When I told him that, he nodded and accepted 35 cents from me thereafter. My wife was at the project during part of the time I was there. I paid 50 cents per meal for her, for several days. When I told him her meals should be 35 cents apiece also, he agreed and thereafter accepted 35 cents, and at my suggestion, credited me 15 cents per meal for each meal for which I had paid 50 cents. He kept very close account of the matter--on a little slip of paper, which he threw away when our accounts were even again.

I am guessing that the accounts were as well kept the day his cash register was broken and he could not ring up receipts as when his cash register was in good order.

Either his accounts are not very carefully kept (and certainly not very carefully supervised) or the boy is a mathematical genius who, registered or unregistered, ought to have a much better position.

(5) I was on the project eleven days. Two days out of those eleven, the electric lights were burning during a



good portion of the morning as if it had been midnight. This was true of lights just outside the doors of the administration building as well as elsewhere. I tried to find out, on the second occasion, where to turn them off but the first two people whom I asked did not know and were utterly disinterested.

(6) All the time I was at Tule Lake I saw not a single evacuee guard on duty, either in the vicinity of the houses occupied by the appointed personnel or in any part of the sections occupied by the evacuees. I was in the latter area on three occasions at night; and I was in the section occupied by the appointed personnel every night, of course. This fact crossed my mind several times only because of the tense situation in the center. I did not know that at other centers evacuees are on guard every night as a matter of course. On the two nights I was at Gila, I twice saw evacuee guards on duty.

(7) I am told that the coal-handlers went out on strike--wanted more pay. I am told that the Assistant Project Director settled the strike by accepting the terms offered by the strikers: instead of working eight hours per day, they were to work four hours and were to be given their regular eight hours' pay. The fiscal man, when informed of the settlement, told the Assistant Project Director that he would not be able to okay the pay vouchers, since to do so would be a violation of his duties and of his bond. He was told that that was the settlement and that he had no discretion in the matter except to follow orders. He followed orders for a while, until he could no longer stomach the situation; then he put on his own strike and refused to make further payments to the coal-handlers except for hours actually worked. I am not informed as to the outcome.

(8) There has been a succession of petty crimes. The administration has thus far given an impression of weakness and vacillation in this connection which I am afraid is not very discouraging to wrongdoers. Apparently those responsible for internal security do not want to prosecute anybody unless somebody from Washington orders them to do so. Jacoby, Chief of Internal Security, told me that there was at least one house of prostitution flourishing at the center. Perhaps in this case no action has been taken because Jacoby does not have sufficient evidence thus far. But there have



Philip M. Glick, Solicitor--16

been cases in which the evidence of crime was inescapable--culprits were caught redhanded--and yet nothing was done. For example, evacuees have been caught in the act of stealing; they have been caught in the act of running away, with the stolen goods on their persons; they have been caught in the act of gambling for sizable stakes. In the gambling case, names and addresses were taken, the money was returned to the gamblers, and nothing was done. In the other cases, names and addresses were taken, and the stolen goods repossessed, but nothing else happened. It is not surprising therefore to learn that goods have been taken out of storage, that warehouses have been broken open and goods stolen, that Government property (tools, etc.) has been taken, and even that railroad cars have been broken into and some of the contents stolen.

(9) I know that Tony O'Brien's unsatisfactory office space is an old story to you, but I wonder if you have ever heard the full tale. Tony's desk is out in a large open room containing perhaps 20 other desks. During his absence I sat at his desk seldom, and only for short periods. Nevertheless I had an opportunity to see under what difficult circumstances he must work. At income tax time, when I was there, the situation was of course particularly bad. Evacuees were being interviewed by two or three evacuee lawyers at the same time, within eight feet of Tony's desk. But the real point is that Tony has for months been asking for a partition behind which he can have his office, but the Assistant Project Director has somehow never been able to get the material.

With that fact, consider the following story--hearsay, but told to me by the principal person involved, the fiscal man who has been on the project for about ten months. During that time he has been attempting to get housekeeping quarters so that he and his wife can cook their own meals. The Project Director has somehow never been able to assign such quarters to him. Meantime a number of others of the appointed personnel have been assigned to such quarters within that period--and every man in this fiscal man's department who has asked such quarters has been able to get them. All of these people have been at the project a shorter time than the fiscal man has been there.



The latter finally suggested that he and his wife could stay in their present quarters if a very small addition could be built to house the kitchen equipment, which they apparently already own. The Assistant Project Director said he would be glad to do that but it would be impossible to get the material; however, that if the fiscal man could get the material, the addition of course could be built. The fiscal man then arranged with another Governmental department to furnish the material. It lay on the ground beside his quarters for a considerable time before anything happened. Then when the fiscal man was out of town, the Assistant Project Director took that material and with it built himself an addition to his own quarters because his wife was expecting a baby.

