

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

A STUDY OF THE CAREER OF INTERGROUP TENSIONS:  
THE COLLECTIVE ADJUSTMENTS OF EVACUEES TO CRISES  
AT THE TULE LAKE RELOCATION CENTER

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM OF GROUP TENSION

The Nature of the Study

Introduction.---This is a study of group tension. In particular, it is an analysis of the acute recurrent tensions which appeared among the Japanese American evacuees who were confined during the early stage of the Second World War at the Tule Lake Relocation Center.

Relocation center life could have been studied from a number of viewpoints, but for several reasons it seemed especially appropriate to investigate it in terms of the problem of tension. In the first place, stress and strain were among the chief experiences of the evacuees during and after the evacuation, and their behavior was often incomprehensible unless seen in the light of their condition of stress. Furthermore, sociologists have recently shown considerable interest in the problem of group tension. Of recent examples of intergroup tension in the United States, none was more dramatic or more immediately disruptive than that which resulted from the evacuation, and it was felt that students of the subject might be interested in an account of the tensions of an ethnic minority under mass evacuation. Finally, in the previous studies of various social sci-



entists, generalizations have been stated which invite further examination. It is hoped that the present study may aid in the verification, or the reformulation, of some of these hypotheses regarding group tension.

The Tule Lake Project where the material for this study was gathered was only one of ten relocation centers established by the Government to receive evacuees. Strictly speaking, therefore, our observations apply only to one segment of the evacuated population. The investigation was also restricted to the early period of center development when, on the whole, the greatest amount of disorganization was apparent in most of the centers. For this period, the Tule Lake Center with Manzanar and Poston were the three in which tensions rose to the highest level gaining expression in a series of conflicts and rebellions. For the purpose of studying tension situations, however, these limitations should not prove disadvantageous, for not only were the experiences of Japanese Americans throughout this period essentially similar, but also the centers having major conflicts tended merely to highlight latent conflicts and tensions which were present at the other centers as well.

Acute stress was, as previously stated, a common experience of the evacuees from the outset. The sharp rise following Pearl Harbor of suspicion and hostility toward the Japanese minority, the talk of evacuation, and the crisis of the evacuation itself, constituted only the early phase of the strains to which the evacuees were exposed. Once the evacuees were removed to the



centers, they faced the problems of adjusting to confinement and regimentation. They also faced the strangeness and disorganization of the early center communities, and the new and untested personnel and policies of the War Relocation Authority (WRA), the federal agency that was established to supervise the program. A part of the atmosphere of the centers, too, was the air of bitterness, resentment and chronic anxiety.

At the Tule Lake Project, the consequence of these conditions was a series of disturbances that was marked by a trend toward increasingly intense conflicts between the evacuees and the WRA administrators, as well as among the evacuees. The disturbances culminated nine months after the opening of the Project in the so-called "registration crisis," in which the administration, failing to effect a certain program through the devices of persuasion and indirect pressure, resorted finally to military force and arrest as the method of coercing cooperation from the evacuees. The extremists among the evacuees, on the other hand, invoked a brief "reign of terror" against those in the community who showed inclinations of cooperating, and they thus sought to maintain the evacuee resistance. Mob action constantly threatened, although it actually occurred only in mild form, and suspicion, threat and personal violence were characteristic features of the community during the period. Following this experience, the War Relocation Authority decided to segregate the "cooperative" evacuees from the "non-cooperative" ones, and, as it happened, chose the Tule Lake Project as the



center to which all the segregees would be sent.<sup>1</sup> Thus, a little over a year after the Tule Lake Relocation Center was established, it was brought to its end.

One objective of this study is to attempt an explanation of the "registration crisis," and the impasse in which the evacuees and administrators became involved. It should be obvious, however, that to explain the "crisis," it could not be treated as an isolated event, for tangible conditions of tension pre-existed in the community, and there is substantial evidence that tensions under certain circumstances may greatly affect later behavior. If the "crisis" was much earlier in the process of formation, it seemed necessary to explain how the irritations and stresses accumulated among the evacuees, and among the administrators as well, building to a point where open conflict was predictable under the given conditions.

Our interest in the study of group tension should now be understandable. This study proceeds under the hypothesis that a collective reaction, such as a rebellion of an ethnic minority, develops out of a history of tensions, and, contrariwise, that the reaction and the behavior within it is not explicable without a full description of the career of tensions. Because the term, "group tension," is a key word, our immediate task

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<sup>1</sup>See Dorothy S. Thomas and Richard Nishimoto, The Spoilage (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1946), for a study of the Tule Lake Relocation Center after it was converted to a segregation center. The present study may be seen as taking the account of Tule Lake up to the point where Thomas and Nishimoto begin their analysis.



should be to define it more clearly. In the following section, some of the existing usages are examined with a view toward developing a working definition suitable to our purpose. At the same time, the literature will be scanned for theories of tension which may assist us in our investigation.

#### An Evaluation of Previous Studies

The concept of group tension.--The definition of "group tension," it turns out, is itself a problem because of the highly ambiguous uses to which the concept has been put. The term, "tension," applied to the individual, has long been in use in psychology and social psychology to describe states of stress or of disequilibrium occurring within the individual. More recently, the practice has appeared of referring to "group tension" or "intergroup tension" in analyses of antagonism between racial, religious, class, industrial, and national groups; but despite the current interest in these problems, the concept of group tension itself has remained very vaguely defined, the impression being given that the phrase is used mainly for its figurative value.

The commonest tendency is to refer to any situations of intergroup hostility and conflict as one of intergroup tension, but it is seldom clear as to whether the latter is used as a synonym for hostility, or as a referent of something that lies behind hostility. This is generally the case in the thirty-two papers presented under the section, "The Problem of Group Ten-



sion." at the Fifth Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion.<sup>2</sup> Except in two articles, no attempt is made to define the topical concept, and the most diverse discussion is introduced although all at least are agreed upon discussing situations of intergroup antagonism. A similar vagueness occurs in Robin Williams' recent monograph, The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions.<sup>3</sup> Having used the term, "intergroup tensions," in his title, he, however, nowhere discusses its meaning, and makes little use of the phrase in his text. When he defines his key terms, those he mentions are group prejudice, hostility, discrimination, competition, conflict and aggression; but nothing is said of tension. The impression given is that the latter is considered a general term covering all these types of relationships.

Definitions or characterizations of the term are scarcely to be found, and even a clarity of usage is wanting. The difficulties surrounding the concept may be indicated by a few illustrations. Kecskemeti, for instance, in discussing conflicts between nations, classes, rural and urban populations, and races, as the major current types of group tension, summarizes with the statement:

We have distinguished two components in the group tensions we have examined--the underlying clash of interests, and the ideological component. I think that in order to

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<sup>2</sup>Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, and Robert M. MacIver (eds.), Approaches to National Unity. Fifth Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion. (New York, Harpers and Brothers, 1945), pp. 1-576.

<sup>3</sup>Robin M. Williams, The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions. Social Science Research Council Bulletin 57 (New York, 1947).



reduce the danger arising from group tensions as much as possible, two kinds of action are necessary: one directed toward diminishing the virulence of the clash of interests, and the other aimed at the ideological component as such.<sup>4</sup>

The term group tension is here used as a handle to which a general discussion of conflicts in modern society is attached. The concept is given no analytical status. No attention is given to group tension as itself representing a social process. Rather, the term is used as descriptive of an established condition, and the concern is almost wholly with analyzing and explaining the etiology of this condition. This point of view, in fact, is the one adopted in virtually all of the articles appearing in Approaches to National Unity. In one of his few references to the concept, Robin Williams makes it clear that he follows a similar usage. He says, "In this connection the title of the present memorandum requires some comment. Concentration of attention upon means for 'reducing group hostility' may seem to rest upon an implicit value-premise. . . ."<sup>5</sup> It may be noted that he substitutes the word, "hostility," for "tension" which appears in the title. Not only does he make these two terms interchangeable, but elsewhere he also discusses prejudice, discrimination, conflict, and aggression seemingly as synonyms of tension, thus giving a most general meaning to the latter.

Another view which further illuminates this kind of usage regards group tension as a symptom of underlying malad-

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<sup>4</sup>Paul Kecskemeti, "Types of Group Tension," Approaches to National Unity, ed. by L. Bryson, L. Finkelstein, and R. M. MacIver. Fifth Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion (New York, Harpers & Bros., 1945), p. 258

<sup>5</sup>Robin Williams, op. cit., p. 5.



justments. Charles Johnson, for instance, says in his discussion of racial tensions:

Group tensions may be viewed as symptoms of changes in group relations. . . . Racial tensions are, basically, reflections of differences in group ideologies, or group conceptions of themselves and their relations with each other. . . . The essence of minority-group status is struggle for change in the direction of improvement of its status. There is a corresponding resistance to this change or the rate of change, on the part of the majority.<sup>6</sup>

Elton Mayo also discusses group tension as a symptom,<sup>7</sup> and Rubin and Segal make the point explicit in an article entitled, "Race Tensions--A Symptom," the thesis of which is:

Discrimination, segregation, bigotry, are treated as if they were approachable directly by an appeal to fairness, decency, and common sense. In reality, the tensions are symptoms only. They cannot, therefore, respond to direct treatment any more than symptoms of a disease can be treated while ignoring their cause.<sup>8</sup>

For Rubin and Segal, tension is apparently synonymous with discrimination, segregation, and bigotry.

T. North Whitehead criticizes these uses of the phrase "in a very wide sense to cover all forms of antagonism between groups," for he finds such a meaning about as useful for diagnostic purposes "as the word 'illness' to the physician."<sup>9</sup> But

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<sup>6</sup>C. S. Johnson, "Group Tensions: The American Negro Minority," Approaches to National Unity, ed. by L. Bryson, L. Finkelstein, and R. M. MacIver (New York, Harper & Bros., 1945), pp. 132f.

<sup>7</sup>Elton Mayo, "Group Tensions in Industry," Approaches to National Unity, ed. by L. Bryson, L. Finkelstein, and R. M. MacIver (New York, Harper & Bros., 1945), p. 60.

<sup>8</sup>A. Rubin and G. J. Segal, "Race Tensions--A Symptom," Approaches to National Unity, ed. by L. Bryson, L. Finkelstein, and R. M. MacIver (New York, Harper & Bros., 1945), p. 31.

<sup>9</sup>T. North Whitehead, "Group Tensions as a Social Problem," Approaches to National Unity, ed. by L. Bryson, L. Finkelstein, and R. M. MacIver (New York, Harpers & Bros., 1945), p. 141.



little is added to the clarity of the term in his own suggested definition in which he chooses to confine the phrase to

Those unfriendly attitudes between groups not based on any obvious incompatibility of moral belief or of material interest. . . . Group tension, as I am defining it, refers to the tendency for groups, large and small, to be intolerant of a departure from their chosen norms in secondary matters, unconnected with fundamental questions of morality or of material well being.<sup>10</sup>

The chief difficulties in the foregoing characterizations of group tension may be summarized. First, the concept is so vaguely defined that it is useless for the purpose of scientific analysis. Second, group tension is seen primarily within a static framework, as representing established conditions of relationship between two groups, and little concern is exhibited for the changes which may occur in tension situations. But tension situations characteristically involve flux and adjustment, and it would seem that a consideration of the adjustmental behavior which occur in such circumstances would be fundamental to an understanding of group tension. Third, the concept is treated as referring to a residual phenomenon, an effect or symptom that is only of secondary importance; and because of the greater concern to explain the causes of this effect, little attention is directed toward the behavior that occurs in tension situations. But the word, "symptom," is itself unclear, for, in one sense, everything in a causal relationship is a symptom of something else. Furthermore, that which is regarded at one time as "only a symptom" very often

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 141.



comes to be seen later as having considerable functional significance, and the only way in which the factors influencing a phenomenon may be fairly evaluated is through a careful study of the total process. The ~~dichotomization~~<sup>separation</sup> of variables into fundamental causes and symptoms has the fault of tending to discourage the investigation of the total process.

The concept of individual tension.--The concept of tension in physiology, psychology and social psychology is, in fact, the view of tension as the beginning of activity rather than as the effect or symptom of some other more fundamental process. Lundberg has given a general but clear statement of this point of view where he says:

"Tension" and "imbalance" are words used to describe the result of an imperfect adjustment. "Adjustment" is in turn a word used to describe the situation under which the activities of an organism come to rest or equilibrium. The latter we define, as in physics, as the state of maximum probability in any organism or other system.<sup>11</sup>

The notion of a continuous flux between equilibrium and disequilibrium within the physiological system has long been familiar to students of the human organism, whether the phase of imbalance was referred to as tension or not. Organic tensions are of various kinds, but are generally classed under the three forms: chemical, electrical, and mechanical (including muscular tensions and surface tensions of cells).<sup>12</sup> Here the term tension

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<sup>11</sup>George A. Lundberg, Foundations of Sociology (New York, Macmillan Co., 1939), p. 3.

<sup>12</sup>See, for example, Clifford T. Morgan, Physiological Psychology (New York, McGraw Hill Book Co., 1943), pp. 18-69; Gardner Murphy, Personality, A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structure (New York, Harper & Bros., 1947), pp. 86-104; and L. K. Frank, "The Management of Tensions," American Journal of Sociology, XXXIII (March, 1928), 705-736.



is obviously used in a literal physical sense, and can lead to little misunderstanding. As in Cannon's widely known theory of homeostasis,<sup>13</sup> which can roughly be defined as the tendency of physiological systems in a state of tension to return to a state of reduced tension, the foregoing manner of defining tension logically results in a conception of it as initiating activity.

It required only a step from the acceptance of the idea of organic tensions to gain its extension to a broader psychological meaning. How short this step was may be seen from the definition of tension appearing in a recent psychology text by Guthrie and Edwards, where they say:

. . . . tension (is) defined as a disturbance of the equilibrium of an organism including the disturbance of learned habits as well as of tissue conditions--the biological norms or constant states.<sup>14</sup>

Others have related tension directly to motivation.<sup>15</sup> To the Gestaltists, for whom field theory is fundamental, the term was a natural part of their conceptual system.<sup>16</sup> They would say that tension exists in any part of a field that is in disequilibrium, and that the tension initiates and guides action.

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<sup>13</sup>W. B. Cannon, The Wisdom of the Body (New York, Norton, 1932).

<sup>14</sup>Edwin R. Guthrie and Allen L. Edwards, Psychology: A First Course in Human Behavior (New York, Harper & Bros., 1949), p. 123.

<sup>15</sup>For example, E. G. Boring, H. S. Langfeld, & H. P. Weld, Introduction to Psychology (New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1949), p. 163ff.

<sup>16</sup>For example, Kurt Lewin, A Dynamic Theory of Personality (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1935); and Raymond H. Wheeler, The Laws of Human Nature (New York, D. Appleton & Co., 1932).



Finally, the psychoanalysts too have adopted such terms as emotional and frustration tensions to refer to various conditions of psychological stress.<sup>17</sup> These usages likewise suffer from some degree of vagueness and ambiguity, but unlike those who employ the term group tension to describe general conditions of hostility and conflict, the latter apply their concept to specific physiological and psychological conditions which are directly related to action tendencies of individuals.

