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WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY


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WASHINGTON

March 19, 1943

To: Project Directors

Every project director has had his own immediate problems on registration--problems so immediate that he may be tempted to feel that events and attitudes on his project are unique. The accompanying analysis of the effects of registrations on one of the relocation centers where no incident took place may serve to give some perspective on the whole experience. The attitudes and reactions of residents correspond to reports from other centers and the analysis of them presented here should help in understanding some of the effects in a problem that seems to have come like a bolt from the blue in every center.



Director





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The Project Director

Every Project Director has the right and immediate responsibility to investigate the program of investigation that he may be working on. It is his duty to see that the project is carried out in accordance with the objectives of the project and to see that the project is carried out in accordance with the objectives of the project and to see that the project is carried out in accordance with the objectives of the project.

Very truly yours,

*Handwritten signature*

Director



WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION

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*Social  
Report*

ARMY REGISTRATION AT ONE RELOCATION CENTER

This report on Army registration at one relocation center is based on information acquired during eight days at the project. While no claim is made that the analysis presented is exhaustive nor that the emphasis on specific factors is an accurate representation of the actual importance of these factors in determining the outcome, it is felt that the general picture presented is a fair one.

The question may well be raised as to whether events at X are representative of events at other centers. It is my feeling that the same considerations are involved at other centers, but that certain unique characteristics of X make it likely that they will have operated somewhat differently elsewhere. At least two conditions may be mentioned as possibly distinguishing X from other centers. First, the fact that the Army registration was conducted separately from the general leave clearance registration--which obviated the protests raised by Issei at having question 28 in its original form presented to them. Second, the generally amicable relations between the appointed personnel and the project residents, reflected in the widely expressed opinion that "X is the best center."

Undoubtedly, there are other differences between X and other centers, but these two seem especially important.

I. FIRST PHASE, REGISTRATION, 6 FEBRUARY TO 13 FEBRUARY

A. Announcements

The residents of the center first learned of the proposed Japanese-American Combat Team when it was announced in the public press. The Proj. paper carried President Roosevelt's letter on the 6th of February and in its next issue on the 9th. It printed the text of the War Department message in full. Meanwhile, the Chief of the Employment Office, who was charged with organizing the registration, had decided to utilize the appointed teaching staff as registrars. He had met with them the afternoon of the 6th and gone through Selective Service Form 304A question by question.

B. Army Team Presentation

On Monday and Tuesday, the 8th and 9th of February, the Army Team and some member of the appointed personnel, usually the Chief of the Employment Office, conducted a series of fifteen meetings, one every hour, to explain the registration to the entire population. Present at each meeting were the residents of two blocks. The Army Team went through its formalized routine and then allowed time for questions and discussions, copies of DSS Form 304A having been distributed to the audience to enable them to follow it. According to the Chief of the Employment Office the explanations were quite sufficient, although he recognized the limitations imposed upon the Army Team by their apparent instructions to say nothing which was not planned in advance. At the early meetings, the answers to questions raised were read by the Captain--although later he apparently memorized them--and any questions to which he had no written answer had to be passed by.

At the end of the meeting for each pair of blocks, the people were instructed to return to the same place at a time at least forty-eight hours later and in some instances more than forty-eight hours later, the original meetings occupying two days and the time allotted for registration three days.

C. Registration

On Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, the 10th, 11th, and 12th of February, a formal registration took place. The adult population--whether military age or not--returned to the place to which the earlier meeting had been held, and each individual was given an appointment for registration. The Nisei males of military age were given immediate appointments, and the rest of the adult group were given appointments for a later date for their leave clearance registration. A brief time was allowed for further questions and discussion. Whereupon the men of military age went to the school and the individual designated for registration. This registration was concluded the morning of February 13, there having been a few stragglers.

D. Results

Following the Army registration, it was found that 31 had volunteered for the Army, and that 106 had said "no" to question 28. These results came as a severe shock to the appointed personnel. Their reactions ranging from the sentiment that "if that is the way they feel, the hell with them," to the feeling of disappointment that the residents of X should have "let them down" so badly.

E. Factors Involved in the Registration Outcome (Affecting both Question 27 and Question 28)

1. Positive

These results require some explanation. While it is true that there were a large number of "noes" to question 28, it is also true that there were approximately 1,100 who said "yes"; and although 31 volunteers is not a large number, yet it does represent something. Several positive factors were involved in producing these results.

a. Patriotism

There can be no doubt that many of these original volunteers were influenced by a patriotic desire to serve their country at war, and perhaps a number of them were rather eager to manifest their loyalty in this concrete fashion--not so much as individuals, as members of the Japanese-American minority group.

b. Desire to Leave the Center

At least one individual volunteer, aside from any other motives, expressed himself as seeing in the Army opportunity a chance to leave the center where he found life distasteful. It seems possible that others may have been somewhat influenced by this desire.

c. Pre-evacuation Experience

It is probably of first importance to recognize that the reaction of individual Japanese-Americans to the Army registration has been influenced by their experiences prior to evacuation. This is shown by the fact that in two blocks at X there were fifteen volunteers all of whom were from \_\_\_\_\_, California. \_\_\_\_\_ was a community in which Christianity was very powerful among the Japanese-Americans, and it seems likely that this large number of volunteers from a small area have been influenced by the pre-evacuation experience. (These fifteen were not necessarily among the first group of volunteers, but the case is cited to illustrate the significance of pre-evacuation experience.)

d. Normal Impulsions to Enlist

Aside from the above factors, the Nisei males of military age must also have been influenced by the same considerations that induce people to enlist from the general population, the desire for adventure, the desire to escape from an uncomfortable domestic situation, and like personal considerations must have been involved.

2. Negative

a. Unemphatic Presentation

The manner in which the Army registration was presented to the residents of X was not well calculated to produce the optimum results. Omitting the more detailed difficulties, there were three general flaws in the presentation.

(1) The whole scheme was pushed through very suddenly and it came, as it were, like a bolt from the blue to the center residents. It is probably no exaggeration to say that the last thing the evacuees had been expecting when this announcement came was that there would be a sudden call for Nisei volunteers in the Army. This naturally meant that a considerable mental readjustment was required on the part of many before they were able to get the whole idea in perspective and were prepared to express themselves on questions 27 and 28. Although at least forty-eight hours did elapse between the first explanation of DSS Form 304A and actual registration, it is probable that this was too little time to allow the idea to be thoroughly digested. In any event, it is certain that there was a good deal of tension among the evacuees from the time of the first announcement until after the registration had been completed, and it is further certain that there was a tremendous amount of discussion of the registration and its implications during that time.

(2) The presentation was weak from the point of view of persuading people to enlist, and from the point of view of impressing the importance of question 28 on the residents. This was true because of the Army's plan which demanded that no recruiting campaign be conducted. Both evacuees and appointed personnel stated repeatedly that the Army Team "leaned over backwards" in refraining from persuading anyone to enlist. This undoubtedly was according to their instructions, but it had the effect of deflating the importance of the whole proceeding and may well have convinced many that it did not matter much whether they enlisted, nor how they answered question 28. The Captain was quoted as having said publicly that it did not matter in the least to him how many volunteers there were, and that his only desire was to complete the registration as quickly as possible so that he could go on furlough to Texas.

Considering the intrinsic emotional significance of the entire proceeding to the evacuees, the absence of any emotional appeal must be regarded as contributing to confusion rather than to clarification.

It is perhaps worth noting, in addition, that the Nisei member of the Army Team was not probably a good choice. For one thing, his family were in the center, a fact which may have interfered with his effectiveness. For another, he was described by several evacuees as having been rather unsympathetic in discussions of the evacuation experiences.

(3) Perhaps most important in making the initial presentation unemphatic is the fact that DSS Form 304A was only the last of several "loyalty tests" to which the population had been subjected since Pearl Harbor. When it is recalled that these people were urged to show their loyalty by evacuating peaceably, which they did; by volunteering to participate in advance groups in the construction of the center, which they did; by participating in this, that, or the other work project, which they did; it becomes apparent that the idea of a loyalty test was something of an old chestnut.

Thus the Army registration as a loyalty test was but one of a series of such tests to many evacuees and because of the previous ones, it seemed to them not to be of special significance.

b. Protest Reaction

The relative paucity of volunteers and the relative large number of "noes" to question 28 were in part a protest. For different individuals, the protest might be differently motivated but a number of factors may be enumerated as of considerable significance.

(1) Pre-evacuation experience is certainly involved in some of the negative responses. The status of the Japanese-Americans from the West Coast and the frequent discriminations against them there are a contributing factor in the bitterness of many. To be more specific, some of the "noes" on question 28 came from individuals who had resided in \_\_\_\_\_, a small town distinguished by the fact that it has had a separate and inferior school for the Japanese for some years.

(2) The evacuation itself is, of course, deeply resented by many. The more ideologically inclined of the Nisei are especially resentful of the partial denial of their citizenship rights. This resentment has been aggravated by the attitude of some of the Issei who have taunted them with the assertion that, after all, citizenship has not resulted in their obtaining any distinctive treatment now that a crisis situation has arisen.

Many unpleasant personal experiences in evacuation have contributed to a general resentment on the part of the Nisei, for example, some of them have seen their parents interned suddenly and without--from the Nisei point of view--any justification.

(3) Among the evacuees the Army, in particular among the agencies of the Government, has been disliked by many for a number of specific reasons.

(a) The Army is held responsible for the fact of evacuation, since it was ordered by the West Coast Defense Command.

(b) The Army discharged Kibei soldiers immediately following Pearl Harbor, a fact which was of particular importance during the registration when the Army turned about and requested volunteers.

(c) The assembly centers were organized and administered by the Wartime Civil Control Administration, an agency of the West Coast Defense Command. These centers were the scene of some of the most exacerbating experiences of the evacuees. To cite a minor illustration only, the soldiers manning searchlights at Santa Anita are reported not only to have illumined the boundaries of the

d. Normal Reluctance to Enlist

Finally, it must be recognized that among the evacuees, as among the rest of the American population, there is a certain reluctance to volunteer for military service. This is motivated by a desire to provide for one's family, by a desire to remain in civilian life, and by countless other personal considerations. It is evidenced in the relatively small proportions of volunteers found in most states of the Union--the percentage being usually not over 10 per cent.

3. Confusion Regarding the Significance of Questions 27 and 28

It must already be apparent that at the time of the original registration there was a tremendous amount of confused thinking among the evacuees regarding the meaning of the entire Army registration procedure. I believe it can be said with certainty that this confusion persisted in the minds of many registrants up to the time when they filled out their questionnaires. Moreover, I think that the confusion and misunderstanding of the questionnaire accounts in a large measure for both the small number of volunteers and the majority of the original "noes" on question 28. This confusion was not resolved until the third phase of registration to be described below.\*\*

F. Factors Involved in the Registration Outcome (Affecting Especially Question 28)

1. Confusion

The general confusion just mentioned played a part in many of the negative answers to question 28, but in addition there were at least two misunderstandings of a different sort.

Some of the registrants did not succeed in distinguishing questions 27 and 28 as is evidenced, for example, by the Nisei who said in response to question 28 "yes, if drafted"; and by the twelve Nisei who answered question 28 "yes" with the qualification that they were unwilling to enter combat duty. Other answers indicate the same sort of mix-up, and personal conversation with evacuees produced the evacuee opinion that some of the registrants had interpreted the "defond" phrase of question 28 as meaning that an unqualified "yes" was tantamount of volunteering.

Question 28 was verbally confusing to a few of the registrants. Discussion of the language difficulty with a number of people who know Japanese or who have had considerable experience with bilingual Nisei or Kibei produced the unanimous view that because of the double negative in Japanese the combination of a positive and negative statement in question 28 must have mixed up some of the Nisei whose command of English is inferior. This view was borne out by at least one of the answers to question 28 which read as follows, "No, I swear that I have no intentions of harm to the United States."

2. The Cultural Background

Aside from the concentration of "noes" among Nisei of a rural background in California, it is of interest to note that 49 of 106 of the original "noes" on question 28 were from Kibei; and that 73 of the 106 were Buddhists in religion. These facts confirm the impression that a disproportionate number of the "noes"--

5. The Project Director discussed the meaning of answers to question 28, stating that the question was a straightforward loyalty question which must be answered with an unqualified "yes" or "no" according to the registrant's feeling. He also suggested rather plainly that those who were disloyal must expect to lose certain privileges, and might even be subject to internment or segregation.

B. The Council's Campaign

Following the mass meetings, the community council through its representative in each block or each district, approached individually all those who had said "no" to question 28 with the exception of those who had applied for repatriation or who were known to be sincere and unconfused in their repudiation of the United States. In each individual conference, the registrant was quizzed as to his reasons for the "no" and counterarguments were presented by the councilman. One executive committee member approached nine individuals in his district himself and talked to each "until they agreed to change their answer." He reported that no one of the nine had any sound reason for the "no" but had either been confused, or had simply underestimated the importance and the significance of his answer.

C. The Results of the Reconsideration

By March 6, the mass meetings and the council's campaign of individual contact had raised the number of volunteers to 116 and had resulted in 77 of the original "noes" changing their answer to "yes". Since the 116 volunteers had been preceded by about a score of volunteers who were in service at Camp Savage, and an even larger number who were teaching at Boulder, the total number of Nisei males of military age who had volunteered for military service was well above ten per cent of the total group. This compares favorably with the ten and a fraction per cent of volunteers from the State of \_\_\_\_\_, and is especially significant when it is remembered that no evacuee was allowed to volunteer for the Navy or for the Air Corps, and that very few of them could anticipate commissions.\*\*\*

The twenty-nine who, after personal contacts by councilmen, declined to change their "no" to a "yes" must probably be regarded as an irreducible minimum of non-loyal Nisei.