(10) Senator Wallgren was to arrive at the project the day after I left. About noon of my last day there, Tony O'Brien heard--I think from the person who picks up visitors at the station--that the Senator was on his way. Coverley was in San Francisco, and, therefore, Tony went to Hayes at once to ask him whether the staff had been informed. It had not, and apparently Hayes was not thinking of informing them. Under pressure from Tony, however, he agreed that when he talked to Coverley on the telephone he would suggest a staff meeting so that the staff could be told. I understand the meeting was held.

I can understand that the administration would want Senator Wallgren to see the project in operation under absolutely normal conditions. It would seem to me that he would see them under anything but normal conditions if the staff did not know he was there until he walked in on them. Also, of course there would be no chance to think ahead as to what data the Senator might want, what information in somebody's desk or files or mind ought to be brought out, etc. In addition, does it contribute to the morale of the personnel not to inform them of something like this?

Mark Twain once wrote a book (wann't it "Following the Equator"?) in which he omitted all reference to weather. He added an appendix consisting of descriptions of every variety of climatic condition--and in a preface invited the reader to dip at will into the appendix whenever he felt the need, choosing whatever kind of weather he felt would be appropriate. In a similar way, I have tried to leave out some



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of the stronger adjectives which occurred to me, and I am tempted now to add an appendix consisting of epithets and invective of every description--but perhaps you do not need any such artificial assistance and have been supplying your own as you went along.

In conclusion let me say again that I am ready to be informed or corrected. I would, in fact, welcome facts which would make me change my mind because my experiences at Tule Lake did not tend to make me feel great pride in WRA. In addition, I believe very thoroughly that if conditions there are not soon corrected from the inside, they will be corrected from the outside--and justifiably.

Sincerely,

/Signed/ Edgar  
Edgar Bernhard  
Principal Attorney



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WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Tule Lake Project  
Newell, California

April 21, 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Dillon S. Myer  
Director  
War Relocation Authority  
Barr Building  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Myer:

In further reply to your confidential airmail letter of March 31 regarding the alleged activities of conscientious objectors on our appointed staff, I am pleased to submit a final report. All the persons listed in your letter have been interviewed either by a representative of the Internal Security Division or by myself. In addition, the activities of these persons have been checked and investigated independently by the Internal Security Division. With the exceptions of Miss Goldie Nicholson and Miss Nellie Carter, all of the persons listed were conscientious objectors or have pacifist leanings. Neither Miss Nicholson nor Miss Carter consider themselves as conscientious objectors or pacifists and there is nothing in their past records to contradict this. No evidence could be obtained either direct or collateral which would support the seriousness of the charges made in your letter. In other words, we have nothing on which to base any disciplinary action.

Since you pointed out in your letter that Miss Goldie Nicholson and Miss Emily Light were particularly dangerous to the administration and were leaders in an alleged "anti-war propaganda organization", I interviewed them personally. In the case of Miss Nicholson, as indicated above, she is not a pacifist or a conscientious objector. She formerly worked with Baptist Church groups, including Japanese-Americans, in the city of Sacramento, California and has been active here in church work. From all the information we can obtain, she urged her nisei friends to register. Otherwise she promoted the registration program. She has encouraged the young men to volunteer for the Army and has given one or two entertainments



in the nature of farwell parties for the volunteers who will soon be leaving. There is nothing to support the charges made against her.

In the case of Miss Light, the evidence is somewhat less favorable. On the first day of registration she was detailed to a post in Block 27. During that day the block manager apparently told her that the issei would be slow to register due to the wording of Question 28 on Form 126, revised (the substitute question had not yet been received). She apparently replied, "I don't blame them for waiting." Later on in telling of this incident to one of her colleague's she made a remark which could easily be interpreted to mean that she had instructed the Block 27 residents not to register. A check up in that block, however, seems to indicate quite clearly that she did not give such advice. After the substitute question was received, she felt there was no further reason for anyone refusing to register and there is no evidence of any further activity which might be considered obstructive. At no time have we reason to believe that she made any remarks applicable to the registration of citizens.

At the time registration began, Miss Light asked a number of questions regarding why the registration was necessary. Later on she asked Sergeant Vincent Sullivan, one of the members of the military team, a number of additional questions about registration for her information. These questions were interpreted by some to mean that she was opposed to registration. It seems clear that she was very much opposed to the idea of an all Japanese combat team but as far as that goes, so were many others including Major Marshall and myself. There is no evidence that she ever told anyone not to register or that she ever agitated against registration. Miss Light claims to be a conscientious objector but I personally doubt if she could prove it. She is a Congregationalist, a denomination which has no strong stand on peace. She has never belonged to a pacifist organization and has never participated in a pacifist propaganda drive.