The latter view of tension has been elaborated in considerable detail by Gardner Murphy in his recent volume, Personality, and because of the pertinence of his account to our problem, some space will be devoted to its discussion. For Murphy, the study of personality is pre-eminently a study of motivation, and motivation is regarded as tension. "Our first hypothesis, then," he says, "is that all activity is traceable to tension, that tension is 'need' for acting, and that tension, need, and motive are one and the same."<sup>18</sup> By tension he means physiological disequilibriums of various sorts which may be so distributed throughout the body tissues as to make of every cell a source of motivation. "There are no 'motive spots,' there are simply degrees of motivation--tension gradients--throughout the living organism."<sup>19</sup> Nor can there ever be a total absence of tension

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<sup>17</sup>Leon J. Saul, "Physiological Effect of Emotional Tension," Personality and the Behavior Disorders, ed. by J. McV. Hunt (New York, Ronald Press, 1944) I, p. 270. See also, Saul Rosenzweig, "An Outline of Frustration Theory," in the same volume, p. 380

<sup>18</sup>Gardner Murphy, op. cit., p. 89.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 88.



in the living organism; there are only ". . . . rapid or slow rises in tension level, and rapid or slow transmissions of the tension."<sup>20</sup> Although there are strictly no localized "motive spots," Murphy finds it useful to classify "characteristic syndromes or excitation patterns," in which these motivational patterns are thought of as dependent upon external as well as internal environmental factors. The internal states effect a selective influence upon the external stimuli to which the organism responds.

To state the foregoing points systematically: (1) tension initiates all activity, (2) the organism is constantly under some degree of tension, and hence is always active, (3) under certain conditions, tension levels may rise in certain regions and result in characteristic patterns of response, such that an act (an abstraction) may be defined as being initiated by a particular tension system, and (4) the dominance of a particular set of tensions at a given time sensitizes the organism to certain kinds of external stimuli.

Two additional points are of particular interest. First, Murphy finds it reasonable to think of symbolic events as giving rise to tensions when they serve as inner cues to action.<sup>21</sup> Second, he distinguishes frustration tensions. Action that has been initiated by an organic or symbolic tension is subject to interruption from various causes, and the result is frustration with an accompanying rise in the general level of tension. "Frustra-

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<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 88.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 263.



tion, then," he says, "is not only a negative thing, a failure to achieve; it is a positive augmentation of tension throughout the organic system."<sup>22</sup>

The validity of Murphy's fully elaborated theory of tension is not a point of present concern, although it may be said that the basic underlying notions are consistent with the present psycho-physiological knowledge about tensions, and, incidentally, with the theory of motivation and activity outlined by John Dewey and G. H. Mead. What is of interest is the possibility that is suggested of a detailed analysis of behavior in tension situations. By contrast with the previously mentioned conceptions of group tension, in which attention has been drawn away from the tension situation itself to the presumed fundamental causes of it, Murphy and others who look upon tension as initiating activity focus attention directly upon the nature of tension, and upon the behavior consequent to its appearance. Emphasis upon the observation of behavior adjustments to tension situations provides a basis of empirical research that is completely lacking in the strictly etiological concern regarding tension.

Implications for the study of group tension.--Several advantages flow from the conception of tension as related to activity. First, by defining the term in the restricted sense, much of the vagueness residing in the current definitions of group tension may be eliminated. Second, the definition of group

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 305.



tension may be made consistent with the concept of tension in psychology and physiology. Finally, and perhaps most important for the purpose of empirical research, the necessity of discussing tensions in the abstract is avoided, for the suggested approach leads naturally to the study of observable events.

The analysis of individual tensions, however, cannot be blindly adapted to the present study, for the behavior of individuals is not the same thing as group behavior. To be sure, the tension itself can be located only in the individual members of the group. But by group tension is meant a shared experience of tension,<sup>23</sup> by which is implied that the tension has been communicated among the members of a group. It is possible for an aggregate of individuals to be in states of tension without having the latter communicated among the members, but such a situation would certainly differ from the case where individual disturbances are communicated from person to person, or a group tension is built up through an interactional process.

If group tension involves a shared experience of tension resulting from communication, among the questions which follow are: how do individuals come to share experiences of tension; what kinds of interactional patterns occur in group adjustments to tension situations; and how is this interaction related to the subsequent reduction of tension? These would appear to be critical problems requiring answers if group tension, and the related intergroup hostilities, are to be understood.

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<sup>23</sup>Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behavior," New Outline of the Principles of Sociology, ed. by A. M. Lee (New York, Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1946), Part IV, p. 172.



Furthermore, although the analyses of individual tensions have dwelt on their general function in motivating activity, the concern of this study is specifically with those acts motivated by tensions which are aroused by frustration or conflict. The function of tension, as initiator of action, does not differ in the two cases, but in cases of frustration there is what Murphy has appropriately called an augmented tension. It may be expected that groups confronted by frustration and conflict will characteristically react in certain ways, and the problem of this study is to describe the kinds of behavior which occur in these situations.

Theories of the origins of tension.---It has already been indicated that there is in the literature a number of theories regarding the origins of group tension. A review of any substantial part of these writings is not possible here, but Robin Williams has fortunately provided a convenient summary of the important material in this area.<sup>24</sup> The present purpose is primarily to consider the orientation of these current theories, and to assess their adequacy for interpreting situations of group <sup>tension</sup> such as that with which this study is concerned.

Despite the extensive writings on the subject, the material may be put in manageable form by a classification of the conditions which are considered to be the basic factors in group antagonism. The major theories may be outlined as follows:

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<sup>24</sup>Robin Williams, op. cit., pp. 51f.



- (1) Differences of characteristics: contact between groups having perceptible differences of biological traits or customs tend to arouse suspicion and antagonism, or may present barriers to communication and understanding.<sup>25</sup>
- (2) "Realistic" conflicts of interests and values: competition for improved standards of living, wealth, power, territory and other marks of status, in which their enjoyment by one group excludes others from receiving similar satisfaction, tends to lead to conflict. Likewise, efforts to retain and advance values which are functional to one group but incompatible for another may lead to conflict.<sup>26</sup>
- (3) Social change and status shifts: changes due to migration, technological innovations, or crises may create new conditions of contact or arouse new interests which threaten the established status system and bring groups into conflict. Also, maladjustments within a social organization due to rapid changes or slowly evolving contradictions may create insecurities that gain expression in violence.<sup>27</sup>
- (4) Frustration and aggression: frustrations due to whatever source raise the level of tension, and produce tendencies of aggression that may become focused on other groups, as displaced aggression, particularly upon those who may be attacked without arousing social disapproval.<sup>28</sup>
- (5) Schizoid reactions and projection: a theory actually involving a combination of the foregoing views, it suggests that people when forced to choose between important alternatives, as between a socially legitimate and an illegitimate form of conduct, choose one and attack a group symbolic of the other.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>25</sup>For a summary of these views, see, Arnold and Caroline Rose, America Divided (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1948), pp. 279f; and Robin Williams, op. cit., pp. 51f.

<sup>26</sup>Talcott Parsons, "Racial and Religious Differences in Group Tension," Approaches to National Unity, eds., L. Bryson, L. Finkelstein, and Rm M. MacIver (New York, Harper & Bros., 1947) p. 191.

<sup>27</sup>Charles S. Johnson, op. cit., p. 134.

<sup>28</sup>John Dollard, "Hostility and Fear in Social Life," Social Forces, XVII (1938), 15-26.

<sup>29</sup>For example, Maurice Samuels, The Great Hatred (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1941).



This summary is not intended to be exhaustive, but it should be adequate to represent the characteristic explanations offered of the way in which group tension originates. It is perhaps true that the conditions listed are frequently, if not generally, associated with the origin of tension, but in giving adequate explanations of the appearance of group tension, these theories involve several difficulties.

In the first place, it may be noted that the prevalence of these conditions does not produce the tension which theoretically would be expected. Furthermore, temporal differences in levels of tension, which are not adequately taken into account in these theories, often result despite the fact that the external conditions remain largely the same. For example, to the extent that two groups engage in economic competition, conflicts of interest are an ever present condition. This was certainly true of the Japanese minority on the Pacific Coast throughout its half century of struggle to achieve economic success, yet there were considerable fluctuations of intergroup tension between the minority and the white American majority group. It would be difficult to prove that the peaks of tension occurred in correlation with the peaks of competition. Much the same kind of difficulty exists with regard to the assertion that contact between racially or culturally different groups tends to produce suspicion and antagonism. There is not, for instance, a concomitant reduction of tensions whenever there is a gradual disappearance of group differences; in fact, the experience has been that intergroup tension often rises as the minority approaches the characteristics



of the majority. It is very often between groups which are very much alike, such as two left-wing groups, that the most intense hostility emerges; and, in any case, many more differences between groups are attributed than can be objectively determined.

The difficulty is much like that which has arisen specifically with respect to the frustration-aggression hypothesis. The key terms in this theory are so vaguely defined that it is impossible to subject it to experimental test, and because the hypothesis cannot be subjected to rigorous test, almost any kind of data can be fitted to it without fear of contradiction. Moreover even in those instances in which an observable frustration could be identified, numerous cases could be cited in which no observable aggression ensued. Maslow suggests that the hypothesis may be improved if a distinction is made between a simple frustration of a need, and a frustration that threatens the personality, for it is especially the latter which produces hostility reactions.<sup>30</sup> While Maslow's suggestion does not remove the ambiguities in the frustration-aggression theory, there is much to be said for his requirement that specific kinds of frustration situations be identified in which aggression is observed to follow.

All of the above theories similarly suffer not only from the generality of their definitions, but also from the vague and general way in which the conditions for the origin of group tension are indicated. A clearer specification is needed of the kinds of situations in which group tension observably originate.

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<sup>30</sup>A. H. Maslow, "Deprivation, Threat, and Frustration," Psychological Review, XLVIII, (1941) 364-366.



Furthermore, the crucial condition which needs to be investigated is not only the external set of circumstances which is related to the rise of tensions, but also the interpretation which is given of the situation. Since the emphasis that was given the latter by W. I. Thomas, the point of view has become something of a commonplace in sociology, yet except for those theories which emphasize the symbolic character of group tension, there is apparent some tendency to ignore the latter as a necessary component in the analysis.

A second shortcoming of the present accounts of the origin of group tensions is their failure to emphasize the processual character of this origin. It would be more accurate to say that group tensions emerge than that they have origins, for the latter seems to imply that when specified conditions are present, tension will suddenly exist where it was non-existent at an immediately prior time. If we are correct in assuming that group tension of the kind that is commonly understood by the term involves a shared experience, it follows that a process and a time interval must also be involved between the appearance of individually felt tensions and the achievement of group consensus about the tension. And if the problem of the origin of group tension is stated in this way, the analysis of the communicative means by which the consensus is achieved becomes of key significance.

Development of group tension.--Certain implications flow from taking the view of group tension as a social process. Tension must then be conceived as having not only a stage of



emergence, and a stage of reduction, but also a middle stage of development. The developmental stage may be truncated, the energy of the tension being dissipated almost as soon as it appears, but the tension situations which have come under sociological investigation were not the type that quickly disappeared. Hence, one would expect that the earlier studies would have given much attention to the developmental phase in which there are the problems of the spread of tension, heightening of tension, the emergence of subordinate tensions, the rise of factionalism, the maintenance of in-group cohesion, and the development of collective organizations for the purpose of overcoming the tensions.

Within the current systematic theories of group tension, however, there is little or almost nothing bearing on these questions, a condition attested to by Robin Williams scant mention of these matters in his summary review of the literature. The absence of writings in this area virtually precludes our discussion at this point, except that Alexander Leighton, in his study of the strike at the Poston Relocation Center, presented an analysis of the developmental phase of this situation. The following mainly concerns itself with his presentation.

In his discussion Leighton devotes considerable space to the question of what happens to an ideational system ("belief system") of a population under stress. The fundamental postulate from which he proceeds is: "In times of stress, human dependency on belief systems becomes greater and has significance in determining the direction in which events will move."<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>31</sup>Alexander Leighton, *The Governing of Men* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1945), p. 292.



Some of his major propositions in this connection are:

Principle 5. People under stress are inclined to become more intolerant of belief systems which they perceive to be different from their own.

Principle 6. Related to this intolerance is the common belief system that persons who live by foreign belief systems are out to one stereotyped pattern and are possessed of traits that are unaccountable, inferior or repugnant.

Principle 7. In communities undergoing stress it is common for belief systems to:

Become more emotional and less rational.  
Increase in number and variety.  
Increase in tendency to conflict.  
Become more plastic and changeable.

Principle 10. Out of the confusion of a community under stress there is likely to arise a single radical system of belief which may or may not bring a new stability, but which will bring to a large section of the population a sense of at least temporary relief from stress.

Principle 11. After a period of stress, there is a drift back toward former systems of belief, but the return is rarely, if ever, complete.<sup>32</sup>

Changes in ideational patterns which correspond with changes in the tension situation are undoubtedly of great importance, but Leighton's choice of belief systems as the focal point of interest would seem to direct attention away from the ideations in tension situations which are of greatest significance.

He defines systems of belief as, "Those sentiments which are socially shared and relatively resistant to change, but including, interconnected with and shading into a wide variety of other sentiments, complex and simple."<sup>33</sup> One might again complain of the indefiniteness of the term "belief systems," but it is at least made clear that the term refers to relatively stable and

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<sup>32</sup>Ibid., pp. 296-303.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 386.



unchanging sentiments. The usage conforms to the anthropological definition of beliefs in which the term designates untested but customarily accepted views about the cause and effect relationships in the universe. Such a conceptual scheme leads Leighton to concern himself primarily with the belief system which pre-exists the stress situation, and which replaces it, but he lacks the means of analyzing the transition from one system to the other.

Ideationally, the characteristic of tension situations is its unyielding quality; the situations do not readily submit to explanation by the existing systems of belief. While beliefs are undoubtedly employed in arriving at explanations, their role in tension situations is not of greater significance than that of other forms of ideation. Put another way, tensions result from problematic situations, adjustments are necessary but remain unrealized, and the activity which ensues will be in the nature of experiments to overcome the difficulty. The symbolization occurring in these adjustmental activities will likewise possess an experimental aspect, and may best be described as attempts to redefine the situation. Viewed in this way, the resulting line of investigation would differ from Leighton's, for the questions of interest then are: how does the group define the object of hostility, how does it conceive of its own position, what plans of action are discussed and formulated, and what rationalizations are offered in defense of the action taken? Furthermore, the concern is not only with the symbolization, but



also with the symbolizing, the defining activity through which the popular ideas gain form. Leighton does not completely overlook these questions, and he has some interesting suggestions to offer, but it seems apparent that he lacks a conceptual scheme adequate for the analysis of dynamic situations.

Between the emergence of group tension and its final reduction, some kind of organization of activities must occur which will serve the end of collective adjustments. Leighton has offered several propositions regarding these organizational developments, among which the most pertinent for this study are:

Principle 3. Cooperation, withdrawal and aggressiveness are three universal kinds of behavior with which individuals react to authority when subject to forces of stress that are disturbing to the emotions and thoughts of the individual.