It should also be borne in mind that the 106 originally classified as "no" on question 28 included everyone whose answer to that question was anything but an unqualified "yes". Thus nineteen of the original "noes" had actually said "yes, if non-combat duty", or "yes, if citizenship rights are restored."

D. Factors in the Changed Results

The effect of the mass meetings was to define clearly and emphatically the significance of negative responses to questions 27 and 28. An emotional appeal, to volunteer or to express loyalty on question 28, for the sake of the residents at X and the future welfare of the Japanese-American group had been introduced into the situation. Moreover, the prime significance of this particular "loyalty test" as compared with previous ones was made plain. This clarification apparently did much to dissipate the confused reactions of the evacuees, and to show them how the registration results would be interpreted by the public at large.

The council's individual explanations to those who said "no" made certain that no one whose response had been unfavorable was left untouched by this new definition of the situation.

It is my considered opinion that the majority of those originally classified as "no" on question 28 who later changed that answer to "yes" are fundamentally loyal to the United States. I feel that the circumstances under which their original answers were made (see discussion of negative factors in E and F above) are quite sufficient to explain their original negative. In this connection, it is worth noting that at a time when about half of the original "noes" had been changed to "yes", 36 of those who changed stated that their original answer had been due to misunderstanding; or that when the question had been explained to them they had decided to change.

Some few who changed, no doubt, did so because of the obvious implied threat (of lost privileges or segregation) in the new presentation, but in my opinion the number who did so while remaining actually disloyal must have been small.

The increase in the number of volunteers can be explained largely in terms of a decision to enlist on the part of many who had been somewhat inclined to at first, but who had said "no" because they were unable to finally make up their minds. The emotional appeal in the new presentation, the change that their action might redound favorably for the entire Japanese-American population, the pressure of public opinion as expressed by the community council--sometimes in individual recruiting talks apparently, the "band wagon" effect of certain prominent young men's volunteering, largely explained the increase in the number of volunteers.

#### IV. FOURTH PHASE, CURRENT SITUATION

It was widely reported that by March 6 most of the tension which had existed in the center at first had disappeared. With the situation redefined, and with many individuals changing their original answers on questions 27 and 28, the entire registration began to be looked at as an historic event which was important certainly, but which no longer remained an active issue.

There is some evidence that the Issei have been reconciled to the idea of their sons serving in the United States Army. Most blocks have arranged parties for the volunteers under the auspices of leading residents, both Issei and Nisei. The feeling as reported by one Issei of prominence is that these volunteers are courageous young men who are entering the Army, that they had volunteered for the sake of the country at large and of the entire center population, and that they should be given the best possible send-off of all concerned.

Both Issei and Nisei now seem proud of the volunteers. This is especially in evidence among the Nisei, and is shown in various ways; for example, in the appearance of a service banner with ten stars in the Reports Office towards the end of the first week in March (ten Nisei from this office alone had volunteered).

There is, however, some continuing anxiety as to the fate of those who said "no" to question 28, and as to what provisions will be made for those who changed from "no" to "yes". One influential Issei stated his view that if segregation is ordered--even for those who did not change their "no", there might be some trouble in the center. He went on to raise the question of the constitutionality of segregation of citizens for their political views, arguing that so long as their opposition was not active there was no ground for segregation. On the other hand, one Nisei, a volunteer I believe, insisted that unless those whose answers to question 28 remained "no" were removed from the center serious difficulties might arise.

The evidence at hand does not permit any accurate estimate as to the relative prevalence of these two views: they are cited merely to show that some anxieties remain, and that the disposition of the "noes" on question 28 is a matter of great delicacy, and must be carefully handled.

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\* The Issei influence perhaps was rather important in preventing more Nisei from enlisting during the original registration. This is shown by two events which occurred at that time. One Nisei, desiring to enlist but yet somewhat uncertain about it, called on the Project Director accompanied by his mother. The boy expressed his wish whereupon the mother addressed him in Japanese, and turning to the Project Director bowed and smiled. This was repeated several times until someone who understood Japanese was located. It turned out that she had been saying to the boy, "You are a disgrace to your father and your country."

Another individual, a member of the council, who was considering volunteering reported that no less than seven mothers had called upon his mother to try to persuade her that he should be prevented from enlisting. The reason given was that because of his influential position his example might lead their sons to volunteer also.

\*\* One form taken by this confusion is seen in the reluctance of some Nisei to swear unqualified allegiance. One individual crossed out the unqualified and answered question 28 "yes" (he later stated that he wished to delete his deletion). Also, one Christian pastor reported that it was the word unqualified which caused the most trouble to several boys who consulted him about the registration. The feeling seems to have been that because the evacuees could not accept as unqualifiedly justified the evacuation and its curtailment of rights, they ought not to say that their allegiance was unqualified. That is to say, they somehow wished to state their loyalty while at the same time reserving the right to protest the evacuation.

\*\*\*It is perhaps of interest to note that well over fifty per cent of the Nisei girls volunteered for service in the WAAC's in the later leave clearance registration.

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*Marion Opler - Tall Lake* *Thomas*  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ E 2.56  
Apr. 3, 1943

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
Community Analysis Section  
Second Special Report on Registration

I arrived at Manzanar the evening of March 26 and began work on March 27. I have felt that my first task is to become familiar with the history of Manzanar and have endeavored in various ways to acquaint myself with the flow of past events. The reading of the files of the MANZANAR FREE PRESS, the perusal of the reports of a number of divisions, combined with what I knew of Manzanar from published articles and newspaper files, have given me at least a beginning of background and perspective.

I was not long at Manzanar, however, before I discovered that a most important problem requiring social analysis and interpretation exists, one that requires understanding and social intelligence, both because of the unhappiness it has created within the Project and because of the damage and repercussions which can result from a mechanical or shortsighted reaction to it from the outside. I refer to the large number of "no" answers returned by both aliens and citizens to the so-called "loyalty" questions (Nos. 27 and 28) during the registration and application for leave clearance which began February 13.

Accordingly I have thus far devoted much of my time to an investigation of these "no" answers, and to the question of whether they can be accepted as an indication of actual disloyalty toward the United States and of active loyalty toward Japan. I have talked the matter over with a substantial number of persons of Japanese ancestry, some aliens, some citizens, in an endeavor to learn what was in their minds when they made their response. Many of these people, I may add, are greatly troubled over the answer they felt it necessary to give at the time, and have either asked to be allowed to change their answer or would like to do so.

My conclusions and interpretations on the basis of this preliminary survey are as follows: For all realistic purposes and in spite of the intentions of the framers of the questions, it is very doubtful whether these questions should be called "loyalty" questions at all. In a good many cases (the great majority, I suspect) the final decision had relatively little to do with affection for Japan or disaffection for the United States.

The crux of the whole problem is that the aliens were asked a question to which they felt they could not, in safety to their future and conscience, say "yes". On the original form (659 Rev. A) the aliens were asked not only to swear unqualified allegiance to this country, which refuses them naturalization and citizenship, but to forswear allegiance to Japan, the country of which they are nationals. It is true that this question was withdrawn and another substituted for it, but the very fact that it appeared on the form created great uneasiness. It must be realized that these aliens are well aware of the resolutions of legislatures and of group and individual demands that they be returned to Japan as soon as possible. Many, despite an earnest desire to end their days in this land, have been led by circumstances to the conclusion that they will never again be able to earn a livelihood in this country, and assume that they will therefore be forced to seek a refuge in Japan. Naturally they wondered whether such a renunciation of Japan would not jeopardize their Japanese citizenship or subject them to punishment or disability at the hands of the Japanese government should they come within its jurisdiction, and they reacted accordingly. A negativistic attitude sets in.

The substitute question, formulated at Manzanar, while it did not call upon the aliens to forswear allegiance to their national government, did inquire whether the aliens would defend the United States from attack,

including attack by Japan. Unfortunately, the Japanese character by which the words "to defend" was translated, has a much more aggressive and militaristic connotation than the English equivalent. To many Japanese aliens, a "yes" answer seemed equivalent to an agreement to take up arms against the country in which they hold citizenship. Such an agreement or action, according to the laws of most nations, including those of the United States and Japan, is considered treason, and is punishable by the loss of citizenship and worse. Although the purpose of the question was primarily to expedite leaves from the centers, upon reflection and in view of the total situation, it is not difficult to see how the very presence of the question evoked resentment or was received as a fresh attempt to persecute and disconcert.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the question 28 for non-citizens which came from Washington as a substitute for the first and unsatisfactory version, though it was the question answered at all other centers, is markedly different from the question which the Manzanar residents faced. Registration at Manzanar was virtually completed by the time the substitute question arrived and it was too late to make the change.

The final Washington question, which all centers except Manzanar had the privilege of using, is an eminently just and reasonable one. It calls upon the enemy alien to abide by the laws of this country and to take no action which would impair its war effort. But it does not imply any responsibility on the part of the alien for bearing arms against the country of his origin and citizenship. As I understand it, this is all that can and should be asked of an enemy alien in time of war under international law. And I am convinced, had this question and not the other been submitted at Manzanar, the record of the residents would have

been as affirmative as that of other centers. In other words, I think it is safe to assert that the difference in percentage of "yes" and "no" answers between Manzanar and other centers is largely a function of the difference in the question asked rather than a reflection of variation in basic loyalties.

The current reaction of the residents tends to bear out this analysis. As a result of correspondence with friends and relatives in other centers, residents of Manzanar have learned that the question they answered was much more perplexing and formidable than that which was put to aliens elsewhere. They have inquired of the Project Director concerning this, and, at the present writing, the inhabitants of 17 blocks have met and have passed resolutions asking for the privilege of answering the Washington version. It is difficult to see how this request can be refused or why the results, if the request is granted, should not replace the old statistic. Only in this way can a reliable comparison between Manzanar and other centers be attained, and if these answers are to be in any way used as a basis for future dealings with the residents, only in this way can equitable treatment be accorded the evacuees in Manzanar.

While the character and unfortunate sequence of the questions concerning loyalty were an important factor in the negative response of aliens, other elements were at work in the complex situation. To a certain degree the greater hardships through which many of the residents have passed are reflected in their responses. Many of the Manzanar residents are from Terminal Island. Even before the outbreak of war they were the butt of a certain amount of discrimination and suspicion. When war came they were the first to suffer a total work stoppage and loss of income, while farmers and persons in other fields of endeavor were able

to continue for a time. They were not a prosperous group and so suffered hardship almost at once. Their work had taken them close to naval and defense installations, and so they received more than average attention from the F.B.I. Their leaders were taken into custody and their community crumbled under dislocation and fear. After being assured that they would have 30 days to vacate their premises, they were suddenly informed that they had but 48 hours in which to evacuate. They bear the scars of the suffering and property loss that compliance with this order entailed. No response to an important question can be dissociated from recent, bitter experiences. It is naive to expect it; it is cynical to pretend to expect it. The negative response to a question that was deemed unfair then, was reinforced by a protest over harsh conditions to which these people had been subjected. In my judgment the element of protest dominated any element of affirmation. It was not interest in Japan, but blind resentment over discriminatory treatment which entered prominently into the decision.

There is still another factor which has very little to do with loyalty or disloyalty toward the United States, but which motivated a good many "no" answers from aliens. This is the loss of confidence in themselves and in the American public which evacuation has entailed. The form on which question 28 is found is an Application for Leave Clearance. There were those who assumed that if they answered all questions, and particularly question 28, in a manner satisfactory to the authorities, they would be sent out to face the competitive system in the outside world at this time. Many of these aliens have seen the stakes and fruits of a life of toil disappear in a few turbulent months. They are now in average well past their prime in years. Their total discouragement at

their dispossession and insecurity is a reaction from their past thrift and industry. This loss of faith and confidence is and will continue to be one of the most appalling consequences of evacuation. This is particularly serious because it is contagious; the old reflect bitterly that they have not been able to establish security for themselves or their children in a lifetime of toil; the young read their future in the light of their parents' plight. At any rate I have found that a good many answered "no" or were influenced toward a negative response simply because they could not again face the responsibility of an independent economic existence in or near white communities. Obviously this has little to do with loyalty as such. It does have a great deal to do with an assault that has been made on the psychological integrity of a group. I hear rumors that the "no" answers are likely to act as a basis for repressive action against those who gave them. No policy could be more unwise. In these cases it would only increase the hopelessness of the individual and make his rehabilitation virtually impossible. Certainly a sympathetic and constructive policy is required, one which penetrates beyond the verbalisms of "yes" and "no" to basic motivations, fears, and uncertainties.

It is my considered opinion that the answers of the non-citizen group to question 28 are far more an index of their faith in their future and rehabilitation in America than of loyalty. The renewal of faith and confidence in themselves and in America is not an automatic or speedy process. It takes time; it proceeds against obstacles. Enough time had not elapsed by February 13 to give a picture undistorted by disillusionment and despair. The obstacles to the "settling down" process, to the calm and adjustment which generate confidence and new faith, have been particularly marked at Manzanar. To begin with, Manzanar was first an assembly

center, and the shock and grief of first dislocation is in some measure associated with it. Secondly, Manzanar is one of the smaller projects in size and, being in the Western Defense Zone, is subject to close military surveillance. Thus the barbed wire, the guard towers, and soldiers, with their grim implications, are all too evident. Finally there is the unnerving attitude of the outside population of the area, from which the center cannot be insulated. In no other part of the country is the feeling so hostile against those of Japanese ancestry. Nowhere else does the radio and newspapers carry so many threats against the future and civil rights of those of Japanese antecedents. These inevitably have their effect; they evoke anger and promote pessimism. They revive fear and uncertainty. They act as the basis for rumors and throw suspicion on questionnaires such as the one under discussion. It seems to me necessary and justified that the Federal Government, which has established relocation centers and is responsible for the maintenance of order and the well-being of the residents, should attempt to exercise some control over the dissemination of colored and inflammatory statements and "information" calculated to create restlessness and resentment among the residents.

