

10:22

Suzuki, Peter T.

Anthropologists in the Wartime Camps...

1981

83/115  
C



See pp. 30-1, 38-9.

# DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

WASHINGTON  
UNIVERSITY

SEP 1 1981

LIBRARIES  
SERIALS DEPT.

VOLUME 6, 1981

no. 1 (August)



ELSEVIER



## ANTHROPOLOGISTS IN THE WARTIME CAMPS FOR JAPANESE AMERICANS: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY

Peter T. Suzuki

There are many accounts — some quite recent — which document the historical roles of social scientists in the War Relocation Authority, the government agency established in March 1942 to administer the relocation camps for Japanese Americans (including alien Japanese) [1]. Therefore, only a few basic matters regarding that history need be recounted here.

Initially, there were nine camps under the War Relocation Authority (WRA). The tenth, at Poston, Arizona, was on an Indian reservation (as was Gila, Arizona, which was always under WRA management). For this reason the Office of Indian Affairs administered Poston for a year before it came under WRA's aegis. In March 1942, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier, an anthropologist, made plans for a social science research laboratory at Poston. In August 1942, a psychiatrist and anthropologist, Lieutenant Commander Alexander H. Leighton, Medical Corps, USNR, consultant with the Indian Personality and Research Project, headed the laboratory, which was established as the Bureau of Sociological Research. In turn, Leighton recruited two anthropologists, Edward H. Spicer and Elizabeth Colson, who, along with fifteen

Japanese Americans, undertook research on Poston life [2].

Also, in March 1942, John H. Provinse, anthropologist with the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, was appointed Chief of the Community Management Division, one of the largest divisions within WRA, with headquarters in Washington, D.C. He, too, conceived of social science research in the relocation camps. John F. Embree, an anthropologist who had conducted field research in Japan, was requested to head the Documentation Section within the Reports Division, the latter being another major WRA office. What eventually emerged as a result of this bureaucratic activity was the Community Analysis Section within the Community Management Division, with Embree as the first head of the Community Analysis Section (CAS). CAS, with headquarters in Washington, was formerly established by the director of WRA on February 26, 1943, and there came to be a CAS in each of the camps (later on, in Poston as well) [3].

WRA's agreement to establish the Community Analysis Section was of itself a major concession because Embree had to hurdle many obstacles in order to get this sub-agency.

---

Peter T. Suzuki is Professor of Urban Studies at the University of Nebraska at Omaha.



Embree had managed to impress a WRA official, John Baker, who looked upon CAS or an agency similar to it as a potential "boondoggle." However, Embree's "prediction of riots in a letter from Manzanar [a camp in California] in September [1942] had come true in a memo to him [Baker] with the subject title 'The Need of Social Analysis'".

Almost simultaneously, from February 1942 through December 1945, another research project, The Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Study, was being conducted under the direction of the sociologist Dorothy S. Thomas of the University of California at Berkeley. Although most of its field staff were Japanese Americans, three white social scientists did field work in camps; two were anthropologists, viz., Robert F. Spencer at Gila camp, Arizona, followed by Rosalie Hankey Wax [5]. Also, at the University of California at Los Angeles, Leonard Broom (Bloom), a sociologist, conducted longitudinal research on Evacuation (i.e., the evacuation, detention, and relocation of Japanese Americans), with special reference to its impact on the Japanese American family and upon the economic consequences of Evacuation [6]. Finally, mention must be made of a sociologist at the University of Southern California, Emory Bogardus, who studied various aspects of the evacuation through visits, correspondence, and interviews, and published his results in five articles in the journal *Sociology and Social Research*.

So far as the Community Analysis Section was concerned, it was an anthropological enterprise from beginning to end. Only one non-anthropologist, Frank L. Sweetser, a sociologist, held an administrative post within CAS, and that was only for a period of eight months (in the Washington Office) before he resigned for the Navy. The staffing was as follows (the list includes the Poston staff; asterisks denote sociologists) [7]:

Gordon Armbruster (Minidoka, Idaho)  
James H. Barnett\* (Gila, Arizona)  
G. Gordon Brown (Gila)  
Elizabeth Colson (Poston, Arizona)  
John de Young (Minidoka, and Manzanar, California)  
John F. Embree (Director, Community Analysis Section, Washington, D.C.)  
David H. French (Poston)  
Asael T. Hansen (Heart Mountain, Wyoming)  
E. Adamson Hoebel (Granada, Colorado)  
Oscar F. Hoffman\* (Topaz, Utah)  
Solon T. Kimball (Head, Community Government Section, Community Management Division, Washington, D.C.)  
Weston LaBarre (Topaz)  
Margaret Lantis (Rohwer, Arkansas, and West Coast Locations)  
Forrest LaViolette\* (Heart Mountain)  
Alexander H. Leighton (Poston)  
Katherine Luomala (Washington, D.C.; Rohwer, Arizona, and West Coast Locations)  
John Ralph McFarling\* (Granada)  
Edgar C. McVoy\* (Jerome, Arizona)  
Marvin K. Opler (Tule Lake, California)  
Morris E. Opler (Manzanar)  
John H. Provinse (Chief, Community Management Division, Washington, D.C.)  
John A. Rademaker\* (Granada)  
Rachael R. Sady (Jerome, and Washington, D.C.)  
Elmer R. Smith (Minidoka)  
Edward H. Spicer (Poston, Assistant Director, Community Analysis Section; Director, Community Analysis Section, Washington, D.C.)  
Frank L. Sweetser\* (Assistant Director, Community Analysis Section, Washington, D.C.)  
Charles Wisdom\* (Rowher)

In addition, the following scholars played special roles:

Conrad M. Arensberg (Consultant, Poston)  
John Collier (Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and Poston)  
Robert Redfield (General Consultant)  
Robert F. Spencer (Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Study, Gila)  
Laura Thompson (Consultant, Poston)  
Rosalie Hankey Wax (Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Study, Gila and Tule Lake)

On the first list, 20 of the 27 were anthropologists (i.e., 74.07%). All of these social scientists had done graduate work at, or had received their terminal degrees from, top-ranked departments of anthropology and sociology:

viz., California, Harvard, and Pennsylvania (Seattle), Washington.

The role of Analysts — scientists in the WRA — in order to do Community engagement work, reports Division ".... Community with group causes of social individual interested in this point, in 1944 to a conference in Denver; names were to ".... informants."

As I have in publications in WRA, but by those who thus, to date by any of the the use of Japanese research in the individuals have past experience or [11]. Consequently from scientists in the fact that an internee because I rely in the Nation which previous largely ignored accounts given by former administrators.



viz., California (Berkeley), Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, London, Minnesota, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Radcliffe, Toronto, Washington (Seattle), Wisconsin, and Yale.

The role and functions of the Community Analysts – the title designated for the social scientists in the Community Analysis Section of WRA – were spelled out in great detail [8]. In order to allay the fear among internees that Community Analysts would be doing intelligence work, CAS was separated from the Reports Division. As Embree saw the situation, “.... Community Analysis would be concerned with group investigating and analyzing the causes of social upsets, not with apprehending individual law breakers. Analysts would be interested in why, not who [9]. To reinforce this point, he voiced the following concern in 1944 to Community Analysts at a special conference on Community Analysis held at Denver; namely, that Community Analysts were to “... preserve the confidence of [their] informants.” [10].

As I have indicated, there have been many publications on the role of the social scientist in WRA, but they have been written primarily by those who held administrative positions: thus, to date, there has been no publication by any of the “natives,” i.e., inmates. Despite the use of Japanese Americans in social science research in the WRA camps, none of these individuals has provided information on their past experiences (despite the Americanist dependence on the words of field informants) [11]. Consequently, this paper differs significantly from previous publications on social scientists in WRA not only with reference to the fact that I had no ties with WRA save as an internee [12] but, more importantly, because I rely heavily upon unpublished materials in the National Archives, an important source which previously published accounts have largely ignored [13]. Hence, the published accounts presently available – be they authored by former Community Analyst Section administrators or Community Analysts – fail to

provide adequate information about what these social scientists in WRA actually did in the camps (general or programmatic statements aside).

It was not until August of 1943 that the staffing of the Community Analysis Section was finally completed. By then there were two analysts and an assistant in the Washington Office, and a Community Analyst in each of the nine WRA camps (not including Poston, where Leighton, Spicer, and Colson were stationed) [14]. Therefore,

by the time the Community Analysis Section was established, all but one of the basic policies of the War Relocation Authority had been decided. The setting up of large camps with populations as great as 17,000, employment of evacuees at a \$12 - \$16 - \$19 a month wage scale, the encouragement of self-government, the provision of indefinite leave for purposes of resettlement outside the camps, and the subordination of community development in the centers to re-establishment in normal communities – all these basic policies were settled before December, 1942. Of major policy determinations, only that of segregation of the loyal and disloyal had not been decided by that time. Thus it was not as advisers in long-range planning and fundamental policy decisions that the Community Analysts functioned. Throughout the program they worked at sizing up problems which stood in the way of executing the basic policies, and to a lesser extent at devising means for solving those problems [15].

## RELOCATION POLICY

At first, the ten camps were envisaged as permanent settlements, or at least for the duration of the war. However, this policy was suddenly changed to that of relocation; i.e., of emptying the camps as quickly as possible, with the goal of distributing the Japanese Americans throughout the various areas of the United States not restricted to them. This switch in policy came so suddenly that, at Poston, AZ, John Collier was caught in the embarrassing position of having told the internees that they would be a Poston 40 years thence, i.e., until 1982. Several weeks after having made this announcement, WRA promulgated the relocation policy and the policy of closing the camps before the end of the war [16]. Thus, by the end of March



1943, WRA was providing some financial aid, e.g., one-way second-class railroad tickets to the place of destination and settling-in allowances of approximately \$50 (which was later reduced to \$25), as an inducement for relocation [17]. Because of the official WRA policy, relocation became a major concern of Community Analysts as well, and a no-nonsense attitude was made clear to them. When Marvin Opler was preparing for his assignment at Tule Lake, for example, Embree advised him as follows:

... one of the first problems that the Community Analyst will be concerned with is ... resistances [to relocation] of the residents [inmates] with a view to discover what lies behind them and how they may be overcome... [W]hen ever a person has an opportunity to relocate he should be encouraged to do so and never discouraged no matter how temporary it may be to ask a person to stay in the center [camp] "as a duty to the program" or "as a duty to his fellow residents" [18].

The tone for Community Analysts was more firmly established by means of Embree's widely circulated report entitled "Evacuee Resistances to Relocation" [19]. Accordingly, every minor adjustment by the inmates to camp life was interpreted as a form of resistance [20], and other Community Analysts picked up the cue and wrote reports about the "resistances" — some with remarkably similar titles. For example, although at Gila for less than four weeks, one of Community Analyst Barnett's few reports was a two-page document entitled "Factors and Conditions that May Retard Resettlement" [21]. Furthermore, to underscore the rectitude of WRA policy, when Embree's report appeared in published form in *Applied Anthropology*, it became "Resistance to Freedom." The identical title was then used by Spicer for an article in his well-known book of case studies in anthropology [22]. As Assistant to the Chief of the Community Analysis Section in the Washington Office, Spicer was equally concerned about relocation. Thus, he requested Margaret Lantis to look into "factors making

for successful farm relocation" [23], and those which "cause families to decide to remain in the centers rather than resettle" [24], because Lantis had evinced an interest in inmates with rural background, when she was about to start research in a camp with a grant from the Social Science Research Council [25].

In point of fact, so intent was WRA on relocation that Jerome camp was closed on June 30, 1944, as a demonstration to the internees of the seriousness with which relocation was to be viewed. Community Analysts were also required to submit reports on the progress of relocation and the resistances to it: numerous documents attest to their having dutifully followed instructions [26]. Surveys and attitude studies were undertaken, and even the focus of education in the camps changed: "... the real job of the [camp] schools is 'education for relocation'," noted one educator [27]; and John Rademaker, Community Analyst at Granada, developed a detailed curriculum for the secondary school in that camp; "A Syllabus for Social Studies Courses on Relocation" [28].

In one of his many letters marked "Confidential," Rademaker (to Spicer) devoted most of the thirteen single-spaced typed pages to condemning the inmates of Granada who were refusing to relocate. Among other things, he wrote, "The public opinion and attitudes which one meets among the evacuees is becoming, in my judgment, more and more psychopathic" [29]; therefore he recommended to Spicer that a psychiatrist be assigned to this camp to help the Japanese Americans and the relocation program along [30]. Despite Spicer's feelings about relocation, even Rademaker's perspective, as indicated in the letter cited, seemed to the former a bit extreme: "John [Rademaker] can reason his way to an understanding of the analyst's role in the WRA job. But it is clear that he is more interested in evangelization (sic) work that is involved in relocating people" [31].

Paradoxically, it was this same Community

Analyst who contradicted administrative reports, that is vital and of all evaluations of this notion. Office signed to reports, that not proceed. Community office at reservation.

Resistance concept WRA is a result of the insight developed. Arguably due to the people's opportunity and to leave plans based. As an example, resettle in come assigned had better English can teach you do not show we interpret the premise the need resistance of thought.

Furthermore, the notion of Embree noted with [Poston] serious loss and exact program and all for immediate without aesthetic to note the



Analyst who, some months earlier, had flatly contradicted Embree's report: "Contrary to administration belief a resistance to relocation does not exist. The realization that relocation is vital and inevitable is universal in the minds of all evacuees" [32]. To disabuse Rademaker of this notion a staff member of the Washington Office, Anne Freed, was immediately assigned to show him, by means of research reports, that relocation at Granada was indeed not proceeding rapidly enough [33]. But a Community Analyst who later assumed this office at Granada, McFarling, also had some reservations about the resistance theory.

Resistance then is a result of the evacuee's failure to accept WRA's solution to his problem, and this failure is a result of his not having the opportunity to develop the insight into his problem which the WRA has developed. Again it may be partly due to difficulty, and partly due to unwillingness on the part of WRA to take the people freely into their confidence; to give opportunity and time for full discussion and insight and then to leave responsibility with them in working out their plans based on this insight.

As an example: WRA says, because you are going to resettle in communities throughout the country and become assimilated into the life of those communities you had better learn to speak English. So we will set up English classes in our adult education department and teach you English. The Issei [first-generation Japanese] do not show up for English classes in large numbers, and we interpret it as resistance. In reality he does not accept the premise WRA starts with and therefore does not see the need for learning English. This may be interpreted as resistance while it actually constitutes two different lines of thought [34].

Furthermore, simultaneously with the distribution of Embree's report of June 1943, Leighton noted with alarm that "The Nisei are leaving [Poston] in such numbers as to constitute a serious loss to manpower and leadership" [35], and exactly one month later, warned, "The program of mass relocation should be slowed, and all forms of coercion, direct and indirect immediately stopped" [36]. Even a sociologist, without any ties to WRA, totally unsympathetic to the Japanese Americans was pleased to note that the inmates were leaving the camps

at a rate of 75 a day by the end of January 1943 [37].

Given the insecurity, hostility, and uncertainty that the internees faced, relocation was certainly moving along at a very fast pace. In fact, at Minidoka, relocation was proceeding so rapidly that a special conference was arranged to discuss a camp policy for those under eighteen years of age wishing to leave unaccompanied [38].

To one who was not incarcerated everything was simple: relocation was an imperative. Thus, a white employee of Manzanar told Community Analyst Morris Opler: "If I were an evacuee and could get out of here, I'd move so fast you couldn't see anything but dust, because you never know what is going to happen next. The worries and uncertainties of the outside cannot be any worse than what they undergo here" [39].

A draconian measure was envisaged by the Community Analyst of Jerome, McVey, who, in commenting favorably about a report extrapolated the following thoughts, as expressed to Embree.

I read with great interest the Tule Lake [camp] report on resistances to resettlement, particularly the conclusions with regard to group resettlement. If most of the community analysts are agreed on this approach (I heartily concur...), why don't we put the screws on the WRA to initiate such a program? I think our dream of complete assimilation in one quick jump is fantastic. What we know about the persistence of culture patterns certainly should teach us that [40]. I probably sound by this time [i.e., after a full page and a half on this proposal] like a monomaniac on this subject, but I still believe that unless we have such a program, we shall have the majority of the Issei on our hands for the duration or x months thereafter; they might provide interesting studies of family degeneration for us community analysts (if we retain our morale that long) but it (sic) won't provide a very savory page from the *Rise of American Civilization* [41].

To spur relocation, McVoy also recommended that "*employment might be denied an evacuee who refuses a bona fide job offer without adequate justification*" [42].

Moreover, the Japanese Americans were



under constant pressure: Community Analysts such as E. Adamson Hoebel (Granada) gave pep talks about the virtues of relocation to the inmates in the evening hours [43]. Some concerned inmates (Minidoka, ID) therefore used the only legitimate avenue of protest available to internees in the ten camps. Since the Spanish government had been designated the neutral power to protect Japanese in war-time America, it was to the Spanish Consul, Captain Antonio R. Martin, that sixteen Minidokans submitted a statement of protest concerning, among other things, what they considered to be high-handed methods in pressuring the internees to relocate [44]. Any contact with the Spanish government made the Community Analysts extremely nervous [45], and one Minidoka dissident who had written to Captain Martin even before the group of sixteen was called to Spicer's attention by a resident Community Analyst [46]. The petition of the sixteen caused great consternation: as with the previous complaint from the single inmate, Community Analyst John de Young notified Spicer. Spicer (who had taken Embree's place in August 1943 when the latter resigned), upon receipt of the information from de Young, notified Provinse, head of the Community Management Division. Spicer was thanked for the information, which included the names of the dissidents who had signed the petition. Then Provinse sent a letter to Harry L. Stafford, the Project Director (camp director) of Minidoka, to express his concern.

My particular reason for writing you now is to make inquiry as to the relationship of the individuals signing the report to relocation, and their influence in the development of negative attitudes among the community, affecting the present and future welfare of the evacuees [41].