Principle 7. Communities undergoing social disorganization also show new organization; breakdown and repair take place simultaneously.

Principle 8. Where stress is severe and social disorganization is extensive; the breakdown-and-repair process is likely to take a violent form consisting in groups of people, each coalesced around a different system of belief, struggling with each other until one group dominates or until an equilibrium is achieved among several dominant groups.

Principle 9. The most stable part of the population is that portion in which the systems of belief and the social organization are most resistant to change.

Principle 11. Correlated with the appearance of multiple systems of belief and changing social organization in a community under stress is the appearance of numerous competing leaders.<sup>34</sup>

Leighton offers several hypotheses in this section which are worthy of further investigation. His principle that cooper-

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<sup>34</sup>Ibid., pp. 332-339.



ation, withdrawal and aggression are three typical reactions to stress, and the additional view that groups tend to form about these types of reactions, is in line with Myrdal's statements about the accommodative and protest reactions in the Negro minority,<sup>35</sup> and with Rosenzweig's hypothesis of the three basic reactions to frustration.<sup>36</sup> More will be said about this later. Principles 7 through 9 indicate Leighton's awareness of the role of competing sub-groups within a group under stress. Nor does he overlook the problem of the different types of leadership corresponding to these sub-groups which emerge and compete for dominance.

Leighton, unfortunately, does not fully develop the discussion of organizational changes, and it seems that his attention is still focused primarily upon the institutional forms, for despite his awareness of the transitory groups which may appear during tension periods, he looks on them as incidental to the main drama of the "breakdown-and-repair" process in the stabler organizational forms. But to fully understand the developmental phase of group tension, it would seem that concern should be directed primarily at the process by which competing groups arise and struggle for the dominance of their views. It is in such a process that the collective effort to adjust to a tension situation comes most clearly to light; and it is this

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<sup>35</sup>Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York, Harper and Bros., 1944), Vol. II, Part IX.

<sup>36</sup>Saul Rosenzweig, "The Experimental Study of Repression," Explorations in Personality, ed., H. A. Murray (New York, Oxford University Press, 1938), pp. 585ff.



collective adjustmental process which is the substance of what we refer to as the developmental phase of group tension.

Reduction of tension.--Hypotheses concerning the methods of reducing group tension are extremely numerous and varied, and it is impossible here to review even the main ones. In any case, such a discussion would be pointless for at least two reasons. First, the scientific control of tension or any human behavior is dependent upon scientific knowledge about that phenomenon, in which the knowledge is of the form: given a specified set of conditions, specified consequences will follow. Control, in this sense, is a matter of so manipulating the conditions of behavior as to yield the desired consequences. In other words, the methods of reducing group tension can be outlined only after the data are at hand regarding how people did in fact behave in response to given tension situations under specified controls. To fairly evaluate the methods of reducing tension which have been hypothesized, it seems desirable that our observations first be presented.

Furthermore, it is difficult to discuss controls in the abstract without first knowing the surrounding circumstances within which the controls would be applied. For example, the conditions of the relocation centers placed limitations upon the controls which could be employed. A number of propositions have been offered for the reduction of intergroup hostility through long-term programs of reorganization, legislation, re-education, and reorientation of values, but because of the short-term operation of the centers, none of these were applicable to



the solution of center problems. The tensions were also critical and frequently at a high level demanding not only an immediacy of action but also methods suitable for dealing with emotionally aroused populations. Finally, the status of the evacuees, the detention character of the centers, and the intimate conditions of center life which greatly expedited informal communication within the group, all had to be taken into account in determining which controls could be used. Without foreknowledge of the conditions of control, there is a danger of becoming involved in an aimless discussion of reduction techniques.

A brief comment needs to be made, however, about a general principle of reduction methods which has been stated by several writers, including Marcson,<sup>37</sup> Parsons,<sup>38</sup> Strothers,<sup>39</sup> and Williams,<sup>40</sup> in which it is suggested that there are two chief methods of meeting problems of intergroup conflicts, (a) by changing the situation, or (b) by changing the individuals' view of the situation. Williams, for instance, says:

First, one may operate on the situation within which people must act, or upon their perception of the situation, without attempting directly to alter their attitudes, sen-

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<sup>37</sup>Simon Marcson, "The Control of Ethnic Conflict," Social Forces, (1945), XXIV, pp. 161-165.

<sup>38</sup>Talcott Parsons, "Propaganda and Social Control," Psychiatry, V (1942), 551-572.

<sup>39</sup>Charles Strothers, "Methods of Modifying Behavior," Journal of Social Issues, I, (1945), 46-52.

<sup>40</sup>Robin Williams, op. cit., pp. 17-25.



timents, or values. The pressure for a given type of behavior then comes either from (a) revealing information which affects the way in which individuals visualize the situation, or from (b) actual or potential alteration of the situation itself. . . .

The second main avenue of control is through direct appeal to the values or attitudes of individuals, without necessarily changing the actual or potential situation of action in other respects. Here belongs much of the whole panoply of propaganda: use of shared symbols, prestige appeals, redefinition of values, affirmation of moral norms, manipulation of anxiety and guilt, etc.<sup>41</sup>

The separation of "situations" from "values or attitudes of individuals" appears to raise more questions than it answers. It implies that situations can exist apart from values or attitudes toward them, or, vice versa, that values or attitudes may exist, so to speak in the abstract, independent of situations toward which they may be directed. Presumably, the separation is made on the ground of convenience for analytical purposes, but it may be doubted that the division can strictly be maintained. The contradiction involved may be seen in Williams' suggestion that the "perception of the situation (may be manipulated) without attempting directly to alter their attitudes, sentiments, or values." Perception is so intimately related to attitudes, sentiments, or values that to suggest a change in one without a corresponding modification in the other reduces to a meaningless proposition.

Our view is that the situation, understood to mean the perceived context of behavior, always undergoes change before a reduction of tension can be achieved. If this is so, the problem of the reduction of tension is not quite correctly stated

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<sup>41</sup>Ibid., pp. 17-18.



by Williams, for the problem is not one of changing (1) the situation, or (2) the attitudes; it is one of changing behavior. The point may be clarified by an illustration. If a person indicates a hunger tension by his restless search for food, the tension may be reduced by his consumption of food. Now, if the "situation" is changed by the presentation of food, the ~~hunger~~<sup>food</sup> may be ~~consummated~~<sup>eaten</sup> and the tension reduced. But there are also those instances in which the "situation" is changed by the presentation of food, say, of horse meat, but the subject does not respond to the object as if it were food, and the tension therefore is not reduced. It might be said that the problem here is to change the "attitude" toward horse meat, but this is tantamount to saying that the "perception of the situation," of what constitutes food objects, needs to be changed. A thoroughgoing analysis of the difficulties in Williams' position cannot be presented in this brief critique, but it should be obvious that his attempted distinction leads to a number of ambiguities.

The only reliable criterion of a reduction of tension lies in a change of behavior--the individual, for instance, no longer engages in search for food, nor expresses hunger desires --, and the correct statement of the problem of reducing tensions is, therefore, how may behavior be changed so that tension no longer exists? The further question, then, is of classifying different forms of behavior so that appropriate techniques might be applied toward their modification. The simplest classification of behavior that may be suggested is a dichotomy into (1)



non-symbolic behavior, such as automatic acts, and (2) symbolic behavior, in which meanings are involved. No further elaboration of this scheme will be attempted at this point, but it may at least be noted that when the problem of reducing tension is stated in terms of changing behavior, attention becomes focused directly upon that which maintains conditions of tension.

#### The Problem and Method

The problem.--A fundamental assumption of this study is that group tension is to be seen as a process rather than as a static condition that suddenly comes into existence, and as suddenly disappears. Through a critical evaluation of the current conceptions of the phenomenon, reasons have been given for preferring the view of it as a process. A definition of group tension that takes account of this processual feature might then be tentatively stated somewhat in this manner: group tension is a shared or communicated experience of discontent or maladjustment that occurs among a number of persons. The emphasis in this definition is upon the sharing or communication, for it is the latter interactional process which gives the dynamic aspect to group tension.

The problem of this study, too, is consistent with the above assumption. Briefly stated, the problem is: what description can be given of the developmental career of group tension from its emergence to its reduction and disappearance? In this study, the question, of course, applies only to a minority group subjected to hostility by the majority group. The problem could also be stated another way, namely, what are the characteristic



patterns of collective adjustments to group tension which appear in a minority group subjected to critical restrictions by a majority group?

If a developmental view of group tension is taken, the process may be considered as having a beginning, middle, and ending, and further questions may be raised regarding each of these phases. Questions concerning the conditions of relation between two groups, which are associated with the initial appearance of tension between them, cannot be avoided, but, in addition, inquiry also needs to be made into the forms of interactional behavior which occur and enable the communication of tensions within each group. Once tension is generalized within a group, efforts to organize toward the reduction of the tension may be expected, and the problem of how such organizations are achieved arises. In any extended process of tension, it is scarcely to be expected that the level of tension will remain constant, and two questions therefore arise, (1) of the forms of behavior which occur at different levels of tension, and (2) of the factors associated with the rise or fall of tension. Finally, there is the problem of the conditions which lead to a reduction of tension.

It is evident that this study involves itself in no problems which yield crucial tests of hypotheses. The answers which may be forthcoming will simply add further evidence to our currently small body of knowledge about expected behavior in tension situations, but the problems are not of a kind that

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will produce strongly entrenched assertions that one kind of behavior, rather than another, may be expected in given tension situations. If there is such a shortcoming in the present investigation, it is at least in part due to the newness of group tension as a field of research, the consequent dearth of previously stated testable hypotheses which might be further investigated, and the resulting necessity of having to engage in exploratory work if a study of the field is to be attempted.

The method.--On the surface, the relocation center appeared to provide ideal conditions for social research. It was a closed community of a homogeneous population with reference to certain characteristics, in which there was very little migration in or out, or residential movement within the center, during the first year. Personal data sheets were available for every resident, and every person could be located by block and apartment. Although the residents were relatively free to move about within the center, the number of activities which engaged their interest were relatively few compared to circumstances on the outside, and the residents therefore had time to give to interviews. The most straightforward methods of random or stratified sampling seemingly could have been applied, and with a relatively immobile population, panel techniques presumably might also have been used.

In the actual research, however, there were not only the usual difficulties of field investigation, but there were also special methodological problems deriving from the hostility of the evacuees which were never completely overcome. The



present study was undertaken as a part of a larger investigation. The Evacuation and Resettlement Study, under the directorship of Dr. Dorothy Swaine Thomas at the University of California. In the Preface to the first volume of the Study, the authors, Dr. Thomas and Mr. Nishimoto, have outlined the difficulties which faced the staff in its research at the relocation centers. Despite the length of the following quotation from that work, because it describes adequately the observational problems encountered in the present study, and also reports on the method which was finally settled upon, it is quoted in full.

From the very beginning of our observations in camp, we realized that we could not utilize attitude surveys or questionnaires to get valid (or any) information from people whose recent experiences had led to an intense preoccupation with the real and imagined dangers of verbal commitments and to growing suspicions of the intentions of persons who asked them to commit themselves on even the most innocuous questions. We did, however, collect and exploit to the full data from surveys that emerged as administrative by-products. . . . In addition, the written documents of the highly literate people being studied were an important source (e.g., minutes of meetings, memoranda, manifestoes, bills of complaint, petitions and personal letters.)

Instead of sampling and surveying, either on a time or population basis, we had to depend on a day-by-day record, as complete as possible, of the maneuvers and reactions of an insecure, increasingly resentful people to policies imposed by government agencies and to incidents developing from the application of these policies. It was also apparent that the main part of the record of what was going on inside the camps could be obtained only by "insiders," that is, by trained observers who were themselves participating in and reacting to the events under observation. Most of the staff observers were evacuees; at one time as many as twelve Japanese Americans were employed. . . .

Each staff observer built up a circle of participant informants whose confidence he had obtained, and also made extensive records of acts and conversations of people who did not know they were under observation. As cleavages in the population became apparent and factions multiplied, efforts were made to extend the slate of observers and informants to cover all the divergent interest groups. Every staff observer kept a detailed journal, to which he appended all documents that he could obtain. These journals, which cover many thousands of pages, form the main



body of material on which this volume is based. Excerpts from them are given footnote references as "Field Notes," with an indication of the date on which the observation was made.

Constant efforts had to be made to guard against betrayal of informants, and against divulging information even to friendly government agencies. In spite of the high regard accorded universities in general, and the University of California in particular, by evacuees it soon became apparent that the Japanese Americans on our staff could not operate openly as employees of the University. To their fellow evacuees, "research" was synonymous with "inquisition" and the distinction between "informant" and "informer" was not appreciated. Consequently every one of our evacuee staff members was stigmatized, or in danger of being stigmatized, as an inu (i.e., an "informer; see Chapter X) by some of his fellow evacuees. The bases for the suspicions that led to this stigmatization were such acts as associating with the Caucasian personnel in the camps; taking notes in public meetings; using typewriters in their barracks; asking too-direct questions; receiving mail in envelopes marked "Evacuation and Resettlement Study"; and cashing university checks. Each of these acts raised suspicions that our staff members were operating as stool pigeons for the project administration or one of the governmental intelligence agencies, all of which, it was widely believed, employed operatives among the evacuees. Suspicion reached a maximum at the time of registration, ebbed after segregation, recurred with every period of crisis in every camp, and was a factor that had to be considered from the inception until the closure of the camps. As a result, our evacuee staff members and collaborators had to exercise great ingenuity in establishing roles which would make it possible for them both to live as respected members of their own community and at the same time to carry on disinterested research for the study. Several of them were unable to resolve the conflict, and had to leave camp soon after the registration crisis.<sup>42</sup>

After pointing to certain other problems which were faced such as the need to maintain good relations with the administration while protecting the study data, the difficulties of assessing the validity and objectivity of the observations included in the journals, and the problems of studying a bi-cultural and bilingual population, the authors go on to say:

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<sup>42</sup>Dorothy S. Thomas and Richard Nishimoto, The Spoilage (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1946), pp. vii-ix.



It must be apparent that no techniques could be devised to assure complete success in overcoming all these methodological difficulties. One safeguard was, of course, the competence, intellectual honesty, self-control and self-correction of the observers themselves. Another safeguard was the interdisciplinary approach of the study (sociology, social psychology, anthropology, political science, economics) which resulted in a situation analogous to "differential diagnosis." A third was the bicultural composition of the evacuee staff (Issei, Kibei, Nisei). A fourth was the utilization, wherever possible, of administrative and particularly quantitative materials collected independently of the study for checking or revising the generalizations growing out of the materials of the study itself.<sup>43</sup>

Because the present study was under the direction of Dr. Thomas during the data-gathering stage and was organized within the cooperative research structure of the Evacuation and Resettlement Study, her statement of method may be considered to apply to this study as well. The chief qualification needed is that in this special study dependence was necessarily upon data gathered by myself, and the Director's statement could not reveal our unintended personal departures from the formally outlined procedures. On the other hand, the present investigator enjoyed the advantages of check and cross-check made possible by cooperative research, and, as will be noted, had access to the field notes of other staff members which bore on the present problem.