Mr. Charles Farmerlee, who entered on duty one day before registration began, also raised a question regarding the propriety of requiring issei to sign the original Question 28. He offered no further criticism after the substitute question was provided.

The strongest evidence, however, in favor of the persons named by you, is that the groups with which they were most closely identified were those which had the highest percentage of registration of any on the project. In other words, the people



CONFIDENTIAL

April 30, 1943

Mr. Dillon S. Myer  
Director  
War Relocation Authority  
822 Barr Building  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Myer:

As you know, the Federal Bureau of Investigation recently conducted investigation at the Tule Lake Relocation Center to determine whether certain events surrounding the Army's registration of Japanese for military service constituted a violation of the Sedition Statutes. Over fifty Japanese were questioned during this investigation. Certain information of a general nature received from them presents an interesting and informative picture. These data are hereinafter summarized for your information and whatever action you deem appropriate.

Practically all of the Japanese interviewed agreed that one of the greatest tragedies at the camp was the manner in which Japanese propaganda had been permitted to get around. They all agreed that certain elements in the camp were spreading propaganda almost identical in context. This was essentially; that Japan was winning the war and that America was undergoing terrific losses but failed to reveal these losses to the people. Other reported rumors were that Australia was taken by the Japanese a long time ago and that General MacArthur is already a prisoner of Japan. It was alleged that these rumors originated from short wave broadcasts received from Japan by the evacuees. A great number of the Japanese stated that they knew for a fact that many Japanese wandered up and down the camps both day and night giving information they had heard over their short wave radios. When questioned concerning the existence of these short wave radios sets, the Japanese, in all instances, answered that while it hardly seemed possible that the sets could have been smuggled into the camp, nevertheless, they had heard these reports so often, they were finally inclined to believe them to be true.

One evacuee who has lived in rural and urban areas of Northern California for the past twenty years estimated that among the colonists at Tule Lake, at least thirty per cent wished with all their hearts to see Japan win the war. He estimated that another thirty to forty per cent were neutral and the remainder loyal. The informant pointed out, however, that a great number of the native born Japanese, who, prior to the evacuation program were loyal, are now going over to the pro-Japanese groups every day. He further advised that is corrective steps were not taken by the United States to counteract the influence of the alien Japanese, that a vast proportion of the Nisei would be lost as loyal citizens. This statement was substantiated by virtually all Japanese talked to at Tule Lake. An an



example of this pro-Japanese influence, the following excerpts, which are representative of the thoughts of many evacuees, are quoted from a letter written by a native born Japanese who has never been in Japan:

"Up until December 7, 1941, I, like hundreds of my Nisei friends, enjoyed the many advantages that the United States offered. I am married and have several children and it has been my intention to remain in this country and to be the best possible citizen that I can be. When the war came, I was stunned at what happened at Pearl Harbor and I wanted to serve in the United States Army. When it became evident that we citizens would not be permitted to go back to our homes, that seemed very unfair to me. At first, here at the camp, I did everything I could to maintain a reputation for my country, the United States. I told the aliens and Kibei, when they made nasty cracks about the United States, that they were wrong and that this country was fair and that everybody would be treated individually. After a while, the pro-Japanese people started to laugh at us Americans and say, 'Well, we don't see the government sending you back to your homes like you said they would.' We had no answer to those taunts. At first we tried to laugh them off but gradually it got harder and harder. The last straw was this registration program. I truly believe that even if most of the Japanese here want Japan to win the war or at least want to remain neutral, nevertheless, they were anxious to cooperate with the War Relocation Authority for our mutual advantage. But this registration program was so absolutely unfair. The authorities here, after ordering us to register, refused to discuss it at all. There were some questions in the registration questionnaire which we did not understand and which we wanted explained. The War Relocation Authority refused to explain anything. That made us mad. We wanted to know whether by answering certain questions one way or another, we would be considered disloyal to the United States. The older Japanese and the Kibei stated that this was all part of the program to take away our citizenship."

Of the Japanese talked to at the camp, not one had a complaint to make regarding the physical set-up of the Tule Lake Center. They all agreed that the food was satisfactory, the houses more than adequate, the surrounding delightful, and the recreational program entirely successful.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ J. Edgar Hoover  
John Edgar Hoover  
Director



Mr. Dillon S. Myer

Page - 3

with whom they were working are those who had the best registration record. The groups with which they had the least contact were those which had the poorest records, namely Buddhist and kibel groups.