I have dealt with the underlying meanings of the "no" answers of the non-citizens because the decision of the older people was so central for the response that the younger people felt impelled to make. Once their parents, for any of the reasons listed above or for a combination of them, determined that they would answer "no", the children were faced with a grave problem. The older people assumed the worst, that a "no" answer would bring segregation and eventual forced return to Japan. They appealed to their children to return a comparable answer so that, whatever happened, the families might remain together and inviolate. The pressure upon the

children was intolerable. They had seen their parents uprooted and humiliated. A good many, resolved to spare their elders any further worry and sadness, suppressed their own desires and voted "no". Others resisted parental pressure for some time, only to give in at the end. The movement to have all members of the family reply in the same general way, so that a like fate and destination would be shared by all, precipitated an endless number of quarrels and misunderstandings within families. No more unfortunate and disorganizing event could have occurred. Ill-feelings and family disruptions which were occasioned then still persist. I believe that this has materially contributed to delinquency and gangsterism, and I propose to investigate the point. There is much evidence that these internal disputes have greatly affected personal happiness and family life, and it is therefore imperative that the issue be settled as sensibly as possible and as soon as possible.

The feeling of loyalty to the old people and the resolve to share their fortunes and keep the family united was the dominant factor in "no" answers of citizens. In part this loyalty was volunteered; in part it was exacted. Where it was exacted, a note on the attitude of the elders is in order. It must be remembered that the non-citizen group has very rapidly been reduced from a position of leadership in the Japanese community to a position of impotence. Since the Nisei as a group were young and untried, financial and community control was in the hands of the first generation. And, of course, their positions as family elders left the parents, particularly the fathers, in the ascendancy. No group has been more rapidly deflated. Their assets and jobs were swept aside. The more prominent they had been in community life, the more likely they were to be investigated, detained, or interned. Criteria of prestige were suddenly rendered

void. When self-government for assembly centers and relocation centers was instituted the Issei were barred from office. The family was the last as well as the strongest refuge of this older generation, the only spot where the word and advice of the elders still carried weight and authority. Both aliens and citizens sensed this, and because of it, the former were more insistent and the latter more pliant than would otherwise have been the case.

Like the "no's" of the non-citizens, those of the citizens were a compound of many influences. The citizens shared the resentment of the aliens over what they considered to be discriminatory and arbitrary treatment. In fact, they felt their grievances to be even greater, for they had assumed that their citizenship would protect them from evacuation. Then, too, many of the young people reacted against the lot of their parents. There are those who believe that their parents have been interned for reasons and on evidence which would not suffice to hold an Italian or a German.

There are objections, also, to questions 27 and 28 put to male citizens. By army directive, only those who were willing to volunteer immediately to serve in the armed forces were permitted to answer question 27 in the affirmative. Hundreds of young men who are willing to take their chances according to the workings of selective service and to take up arms when and if they are called, were forced to answer "no", and so misrepresent their position to the point of saying that they were not willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on combat duty, wherever ordered. It seemed to these young men, and it is difficult to resist their logic, that a test of willingness to serve was being presented to them which differed from anything demanded of the rest of America's youth. And it is

the opinion of many of them that this super-patriotism expected of them oddly contrasts with the abridgment of citizenship rights which they have suffered. The particular interpretation put upon question 27 by the Army simply worked to irritate a large number of citizens. One young man whom I interviewed, for instance, was angry because he had been forced to answer "no". He had been eager to volunteer but the Army men in charge advised him not to because he had a wife, a child, and other family responsibilities! At Granada, on February 10 - 13, the most frequent answer to question 27 was "Yes, if drafted" -- an answer which the Army team accepted. (F.L.S.)

Much more repugnant to the male citizens was question 28. Over two-thirds of the male citizens are not and have never been dual citizens; they have never been registered at a Japanese consulate within the required 14 days of birth. Legally they do not exist for Japan. When these young men were asked in question 28 to "forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor", their reaction can be imagined. Many of them interpreted it as an attempt to force dual citizenship upon them, and as an indication that our government was making race and not national or international law the criterion of their status. They did not fail to note that they were being asked to assent to a loyalty oath such as is ordinarily administered to foreigners when they naturalize. They took this as added proof they "were not wanted or trusted" and it reinforced their determination to answer in the same spirit as their parents.

It is true that some answered question 28 in the negative because they wished to avoid being inducted into the armed forces and believed that such an answer would insure their continued civilian status. Even in the majority of these cases, however, I do not think that the motivation was cowardice or regard for the Japanese emperor. More important was the

feeling that they were being expected to assume the responsibilities of citizenship without being able to exercise the full privileges of citizenship. It is inevitable that different treatment will result in different response. Over 10,000 male citizens of Hawaii volunteered for combat duty. The ratio at Manzanar was far different. The state of mind that makes for the difference can be overcome. A fair handling of the alien loyalty question and the consequent bolstering of the morale of the older people will not fail to have its effect on the younger generation. Time, a successful relocation program, and favorable reports from those who have joined the armed forces, will stem the tide of bitterness and awake interest and faith in democratic principles to the point where these young men will be as enthusiastic as any to defend them.

This is a preliminary report and a hastily written one. It by no means does justice to the complexity of the situation. But it indicates, I hope, that the "no" of a resident of Manzanar, like that of some young ladies, should not always be taken at face value. It suggests, I hope, that a complex situation cannot be properly described by a word of limited meaning, such as "loyal" or "disloyal". Most of all, I trust I have made clear my conviction that the problems of Manzanar are not to be settled with an adding machine.

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April 3, 1943

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4/12/44

Subject: Seinen Kai

Recently a young people's association, usually referred to as a Seinen Kai, was organized at Tule Lake. They have submitted a Charter to the project administration. This represents the first attempt at Tule Lake of the young people to form a project-wide Seinen Kai. Several of the blocks already have such groups. An elaborate organization for the over-all association is planned. Several of the functions they aspire to develop are welfare, publicity, library service, dramatics, research, oratory, literary and editorial work, athletics including judo, sumo, and kendo, a personnel department "to investigate and study continually the general opinion of the community", and a department of liaison to deal with other organizations. It hopes to achieve a membership of five or six thousand people. Finally, in addition to its regular officers and board of governors, it would contain an Advisory Board of elderly people "to advise and counsel the members of the organization on all matters affecting their well-being".

The temporary leader of the proposed Seinen Kai of Tule Lake was also the chairman of the Gila River Young People's Association which was regarded with suspicion by the administration and the leader was sent to Leupp. In Tule Lake the administration is hesitant about permitting the growth of such a Seinen Kai. In order to evaluate the validity of the suspicions and to understand the role of Seinen Kai among the young people it is necessary to consider the part Seinen Kai have played in the Japanese and Japanese American society before evacuation in the relocation centers.

#### What is Seinen Kai.

Seinen Kai literally translated means "young people's association". It refers to any young people's clubs and has no reference to citizenship. In every country one finds such clubs and this was so on the West Coast among the Japanese Americans who formed innumerable clubs.

#### In Japan.

In Japan the villages had their Seinendan and Shojokai (young girls' association). In Suze Mura, young men and women after graduation from grammar school formed such associations and met at the schools. The young men drilled while the young girls did sewing and cooking, and learned accounting and physiology. On all big school occasions they turned out in uniforms especially prescribed for the occasion. These societies were branches of a national organization. Twice a year in Suze

Mura they had less formal meetings and sponsored a party where boys and girls mixed. Each age group held separate parties.

Besides these social and military seinen kais in Japan before the present war, there was a Dai Nippon Seinen Kai for young unemployed men who wished to be established in Manchuria.

#### In the United States.

The young people's associations in this country have been different from those in Japan. Numerous organizations were formed along interest lines. Most of the churches had young people's groups both among the Buddhists and the Christians. Within the YW and YMCA's there were many small clubs. The language schools sometimes organized a Seinen Kai. Students and alumni of the various schools usually formed associations. Athletic clubs of all types were established from judo, sumo, and kendo, to archery, baseball, football, ping-pong, and fishing. There were political clubs like the Young Democrats of Oakland and the JACL, and there were many literary and dramatic clubs, and a few more serious discussion groups. Some young people formed junior prefectural organizations copied after their parents' kenjinkai. The organization names ranged from such American versions as The Golden Bears, Terminal Island Skippers, Montebello Coppers, the Olivers, the San Fernando Aces, the Zeros, the Anchovies, the Oliver Mustangs and Broncos, to such Japanese names as Engai kai (dramatics), Yuai kai (fellowship), Judo Yudansha kai (judo club) Zenneji Shojo kai (Buddhist church group), Kyudo kai (archery), and the like. The use of the words, "seinen kai", did not necessarily reflect the degree of Americanization or Japanization of the associations. However the clubs under the Christian churches were less likely to use Japanese titles than the Kibei and Buddhist groups.

Most of the Nisei belonged to several groups. Those interested in sports concentrated on athletic clubs. For social purposes many belonged. It was a good way to meet other Nisei, particularly of the opposite sex. Students liked to join student clubs as a way of getting together to know other Nisei. In most instances, the older people had little to do with the clubs. Among the Bukkyo Seinen Kai (Young Buddhist Association), the Issei might hold advisory positions but actually did not supervise the activities to a great extent.

The degree of Japanization among these clubs varied. Many were typically American in interest in every respect and they had no knowledge of things Japanese. Those interested in Japanese sports like judo, sumo, and kendo, and members of the Junior Butoku kai were more interested in Japanese culture. These groups were taught the spiritual value of their sports and were indoctrinated with specifically Japanese ideals of behavior. A 26 year old Kibei described the Butoku kai as a fencing society. "It teaches one how to behave, to respect parents, etc." Many of the Kibei organizations too had a Japanese cultural orientation but seldom were concerned with politics.

In discussing young people's associations, it must be recognized that the young Japanese Americans are not all alike and have diverse in-

interests. There were some Kibei who wished to join Nisei groups and become Americanized. There were others who would have liked to have done this but did not have the opportunity or were hesitant and felt unwelcome. There were conservative Nisei whom the more Americanized Nisei considered Kibei because they were so "Japanese". There were Nisei who wished to be accepted by Caucasians but felt insecure with them and formed their own social cliques which were very much Americanized. And finally, there were Nisei who were thoroughly assimilated and accepted in Caucasian groups and were in every respect Americans.

There was a split noted between Nisei and Kibei in some of the young people's groups. Kibei frequently could not speak English and had little in common with the Nisei. They would then form their own groups. They did this in some Buddhist churches, in the JACL, or within districts. In other cases they joined with the Nisei. A 28 year old Kibei described his reasons for joining the Sumner Seinen Kai of which he became president. "When I first came back from Japan I couldn't speak English and could not join as I wasn't old enough, and they all spoke English, but I later joined to meet other people and make friends and learn to speak better English". Although the motives among the Kibei for forming their own seinen kai or joining Nisei associations varied they have all been regarded with suspicion by the intelligence agencies and such groups as the California American Legion. This latter organization was alarmed by the Kibei in particular and described them as follows: "So important a step in the prosecution of Japan's policies for a 'new world order' has this activity been considered, that Japan gave a specific name to all Nisei who had journeyed to Japan for a more intense infusion of the spirit of Japanism. The Kibei constituted one of Japan's primary hopes for co-operation in the event of a war with the United States." The California Legion listed eleven organization which they considered "subversive" — three were prefecture groups, five were religious groups both Christian and Buddhist, one was a division of the JACL, and two I cannot identify. The motives for these organizations were described by Mr. Lechner: "So well organized were the Kibeis of America that these American citizens who took their 'final shots' in Japanism in Japan itself, formed several district Kibei organizations to keep alive the spirit and the 'culture' thus obtained and to perfect a common bond among the several groups." This interpretation of the Kibei Seinen Kai is extreme and does not reflect the various types of Kibei clubs and the motives for joining such organizations. Kibei formed these organizations not only because of language difficulties but because many had no interests in common with the Nisei. They were especially interested in discussing their place in American society and their problems of adjustment. Some were interested in Japanese culture and spent their time promoting lectures and oratorical contests and the like. It was a cultural rather than nationalistic interest that they stressed with regard to Japan, although in some instances undoubtedly the nationalistic attitudes were expressed. Others were interested in becoming better American citizens. A Kibei, age 32, described the Kibei Nisei Shimin Kyo Kai (Kibei American Citizens Association): "The one if the idea (apparently the speaker meant "one of the ideas is ....") is identical to that of the JACL, but due to the difficulty in language and custom, etc., of those who came from Japan, it is sometime quite inconvenient or not proper to get together and take part

in activity of JACL. Therefore, they thought they might start another club having the same aim and ideals, that is, to be a better citizen. .... This club was first organized mainly for the purpose of promoting the social welfare of the Kibei".

A description of some of the seinen kais of the West Coast before evacuation will illustrate the different types of organizations.

#### Bukkyo Seinen Kai of San Francisco.

A former member of the Buddhist Young People's Association stated that this group was similar to the YMCA or YWCA. Most of the Nisei joined it for recreation purposes. It was also a place to meet people, especially of the opposite sex. The spiritual interest was the most minor consideration. The Bukkyo Seinen Kai were divided into branches within each district. They were connected with the Buddhist churches and were organized to promote Buddhist ideals. As the Nisei grew up these organizations became less and less interested in Buddhism and concentrated on athletic events, carnivals, and dances. In the San Francisco YBA, there were Christian Nisei who joined to take advantage of the sports and parties. Although each branch had an Issei advisor, this position was honorary and the Issei frequently did not attend the meetings as the discussions about social and athletic plans did not interest him. The meetings were conducted in English. In San Francisco though a few Kibei belonged to the organization, the larger number did not as they were not interested in the activities of these Nisei. Kibei in the YBA attended all meetings, even went to the dancing classes, but on the whole did not associate with the Nisei outside of the club. The group was not a serious one. They seldom had lectures and were not interested in such activities. The girls and boys held separate meetings but joined each others' dances and parties. Some of the more conservative parents did object to their children belonging to this organization because of its great emphasis on social events. The priest struggled to bring Buddhism into the meetings and a compromise was reached when they agreed that a service would be held just before the meeting. However, many of the Nisei arrived late in order to avoid the service. The organization was divided into two parts: the Junior group, age 15-18, and the Senior group, age 18-22.