Since our problem is concerned with changing levels of tension, an additional remark is needed regarding the index of group tension that was used. On what was the judgment of the rise or fall of group tension based? As the Director has indicated, questionnaires and sampling methods could not be employed, and our data therefore did not lend themselves to any quantita-

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<sup>43</sup>Ibid., pp. x-xi.



tive index of group tension. As a result, it was necessary to estimate varying levels of tension on the basis of gross qualitative judgments made by the investigator which were checked against the independent judgments of at least five other staff members who were observing the same situations. The main factors taken into account in the personal judgments were the amount and intensity of expressed discontent, evidences of hostility (e.g., incidence of actual or threatened physical violence, prevalence of concern about "informers", and aggressiveness in making demands), and the frequency and intensity of rebellious behavior (e.g., collective refusals to cooperate, strikes, and riots). It is believed that readers who follow our objective descriptions of various events will at least agree with our gross distinctions between situations of low and high level tensions.

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CHAPTER II

A THEORY OF GROUP TENSION

Group Tension as Motivation in Collective Acts

Redefinition of the concept of group tension.--In view of the evident departure from the earlier conceptions of group tension which we are attempting in this study, it seems desirable to specify as clearly as possible at the outset the point of view that we shall try to maintain. This chapter will therefore be concerned with clarifying our meaning of the concept, and with setting up a theory of group tension that is based on existing knowledge in social psychology and collective behavior about tension situations. The latter will be used as the source of hypotheses which will be tested against the empirical data gathered at the Tule Lake Project.

If there is anything unique in our definition of the concept, it is that group tension is seen within the context of a collective act. A collective act such as a revival meeting, a strike, or a war, is a definable thing having a beginning and ending, and some kind of describable form. We propose to define group tension as a functional element within such a context. By contrast, previous writers have discussed group tension entirely in the abstract; they have tended to treat group tension as a general condition underlying intergroup conflict, but have largely



failed to show how tensions are specifically related to the resulting forms of behavior. If the present analysis is successful, a major point that should be established is that group tension may not be understood except in terms of its relationship to forms of collective action.

Group tension is here regarded as that which initiates and maintains a collective act; it is, in other words, the motivation underlying collective acts. When, for instance, relations between two racial groups deteriorate and rapidly move toward an open clash, we imply that tensions arose in the respective groups somewhere in the course of their relations, and channeled their actions in the direction of opposition and protest against each other. If a particular collective act can thus be abstracted out of a total social process for the purpose of analysis, group tension may be seen as motivating the act, and as sustaining and directing it until the initial tension is removed. Defined in this way, the concept of tension may be related to G. H. Mead's convenient division of an act into the stages of motivation, perception, manipulation, and consummation.<sup>1</sup> For Mead, the act is a functionally related whole in which each phase affects and guides the rest of the phases. Although his analysis was directed at the act of an individual person, the same stages appear to be definable for the act of a collectivity as well. Pursuit of this formulation draws attention to the question of how group tension, as a motivational factor, influences the col-

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<sup>1</sup>George H. Mead, The Philosophy of the Act (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1938), pp. 3-25.



lective perceptions and manipulations which become involved in the effort to reach the end phase of the collective act.

It has already been noted that the tendency of interpreting motivation in terms of tension is increasingly characteristic of psychology. The trend apparently resulted from the failure of the earlier instinct, prepotent reflexes and appetite-aversion theories to isolate basic motivational categories. The most acceptable generalization about motivation that remained was that living organisms are characterized by activity, and that these tendencies of activity derive from a variety of sources. Incidentally, a concomittant modification of a basic assumption in psychological theory has tended to occur. The classical stimulus-response conception, of the stimulus as the initiator of action, is being displaced by the view, long ago emphasized by John Dewey, that activity is ever present in the living organism, and that the stimulus merely redirects an ongoing activity. In any case, the role of organic tensions in motivation has been receiving much attention with the effect of modifying many important features of psychological theory.<sup>2</sup>

For our purpose, it is sufficient merely to take passing notice of organic tensions, for in adult human behavior they are so complicated by experience and learning that the studies of organic tension, in their present state, tell us little about social behavior. One of the complications arises from their interplay with imagery and symbolism, but because the latter may

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<sup>2</sup>For example, D. O. Hebb, Organization of Behavior (New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1949), pp. 3-11.



be made observable, their function in tension situations become of crucial significance. There are two ways in which symbols and images enter into tension systems: (1) they may serve as cues which stimulate physiological tensions, and thus may initiate action, or (2) they may arise as a function of a previously aroused tension, serving to define and guide the course of action. Murphy has pointed to these relationships in his remarks:

Symbols, then, become inner cues to action. The outer symbols used by society have been "internalized," "interiorized." Since symbols are definite organic events with a definite locus in a functional context, they act as precipitating and organizing agencies, precipitating in that they initiate action, and organizing in that they simultaneously or successively control a number of responses. They are themselves tension systems, and each one of them arouses the tension system of an act or another symbol.<sup>3</sup>

The evidence on the proposition that symbols may serve as inner cues to action cannot be reviewed here, but works such as those of Murphy<sup>4</sup> and of Lindesmith and Strauss<sup>5</sup> amply summarize the studies bearing on this point. If it is accepted that symbols serve initiating and organizing functions, it follows that considerable significance may attach to the symbolizations occurring in tension situations, and that explanations of tension which do not take account of individual and group definitions of the situation will be found inadequate. Furthermore, clues to the understanding of tensions should be found in the goals, oppositions, plans of action and feeling states which are verbalized.

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<sup>3</sup>Murphy, op. cit., p. 263.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., pp. 252-264.

<sup>5</sup>Alfred Lindesmith and Anselm Strauss, Social Psychology (New York, Dryden Press, 1949), pp. 31-131, 306-355.



Fundamentally, all tensions are probably the products of some more or less temporary frustration, an interruption of action fulfilment, for if action tendencies were consummated as rapidly as they were aroused, no tensions could be said to exist. But there are some interruptions of action which are more pronounced and enduring than others, and which result in what has been called "augmented tensions." It is the augmented tension of the frustration or conflict situation<sup>6</sup> with which this study is primarily concerned, although all that has been said about the general characteristics of tension still apply. Frustration and conflict mean opposition of action tendencies. Where opposing tendencies of action are sustained and no method of resolving the conflict appears, a rise in the earlier level of tension may be expected. The resulting augmented tension may be thought of as leading to action that moves in the direction of removing the attendant discomfort.

The clearest expressions of this type of tension have been observed in cases of experimental neuroses induced in animals which were subjected to conflicting stimuli. Masserman, who experimented with hungry cats which were presented with the

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<sup>6</sup>The distinction between frustration and conflict is seldom clearly drawn. Our point of view is that opposing tendencies of action are aroused in both cases, and both involve blockages of action. For our purpose, we shall define "frustration" as interiorized opposition, that is, oppositions of muscle sets, verbal sets, etc., which can be only indirectly observed and inferred; while "conflict" shall be understood as exteriorized opposition, that is, directly observable opposition between persons. The two are obviously not mutually exclusive.



signal for the consummatory response at the same time that a blast of air was directed at them, reports of the resultant behavior:

The animal crouches, trembles, shows horripilation, dilated pupils and retracted nictating membranes, breathes rapidly, shallowly and irregularly, has a fast, pounding pulse and a markedly increased blood pressure. As previously demonstrated by Cannon, special studies reveal increased oxygen and sugar content of its blood, diminished clotting time and other bodily changes indicative of the mobilization of various physiologic resources and "emergency mechanisms." These manifestations of motor and sympathetic tension, then, obviously parallel those that accompany the subjective experience of normal and neurotic anxiety in the human.

Guthrie, in an account of human behavior paralleling Masserman's description, has pictured the characteristic reactions of people who are under the strain of conflict or excessive stimulation.

One of the most striking changes in the onset of excitement is in the nature of movement. This is energized. The voice of an angry man is changed and becomes louder. His least actions are either very energetic and exaggerated, or they show the effects of tension in their restraint. He does not simply close the door, he bangs it. He paces the room or makes useless gestures. There is energy to spare. His body is prepared for action by a large number of physiological mechanisms.<sup>8</sup>

For reasons that will be made obvious presently, it is especially of interest to consider the effect of conflict upon the neuromuscular system. Jacobson has exerted much conscientious effort toward the study of this problem, and his statement of the relationship between conflict situations and muscular tensions is worthy of note. He remarks:

Neuromuscular or nervous hypertension may be defined as

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<sup>7</sup>Jules H. Masserman, Principles of Dynamic Psychiatry (Philadelphia, W. B. Saunders Co., 1946), pp. 126-127.

<sup>8</sup>Edwin R. Guthrie, The Psychology of Human Conflict (New York, Harper and Brother, 1938), p. 78.



a condition marked by reflex phenomena of hyperexcitation and hyperirritation. . . .

The causes of neuromuscular hypertension as encountered in medical practice are many and various. Acute conditions may occur after intense or prolonged pain or distress from whatever source, whether physical, as a trauma, angina or colic, or mental, as a fright, bereavement, quarrel or loss. Such excitations are commonly called "emotional disturbances."<sup>9</sup>

The evidence indicates that one of the principal effects of conflict is to prepare the physiological and psychological systems for some action.

We return now to the problem of defining "group tension." While knowledge about the nature of individual tension is helpful in the understanding of group tension, the analysis of the latter in terms of the former alone gives but a limited appreciation of all that is involved in group tension. In the first place, the student of individual tension gains his knowledge through the observation of individual behavior and the subcutaneous organic and psychological processes which may be involved; but this treatment leaves out of consideration that which is the key to the understanding of group or intergroup tension, namely, the maladjustments of social relations which create the tension, and the processes of group organization by which the collectivity responds to the situation. Moreover, hostility between races, nations, classes, and religious groups, which are generally listed among the prominent instances of intergroup tension all have been based on the belief among members of the respective groups that others of their group hold a similar discontent and hostility.

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<sup>9</sup> Edmund Jacobson, Progressive Relaxation (2d Ed., Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1938), p. 6f.



It is with these considerations in mind that we have chosen to define group tension as: a shared experience of discontent and maladjustment appearing in a collectivity under conditions of frustration and opposition. Consensus is implied in our meaning of "a shared experience," for consensus is presumed to be a necessary condition for collective action to emerge. If tension is motivational in the individual, as we attempted to show, then the combination of tension and consensus should be motivational for the collective act. It was this function of group tension in initiating and guiding collective action that was emphasized at the outset. This, in fact, is the function that is socially important, for strikes, race riots, wars and other intergroup conflicts could not occur unless groups were capable of acting collectively.

The characteristic individual reactions to tension, interestingly enough, produce exactly those conditions which facilitate interaction, and the formation of consensus. The generalized activity induced by restlessness tends to increase the rate at which contacts occur, and the irritability of the people sensitizes them to each other. The communication of discontent and anxiety not only increases the preoccupation of the people with their maladjustments, but it also promotes the formation of group definitions of the situation and of plans for remedying the conditions. The process of establishing the common mood and attitudes is greatly aided by the tendency toward suggestibility characteristic of people whose sensitivity to each



other has been heightened.<sup>10</sup>

If the foregoing are the basic characteristics of group tension, the existence of tension should be recognizable by three conditions. First, there should be a relatively agreed upon object, or objects, of hostility. Second, the verbal behavior of the group members is likely to include many expressions of discontent, embitterment, hostility, suspicion and anxiety, much of which is of a stereotyped character. Finally, with respect to the overt non-verbal behavior, the augmented tension of conflict should be reflected in irritability, excitability, strains of the facial muscles, rise in pitch and volume of the voice, increased vigor of action or its obvious restraint, and a general restlessness.<sup>11</sup>

Types of group tension.--In the broadest sense, all forms of collective behavior have their beginnings in group tension, and even if the latter term is restricted in application to those situations in which definite blockages of action occur, a number of behavior forms, including, the crowd, mass, public, pressure groups, and social movements, may be said to arise from group tension. To be clear about the kind of tension with which this study is concerned, some distinctions should be drawn among the

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<sup>10</sup>The indebtedness of our entire treatment of group tension to the ideas about collective behavior set forth by Robert E. Park, Herbert Blumer and others is all too obvious, but it is very possible that they would disagree with the particular interpretation of their views which is given here.

<sup>11</sup>Although no attempt was made in the present study to quantify the level of tension, it is conceivable that such a measure might be developed. For an initial attempt of this kind, see, Robert F. Bales, Interactional Process Analysis



various types of group tension situations which may occur.

Situations of group tension arising out of conflict may be distinguished from each other on a number of bases. Among these distinguishing features are (1) the size of the groups in opposition, (2) the basis of group identification, (3) the clarity of group differentiation, (4) the degree of organization of the group, and (5) the duration of the tension period. The present study is concerned with the tension that arose between an ethnic minority community and a segment of the majority group because of the forced exclusion and incarceration of the former by the latter. The aim here is to place this kind of phenomenon in a class with others which bear similar features.

Although intergroup hostility may appear between very small groups, consideration of such instances will be dismissed because the present concern is with relatively large groups. Of the large collectivities, masses, publics and crowds are among those which very frequently arise in tension situations. The mass has been characterized as a heterogeneous, anonymous group in which there is only loose organization and little interaction, but which is identifiable as a collectivity by the common pattern of behavior of its separate members.<sup>13</sup> As there is little sharing of experience among mass members, our definition of group tension would not apply to mass phenomena. However, the tension

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<sup>13</sup>Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behavior," New Outline of the Principles of Sociology, ed., Alfred M. Lee (New York, Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1946), pp. 185-189. The same source is used for the meanings of other concepts of collective behavior referred to in this section.



of the mass may be converted to a group tension as soon as ~~as soon~~ as social interaction occurs and individual tensions are socialized.

The public, too, may have its origin in tension. Some issue exists on which people take sides, and through discussion public opinion is formed. Since both tension and interaction occur, group tension might be said to occur. But the public exists mainly to discuss issues and formulate opinions; when the public moves to act upon its formed opinion, it will no longer bear the original characteristics, for it then is an action group requiring a different type of organization. Group tension as a motivation persisting throughout a collective act may bring a public into existence, but the public then occurs only as a phase of the entire collective act.

Group tension is obviously related very closely to crowd behavior, especially to acting and expressive crowds. Tension initiates action in these crowds, interaction occurs, and the resulting consensus enables the collectivity to act together. Group tension in the sense of our definition applies to such behavior. But the crowd is typically a spontaneous group, extremely simple in organizational structure, having only momentary existence, and inclined to a speedy dissipation of its tension. Intergroup conflicts of the type with which this study is concerned usually involve groups such as racial communities, religious bodies, labor and management organizations, and nations which are relatively enduring, organized groups which maintain relatively longer spans of tension than occur in crowds.



Social movements likewise are based on group tension. The labor movement, Negro protest movement, and women's suffrage movement are typical examples all of which fall within the scope of our definition. By their very nature, however, the development of such movements occupy a considerable span of time. Furthermore, their actions are seldom continuous; they struggle ahead for a while and then may lie dormant for a longer while. They win or lose a battle, and then wait and prepare for the next crisis. It is thus possible to conceive of social movements as being constituted of a series of minor tension episodes. The aim of this study is to concentrate attention primarily upon the episodic instances of collective tension, which may be phases of a larger social movement.