For your information, I am enclosing copies of two interviews between persons accused and a member of our Internal Security staff. These are samples to show you what type of questions were asked.

I wish to lodge a strong protest against the activities of Mr. Hoffman when he recently visited this center. You have advised me that he is the person who submitted the list of names contained in your letter. He is also presumed to have reported that the list was given to him by Mr. Floyd Wilder, former principal of our high school. For your information, there is enclosed a copy of a confidential memorandum addressed to our Assistant Project Director by Mr. Wilder, in which he points out that Mr. Hoffman solicited the list and represented himself as a member of the Washington staff, delegated to obtain such information and hinted that he was serving in a secret service capacity. Mr. Hoffman did not mention this to me and I strongly resent his snooping around the project in this manner. In the future I suggest that if it is necessary to send anyone here to inspect our Fire Control service, that you delegate someone other than Mr. Hoffman. I regret that I cannot make him welcome here again.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Harvey M. Coverley  
Harvey M. Coverley

Enclosures #33779



CONFIDENTIAL

May 7, 1943

Memorandum

To: Mr. Glick

From: E. Barker

Mr. Myer suggests substitution of the following sentence for the one crossed out on the second page:

"We will be glad to call to the attention of the Federal Bureau of Investigation those cases involving violations of Federal law which are to be referred to the United States Attorney for prosecution, or any other cases you may indicate would be of interest to your Bureau."

As far as Mr. Myer is concerned, the letter will be ready to go then. However, I think the last sentence needs to be revised accordingly.

April 2, 1943

Mr. Dillon S. Myer  
Director  
War Relocation Authority  
Barr Building  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Myer:

As you predicted, I was very much interested in your correspondence with Mr. John Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as transmitted with your letter of March 24. This is the first occasion we have had to learn of the FBI's analysis of the events which have transpired during the past two months in the center.

A number of the statements made by Mr. Hoover help us to understand, at this late date, the reasons from some of the actions taken by the FBI. In certain respects, however, I am compelled to differ with Mr. Hoover, much as I regret to do so. In the second paragraph on Page 1, Mr. Hooversays "I understand a representative of this bureau is alleged to have informed the WRA representatives at Alturas, California and Klamath Falls, Oregon that they had no authority to hold the Japanese who were removed". No such allegation has been made by me. If you will refer to my telegram of February 24, you will note that I stated the "FBI informed the District Attorney of Modoc County they doubted whether the sheriff had any right to hold the evacuees incarcerated there by me on Sunday". In other words, we did not state that the WRA representatives at the points in question had been contacted by the FBI, nor did we make statements regarding Klamath Falls, Oregon in this connection.

We were advised by the District Attorney of Modoc County,



Mr. Dillon S. Myer

Page 2.

Mr. Charles Lederer, that he had been informed by the FBI in the manner reported to you. Following receipt of your letter of March 24, I talked to him again over the telephone. He states the facts are as follows:

On Tuesday, February 23, he called Mr. Nap Pieper, Agent in Charge of the FBI office in San Francisco, asking him whether or not the FBI proposed to prosecute the prisoners we had lodged in the Modoc County Jail on February 21, or whether he was to prosecute them locally. Mr. Pieper advised that he would inquire into the matter and communicate with him further. On the following day, an FBI agent at Sacramento, California telephoned to Mr. Lederer and stated that he had been requested by Mr. Pieper to inform him that the prisoners were not being held at the request of the FBI and that he questioned whether they were properly held upon the request of any government agency, and that it was assumed they were being detained on the responsibility of Modoc County. This was the first time we were aware Mr. Lederer had first communicated with the FBI. He tells me he was under the bonafide mistaken assumption that the FBI was somehow involved. He also assures me that the information given him by the FBI agent at Sacramento was of such nature as to alarm him and make him believe that he was holding the prisoners without any right to do so. He also gained the impression from this conversation that the FBI felt WRA did not have authority to commit these prisoners.

In the same paragraph of Mr. Hoover's letter he says "This Bureau was originally informed of the situation being encountered in Camp Newell, in connection with the registration of Japanese for military service, on February 17, 1943". Our records reveal this is not quite true. I first reported that we were encountering difficulty in connection with the registration on Monday, February 15, via long distance telephone to Mr. McConnell of the FBI office in San Francisco. This report was made to Mr. McConnell because I was advised that he was in charge of all FBI activities in Northern California. After advising Mr. McConnell of the kind of resistance and the interference we were encountering, he told me he would see what could be done and would phone me back. In the course of his conversation, however, he more or less led me to believe he did not consider the matter very serious and wasn't sure that there was anything they could do, unless we would ascertain specifically what acts were being performed, who was doing them and gather all necessary evidence in connection therewith. I told him that if we were in position to do these things, we would not need the FBI. Later the same evening (around 7 or 8 o'clock, I would estimate) I received a call from Mr. Hart, the FBI agent stationed at Red Bluff, California, who stated he had been informed by Mr. McConnell of my call and wondered if I could give him a little more specific information about what was happening, in order that he might ascertain the best way that he could serve us. I gave him all the information we had available about the kind of hidden and subversive opposition arrayed against us. His conversation