#### Sawtelle Kibei Seinen Kai.

The Kibei Seinen Kai of West Los Angeles, as described by a Nisei who spent three years in Japan, appears to be typical of the Kibei organizations formed in the cities on the West Coast. The Kibei felt they had to form their own organizations because of their "outcast" positions. They had little in common with the Nisei and could not communicate with them. Furthermore, there were a number in this country without their parents; they had no ties to any families and sought each other's company. Even those with families did not always find themselves in agreement with the Issei and their age difference served as a barrier. The Kibei had their experiences in Japan in common. This gave them a cultural and language tie. They were more serious than the Nisei and

did not enjoy the Nisei interests in athletics and socials. The Sawtelle Seinen Kai held many lectures, oratorical contests, and talent shows. They used Japanese in all their meetings, and only boys were eligible for membership. A subject which concerned them especially and to which they devoted hours of discussion was the "Status and Future of the Kibei in the United States". They stressed the need to adjust in this country, to acquire a better understanding of the English language, and to mingle with the Issei and even the Nisei. They did not have Issei advisors. One Nisei states the Kibei rejected Issei advisors because the Kibei were better educated than the Issei and thought they knew more than the Issei. This Nisei felt that the Kibei wanted the Nisei to understand Japanese ways while the Nisei groups were trying to help the Issei understand American culture. The Nisei and Kibei did not mingle in these clubs in the large cities.

In Seattle the JACL, as in other cities, objected to the formation of Kibei Seinen Kai. They resented the use of Japanese at all the Kibei meetings and felt the Kibei would not learn English and become Americanized by forming their own societies. Instead the JACL formed a Kibei division and tried to bring the Kibei into their organization. Many did join but the two groups did not get along well. The Nisei were antagonistic toward the Kibei while the Kibei showed little understanding of the Nisei. The JACL always held meetings in English but provided translations for the Kibei.

#### Japanese American Seinen Kai of Oakland.

In Oakland the Japanese Language School organized a Seinen Kai. Its real purpose was to form a group under whose name it could purchase land, obtain titles and the like. The group originally included both Nisei and Kibei, but before long they separated and held their own meetings. At first the Issei wanted to control the organizations, but after a while they lost control and had to appeal to the club each time they wanted to use its name.

The meetings of the Nisei section of the organization were conducted in English. The boys, age 14 to 18, mainly concentrated on sports. They occasionally had discussion groups but the subjects were not political. Instead they concerned themselves with the topic of vocational opportunities and education for the Nisei. They enjoyed planning parties, dances, picnics and hikes. The Issei frowned on their dances but the Nisei held them anyway. The Kibei too disapproved. Usually the Nisei went to the dramatic group of the Christian Endeavor Church.

Out of fifty members in the Kibei section, only about six were Nisei. Their meetings were conducted in Japanese; they organized oratorical contests, sponsored kendo, gave dramatics in Japanese, and held political and economic discussions. They scorned the Nisei because of their lack of seriousness and refusal to participate in their discussions. They thought the Nisei existed from day to day and did not think ahead. A Nisei belonging to the Nisei section claims the Kibei wanted them to "consider the greatness of Japan", and the Nisei refused. He thought the

Kibei were quite emotional, sentimental, and interested in Japanese culture. He described them as "romanticists".

Although the Kibei were given assistance by the Issei, they were frequently antagonistic toward Issei interference when Issei tried to regiment them into Issei patterns and put across "outmoded Japanese ideas". The Kibei insisted on freedom of thought and action. So far as the Nisei were concerned they considered anyone a Kibei who was interested in Japanese culture, regardless of whether or not the individual had been to Japan. The Nisei in this organization didn't like these people.

In addition to the types of Seinen Kais described above, there were several others. The Junior Kenjinkai were made up of Japanese Americans whose parents were from the same ken or prefecture. This group maintained an artificially created tie to the ken and primarily to Japan. Americanized Nisei looked upon the young people who joined these groups as "Japanesy". This group did tend to look to Japan for their cultural values. Also some of the Americanized Nisei considered the members of the Junior Japanese Chamber of Commerce "Japanesy".

Most of the Seinen Kais discussed above were in urban areas where the situation was different from the rural districts. In rural areas there were fewer organizations and the young people were less likely to split on the basis of Kibei and Nisei. The older people had more control over the organizations and the Kibei were more acceptable. In some instances the Nisei were more "Japanesy" and spoke the Japanese language, while in others the Kibei were more willing to accept some of the Nisei interests.

#### In the Relocation Centers.

The Seinen Kai which developed at the centers differed considerably from the pre-evacuation groups. The conditions of the centers made this development inevitable. To a large extent the Kibei-Nisei split is still observed but other features were more important. The young people formed their Bukkyo Seinen Kai as before evacuation and assumed a more important role in the Buddhist church than they had before evacuation. Then block Seinen Kais were formed in several of the centers, and finally over-all camp Seinen Kais were attempted. These block Seinen Kais were different from pre-evacuation. They were especially concerned with bringing the Issei and Nisei closer and wished to make the Nisei conscious of Japanese culture. Before evacuation many of the Kibei had not been especially close to the Issei and had resented any efforts on the part of the Issei to dominate their organizations. But in the projects they recognized more keenly that the gulf between the Issei and Nisei was serious, that the two groups did not understand each other, and that the cultural schism between the two was acute. Since the Kibei were of the Nisei age group and of the Issei culture, they saw themselves as the coordinators of the two groups and sought to bring the two together to develop an appreciation among Nisei of Japanese culture. The over-all

Seinen Kai had a similar function, and in Poston I an attempt was also made to organize an over-all organization which would participate in center politics. This failed.

In all the centers, in addition to the groups interested in Japanese culture, large numbers of American clubs were started. They were interested in athletics and social events. The names of some of these clubs are Rohwing P-40-ettes, the Eight Balls, the Suicide Squad, the Pioneers, the Indian Guides, the Phalanx, the Mutineers, the Starlights, Hunt Wolverines, Okie Dokies, Skippers, Manzakights, and Zeros.

#### The Poston Unit I Seinen Kai.

In Poston Unit I, there were at least four block organizations which gave themselves the name of Seinen Kai. They stated their motives were primarily to create a better understanding between the Issei and Jun-Nisei (Nisei who have never been to Japan). In Block 27 the boys were encouraged by the Issei to form an organization to provide constructive activity for young men and to forestall gambling. The Block 37 Seinen Kai was formed to bring the Issei and Nisei closer. The meetings were conducted in Japanese and led by an older influential Nisei. In Block 42 the Seinen Kai had a junior and senior division. It started the movement to establish a Japanese language school and organized the Japanese Singspiration to help Nisei improve their knowledge of the Japanese language. The leader was a Kibei. The conservative Issei complained against the Seinen Kai when during the Christmas and New Year holidays they sponsored several dances, since they disliked the American slant the Seinen Kai was taking. In Block 44 Seinen Kai a split between the Kibei and Jun-Nisei developed after a short period, and the Jun-Nisei group formed another club to sponsor a basketball team. They named themselves the "Starlights". In all four Seinen Kai, although the Kibei were especially interested in the organizations, the groups were not primarily Kibei as many Nisei belonged. There were girls as well as boys in these Seinen Kais.

In addition to these block Seinen Kais, an effort was made to organize a camp-wide Seinen Kai, the movement for this beginning in Units II and III of Poston. A split occurred over the concept some of the leaders had of the function of such an over-all organization. One group wished to make it a political organization to act as a pressure group for the Central Executive Committee of Unit I. They saw the Seinen Kai wielding power not only in spreading the Japanese language and culture but in assisting in maintaining law and order in the camp, regaining the citizenship rights and civil liberties for the citizens, and studying the problems of rehabilitation to guide their parents after the war. The organization did not materialize as the majority of the people who participated in the planning meeting preferred to keep out of center politics and work solely in the direction of helping the Nisei understand the Issei and Japanese culture.

Gila Young People's Association.

In Gila a Seinen Kai was organized by a group of Kibei headed by the leader of the present group in Tule Lake. They were interested in Japanese cultural activities and in the need to Japanize the Jun-Nisei. The Seinen Kai was looked upon with suspicion by the administration and the leader was sent to Leupp.

Bukkyo Seinen Kai in the Centers.

In the Young Buddhist Association also, changes have taken place caused by the relocation center living. It has become a more serious organization. The young leaders assisted in establishing Buddhist services for young people in addition to their more social activities. But Americanizing influences have been felt in the Buddhist church through the YBA, and some have tried to sponsor the establishment of an American Buddhism. Even those who are more conservative have directed the services for young people away from the Issei influences, and have injected more Christian practices and the use of the English language. They have continued to sponsor dances and sports but have been interested in the serious religious activities also. They have accepted Issei advice and the Buddhist priest leadership more than before evacuation, but nevertheless they have remained relatively independent.

Thus we see that center conditions brought the various groups closer and made them subject to each other's influence more than before evacuation. The Nisei in particular are in a difficult position. Before evacuation they attended the American schools and mingled with Caucasians and many Japanizing influences were counteracted. But in the relocation centers this situation has changed, and with it the concept of the use of the Seinen Kais as a method of Japanizing Nisei and as a political instrument has arisen. This new development of the Seinen Kai may be considered as one of the several responses among the evacuees to the attack from without. A solidarity in the group is observed caused by evacuation. One frequently hears the comment, "We're all Japanese together." As a result many feel the Issei and Nisei should be closer and should understand each other. In Tule Lake where attack from without is sharper in the minds of the people than in the other centers and where the people feel completely separated from the administration, this need to form strong groups is even more extreme.

Implications for Tule Lake Seinen Kai.

The Seinen Kai proposed at Tule Lake on a camp-wide basis embraces many activities the various groups promoted before evacuation, and the concepts developed in the centers as a result of center life and evacuation, in an effort to appeal to both the Nisei and the Kibei. An expressed motive is to bring the Issei and Nisei closer through helping the Nisei understand the culture of the Issei. The approach some of the Nisei had before evacuation of helping the Issei understand American culture is gone, as one would expect in Tule Lake.

The trends observed in other centers are strongly accentuated in the Tule Lake Seinen Kai plans. The group is even more serious in its intent and more far-reaching in its goal. They even hope to make an intensive study of post-war opportunities for the Nisei and probably this would include the Issei. In addition to social and recreation activities, they wish to concentrate especially on cultural and literary interests.

There are many problems posed by the organization of such a Seinen Kai. The Charter itself cannot reveal the actual way the Seinen Kai will function. If those in the organization use high-pressure methods to force Nisei to join, it will create a serious situation. If it doesn't work out an agreement with existing organizations, there will arise a conflict between the Seinen Kai and the YBA, the sports clubs, particularly the judo, sumo, and kendo groups, and the administration Community Activities Section. Its success will be determined by the response of the Nisei and their interest in such an organization. It will bring the Nisei closer to the Kibei and to the Japanese culture than their pre-evacuation clubs ever did. Those who plan to go to Japan with their families may be more receptive to such a program than they were in the past.

The young people in Tule Lake today find they have too much time on their hands. There is a large unemployed group and the situation is serious. A Seinen Kai will be of value in keeping the young people occupied and in directing them into activities in which they may be interested. The program is broad and probably will appeal to a large number of Nisei. If they are denied the right to form their own organizations they will be resentful and rebellious, and the possibility of working underground will be heightened. This would be more serious especially for the administration. Of course, it is possible the Seinen Kai will become so strong it would be a political factor in Tule Lake, but denying it the right to organize will not prevent such a move.

Two of the functions in particular visualized by the founders will require more thought and discussion before they are undertaken by the YBA. Their plans to establish a welfare department may conflict with the existing WRA welfare program, and however good their intentions they do not have the professional skills with which to approach the type of problems handled by the Welfare Section. However, in Tule Lake the people and the administration are not close and some people needing help may hesitate to apply to the Welfare Section. A greater understanding of Japanese culture and the hesitation found among some of the people in relation to welfare problems are desirable. Whether the go-betweens in bringing this about should be the Seinen Kai or another group in the community will have to be decided. Another welfare function the association plans to be concerned with is juvenile delinquency. In working with the Education Section are they planning a "Big Brother" type of program to counteract juvenile delinquency? Under proper supervision this might work out very well. Another function planned by the leaders which would to some extent duplicate the Community Analysis Section is the Personnel Department established to study and investigate the "general opinion of

the community" as well as to nominate the chairman of each department. This requires professional skills and a careful use of data. The association should be made aware of this, the problems involved in the work, the techniques needed for reliable sampling of opinion, and the implications for such a program.

Discussion with the leaders of the Seinen Kai about their literary, publicity, editorial, and research department may be necessary. Any written material which they might send to other centers and which might be written from a Japanese nationalistic slant might have serious repercussions from the point of view of public relations. It may be possible to establish a review board to discuss all material being sent to other projects to prevent such a situation from occurring.