The type of phenomenon which this study attempts to describe resembles most closely a rebellion, especially a rebellion of an ethnic minority that feels it is being persecuted by the majority group. Some of the Negro slave revolts of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries bear a similarity to the present case,<sup>13</sup> and an even closer likeness is found in the Indian rebellions such as those described of the Navaho by Kluckhohn<sup>14</sup> and the Klamath by Sol Tax.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>Herbert Aptheker, American Negro Slave Revolts (New York, Columbia University Press, 1943).

<sup>14</sup>Clyde Kluckhohn, "Group Tensions: Analysis of a Case History," Approaches to National Unity, eds., L. Bryson, L. Finkelstein, and R. M. MacIver (New York, Harper & Bros., 1945), pp. 222-241.



In interracial tension of this type, the hostility is generally between local groups, and is unlike international or labor-management conflicts in that relatively smaller groups are involved. The difference is due to the narrower range of organization of racial groups, and their consequent lack of the organizational means for bringing large populations into opposition with each other. Such a population as the American Negro minority is, in a sense, in a state of tension relative to the white majority group, yet heightened tension leading to open conflict between them have seldom involved the whole of the respective groups.

Where local racial opposition occurs, strong cohesive influences are likely to be present, particularly in the minority group, that makes the cleavage sharp and the tension intense. The basis of group identification and of differentiation from the other group is generally unambiguous and very much emotionally colored, with the result that the members of the respective groups may have little doubt as to the side to which they belong. Under such circumstances, the symbols of the group, the "race" symbols, may be expected to play an important role in mobilizing and organizing the hostile groups.

Finally, interracial tensions invariably involve opposition of groups with considerable difference in status and power. In situations of conflict, the problem for the majority is one of justifying the use of the power which is inherently theirs in suppressing the minority. The latter, on the other hand, can



overlook their own weakness only by a fanatical disregard of it or by some other method of self-deception. In general, the minority groups constantly face a problem of defeatism in any struggle to win something from the majority.

### Stages in the Career of Group Tension

Emergence of group tension.--Evidence has been presented to show that frustration, or the blockage of an action tendency, has the effect of raising tension. We assume this condition to be basic to the appearance of intergroup hostility and conflict. The frustration may be caused by either (1) the group against whom hostility is directed, or (2) some other conditions not directly related to the group against whom hostility is directed.<sup>16</sup> In either event, the respective groups involved in intergroup tension come to define the other as restricting freedom of action.

The blockage of action tendencies may, of course, result from a variety of conditions. Some authors have attempted to list the types of conditions which typically lead to intergroup stresses, but the stresses which affect individual members of a group are so varied that such an effort would seem to have dubious value. Thus, the evacuation was a general cause of tension among the evacuees, but the specific experiences which aroused their tensions varied from person to person, and included the loss of property, FBI apprehension of family heads, specific unpleasant experiences with non-Japanese, interruption of contacts with friends and family members, uncertainty about disposing of

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<sup>16</sup>Dollard, op. cit., p. 16ff. Dollard suggests a similar dichotomy.



property, and a multiplicity of other conditions which cannot be listed for want of space. It seems futile to attempt a classification of such conditions, especially of external conditions, for they are so varied as to defy ready classification. It would seem that a more fruitful approach is to analyze in a more general way how people come to interpret situations in the way they do.

In the broad, it is possible to indicate two general conditions which appear to be associated with the origin of tension. To state the logically secondary condition first, because group tension requires that a large number of persons in a group become simultaneously disturbed, an event or a set of events must occur which will be interpreted as disturbing by a number of individuals at the same time. This point is so obvious as to require no further comment.

Second, we have already indicated frustration, the blockage of action tendencies, as the general source of the individual disturbances which lead to group tension. The commonest source of frustration to individuals is a set of conditions which interfere with the expression of their basic roles. Two meanings of the term "role" may be distinguished: on the one hand, there is the group-defined role of individuals, and, on the other, the self-defined role or the person's own conception of his role. Our concern is with the latter meaning. By role, then, is meant the organized patterns of behavior by which a person expresses his conception of himself and his relationship with others. Roles vary from situation to situation, but they always involve the following aspects: (1) the individual's definition of the



situation, (2) a pattern of habitual responses which he defines as appropriate for the situation, and (3) a conception of the self in the situation. Interference with the carrying out of a role may occur at any one of these levels. Confusion, uncertainty or insecurity may inhibit the definition of the situation. New regulations which disrupt accustomed routines, or changes which introduce unfamiliar features into the environment, tend to disturb habitual responses. Finally, ambiguities in relations with others, and the unwillingness of others to accept and approve a person will create difficulties in defining or maintaining a self conception. Each of these conditions would tend to arouse tension.

What is termed the basic roles refer to those expressions of self conception which are most closely associated with the maintenance of self regard. The highly successful Kansas City business man on his first trip to England resents the condescending "colonial treatment" which he receives at the hands of the British. The Japanese farmer who prides himself on his ability to grow crops better than his white neighbors resents the role of an ordinary farm hand at the relocation center under the supervisory authority of white men. The problem of self regard arises from the fact that the individual accredits to himself certain capabilities, acquisitions and status (rights and privileges) which he desires to have recognized by others. It is the threat to those roles which would maintain such a self conception that is at the basis of much intergroup tension.



The characteristic effort of minority groups to emphasize the achievements of the group and discredit the vaunted superiority of the majority group seems to reflect the concern to maintain self regard. Likewise, much of majority group attack upon minorities may be similarly interpreted. For example, one may suspect of the German people between the First and Second World War, that they saw their bases of self regard seriously threatened by various conditions. The hypothesis is suggested that the ferocity of German anti-Semitism derived primarily from this condition. A traditional prejudice and belief in the inferiority of the Jewish people already existed. One may imagine how a German people sensitive to and troubled by the problem of maintaining self respect would interpret the "effrontery" of a traditionally "inferior" group who would "ape" and compete for, incidentally with considerable success, those values which the Germans most strongly cherished. The situation would be no less infuriating for the Germans than would be the situation of a class-conscious society matron who unexpectedly comes upon her kitchenmaid at an exclusive affair bedecked in the livery of fine society, brazenly passing off her deception with great success. If others refused to be convinced of the deception, to "know" that a person or a group is inferior, yet not to be able to assume the accustomed role of superior to inferior, would be a highly frustrating experience.

To understand the origin of group tension, it is necessary to identify those features of individual self conception which, in a tension situation, may be regarded as being threatened.



More specifically, it is necessary to determine how an attack upon the group as a whole is interpreted as an attack upon the individual members, and, as well, how attacks upon the individual members is interpreted as an attack upon the group as a whole. Further, there is a need to understand how a group may be blocked from engaging in those roles which would enable the group members to realize the picture which they have of themselves.

Socialization of tension.---When a large number of persons are simultaneously aroused, and these people identify themselves as a group that is threatened, the setting is laid for the appearance of group tension. But even when a group encounters an acute and clear crisis, as in the case of the evacuation, a collective reaction to the event seldom occurs immediately. The reason for this lag is that the un verbalized distresses and discontents of individuals are not of themselves adequate impelling forces for collective reaction. Only when the individual tensions induces interaction may the emergence of tension in the group be expected.

The members of a collectivity, however, are never affected uniformly, and the socialization of tension does not occur evenly over an entire population. Within a group confronted by a critical situation, there will be some who remain relatively undisturbed, while others with a lower threshold of sensitivity to the crisis may be quickly aroused. At least two factors are evidently important in determining where the points of rapid rise in tension will occur. First, because different types of personality and attitude are drawn into particular subgroups, earlier



reactions may be expected in some local groups and areas than in others. Second, tension conditions set up differential pressures for various segments of a population. This may result from various causes. (a) Spatial contiguity to a center of disturbance may automatically implicate those in the neighborhood, while others at a greater distance may be able to avoid the trouble. (b) People in different socio-economic positions may be affected differently by a given disturbing condition. Finally, (c) fortuitous circumstances, unforeseen and on-controllable events, may cause tension to affect some and not others. To speak figuratively, then, group tension does not emerge as a sudden conflagration over an entire area, but has its beginnings in spot fires which potentially may spread over an entire area.

The communication and consequent socialization of tension is therefore likely to occur in stages, first affecting those sub-groups which are most sensitive to the maladjustment, and later involving other groups and individuals as the problem is given wider and wider definition. The early phase, which may be called a stage of latent group tension, is likely to be characterized by much discontent and a number of minor disturbances which have no clear connection with each other. The problem remains of how a common general concern evolves out of the local incidents.

In this latter phase, leaders of all kinds who function as definers and generalizers of the group difficulties may come to play important roles; and to the extent that the population is led to redefine the situation in general terms, group tension



may come into existence. However, leadership is not of itself sufficient to bring about this fundamental transformation. More commonly, the generalization results from the occurrence of some additional critical event, or events, which are striking enough to attract widespread attention, and important enough to affect large segments of the population. Without the preparatory series of disturbances, the population cannot be aroused to tension, but if the tension is not fed further with crises about which the population may mobilize, the consensus which underlies group tension may not arise. When a group is mobilized for collective action with reference to a tension situation, group tension may be said to exist.

The consensus which appears at this point involves, at the minimum, at least two things: (1) a common attitude that "something must be done" collectively about the disturbing conditions, and (2) a preliminary identification of those who are believed to be responsible for the distresses of the "we group." Attitudes of this kind, however, seldom remain stable for any length of time. Indeed, the focusing of attention and activity upon a common problem starts a process of defining and redefining that yields, on the one hand, a simplification of the group definitions by the elimination of less attractive interpretations, and, on the other, an elaboration of the definitions which are retained. With increased clarification of commonly held ideas, the possibility of concerted action is likewise improved.

Organization of groups under tension.--Terms such as



"consensus" and "concerted collective action" are actually misleading in representing the reactions of an entire group to tension, for they imply a unity of attitude and action that does not correspond with reality. The consensus which exists has to do with agreement upon the need for action, and possibly upon the broad objectives to be achieved, but regarding the specific aspects of the action to be taken, division of opinion is often the characteristic. The reactions of people to conflict vary greatly.

Rosenzweig has suggested three characteristic types of reaction to frustration, the "extrapunitive," "intropunitive," and "impunitive." Of these types, he says:

(1) He may manifest the emotion of anger and condemn the outer world (other persons, objects and circumstance) for his frustration, adopting an attitude of hostility toward his environment. This type of reaction may be termed "extrapunitive." (2) He may react with emotions of guilt and remorse and tend to condemn himself as the blameworthy object. This type of reaction may be termed "intropunitive." (3) He may experience emotions of embarrassment and shame, making little of blame and emphasizing instead the conciliation of others and himself to the disagreeable situation. In this case he will be more interested in condoning than in condemning and will pass off the frustration as lightly as possible by making references, even at the price of self deception, to unavoidable circumstances.<sup>17</sup>

The characterization is highly suggestive although it involves too much of the psychiatric view for our purpose. Myrdal identified at least two of these types in his description of "protest" and "accommodative" leadership among Negroes.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Saul Rosenzweig, "The Experimental Measurement of Types of Reaction to Frustration," Explorations in Personality, ed., Henry A. Murray (New York, Oxford University Press, 1938), p. 586.

<sup>18</sup> Gunnar Myrdal, The American Dilemma (New York, Harper and Bros., 1944), pp. 709-857.



And Leighton, from his study of the Boston Relocation Center, classified the "aggressive," "withdrawal," and "cooperative" reaction types.<sup>19</sup>

The analysis of our data forces us to a similar conclusion about the major types of reaction to tension situations.

A comment is needed about the so-called withdrawal or impulsive type, which implies a schizophrenic reaction, for the type enters very little into any action scene except as inertia upon it. The closest thing to it in collective behavior would be found, for example, among Negroes who find a solution to their race problems in sectarian revivalist movements. However, a class of withdrawal behavior may be distinguished that occurs more commonly, in which the individuals seeing no direct solution to their difficulties prefer to make no immediate commitment to any action program. Such people might be called a "passive" reaction type, a class that often involves the largest sub-group, and is important because as tension increases, its members may be transformed, willingly or unwillingly, into more positive advocates of action.

Sub-groups encouraging the protest, accommodation or passive policy form and draw adherents to their policies. Leaders emerge in each group. Organization, both formal and informal, develop as the means of pursuing the defined ends. Because incompatible policies cannot jointly dominate, a struggle may be expected among the sub-groups as a result of which some single group may emerge superior to the rest; but because tension situ-



ations are inherently unstable, there is rarely any permanent prominence of any single view.

The nature and extent of organization will depend greatly upon the degree of organization present in the group prior to the appearance of tension. Where there is no previous background, probably nothing more complex than the primitive organization which appears in crowds, of focused attention held together by rapport, may be expected. At the opposite pole are those groups which come to a tension situation with a high degree of organization, as in the case of labor unions which calculatingly manipulate the rise and fall of tension in its membership. The complex structure and well-defined systems of relationships enable a much higher degree of control in pursuing aims and a greater sustaining power than in crowds. How tension will be expressed will thus vary with the nature and degree of organization of the group.

The function of organization in tension situations is to facilitate effective collective action. Organization fulfills this purpose by (1) providing the channels of communication and influence, (2) defining status relations and division of labor, and (3) offering the means for controlling the behavior of group members and maintaining morale. The main activities which occur in tension situations: defining the problem, defining the object of hostility, evolving a group self conception, deciding upon plans of action, negotiating or "jockeying" with the opposition, or engaging in actual conflict, all are greatly aided by such a structure.



The organizing process develops in the sub-groups, and both in the initiation of the process as well as in the utilization of the structure that is established, leaders are particularly important. As Myrdal has suggested, the leadership in tension situations is predominantly of either the protest or accommodative variety. Both types have in common the problem of justifying their behavior to their group, of indicating to the people that they, as leaders, are working in the interest of the group. The contrast between them arises from the difference in the degree to which they assume the role of the other side. The accommodative leader, because he has been schooled in the opposition view or holds interests in common with the latter, interprets problems in some degree from the standpoint of the opposition. On the other hand, the protest leaders are those who typically have little "appreciation" of the opposition view, and whose past experiences are such as to minimize the tendency of identification with the opposition.

In general, it may be said that the influence of the protest leaders tend to rise with a rise of intergroup tension, and that the decline of tension often causes a loss of their function. Masses of people are not readily aroused to protest action even under provocation, and despite the verbal criticisms which may be directed at them, the accommodative leaders often retain power and advantage as long as a relatively low level of tension prevails. When intergroup tensions become acute, however, the situation cries for more vigorous action than the accommodative



tive leaders are capable of providing. The advantages of the accommodative leaders are then reduced, and the locus of power shifts toward the protest leaders. But the latter position of leadership is a difficult one to maintain, unless the protest leaders are able to entrench themselves strongly once they are in power, for short of a complete rout of the opposition, protest action invites numerous adverse conditions which may be imposed by a powerful opponent, and demoralization may set in if the motivation is weakened.