then conveyed to me the attitude that it did not seem very serious and that he thought we were over-emphasizing its importance. He also inferred that he had previously visited the Project once or twice on what he felt were "wild goose chases" and hardly considered it would be worthwhile for him to come here on a similar mission. I then made it quite plain, in my exasperation, that I felt we were not getting very good cooperation from his agency. He thereupon advised me that if we would get all the details about specific acts being committed, with the names of the persons connected, he would be very glad to come up and conduct an investigation. I therefore told him, as I had told Mr. McConnell, that if we were in possession of this information, we would not need any help. On the following morning, I received another telephone call from Mr. McConnell, who again asked me just what was happening and what kinds of acts were being committed, which we wished investigated. In the meantime, I had analyzed somewhat more carefully the experiences through which we were passing and was able to state more concisely just what it was we wanted. Mr. McConnell then told me he would get in touch with appropriate officials and see what could be done. This conversation was much more agreeable and indicated a more cooperative attitude. There were one or two other telephone conversations with FBI representatives between Tuesday and Friday.

On Friday evening, February 19, I reported to the San Francisco office, over the telephone, the fact that 34 residents of Block 42 had come to the Administrative Building that afternoon and presented us with a written statement advising that they refused to register. I was told by the FBI office that the matter was being considered in Washington and there was nothing they could do for the time being. I then complained, as I had before, that the FBI in Phoenix had assisted the Gila River Project immediately, and without any delay, upon request. I also advised that the FBI offices in Los Angeles, Salt Lake City and other places had given similar assistance to Manzanar, Central Utah and other relocation centers. San Francisco then advised me that it made no difference how other offices acted, they were proceeding in accordance with instructions and would take no action until their Washington office had issued orders.

At this point, may I call attention to the first paragraph on Page 3 of Mr. Hoover's letter, in which he stated that special agents were conducting investigations into this matter on February 20 and 21, 1943. As you know, we did not make the arrests in Block 42 until 5:00 P.M. on the afternoon of February 21. Prior to that time we had only made one arrest, that of Mr. Junichi Nimura on Tuesday, February 16. So far as I know, no FBI men were making any investigations on the dates mentioned.



Mr. Dillon S. Myer

Page 4.

On the evening of Tuesday, February 23, I received a telephone call from Mr. Gleysteen and Mr. Jacoby, (no relation to our Internal Security Chief) who advised they were FBI agents who had just arrived at Klamath Falls, Oregon to assist us with our investigation. I made an appointment with them for 8:30 the following morning in my office. They arrived therefore, on Wednesday, February 24. So far as I am aware, between my first telephone call on February 15 and February 24, these were the first agents to visit the project.

With reference to the third paragraph of Mr. Hoover's letter, may I state that I, like you, was under the impression at the time the arrests were made on February 21, that a violation of the regulations of the Selective Service Act was involved. Furthermore, I wasn't aware that all violations of this act, were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the FBI. Your letter to Mr. Hoover indicates that you thought similarly.

When the two agents, above mentioned, arrived here on the morning of February 24, they asked us why we had proceeded to make arrests on suspicion of violation of Selective Service regulations when such matters were under their jurisdiction. They also questioned why the project attorney had proceeded to interview the prisoners after their arrest. It may be stated therefore, they did not question my general authority to arrest evacuees and remove them from the project, but in effect, they did question my authority to arrest these particular evacuees. In this respect, therefore, I would say that Mr. Hoover is in error. I explained to the agents that such a statement came from them with poor grace, in view of the fact that we had been trying for approximately ten days to obtain their assistance and then when it became absolutely necessary for us to proceed without them, they criticized us for taking action. Nevertheless, I did request Mr. O'Brien to discontinue his investigation, in view of the fact that the FBI claimed exclusive jurisdiction. Subsequently, as Mr. Hoover states, it was determined there was no violation of the Selective Service Act involved. Nevertheless, after this fact became known, the FBI men continued their investigation. They departed from the project on the evening of March 1, advising us they would let us know as soon as possible whether or not they intended to prosecute. We did not receive any further communication from them. After waiting for more than a week, Mr. O'Brien made a trip to San Francisco and telephoned to Mr. Gleysteen at the FBI office on March 9, in order to get an answer. Mr. Gleysteen told him the FBI had not reached a final decision but if he were in O'Brien's shoes, he would proceed on the assumption the FBI was not interested in the matter. He also hinted to Mr. O'Brien that it would be useless for him to take the problem up with the United States Attorney.