The letter then listed the names of three of the dissidents who had signed the petition to Captain Martin [48]. Interesting enough, a

book by Spicer and three other anthropologists and Community Analysts, Asael Hansen, Katherine Luomala, and Marvin Opler, accurately describes some of the conditions which led to the petition, and cites several long passages from the petition. However, the book fails to mention the role that Community Analysts played in the processing of that information [49].

Despite the turmoils and upheavals that all ten camps went through at one time or another [50], when WRA was terminated the Community Analysts took satisfaction in the following statistic: by December 1944, "more than 30,000 — over a quarter of the total number of evacuees — had left the centers [51].

Passages from a thorough study of Evacuation by two sociologists who had no ties with WRA shed quite a different light on the relocation policy to which the Community Analysts were committed.

Families choosing the loyal alternative [vs. the "disloyal"] were no less harassed by administration policies [regarding relocation]. Even while faced with the prospect of losing their Nisei sons to the Army, the families were subjected to increasing pressures to relocate. The relocation program was first directed at the Nisei, for in effecting their relocation the Administration assumed it would have a lever by which to relocate their parents. The effect of the Administration's policy, far from promoting concerted family action, encouraged individuated action by the Nisei. The residue, the "unrelocatables," who obstinately remained in the center despite the Administration's persuasions and warnings were to plague WRA to the end of the relocation program. The majority of the residue was comprised of families with young children and old Issei who presented dependency problems. The Administration's encouragement of Nisei as a means of relieving themselves temporarily of responsibility of Issei. Relief from familial responsibility was short-lived, however; the Administration closed the centers less than two years after the majority of the adult Nisei had relocated. The announcement in December, 1944, that the centers would be closed within a year shifted the relocation program from a voluntary to a compulsory basis. The policy presumed that the evacuees would return to the areas from which they were evacuated and consequently no further rationale for the existence of WRA remained. When the evacuees did not plan immediate relocation, the Administration presented them with the ultimatum, euphemistically termed "scheduled relocation" [52].

The an  
understan  
well) that  
evacuees i  
the same  
Japanese  
petuating  
the "loyal  
anthropol  
complexit

#### SEGREGAT

Attenti  
major WR  
removal of  
loyal to a  
to be know

Once th  
from the  
standards,

... the con  
disclosed  
evacuees b  
with regar  
fined by W  
to Question  
loyalty que  
fill the stri  
those who  
Japan; tho  
of the Proj  
vious state  
had been d  
camp indef  
explained a  
parolees fr  
detention

Segregat  
ing effect o  
Tule Lake.  
euphemism  
tion, was to  
cerned. On  
which a per  
fear and un  
ditions were



The anthropologists apparently did not understand (or perhaps they understood too well) that relocation thrust the Japanese evacuees into a hostile white community; at the same time, it broke up the possibility of Japanese solidarity in the camps, while perpetuating the invidious distinction between the "loyal" and "disloyal". In short, the anthropologists failed to grapple with the complexity of the Japanese dilemma.

### SEGREGATION POLICY

Attention will now be paid to another major WRA policy, that of segregation, or the removal of those who were considered disloyal to a special camp, Tule Lake, which came to be known as the segregation center.

Once the "disloyals" had been distinguished from the "loyals" by means of questionable standards,

... the consequences for actions then taken were finally disclosed [by WRA]: the war-duration incarceration of all evacuees believed to be disloyal at Tule Lake. Disloyalty with regard to descendants of the Japanese had been defined by Washington as follows: Those who answered "no" to Question 28 or had *failed* to or *refused* to answer the loyalty question; (conditional responses also failed to fulfill the stringent requirement of "unqualified allegiance"); those who had applied for repatriation or expatriation to Japan; those whose loyalty was questionable *in the opinion of the Project Director* [camp director] "because of previous statements or because of other evidence;" those who had been denied leave clearance [i.e., a permit to leave camp indefinitely or for seasonal work] due to some unexplained adverse information found in a dossier; also parolees from alien internment camps recommended for detention [53].

Segregation was not only to have a stigmatizing effect on those who were to be removed to Tule Lake, but, like registration (the official euphemism for the loyalty oath) and relocation, was to have a divisive impact on all concerned. Owing to the questionable bases upon which a person could be removed to Tule Lake, fear and suspicion were rife in the camps. Conditions were ideal to ferret out those considered

to be disloyal or to settle old scores. As an example, John Rademaker (Community Analyst, Granada), who had suspected from 50 to 100 "disloyals" there, in a letter to the camp director, wanted to hold

immediate hearings on 10 or 12 Kibei [second-generation Japanese Americans who had had some or all of their education in Japan] leaders... and send them forthwith to Leupp [a special camp in Arizona for dissidents and "troublemakers"]. *The evidence [against them] would be fragmentary* but after the vociferous leaders are yanked out, it will be easier to get further evidence from loyal residents [54].

Rademaker then proposed to the camp director of Granada that the denial of leave clearance, and thus of relocation or failure to qualify for a pass to leave camp temporarily, "might be used as a criterion for shipping them out [to Leupp]. We could catch most of them that way without delay and without further hearings and fuss" [55]. He also routinely passed on reports to the FBI agent and to the representative of Naval Intelligence [stationed at Granada] "regarding the 'disloyals'" [56]. In order to find out more about them, the same Community Analyst, with the permission of the camp director, attended inmate meetings which were known to both as being illegal [57]. Furthermore, in line with this kind of work, from March 25 to April 7, 1944, when "a colored attorney from Los Angeles," Hugh MacBeth, visited Granada, Rademaker immediately reported this event to the camp director of Granada. What struck Rademaker was that the visitor wanted to form "a comprehensive alliance of colored peoples" [58], and, because, according to MacBeth, the Japanese, like the Negroes, were "slaves," this Black man urged cooperation among the "slaves," to overthrow their "masters" [59]. Rademaker concluded that, "... the evidence we have here indicates that Mr. MacBeth is genuinely and sincerely concerned about the injustices which are unquestionably being suffered by colored people the world over"



[60]. Nevertheless, a report on MacBeth was duly sent to the FBI agent at Granada by Rademaker [61]; furthermore Rademaker provided the Naval Intelligence Officer at Granada with information about MacBeth [62].

Rademaker did not confine his intelligence work to gathering data on internees and visitors. The camp director of Granada requested him to sit in on staff meetings (composed solely of whites) where, for example, Rademaker "... listened carefully for reaction to that [staff] meeting [of July 12, 1943] and for conversations concerning such meetings in general" [63], and in two separate documents to the camp director, reported to him conversations he had overheard among the white staff members [64]. The result of this type of work was a document of seventeen single-spaced typed pages sent to Spicer, in which 23 key white administrators of Granada were evaluated [65].

A different approach to intelligence work was undertaken by McVoy, a Community Analyst (Jerome) when, in May and June 1943, he conducted a series of six interviews: the first with two block managers (Japanese Americans) and the others with Japanese American religious leaders (Christian and Buddhist clergy) [66]. The contents of these interviews reveal quite clearly that McVoy was expressly gathering data of an intelligence nature. In one interview he wanted to get information about "the most dangerous group" in Jerome [67], and in another, about the "separation of loyal and disloyal groups" [68], while in a third, about the loyalty to the U.S. of a Buddhist priest's followers [69]. The significance of these interviews with the spiritual leaders of the Jerome camp takes on an added dimension when one learns that the Jerome director, shortly thereafter, "removed" from camp "another" Buddhist, a certain Reverend T., who, along with two other men, was sent to Leupp, AZ, the isolation camp for "trouble-makers," for his alleged pro-Japan attitude [70].

No less of an intelligence operation was the request in a memorandum by E. Adamson Hoebel (who succeeded Rademaker), to the Granada Relocation Officer, for "a list of the names and addresses of the [Japanese American] boys... who failed to answer the Selective Service call, giving the date of the delinquency" [71]. The information that Community Analyst Hoebel received from Walter Knodel was then analyzed to make a list and map showing the distribution of the evaders, which he then passed on to Knodel [72], in addition to a lengthy classified report on the subject of evaders to the Granada camp director [73]. Likewise, Spicer's passing on to an official at Tule Lake — the camp in California where the "disloyals" had been segregated — the names of two former inmates from Topaz who may have been in a strike which was going on at Tule Lake, must also be interpreted as an intelligence operation [74].

Furthermore, despite the admonition that Community Analysts "must never take on any administrative functions" [75], G. Gordon Brown, the Community Analyst (Gila) worked for the administration of that camp when he was put "in charge of maintaining the accuracy of all lists of those to be removed to Tule Lake," and was also appointed to a "special review committee" which judged cases of removal to Tule Lake [76]. At the request of the Granada camp director, John Rademaker also assumed membership on the segregation review panel of that camp [77].

In the context of segregation and intelligence work by anthropologists in the relocation camps, one who was with the Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Study, Rosalie Hankey Wax, must also be mentioned. Although lacking any special knowledge of Japanese Americans and any field work experience, Alfred Louis Kroeber notified Wax of a research position with the Evacuation and Resettlement Study because Robert Spencer, another Berkeley anthropol-

ogy grad  
AZ, had  
became  
1943, ma  
and in th  
Lake can  
By her o  
she was a  
her resea  
one infor  
"went a  
ment in t  
rate, Tule  
the "dislo  
contingen  
Lake bef  
there bec  
move aga  
a politica  
mount in  
work. Do  
ation and  
that Hank  
reports fr  
with who  
ber [of th  
Study] co  
tact" [82  
sion, Han  
did she id  
Japan gro  
with infor  
Tulean wh  
sentiment  
a cruel and  
the WRA  
those who  
asking for  
gotten it"  
this attitud

Memorandum  
given to me  
about the  
and the  
and the



ogy graduate student, who had been at Gila, AZ, had resigned. Rosalie Hankey (she later became Wax) went to Gila in the summer of 1943, made three brief visits to Tule Lake, and in the middle of May 1944, moved to Tule Lake camp, where she spent a full year [78]. By her own admission, while at Tule Lake, she was arrogant and deceptive while doing her research among the inmates [79], lied to one informant [80], and on several occasions "went a little crazy" [81] during her involvement in the activities of the Tuleans. To reiterate, Tule Lake was designated the camp for the "disloyals," although there was a large contingent who had originally been in Tule Lake before segregation, and had remained there because they felt it was inconvenient to move again or for other reasons. Activities of a political nature among Tuleans took on paramount importance in Rosalie Hankey's field work. Dorothy S. Thomas, head of the Evacuation and Resettlement Study, was to state that Hankey was able to obtain "confidential reports from a group of determined 'disloyals' with whom no Japanese-American staff member [of the Evacuation and Resettlement Study] could possibly have established contact" [82]. Indeed, again by her own admission, Hankey became a "fanatic," so closely did she identify herself with an alleged pro-Japan group which had been supplying her with information. Consequently, when a Tulean who did not share the same views and sentiments was murdered, she "... experienced a cruel and self-righteous satisfaction, for... the WRA and the Japanese accommodators [i.e., those who did not share her views] had been asking for it for a long time, and now they had gotten it" [83]. She was to later reflect upon this attitude:

Naively, I had taken the side of the "oppressed," and, as part of my protective self-deception, I had constructed an ideal model of "true Japanese" behavior — for the Japanese and for myself — and I proceeded (in my own mind) to

criticize and despise anyone who deviated from this model. That my model was melodramatic and unreal I did not then perceive. Nor did it occur to me that as a social scientist I had no business sitting in judgment on myself or on the people I was supposed to be studying and understanding [84].

Not until several months later did she come to the realization that "... the disposition to denigrate or look down on people who did not behave like "true Japanese" was silly and immature." Thus, she "... gave up trying to behave like a "true Japanese" ..." [85]. Hankey then reversed herself and became "an antifanatic" [86]. It was while in this second phase that she "did two very unprofessional deeds" [87]. Both involved informing the Department of Justice personnel at Tule Lake. In one instance Hankey interceded on behalf of an outspoken opponent of resegregationists (those in Tule Lake who wanted to go to Japan as expatriates or repatriates); the person at issue was about to be interned with a resegregation group (there was internal segregation within Tule Lake). Her talk with the Department of Justice staff prevented his being interned with that group. In the second instance, she denounced a vigorous proponent of renunciation of U.S. citizenship because he himself did not renounce it. Hankey again approached Department of Justice investigators, "... suggesting that they call in Mr. Kira [the proponent of renunciation] and question him about his loyalties in the presence of some of the young *Hokoku* [renunciants] officers. Mr. Kira [subsequent to the interrogation] applied for denationalization" [88].

Subsequently, he was sent to Japan with the other expatriates, and they were all once again confined in a "center," this time by the Japanese government. Many months later, a friend sent me a clipping from a California newspaper. The clipping told how a certain expatriate, Stanley Masanobu Kira, confined in a detention area in Japan, had appealed to the American army to remove him because certain of the young men confined with him were threatening to kill him [89].



In May 1945, shortly after the two encounters with the Department of Justice personnel, Hankey received a telephone call from Thomas in Berkeley ordering her to leave Tule Lake immediately, "without letting anyone know" [90]. At that point in her field work at Tule Lake, one of the few persons on the staff she could trust was a minister; with his help she slipped out of Tule Lake under cover of darkness that very night. She was expelled by WRA for having communicated with the Department of Justice (i.e., the FBI), among other reasons [91].

#### THE FORECASTING SKILLS OF COMMUNITY ANALYSTS

Two major policies of WRA, *relocation* and *segregation*, as previously noted, were closely followed and analyzed by Community Analysts. The question of ethics aside, since the Community Analysis Section was established on the strength of Embree's having accurately predicted trouble at Manzanar, and on the general forecasting skills of anthropologists and other social scientists, the question arises whether Community Analysts were, in fact, successful in predicting the "trouble pattern," which was supposed to be their specialty [92]. By their own accounts the Community Analysts failed.

[In 1943] with one exception there was a notable lack in the analysts' predictions concerning the effects of segregation. They viewed the process in terms of its effects on the centers [camps] in which they were working, exclusively. The analyst at Tule Lake [Marvin Opler] alone made an effort to envisage the problems which the segregation center itself would present. Neither the Tule Lake analyst or any other attempted to foresee in detail the problems which the new social aggregation of segregants would present. The lack reflected some serious deficiencies in the analysts' approaches: (1) a preoccupation with the norm in the communities in which they were working; (2) a lack of acquaintance with the extremist types of persons to be concentrated in the segregation center; and (3) insufficient knowledge of social organization and disorganization in the assembly and relocation centers [93].

Some of the above criticisms by the Washington Office which prepared the report were patently unfair, for it was the author of this report, the Washington Office, which was constantly exerting pressure on Community Analysts to analyze camp-specific events. Moreover, the criticism of lack of knowledge regarding social organization and disorganization in the assembly camps — the camps along the West Coast where the Japanese Americans had been temporarily incarcerated before having been moved to the relocation camps — was disingenuous, in view of the following: on April 23, 1943, Anne O. Freed, Assistant Social Science Analyst of the Washington Office, completed a detailed interview study of conditions in the assembly centers. This was followed on July 14, 1943 by another detailed analysis of data on assembly camps [94]. In a note written in blue pencil attached to Freed's July document and sent to Provinse, Spicer wrote:

It [Freed's report] would ... have to be Restricted material. Problems it presents are 1. Criticisms of the Army and WCCA [Wartime Civil Control Administration, the agency which ran the sixteen assembly camps] implied in some descriptions of conditions which could be taken amiss in some quarters. 2. Implications for internees and prisoners in Japan [95].

In his reply, Provinse wrote to Spicer that he had discussed the matter of restricting the July Freed report with Dillon Myer, head of WRA, and concluded: "... it seems best not to give any wide distribution at this time. Let's file" [96].

In the same semi-annual report by the Washington Office referred to earlier, Morris Opler, Community Analyst at Manzanar, was singled out for criticism because "he worked more like an old-fashioned ethnologist, obtaining great masses of material on the pre-evacuation life of the Japanese" [97]. His detailed ethnographic reports "removed him from contact with the staff," and as a result, he had

little involvement" [98]. Opler "pre-ethnographic" minor administrative on the pro-

In other of Community beginning life of the analysis of successful [100], Opler done enough Washington director of Morris Opler report by quickly caught other things

The emphasis upon was to produce Mountain) ing remarkable developments which could [102].

Again, a of the Community six months previous re in the capacity to predict

In regard to lyon fell do have done in the segre prepare the immediate

Obtained Washington Office for the purpose of a separate report



little involvement in "project [camp] administration" [98]. Additionally, although Morris Opler "probed deeply," "this [old-fashioned ethnographic] approach lacked analyses of minor administrative programs and procedures on the project" [99].

In other words, because the "basic approach of Community Analysis was established at the beginning as not one of merely recording the life of the evacuees, but of contributing through analysis of social structures and attitudes to the successful execution of the WRA program" [100], Opler was castigated for not having done enough policy analysis studies to suit the Washington Office. When, however, the camp director of Manzanar wanted to eliminate Morris Opler's position after he had read the report by the Washington Office, Provinse quickly came to Opler's defense, noting, among other things, that his reports were "good" [101].

The emphasis placed by the Washington Office upon current events and policy analysis was to prompt the Community Analyst (Heart Mountain), Asael Hansen, to writing the following remark: "The pre-occupation with current developments meant that relatively little which could be called research was ever done" [102].

Again, according to the Washington Office of the Community Analysis Section, the next six months following the period covered in the previous report did not see any improvement in the capability of the Community Analysts to predict events.

In regard to the aspect of segregation, Community Analysis fell down. It did not analyze thoroughly, as it might have done, the nature of the population to be confined in the segregation center [Tule Lake]. It thus failed to prepare the administration to help forestall the Tule Lake Incident [of October/November 1943] [103].