In-group solidarity.---Dissension and cleavage within a group are dangerous, for energy that needs to be conserved for attack upon the out-group is dissipated in intra-group bickering and conflict. In a group under crisis, group solidarity serves certain primary functions. First, members of the group gain in morale from the knowledge that others of their group are strongly united in the pursuit of a common goal. Conversely, any indication that the group is not tightly bound together has an adverse effect on morale, for the individuals separately are seen as more vulnerable to external threats than when they are jointly resisting. Second, the group needs assurance of the loyalty of its members, for communication to the out-group of the private knowledge of the group may prove extremely damaging to the latter's resistance. In particular, specific individuals and groups may become especially exposed to personal danger by the revelation of "secret" information.

With increasing tension there is likely to be increasing



concern about group solidarity. As the urgency of action rises with increasing stress, anything that interferes with collective action, including dissent within the group, tends to be viewed with more and more impatience.

The striving for internal cohesion tends to be reflected in certain typical forms of behavior. First, as hostility toward an out-group becomes intensified, the tendency of identifying with the in-group becomes stronger. The distinction between one's group and the other becomes more sharply drawn, and the image of the other acquires the aspects of a rigid stereotype. Furthermore, the initial efforts to arrive at a group policy through deliberative processes tend to give way to coercive methods of eliminating alternative views. Such circumstances favor the aggressively motivated protest groups, and the efforts to achieve group solidarity is likely to be concentrated about the latter's policy. Finally, as intergroup tension and feelings of insecurity increase, suspicion and concern about "disloyal" members of the group may be expected to increase to neurotic proportions. The group defines "disloyalty" by vague criteria of dissimilarity with the in-group, and similarity to or association with the out-group. In extreme cases violent methods may be used to coerce conformity of the deviant individuals, or to eliminate him as a threat to the group.

The internally generated pressures to achieve cohesion contribute to the heightening of the tension. To the extent that closer identification is achieved, group objectives are likely to be clarified, and pursued after them intensified. At the same



time, the effort to force conformity among the members itself creates stresses which add to the existing tension. The alarms about "disloyal" members and the suspicion and insecurity they arouse on all sides tend both to reflect and contribute to "group jitters."

Crises in tension situations.--Once group tension appears the group becomes inordinately sensitive to any disturbances, even those which under normal circumstances would produce only the mildest reactions. As a result groups under tension are particularly susceptible to crises, and the latter might be said to be the natural outcome of prolonged tension.

The occurrence of a crisis depends upon two conditions, the previous establishment of a predisposition to react strongly with hostility and fear to certain kinds of events, and the occurrence of an event that will call forth that patterned reaction. The predisposition that is referred to is a product of the interactional process by which the group comes to define its situation of maladjustment. Beginning with an awakening consciousness of the mistreatment which the opposition seemingly is heaping upon the in-group, the collectivity evolves a steadily deepening distrust of the other group. The event which sets off the crisis is one which is widely interpreted by a group as seriously threatening its position, and as offering conclusive proof of the fundamentally unfriendly intent of the opposition. It does not always happen that crises develop only when the immediately preceding period was one of high level tension, for the level of group tension may fluctuate rapidly once a group orientation as



well as efficient channels of communication have been established. If crises are frequently allowed to occur at a time when the leaders of the respective groups are striving to eliminate the basis of conflict and tension, it is often due to their miscalculation and underestimation of the stresses present, and a failure to judge correctly how the groups involved will interpret situations with which they might be confronted.

The adjustmental process occurring in a crisis tends to be essentially of the same form as that which occurs with respect to the more general tension situation, but the process is telescoped into a shorter period of time. It develops about some issue, collective efforts to define the situation take place, and all the processes involved in organizing for an emergency response occur. The crisis, in fact, is a crisis because the situation presents all the basic features of the general tension problem but in a highly condensed and vivid form with the previously repressed conflicts suddenly forced into the open. Thus, it is evidently possible to think of group tensions as occurring within larger tension systems; that a given tension process occurs within the context of a more inclusive process, and is itself in turn composed of a series of minor tension incidents.

Decisive action is required in crises, peaks of tension are reached, and because of the strong pressure toward action of some kind, excitement often runs high among the people involved. The circumstances favor crowd-like behavior, and the consequences which follow are those which may be expected from crowd interaction.



Because of the rapidity of interaction and the high degree of suggestibility, extreme ideas which normally might be given but scant notice are often widely and quickly accepted. The cautiousness of the accommodative leaders has less appeal than the more aggressive ideas of the protest leaders. In general, the issues of the general tension situation are sharply defined, the tempo of collective action is greatly accelerated, and drastic measures may be taken by the respective groups to win their cause.

Because of the tendency of each group in the crisis situation to take an uncompromising stand and to stake everything on the successful outcome of the struggle, the situation is also potentially the penultimate phase before the total or partial solution of some of the basic difficulties underlying the intergroup tension. The crisis may serve this function in several ways all of which are related to the fact that the crisis cannot be indefinitely prolonged because exhaustion from the struggle will sooner or later appear in the conflicting groups and automatically reduce the tension behind the crisis. If demoralization appears in one of the groups first, it may lead to the withdrawal of opposition by that group and a surrender to the demands of the other. If exhaustion and demoralization appear on both sides more or less simultaneously, compromises may be accepted, or an entirely new line of solution may be sought. Yet another possible result is that the crisis continues until there is a general deterioration of action on both sides, that the action groups which came into being in consequence of the tension situation likewise become disorganized, and that the interlude which follows provides a setting



favorable to a fundamental reorganization of the relations between the groups. Finally, crises often invite the intervention of outside groups who may decisively influence the solving of the tension problem.

The reduction of group tension.--In attempting to reduce group tension, two questions need to be answered, (1) what are the frustrations at the basis of the tension, and (2) what techniques may be used to modify the conditions of frustration? With regard to the first question, our hypothesis is that, generally speaking, the underlying frustration is an inability of a group to enact those roles which would be consistent with its group self conception or with the desired status of the group. As to what is desired by a group can be determined only by close observation of it, particularly as these desires are reflected in expressions of self evaluation, the conception of the mistreatment being received, the aims, and the hopes. Frequently in intergroup tension, however, basic conflicts exist which can scarcely be resolved immediately and by direct methods. If the latter is the case, the problem of reducing intergroup tension becomes one, not so much of modifying the basic conflicts, but of seeking to prevent the tension relations from becoming so deeply canalized as to lead to inevitable critical consequences. In other words, the problem is rather that of preventing the accumulation of minor tensions, and of keeping the situation flexible so that when rational proposals for dealing with immediate difficulties are offered, they will not be engulfed by the irrational impulses aroused by the earlier tensions. The discussion



here focuses, therefore, primarily upon techniques of reducing tensions aroused by current issues rather than of those which have a historical basis.

It was suggested in the first chapter that the reduction of tension may be achieved by changing behavior, and that there are two forms of behavior to which modification may be directed, the symbolic and non-symbolic. The symbolic behavior of a collectivity involves the way in which it verbalizes its definition of the problem and the situation, group self conception, ends to be attained, and the means to be used for achieving the ends. Various techniques have been suggested for modifying such behavior including the introduction of new knowledge, re-education, propaganda, and psychotherapy, and each no doubt<sup>has</sup>/its usefulness. But a fundamental difference needs to be noted between the problem of changing collective behavior and individual behavior. The verbalization in a collectivity occurs through communication within the group--for the individual, much more through communication with himself--, and the modification of collective symbolization may be chiefly accomplished by changing the channels of communication, or the content of what is transmitted. Leaders are obviously important in determining the content of communication, and the devices for influencing leaders or of changing their composition may be highly effective in changing the verbal habits of a group. It should be noted, however, that the key persons of influence in opinion formation in the masses are probably not the top leaders of an organization but rather the lower echelon leaders who are in direct personal contact with friends



and neighbors who lean on them for political guidance.

The modification of symbolic behavior is closely related to the modification of non-symbolic behavior. The latter refers to those aspects of collective behavior occurring in the tension situation which the collectivity fails to indicate to itself as being relevant to the tension problem. Thus, in the crowd behavior of a mob, what is verbally communicated may be the expressions of hostility and suggestions of what should be done, but the non-symbolic behavior of milling and excited reactions are no less a part of the interaction, and are no less significant in determining the course of tension development. The basic method of manipulating non-symbolic behavior rests on the alteration of the setting within which interaction occurs, specifically with respect to spatial arrangements, other physical conditions, and the social organization. It involves, also, certain rather subtle problems such as of changing the atmosphere or mood within a group.

It is not particularly meaningful to speak of general methods of reducing group tension for there is considerable variation in the controls which are effective at different stages in tension development. This is perhaps but another way of saying that the conditions under which specific techniques of control may be employed need to be clearly indicated. It should be patently ~~obvious~~ that in the early stages of collective tension when organization is at a minimum, the techniques which might be employed to effectively manipulate a group will differ from those which would be applicable to a later stage when the group has be-



come highly organized. In order to judge accurately the methods of control which will be feasible at any given time, it is necessary to know the attitudes and the characteristics of group organization which are current at the time.

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## CHAPTER III

### EVACUATION AND THE TULE LAKE RELOCATION CENTER

#### The Background of Tension in Pre-Evacuation Communities

Pre-war communities.---Accounts of the circumstances leading to the evacuation and of the reactions of the Japanese minority to the stresses of the enforced migration have already been presented in several places, and the story perhaps no longer bears repeating. However, in order to be clear about the historical circumstances which preceded the events which are described in this study, and also to depict the setting of the Tule Lake Project, a chapter is here devoted to a brief account of this background.

In 1940 there were in the United States some 127,000 persons of Japanese ancestry, of whom about 112,000, or almost ninety per cent, resided in the three Pacific Coast states of California, Oregon and Washington. About three-quarters of the total population were in California alone. Within these states these people were largely concentrated in the major metropolitan districts or in certain coastal valleys that provided land suitable for truck gardening or orchard farming in which the Japanese Americans specialized; and within these areas of concentration there was further a localization into their own communities. In view of this heavy concentration of the Japanese minority in



the three westernmost states, it should not be surprising that the "Japanese Problem" has long been primarily a local West Coast issue, particularly a California problem; yet, at the same time, these states were frequently able to instigate restrictive legislation in the national government against the Japanese minority.

No other racial minority in America has been as much affected as have the Japanese Americans by the international relations between its country of origin and the United States.<sup>1</sup>

Broad trends of world history did much to shape the destiny of a small group of immigrants and their offsprings. For facing each other across the Pacific Basin in 1900 were two nations both in an expansionist phase, the United States which was just completing the settlement of its western frontier and was vigorously engaged in exploiting its resources, and Japan which had been thrown into turbulent changes as a result of certain catalytic events of the Nineteenth Century and was self consciously making a late bid for international status.

It was the stimulation of the latter social changes which started the general migration of the Japanese to this country about 1890. They came mostly as "Birds of Passage," some for adventure, others for learning, but most of them for wealth with the hope of improved status in Japan upon return. They came with little money; began working at menial jobs at low sub-standard wages in the belief that industry, thrift and perseverance would overcome obstacles; stayed longer than they had expected; and in

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<sup>1</sup>Carey McWilliams, Prejudice, Japanese Americans, Symbol of Racial Intolerance (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1944), pp. 3-13.



most cases remained to establish families here and gradually relinquish the long-intended promise of return.

The earliest migrants experienced little organized hostility from the majority group except for localized opposition from labor groups, but after the Russo-Japanese War, talk of war intermittently disturbed relations between Japan and the United States, and the public attitude toward the Japanese minority grew harsher. General Homer Lea, a Californian who knew his own group as well as the Orientals, wrote in 1909:

Anti-Japanese sentiment may have been dormant prior to the conclusion of the Russian War, but since then it has openly manifested itself, and is not restricted, as may be supposed, to union-labor or socialistic elements, but permeates the entire social and political fabric of the West.

Lea's now famous volume predicting war between the two nations "was immediately seized upon by the Hearst Press and utilized as a major prop in the developing anti-Oriental agitation."<sup>3</sup> His was not the first of such predictions, though it was perhaps the most cogent, and it was not the last. Throughout this period, West Coast newspapers in general held an anti-Japanese bias, and certain metropolitan papers made it their editorial business to sound the alarm of the Japanese threat. Publicists, through satire, caricature, exposition and fiction aided in establishing the stereotype of the Japanese both in Japan and America as crafty, arrogant and untrustworthy. The population was also seen as "mul-

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<sup>2</sup>Homer Lea, The Valor of Ignorance (New York, Harper and Co., 1909), p.

<sup>3</sup>McWilliams, op. cit., p. 42.



tipling like rabbits." Politicians, quick to sense the shifts of political climate, used the anti-Japanese sentiment for their own ends.

This conscious program of hostility organized the latent prejudices of the white population, and assisted in instigating a series of repressive measures against the Japanese minority. Most of these were minor local restrictions which taken cumulatively produced much irritation, but two which caused the greatest distress were the Anti-Alien Land Laws and the Immigration Act of 1924, both of which were specifically directed against the alien Japanese although they withheld rights from all aliens ineligible to citizenship. Efforts of the latter to gain the right of naturalization through a test case before the United States Supreme Court failed. After the passage of the Immigration Act of 1924, however, the intensity of the agitation subsided, and despite the rise of international tensions during the Japanese campaigns in Manchuria and China, a peak of public hostility was not again reached until after the outbreak of war.

Concurrently with this history of anti-Japanese developments, the Japanese communities were undergoing change in adjustment to both the trend of majority group attitudes as well as their internal processes of accommodation and assimilation. These experiences differed for three rather distinctive classes of people in the communities. Some 47,000 were immigrant Japanese ineligible for citizenship known as the Issei (first generation), while the remaining 80,000 were the American-born offsprings possessing citizenship who were called the Nisei (second generation). About twenty per cent of the latter group were those who had been



to Japan, received education there, and returned to this country; a group that has been identified in the communities by the label, Kibei (returned to America).<sup>4</sup>

The Issei, virtually all of whom experienced something of the early period of hostility, were thereby prompted to seek group strength through their communities, a tendency which implemented a trend of community solidarity that had already been initiated by the cultural and racial barriers to assimilation. Moreover, lacking citizenship in this country, they were as a matter of safeguard and legal status impelled to retain some orientation toward Japan. Outlets for their interests were found in the Japanese Association which was their central organization, business and farming associations, prefectural associations, Buddhist and segregated Christian churches, cultural societies, recreational clubs and vernacular newspapers. They prided themselves on their self sufficiency, and as they prospered, upon their ability to compete despite their handicaps.

Although essentially lacking social contacts with the American majority group, the Issei by 1940 had made a considerable adjustment to their surrounding society. The Japanese communities which had started as tight little knots of immigrants who were enthusiastically interested in reconstructing old world institutions and practices, dispersed noticeably over the years, and with the outward movement showed a decline of old-world habits and a marked adaptation of American ways. It might be said

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<sup>4</sup>Although the Kibei are a sub-class of the Nisei, for the sake of brevity and in conformance with common usage, Nisei will be used to mean those born and raised in America alone, distinguishing them from the Kibei who received some part of their training in Japan.



that the framework of their practices and outlook remained Japanese oriented, but the content involved a great amount of unde-liberated inclusion of American ways. Before the war, the Issei looked with comparative satisfaction upon their way of life and their achievements.