Mr. Dillon S. Myer  
Page 5.

In all respects concerning the visit of the FBI, we cooperated with them in every possible way. We made available special quarters outside our Administrative office where they could interview privately, persons whom they wished to investigate. We placed a driver and a car at their disposal for bringing persons to be questioned. When necessary, our Internal Security officers were available to assist them. Upon their departure, both Mr. Gleysteen and Mr. Jacoby expressed full satisfaction with all aspects of their stay here.

With reference to the last paragraph of Mr. Hoover's letter, may I state that we are most desirous of establishing a relationship with the FBI which will result in us obtaining their assistance promptly when it is needed. We realize their investigative facilities and resources are incomparably better than our own. We would be most happy to make full use of them. It is not only discouraging, but somewhat humiliating, however, to beseech them for help over a period of time and then to be criticized later for having taken such action as we thought necessary and proper.

Please let me make it clear too that we are perfectly willing to furnish the FBI with all the information we have available as to why we need their services in any particular instance. We do consider it embarrassing on the other hand, to have our requests treated as though they were less serious than we consider them, with the inference that we had become unduly excited about a trivial matter. In this connection, it may be significant to point out that we did not obtain any assistance from the FBI until after considerable newspaper publicity had been given to all our troubles, making it obvious to them that the situation was, if anything, more serious than we had described it.

Sincerely yours,

Harvey M. Coverley  
Project Director



Letters - Coverley to Pieper of FBI (Coverley - Files - 5/18/43

Attn. Mr. Moore

Dear Mr. Pieper:-

Pursuant to the request made by Mr. Moore in the telephone conversation of May 13, we have inquired concerning the motives which impelled several residents of this project to order catalogs from the International Harvester Company.

There is enclosed a copy of the memo. dated May 17 addressed to me by Mr. Delbert R. Cole Acting Chief of Internal Security giving results of his investigation. We trust this information will suffice. If not, please advise us.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Coverley

Enclosure:

Memo to Coverley  
From D.R. Cole  
Subject Tractor catalog

The following persons were investigated as per Mr. Moore's request regarding their orders for catalogs from the International Harvesting Company.

Norman T. Tanabe 4812-D is one of our garage mechanics and wished the catalog to study the parts and illustrations of parts to help him in the upkeep of our own machines.

Y. Yoshino 3216-B is working at the #1 Fire Station and gave about the same reason as Mr. Tanabe. I am informed that Mr. Yoshino also helps in tractor repair.

Riichi Yoshida 7013-D is another garage mechanic and stated he needed the catalog for illustrations of parts in case one of our machines needed a replacement.

George Morishige 5312-D has left the project and is now in Fayette, ~~XXXX~~ Idaho, R.F.D. #2 c/o L. J. Rudd.

D. Cole



FBI file -

It is possible that the American Civil Liberties Union will make some of their detailed correspondence available to us. In this correspondence there are protests raised by the ACLU, E. Bestig, director, regarding the apprehension of the men apprehended at the time of registration. I should guess that there is correspondence with other projects also. Some of the material may be obtained in Washington since Glick wrote a number of letters to the ACLU regarding these matters.

In regard to registration the following abstracts were made from letters concerning the interest of the FBI in this matter:

~~Myer to Hoover (in Alturas) E. K. Klamath Falls, Sk. Klamath Falls, 1943~~

March 9, 1943

Hoover to Myer:

Several Japanese were removed from T.L. and placed in jail in Alturas and Klamath Falls. The DA in Alturas wanted to know what to do with them, asking the FBI. The FBI did not have any jurisdiction since the arrests were made by the WRA. Coverley's right to do this had been questioned by the FBI agents on the project at the time of registration because the Japanese had violated the Selective Service Act, and the Sedition Acts, the bailiwick of the FBI. The two agents did not interfere with Coverley's action, however. Failure to register is a violation of the Selective Service Act. The question arises as to whether registration was voluntary or compulsory under the SS act. This has not been decided. Mr. Coerley can take whatever stand he wishes. If he takes the former, the FBI will leave the WRA free to handle its own investigations until such time as the act is clarified.