Obviously — and tragically — no one at the Washington Office, and indeed in WRA, seems to have read closely nor took seriously Marvin K. Opler's insightful reports on Tule Lake, par-

ticularly on the effects of segregation if that camp were to be turned into a special place of segregation [104]. For example, during the summer of 1943, Marvin Opler submitted two lengthy analyses of the segregation program and its effects, including dire predictions, all of which came to pass that fall [105]. Aside from low morale, anger, frustration, and despair [106], he predicted a "run" on disloyalty by those who would declare themselves "disloyal," because of the bitterness which the situation would engender. The end result, Marvin Opler wrote, would be what he termed "paper-disloyalty" [107] and branded the loyalty issue as "phony" and "simplistic" [108]. He warned:

We must not allow segregation, least of all the motivation behind it, to become transformed at Tule Lake into a comic opera of the disloyalty myth. More important, we must guard against the promotion of disloyalty where none actually existed in fact... [109].

In this same 1943 report is found a prescient statement predicting the following: "... riots, passive resistance, run on disloyalty, [and] letters [by whites] to Mr. Dies [Chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee]" [110]. *Everything* Opler predicted came true.

#### COMMUNITY ANALYST REPORTS AS ANTHROPOLOGICAL DOCUMENTS

More than one former Community Analyst has invited those interested in relocation camps and applied anthropology to study Community Analyst reports as important anthropological documents [111]. According to Katherine Luomala, there are 2,356 documents by various people who worked in CAS or as Community Analysts. Actually, because many items in the National Archives mentioned by Luomala comprise entries made up of several documents clipped or stapled together, there are more than twice the number Luomala gives (not including the thousands upon thousands



of documents which make up the WRA record). These unpublished papers include letters, notes, reports, memoranda, clippings, and so on, which were written by, or to, Community Analysts and their staffs [112]. At Minidoka, for example, the Community Analysts, initially John de Young and later Elmer Smith [113], with a small staff of four or five Japanese Americans, submitted some 355 documents. Apart from the usual reports dealing with policy analysis (i.e., documents about the loyalty oath, relocation, segregation, and political activities), a significant number are devoted to ethnographic/ethnological studies [114]. The Tule Lake and Manzanar Community Analysis Sections, headed by Marvin Opler and Morris Opler respectively, were also prolific in documenting activities in an ethnographic/ethnological framework.

Despite the hundreds of documents, including scores of reports by Community Analysts and their staffs, a dismaying few were devoted exclusively to language and linguistics. This is doubly disappointing, in view of the well-rounded training aspirants in anthropology were getting in graduate schools before the war, as compared to today. In the National Archives there are several reports by Community Analysts on prewar Japanese language training in the West Coast communities and on Japanese language schools in these communities; there are, however, only three reports by Community Analysts on the language which was spoken in the relocation camps. All three are essentially word lists, which were compiled by the most productive Community Analysts; viz., Marvin Opler of Tule Lake [115], deYoung of Minidoka [116], and Smith, also of Minidoka [117]. Also, there are several brief reports from Minidoka written by the Japanese American staff [118]. Because these are the only extant documents on language spoken in the relocation camps, they are of inestimable value, and gratitude is long due to those who wrote these papers. Yet, by anthro-

pological standards the documents leave much to be desired. Insofar as they are strictly word lists, there is no analysis of the following: basic phonetic shifts in the Japanization of American English words; the influence of English structure on Nisei Japanese (e.g., sandhi forms, English gerund suffixing of Japanese verbs, etc.); the influence of Japanese structure on Nisei Japanese; the structural influence of Issei Japanese on Nisei English, a sound somewhat unique to Japanese; and so forth. Many of these features could have been deduced had a rigorous linguistic analysis been made of the word lists compiled, aided by standard elicitation methods [119]. Another criticism, albeit minor, is the following: unconventional orthographies were used despite the widespread use and acceptance of the Hepburn System of romanization of Japanese, a system which had been available since 1885. Even Bloch, who had developed a putatively superior system to the Hepburn had to admit that the Hepburn romanization system was "closer to a phonemic description" of Japanese than his own truly cumbersome alternative system [120]. The dearth of studies in linguistics is understandable in light of the phenomena on which Community Analysts were constrained to report. Still one can only be grateful for those few documents on language in the camps.

Moreover, despite the image of anthropologists as those who are holistically concerned with all facets of culture, the following shortcomings were evident. In the multitudes of documents they wrote, *only one* is a study of kinship: kinship studies, long anthropology's forte, were sadly neglected. The sole document, once again by the Minidoka Community Analysis Section staff, is a brief document with two of its double-spaced typed pages listing several of the Japanese kinship terms used in Minidoka camp [121]. Surprisingly, in the thousands upon thousands of documents deposited in the National Archives on the

Japanese A  
and relocat  
a kinship ch

Consider  
studies and  
played in an  
role kinship  
the numero  
Analysts on  
[124]; the  
fessed to ha  
and how ea  
detailed kin  
grettable th  
not pursue

If anthro  
linguistics a  
energetically  
could other  
sociology h  
situation? T  
be in the af

Each can  
Historical S  
title), which  
to those th  
lysts. Staff  
data just as  
Analysts, a  
ports Office  
logical in na  
Section of  
reports from  
that year, t  
graphic. An  
bingo crisis  
by a Japan  
page single-  
the hospita  
same camp  
interpretable  
hospital sta  
Apparent



Japanese Americans in the camps — assembly and relocation — *there is not one that contains a kinship chart* [122].

Considering the central position kinship studies and analyses of kinship have uniquely played in anthropology [123]; the diagnostic role kinship terms play in analyzing change; the numerous lengthy reports by Community Analysts on the Japanese American family [124]; the interest Community Analysts professed to have had in acculturation theory; and how easy it would have been to obtain detailed kinship data, it is both odd and regrettable that the anthropologists involved did not pursue kinship studies at all in the camps.

If anthropology's traditional strengths — linguistics and kinship studies — were not energetically pursued by WRA social scientists, could others not trained in anthropology or sociology have performed as well in the same situation? The answer to this question must be in the affirmative.

Each camp had its Report Office with its Historical Section (or a unit with a similar title), which was responsible for reports similar to those that were written by Community Analysts. Staff from the Reports Offices gathered data just as assiduously as did the Community Analysts, and many of the reports by the Reports Offices were ethnographic and/or ethnological in nature. For example, the Historical Section of the Topaz Reports Office filed 293 reports from September 1942 to the end of that year, the majority of which were ethnographic. Among later reports there is one on a bingo crisis [125]. Another notable report is by a Japanese American who authored a 229-page single-spaced typed document analyzing the hospital and health-care system in the same camp and incorporating a functional interpretation of personnel problems of the hospital staff [126].

Apparently, the Tule Lake Reports Office

was just as prolific as the Community Analysis Section of the same camp. Some reports of an ethnographic genre from the Reports Office of interest to the anthropologist include a description of Labor Day activities [127] and a 32-page single-spaced typed description of food at Tule Lake, nine pages of which included recipes for traditional Japanese dishes (based on informant-derived data), a topic which was not broached in *any* Community Analysis report in any camp. Several other outstanding reports include one on how retired men and unemployed women spent their time, based on interviews of 93 subjects [128], and an interview study of how women with children viewed camp life [129]. Minidoka, ID, had an equally productive Reports Office. Those which could be useful to the anthropologist include a document on reading tastes among the inmates [130]; a study of *senryu*, a traditional satirical poetry form [131]; an ethnography of a Minidoka living quarter [132]; and acculturation studies of Alaskan internees of mixed descent [133].

The Community Analysts' claims of distinction between their kind of reports and those written by the Reports Offices notwithstanding [134], there was much similarity and overlapping between the two. Despite their lack of training in anthropology *per se*, many of the reports by those of the various Reports Offices were no less anthropological and creditable than those which were written by Community Analysts [135].

#### COMMUNITY ANALYSTS AND THE LABELING TECHNIQUE

One further distinction between the documents by the Reports Offices of the various camps and Community Analysts' reports is worth examining. Nowhere in the hundreds of reports filed by white members of the Re-



ports Offices can reference be found to the inmate population as mentally ill, nor can there be found in their works an attempt to explain camp events by labeling inmates sick. It goes without saying that, unofficially, in addition to a racist attitude among some whites working in these camps [136], there were those (undoubtedly including some working in Reports Offices) who held that "the attitudes of the evacuees appeared to be those of people suffering from a 'persecution complex,' or, that is to say, abnormal behavior" [137]. Thus, Minidoka's camp director told Community Analyst Smith:

Now the way I look at things is this: I figure that the people are sick. A lot has happened to them. They've got a persecution complex. They're not well mentally. You can't treat them like well people. You've got to feel that, or you shouldn't be working on this project [camp]. You've got to have an understanding for their condition. And sometimes it looks to me as if they're a lot like some Nez Perce Indians I know. Just pare a little farther to the primitive, and there you've got them. Not much difference from those Indians, if you peel off a few of these things they've picked up. Well, then, they've got a lot of those traits. I saw it the first day [138].

Furthermore it should not be surprising that the labeling technique and a racist attitude were found among some whites working in these camps — the majority had a limited education compared with the Community Analysts; and, according to Leighton, "Almost all [administrative officers and their assistants at Poston] received substantial increases in salary over anything they had had previously [139]. Therefore, that reductive labeling was practiced by some Community Analysts and that they were perhaps influenced by those not specifically trained in the social sciences is noteworthy. The 1944 *Annual Report* of the Community Analysis Section, for example, begins with the following statement: "Community Analysis understood its job to be the interpretation to administrators of the human beings whom the

WRA is designed to *rehabilitate*" [140].

The reader is also reminded of the efforts of some Community Analysts to help relocation along. In his frustration at the pace of relocation at Granada, Rademaker labeled those not wanting to relocate psychopaths. Also, it will be remembered, Embree and Spicer in their publications — the article by the former addressed to fellow anthropologists, and the one by the latter primarily to anthropology students — intimated to their respective readers by the very titles of their publications ("Resistance to Freedom") that there was surely something wrong with a people who "resisted freedom" [141]. However, without doubt the most blatant case of labeling is that of Weston LaBarre, Community Analyst for some six weeks at Topaz, as evidenced by his publication of 1945, entitled "Some Observations on Character Structure in the Orient: The Japanese." In this article LaBarre attempts to label Japanese as abnormal and neurotic, basing much of his thesis upon his observation of Topazeans while he was Community Analyst [142].

#### THE SOCIAL SCIENTISTS' PUBLICATIONS

Published materials by Community Analysts, number some 30 articles in journals and three books [143]. In the words of Spicer:

Individual community analysts also made some contributions in the special fields of their interests. For example... [they] published in various journals, ranging from the *American Anthropologist* to the *Utah Humanities Review*, analyses of different aspects of the relocation program. It was also true that the Community Analysis Section as a whole made an effort to meet this sort of obligation [144].

In addition, there are the publications by Wax, and one article by Spencer, which are products of the Evacuation and Resettlement Study experience. Three dissertations (by Spencer, Sady and Wax) were also written [145].

Despite r  
about resea  
one conven  
worth of su  
the results o  
publications  
reports by C  
WRA, some  
see print in  
ever, the ine  
which contr  
recent article  
is that, given  
tists involved  
anthropology  
achieve great  
the professio  
offices of the  
ciation and o  
ments to end  
turer of the A  
Anthropology  
mainly on the  
the number o  
perience is rel  
from the fact  
Community A  
ity of the pub  
that, until qui  
work" prevail  
ing by anonym  
social science  
the war and po  
"old boy netw  
anthropologist  
to have paper  
nals in the  
majority of pu  
appears. I thou  
true of the  
thought of be  
cultural full  
but that is  
figure is not  
from the  
the



[140].  
the efforts  
help reloca-  
the pace of  
er labeled  
chopaths.  
free and  
article by  
anthropologists,  
y to anthro-  
their respec-  
their publica-  
that there  
a people  
However,  
case of label-  
community  
paz, as evi-  
5, entitled  
r Structure  
this article  
se as abnormal  
thesis upon  
le he was

## TIONS

community Ana-  
journals and  
of Spicer:

some contribu-  
s. For example...  
ing from the  
manities Review,  
tion program.  
lysis Section  
rt of obligation

tions by Wax,  
are products  
ent Study  
y Spencer,  
[145].

Despite many reservations one might have about research in the social sciences, surely one conventional rule of thumb regarding the worth of such research is the appearance of the results of that undertaking in professional publications. To be sure, there were numerous reports by Community Analysts written for WRA, some of which were "good enough" to see print in professional journals [146]. However, the inescapable conclusion, and one which contravenes the quotation from Spicer's recent article, cited in the previous paragraph, is that, given the large number of social scientists involved — many were well established in anthropology, while they and others would achieve great distinction and recognition in the profession (e.g., President and other high offices of the American Anthropological Association and other kindred societies, appointments to endowed chairs, Distinguished Lecturer of the Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association, festschrifts, etc.) mainly on the basis of their publications, — the number of publications on the camp experience is relatively meager. Moreover, aside from the fact that only a few of these former Community Analysts have authored the majority of the publications, it must be kept in mind that, until quite recently, "the old boy network" prevailed, so the system of blind refereeing by anonymous reviewers now prevailing in social science journals was unknown during the war and postwar years. In short, given the "old boy network" and the small number of anthropologists in the profession, it was easier to have papers published in anthropology journals in the immediate postwar years (when the majority of papers by Community Analysts appeared) than it is today; this is especially true of those which appeared in *Applied Anthropology*. In addition, the majority of publications fall into the category of policy analysis; that is, they deal repeatedly with such topics as the history of the Community Analysis Section; the role of the anthropologist

in WRA (although not in a probing fashion); the decision-making processes; the impact of the loyalty oath, relocation, and segregation policies; the political activities in the camps; ad infinitum [147].

Let me now turn to the publications of the anthropologists who were with the Evacuation and Resettlement Study at this time, rather than those of Community Analysts. To begin with, Robert F. Spencer's article on a Buddhist church in Berkeley in the immediate post-war period deserves comment [148]. It is definitely not a policy analysis study but is more in the realm of traditional anthropological concerns. The article is a by-product of the camp experience, inasmuch as Spencer was a researcher at Gila, for the Evacuation and Resettlement Study [149]. Although he mentions the evacuation of the Japanese Americans in his article, he regrettably fails to grasp the significance of it as the axial factor in the structure, function, and organization of the Berkeley Buddhist Church. That the evacuation, incarceration, and resettlement accounted for the church's Americanization of services (the message of evacuation was clear: assimilate or else); the low membership of Nisei (who were furiously trying to catch up on the lost years and for whom identity with anything remotely Japanese was a "kiss of death"); the weak ethnic consciousness of members; the impoverished state of the priest and congregation [150]; the lack of Japanese language courses; and so on, completely eluded him. When he undertook his study, and even in 1948, when his manuscript appeared in print, Japanese Americans were still reeling from the effects of removal, incarceration, and resettlement. They had barely got resettled in their prewar setting and, just before their return, a concerted effort — including acts of violence by vigilante groups and common citizens — was made all along the West Coast to bar Japanese Americans forever from that area [151]. Nor were the California courts inactive in this respect.



For example, on June 15, 1948, the California Supreme Court upheld the Federal District Court of Appeals, which had revealed the decision of a California trial court in the *Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc.* case. It came down to the fact that the Supreme Court upheld the California Alien Land Law, which was aimed primarily at Japanese Americans (the *Palermo* case involved a lease to some California Japanese) [152]. Earlier, in 1946, the year Spencer received his doctorate in anthropology for his dissertation on the Berkeley Buddhist Church, upon which his article of 1948 was largely based, the California Supreme Court backed the action of the State of California in escheating two parcels of land which were recorded in the name of a California Nisei, a decision which was overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court [153]. Again, in 1946, Californians were asked to vote on Proposition 15, a strictly anti-Japanese measure sponsored by the reactionary Senator Jack Tenney, "long known for his anti-Japanese bills in the California Legislature in 1943 and 1945..." [154].

Indeed, it was not until November 4, 1956 that the infamous anti-Japanese Alien Land Law of California was repealed in a ballot as Proposition 13 [155]. So far as the legal actions in the 1940s, mentioned in the paragraphs above, and the sentiment of Californians toward Japanese Americans in the immediate postwar years are concerned, in reading Spencer's article one comes away with the sense that nothing untoward had ever happened or was happening against the Japanese Americans in California; that somehow the reasons that the Berkeley Buddhist Church was not really successful lay in the priest, the congregation, and the deviancy of Buddhism in a Christian nation (and therefore it was acculturating elements of Christianity). Nowhere in his article does Spencer allude to the very crux of the issue — the long history of anti-Japanese

relations which obtained on the West Coast, culminating in Evacuation — and to some of the events in the courts which were unfolding before his very eyes. And it would be a major error to assume that the Bay Area, including Berkeley and the university, were the liberal, "swinging, laid-back places" that they are today. On the contrary, from the turn of the century, the Bay Area had been one of the major centers of virulent anti-Japanese sentiment which lasted through the 1950s [156]. Nor did the faculty or students of the University of California at Berkeley raise their voices when the evacuation was ordered and the Japanese Americans were removed [157].

The net result of Spencer's failure to take into account any contemporary events or the history of Japanese-white relations in California and the West Coast is a mediocre descriptive acculturation study that lacks any analytical insight into the realities of those he studied or, more generally of race relations in California [158].

A brief review of the work of one of the more prolific anthropologists, also of the Evacuation and Resettlement Study, is quite revealing. Aside from the major publications by Rosalie Hankey Wax [159], mention of *The Spoilage* must be made, a book to which she made significant contributions. Apart from criticizing *The Spoilage* for its narrow scope and perspective because of its emphasis upon factionalism in Tule Lake, Marvin Opler made these comments about the book, although not identifying Hankey by name as the "field-worker":

Dependence upon one person [i.e., Hankey] for major contributions led ... to undue credence afforded about two dozen factional leaders who happened to impress the fieldworker, during the year period, as knowing the Center [Tule Lake] [160].