Instead of refusing to permit this association to be organized, it would appear advisable that the administration discuss with the leaders the details of their plans and some of the problems it will face, but not inhibit their activities. This organization is no more subversive than any of the other young people's groups. It combines the function of previous Seinen Kais into a comprehensive organization. It is not new or different but is an expression of need which some of the young people feel, and this is their way of formulating this need into a concrete plan of action.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
Community Analysis Section  
November 18, 1944

AN ANALYSIS OF REQUESTS FOR REPATRIATION & EXPATRIATION

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- IV. Local Crises at Tule Lake Segregation Center
  - Selection of Tule Lake as a Segregation Center
  - Population in May, 1944, and October, 1944
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- V. Cancellations
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    - Before Pearl Harbor
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      - For the duration
      - Postwar
  - Desire for Family Solidarity
  - Feeling of Transiency in the United States
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- VII. Legal and Political Implications of Repatriation & Expatriation
  - Compulsory Deportation
  - Revocation of Nisei Citizenship
  - Policy of Laissez-faire

### SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS

As of October 15, 1944, a total of 33,286 evacuees have taken indefinite leave, and 19,013 have gone, or intend to go should there be space available, to Tule Lake Segregation Center. Frequently relatives accompany to Tule Lake those who have formally requested repatriation or expatriation and it is usually only a matter of time before they too put in an application. Tule Lake now has 3,195 residents who, unlike its other 15,508 residents, have not yet applied, but there is every evidence that they will request repatriation or expatriation rather than relocate or transfer to relocation centers.

Comparison of the relocation and repatriation figures of May 1, 1944, with those of October 15, 1944, shows that the lead of resettlement over repatriation is increasing. Apparently those who intend to turn their backs on the United States have been pretty well separated from those who intend to stay here, or it may also be that no local or general crisis has occurred in the centers to stimulate a rise in requests to leave the country. Now in the centers are 56,582 evacuees who have yet to choose one of the two paths before them -- resettlement in the United States or departure to Japan after the war.

Whenever the War Relocation Authority has instituted a new major program, such as registration, segregation, or selective service, requests for repatriation or expatriation have risen. It is expected that any new program requiring evacuees to make a decision about their future will result in more applications to go to Tule Lake.

The decision to request repatriation or expatriation is more likely to be based on emotion than reason. In a 2-year period, 8% of the applicants for either repatriation or expatriation have reconsidered their hasty decision and cancelled their requests. Long-standing and deeply-felt tensions and anxieties focus on the need to make a decision about a new program of the Authority and precipitate an emotional crisis and breakdown in morale which leads those who are on the fence or weary of family indecision to apply for transfer to Tule Lake and eventually to Japan.

The varying reactions of different centers to program changes are reflected in the number of their residents who request repatriation. If a center has weathered a severe local crisis which drained off the emotions aroused by evacuation and center life, a change in policy or a new program does not lead to as many applications as in a "quiet" center which through the new program gets its first opportunity to mobilize and express latent emotions.

Involved in the requests are the search for social and economic security, a desire to hold the family together by following the repatriating head of the house, an obligation to care for relatives in Japan, and a feeling of impermanency in the United States. Added to the basic economic and emotional considerations are problems arising from center life.

Among most of those applying for repatriation or expatriation, political motives are relatively unimportant. Many applicants for repatriation seem to have no expectation or interest in actually going to Japan. They go to Tule Lake to stop moving for a while, to escape pressure to relocate under uncertain wartime conditions, to keep the family together, or to protest in this way against evacuation. Others

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\* Repatriation refers to requests of aliens to return to their native land. Expatriation, technically speaking, is the renunciation of citizenship in the country in which one is vested with the rights of citizenship. Nisei who request expatriation have not given up their American citizenship but have merely declared their intention and interest in going to Japan.

who do look to a future in Japan often build up fantasies of life there with scarcely a realistic idea of the government or living conditions in the Empire.

Certain possibilities as to future legislation about this group at Tule Lake are discernible. There is, of course, a possibility that no provision will be made for eventually sending Tule Lake evacuees to Japan. Bills have been submitted which would provide for deporting all aliens and citizens who have been declared disloyal to this country. Other bills provide that after a review of individual cases by an administrative or judicial body, the compulsory deportation of disloyal aliens and citizens would be permitted. Several proposals dealing only with citizenship rights would permit either the automatic deprivation of citizenship of people found disloyal or the voluntary renunciation of citizenship. A proposal of the latter kind has recently been passed by Congress and is now law.

The programs of the War Relocation Authority work in two ways. On the one hand, they open the way to reestablishment of Japanese Americans in normal life in the United States. On the other, they direct Japanese Americans toward identification with Japan. The relocation program accomplished the former. The segregation program fosters the latter.

On October 15, 1944, the Authority had a total of 19,031 requests for transfer to Japan on file and had granted indefinite leave to 33,286 evacuees (Table 1). 56,582 evacuees have not yet made a choice between relocation and repatriation or expatriation.

The number of indefinite leaves should be revised slightly downward to exclude two groups of evacuees who psychologically belong with those who have turned toward Japan, but are now classified as having indefinite leave. These two groups include (1) evacuees who have actually repatriated and left for Japan on the Gripsholm, and (2) evacuees who are interned and have been voluntarily joined by relatives. They are now included technically under indefinite leave which is a comprehensive term for any authorized departure from the relocation centers for the purpose of education, employment, medical attention, joining the Armed Forces, accepting community invitations, joining or accompanying relocated relatives, being committed to an institution, entering an alien enemy internment camp, joining relatives at an alien enemy internment camp, or formally repatriating to Japan. The last three named categories include those who have turned their backs on the United States.

Table 1 shows (1) how many evacuees in each center have requested indefinite leave, (2) how many have applied either for repatriation or expatriation, and (3) how many have not yet indicated a choice between these two broad alternatives. Most but not all evacuees who have applied for repatriation or expatriation are now in Tule Lake Segregation Center. Those who have not been transferred to Tule Lake will remain in their original center until space is found for them in the overcrowded Segregation Center. Tule Lake itself still has a residue of 3,195, the composition of which is discussed later, that has not committed itself either to relocation or to departure to Japan.

TABLE 1

COMPARISON OF NET FIGURES ON INDEFINITE LEAVE  
WITH THOSE ON REQUESTS FOR REPATRIATION  
AND EXPATRIATION, OCTOBER 15, 1944

<u>Center</u>	<u>1. Indef. Lvs.</u>	<u>2. Requests, Repat.-Expat.*</u>	<u>Pop. Left at Center Exclusive of 1 and 2**</u>
Central Utah	3,139	984	5,431
Colorado River	5,229	1,665	9,999
Gila River	4,468	1,715	8,591
Granada	3,074	300	5,396
Heart Mountain	3,708	959	7,873
Manzanar	2,121	1,112	4,622
Minidoka	4,325	421	5,677
Rohwer	3,432	1,212	5,798
Tule Lake	1,736***	8,876	3,195
Jerome (closed)	2,054	1,767	0
Leupp	0	2	0
	<u>33,286</u>	<u>19,013</u>	<u>56,582</u>

\* Table 8, a breakdown of this column, shows how many applicants for repatriation and expatriation remain in their original centers and how many have been transferred to Tule Lake.

\*\* These figures differ from the actual population at the centers because many of those who have requested transfer to Tule Lake remain in their original centers because there is no space for them at the Segregation Center. These figures were arrived at by subtracting from the actual Center population of October 15, 1944, the number of evacuees requesting repatriation and expatriation who had not been transferred to Tule Lake.

\*\*\* Most of these left before the segregation program when Tule Lake was changed from a relocation to a segregation center.

Table 2 below gives comparable figures for May 1, 1944. A comparison of Tables 1 and 2 show that the lead of relocation over repatriation or expatriation is growing slowly or else no crisis has occurred in the 6-1/2 months period to direct many people toward asking to leave the United States.

TABLE 2

COMPARISON OF NET FIGURES ON INDEFINITE LEAVE  
WITH THOSE ON REQUESTS FOR REPATRIATION AND  
EXPATRIATION, MAY 1, 1944

<u>Center</u>	<u>1. Indef. Lvs.</u>	<u>2. Requests Repat.-Expat.*</u>	<u>Pop. Left at Center Exclusive of 1 and 2</u>
Central Utah	2,088	971	6,738
Colorado River	3,649	1,563	11,931
Gila River	2,621	1,683	8,420
Granada	2,182	297	6,105
Heart Mountain	2,246	954	8,847
Manzanar	1,447	949	5,847
Minidoka	3,073	407	7,909
Rohwer	1,787	1,220	5,403
Tule Lake	1,682	2,448	8,406
Jerome	1,724	1,828	5,837
Leupp	0	2	0
Total	<u>22,499</u>	<u>12,322</u>	<u>75,443</u>

\* Breakdown in Table 9

Both relocation and segregation are continuing processes. At the same time that some people are becoming interested in leaving the centers, others turn toward Japan or at least to Tule Lake. This process of turning toward Japan must be examined with reference to the conditions which stimulate it just as attention is given to the process of relocation and the conditions which influence it.

INFLUENCE OF CRISES  
ON APPLICATIONS FOR REPATRIATION AND EXPATRIATION

Crises increase the number of requests for repatriation and expatriation. The earliest applications were made in the critical period between evacuation to assembly centers and adjustment to relocation center life. Later the number of requests rose as the result of three major crises which were precipitated by new programs of the Authority about (1) registration for the Army and for leave clearance, (2) segregation, and (3) selective service.

The ten centers have different trends in their applications for repatriation which reflect the different impact of crises on them. Two local crises at Tule Lake, for example, have swelled that center's number of requests. The first crisis was the incident of November, 1943, which ended in a public demonstration; the second crisis involved a series of events in the spring of 1944 which focused on the center stockade and culminated in a hunger strike of some of the evacuees detained in the stockade and a murder.

After leaving their homes for assembly and relocation centers, evacuees saw two alternatives for their future, namely, (1) to remain in the United States, or (2) to return to Japan (or to one of its possessions). Many would have deferred choosing between the two until after the war, but the offer of the Authority "to return evacuees to the United States" (other than the West Coast) immediately did not permit them to postpone thinking and planning for the future. Every program causing people to think of their future has led a certain number to apply for repatriation or expatriation.

In only one month has there been a decrease in the net cumulative total of requests for repatriation or expatriation. In all other months the net total has risen constantly. (Table 3).

The decrease occurred as of October 1, 1943, when the Authority had 7,490 requests on file as compared with 7,571 on September 1, 1943. The decrease, however, was definitely more apparent than real. What happened, briefly, was the 313 persons actually repatriated to Japan, leaving on the ship Gripsholm on September 2, 1943, and their application forms were then removed from the files of the Authority. In addition, 90 other people who had applied changed their minds about repatriating and cancelled their requests. Since only 322 new applications came in that month, while 403 applications were withdrawn, the net cumulative total declined by 81.

In every other month, however, cancellations have never outnumbered new requests. The cumulative total of requests for repatriation and expatriation has continued to rise rather than decline, and every time a new crisis disturbs morale or compels people to decide one way or another about their future, the number of requests can be expected to spurt upward.

The effect of crises in raising the number of applications for repatriation is known from the experiences of the centers and reports from them.

Unfortunately, the monthly figures in Table 2 do not show this phenomenon because of problems in their recording. These figures are from records kept in Washington where they were sent by the ten centers. Because of clerical shortages, the centers were unable to send in figures regularly each month. Instead, applications for expatriation and repatriation often piled up in the centers for two months or more, particularly during crises which stimulated an increase in requests but added to the clerical difficulties. Then, as they were able, the centers sent in the accumulation to Washington where they were recorded as of the month in which they arrived there.

During the period of segregation, for instance, 99 applications came from Heart Mountain to Washington, but two months later 200 applications came into the national office, representing apparently an accumulation from the crisis period.

TABLE 3

NUMBER OF EVACUEES REQUESTING REPATRIATION OR EXPATRIATION  
BY SPECIFIED DATES, FROM OCTOBER 15, 1942, TO OCTOBER 15, 1944

NOTE: Specified dates determined by available data. Row caption dates refer to date of receipt of document in Washington except for dates prior to 7-1-43, which refer to date of receipt in San Francisco.

DATE	NET NUMBER		:	GROSS NUMBER		
	Requests	Changes		Requests	Cancellations	Deaths
10-15-44	19,013	71	87	-16	0	0
10-1-44	18,942	232	453	-47	-8	-166
9-1-44	18,710	754	803	-47	-2	0
8-1-44	17,956	2,590	2,661	-61	-1	-9
7-1-44	15,366	1,224	1,315	-50	-5	-36
6-1-44	14,142	1,820	1,903	-77	-3	-3
5-1-44	12,322	1,977	2,031	-49	-4	-1
4-1-44	10,345	1,273	1,331	-38	-1	-19
3-1-44	9,072	717	766	-30	-2	-17
2-1-44	8,355	222	368	-116	-1	-29
1-1-44	8,133	24	119	-95	0	0
12-1-43	8,109	419	514	-82	-2	-11
11-1-43	7,690	200	364	-65	-10	-89
10-1-43	7,490	-81	322	-90	0	-313
9-1-43	7,571	890	1,032	-142	0	0
8-1-43	6,681	296	522	-226	0	0
7-1-43	6,385	2,833	3,206	-373	0	0
4-1-43	3,552	471	473	-2	0	0
3-17-43	3,081	30	38	-8	0	0
3-5-43	3,051	82	117	-35	0	0
2-17-43	2,969	25	60	-35	0	0
1-24-43	2,944	193	215	-22	0	0
10-15-42	2,751	-	2,751	0	0	0
TOTAL	19,013	16,262	21,451	-1,706	-39	-693*

\* 3 have never formally applied; 7 confined in institutions, 10 outside relocation centers, 99 interned, (Crystal City, Santa Fe, etc.); 261 duplications of applications; 313 repatriated on Gripsholm 9-2-43.

Source: WRA-230 and 152

### Evacuation, The First Crisis

By October 15, 1942, about seven months after evacuation, the War Relocation Authority had received a net total of 2,751 applications for repatriation or expatriation; by January 24, 1943, the net total filed in Washington had risen to 2,944 (Table 3). The relocation centers had probably received even more requests than that but had not been able to get them into the national office.