Myer to Hoover - Mar 24, 1943

The WRA is responsible for the administration of the centers under Exec. Order 9102. The project director under this order can enforce law and order in the communities and with the aid of Int. Sec. is authorized to make investigations of any disturbance in the centers. When the director believes that a statute is violated which lies within the jurisdiction of the FBI he can call this agency in. In fact, the FBI may be called in at any time under the exec. order and the project director is free under the order to call on such service. Requests a copy of the disturbance report at T.L. from the FBI which was completed as of the above date. (Hoover's letter)

Copies of these letters sent to Coverley.



Coverley's files - FBI

Reference is made to the Myer-Hoover correspondence on FBI jurisdiction.

Coverley writes his views to Myer:

Reference is made to the question raised by the DA in Alturas as to whether the FBI proposed to prosecute the arrested evacuees. Pieper replied that the prisoners were held by the WRA and not by the FBI. The DA thought the FBI were involved since there were FBI men on the project at the time of registration.

"....In the same paragraph of Mr. Hoover's letter he says "This Bureau was originally informed of the situation being encountered in Camp Newell in connection of the registration of the Japanese for Military Service on Feb. 17, 1943". Our records (?) reveal that this is not quite true. I first reported that we were encountering difficulty in connection with the registration on Mon. Feb. 15 via long distance telephone to Mr. McConnell of the FBI office in San Francisco. This report was made to Mr. McConnell because I was informed that he was in charge of all FBI activities in Northern California. After advising Mr. McConnell of all the kinds of resistance and the interference we were encountering, he told me that he would see what could be done and would phone me back. In the course of this conversation however, he more or less led me to believe that he did not consider the matter very serious and wasn't sure that there was anything they could do unless we could ascertain specifically what acts were being performed who was doing them and gather all specific information and necessary evidence in connection therewith. I told him that if we were in a position to do this we would not call the FBI. Later the same evening (7 PM) I received a call from Mr. Hart the FBI agent stationed at Red Bluff Calif. who stated ~~CAC~~ that he had been informed by Mr. McConnell of my call and wondered if I could give him more specific information about what was happening in order that he might ascertain the best way in which he might serve me. I gave him all the information we had available about the kind of hidden and subversive opposition arrayed against us. His conversation conveyed to me the attitude that it did not seem very serious and that he thought we were over-emphasizing its importance. He also inferred that he had visited the project once or twice on what he felt were "wild goose chases" and hardly considered that it would be worth while for him to come up here on a similar mission. I then made it quite plain in my exasperation that I felt we were not getting very good cooperation from the agency. He therefore advised that if we could get all the specific details about acts being committed, with the names of the persons connected, he would be very glad to come up and conduct an investigation. I told him as I had told Mr. McConnell, that if we were in possession of this information we would not need any help. On the following morning, I received another phone call from Mr. McConnell who again asked me just what was happening and what kinds of acts were being committed and what we wanted investigated. In the meantime I had analyzed more carefully the experiences through which we had passed and was able to answer more concisely. Mr. McConnell then told me to get in touch with the proper officials and



see what could be done. This conversation was more agreeable and indicated a more agreeable and cooperative attitude. Other conversations followed.

On Friday evening, Feb 19, I reported to the San Francisco office that 34 residents of Block 42 had come to the admin. bldg. that afternoon and had presented us with a written statement advising that they ~~had~~ refused to register. I was told that the matter was being considered by the FBI in Washington and that there was nothing to do for the time being. I...complained...that the FBI in Phoenix had helped the officials in Gila...without delay and upon request. (Similarly at Manzanar, Topaz, etc.) San Francisco then advised me that it made no difference how other offices acted; they were waiting for instructions and would not proceed until their Washington office had issued orders.

....No FBI investigation took place until Feb. 23 when on the evening of Tues. Feb. 23, two agents phoned from Klamath Falls to assist with the investigation. They arrived Feb. 24 and conferred with me in my office. These were the first agents to visit the project." Agents were Gleysteen and Jacoby.

Coverley then says that he really felt that the arrests were under the jurisdiction of the FBI constituting as they did violations of the SS act. The point was that Coverley had made arrests previously for SS act violations when no FBI men were on the project. The FBI agents wanted to know why an investigation was being conducted by O'Brien and why he questioned the prisoners after their arrest. Coverley upbraided them for their "bad grace" in view of the fact that for ten days they had been trying to contact the FBI. The FBI men left satisfied. Coverley wanted to make sure that he could call on the services of the FBI whenever he desired. The problems of the prisoners in K.F. and Altura s is not solved by this letter nor is there further information on this subject. The entire missive, five single spaced pages long, is a complaint against the FBI for lack of cooperation and whining complaints from Coverley that he is not getting the cooperation from either the WRA or the FBI that his responsibility merits.