Again, by Opler:

... the "loy  
since these  
cant mean  
to consiste

Only "two  
this same u

Perhaps th  
period was  
ties of Jap  
This incor  
to the curr  
took the fa  
of Japanes  
favor on Ja  
or repatri  
to win the  
which I im  
variety of  
comprised  
ble for all  
this group  
to make co

Despite so  
the Comm  
been there  
director of  
Study, res  
almost fro  
signment t  
tunate res  
change of  
the Evacua  
at Tule La  
Analysis S  
ment by T  
*The Spoila*  
Lake event  
There is no  
he is merel  
Analys of  
[161] and  
which were  
important  
find [162]  
do not ment  
an allied op



... the "loyalty-disloyalty" labels, were actually misleading since these labels had long since lost any objectively significant meaning in the maelstrom of emotionalized reaction to consistently discriminatory treatment [161].

Only "twelve years later" would Wax come to this same understanding:

Perhaps the most important handicap during this early period was my notion that there were two distinct varieties of Japanese, a "pro-American" and a "pro-Japanese." This incorrect idea sprang from my emotional reaction to the current anti-Japanese propaganda, a reaction which took the form of a stubborn faith that the great majority of Japanese residing in America did not look with any favor on Japan, did not seriously consider expatriation or repatriation, believed that the United States was going to win the war, and, in short, held many of the attitudes which I imagined I would hold in their place. The other variety of Japanese, I thought, was "pro-Japanese" and comprised a small group, inclined to violence and responsible for all the disturbances in the Centers [camps]. With this group, I had been told, it would be almost impossible to make contact [162].

Despite some contacts with Marvin Opler [163], the Community Analyst at Tule Lake who had been there since May 1943, Dorothy S. Thomas, director of the Evacuation and Resettlement Study, resented sharing documents with him almost from the very beginning of Opler's assignment to Tule Lake [164], with the unfortunate result that there was only sporadic exchange of information between researchers of the Evacuation and Resettlement Study living at Tule Lake and the Tule Lake Community Analysis Section. It is obvious that the resentment by Thomas was carried to an extreme. *The Spoilage*, which deals exclusively with Tule Lake events, completely ignores Marvin Opler. *There is not a single reference to him as such*; he is merely identified as the "Community Analyst" in the references to four of his letters [165] and two of his Trend Reports [166], which were only a very few of the lengthy and important documents which he and his staff filed [167]. Oddly enough, *Morris Opler's* document on *Manzanar*, is praised, referred to, or cited repeatedly [168]. This same idiocyn-

cracy is evident in Wax's book, *Doing Field-work*. Not a single one of the almost 300 documents written by Marvin Opler and his staff is cited; instead, exactly as in *The Spoilage*, *Morris Opler's Manzanar* segregation document is praised and noted [169]. Yet, Weglyn, who analyzed the complex issues that took place at Tule Lake after it became a segregation camp – and hardly an admirer of anyone connected with WRA – complimented Marvin Opler for his "perceptive reports filed during this period" [170].

As Marvin Opler has pointed out more than once, the undue emphasis given factionalism by the Evacuation and Resettlement Study team distorted the perception of other aspects of Tule Lake life. People were going to movies; teenagers were holding dances; there were the traditional arts which the Issei and Kibei were patronizing and cultivating; *go* and *shogi* (chess) tournaments were being held; sports events were crowding the calendar; church services were being conducted [171]; and so on: yet, about these equally important aspects of the Tuleans' lives one learns nothing by reading Wax's publications. Nevertheless, these aspects had been, and were being, meticulously and even brilliantly recorded by Marvin Opler and his staff.

As was pointed out earlier, the output of ethnographic/ethnological reports of the Tule Lake Community Analysis Section was second only to Minidoka's. Without question, one of the major published results of the Evacuation and Resettlement Study, *The Spoilage*, was diminished and distorted to the degree that the Study group passed over Marvin Opler's and his staff's reports. The same comment applies to Wax's major publications. Given Wax's emotional involvements while at Tule Lake and Marvin Opler's analysis of *The Spoilage*, one can safely conclude that her writings may be more useful for learning about the author than learning about what actually transpired at Tule Lake [172].



With regard to publications by Community Analysts, Weston LaBarre's article on the character structure of the Japanese, based to a significant degree on field research he undertook as a Community Analyst at Topaz, must be mentioned here. It has been analyzed in detail elsewhere. Suffice it to say that LaBarre's publication is disingenuous scholarship, so far as his observations on Topazeans are concerned [173].

*Impounded People*, a summary report which originally appeared in 1946 as a government document, is a book co-authored by four Community Analysts (Spicer, Hansen, Luomala, and Marvin Opler). It does escape the weaknesses of the majority of the policy analysis publications by WRA anthropologists, insofar as it attempts to offer a well-rounded picture of what life was like in the camps. However, this report, published as a book with illustrations and a new introduction by Spicer [174], has some disturbing flaws. Thus, the reader will look in vain for an analysis of kinship, a kinship chart, kinship terminology, and a rigorous linguistic analysis. Although it describes the underlying causes of the unrest at Minidoka, which had given rise to the complaints of the sixteen Minidokans to the Spanish consul, and reproduced certain passages from their list, there is no mention of how these complaints to the Spanish consul were actually handled by some Community Analysts. The 1969 book edition also takes for granted the accuracy of an official report on the shooting of a 63-year old Issei man at Topaz in April, 1943. James Hatsuaki Wakasa was killed by a single rifle shot from an army guard, according to Spicer et al., because he "... merely stepped beyond the strands of barbed wire marking the boundary of the center [camp]" [175]. This was the official version which was issued immediately after the killing [176], and was later to be proved false by Russell Bankson of the Topaz Historical Section in that agency's thorough investi-

gation of the shooting, which proved through photographs, among other means, that Wakasa was killed well within the camp [177].

The publications on policy analysis, which comprise the majority of the writings by Community Analysts — many of which were viewed as pioneer contributions to applied anthropology when they first appeared — are presently of historic value only. Even the bulk of Leighton's important book *The Governing of Men*, is, after all, a *post factum* analysis of one incident at Poston (a strike), an event which was not foreseen by the anthropologists who comprised the Bureau of Sociological Research. Nor can one readily ignore the severe criticisms of the book by one who was overseeing most of the activities of the Bureau and following closely the work of the anthropologists, John Walker Powell, Chief, Community Management Division, Poston, as expressed in his lengthy analysis of the Bureau [178]. That Leighton and his staff were not able to predict the strike, despite the many cues which were present before it took place, was most distressing to Powell [179].

The publications of one former Community Analyst is the exception to everything that has been noted in this paper, as regards quality, timelessness, and contribution to anthropology. Marvin K. Opler's five publications based on research in Tule Lake [180] are noteworthy for several reasons. All are refreshingly free of the jargon and rhetoric of WRA policies imposed upon internees and so ubiquitous in the writings of his colleagues. His articles deal with the concerns and behavior patterns of the inmates as they worked them out at Tule Lake; accordingly, the categories of thought and action are those of the Japanese Americans, not Opler's. By making these studies available in standard, accessible journals, he announced to his colleagues and his readers that, in effect, the culture patterns of these Japanese Americans were worthy of note and respect. Furthermore, by virtue of bringing to the reader's

attention  
he also r  
darkest l  
a politica  
One c  
ments. M  
was bese  
by its sta  
sphere th  
gation. In

Doctor [  
differenc  
the Evacu  
and at G  
at Tule L  
(sic) they  
mit was u  
that (sic)  
evacuees.  
tains: the  
with the  
the presti  
their worl

In spite of  
over Tule  
Communi  
Opler, and  
of insightf  
of Tule La  
dence, the  
Analysts, C  
made an et  
the segrega  
Also, it wa  
ly and con  
cy [182].  
Lake he wa  
was going o  
write symp  
among othe  
policies wh  
time [183].  
As for the  
mean stud  
enduring th  
need show



attention five different aspects of their lives, he also made it known that, even during its darkest hours, Tule Lake camp was not solely a political arena among factions.

One can only stand in awe at his achievements. More than any other camp, Tule Lake was beset with political unrest, exacerbated by its status as a segregation camp. The atmosphere there was unhealthy even before segregation. In 1942,

Doctor [Dorothy S.] Thomas reported a considerable difference in the attitude of the workers [researchers of the Evacuation and Resettlement Study] at Tule Lake and at Gila River [the camp at Arizona]. The workers at Tule Lake have anxieties that if it were known that (sic) they were collecting information which they submit was used as the basis of action by the administration that (sic) they would be subject to bodily harm by the evacuees. At Gila River a quite different situation obtains: there... the workers are proud of their relationship with the University [of California, Berkeley] and use the prestige gained from this association in furthering their work [181].

In spite of the heavy atmosphere which hung over Tule Lake throughout its existence, the Community Analysis Section under Marvin Opler, and Opler himself, filed a steady stream of insightful studies and analyses on all aspects of Tule Lake life and culture. It was no coincidence, therefore, that, among all Community Analysts, Opler (as was noted earlier) "alone made an effort to envisage the problem which the segregation center itself would present." Also, it was Marvin Opler who was unequivocally and consistently against the segregation policy [182]. Throughout his assignment at Tule Lake he was unswayed by the madness which was going on around him and continued to write sympathetic, compassionate reports on, among other things, the effects of the inane policies which were imposed upon their victims [183].

As for the emerging fields of Japanese American studies and Asian American studies, the enduring quality of Marvin Opler's publications needs stressing again. Because most of the pub-

lications by the other Community Analysts deal almost exclusively with policy analysis, they are of only tangential value and significance for the study of Japanese Americans *qua* subculture [184]. And even as policy analysis studies, they are of questionable value because they tend to be uncritical and lack candor; when unpublished CAS documents are cited, they are invariably the mimeographed reports — those which were put out for "public consumption," ignoring the truly important documents.

Although the WRA experience has been heralded as a breakthrough in applied anthropology, the published materials by WRA anthropologists in this field are also remarkable for something else; namely, their lack of contribution to theory and theory-building [185]. So far as theory and evacuation are concerned, it remained for two sociologists, Broom and Kitsuse (ironically, the former an unrelenting critic of WRA and of its social scientists), to formulate *the* important theoretical statement — published in the pages of *American Anthropologist*, no less — on precisely the issue which was so vexing to the relocation camp anthropologists, and one which had traditionally been in anthropology's province; i.e., acculturation of an ethnic minority [186].

Some final observations on Community Analyst reports will be made because they tie in with the topic of publications of Community Analysts. In addition to what has already been noted about the publication record of the Community Analysts, save for the Community Analysts at Minidoka, Tule Lake and, to some extent, Manzanar, considering the large number of anthropologists involved in WRA, like their published counterparts, documents of an ethnographic-ethnological nature by them in The National Archives are surprisingly few. This is even true of Poston which had the oldest and one of the largest Community Analysis Section (18 staff members), because priority at all camps was given to policy analysis studies.



Remember, too, Morris Opler was almost fired for being "the old-fashioned ethnologist." In point of fact, the documents he filed and for which he was criticized because of their "old-fashioned ethnographic nature," are precisely the ones which are of lasting importance and value, whereas those by him of a policy analysis nature are the least valuable. Morris Opler wrote superb reports on the prewar West Coast Japanese communities that remain invaluable sources of data on the world which disappeared with the evacuation.

The irony of this particular incident of opprobrium, which almost got Morris Opler fired, is that, in late 1944, when it was clear that the Japanese Americans would be returning to the West Coast, a typewritten manuscript of 30 double-spaced pages entitled "West Coast Locality Groups of Manzanar Residents" was compiled under John Provinse's aegis [187] based on materials gathered "principally from the Manzanar files which are in the Washington office" [188] (i.e., Morris Opler's many reports!). In the covering memorandum to the document, Provinse also stressed the importance of knowing about the "West Coast locality groups," and encouraged Community Analysts to compile such information, the very nature of which had been previously condemned by someone in the Washington Office [189].

#### COMMUNITY ANALYSTS AND THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY AS BUREAUCRACY

Inevitably, anthropologists in such a bureaucratic situation are constrained to assimilate the language, perspectives, categories of thought, organizational codes, concerns, and values of the encompassing bureaucracy in order to be successful. The anthropology which results deviates markedly from the issues, methods, and concerns of traditional anthropology.

At the outset, because Community Analysts were not part of the planning process when WRA was established, they were disadvantaged. Thus, certain terms were excised from the vocabulary by the government: everyone associated with WRA was to develop a certain vocabulary. Here are some passages from a government directive:

1. The Japanese-Americans ... should always be referred to as "evacuees," never as "internees," or "prisoners."
2. The work areas... should be referred to as "relocation centers" or "relocation projects," not as "internment centers" or "concentration camps." Even the use of the word "camp" should be avoided since it carries some implications of internment and close military surveillance.
3. An "assembly center" is a convenient gathering point where the evacuees are temporarily fed and housed until they can be moved to relocation projects [190].

"Registration" for loyalty oaths, "relocation" for dispersal, "appointed personnel" for white employees, "stop order" for permanent incarceration in the camp, etc., were some other well-known euphemisms employed. The loyal-disloyal distinction formulated by the government, and, as revealed in unpublished documents, accepted by many Community Analysts, is an example of how categories of thought from above were imposed upon and adopted by them [191]. In the case of Wax, as indicated, it took twelve years for her to realize that loyal-disloyal was a false dichotomy. Spicer forthrightly analyzed the situation twenty-six years later in the following way:

It was a full year before the simple fact that the United States had forced the first-generation immigrants to retain their Japanese citizenship had any impact on policy. The administrators were aware that the United States had denied Issei the right to become American citizens; but implications of that solid fact for the Japanese-Americans in time of war between Japan and the United States did not sink in. Not until the Issei were forced to take a stand during the Army registration program [i.e., the loyalty oath program] did the Issei point of view finally come across to the administrators, and this was in February, 1943. In short, the realities of life for persons of Oriental background on the West Coast of

the Uni  
and it w  
gave rise  
relocati

By assim  
the persp  
scientists  
cepts and  
ing in rea  
governm  
examples  
be menti  
was place  
(although  
With r  
rather tha  
may be n  
torship o  
Washingt  
in 1943,  
made. In

I think o  
emphasiz  
the prima  
port wha  
I reacted  
function  
the projec  
they can  
going on

This shift  
constraini  
than befor  
they were  
going on i  
effect of a  
training o  
ogy the rig  
internec-a  
This policy  
lyst at a m  
having to  
Office wh  
the report  
of admin



the United States were not real for the WRA policy makers, and it was these realities as felt by the evacuees which gave rise to formulation by them of the meaning of the relocation centers [192].

By assimilating the categories of thought and the perspectives of the bureaucracy, the social scientists were also vulnerable to reifying concepts and terms which had very little grounding in reality. "Community" and "community government," with attendant terms, are two examples of the WRA experience which could be mentioned here because so much emphasis was placed upon them through various policies (although not discussed in this paper) [193].

With respect to loyalty to the bureaucracy rather than to anthropology, the following may be noted. When Spicer assumed the directorship of the Community Analysis Section in Washington, D.C. upon Embree's resignation in 1943, a major policy shift was obviously made. In Spicer's own words:

I think originally that John Embree and Frank Sweetser emphasized pretty heavily to the project analysts that the primary function of Community Analysts was to report what goes on at the projects [camps] to Washington. I reacted against that policy. I thought it was their main function to make clear to the project staff conditions on the project. After serving this function on the project they can proceed to inform Washington as to what is going on in the projects [194].

This shift in policy had the ultimate effect of constraining Community Analysts even more than before to look only at the camp to which they were assigned rather than to what was going on in all the other camps. It also had the effect of acceding to those who had had no training or interest in anthropology or sociology the right to establish priorities among internee-activities and -behaviors for analysis. This policy obviously put Community Analysts at a marked disadvantage. Instead of having to submit reports to the Washington Office, where there were fellow anthropologists, the reports first went to the camp directors or administrators. Understandably, the over-

riding consideration of camp directors was to have trouble-free camps [195]. This meant that the reports for a camp director from a Community Analyst which would be most appreciated would be those dealing with policy analysis and not those of an ethnographic/ethnological nature. The same Community Analysts who had complained about "a pre-occupation with current developments," commented as follows:

The Analyst [Hansen] developed the definite idea that the Project Director [of Heart Mountain] found his information and his judgments useful. For his part, the Analyst learned what a Project Director wanted and needed to know about the community and what the administration was doing and planning to do. The long-continued contacts had another result, closely connected with the above. They tended to keep the Analyst from "going over" to the evacuees [196].

At the request of the camp directors, two Community Analysts, Brown of Gila, and Rademaker of Granada, as noted earlier, accepted positions on the local review board whose function it was to identify the "disloyals," and Rademaker even gathered intelligence data on white personnel at the request of the camp director [197]. Also, given the new line of communication and responsibility, it was only a matter of time before certain Community Analysts started supplying names to camp administrators, despite the agreement among Community Analysts, following anthropological custom, that it was important to "preserve the confidence of... informants" [198]. This also violated the Embree dictum that Community Analysts "should be interested in why and not who" [199].

Owing to another characteristic feature of bureaucracy, the wish of the bureaucrat to ingratiate himself with those higher in position than he — even though it was the consensus of Community Analysts that camp directors did not pressure them to provide them with names [200] — documents already cited in this paper show that some Community Ana-



lysts gratuitously supplied camp directors and other administrators with reports of an intelligence nature replete with ruses. For such Community Analysts it became more important to please camp directors and administrators rather than to study the culture patterns of the inmates [201], a task which was originally established as the highest priority for Community Analysts [202].

At the 1944 Denver Conference of Community Analysts, Embree made this observation:

[Community] Analysts in general realize the function in regard to the total Civil Service program. In so far as that function is forgotten the analysts' work will be handicapped [203].