Nevertheless, outside their communities the Issei rarely saw themselves as other than alien. They recognized economic, political and social boundaries that excluded them as well as their children from important areas of American opportunities, and they harbored the suspicion that wherever basic conflicts of interest should arise, their race would automatically cause them to be made the target of hostility and discrimination. Hence, if they were able to better their lot, the advancements were seen as having been achieved largely in spite of the majority group. The Issei differed in the degree to which they held these views, just as they varied in the extent of their Americanization, but the characterization generally applied to the group. American criticism of Japan's warfare in China during the thirties did much to arouse again the sensitivity of the Issei to majority group opinion, for they saw their status tied to the fortunes of Japan, and the American attack upon Japanese foreign policy was regarded as a threat to their own position. They defended and rationalized the Japanese policy on the Asiatic continent, and viewed the American criticisms as unnecessary meddling and further evidence of attempted white dominance.

The Nisei grew up within these circumstances, exposed at school to the American tradition, and at home to a diluted



Japanese culture. The relative influence of the two cultures upon the individual Nisei varied greatly with the nature of his contacts, for some grew up in the heart of highly segregated Japanese communities, and others at the periphery of loosely structured communities. But rather than as a composite of two cultures, the Nisei are better understood as the products of Nisei society. This was a group more American than Japanese that was largely cut off from intimate participation in either Issei or white American society. The Nisei wanted to identify with Caucasian age-mate groups, but they generally found themselves outside such groups and often excluded from them. Toward the Issei society they showed disinterest and sometimes rebellion, yet they were in more or less degree controlled by it. Cut off from identification with others, the Nisei participated intensively in their own activities--in competitive sports, club activities, school organizations, and social life--, and for the most part, they saw their behavior in these activities as essentially American.

The bi-modal age distribution of the Japanese American population greatly affected the relationship between the Issei and Nisei. Thomas and Nishimoto have aptly described this distribution.

The Issei, like all immigrant groups in the American population in the 1940's, were old. Half of them were 50 years of age or older; 17 per cent had passed their sixtieth birthday; and only 8 per cent were under 35 years of age. In contrast, the Nisei were characterized by extreme youth, two thirds of them being under 20 years of age and less than 3 per cent having reached 35.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Thomas and Nishimoto, op. cit., p. 4.



Because of their youth, the Nisei were largely dependent economically upon the Issei, and were subject to the latter's control. As long as their interests were separate, the Issei and Nisei functioned in separate worlds, but where their interests and sentiments came in conflict, it was generally the Issei view that dominated. The flow of influence was by no means unilateral, for not only did each provide an environment for the other and thus influence each other, but also in cases of conflict, compromise was very frequently the long-term method of resolution. Nevertheless, age and power favored the Issei, and where major decisions were involved, the opinion of the older generation was generally more telling.

One issue on which the Issei and Nisei frequently differed concerned American values, the majority group, and the latter's attitude toward the Japanese minority. The Issei were less trustful of white American intent toward the minority than the Nisei, and often urged the retention of the Japanese language and Japanese ties as a safeguard against the eventuality of exclusion from opportunities in America. The Nisei, on the other hand, who were trained in American ways and brought up in association with white children and youths, at least in schools, saw less reason to suspect any acutely hostile motives in the majority group. There were undeniable limitations. Housing covenants restricted them from many residential areas. Some places of public recreation discriminated against them. Certain labor unions excluded them from membership. Most frustrating of all, positions in Caucasian companies other than the least desirable



ones were so uniformly closed to the Nisei that the few achieving such employment were regarded with special notice. Yet, because these problems were seldom personally experienced by the youthful Nisei, most of whom were still of school age, the fundamentally prejudiced attitudes of the majority group of which the Issei warned often seemed irreal to the former. These ambiguities of the situation were reflected in an ambiguity of the Nisei's attitudes toward the majority group and a weaker conviction than among the Issei about their evaluations of white Americans.

The Kibei constituted a third distinct group within the Japanese communities. Although born in this country, they had gone with their parents or were sent by them to Japan during childhood or early adolescence, received at least one year of Japanese schooling, and were exposed to the Japanese culture and ideologies during their formative years. Return to this country often resulted in maladjustments, for they frequently found themselves misfits in families from which they had long been isolated, unable to associate readily with either the Issei or Nisei, and handicapped by their lack of American training. To be sure, the group varied greatly in adjustments depending in part upon the length of stay in Japan and the time elapsed since return to this country. Some by acquiring an American training were able to capitalize upon a bi-cultural background in seeking employment, and made excellent adjustments. On the whole, however, they showed the marks of their frustrating struggle to gain an acceptable status in the Japanese as well as the larger community.



Such, in brief, was the Japanese minority society just prior to the outbreak of war. Through years of adaptation a reasonably satisfactory adjustment to the majority group society was made, and with a continuation of the trend as well as the gradual disappearance of the immigrant generation, it appeared likely that the group might in time become quite fully assimilated. In view of the traditional pattern of superordinate-subordinate relationship that had become established, however, such a process seemed not likely to be completed in a matter of a generation. As conditions stood, latent tensions were present which could, by a turn of events, lead to a full-blown conflict between the Japanese minority and the majority group.

Pearl Harbor to evacuation.--The outbreak of war, December 7, 1941, came as a violent shock to the people of Japanese ancestry in the United States. It found them badly prepared for the crises that followed.<sup>6</sup>

Within a few hours after the news from Pearl Harbor, the Federal Bureau of Investigation started apprehending those who were "considered dangerous to the national safety,"<sup>7</sup> continuing the arrests with regularity until after the start of evacuation. Because the policy brought under suspicion virtually every alien Japanese active in Japanese community affairs, a considerable fear developed among many families that their members might be interned. They engaged in panicky efforts to burn Jap-

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<sup>6</sup> See, Morton Grodzins, Americans Betrayed (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1949), for a detailed account of the pressures leading to the evacuation.

<sup>7</sup> U. S. Department of Justice, Questions and Answers on Regulations Concerning Aliens of Enemy Nationality (Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1942), p. 1.



anese books, correspondence, photographs, and anything that might identify them with Japan or appear incriminating to the FBI. Stories and wild rumors circulated of the ruthless methods of the agents, and of the dark prospects for interned persons. Other rumors told of the astonishing amount of information about the Japanese minority that had been accumulated by the FBI; and to explain the mysterious omniscience of the agency, the people concluded that members of the community were serving as inu (informers), a belief that later in the relocation centers acquired enormous significance.

Simultaneously, a presidential proclamation was issued that required Japanese nationals (as well as German and Italian aliens) to relinquish weapons of any kind, cameras, short-wave receiving sets, and maps or pictures of strategic areas and installations.<sup>8</sup> Not only did the disposition of these articles present irritating problems, but no little concern was also engendered over the definition of contraband goods. Questions of whether or not kitchen knives were weapons, and ordinary road maps were maps of strategic defense areas, acquired disproportionate importance. By the same proclamation, alien Japanese were prohibited from travel or change of residence except by permission of the District Attorney, and were restricted from military areas. Here again, misinformation regarding the regulation both on the part of the public as well as the affected population led to far greater immobilization than was intended by the rule.

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<sup>8</sup>U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, Findings and Recommendations on Evacuation of Enemy Aliens and Others from Prohibited Military Zones, H.R. 2124, 77th Congress, 2d Sess. (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1942), pp. 295-296.



But the restrictions most acutely felt by the Japanese minority were those affecting their economic activities. By Monday, December 8, all funds and assets of Japanese nationals were frozen. The regulation categorically prohibited any business transactions involving any transfer to them of funds or assets, including the payment of wages and rents. Although these restrictions were quickly relaxed, aliens found themselves seriously handicapped in the conduct of their occupation, and became increasingly dependent upon the Nisei for subsistence. In several localities the renewal of business licenses of aliens was suspended causing much uncertainty about the prospects of continuing business enterprises.

Informal restrictions were equally effective in strangling the economy. Business men reported substantial declines in patronage by non-Japanese customers. Credit facilities became extremely tight placing severe restrictions upon business activities. Farmers at the slack period of the winter season not only had their credit curtailed, but those with winter crops to sell found that teamster's unions objected to moving their produce, or that markets were reluctant to purchase them. A steadily increasing pool of the unemployed developed as Japanese firms curtailed or closed operations, and Caucasian firms and agencies dismissed their Japanese American employees. Japanese communities which had hitherto proudly boasted of the negligible numbers of their group on public relief now were forced to turn with increasing frequency to welfare agencies for assistance in hardship cases. Among the incidental features of their economic uncertainty



was the constant expectation of antagonism from the non-Japanese with whom they necessarily came in contact.

In the months following Pearl Harbor the Japanese Americans scrutinized the newspapers with greater care than ever before, for they had never been as prominent in public discussion, and the press offered a fair barometer of the trend of opinion. At first the papers were gratifyingly sparing of hostile news, rather publicizing the advice of public officials for fair treatment of the Japanese minority; but in late December following newspaper publicity of the Roberts Report on Pearl Harbor, spectacular disclosures were made of alleged sabotage by Japanese Americans at Pearl Harbor<sup>9</sup> and on the Pacific Coast. While few newspapers took a strong editorial stand against the Japanese Americans, the bulk of the news, columnists' articles, and letters to the editors presented a very unfavorable picture of the Japanese minority.

In the Japanese communities, the nature and extent of the hostility was gauged particularly by the striking accounts of action taken against their own group. Newspaper and word-of-mouth stories told of unprovoked assaults on the streets, of terrorist attacks on isolated farmhouses, and of murder by unknown assailants. Rumors circulated of Nisei girls who were criminally assaulted by persons who had been emboldened by the general hostility toward the Japanese minority. "No Japs Allowed" signs appeared in the shop windows of some communities. On

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<sup>9</sup>The later denial by Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Knox, John E. Hoover of the FBI, and Chief W. A. Gabrielson of the Honolulu Police, of any known acts of sabotage in Hawaii either on or subsequent to December 7, unfortunately received scant notice in the news.



the other hand, experiences of sympathy from non-Japanese were given heavy weighting as positive values.

Efforts were made to adjust to these changing circumstances. With the impairment of Issei organizations and leadership, the Nisei assumed leadership and attempted to cope with their growing difficulties particularly through the Japanese American Citizens League<sup>10</sup>, the only remaining national organization in the communities. Rallies were held, and with important public officials present, the Japanese Americans reaffirmed their allegiance to the United States. Participation in civilian wartime activities was encouraged. Some youths volunteered for military service. These changes were in part related to the general conversion throughout the nation to a wartime program, but to the extent that the Japanese minority was treated as a separate and suspected member of the society, the latter had obvious difficulty remaining in tune with the national trend.

#### Stresses of the Evacuation

Evacuation.--In singling out the starting point of the events leading to the evacuation, Dillon Myer, Director of the War Relocation Authority, said:

On December 15, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox returned to Washington from his flying visit to Pearl Harbor and held one of the most heavily attended press conferences of the whole wartime period. In commenting on the effectiveness of the attack and the unpreparedness of the defending forces, he made the undoubtedly sincere but extremely unfortunately phrased remark that "the most effective fifth col-

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<sup>10</sup>The Japanese American Citizens League will hereafter be referred to as the JACL, an abbreviation that is in common usage among the Japanese Americans.



umn work of the entire war was done in Hawaii, with the possible exception of Norway." What Secretary Knox had in mind, it now seems clear from all the available evidence, was espionage activity which was carried out by agents in the Japanese consulate at Honolulu and perhaps, to some extent, by special emissaries who had quite recently come into the Territory from the Japanese home islands.

In the week before and the week after Christmas, the initial impression created by the Secretary's remark was greatly fortified and supplemented as a result of two simultaneous and unrelated developments: (1) the continuing reports--some of them undoubtedly authentic--of enemy submarine activity off the California coast, and (2) the wholly unfounded rumors of resident Japanese sabotage at Pearl Harbor which were brought into the mainland on Christmas Day with the first shipload of women and children refugees from Honolulu.<sup>11</sup>

Thereafter, the question of whether or not the Japanese Americans should be removed from the Pacific Coast became a major controversy in this region, with the forces favoring evacuation gaining in numbers and acrimony day by day. Radio commentators and syndicated columnists, among them John B. Hughes, Edward Murrow, Walter Lippman, Westbrook Pegler, and Henry McLemore, added the weight of their opinions to the wave of demands for evacuation. McLemore made a special trip to the Pacific Coast to gather material for a most abusive series. Various organizations too numerous to list submitted resolutions urging evacuation. Political leaders joined the cry. The Dies Committee gained headlines with hints of knowledge about a vast espionage system among the Japanese minority, promises of an expose of Japanese activity, and criticisms of the Department of Justice for ignoring the danger. High military officials, including General

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<sup>11</sup>U. S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, WRA, A Story of Human Conservation (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 10f.



John L. DeWitt, Commanding Officer of the Western Defense Command, were apparently imbued with the same suspicions.

The Japanese minority made ineffectual efforts to stem this ominous tide. Strategy meetings were held, plans were laid, and discarded, and attempts were made to reach influential government officials and nationally known publicists for support. However, by mid-February, 1942, it was apparently virtually understood among the highest government officials that the Japanese minority, including citizens, would be evacuated.<sup>12</sup> Yet, when the Tolan Congressional Investigating Committee arrived on the Pacific Coast about February 21 to open hearings on the evacuation, the impression was given that the decision still rested in the balance. Dwelling on the hope that the Government would not venture on so costly and complicated a program as an evacuation, members of the community, especially leaders of the Japanese American Citizens League, appeared before the Committee intent on presenting the strongest case possible. In discussing the "loyalty" of the Japanese Americans, however, the arguments on both sides were necessarily based largely on supposition and opinion rather than on positive evidence, and in such a discussion the representatives of the minority fared badly, particularly since the committee members were evidently already convinced of the need of evacuation. Although the Tolan Hearings probably had little influence upon the decision of evacuation, the JACL, as chief spokesman for the communities, became the object of bitter

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<sup>12</sup> Thomas and Nishimoto, op. cit., pp. 8-9.



intra-group recrimination because of its presumed failure at the Hearings and its allegedly weak stand.

Evacuation was made a certainty by a proclamation of the Western Defense Command issued on March 2,<sup>15</sup> and in less than two months the major evacuation movements were under way. The intervening period was one of utmost confusion, tension and disturbance in the communities. General DeWitt advised voluntary migration to unrestricted inland areas, but because of the hostility of the inland states as well as the inability of most evacuees to act on the advice, all but a small minority clung to their familiar surroundings. Thereupon, DeWitt issued a "freezing" order prohibiting further movements, and established a curfew from 8:00 p. m. to 6:00 a. m.<sup>16</sup> that paralyzed many activities in the communities. The problem of closing businesses, farms, and homes was an enormous source of disturbance as decisions of selling, leasing or storing had to be made under circumstances that afforded little opportunity for deliberate action. Those who sold their property were often embittered by the low returns received from buyers who "took advantage of our situation." Those who leased or stored property risked the chance of serious losses. Federal agencies were authorized to assist in these details, but because their procedures with respect to evacuees often were not clear, and they could not assume responsibility for eva-

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<sup>15</sup>U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, Findings and Recommendations on Evacuation of Enemy Aliens and Others from Prohibited Military Zones, H. R. 2124, 77th Congress 2d Sess. (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1942), p. 317f.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 330.



evacuation losses, many distrusted the government agencies while others found them unsatisfactory for their needs.