During the period from March, 1942 (about a month earlier for those who evacuated voluntarily from their West Coast homes) to January, 1943, when the Authority received the 2-944 applications, evacuees were going through a trying period of leaving their homes for assembly centers and of being moved to relocation centers, where they faced the prospect of residing for an indefinite period during the war. Requests for repatriation or expatriation came, in general, from four different groups of people:

1. There were those who had planned to return to Japan just before the war and then were unable to do so.
2. There were families of men interned in the United States who thought that they could be reunited only by applying for expatriation or repatriation. They also seemed to feel it not worthwhile to remain in this country if they were to be suspected during every emergency.
3. There were families whose relatives had been caught in Japan by the freezing of travel and had therefore been unable to get back to the United States. The families thought that the quickest reunion would come through applying for repatriation and getting sent to Japan.
4. There were a few who filed requests because they feared that the depressing conditions in the assembly and half-built relocation centers would never improve. Consequently, they felt it best to try to go to Japan.

Thus, by the beginning of 1943, nearly 3,000 of a total of about 106,000 evacuees had applied for expatriation or repatriation. For these applicants, the pressures and tensions of the evacuation period and the removal to relocation centers had been more than they could stand. They seemed to feel that it was best for them to apply for expatriation or repatriation and start a new life after the war in Japan.

### Registration, the Second Crisis

The residents had scarcely got settled in the relocation centers and begun to adjust to their new way of living when the Authority announced the registration program. The program was actually in progress by the first week of February, 1943, and continued, in most places, through the next month.

The registration program for all evacuees over 17 years of age was instituted and carried out by both the Authority and the Army for the purpose of getting basic data about the evacuees. The Authority intended to use the information for its leave-clearance program which was to determine whether individual evacuees were eligible from the standpoint of national security to relocate on indefinite leave. The Army was using the information in its recruitment of volunteers for a Japanese American combat team.

The registration forms had one question which particularly aroused much confusion and emotion. Difficulties over the wording of this question, the decision of how to answer it, and general tension over the whole program together with anxieties dating back to evacuation led many to turn toward Japan and apply for expatriation or repatriation.

The question as originally worded asked the registrant, whether an alien or citizen, to swear unqualified allegiance to the United States and foreswear allegiance to any foreign power, especially the Emperor of Japan. Aliens, since they are ineligible for naturalization in the United States,\* feared that they would belong to no country if they answered "yes." The question was then revised to ask alien registrants if they would abide by the laws of the United States and take no action injurious to the war efforts of this country. Citizens, of course, were still asked to pledge allegiance to the United States.

Registration, in effect, asked evacuees to think immediately about the future. And they had hoped and expected to put off such thinking until after the war. Now they had to review their entire experience in this country which had been climaxed by the economic and psychological shock of evacuation and detention. Because they had to make a decision after this review and under the influence of very strong, and frequently adverse, pressures in the community, many evacuees used emotion rather than reason to guide them in their choice between the United States and Japan.

Though the Army and the Authority regarded registration as an important step toward returning qualified evacuees to life outside the center--"to the United States" was the popular phrase--many evacuees did not see it that way. Either the program had not been fully explained to them or well administered, or emotional factors outweighed their appreciation of the desirable features of the program.

Furthermore, registration was the first opportunity for residents in most centers to express concretely and publicly the protests, frustrations, and anxieties which evacuation and life in relocation and assembly centers had produced. In those centers where residents had earlier released their emotions through local crises, the reaction to registration was less vigorous and fewer people applied for repatriation or expatriation. Centers also differed from each other in number of applications because of differences in the way that the registration program was announced, explained, and administered.

Minidoka and Granada had relatively few applications for repatriation or expatriation during the registration program. Because of the nature of the administration of the program and the information presented, these two centers suffered a minimum of confusion and disorder.

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\* A person of Japanese ancestry may not become a naturalized citizen of the United States unless (a) he serves honorably in the armed forces of the United States during the present war. (He may have been naturalized prior to January 1, 1937, by virtue of having been a veteran of the First World War); (b) he was born of alien parents in Puerto Rico at a time and under such circumstances that he was not an American citizen by birth or collective naturalization; (c) he was formerly and American citizen who lost that citizenship as a result of services in the armed forces of an Allied country during the first or second World War; (d) in the case of a woman, she was formerly an American citizen who lost that citizenship (1) by reason of marriage to an alien prior to September 22, 1922; (2) by reason or marriage to an alien ineligible to citizenship after September 22, 1922; or (3) because her husband, if a United States citizen, was repatriated prior to September 22, 1922, provided she acquired no other nationality by affirmative act other than her marriage.

Colorado River and Manzanar also had few applications after registration because earlier local crises had dissipated much of the tension created by evacuation.

In Colorado River Center, Unit I, a centerwide strike in November, 1942, had drained off some of the resentment and bitterness caused by evacuation. The strike was over the jailing of two men accused of beating up another evacuee, suspected of being an informer. Residents assembled to demand their release, and the entire community was drawn into the excitement. After an agreement had been reached, the community quieted down to a state of equilibrium better than that before the incident. Then when the registration program was announced, residents were but little inclined to protest against it by applying for repatriation or expatriation.

The incident of December, 1942, at Manzanar had a similar effect on its residents. As at Colorado River, Unit I, the Manzanar incident started over an evacuee attack on another evacuee accused of being an informer and ended in a demonstration by the community which had been growingly restless for some time. After the incident the Manzanar community, like that at Colorado River, quieted down so that the registration program did not become the target of long-repressed emotions.

In the six remaining centers, registration led to serious crises and many requests for repatriation and expatriation. In these centers, unlike Colorado River and Manzanar, no local crises had released the tensions aroused by evacuation and removal to relocation centers. Consequently, the registration program became the focus around which these emotions concentrated.

Jerome led all centers in the number of requests for repatriation and expatriation, having nearly a thousand more than the center second highest. Registration was the first crisis at Jerome which led residents to express their grievances. The people who came to Jerome were the last to leave the assembly centers, which closed at the end of October, 1942. Besides having had less time in which its population could settle down and adjust itself to relocation center life, Jerome had a number of conflicting groups in its population. There was a large group of evacuees from the Hawaiian Islands who were unusually discontented and bitter over their evacuation and had never achieved harmony with the other Jerome residents. Besides the Hawaiians, Jerome also had several mainland groups whose preevacuation and evacuation experiences had deeply frustrated and disillusioned them about American life. The predominantly rural and conservative nature of the population as well as administrative difficulties further complicated the picture at this center and influenced many to decide to throw their lot with Japan when registration required them to make some decision about their future.

Though they were the hastiest to react negatively to the crisis, many more among the remaining 100,000 or so were resentful about evacuation, the hardships of assembly and relocation center life, indefinite detention, and the day-to-day difficulties of center administration. Their emotions, however, had not yet flared to the point there they would apply to leave this country. Some later crisis was to shake them loose from their attachment to the United States.

Table 4 below gives a general idea of the relative position of the centers in regard to the net number of applications for repatriation or expatriation as of January 24, 1943.

TABLE 4

NET NUMBER OF PERSONS REQUESTING REPATRIATION  
OR EXPATRIATION BY CENTERS AS OF JANUARY 24, 1943

<u>Center</u>	<u>Net No. of Applications</u>
Central Utah	236

(table cont'd)

<u>Center</u>	<u>Net No. of Applications</u>
Colorado River	521
Gila River	478
Granada	126
Heart Mountain	292
Jerome	51
Manzanar	373
Minidoka	378
Rohwer	322
Tule Lake	167
Total	2,944

By the end of June, excitement over registration had declined and no new program affecting all centers had been instituted by the Authority. Consequently, the clerical staffs at the centers were able to catch up on the accumulated application forms and send them into Washington. The figures for each center at the end of the first six months of 1943 give an idea of the situation as to repatriation and expatriation.

On July 1, 1943, the Authority had a net of 6,385 requests for repatriation and expatriation, an increase of 3,441 over the net figure of January 24, 1943. (The gross increase was 3,894; 453 cancellations brought the net to 3,441). The distribution of the 3,441 by centers is shown in Table 4 with the net cumulative total to July 1, 1943, of requests for repatriation and expatriation. 290 of those applying did so at the request of the Japanese Government (2,422, however, refused the Japanese request through preference for this country); the remaining 6,095 requested repatriation or expatriation on their own initiative.

TABLE 5

NET NUMBER OF PERSONS REQUESTING REPATRIATION OR  
EXPATRIATION BY CENTERS AS OF JULY 1, 1943, AND  
THE NET INCREASE FROM JANUARY 24, 1943, TO JULY 1, 1943.

<u>Center</u>	<u>Net No. Requests to July 1, 1943</u>	<u>Increase in Number from 1-24-43 to 7-1-43</u>
Central Utah	664	428
Colorado River	663	142
Gila River	995	517
Granada	90	-36
Heart Mountain	697	405
Jerome	1,512	1,461
Manzanar	374	1
Minidoka	303	-75
Rohwer	627	305
Tule Lake	460	293
Total	6,385	3,441

#### Segregation, the Third Crisis

A glance at Table 3 shows that by July 1, 1943, the clerical staffs at the centers had got to the bottom of the requests which had accumulated during the registration program of February and March and that they had also sent into Washington in June 373 cancellations.

This is concrete evidence that emotions had quieted at the centers after registration and that many who had applied while under the influence of centerwide tension had reconsidered, in personal terms, the meaning of registration and had withdrawn their applications for repatriation or expatriation. Also aiding in an improved adjustment was the speeding up of leave clearance.

Some evacuees were now agitating for a formal program to segregate those interested in Japan from those planning to stay in the United States. By the end of June, the Authority had under way plans for a segregation program and the use of Tule Lake as a segregation center.

During the last week of July, 1943, the Authority announced that segregation would begin in September and October. Emphasizing that selection of Tule Lake meant orientation to Japan, it asked evacuees to choose between Japan and the United States.

Segregation proved less of a crisis than registration. The fewer requests for repatriation or expatriation that came during segregation resulted, in general, from three major factors, namely, (1) segregation unlike registration was voluntary, (2) segregation was a kind of clean-up which gathered in those who had hesitated to make up their minds during registration, and (3) the registration program had effectively served as an emotional catharsis for embittered evacuees, and the centers had reached a fairly stable, new balance before the announcement of segregation.

The Authority accepted no applications from Tule Lake residents during segregation because segregants from all other centers were to be sent there immediately. People began to move there during September and October and to settle down. The number of requests from Tule Lake did not increase therefore during the period of segregation; as a matter of fact it declined (Table 6) because of cancellations.

During the 6-months period in which segregation was the major crisis, Minidoka and Granada, as during registration, received fewer applications than any other center. Minidoka showed a decline due to cancellations outnumbering applications.

Rohwer and Gila River had the highest number of requests for transfer to Japan, partly because of their largely rural population which tends to maintain a closer bond to the homeland than does the urban population. The administrative history of Gila River may also have influenced many evacuees at that center to apply for transfers.

Manzanar, third highest in requests, is a special case. Segregation was delayed there several months after the other centers so that requests did not reach a peak until after other centers had begun their train movements to Tule Lake. As segregation got under way at Manzanar, this center showed an increase in requests for transfer after September, 1943.

Many Central Utah requests, like those from Jerome, probably came from the Hawaiian segment of the population.

Between July and January, 2,873 evacuees applied to go to Tule Lake, but the number fell to 1,748 because 700 cancelled their requests, 12 died, 313 actually departed to Japan on the Gripsholm, and the remaining 100 either went to internment camps or filed duplicate requests.

Table 6 shows the net cumulative total of requests for each center up to January 1, 1944, and the net increase from July 1, 1943, to January 1, 1944, the period in which segregation was the only major crisis.

TABLE 6

NET NUMBER OF REQUESTS BY CENTERS TO JANUARY 1, 1944,  
AND NET INCREASE FROM JULY 1, 1943 TO JANUARY 1, 1944.

<u>Center</u>	<u>Net No. Requests to 1-1-44</u>	<u>Net Increase from 7-1-43 to 1-1-44</u>
Central Utah	935	271
Colorado River	880	217
Gila River	1,317	322
Granada	121	31
Heart Mountain	744	47
Jerome	1,690	178
Leupp	2	2
Manzanar	684	310
Minidoka	280	-23
Rohwer	1,062	435
Tule	418	-42
Total	<u>8,133</u>	<u>1,748</u>

#### Selective Service, The Fourth Crisis

When selective service was announced on January 20, 1944, evacuees again, as during registration and segregation, had to think about the crucial question of the country of their future. Old people asked themselves if they were willing to see their sons fight in the American army. Young Nisei asked themselves if they were willing to give up their lives for the United States. The majority proved willing, but to some, the announcement served to crystallize their feelings and turn them toward Tule Lake. Colorado River had an unusually large number of requests for repatriation and expatriation after selective service was announced. The explanation for this phenomenon is that Units I and II had gone through crises in the past which had served as a catharsis. Also, Unit II had been cleared by the FBI of people they suspected. But Poston III, unlike Units I and II, had always been kept under control and its leadership never "purged", so that the issue over selective service was the first to arouse this Unit to express freely its attitudes.

Manzanar suffered much confusion because of the poor timing of the announcement of selective service, which coincided with segregation. The latter program, it will be recalled, was delayed there beyond other centers. Feelings about segregation were still at a high pitch when selective service was announced and led to numerous requests for repatriation and expatriation.

Gila River has been consistently high in the number of requests for repatriation and expatriation through any crisis.

At Heart Mountain, more highly organized resistance to selective service gained a foothold than at any other center. Nevertheless, this center had relatively few applications for repatriation or expatriation. Because many Heart Mountain residents busily engaged in protesting selective service and raising the issue of civil rights, they did not concentrate, therefore, on a choice between Japan and the United States.