Quite the opposite was true, as is now clear. Community Analysts were only too well aware of the Civil Service — the WRA bureaucracy, especially at the camp level — but had lost touch with the subjects they were recruited to study. An interesting example of such a case is E. Adamson Hoebel, who spent the summer of 1944 as Community Analyst at Granada. In a memorandum to Spicer, Hoebel quoted sections from *Administrative Manual* 30.8 [204], the official government document containing the job description of Community Analyst. They were sections 30.8.1a, on relocation; 30.8.3, on effects of administration policy on the internees; and, again, a section from 30.8.3, on observations and studies with specific attention to social relations that might become critical [205]. In connection with relocation, Hoebel noted "... the residue of evacuees consists increasingly of obstinate and less cooperative persons..." [206]. Three days later he requested a list of draft evaders in Granada, an act to which reference has already been made.

Instead of looking into "trouble cases" [207], of which there were many at Granada and elsewhere, between whites and Japanese Americans, among the administered, and

among whites [208] — the study of which could have considerably widened Hoebel's vision on the anthropology of conflict and law, a field within anthropology he was to help establish — he was content to adhere strictly to WRA guidelines for work as Community Analyst (*but not to the primary aim, viz., "... to analyze the culture patterns existing in the community..."*) a statement which prefaced 30.8.1 as 39.8.1.1) [209]. The upshot of this selective conformity was that, as Community Analyst, only one report — a very brief description of memorial services with an interpretation of what he had witnessed as having a cathartic function for the bereaved Japanese American families [210] — can be viewed as even remotely anthropological.

In discussing *behaviors*, another by-product of the WRA experience, the incompatibility of the government's goals and values with those of anthropology, and the acceptance by many Community Analysts of the official perspectives had inevitable consequences for the social scientists involved: turning informer, gathering intelligence data, participating in administrative functions, and trivializing internee perspectives, behaviors, and needs. Apparently these things did not come without a cost. Rademaker, for example, left Granada a very frustrated man [211]. After her expulsion from Tule Lake, Wax went into a state of depression ("... as if ... walking around with some vital part missing") which lasted "many years" [212]. After their WRA experiences, Forrest La Violette, Morris Opler, and John Collier each in his own way condemned Evacuation and the camps in no uncertain terms [213]. Others (e.g., Arensberg, Brown, Hansen, Luomala, et al.) filed and published their reports and went on to other things. The vast majority never shared their observations and insights through publications, and to date have remained silent about this period [214].

But one Community Analyst, Marvin Opler,

wrote a 40  
on behalf of  
caught in the  
publish and  
on Japanese  
observation

A clue to  
may lie in the  
discipline he  
that camp's

In the sciences  
in mass data  
Analysis [in]  
On the other  
written accounts  
understanding  
speak [216]

As evidence  
tive — recent  
historians [in]  
It is fitting  
Paul Bailey  
it captures a  
perspective  
WRA anthropo-  
not grasp, but  
the inmates

Because the  
upper echelon  
intentions were  
of the internees  
were represented  
someone of the  
most desperate  
could talk to  
seemed capable  
fact [219]

#### CONCLUSION

The community  
from a number  
camp at Tule  
related to the  
from the internees  
the Japanese



wrote a 40-page brief as a legal *Amicus curiae* on behalf of young Japanese Americans still caught in the renunciation: he continued to publish anthropologically significant papers on Japanese American culture based on his observations and research at Tule Lake [215].

A clue to Opler's loyalty to anthropology may lie in the general statement about the discipline he made to a Tule Lake reporter of that camp's newspaper, *Newell Star*:

In the scientific study of communities, one is interested in mass data and not in individual cases. Community Analysis [in the camps] has no administrative power. On the other hand, it is important that history be written accurately and with the proper sympathy and understanding of the people who live history, so to speak [216].

As evidenced by his publications, this perspective — recently appropriated by the new urban historians [217] — went beyond rhetoric.

It is fitting to quote here a paragraph from Paul Bailey's detailed study of Poston, because it captures so trenchantly and poignantly a perspective which, with a few exceptions, the WRA anthropologists and sociologists could not grasp, but one which was so obvious to the inmates.

Because the community analysts consorted with the upper echelons of management, their training and good intentions were nullified through the natural suspicion of the internees as to whose side of the struggle they were representative. Inwardly the people were crying for someone other than management (sic) or experts. They most desperately needed souls they could trust, who could talk in their behalf. Instead, no one in camp seemed capable of bridging the inscrutable wall of the races [218].

## CONCLUSION

The contents of this article differ markedly from accounts previously published by the camp anthropologists because this study has relied heavily for information upon heretofore untapped sources, viz., documents in the National Archives.

There is no question that the task of these anthropologists was a difficult and confusing one [219]. By virtue of their assignment, and given the wartime exigencies, they were placed in a position where they could really do nothing without displeasing someone. Nevertheless, one must sadly conclude that, with the few exceptions noted in this paper, neither anthropology, the anthropologists involved [220], nor the administered were measurably aided and advanced by field work in the wartime camps for Japanese Americans. What the anthropologists accomplished could have been readily achieved by run-of-the-mill bureaucrats, whose roles as Community Analysts or social researchers would not have left the sense of disappointment that now exists because professional anthropologists did, in fact, work in these camps.

Finally, the WRA experience resulted in an anomalous anthropology for the following reasons.

1. In terms of research methods and administrative strategies, both the subjects as well as the anthropologists were adversely affected.
2. With respect to the publications of these anthropologists, the following points are consistent with what has been brought out or stated earlier.
  - a. The majority of the publications [221] exhibit a preoccupation with policy analysis, with a commensurate neglect of the culture of the people Community Analysts were recruited to study.
  - b. The publications are relatively few in number despite the fact that some of the most prestigious people in American anthropology were involved; and the publications themselves are weak as contributions to anthropological and general social science theory.
  - c. The publications neglect linguistics and kinship studies, features fundamental to a meaningful cultural portrait.
  - d. There is a surrealistic quality about most of the publications. That is to say, the policy analysis-type papers lack depth and candor, despite their length. With the exceptions noted, the publications are bizarre, distorted, expiational, or superficial. One is simply dishonest.
  - e. With a few exceptions (e.g., the Oplers', LaViolette's, Collier's, and several of Embree's), the publications lack understanding of or compassion for the subjects-inmates.



3. The total experience resulted in an erosion of what has been identified as an "anthropological ethos" [222].

It is not too much to say that the methods, assumptions, and pretensions of conventional American anthropology were tested in the Japanese internment camps during world war II, and were found wanting [223].

## NOTES

- 1 See, for example, John F. Embree, "Community Analysis - An Example of Anthropology in Government," *American Anthropologist*, vol. 46 (1944); John H. Provinse and Solon T. Kimball, "Building New Communities During War Time," *American Sociological Review* vol. 11 (1946); Edward H. Spicer, "The Use of Social Scientists by the War Relocation Authority," *Applied Anthropology*, vol. 5, no. 2 (1946); "Early Applications of Anthropology in North America," in Anthony F.C. Wallace, et al. (eds.), *Perspectives on Anthropology 1976* (Washington, D.C.: American Anthropological Association, 1977); and "Anthropologists and the War Relocation Authority," in Walter Goldschmidt (ed.), *The Uses of Anthropology* (Washington, D.C.: American Anthropological Association, 1979). See also "Profile of an Anthropologist Edward H. Spicer," *Anthropology Newsletter*, vol. 20, no. 6 (1979); and Edward H. Spicer, Asael T. Hansen, Katherine Luomala, and Marvin K. Opler (eds.), *Impounded People: Japanese-Americans in the Relocation Centers* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1969), which was first published in 1946 by the Department of Interior as a government report. All unpublished documents listed in this paper are deposited in The National Archives, Washington, D.C., under the War Relocation Authority, Record Group 210. Unless otherwise noted, the documents are in typescript. The following abbreviation is used in the list: CAS = Community Analysis Section. In his latest publication on CAS, Spicer, *op. cit.*, p. 227, has written: "No system of classified reporting was developed." It is difficult to determine what is meant by "system of classified reporting." Suffice it to say, many of the documents bear classified labels, as can be seen from the references below. On the same page, Spicer (*Idem.*) then writes, "Moreover, the mimeographed reports that emanated from the Washington officer were available equally to evacuees and 'appointed personnel!'" This is erroneous. See, for example, the John de Young report on the fence in Minidoka, which attained declassified status - as did the other CAS materials marked "Restricted" - only in 1972 and by Executive Order (EO). John de Young, "The Fence at Minidoka," Project Analysis Series No. 4, Washington CAS, April, 1943, (Mimeographed.), ("Restricted."). My copy of his documents bears this stamp: "Declassified, E.O. 11652 Sec. 3(E) and 5 (D) or (E), Interior Department. Letter 11/11/72." Copies of several other mimeographed CAS reports in my possession (though not necessarily used in this paper) bear the same stamp.
- 2 For a detailed description of the history, structure, and operations of the Bureau of Sociological Research, see Alexander H. Leighton and Edward Spicer, "Applied Anthropology in a Dislocated Community," in Alexander H. Leighton, *The Governing of Men: General Principles and Recommendations Based on Experience at a Japanese Relocation Camp* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945), pp. 373-397. On Leighton's plans for the Bureau, see Embree, "Community Analysis...", *op. cit.*, 1944, p. 278 fn3.
- 3 Edward Spicer, "History of the Community Analysis Section," Washington CAS, December 30, 1945, p. 9. See also Embree, "Community Analysis...", *op. cit.*, 1944, pp. 277-282; Spicer, "The Use of Social Scientists...", *op. cit.*, 1946, pp. 17-18; *op. cit.*, 1979, pp. 220 ff; and "Introduction: The Relocation Centers in Retrospect," in Spicer, et al. (eds.), *op. cit.*, 1969, pp. 20-21.
- 4 Spicer, *op. cit.*, 1945, p. 7. For Embree's position on the Community Analysis Section and on Community Analysts, see John Embree, "The Need for Social Analysis," Memorandum to John C. Baker, December 10, 1942, especially p. 2.
- 5 See Dorothy S. Thomas and Robert Nishimoto, *The Spoilage* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1946), p. viii.
- 6 Leonard Bloom and Ruth Riemer, *Removal and Return: The Socio-Economic Effects of the War on Japanese-Americans* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944); Leonard Broom [Bloom] and John I. Kitsuse, *The Managed Casualty: The Japanese-American Family in World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956).
- 7 The list of the names of the social scientists by Spicer, *op. cit.*, 1979, p. 223, has several errors and omissions which will be corrected at the appropriate places. See Embree, "Community Analysis...", *op. cit.*, 1944, p. 286 fn 10.
- 8 Embree, "Community Analysis...", *op. cit.*, 1944, pp. 284-285, 288-289.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 283.
- 10 Washington CAS, "Discussion on Field Techniques," Denver Conference of Community Analysts, September 13, 1944, p. 5. See also John Embree, "Attitudes Toward Selective Service and Relocation (Notes on a Visit to Topaz, February 11-14, 1944)," Washington CAS, February, 1944, ("Confidential."), p. 10.
- 11 At the 1978 Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association in Los Angeles, Morris Opler and several Japanese Americans who had worked in the re-

location c  
as research  
Study, he  
camps. (I

12 In 1942, I  
Seattle to  
bly Cente  
doka Relo  
tie I have

13 This pape  
who work  
other rese  
The Natio  
when I wa  
that time,  
the camps  
thropolog  
Hess, and  
chives, for  
the Archi  
responsibi

14 Embree, '286.

15 Spicer, "T  
pp. 18-1

16 See Paul J  
centration  
Westernle  
Thomas, J  
fornia Pre

On the ba  
Spicer has  
not conce  
132, and  
from the  
barbed wi  
passes for  
killing of  
fences). V  
lists consi  
leave the  
lists, see

Highlight  
Morris E  
in the Re  
ber 14, 19

Demals, T  
Chazam  
I and 11

gaghand  
But at 194  
more are at  
the end of  
attitude to  
the 2. Some

more are  
attitude to  
the 2. Some

more are  
attitude to  
the 2. Some

more are  
attitude to  
the 2. Some



alysis Series No. (mimeographed.), which bears this (3E) and 5 (D) 11/72." Copies of reports in my possession (this paper) bear

ry, structure, and Spicer, "Ap- community," in *ing of Men: General ed on Experience eton: Princeton*. On Leighton's community Ana-

community Analysis 30, 1945, p. 9. sis...," *op. cit.*, of Social Scien- *cit.*, 1979, pp. ation Centers in *p. cit.*, 1969, pp.

ee's position on on Community ed for Social Ana- r, December 10,

Nishimoto, *The* California Press,

removal and Re- the War on Ja- ity of California n] and John I Japanese-Ameri- r: University of

entists by Spicer, ors and omissions riate places. See *p. cit.*, 1944, p.

*p. cit.*, 1944, pp.

ld Techniques," nalysts, September e, "Attitudes To- n (Notes on a Visit Washington CAS, p. 10.

American Anthro- Morris Opler and worked in the re-

- location camps in the Community Analysis Section or as researchers for the Evacuation and Resettlement Study, held a panel on some aspects of the relocation camps. (I did not attend the Annual Meeting.)
- 12 In 1942, I was thirteen when we were evacuated from Seattle to Area "A", Camp Harmony, Puyallup Assembly Center, Puyallup, Washington, and then to Minidoka Relocation Center, Hunt, Idaho. The only other tie I have is that I, too, am an anthropologist.
- 13 This paper is not strictly confined to social scientists who worked in WRA because it includes sections on other researchers in its camps. I first started research in The National Archives, Washington, D.C., in 1952, when I was a graduate student in anthropology. At that time, I did some research on an aspect of one of the camps for a paper I was writing for one of my anthropology courses. I thank Jerome Finster, Jerry Hess, and James Paulanskas, all of The National Archives, for their assistance while doing my research in the Archives in 1975, 1977, 1978, and 1979. I bear sole responsibility for all statements in this paper.
- 14 Embree, "Community Analysis...," *op. cit.*, 1944, p. 286.
- 15 Spicer, "The Use of Social Scientists...," *op. cit.*, 1946, pp. 18-19.
- 16 See Paul Bailey, *City in the Sun: The Japanese Concentration Camp at Poston, Arizona* (Los Angeles: Westernlore Press, 1971), pp. 122-123; and Dorothy Thomas, *The Salvage* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952), pp. 19, 21, 26. On the basis that internees could leave the camps, Spicer has concluded that the camps were therefore not concentration camps. See Spicer, *op. cit.*, 1977, p. 132, and *op. cit.*, 1979, pp. 218-219. However, aside from the physical environment of these camps (e.g., barbed wire fences, watch towers, armed army sentinels, passes for egress and ingress, and the shooting at and killing of several inmates who were too close to the fences), WRA maintained "stop order lists." These lists consisted of names of individuals who could not leave these camps under any circumstances. On these lists, see Minidoka Staff, "The Minidoka Staff Digest: Highlights of the Staff Meeting," June 19, 1943, p. 1; Morris E. Opler, "The Stop History: From an Employee in the Records Department," Manzanar CAS, September 14, 1943; Rachael R. Sady, "Leave Clearance Denials," Washington CAS, August, 1944; and "Leave Clearance Denial Dockets: Citizen 'Yes' Cases. Parts I and II." Washington CAS, August, 1944 (mimeographed). In 1945, Elmer R. Smith, Community Analyst at Minidoka, ID, complained that even though it was an official policy to close down all the camps by the end of that year, stop orders were being rigidly applied to "doubtful" inmates. See Elmer R. Smith, "U.S. Army Exclusion to Stop Order Lists and Problems," Memorandum to Dillon S. Myer, July 31, 1945, p. 1.
- 17 United States Department of Interior, *The Relocation Program* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 19-26.
- 18 John Embree, Letter to Marvin K. Opler, April 1, 1943, pp. 1-2.
- 19 John Embree, "Evacuee Resistances to Relocation," WRA Community Analysis Report No. 5, June, 1943, Washington CAS (mimeographed), and "Resistance to Freedom: An Administrative Problem," *Applied Anthropology*, vol. 2, no. 4 (1943).
- 20 See Tule Lake CAS, "Preliminary Survey of Resistance to Resettlement at the Tule Lake Relocation Center," June 23, 1943; and Morris Opler, "Resistances to Resettlement," in *Agriculture in Transition from War to Peace*. Papers and Proceedings of the 17th Annual Western Farm Economics Association (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944). This point is confirmed in Edward Spicer, "Final Report of the Washington Community Analysis Section," Washington CAS, February 18, 1946, pp. 24-33; "The use of Social Scientists...," *op. cit.*, 1946, p. 27; and *op. cit.*, 1979, p. 232. Also, tension in an office between white and internee clerical workers was feared by one Community Analyst as having a possible hampering effect on relocation. See Edgar McVoy, Letter to John F. Embree, July 21, 1943, p. 2.
- 21 James Barnett, "Factors and Conditions that May Retard Resettlement," Gila CAS, April 29, 1943. Ostensibly, Barnett, who was Community Analyst at Gila AZ, for only 36 days - from April 5 to May 11, 1943 - left that camp because of illness. See Embree, "Community Analysis...," *op. cit.*, 1944, p. 286 fn 10. However, according to Spicer, *op. cit.*, 1945, p. 13, he was replaced because he "got into trouble over fraternizing (sic) with evacuees." This confirms William Petersen's assertion that "Fraternization was discouraged between colonists [internees] and the appointed personnel, all of whom were Caucasians," in his comprehensive book on Japanese Americans. See William Petersen, *Japanese Americans: Oppression and Success* (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 82. (There is no mention of Barnett in Spicer, *op. cit.*, 1979.)
- 22 Edward Spicer, "Resistance to Freedom: Resettlement from the Japanese Relocation Centers During World War II," in Edward H. Spicer (ed.), *Human Problems in Technological Change* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1952). See also Spicer et al. (eds.), *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 195. In the original paper, Embree, "Evacuee Resistances...," *op. cit.*, 1943, p. 3, has quotation marks around the words 'assembly centers'; these are omitted in the published version. See Embree, "Resistance to Freedom...," *op. cit.*, 1943, p. 11.
- 23 Edward Spicer, Letter to Margaret Lantis, May 10, 1944, p. 1.
- 24 *Ibid.*, p. 2.
- 25 Margaret Lantis, Letter to John F. Embree, December 7, 1942. One of her findings: relocation was being hindered because children were "frightened by stories