On April 6, 1943, Hoover wrote to Myer:

There is no reason why there will not be cooperation and good relations between the WRA and the FBI. There has been some misunderstanding over the jurisdiction of the FBI in matters of the kind mentioned previously (ie. SS Act, Sedition Acts, etc.) On 1/8/43 the FBI was empowered to investigate the following: espionage, counter-espionage, sabotage, subversive activity, and neutrality violations. Sept. 10, 1940 the FBI was given jurisdiction over the SS Act. The FBI finally has decided that the registration is of a voluntary nature and that therefore they have no jurisdiction over violators in registration. Quote as follows:

"...In view of these instructions (IE. the FBI to assume jurisdiction over SS Act violations) it was in the interest of this Bureau to determine whether the failure of the Japanese to register under the registration program constituted a violation of the SS Act. The Criminal Division of the Department of Justice has advised that there was no violation of the act due to the voluntary nature of the registration. However, the Criminal Division has requested further investigation in some of these cases to determine if there has been a violation of Section 33, Title 50, US Code. This statute is part of the Espionage Act passed in 1917. I believe that the above information will explain this Bureau's jurisdiction over sedition and SS violations of Federal laws and the President's directive to receive and correlate information and investigate complaints involving espionage, sabotage, and related matters.

In your letter you state that the authority of the WRA to conduct investigation of events surrounding the registration at T.L. was questioned. Realizing that the proper administration of the relocation centers requires that you have full knowledge of such events I do not question in the least your right to inquire into them. In this case however, it would appear that my original question was justified inasmuch as the investigation by Mr. Anthony O'Brien was admittedly for the purpose of establishing possible sedition violations for presentation to the US Atty. rather than for the purpose of securing information to assist you in administratively handling this and other matters, of a like nature. "

The letter goes on to say that in order to avoid duplication of effort matters relative to sabotage, subversive activities, or espionage should, when discovered, be referred to the FBI for consideration. Myer is called down for mentioning only violations of the Sedition and SS Acts. Included with this letter, although not available in these files, is a report from Chester L. Jacoby, Special Agent, entitled "Masa-shi Tanimoto et al., Internal Security - J, Sedition, Selective Service".



Coverley's Confidential Files - the FBI - 5 cont.

Myer answers Hoover - (not dated, a copy of c. April 9,)

Reference to April 6 letter appreciating reference to FBI jurisdiction. There is no resentment to the assumption of jurisdiction in these matters by the FBI. Investigations are welcomed. One comment only will suffice to close the incident.

"...My comment relates to your repetition of your prior statement that Mr. O'Brien's investigation was an infringement by the WRA on the FBI's jurisdiction because the investigation was admittedly for the purpose of establishing possible violations of the Sedition Act for presentation to the US Atty. Our project staff was faced with a serious difficulty during the course of registration. A large number of persons were refusing to register. Under the circumstances the project director had only two course of action open to him: He could either discipline the recalcitrants by administrative action at the project or he could refer them to the US Atty. for prosecution in the Federal Courts if they were guilty of the violation of any Federal law. Before determining which of these courses of action should be followed it was necessary to investigate the circumstances in order to determine whether there was any reasonable basis for referring any of the cases to the US Atty. for prosecution. This investigation was intended only to ascertain whether a prima facie case could be made out. It was not intended in any way to be a substitute for an investigation by the FBI. For this reason I do not believe it should be considered as an infringement on the FBI's jurisdiction.

Your letter indicates that the statement of general procedure and policies followed by ~~XXX~~ us in connection with matters of mutual interest to the WRA and the FBI is substantially correct. You suggested that we call to the attention of the FBI not only possible violations of the SS Act and the Sedition Statutes but also any possible violation of Federal law. I do not believe that it would be practicable to follow this latter suggestion literally. Many minor violations of Federal law occur on the projects and it would neither be wise nor practicable to refer them to the US Atty. for prosecution in the Federal courts. I am referring to such incidents as minor thefts of food, bedding and other Federal property. use of automotive equipment without proper permission, unauthorized destruction of Federal property, etc. Minor offenses of this kind can best be handled by disciplinary action at the project and the WRA has set up a procedure for this purpose. This is set forth in Admin. Instr. No. #85, 2/26/43 a copy of which is enclosed.... Your attention is directed to Section V. May I suggest therefore that the WRA call the attention of the FBI only to those violations of Federal law that are to be referred to the US Atty. for ~~XXXXXX~~ prosecution. It is understood of course, that all evidence of subversive activity, espionage, sabotage, etc. will be considered in this category."

Yours, etc. /s/ Myer

(This last paragraph is underlined, presumably by Coverley and has been made the basis of administrative action in cases of this kind, reference being made to it in other correspondence.)