Granada, like Unit III at Poston, had been relatively calm through the previous crises, but its reactions to selective service were forceful. When selective service was announced, accumulated tensions were released and led to a sharp increase in requests for repatriation or expatriation.

Between January 1 and July 1, 1944, there was a net increase of 7,233 applications (7,714 gross minus 360 cancellations, 16 deaths, and 105 withdrawals for other reasons). However, of the 7,233 net requests, 4,934 came from Tule Lake alone while only 2,299 came from the other centers. (Table 7). The astonishing number from Tule Lake, discussed more fully in the next section, had little to do with the announcement of selective service because the Army considered but few Tule Lake Nisei as eligible. In the other centers, though, selective service was certainly the major crisis in this 6-months period, and the effect of its announcement coupled with the accumulated tensions and grievances from previous crises was sufficient to shake loose those who had been indecisive before and make them decide to apply to go to Tule Lake.

Table 7 shows the net number of requests from each center from January 1 to July 1, 1944, and the net increase during that 6-months period in which, except in Tule Lake, selective service was the principal crisis.

TABLE 7

NET NUMBER OF REQUESTS FOR REPATRIATION AND  
EXPATRIATION BY CENTERS AND NET INCREASE  
FROM JANUARY 1, 1944 TO JULY 1, 1944.

<u>Center</u>	<u>Net No. Requests to 7-1-44</u>	<u>Net Increase from 1-1-44 to 7-1-44</u>
Central Utah	978	43
Colorado River	1,589	709
Gila River	1,694	377
Granada	296	175
Heart Mountain	959	215
Jerome	1,791	101
Leupp	2	0
Manzanar	1,086	402
Minidoka	411	131
Rohwer	1,208	146
Tule Lake	<u>5,352</u>	<u>4,934</u>
Grand Total	15,366	7,233

LOCAL CRISES AT TULE LAKE SEGREGATION CENTER

Selection of Tule Lake as a Segregation Center

In the fall of 1943, the Authority decided, as stated earlier, to select Tule Lake as a segregation center to which all repatriation or expatriation applicants in the relocation centers would eventually be sent.

Tule Lake was selected because of its extensive acreage, capacity for 16,000 residents, location within the evacuation area which made it subject to Western Defense Command regulations, and the character of its population which included numerous potential segregants.

Those Tule Lake residents who did not apply for repatriation or expatriation and would, it was assumed, relocate eventually and return to normal American life were to be transferred to relocation centers. Many did leave, but some refused to move and thereby put themselves in a peculiar position. Although they had not expressed a desire to go to Japan by requesting repatriation, they chose to live in a center in which the majority of residents are oriented toward Japan.

Population In May, 1944, and October, 1944

On May 1, 1944, the total population of Tule Lake was 16,939. Below is the breakdown.

	(6,085 Transfers from relocation centers of applicants for repatriation or
8,533	(       expatriation
	(2,448 Tule Lake residents who had signed for repatriation or expatriation
	<u>8,406</u> Tule Lake residents who had not yet applied for repatriation
	16,939 Total

The 8,406 Tule Lake residents mentioned in the breakdown consisted of several different groups with at least one common characteristic, namely, they had not applied for repatriation or expatriation and technically, therefore, did not belong in a segregation center. These groups were made up of the following kinds of people:

1. Those who had been refused leave clearance, necessary for relocation.
2. Those who refused at registration to promise allegiance to the United States and support, or at least, no hindrance to the war effort. These people are popularly referred to as the "no-nos" because of their answers to the two registration questions.
3. Those who voluntarily went to Tule Lake to join relatives who had gone there after requesting repatriation or expatriation.
4. Those who had been residents of Tule Lake when it was a relocation center and had refused to leave although eligible to do so.
5. Young children whose parents had made no formal arrangements for them as to their future country.

Six months later, on October 15, 1944, the Tule Lake population was 18,703. Below is the breakdown:

	(6,632 Transfers from relocation centers of applicants for repatriation
15,508	(       or expatriation
	(8,876 Tule Lake residents who have applied for repatriation or expatriation
	<u>3,195</u> Tule Lake residents who have not yet applied
	18,703 Total

The 3,195 are all who are left of the approximately 8,000 who were described under the five headings above. Included among them are doubtless some newcomers who voluntarily left relocation centers to accompany relatives who were applicants. If the 3,195 people who technically do not belong in a segregation center go the way of the others we can expect them to establish before long a legitimate claim to belonging in Tule Lake by applying for eventual departure to Japan.

#### Segregants Left in Relocation Centers

All those who have formally turned away from the United States to Japan have not yet been transferred to Tule Lake because the segregation center is obviously badly overcrowded since it has a capacity of but 16,000 and an actual population of 18,703. The overcrowding is naturally a source of tension and in itself a decisive factor in the rise in requests from Tule Lake residents who had not previously segregated.

At the same time, the presence in relocation centers of 3,505 people who should be in Tule Lake because of their applications is a constantly irritating factor to those in the centers who expect eventually to resettle in the United States (Table 8). On May 1, 1944, there were 3,789 applicants in the relocation centers who should have been at Tule Lake (Table 9). Obviously, the number of transfers from relocation centers to Tule Lake remains but a brief step ahead of the number of applicants who are not transferred.

TABLE 8

LOCATION OF PERSONS FROM RELOCATION CENTERS  
REQUESTING REPATRIATION AND EXPATRIATION,  
OCTOBER 15, 1944.

<u>Original Relocation Center of Applicant</u>	<u>No. Applicants Trans- ferred to Tule Lake</u>	<u>No. Applicants Remaining in Orig. Center</u>	<u>Total Applicants</u>
Central Utah	865	119	984
Colorado River	694	971	1,665
Gila River	1,049	666	1,715
Granada	84	216	300
Heart Mountain	752	207	959
Manzanar	564	548	1,112
Minidoka	175	246	421
Rohwer	680	532	1,212
Jerome (closed)	1,767	0	1,767
Leupp	2	0	2
Total	<u>6,632</u>	<u>3,505</u>	<u>10,137</u>
Tule Lake	8,876		
Total	<u>15,508</u>		

TABLE 9

LOCATION OF PERSONS FROM RELOCATION CENTERS  
REQUESTING REPATRIATION AND EXPATRIATION  
MAY 1, 1944

<u>Original Relocation Center of Applicant</u>	<u>No. Applicants Trans- ferred to Tule Lake</u>	<u>No. Applicants Remaining in Orig. Center</u>	<u>Total Applicants</u>
Central Utah	865	106	971
Colorado River	695	868	1,563
Gila River	1,053	630	1,683
Granada	81	216	297
Heart Mountain	738	216	954
Manzanar	553	396	949
Minidoka	173	234	407
Rohwer	599	621	1,220
Jerome	1,326	502	1,828
Leupp	2	0	2
Total	<u>6,085</u>	<u>3,789</u>	<u>9,874</u>
Tule Lake	<u>2,448</u>		<u>2,448</u>
Grand Total	8,533		12,322

### Rise in Requests from Tule Lake

In the 6-months period from January to July, 1944, Tule Lake had more than twice as many requests for repatriation and expatriation as all the relocation centers put together. The nine relocation centers and Leupp had a net increase in this period of 2,299 requests; Tule Lake had 4,934 (Table 7).

The reasons for this rise are complex and numerous. Some of the reasons are:

1. During the fall of 1943 while segregation was going on in the relocation centers, no new applications were accepted at Tule Lake. The lifting of the ban led to many applications coming in about the same time.
2. Due to clerical difficulties at Tule Lake, no requests for repatriation and expatriation were processed and sent to Washington, D.C. for several months. Then starting in April, 1944, the clerical staff began to send in large numbers of requests. Up to February 1, 1944, Washington had received only 414 applications from Tule Lake; in March, 570. The following list shows the net cumulative total for each month from April to October and including October 15, 1944.

April 1, 1944	1,014
May 1, 1944	2,448
June 1, 1944	4,139
July 1, 1944	5,352
August 1, 1944	7,897
September 1, 1944	8,615
October 1, 1944	8,831
October 15, 1944	8,876

3. Tension, always present at Tule Lake, increased with the transfer of segregants from relocation centers. Among the segregants were several leaders who, like those transferring from Jerome, continued to exert a powerful influence among the residents not only of their former relocation center but over Tule Lake.
4. The most susceptible to requesting repatriation or expatriation are the non-segregated residents at Tule Lake in the five groups described above. They share the crises and difficulties of the segregated residents and life in a segregation center. They are exposed to contact with those who have committed themselves to a future in Japan. Public pressure at Tule Lake favors repatriation. For the many Tule Lake residents who answered "no" to the question of loyalty, repatriation is a logical step.
5. Two serious local crises which afflicted Tule Lake during the past year have also left their mark on the non-segregated population of the center

One of the issues in the crisis of November, 1943, involved segregation and doubtless influenced many to apply for repatriation. A chaotic type of community emerged during the incident and created a climate favorable for repatriation and expatriation.

The second crisis took place in the summer and spring of 1944 and was climaxed by a murder and a hunger strike of those detained in the stockade in the center.

### CANCELLATIONS

In the two years from October 15, 1942, to October 15, 1944, 11% of all applications filed with the Authority requesting transfer to Japan have been withdrawn for one reason or another. The larger part (8%) were withdrawn because the applicant reconsidered his decision and decided to cancel his request and throw in his lot with the United States. The remaining 3% of the withdrawals were necessitated by the death of the applicant; his actual departure to Japan, to internment centers or to institutions; or his having made out a duplicate application. (See Table 3 for figures).

A peak in cancellations followed registration which, except for selective service, has been the most emotionally disruptive crisis the residents of the relocation centers have faced. Many acted in haste and then cancelled when they had thought the matter over.

In general, three groups of people have cancelled their requests.

1. There are those who applied because the family head was interned. They had thought the only way to unite the family was to apply for repatriation. When the family head was paroled from the internment camp to the relocation center and the family was united again, requests for repatriation were cancelled.
2. Another group included those who requested repatriation because of obligations to relatives in Japan. The removal of these obligations eliminated their reason for wanting to return.
3. Others who cancelled their requests included those who had felt that there was no future for them in this country but now were encouraged because they recognized that through the relocation program the Authority was returning their civil liberties. Children have frequently used this argument to persuade their parents to cancel their requests and plan to stay in the United States.

## MOTIVES FOR REQUESTING REPATRIATION OR EXPATRIATION

Security, family solidarity, political ideology, and a feeling of transiency in America are among the dominant motives which have directed some evacuees to ask for repatriation or expatriation and thereby identify themselves with Japan rather than with the United States.

To evacuees an application for repatriation is a highly personal matter. Declaring that little difference exists between applicants for repatriation and the non-applicants, they observe that those who have survived crisis after crisis may suddenly feel overwhelmed and yield to their frustrations and pressures. Highly personalized, the ultimate decision depends on individual psychology and experiences. Consequently, individuals with paralled family situations and experiences may decide differently.

For example, two Kibei at Manzanar with a similar family situation answered differently during registration. One returned to the United States in 1937, speaks English well, likes this country, and, before evacuation, found it easier to make a living here than in Japan. Nevertheless, he has refused to sign an oath against Japan or the Emperor because his parents are still in Japan. Such an act, besides preventing his return to Japan, would disgrace his parents.

The other Kibei, who has also recently returned here, is the eldest son in his family, which is in Japan. Like the other Kibei, he would like to visit his relatives after the war. But he has pledged allegiance to the United States and volunteered to teach Japanese in the language school. He expects his family to disown him and to put one of his brothers in his place. The first Kibei could not give up his family despite his preference for the United States; the second Kibei gave up his family for this country.

Undoubtedly, the reasoning of each individual and each family varies with the particular situation, psychological needs, and social pressures. However, whatever configuration the problems of a specific individual or family may assume, many similar motives are involved.

### Search for Security

The search for security is a fundamental motive in requesting repatriation. Most applicants feel that neither in the relocation centers nor "outside" is there security for them and that even before the war their security was precarious. For this reason they choose Tule Lake and, ultimately, Japan in their quest for security. During a crisis when the individual is most strongly aware of his acute feeling of insecurity he may succumb and decide to request repatriation, especially if the crisis revolves about the issue of national loyalties.

Before Pearl Harbor, the struggle of the Japanese in the United States was like that of other immigrant groups attempting to achieve economic and social security here. The security of the Japanese was narrowly based on an agrarian economy and the establishment of communities which were neither entirely Japanese nor entirely American. They were forced into this type of adjustment partly by economic and cultural considerations and partly by discrimination and legislation which prohibited foreign-born Japanese from acquiring citizenship. Evacuation swept away whatever economic stability they had so laboriously developed for about forty years.

After Pearl Harbor, attitudes of the American Japanese toward the United States were modified by anger over property losses, bitterness about the hostile public and press, fear of proposed legislation against them, and fright over the suspicions of the FBI. Serious questions about both the United States and Japan were raised by not only Issei and Kibei but by Nisei as well. Evacuation and subsequent events made evacuees wonder where they could live and work without interference with their personal liberties. Probably they would have remained suspended in an indecisive, questioning stage had not various crises in the center and a hostile press and public created sharp conflicts which pointed up their need to decide whether they could feel more secure in the United States or in Japan.

Before and after evacuation, as the result of wartime conditions, certain groups of West Coast Japanese had experiences which raised the bitter question of future security. Because these groups have had difficulty in rebuilding their faith in the United States, many have asked to be repatriated. Though not necessarily more "Japanesey" and politically conscious than other evacuees, they are more disillusioned and broken and look to Japan for the security they have not found here.

The Terminal Islanders make up one of these embittered groups, for they lived in fear and uncertainty from December, 1941, to February, 1942. After their businesses had been ruined and their men interned, they were given 48 hours to evacuate. Many went to Manzanar where they formed a large and especially bitter group of people who requested repatriation.