- of Caucasian attitudes toward Japanese." See Margaret Lantis, "Possible Family Reactions to Liquidation of the Centers," November 22, 1944, p. 3.
- 26 See Spicer, *op. cit.*, 1979, p. 23.
- 27 Eunice Glenn, "Education Behind Barbed Wire," *Survey Midmonthly*, vol. 80 (1944), p. 349. For similar statements by Community Analysts, see Edgard McVoy, "Recommendations for Improving the Resettlement Program," Jerome CAS, May 3, 1943, ("Confidential."), p. 1; Tule Lake CAS, "Factors Influencing Low Enrollment," WRA Project Analysis Series No. 8, Washington CAS, July, 1943, mimeographed, pp. 7-8. (Authorship attributed to Marvin K. Opler by Edward H. Spicer.); Charles Wisdom, "Personal Narrative: Period Covering August, 1943-December 13, 1945," Rohwer CAS, 1946, p. 9; and Community Management Division, "Improving the Use of English by Center Residents," Adult Education and Orientation, Memorandum 3, Washington, D.C., 1943, p. 1.
- 28 John A. Rademaker, "Relocation Course," Memorandum to Louise Goodson, Catherine Stegner, and Melvill McGovern, Granada CAS, September 21, 1943.
- 29 John A. Rademaker, Letter to Edward H. Spicer, May 18, 1944. ("Confidential."), p. 2.
- 30 *Ibid.*, p. 6. On this same page he names a certain psychiatrist for the job because "... he has had quite a bit of experience with mental illness in mass situations..."
- 31 Edward Spicer, Note to John H. Provinse, (written in pencil on odd-size paper; signed "Ned."), June 9, 1944, (attached to John Rademaker's letter, *op. cit.*, May 12, 1944). See John Rademaker, Letter to Edward H. Spicer, December 24, 1943, ("Confidential"), pp. 10-11, for a passionate plea to do everything possible to relocate the internees.
- 32 John A. Rademaker, "A Critique of Community Analysis Report No. 5 ['Evacuee Resistances to Relocation,' by John F. Embree]," Granada CAS Report No. 2, Granada CAS, June 2, 1943, p. 1.
- 33 Anne O. Freed, "Washington Community Analysis Summary of 'Granada Community Analysis Report No. 2 on Resistances to Relocation with the Granada Relocation Analysis Made by the Reports Office,' Washington CAS, October 27, 1943.
- 34 Quoted in Spicer, "The Use of Social Scientists..." *op. cit.*, 1946, p. 28. See also Spicer, et al. (eds.), *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 195; and Toshio Yatsushiro, Iwao Ishino, and Yoshiharu Matsumoto, "The Japanese-American Looks at Resettlement," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 8 (1944), pp. 193-201.
- 35 Alexander H. Leighton, "Monthly Report on the Colorado River War Relocation Center for Evacuated Japanese," Poston, June 10, 1943, mimeographed, p. 3.
- 36 Alexander H. Leighton, "Monthly Report on the Colorado River War Relocation Center for Evacuated Japanese," Poston, July 10, 1943 (mimeographed), p. 7.
- 37 Joseph S. Roucek, "American Japanese, Pearl Harbour and World War II," *Journal of Negro Education*, vol. 12 (1943), p. 649, and "Japanese Americans," in Francis J. Brown and Joseph S. Roucek (eds.), *One America: The History, Contributions, and Present Problems of our Racial and National Minorities* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1945), p. 336.
- John de Young, "Special Meeting with Representatives of Community to Discuss and Formulate Policy Concerning Leave for Youth Under 18 Years," Minidoka Field Report No. 37, Minidoka CAS, April 21, 1943. In 1944, at age 15, I left Minidoka, ID, by myself in order to resume high school in a Michigan city. Earlier, my sister, age 17, had relocated unaccompanied to a city in Wisconsin. The year before, my brother had volunteered for the all-Nisei combat team and, in 1944, was in the European Theater of Operations. Therefore, in early 1945, when my parents left Minidoka for Connecticut, only one of their children relocated with them (but my twin sister and parents relocated to different towns in Connecticut). After camp, we never lived as a family unit again. The permanent break-up of our family because of Evacuation was hardly an atypical case. I returned to Seattle in 1968 for the first time since 1942 to attend the Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association which was held there that year.
- 39 Morris Opler, *op. cit.*, 1943, p. 1.
- 40 Edgard McVoy, "[Jerome] Community Analysis Section Operation," Memorandum to R.E. Arne, Jerome CAS, August 22, 1943, ("Confidential."), (initiated "ECM" as the author), p. 1.
- 41 *Ibid.*, p. 2.
- 42 Edgard McVoy, "Interview with Evacuee Christian Minister," Jerome CAS, May 25, 1943, p. 3, (all but initials of all names inked out), original emphasis. The policy recommended by McVoy was actually being practiced by the camp director of Minidoka, ID. He abolished it after formal complaints were lodged by means of a petition to the Spanish government, the neutral observer over camp conditions. See, Roy Akiyama et al., "Petition [to the Spanish Consul from Sixteen Minidokans]," Minidoka, ID., December 22, 1943, p. 2. At Granada, CO, according to John Rademaker, Letter to Frank L. Sweetser and "Ned" [Edward H. Spicer], October 3, 1943 ("Personal."), p. 2:
- Most [of the White personnel] thought that a few salutary (sic) removals [of inmates refusing to work being sent to Tule Lake, CA] would have an electrical effect on getting the other loafers to work. But I'm not in favor of using coercion to secure workers for jobs.
- 43 E. Adamson Hoebel, Letter to John H. Provinse: Attention: Edward H. Spicer, August 7, 1944. This kind of pressure was put on the general population. The rapid departure of Japanese American medical doctors, however, was viewed with alarm. Thus, Hoebel attempted to find a solution to stemming the tide. See, E. Adamson Hoebel, "Conference Between Council Committee on Doctor Problem with the Acting Project Director, August 24, 1944," Memorandum to

Henry F. ...  
Address ...  
1944, als ...  
in Chicag ...  
He encou ...  
44 Akiyama ...  
*op. cit.*, ...  
camps, C ...  
of Japan ...  
Moors af ...  
See Heart ...  
pared to ...  
1943, p. ...  
45 One repo ...  
at Topaz, ...  
block," o ...  
Map of T ...  
sistance o ...  
1943. Osc ...  
placed La ...  
because, a ...  
of residen ...  
(sic) [Con ...  
man, "Clo ...  
lysis Secti ...  
mann is in ...  
Spicer. Sp ...  
46 John de Y ...  
attached t ...  
tain Antor ...  
200, Septe ...  
John de Y ...  
Minidoka ...  
Meeting w ...  
Embassy," ...  
CAS, Augu ...  
47 John H. Pr ...  
Copy to " ...  
1944, ("Co ...  
48 This letter ...  
P.S. to ...  
this to ...  
as those ...  
of conse ...  
as well a ...  
such as ...  
future w ...  
A few mon ...  
to the d ...  
vern ...  
by the ...  
H. Provinse ...  
1944 ...  
49 ...  
50 ...  
51 ...  
52 ...  
53 ...  
54 ...  
55 ...  
56 ...  
57 ...  
58 ...  
59 ...  
60 ...  
61 ...  
62 ...  
63 ...  
64 ...  
65 ...  
66 ...  
67 ...  
68 ...  
69 ...  
70 ...  
71 ...  
72 ...  
73 ...  
74 ...  
75 ...  
76 ...  
77 ...  
78 ...  
79 ...  
80 ...  
81 ...  
82 ...  
83 ...  
84 ...  
85 ...  
86 ...  
87 ...  
88 ...  
89 ...  
90 ...  
91 ...  
92 ...  
93 ...  
94 ...  
95 ...  
96 ...  
97 ...  
98 ...  
99 ...  
100 ...



ek (eds.), *One*  
and Present  
Minorities (New

h Representatives  
late Policy Con-  
ears," Minidoka  
April 21, 1943.  
D, by myself in  
igan city. Earlier,  
company to a  
y brother had  
eam and, in  
Operations.  
rents left Mini-  
eir children re-  
and parents  
cticut). After  
again. The per-  
se of Evacuation  
l to Seattle in  
attend the Annual  
gical Association

y Analysis Sec-  
E. Arne, Jerome  
L."), (initiated

ee Christian  
p. 3, (all but  
l emphasis.  
was actually  
of Minidoka, ID.  
s were lodged by  
ernment, the  
l. See, Roy Aki-  
Consul from Six-  
cember 22, 1943,  
nn Rademaker,  
" [Edward H.  
D, p. 2:  
ught that a few  
refusing to work  
d have an elec-  
fers to work.  
on to secure

Provinse:  
1944. This  
population.  
can medical  
m. Thus, Hoe-  
ng the tide. See,  
ween Council  
e Acting Pro-  
ramandum to

- Henry F. Halliday, August 30, 1944. Hoebel, in "An Address to Chicago Evacuees," Granada CAS, July 28, 1944, also gave a pep talk to some Japanese Americans in Chicago who had moved there from various camps. He encouraged them to assimilate and to adjust.
- 44 Akiyama et al., *op. cit.*, 1943. See also Spicer et al., *op. cit.*, 1969, pp. 192-193. After his visits to various camps, Captain Martin compared America's treatment of Japanese Americans to Spain's treatment of its Moors after Spain had been wrested from Moslems. See *Heart Mountain Sentinel*, "Mass Evacuation Compared to Treatment of Moors in Spain," January 16, 1943, p. 2.
- 45 One report by Weston LaBarre, Community Analyst at Topaz, UT, was an "ecological map, block by block," of that camp. Weston LaBarre, "Ecological Map of Topaz, Utah. Block by Block," (with the assistance of Mary Sasajima), Topaz CAS, May 30, 1943. Oscar Hoffman, Community Analyst who replaced LaBarre, found much to praise about this map because, among other things, it pinpointed the places of residence of members of the "Spanish Council (sic) [Consul] Committee" of Topaz. Oscar F. Hoffman, "Closing Report of [Topaz] Community Analysis Section," Topaz CAS, 1945, p. 1. (Oscar Hoffmann is incorrectly listed as Charles Hoffman by Spicer. Spicer, *op. cit.*, 1979, p. 223.)
- 46 John de Young, Covering Letter to Edward H. Spicer, attached to: "Letter by Minidoka Evacuee X to Captain Antonio R. Martin," Minidoka Field Report No. 200, September 4, 1943, ("Restricted."). See also John de Young, "The Meeting with Captain Martin," Minidoka CAS, August 10, 1943; and T.D.K., "The Meeting with a Representative from the Spanish Embassy," Minidoka Field Report No. 165, Minidoka CAS, August 10, 1943.
- 47 John H. Provinse, Letter to Harry D. (sic) Stafford; Copy to "Ned" [Edward H. Spicer], January 17, 1944, ("Confidential.").
- 48 This letter has the following postscript:  
P.S. to Ned [Edward] Spicer: Thanks for calling this to my attention. I agree that such groups as those who signed this report petition could be of considerable negative influence on relocation as well as other problems of more general nature such as conduct of the centers camps and their future welfare outside.  
A few months after this letter. Provinse wrote a letter to the director of WRA, Dillon Myer, to express concern over the trend among internees to turn increasingly to the Spanish Consul to express complaints. John H. Provinse, Memorandum to Dillon S. Myer, April 7, 1944.
- 49 Spicer et al. (eds.), *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 193.
- 50 See Spicer, "The Use of Social Scientists..." *op. cit.*, 1946, p. 25.
- 51 Spicer et al. (eds.), *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 279. This view (and statistic) has recently been tempered. "The WRA did not succeed in resettling from the centers quite 25,000 evacuees after two and one-half years of the relocation program. The maximum was not attained." Spicer, *op. cit.*, 1979, p. 232.
- 52 Broom and Kitsuse, *op. cit.*, 1956, pp. 44-46; paragraphs restructured. Regrettably, Spicer in his recent article on WRA helps "standardize an error" regarding the beneficial effects of Evacuation. Under Accomplishments of the WRA, he states:  
The resettlement program brought about a much wider distribution of the Japanese Americans over the United States than had characterized them before World War II, thus, eliminating concentrations in westcoast slum areas. Spicer, *op. cit.*, 1979, p. 230.  
This "surrendipitous" effect could surely have been achieved in a better way. Also, prewar residential patterns showed very clearly a pattern of movement away from the Little Tokyos. Furthermore, most of those who relocated eventually moved back to the West Coast. See Petersen, *op. cit.*, 1971, p. 126.  
Another error which Spicer helps standardize in his 1979 article is to place the blame for the evacuation on limited interest groups such as the Shipper-Growers' Association and the "implacable prejudice of a single army general." The evacuation was not a right-wing movement; rather, the rationale and decision for it came from a group of New Deal-WASP-male liberals, as William Manchester, William Petersen, and Michi Weglyn have proved. See William Petersen, "The Incarceration of the Japanese-Americans," *National Review*, vol. 24, no. 48 (December 8, 1972); and Michi Weglyn, *Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America's Concentration Camps* (New York: William Morrow, 1976), p. 298 n3, (a pertinent passage from Manchester's *The Glory and the Dream* is cited). On the Shipper-Growers' Association and the general, see Spicer, *op. cit.*, 1979, p. 217.
- 53 Weglyn, *op. cit.*, 1976, p. 157; original italics; paragraphs restructured. As will be discussed in the next few pages of the text of this paper, the responses of the Community Analysts varied with the individual, even though, according to Spicer, "The Use of Social Scientists..." *op. cit.*, 1946, p. 24, the CAS  
.... prepared a statement which was issued as an administrative instruction to all WRA staff outlining the basis of a general approach to the new problem [segregation]. The instruction [among other points] emphasized the presentation of segregation as a nonpunitive measure in line with evacuee attitudes toward it...  
In other words, if their attitudes were negative, the responses were to be punitive.  
Unfortunately, it must be noted that an early advocate of segregation was Leighton, who strongly recommended it in his monthly reports of June and July 1943 to Poston AZ, administrators. Leighton, "Monthly Report..." June, 1943, *op. cit.*, 1943, p. 6, and "Monthly Report..." July, 1943, *op. cit.*, 1943, p. 9. Yet, only



three months earlier, Leighton had been given a job description of the Community Analyst by Provinse, one which excluded any mention of the Community Analyst as an official to recommend policies of such importance. John H. Provinse, Letter to Alexander H. Leighton, March 27, 1943, p. 12. So far as Community Analysts are concerned, only the segregation policy had not been determined by December 1942, according to Spicer. Spicer, "The Use of Social Scientists...", *op. cit.*, 1946, p. 19. See also Spicer, *op. cit.*, 1977, p. 131; and *op. cit.*, 1979, pp. 231-234. John Embree, in "Registration," Memorandum to the Community Analysis Section, April 26, 1943, p. 3, did not look kindly upon the loyalty oath, which was the basis for segregation.

It is Machiavellian to thrust self-respecting citizens into concentration camp conditions and then to call them disloyal for protesting this treatment by refusing to pledge allegiance in this situation, and then turn about and say to the public this proves we were right in detaining these people, who were largely subversive in the first place.

- 54 John A. Rademaker, "Disloyals," Memorandum to James G. Lindley, February 20, 1944, ("Confidential."). Italics added. Leupp, AZ: "A highly guarded isolation camp surrounded by manproof fence and guard towers ... on a desolate Navaho Indian Reservation..." Weglyn, *op. cit.*, 1976, p. 128.
- 55 Rademaker, "Disloyals," *op. cit.*, 1944.
- 56 John A. Rademaker, Letter to Edward H. Spicer, February 22, 1944 ("Confidential."), p. 14.
- 57 John A. Rademaker, Letter to Edward H. Spicer, February 16, 1944 ("Confidential."), p. 5.
- 58 John A. Rademaker, "Visitors to Granada," Memorandum to James G. Lindley, April 8, 1944 ("Confidential."), p. 5.
- 59 *Ibid.*, p. 7.
- 60 John A. Rademaker, Letter to James G. Lindley, May 23, 1944 ("Confidential."), p. 3.
- 61 *Ibid.*, p. 1.
- 62 *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.
- 63 John A. Rademaker, Letter to James G. Lindley, July 26, 1943, ("Confidential."), p. 1.
- 64 John A. Rademaker, "July 12, 1943 General Staff Meeting," Granada CAS, July 12, 1943; and "July 12, 1943 General Staff Meeting," Granada CAS, July 15, 1943.
- 65 John A. Rademaker, Letter to Edward H. Spicer, April 20, 1944 ("Personal and Confidential."). The Community Analyst of Jerome, Edgar McVoy, also reported on whites in that camp. See Note 70 below. Earlier, in October 1943, John Rademaker, in Letter to Frank L. Sweetser and "Ned" ..., *op. cit.*, 1943, felt uneasy about investigative work, as revealed in these passages from a letter to Sweetser and Spicer.

As a matter of fact, this investigation of dissidents has me a bit concerned. In the first place, we're not an FBI (federal Bureau of Investigation) nor de-

tective outfit. If we do this sort of thing and it gets known that we do (as it unquestionably will if we do much of it), it will stop us from getting a lot of other information which we ought to get. On the other hand, it is essential to know the tenor of public opinion in any question which seems to involve loyalty or disloyalty to the United States, and the threats against the life and safety of any loyal Americans. However, digging out the dirt on that sort of thing is not our job. Can you give me any enlightenment on the problem?