No less perplexing were the problems related to the evacuation procedure. <sup>d</sup>Endless questions were raised as to where the evacuees would be sent, when they would be evacuated, what facilities would be available at the centers, what equipment would be necessary, how much baggage would be permitted to each family, and how soon permission would be granted to leave the centers. Special problems related to families with babies, children, invalided members, aged dependents, and the economically destitute. The JACL served an important liaison function in transmitting information, but the administering agencies often did not have the required information, or offered contradictory statements, and the people were forced to fill the wide gaps of information with rumors and suppositions.

To summarize the experience of Japanese Americans between December 7 and the evacuation: first, there were restrictions, both formal and informal, imposed and self-imposed, which disrupted the normal functioning of the communities and produced strains upon the residents. Second, the regulations and events affecting these people came in such bewildering quantity and succession that they were in a constant state of uncertainty as to what was expected of them. The condition was aggravated by the confusion that often existed among the administering officials themselves. Third, the previously established relationships with the majority group deteriorated, and as public hostility mounted,



members of the Japanese minority became preoccupied with the problem of how to conduct themselves so as to avoid unpleasant incidents and minimize public antagonism. Finally, they were gripped by a sense of helplessness in the face of a rising hostility that was propelled by forces beyond their control. The state of mind was reflected in their frantic but insignificant gestures at self protection, their endless but futile discussions of what to do, and their fluctuations between hope and despair with each new development. They cooperated with the evacuation only because they were helpless to do otherwise.

The assembly centers.--The evacuation was accomplished through three types of movements: (1) voluntary evacuation, (2) direct evacuation from homes to relocation centers, and (3) evacuation from homes to "assembly centers." The majority of the 110,000 evacuees were moved by the last of these methods.

Because of the military view that the safety of the Pacific Coast required the immediate evacuation of Japanese Americans, it was necessary to construct temporary "assembly centers" where the evacuees could be housed to await the construction of the more permanent "relocation centers." Fifteen assembly centers, administered by the Wartime Civilian Control Administration (WCCA), a civilian arm of the Western Defense Command, were established on race tracks and fair grounds where minimum facilities of water, electric power, and sewage disposal were available. The centers were raised with the utmost speed, and while they were intended for very temporary use, evacuees resided in them from two to six months.



The conditions of the centers reflected the speed with which they were built. Evacuees were housed in shed-like barracks, or "apartments" constructed out of horse stables and exposition booths. Crowding and loss of privacy were unavoidable. Toilets, shower and laundry facilities were generally inadequate. Meals, served army style in central mess halls, were generally regarded as unappetizing and insufficient. Not only were there "food gripes", but occasional occurrences of mild dysentery aroused considerable talk of food poisoning.

Medical and dental services, poorly equipped and understaffed, were caught between the administrative delays in providing supplies and the criticism by evacuees of the service. Recreational and educational programs existed, but they were generally more disorganized or unorganized than other aspects of the centers. These and other functions were maintained by workers employed at rates of eight, twelve and sixteen dollars per month.

For the evacuees the assembly center marked their first taste of incarceration behind barbed-wire fences. The limitations of space, the presence of armed military guards, and the regulations restricting their lives all contributed to an acute sense of imprisonment. Moreover, the contrast between the conveniences of the homes which they had just left and the inconveniences of the assembly center inevitably led to a sharp awareness of their losses. Relieved of the pressure of events that had occupied them up to the evacuation, the evacuees tended to become engrossed in the question of how they had come to suffer the degradation, and



of how they might have prevented the debacle. Feelings of resentment and bitterness which had previously existed as individual reactions began to acquire a collective basis.

Where articulated hostility emerged, much of it was directed against the groups administering the assembly centers, the WCCA and the evacuees in high administrative positions. The WCCA, organized as a civilian branch of the Army, ~~tended to bear~~<sup>bore</sup> many features of army structure, authority hierarchy, and regulations. In such a system it was unavoidable that initiative should be withdrawn from individual evacuees and be vested in the Caucasian officials, but the consequence was that responsibility for the shortcomings of the centers was attributed almost entirely to the administering group. The failure to correct the conditions was taken as additional evidence of white discrimination against a racial minority.

In general, evacuee leadership was entrusted to the JACL, and where this was done, the hostility against the WCCA was often extended to the former as well. Following the deterioration of Issei leadership and organizations after the outbreak of war, the JACL was the only remaining organization in the Japanese communities sufficiently organized to assume community leadership during the critical period of the evacuation. Because it was the one functioning organization in most of the communities, the Army and the WCCA naturally turned to the JACL to organize the evacuees, but many regarded the JACL as having preempted power. For with the uprooting and reshuffling of people occasioned by the evacuation, a struggle for status was started that led to no little cri-



ticism and jealousy over the automatic installation of JACL leaders in positions of influence. Moreover, from the time of the Tolan Hearings the JACL had consistently declared a policy of cooperation with the authorities, and serving as the organization did in a liaison capacity between the evacuees and the authorities administering the evacuation, it made itself an easy target for the accusations, "Puppets of the WCCA," and, "Collaborationists." Criticism of the JACL continued throughout the war, and at the relocation centers, its leaders were sometimes subjected to severe attacks.

#### The Tule Lake Relocation Center

Setting of the Tule Lake Project.---On March 18, 1942, the War Relocation Authority was created by an Executive Order of the President that authorized the agency to take into custody the people evacuated by the Army and WCCA, and provide for their housing, employment, medical care, and relocation.<sup>17</sup> Ten relocation centers ranging in capacity from 8,000 to 20,000 evacuees were constructed for the purpose, and among these one of the largest and earliest established was the Tule Lake Relocation Center.

The Tule Lake Project was located in the northeast corner of California, thirty-seven miles south of Klamath Falls, Oregon, in a semi-desert region where nothing <sup>(but)</sup> desert brush, desert grass and range of bald buttes were visible from the camp site. The soil of the adjacent Lower Klamath Basin, however, was extremely fertile when properly irrigated, and the United

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<sup>17</sup>Ibid... pp. 316-17.



States Bureau of Reclamation had virtually completed development of the land for immediate cultivation. 2500 acres of it were laid in crops by evacuee farmers during the first year of project operation.

The project area covered about 32,000 acres of land straddling the Klamath Falls-Alturas highway and railroad, but the camp site proper, the project center, was an area of only about one square mile that was enclosed by barbed-wire fences and guard towers manned by the military police. Initially, the evacuees, except for those holding work passes, were confined to the project center, but a later ruling permitted freer access to the entire project.

One corner of the center was reserved for the military police, a permanent force of two or three hundred men whose contacts with the evacuees were restricted to the outer boundaries of the center. The rest of the center was divided into four sections: the administrative and personnel housing area, the warehouse and factory section, the hospital area, and the evacuee residential area, each separated from the others by wide firebreaks. The evacuee residential area, laid in a checkerboard pattern of barracks, was divided into seven large wards with the wards in turn being subdivided into nine blocks.

The block, roughly comparable in size to an ordinary city block, was the basic administrative and social unit of the community. Built for an average capacity of 250 residents, each block consisted of fourteen residential barracks, a mess hall, a recreation hall, men and women's toilets and showers, and a laundering



and ironing room. An evacuee block manager was appointed to each block by the administration, and since all block administrative functions were served through his office, it tended to become a focal point of block activity.

Each residential barrack, measuring twenty by one hundred feet, was partitioned into living units of varying sizes (twenty by twenty feet on the average) to accommodate different sized families. What were known as "apartments" were essentially sleeping quarters furnished only with beds and a stove, for all other household functions were carried out in the public facilities of the block.

Viewed through the eyes of those confined in the center, the monotonously uniform rows of black tar-papered barracks laid out on a gray, dried-out lake bed presented a dull, oppressive scene. Except for small plots of lawn or garden laboriously cultivated by a few energetic residents, nothing grew at the camp site other than desert grass and brush. Occasional wind storms cloaked the camp in a stinging fog of sand.

The WRA administered the center through a highly centralized system of bureaus. Executive authority and responsibility rested with the project director and assistant project director. Immediately below, the primary functions of the community, including the administrative, employment and housing, transportation and supplies, public works, industry and agriculture, community services, internal security, and community enterprises, were served by "divisions." The offices of the project attorney and of reports had roughly a divisional status. The "divisions" were



in turn subdivided into "sections." The line of authority descended from the executive officers, through the divisional chiefs, to the section leaders, and, finally, to the evacuees. Except in rare instances, every office from the section leader or above was staffed by Caucasians, civil service personnel, while the evacuees functioned in a subordinate, dependent role.

Two evacuee organizations represented the community. In each of the sixty-four residential blocks, an evacuee block manager was appointed by the administration to serve in a liaison capacity in transmitting business and communication between the administration and the block residents. This group was organized into the Central Committee of Block Managers, composed of seven members, one representative from each ward, whose business was restricted to the strictly administrative relationships between the WRA (War Relocation Authority) and the community's residents. The more important political body was the Community Council, an advisory and a semi-legislative body whose powers of legislation and control over the community, however, were greatly restricted because of the wider powers that were necessarily in the hands of the WRA. Although it was the intent of the WRA that the Community Council should provide the evacuees with a means of self government, "self government" in the relocation centers meant little more than a parliamentary organization that went through the forms of governing but had little real power. If the Council had any function, it was as a communicating body that would transmit the residents' grievances to the administra-

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tion. During the first half year, the body was organized as a Temporary Community Council, composed of sixty-~~four~~<sup>two</sup> elected representatives, one from each block, all of whom were citizens because the WRA policy specifically excluded non-citizens from elected offices. This large and cumbersome structure was later, in the Permanent Community Council, replaced by a body of ~~seven~~<sup>twenty-eight</sup> representatives elected ~~from~~<sup>four</sup> each of the seven ward councils.

The centralized system of WRA administration presented one of the critical problems of adjustment to the evacuees. Since virtually every aspect of community life was centrally administered, personal control and occasions for individual decision were greatly curtailed. In the matter of feeding, for example, not only were the decisions about what, when and where food would be eaten centrally determined, but at times it also seemed to the evacuees that the question of whether they would be fed at all was beyond their control. Similarly, in employment, not only were the wage standards of \$12, \$16 and \$19 per month determined by the WRA, but all jobs were assigned through a single employment office and all workers were restricted by its offerings and regulations. Even questions of recreational activities were subject to administrative scrutiny. In other words, the evacuees had to learn to live within a system of "total organization." The system also had a leveling effect upon the evacuee population. Coupled with the disruption of the old status system and the throwing together of a heterogeneous mass of people, the more or less uniform conditions of housing, medical service and employment which all evacuees received tended



to erase social class differences. Finally, the sharpness of the superordinate-subordinate distinction between the Caucasian personnel and the evacuee residents, and the latter's almost complete dependence upon the administrators, forcibly drew the attention of the evacuees to the racial cleavage and their disadvantaged position.

Evacuee transfer movements.--The transfer of evacuees to the Tule Lake Relocation Center was accomplished through a series of movements, most of which were from assembly centers, but others which were directly from the homes without the temporary stay at the assembly center. On the morning of May 27, an advance detachment of 447 volunteers from the Puyallup and Portland Assembly Centers, selected to open the center, arrived at the Tule Lake Project. For almost two months thereafter, these movements occurred regularly until a total of almost 15,000 evacuees had been transferred to the center. The schedule of the major movements were:<sup>18</sup>

<u>Date of Movement</u>	<u>Point of Origin</u>	<u>Number Moved</u>	<u>Ward Location</u>
May 27	Puyallup and Portland Assembly Centers (Seattle and Portland)	447	Ward I
June 2 to 6	Direct evacuation from home (Rural Washington, Oregon and California)	1415	Ward I
June 16 to 24	Walerga Assembly Center (Sacramento, California)	4676	Wards II and III
June 25 to 29	Marysville A. C. (Rural, Upper Sacramento Valley)	2453	Ward IV



(Schedule of movements, continued)

<u>Date of Movement</u>	<u>Point of Origin</u>	<u>Number Moved</u>	<u>Ward Location</u>
July 10 to 13	Direct evacuation from home, "White Zone," (Rural, north- eastern California)	1726	Ward V
July 16 to 24	Pinedale A. C. (Rural Wash- ington and Tacoma, Washington)	4012	Wards VI and VII
Total intake, May 27, 1942 to July 24, 1942.		14729	

Including minor movements, a total of 15,180 evacuees were transferred by October, 1942, to the Tule Lake Project.

Among the relocation centers, the Tule Lake Center was unusual in the sectional distribution of its population, for no other center had as mixed a group of Washington, Oregon and California evacuees. Almost as soon as the different groups arrived, sectional prejudices and conflicts emerged. These feelings were especially aggravated by the difference in time of arrival of the various sectional groups, for the earliest arrivals had the choice of opportunities and were thought to have entrenched themselves before the arrival of others. The variations of sectional origin increased the problem of defining status in the new community. The large numbers of both city and rural people added to the heterogeneity of the population, and, as might be expected, a disproportionate number of leaders and those in administrative positions were drawn from those with a city background.

As the various transfer movements were made, residential quarters were assigned block by block and ward by ward with the



result that most of the residents of each ward had a common sectional origin. Thus, Wards II and III were dominated by people from the city of Sacramento, Wards IV and V were rural Californians from the northeastern section of the state, and Wards VI and VII were rural Washingtonians from the White River and Puyallup Valleys, or city people from Tacoma. Ward I alone had a heavily mixed population of city and rural people, and those from the three Pacific Coast states.

A comment should be made of the group known as the "White Zone" evacuees who were evacuated directly from their homes in early July, and were located in Ward V. These were people who had resided east of Highway 99 in California, a zone that was initially designated by General DeWitt as not subject to evacuation, and was therefore shown on WCCA maps of the evacuation in white by contrast with the blacked-out exclusion areas. By an unexpected late proclamation, residents of this area were made subject to evacuation. The effect upon this group, composed mostly of farming families, was disastrous, for most of them had proceeded with spring planting on the presumption of non-evacuation only to lose their crops because of their inability to remain and harvest it.<sup>19</sup> This Ward subsequently proved to be unusually resistant to certain aspects of the WRA program, and it seems very likely that the special hardships involved in the evacuation of the population may have had a significant influence upon their reaction.

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<sup>19</sup>Thomas and Nishimoto, op. cit., p. 12f.



Finally, among the ten WRA centers, the Tule Lake Project had the largest single concentration of people. Poston, with a larger number, and Gila River with a slightly smaller population, were both divided into two or three spatially separate sub-units each of which were somewhat autonomously administered. There is some evidence that the problems of management and the pressures upon the administration were increased by the larger massing of people at the Tule Lake Project.

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