The Hawaiians in Jerome were another angry group. They had been selected from the entire Japanese population in Hawaii to be interned, sent to the mainland, and transferred to relocation centers. They claim to have been promised many things which never materialized. Also mainlanders at Jerome ostracized them so that they became a group apart in the community.

For the duration. Many of the older people thought they could achieve security for the period of the war by transferring to Tule Lake. Numerous Issei have asked for repatriation, not because they wish to go to Japan, but because they want to enjoy the security of the centers as long as possible. Many enjoy the freedom from the strain of living in a Caucasian community. In a center there is no competition, no language barrier, no cultural difference to set them off from the rest of the community. Some even challenge the Nisei by asking if they think they will ever be able to adjust to a life among Caucasians after years in a center. These old people look to Tule Lake as a home for the duration where they will be free from any pressure to relocate or to pick up their old burdens once more.

Issei particularly fear the possibility of forced relocation. Segregation prompted them to interpret this policy of the War Relocation Authority as one of forced relocation and, therefore, a threat to their present security. By going to Tule Lake some hoped to be isolated from that phase of the program until the end of the war. During segregation, rumors swept the centers that after segregation had been completed all evacuees in the remaining relocation centers would be forced to resettle. Many people with no real intention of going back to Japan requested repatriation in order to go to Tule Lake and escape relocation. The relocation program has, on the one hand, stimulated some evacuees to leave the center and return to normal living, but, on the other hand, it has turned those who want to assure their residence in a center to repatriation.

Curiously enough, a rumor of a center being closed seems more influential than the actual closing of a center in pushing an individual toward repatriation. When Jerome Center was closed recently, relatively few applied for repatriation and at no time was there a rush to repatriate. Yet when rumors swept Manzanar Center that it was soon to be closed, some of the panic-stricken people rushed to request repatriation. They reasoned that once in Tule Lake they would not have to move again or face the possibility of relocation. Rumors about closing a center arouse uncertainty and fear because evacuees dread the mere physical act of moving, the sense of impermanence it creates, and the prospect of more weary adjustments.

More than anything else evacuees want security and serenity. In their own way they are planning their future, though they do not always agree with the concept the War Relocation Authority has of what their future plans should be. Many wish to wait and see what postwar conditions will be like before they plan resettlement. When the Authority forces them to think about relocation, the world outside, selective service, and registration, they keenly feel that they are being pushed around. In protest, they request repatriation.

Postwar security in Japan is the expectation of many evacuees whose interest in repatriation and expatriation is based more upon motives of economic security than upon political or nationalistic considerations.

The quest for postwar economic security is intensified by fear of what the postwar period in the United States will be like for people of Japanese descent. Evacuees wonder if prejudice and discrimination against the Japanese people will become more acute after the war when the soldiers return. Will these soldiers object to their holding jobs and identify them with the enemy? Fear of the postwar in the United States has made some feel that repatriation is the way out and that they will not have to face such problems in Japan.

They wonder too if it is worth remaining in a country which will always regard them with suspicion. Discrimination before evacuation and the experience of evacuation has made them especially sensitive and suspicious of any move which might be interpreted unfavorably. Thus, the slowness of leave clearance recommendations has made them wonder if there is derogatory information quoted against them. They are very critical of this slowness.

The quest for economic and social security in Japan is likely to be strong among those who lost all their money and property during evacuation and feel they cannot start anew here. They hope that perhaps they can find opportunities in Japan. Others who may still have funds fear they cannot regain their lost status in the United States. They have little ambition left to pioneer again and rebuild their businesses. They wish to salvage what they have in the hope that it will be easier to start again in Japan.

Some of the older Issei bachelors who never were successful in this country and who could not afford to return to Japan or face their relatives as failures have a reasonable excuse now to return without loss of prestige. They claim, furthermore, that the government will provide them with boat fare.

Some of the more disillusioned Nisei and Kibei also feel that they have no future in the economy of the United States. Because discrimination has prevented them from getting the types of jobs they want and opportunities have been narrow and restricted, they hope that Japan will give them equal opportunities in competition and no discrimination.

Motives of Kibei who have asked for expatriation are more complex than those of the Nisei. Kibei have faced more serious problems, perhaps, than either Issei or Nisei. Even before evacuation they were struggling with difficult problems of adjustment in the United States due to their recent return from Japan. They suffered the handicaps of the Issei, such as lack of knowledge of English and long exposure to Japanese culture, and faced the discrimination that the Nisei did. Long separation from their families made them feel rejected, for they had little in common with the Nisei and they were too young for the Issei. Their sensitivity has been sharpened since evacuation by the attitude of the intelligence agencies and the Authority in regarding them as a separate group.

There is much wishful thinking about opportunities in Japan. Some point out that Japan is a prosperous nation whose wealth has been considerably increased since the war through her new possessions. They think that she will be glad to place the repatriation and expatriation applicants who so request on some of her new possessions. A few Nisei are even studying the geography and economics of those possessions. When it is suggested that Japan may not win the war, this group optimistically claims that at the worst the war will end in a stalemate with a negotiated peace which will permit Japan to retain some of her new possessions. They are sure that then Japan will not forget them, for even now she sends them food and other materials through the International Red Cross and protests their treatment to the Spanish Consul, the protecting power.

As some of the people who have requested repatriation or expatriation become progressively more pessimistic about their economic opportunities in this country, they tend to magnify the opportunities which they think Japan will offer them. They paint a rosy picture. Even those who left Japan forty years ago are certain that their relatives and former friends will welcome them and offer them support and shelter. They forget the hardships which led them to emigrate to the United States. Instead they nostalgically recall a beautiful past. They cling to all those rumors and exaggerations which they want to accept as truths.

In Manzanar, for example, it was rumored that the Japanese government announced over the radio that it is putting up a large sum of money for the Japanese returning from abroad to be used in any way the returned nationals wish. This search for economic security has not only led people to acknowledge their practical motives for returning to Japan but it has pushed them in the direction of developing serious fantasies about Japan.

#### Desire for Family Solidarity

Even before evacuation the desire to keep the family together characterized Japanese social structure. Although Nisei assimilation before the war was gradually loosening these ties, the reverses suffered during evacuation made family unity a necessity and a resource. Therefore, when the decision to repatriate is made, many families respond as a unit.

Once a member of a family has decided upon repatriation, the other members are frequently forced to a similar decision. Usually it is the head of the family who makes the decision. The Issei father who feels his children must do as he commands may not consult his dependents before requesting the Spanish Consul to list his family for repatriation or expatriation. Sometimes it is a Nisei or Kibei son who insists upon requesting expatriation and requires the family to decide whether they should stick together or let the application separate them. Serious family arguments develop over repatriation and expatriation.

Some children consider it a filial duty to obey their parents and care for them in their old age. Though they have no desire to go to Japan, their sense of duty leads them to consent to apply for expatriation. Other children who refuse to sign the application find home life unbearable, for the parents nag them in the hope of wearing down their resistance. A few young people have requested expatriation merely to end family quarreling and nagging. Some who go to Tule Lake with their families hope that conditions will change to permit them to stay in the United States or that their parents will decide to stay here.

Obligations to relatives in Japan lead some to decide upon repatriation and expatriation. In a few instances, relatives in Japan and in the Japanese army and navy have influenced families in the centers to consider repatriation.

Families of some internees have asked for repatriation in order to be reunited. For them the goal is not primarily to return to Japan but to reunite the family.

#### Feeling of Transiency in the United States

Like many other immigrant groups, a number of Japanese came here to earn enough money to be able to return to the old country to buy a business or farm. Shotaro Frank Miyamoto, in his study of "Social Solidarity Among the Japanese in Seattle", (University of Washington, Publications in the Social Sciences, Vol. II, No. 2, December, 1939) quotes a community leader as saying:

All of them came over here with the idea that they would stay about three years, and then go back to Japan to set up their own businesses. Among all whom I know, I can say that not one in a hundred stayed here all the time. The rest of them went back to Japan after a few years, and they came to America again only after they failed in their native land, and found that life in Japan was harder than life over here. But even then, I think in the bottom of their hearts they wanted to go back to Japan to live.

Immigration figures show that many did return to Japan. The war and evacuation have increased the desire of some to go back to the old country. They feel this to be an opportune time, particularly if transportation is provided them.

#### Role of Political Motives

Although most of the Issei and Nisei requesting repatriation or expatriation are not motivated by political considerations and do not understand the politics of Japan, some of the applicants frankly admit that they favor Japan and want to return for political reasons. These people are proud of Japan's achievements and wish to participate in the Japanese victory they anticipate. Nevertheless, the majority of Issei, though they may be pleased with Japan's successes, do not appear to comprehend the full meaning of Japan's dictatorial government. One Issei stated:

I care nothing for the war. I don't understand how it started nor why they are fighting. I wish it would end soon. Then I and my family can go to Japan where we are wanted and where I can spend my declining years in peace. America has closed the door to us. We have no choice.

Though a few Issei, Nisei, and Kibei recognize that their applications for repatriation and expatriation involve serious political and international implications and arrangements, most evacuees do not fully appreciate this. Not only are they

unaware of the complicated and detailed negotiations necessary in any exchange of people between two countries but they do not realize that their names are on lists which may in the future be held against them if they remain in this country. In many instances they do not understand that legislation may be directed against them because of their applications. Instead they debate primarily the personal, social, economic and psychological motivations which lead them to consider applying for repatriation or expatriation.

LEGAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF  
REPATRIATION AND EXPATRIATION

Unfortunately, the reasons behind applications are not always understood by the public, the press, Congress, and some government agencies. They only see that 19,013 Japanese aliens and Japanese Americans have asked to return to Japan though the United States is at war with that country. Because broad legislation frequently does not take into account complicated personal motives, the possibility of legislation applying specifically to this group presents important problems. The absence of plans for these applicants will also have serious repercussions among them.

Numerous bills have been submitted in Congress dealing with citizens and aliens "who gave aid or comfort to any U.S. enemy or advocated overthrow by force or violence of the U.S. Government or knowingly or intentionally expressed by deed or by word, either orally or in writing loyalty to a foreign state". Four types of proposals which would affect those requesting repatriation or expatriation are (1) deportation of all aliens and citizens declared disloyal in the above description; (2) compulsory deportation of aliens and citizens after individual case reviews; (3) automatic deprivation of the citizenship of those found disloyal; (4) voluntary renunciation of citizenship.

Compulsory Deportation

Compulsory deportation of all those who request expatriation or repatriation is frequently demanded both in Congress and among West Coast residents. Many bills have been submitted. It is argued that by requesting expatriation or repatriation evacuees have given up America for Japan and, therefore, should be sent there. These evacuees are regarded as disloyal in view of their applications for repatriation or expatriation.

Mass deportation would result in grave injustices. Many applicants for repatriation or expatriation do not want to go to Japan. For some, the request is a protest to the United States Government against the denial of civil liberties. To others, it is the result of family or community pressures, or an escape from wartime relocation. Many will probably refuse to go to Japan if given the opportunity. When Gripsholm sailings were being arranged recently, a number of evacuees who had earlier requested repatriation or expatriation refused to go.

Another form of compulsory deportation proposed in several bills would force deportation of citizens and aliens only after individual case reviews had been made. Because of the added safeguards of individual review and allowance for appeals, this type of legislation would, therefore, be preferable to the first type. However, because the process would be cumbersome and routinized by the numerous cases in this category, abuses would tend to develop. The criteria of the administrative agency or court given jurisdiction would be very important in the final selection.

Revocation of Nisei Citizenship

Two types of bills have been introduced in Congress concerning revocation of Nisei citizenship rights: (1) automatic deprivation of citizenship, and (2) voluntary renunciation of citizenship. Automatically depriving all Nisei who requested expatriation of their citizenship would create a group without a country. Such a blanket law would seriously handicap Nisei because of the manifold reasons

involved in their applying for expatriation. Legislation revoking Nisei citizenship because of requests for expatriation would create in the United States a group of people neither American citizens nor Japanese nationals unless they are dual citizens. If these Nisei are not deported or given the opportunity to go to Japan, they would have a curious legal status here. It would be a problem, under such a blanket law, to define their rights and privileges and it would convince disillusioned and embittered Nisei that the United States was punishing them on racial grounds.

Effective on October 7, 1944,

The Nationality Act of 1940, as amended by the Act of July 1, 1944, provides that anyone who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, may lose his nationality by filling out, before an officer designated by the Attorney General, a prescribed form for the renunciation of nationality during a period when the United States is at war. The Attorney General must approve such renunciation as not contrary to the interests of national defense.

Any national of the United States may request the proper form from the Attorney General, file it together with statements proving citizenship with the Attorney General, and appear upon notification for a hearing before the officer appointed by the Attorney General. The notification comes after the Attorney General has approved the application for renunciation of United States citizenship as not contrary to the interests of national defense. After a hearing, the applicant may file with the hearing officer, on a prescribed form, a formal written renunciation of citizenship and request the Attorney General's approval of such renunciation.

The hearing officer recommends approval or disapproval by the Attorney General of the applicant's request upon facts presented at the hearing and any investigation and information available in reports of Government agencies and other sources relating to the applicant's allegiance and the effect of his renunciation on national defense.

Notice by the Attorney General of his approval of renunciation of nationality is sent to not only the applicant but to the State Department, the Alien Property Custodian, Foreign Funds Control Section of the Treasury Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice.

#### Policy of Laissez-faire

Despite the many proposals there is always a possibility that nothing will be done when emotional tensions have lessened after the war to facilitate the return to Japan of those who sincerely desire it. A policy of laissez-faire would present serious problems regarding the final disposition of the population of Tule Lake. Many would be made frustrated and unhappy by such a policy, especially those young people whose conscious severance of their ties with this country and study of Japanese language and culture will maladjust them psychologically to the United States. The policy would, however, be beneficial to those who never wanted to go to Japan but asked for repatriation or expatriation for family reasons, emotional motivations, and escape purposes.