As ever, but somewhat puzzledly yours, (signed) John Rademaker

- 66 Edgar C. McVoy, "Interview with Two Block Managers," May 11, 1943 (all but initials of all names inked out.); "Interview with Evacuee Christian Minister," *op. cit.*, 1943; "Interview with Two Evacuee Christian Ministers," Jerome CAS, May 28, 1943 (all but initials of all names inked out); "Interview with Reverend H. and Mr. A.," Jerome CAS, June 1, 1943 (all but initials of all names inked out); "Interview with a Buddhist Minister," Jerome CAS, June 10, 1943, (all but initials of all names inked out); and "Interview with a Buddhist Priest," Jerome CAS, June 21, 1943 ("Strictly Confidential."), (all but initials of all names inked out).
- 67 McVoy, "Interview with Two Block Managers," *op. cit.*, 1943, p. 1.
- 68 McVoy, "Interview with Two Evacuee Christian Ministers," *op. cit.*, 1943, p. 1.
- 69 McVoy, "Interview with a Buddhist Priest," *op. cit.*, 1943, pp. 1-2.
- 70 Edgar C. McVoy, "Interview with Mr. Taylor, June 22, 1943," Jerome CAS, June 23, 1943 (all but initials of all names inked out), pp. 1-2. Not long after these interviews, McVoy wrote the following to R.E. Arne, Chief, Community Management Division, Jerome, AR. All statements concerning appointed personnel [Whites] shall be sent to Mr. Taylor [camp director of Jerome] in a confidential form. He may use his own discretion about submitting such statements to Washington. For the most part, however, these statements must continue to be in anonymous form. I cannot be placed in the role here of being an informer to the administration about either evacuees or appointed personnel. I should much prefer to go myself to the person or the staff involved and discuss the situation with him. Then, if it seemed advisable, I might report the instance to you and Mr. Taylor. In flagrant cases, however, which seem to jeopardize the operation of the project, I shall make an exception and give what facts I know to you and Mr. Taylor directly.
- 71 McVoy, "[Jerome] Community Analysis Section Operation," *op. cit.*, 1943, p. 1.
- 72 E. Adamson Hoebel, "Draft Evaders," Memorandum to Walter J. Knodel, July 17, 1944.

72 E. Adamson  
Memoran  
73 E. Adamson  
Granada  
Lindley,  
74 Edward H.  
in Tule L  
tober 23,  
of List of  
Provinse,  
for a list  
ty risk" a  
Center.  
75 Embree,  
p. 2.  
76 Gila Rep  
AZ, 1943  
ment on  
Mead, Eli  
port of th  
tion, vol.  
77 John A. F  
August 2  
Ernst, car  
ing staten  
Analyst a  
Project [c  
lyst [LaB  
garding in  
[i.e., Top  
port of Sc  
Topaz," M  
John Prov  
p. 5.  
78 Rosalie H  
and Advic  
1971). p.  
79 *Ibid.*, p. 1  
80 *Ibid.*, p. 1  
81 *Ibid.*, p. 1  
82 Thomas  
83 Wax, op. a  
84 *Ibid.*, p. 1  
85 *Ibid.*, p. 1  
86 *Ibid.*, pp  
87 *Ibid.*, p. 1  
88 *Ibid.*  
89 *Ibid.*, pp  
90 *Ibid.*, p. 1  
91 *Ibid.*, p. 1



thing and it gets  
nably will if we  
n getting a lot of  
t to get. On the  
the tenor of  
ich seems to in-  
United States,  
safety of any  
out the dirt on  
an you give me  
t?  
yours, (signed)

o Block Man-  
of all names  
Christian Minister,"  
Evacuee Christian  
3 (all but initials  
ith Reverend H.  
43 (all but initials  
ith a Buddhist  
3, (all but ini-  
terview with a  
21, 1943 ("Strict-  
all names inked

Managers," *op.*

Christian Min-

Priest," *op. cit.*,

. Taylor, June  
43 (all but initials  
t long after these  
ng to R.E. Arne,  
sion, Jerome, AR.  
ted personnel  
or [camp director  
d. He may use his  
such statements  
, however, these  
n anonymous  
le here of being  
about either  
I should much  
or the staff in-  
with him. Then, if  
t the instance to  
ses, however,  
ration of the pro-  
d give what facts  
ectly.  
lysis Section

" Memorandum

- 72 E. Adamson Hoebel, "Distribution of Draft Evaders," Memorandum to Walter J. Knodel, July 27, 1944.
- 73 E. Adamson Hoebel, "Relocation Situation in Granada Relocation Center," Memorandum to John Lindley, August 1, 1944, ("Confidential.").
- 74 Edward H. Spicer, "Central Utah Segregants Now in Tule Lake," Memorandum to Leland Barrows, October 23, 1943. See also Edward H. Spicer, "Criteria of List of Influentials," Memorandum to John H. Provinse, December 11, 1944. ("Confidential."), p. 1, for a list of six criteria as to what constituted a "security risk" among those in the Tule Lake Segregation Center.
- 75 Embree, "Letter to Marvin K. Opler," *op. cit.*, 1943, p. 2.
- 76 Gila Reports Office, "Segregation Proceedings," Gila, AZ, 1943, pp. 1 and 2. Brown later co-authored a statement on ethics in applied anthropology. See Margaret Mead, Eliot D. Chapple, and G. Gordon Brown, "Report of the Committee on Ethics," *Human Organization*, vol. 8, no. 2 (1949).
- 77 John A. Rademaker, Letter to Frank L. Sweetser, August 25, 1943, ("Confidential."), p. 3. Charles Ernst, camp director of Topaz, UT, made this revealing statement about Weston LaBarre, Community Analyst at Topaz: "At Central Utah [Topaz], the Project [camp] Attorney and the Social Science Analyst [LaBarre] have worked together with profit, regarding individual members of the resident community [i.e., Topazeans]." Charles F. Ernst, "Monthly Report of Social Science Analyst [Weston LaBarre] at Topaz," Memorandum to Dillon S. Myer; Attention: John Provinse and John Embree, Topaz, June 8, 1943, p. 5.
- 78 Rosalie Hankey Wax, *Doing Fieldwork: Warnings and Advice* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 113, paperback edition.
- 79 *Ibid.*, p. 103.
- 80 *Ibid.*, p. 113.
- 81 *Ibid.*, p. 139.
- 82 Thomas and Nishimoto, *op. cit.*, 1946, p. viii fn5.
- 83 Wax, *op. cit.*, 1971, p. 140.
- 84 *Ibid.*, p. 140.
- 85 *Ibid.*, p. 142.
- 86 *Ibid.*, pp. 152-162.
- 87 *Ibid.*, p. 168.
- 88 *Idem.*
- 89 *Ibid.*, pp. 168-169.
- 90 *Ibid.*, p. 169.
- 91 *Idem.* On the relationship between WRA and the various intelligence agencies in each of the camps, see Dillon S. Myer, *Uprooted Americans: The Japanese Americans and the War Relocation Authority During World War II* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1979), pp. 237-239. The anthropologist who reviewed Wax's *Doing Fieldwork* in *American Anthropologist*, failed to mention any of these unusual activities. Morris Frielich, "Review of *Doing Fieldwork: Warnings and Advice*, by Rosalie Hankey Wax," *American Anthropologist*, vol. 75 (1973), pp. 398-399. Despite the relatively large number of Japanese Americans who worked in the Community Analysis Sections or for the Evacuation and Resettlement Study and eventually became professional social scientists (including anthropologists) (see Note 145 below), not a single one has reviewed books on the camp experience for the *American Anthropologist*.
- 92 Embree, "Community Analysis...", *op. cit.*, 1944. According to Spicer, "The Use of Social Scientists...", *op. cit.*, 1946, p. 35, Community Analysts "... offered predictions concerning what would most probably be the result of alternative actions by the administration."
- 93 Washington CAS, "Community Analysis Section Annual Report July 1-December 31, 1943," Washington, D.C., 1944, p. 3.
- 94 Anne O. Freed, "Interviews on Assembly Centers," Washington CAS, April 23, 1943; and "Summary of Available Data on Assembly Centers," Washington CAS, July 14, 1943.
- 95 Edward H. Spicer, Note to John H. Provinse, (written in blue pencil), (Attached to report by Anne O. Freed, "Summary of Available Data...", *op. cit.*, 1943.), 1943. Part of this note is reprinted in Weglyn, *op. cit.*, 1976, p. 297 n6.
- 96 John H. Provinse, Note to Edward H. Spicer (written in pencil), February 8, 1944 (initialed "JHP" as the author). This was not the only incidence of suppression of information by Spicer and Provinse. The Chief of Internal Security at Tule Lake, CA, wanted to publicize the good relations which existed between Japanese Americans and whites in Hawaii, and the fact that one-sixth of the Honolulu police force was of Japanese ancestry. This request was put to Provinse, who, in turn, asked for Spicer's opinion. See John H. Provinse, Memorandum to Edward H. Spicer, October 8, 1943. Spicer was of the opinion that such information "... could be dynamite here in the United States." See Edward Spicer, "[Minidoka, ID] Community Analysis Section Staff Meeting Number 2," Minidoka CAS, May 5, 1943. The information was never released.
- 97 Washington CAS, "Community Analysis...", *op. cit.*, p. 8.
- 98 *Ibid.*, p. 12.
- 99 *Ibid.*, p. 19.
- 100 *Ibid.*, p. 16.
- 101 John H. Provinse, Letter to Ralph P. Merritt, February 3, 1944, p. 1.
- 102 Asael T. Hansen, "Community Analysis at Heart Mountain Relocation Center," *Applied Anthropology*, vol. 5, no. 3 (1946), p. 14. This same sentiment was also expressed by the Community Analyst at Poston, AZ, David H. French, "Final Report: Community Analysis Section [Poston]," Poston CAS, 1945 (?), (No date) and Rademaker of Granada, CO. See John A. Rademaker, Letter to Edward H. Spicer, January 3, 1944 ("Confidential."), p. 2. For criticisms of



- Hansen's failure to predict the low turnout for selective service at Heart Mountain, WY, see Douglas W. Nelson, *Heart Mountain: The History of an American Concentration Camp* (Madison: Logmark Editions, 1976), p. 125.
- 103 Washington CAS, *Annual Report* [The First Six Months]. Washington, D.C., 1944, p. 1.
  - 104 Spicer, "The Use of Social Scientists....," *op. cit.*, 1946, p. 29, states that Marvin Opler's reports were read "... both in Washington and at the center."
  - 105 Marvin K. Opler, "Possible Effects of Segregation: Tule Lake," Tule Lake Project Analysis Report No. 4, Tule Lake CAS, July 7, 1943, and "If Tule Lake Remains the 'Segregation Center'," Tule Lake Project Analysis Report No. 6, Tule Lake CAS, July 20, 1943 ("Confidential.").
  - 106 Marvin Opler, "Possible Effects of Segregation: Tule Lake," *op. cit.*, 1943.
  - 107 Marvin Opler, "If Tule Lake Remains the 'Segregation Center'," *op. cit.*, 1943, p. 9.
  - 108 *Ibid.*, p. 8; original emphasis. He was also of the opinion that "... the *disloyalty* issue became absurd." Marvin Opler, "Narrative Report on the Work of the [Community Analysis] Section by its Community Analyst," Tule Lake CAS, August 31, 1945, p. 31; original emphasis.
  - 109 Marvin Opler, "If Tule Lake Remains the 'Segregation Center'," *op. cit.*, 1943, p. 5.
  - 110 *Ibid.*, p. 9.
  - 111 See Katherine Luomala, "Research and the Records of the War Relocation Authority," *Applied Anthropology*, vol. 7, no. 1 (1948), pp. 27ff.; Hansen, *op. cit.*, 1946, pp. 23ff.; and Spicer, "The Use of Social Scientists....," *op. cit.*, 1946, p. 33.
  - 112 Luomala, *op. cit.*, 1948, p. 31. In his recent article, Edward Spicer, *op. cit.*, 1979, p. 224, writes, "Some memoranda were written, but the WRA program was fast-moving, making constant demands on administrators' time, so that oral communication was better adapted to getting relevant information into the administrative process." There were, nonetheless, quite a few memoranda which were written.
  - 113 Gordon Armbruster, an anthropologist, was Community Analyst at Minidoka, ID, from February 3, 1944 to March 4, 1944. Previously, he had conducted field work in a Welsh coalmining community. There are no documents by him in the National Archives. Edward H. Spicer, *op. cit.*, 1979, p. 223, does not list him among those who worked as Community Analysts. See Elmer R. Smith, "Historical Sketch of [Community] Analysis Section, April 9, 1944–October 25, 1945: A Narrative," Minidoka CAS, October, 1945, p. 3.
  - 114 Of the 355 documents classified according to topic by Elmer Smith, "Historical Sketch....," *op. cit.*, 1945, p. 9, 232 (65.35%) are policy analysis reports; the remainder, 123 (34.65%), would be in the realm of ethnographic/ethnological reports. See also Elmer R. Smith, "Supplement I: To Historical Sketch of [Community] Analysis Section of Minidoka," Minidoka CAS, November 26, 1945.
  - 115 Tule Lake CAS, "A Lexicon of Center Terms," WRA Community Analysis Notes No. 15, Washington CAS, July 18, 1945, (Mimeographed.), (authorship attributed to Marvin K. Opler by Edward H. Spicer).
  - 116 Minidoka CAS, "English Words in Current Use at Minidoka Center that have been given a 'Japanized-English' Pronunciation or have been Translated into a Japanese equivalent," WRA Project Analysis Series No. 10, Washington CAS, July, 1943 (mimeographed), (authorship attributed to John de Young by Edward H. Spicer).
  - 117 Elmer R. Smith, "Some Basic Slang Expressions in Minidoka Among the Nisei," Memorandum to Dillon S. Myer, May 29, 1945.
  - 118 Minidoka CAS, "Report on Speech and Courtesy Patterns at Minidoka," Minidoka Field Report No. 158, August 9, 1943, and "English Words in Current Use at Minidoka....," *op. cit.*, 1943; See also Peter T. Suzuki, "The Ethnolinguistics of Japanese Americans in the Wartime Camps," *Anthropological Linguistics*, vol. 18 (1976), p. 426 n2.
  - 119 See Suzuki, "The Ethnolinguistics of Japanese Americans....," *op. cit.*, 1976, pp. 419–424; and Peter T. Suzuki, "Japanese [hs:], American English [hm:] and Dutch [X] as Expressives and Intercultural Communication," *Anthropological Linguistics*, vol. 19 (1977), pp. 421–423.
  - 120 Bernard Bloch, "Studies in Colloquial Japanese IV: Phonemics," *Language*, vol. 26 (1950), p. 86 fn3.
  - 121 Minidoka CAS, "Report on Speech and Courtesy Patterns at Minidoka," *op. cit.*, 1943, pp. 2–4.
  - 122 For a brief but good report on the grandparent–grandchild relationship, see D[ick] K[anaya], M[ary] W[atanabe] and E[lmer] S[mith], "Grandparent–Child Relations in Minidoka Relocation Center," Minidoka Field Report No. 302, Minidoka CAS, June 21, 1944. Unfortunately, the WRA anthropologists were too concerned with the block in the camps, typically comprising 250 Japanese Americans, as the basic unit of social organization, an ephemeral unit at best. See, for example, Spicer et al. (eds.), *op. cit.*, 1969, pp. 102–114; and Provinse and Kimball, *op. cit.*, 1946, p. 405. On the durability and persistence of kinship patterns and ties in a contemporary Japanese American community – Seattle's – see Sylvia Junko Yanagisako, "Two Processes of Change in Japanese-American Kinship," *Journal of Anthropological Research*, vol. 31 (1975).
  - 123 See Laura Nader, "Standards and What We Study," in Michael A Rynkiewicz and James P. Spradley (eds.), *Ethics and Anthropology: Dilemmas in Fieldwork* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976), p. 169.
  - 124 See, for example, G. Gordon Brown, "Notes on Evacuee Family Patterns [Gila, AZ]," Project Analysis Series No. 11, Washington CAS, November 24, 1943, (mimeographed); Elizabeth Colson, "The Family in Poston," Poston CAS, August 25, 1943;

Bureau of Soc  
Family in Am  
of Political an  
garet Lantis, "  
Rural Families  
port to the So  
1943; Anne O  
ington CAS, N  
"The Families  
November 19,  
125 Topaz Histori  
Topaz, Docum  
126 Evelyn Kirimu  
Health Program  
Document H 4  
tion, 1944. See  
The Granada R  
many of which  
19, 1943 to Ma  
127 John D. Cook,  
to Edwin Bates  
9, 1942.  
128 John D. Cook,  
Women Spend  
Hiroshi Sugasa  
Tule Lake Repo  
single-spaced ty  
see John D. Co  
Bates, Report N  
tober 21, 1942.  
mentary, junior  
all aspects of Ev  
Section, "Surve  
Jerome Reports  
129 John D. Cook,  
Project Life (Re  
Memorandum to  
Tule Lake Repo  
single-spaced ty  
130 John C. Baker,  
16, Minidoka Re  
131 John C. Baker,  
K. Watanabe  
doka Reports Ch  
Opler and J. C  
Community F  
vol. 33 (1947)  
"Tule Lake W  
Lower and U  
West. A group  
Community F  
at center  
132 Elmer R. Smith,  
133 John C. Baker,



er Terms," WRA  
Washington CAS,  
authorship attributed  
picer).  
urrent Use at  
en a 'Japanized-  
Translated into  
t Analysis Series  
3 (mimeographed),  
oung by Edward

Expressions in  
randum to Dillon

and Courtesy Pat-  
Report No. 158,  
s in Current Use at  
o Peter T. Suzuki,  
Americans in the  
*Linguistics*, vol. 18

of Japanese Ameri-  
4; and Peter T.  
English [hm:]  
intercultural Com-  
*munications*, vol. 19

ial Japanese IV:  
50), p. 86 fn3.  
and Courtesy  
3, pp. 2-4.

grandparent-grand-  
aya], M[ary]  
,"Grandparent-  
ation Center,"  
inidoka CAS,  
WRA anthropol-  
block in the  
panese Americans,  
ion, an ephemeral  
er et al. (eds.),  
rovinse and Kim-  
durability and  
ties in a contem-  
nity - Seattle's -  
Processes of  
hip," *Journal of*  
(1975).

What We Study,"  
es P. Spradley  
*Dilemmas in Field-*  
Sons, 1976),

n, "Notes on  
], "Project Ana-  
S, November 24,  
Colson, "The  
ugust 25, 1943;

Bureau of Sociological Research, "The Japanese Family in America," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 229 (1943); Margaret Lantis, "Report of Work on Study of Resettled Rural Families, January-March 1943 Inclusive" Report to the Social Science Research Council, April 10, 1943; Anne O. Freed, "The Japanese Family," Washington CAS, November, 1944; and Asael T. Hansen, "The Families of Block X," Heart Mountain CAS, November 19, 1945.

- 125 Topaz Historical Section, "Bingo Crisis at Topaz," Topaz, Document H 434, 1944.
- 126 Evelyn Kirimura, "The Hospital and the General Health Program at Topaz, Utah, With Supplements," Document H 464, 464A, 464B, Topaz Historical Section, 1944. See pp. 21-29 of her report on personnel. The Granada Reports Office submitted 69 reports, many of which were ethnographical; from January 19, 1943 to March 10, 1943.
- 127 John D. Cook, "Labor Day Fiesta," Memorandum to Edwin Bates, Tule Lake Reports Office, September 9, 1942.
- 128 John D. Cook, "How Retired Men and Unemployed Women Spend Their Time in Tule Lake (Research by Hiroshi Sugawara)," Memorandum to Edwin Bates, Tule Lake Reports Office, November 24, 1942 (11 single-spaced typed pages). For the report on food, see John D. Cook, "Mess," Memorandum to Edwin Bates, Report No. 46, Tule Lake Reports Office, October 21, 1942. For an attitude survey of 1200 elementary, junior, and senior high school students on all aspects of Evacuation, see Jerome Documents Section, "Survey of [1200] Students on Evacuation," Jerome Reports Office, 1943.
- 129 John D. Cook, "How Women with Children View Project Life (Research by Mrs. Masayo Yokota)," Memorandum to Edwin Bates, Special Report No. 60, Tule Lake Reports Office, December 11, 1942, (10 single-spaced typed pages).
- 130 John C. Baker, "What They're Reading," Report No. 16, Minidoka Reports Office, December 2, 1942.
- 131 John C. Baker, "Report No. 58 (Research by Toshi K. Watanabe)," Memorandum to Dillon S. Myer, Minidoka Reports Office, April 9, 1943. See also Marvin Opler and F. Obayashi, "Senryu Poetry as Folk and Community Expression," *Journal of American Folklore*, vol. 58 (1945), on *senryu* poetry; and Peter T. Suzuki, "Tanka in the Wartime Camps for Japanese Americans: Issei and Kibei Contributions to a Literature East and West," *Literature East and West: Journal of World and Comparative Literature*, forthcoming, on *tanka* poetry in camps.
- 132 Edwin Bates, "Model Apartment (Sketches Attached)," Memorandum to E.R. Pryer, Report No. 7, Minidoka Reports Office, 1942.
- 133 John Bigelow, "Alaskan Evacuees," Report No. 2,

Minidoka Reports Office, September 21, 1942; John C. Baker, "Minidoka Report No. 30," Memorandum to Dillon S. Myer, Minidoka Reports Office, January 25, 1943; and Carl V. Sandoz, "Alaskan Evacuees," Report No. 10, Minidoka Reports Office, January, 1943. Those from Deering, ten miles north of Nome, and Bristol Bay were given only 20 minutes' notice by the Army before being evacuated by plane. Some 45 of the 134 from Alaska were of mixed ancestry. See Bigelow, *op. cit.*, 1942, p. 2. Prior to the evacuation several were engaged in the traditional hunting and gathering economy of the Eskimos. The criterion of "one-eight Japanese blood" was the basis for the evacuation of these Alaskans (on the mainland "one-sixteenth Japanese blood" was the criterion used). All Alaskans were initially interned in Area "A", Camp Harmony, Puyallup Assembly Center and later in Minidoka, ID. Because all Alaskan internees lived in the row of barracks next to where we used to live in Area "A", I personally got to know quite a few of them. An interesting fact was that many did not know they had any "Japanese blood." See Peter T. Suzuki, "Urgent Anthropology, Gerontology, and a Vanishing People in the United States: The Isseis (Japanese)," *Bulletin of the International Committee on Urgent Anthropological and Ethnological Research*, vol. 9 (1977), p. 79. According to Bigelow, *op. cit.*, 1942, p. 1, one Alaskan was a full-blooded Aleut; several others were full-blooded Indians (they were married to Alaskan of Japanese ancestry). One boy, age 9, whose mother was dead and whose Japanese father was interned in Lordsburg, New Mexico, one of the internment camps for aliens, was evacuated to Puyallup; he was left virtually orphaned when his 20 year old brother left Minidoka, ID, to work on a farm for several months. (This boy was one-half Japanese, one-fourth Indian, and one-fourth Russian.) Another boy, age 12, a full-blooded Indian, was forced to evacuate because of the fact that he was a member of his sister's family, and his sister was married to a half-Japanese, half-Indian. One woman, age 20, was three-fourths Indian and one-fourth Swedish, but was married to a half-Japanese, half-Indian. There were several adult brothers who were "one-eight Russian, three-eighths Indian and one-half Japanese." In point of fact, in one study made of such Alaskans, only one was a full Japanese, whereas two were full Indians, and one was full Aleut. Sandoz, *op. cit.*, 1943, pp. 1-2. Those people from northern Alaska ... lived in native (Indian) villages, hunted whale and seal to eke out an existence, spoke a jargon of English-Eskimo-Indian-Japanese and lived totally unlike the majority of the Minidoka evacuees from Seattle and Portland.

Bigelow, *op. cit.*, 1942, p. 2. See also Baker, "Minidoka Report No. 30," *op. cit.*, 1943.

Both Margaret Lantis and John Embree were curious



- to know how these Alaskans were doing, the former because she had done field work in Alaska. Obviously they did not know about the documents by the Reports Office of Minidoka. See Margaret Lantis, Letter to Frank L. Sweetser, April 27, 1943, p. 1; John F. Embree, Letter to Margaret Lantis, May 4, 1943; and Washington CAS, "Morning Session," Denver Conference of Community Analysts, September 12, 1944, (First Draft.), p. 9. (In the last-cited work Embree again raises a question about the Alaskan internees.) For a single sentence on the adjustment they were making in Minidoka, see John de Young, Letter to John F. Embree, June 18, 1943. Three from northern Alaska volunteered for the all-Nisei combat team when the call was first made; all three were in Minidoka, ID. See *Heart Mountain Sentinel*, "Three Volunteers from Alaska Join U.S. Nisei Combat Team," September 4, 1943, p. 5. Two were married to Aleuts; one was single.
- 134 Washington CAS, "Relation of Reports [Offices] and Community Analysts," Denver Conference of Community Analysts, September 13, 1944, (First Draft.), pp. 1-6. See also Washington CAS, "Discussion on Field Techniques," *op. cit.*, 1944, pp. 2-3.
- 135 The work of the Reports Division deserves greater credit than Spicer, *op. cit.*, 1979, p. 225, is willing to give it:
- The Reports Division of the WRA carried out some important research into the circumstances of Japanese life leading up to the crisis of evacuation, made summaries of their findings, and distributed them to the WRA personnel as well as to the general public.
- It was from the Reports Division that Embree wanted the CAS separated because, in addition to ethnographic reports, the Report Division's function, in the words of one of its officials, was to maintain "strict censorship" of all newspapers published by and for the internees in each camp. See C.J. Buttedahl, "The Work of the Reports Officer at Minidoka Project," Memorandum to John Baker, Minidoka Reports Office, February 18, 1943, p. 1. See also John C. Baker, "Report No. 43," Minidoka Reports Office, February 19, 1943, p. 2. On censorship of Morris Opler's report on the barbed wire fence in Manzanar, CA, see Frank L. Sweetser, "Manzanar, 29 May-31 May, 1943," Memorandum to John F. Embree, June 8, 1943 ("Confidential."), pp. 1-2. (Only Minidoka, ID, had an electrically charged fence, albeit briefly. See John de Young, "The Fence at Minidoka," *op. cit.*, 1943, p. 2; and Bigelow, *op. cit.*, 1942, p. 3. On censorship of Minidoka's camp newspaper editorial on Jim Crow in the Army, see Minidoka Reports Office, "Report No. 43," February 19, 1943, p. 2. A printed copy of the censored editorial as it was to appear in the *Minidoka Irrigator* is in the National Archives. It condemns Jim Crow and raises questions about it so far as the proposed all-Nisei combat team is concerned. On censorship of Poston's *Chronicle*, see Bailey, *op. cit.*, 1971, pp. 105, 127.
- 136 See G. Gordon Brown, "War Relocation Authority Gila River Project, Rivers, Arizona, Community Analysis Section, May 12 to July 7, 1945, Final Report," *Applied Anthropology*, vol. 4, no. 4 (1945), p. 21; Forrest LaViolette, "Field Notes on the Morale of the Caucasian Staff at Heart Mountain," Heart Mountain CAS, August 8, 1943, ("Confidential."), (initialed "FL" as the author); Alexander H. Leighton, *The Governing of Men: General Principles and Recommendations Based on Experience at a Japanese Relocation Camp* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945), pp. 84-88; Edgar C. McVoy, "Relations Between Staff and Evacuees," Memorandum to Edward H. Spicer, October 15, 1943, ("Rough Draft."), pp. 1-2; Elmer Smith, "Historical Sketch of [Community] Analysis Section...", *op. cit.*, 1945, pp. 5-6; and Wisdom, *op. cit.*, 1946, pp. 6-7. After a visit to Heart Mountain, WY, Embree, "Resistance to Freedom...", *op. cit.*, 1943, p. 9, wrote with concern: "Some staff members have no business on a relocation project [camp]. One man, for instance, recommended that the repatriates be castrated before being returned to Japan."
- 137 Edward H. Spicer, "Introduction: The Relocation Centers in Retrospect," in Spicer et al. (eds.), *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 8.
- 138 Elmer R. Smith, "Interview with HLS [Harry L. Stafford], Project Director," Minidoka CAS, April 8, 1943. See also Edward H. Spicer, "Report on an Unorganized Relocation Center [Minidoka, ID]," WRA Project Analysis Series No. 6, Washington CAS, June, 1943, (mimeographed), p. 11. According to a severe critic of WRA, this director was one of the more enlightened ones. See Weglyn, *op. cit.*, 1976, p. 145. Despite numerous labor disputes and strikes at Minidoka, ID, this same director felt that "... the Seattle and Portland Japanese [i.e., the majority of the Minidokans] were docile and an easily managed lot." See Harry L. Stafford, "Project Director Narrative," To Dillon S. Myer, Minidoka, ID, September 26, 1945, p. 5.
- 139 Leighton, *op. cit.*, 1945, p. 88.
- 140 Washington CAS, *Annual Report*, *op. cit.*, 1944, p. 1; emphasis added. See also Edward H. Spicer, "Suggestions for Job Relations Training at Relocation Centers," Memorandum to Inez Mercer, May 19, 1944, p. 1; Anne Freed and Edward H. Spicer, "The Issei and Nisei Relocation," "Appendix" by Rachel R. Sady, Washington CAS, May 29, 1944, p. 7; and Leighton and Spicer, *op. cit.*, 1945, p. 376, for identical wording.
- 141 Embree, "Evacuee Resistance...", *op. cit.*, 1943, "Community Analysis...", *op. cit.*, 1944, p. 287; Spicer, *op. cit.*, 1952. See also John F. Embree, "The Indian Bureau and Self-Government," *Human Organization*, vol. 8, no. 2 (1949), p. 12. The perspective that the inmates were mentally ill is also implicit in an article heavily influenced by Alexander Leighton. See Sociological Research Project, "The Psychiatric Approach

to Problems of  
*Journal of Psy*  
 327-328, 332  
 Research was c  
 Research Proje  
 142 Peter T. Suzuki  
 time 'National  
*polology*, vol. 5,  
 143 The three book  
 et al. (eds.), *op*  
*Americans of J*  
*tion in the Am*  
 Institute of Int  
 is a fine study.  
 144 Spicer, *op. cit.*  
 145 Japanese Amer  
 Analysis Sectio  
 tion and Reset  
 aspects of cam  
 "The Career of  
 Collective Adj  
 Tule Lake Relo  
 department of So  
 James M. Sako  
 Patterns of Soc  
 partment of So  
 1949; Tamotsu  
 as a Form of C  
 Department of  
 and Toshio Ya  
 Issues at Poston  
 Thermal Analy  
 Political Scienc  
 also be taken o  
 foran Assembly  
*Kikuchi Diary*  
*tration Camp*.  
 John Modell (e  
 1973). After th  
 (both at Poston  
 Of the Evacuat  
 ogists, Spicer, o  
 they included  
 Robert Spence  
 not been able t  
 Tsuchiyama, as  
 and citation of  
 others from Po  
 George Yamagi  
 social sciences.  
 Morris Opler at  
 in her study of  
 Robert Hashim  
*Minzokugaku*  
 dict, *The Chrys*  
*Japanese Cultu*  
 Paperback Edit  
 Considering wh  
 Japanese Amer



- ation Authority  
Community Ana-  
45, Final Report,"  
4 (1945), p. 21;  
on the Morale of  
tain," Heart Moun-  
idental."), (initialed  
Leighton, *The*  
*les and Recommen-*  
*Japanese Relocation*  
rsity Press, 1945),  
ations Between  
n to Edward H.  
h Draft."), pp.  
tch of [Community]  
, pp. 5-6; and  
After a visit to Heart  
ce to Freedom...,"  
cern: "Some staff  
ocation project  
commended that  
being returned to
- The Relocation  
t al. (eds.), *op. cit.*,
- LS [Harry L.  
hoka CAS, April 8,  
"Report on an  
[inidoka, ID],"  
, Washington CAS,  
l. According to a  
was one of the  
, *op. cit.*, 1976,  
spites and strikes  
felt that "... the  
, the majority of  
n easily managed  
ct Director Narra-  
, ID, September
- op. cit.*, 1944, p. 1;  
H. Spicer, "Sugges-  
Relocation Centers,"  
19, 1944, p. 1;  
"The Issei and  
Rachel R. Sady,  
. 7; and Leighton  
for identical wording.  
*op. cit.*, 1943, "Com-  
p. 287; Spicer, *op.*  
e, "The Indian  
man Organization,  
pective that the  
plicit in an article  
Leighton. See Socio-  
chiatric Approach
- to Problems of Community Management," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, vol. 100 (1943), especially pp. 327-328, 332-333. (Poston's Bureau of Sociological Research was originally known as the Sociological Research Project.)
- 142 Peter T. Suzuki, "A Retrospective Analysis of a War-time 'National Character' Study," *Dialectical Anthropology*, vol. 5, no. 1 (1980).
- 143 The three books are by Leighton, *op. cit.*, 1945; Spicer et al. (eds.), *op. cit.*, 1969; and Forrest Laviolette, *Americans of Japanese Ancestry: A Study of Assimilation in the American Community* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1945). Laviolette's is a fine study.
- 144 Spicer, *op. cit.*, 1979, p. 228.
- 145 Japanese Americans who worked in various Community Analysis Sections or for the Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Study also wrote dissertations on aspects of camp life. See for example Frank S. Miyamoto, "The Career of Intergroup Tensions: A Study of the Collective Adjustments to Evacuees to Crises at the Tule Lake Relocation Center," Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, 1951; James M. Sakoda, "Minidoka: An Analysis of Changing Patterns of Social Interactions," Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley, 1949; Tamotsu Shibutani, "The Circulation of Rumors as a Form of Collective Behavior," Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, 1949; and Toshio Yatsushiro, "Political and Sociocultural Issues at Poston and Manzanar Relocation Centers - A Thermal Analysis," Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Cornell University, 1954. Note should also be taken of Charles Kikuchi's diary while in Tanforan Assembly Center. See Charles Kikuchi, *The Kikuchi Diary: Chronicle From an American Concentration Camp. The Tanforan Journals of Charles Kikuchi*, John Modell (ed.), (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973). After the war, Iwao Ishino and Tom Sasaki (both at Poston) became full-fledged anthropologists. Of the Evacuation and Resettlement Study anthropologists, Spicer, *op. cit.*, 1979, p. 235 fn1, states that they included "... Rosalie Hanke (sic) (later Wax), Robert Spencer, and Tami (sic) Tsuchiyama." I have not been able to find information about Tami Tsuchiyama, aside from her participation in the Study and citation of her manuscript in *The Spoilage*. Several others from Poston, e.g., Yoshiharu Matsumoto and George Yamaguchi, went on to earn doctorates in the social sciences. Robert S. Hashima, after working under Morris Opler at Manzanar, worked with Ruth Benedict in her study of the Japanese National Character. See Robert Hashima, "Rusu Benedekuto Joshi no Tsuioku," *Minzokugaku Kenkyū*, vol. 14 (1949); and Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (New York: New American Library Paperback Edition, 1946), "Acknowledgements." Considering what they had to go through, these Japanese Americans (and undoubtedly I missed the
- names of others who might be included) were a remarkable group. The majority are presently professors in major universities (e.g. Brown, California - Santa Barbara, Hawaii, Michigan State, Notre Dame, Washington (Sea'le)). They got their doctorates from such schools as California (Berkeley), Chicago, Cornell, and Harvard. It should be kept in mind that, in camps, they were strictly data-gatherers and had no decision-making powers.
- 146 See Spicer et al. (eds.), *op. cit.*, 1969, pp. 301-316.
- 147 Edward Spicer's recent article, *op. cit.*, 1979, epitomizes this genre. For some criticisms of it, see Dorothy Willner, "For Whom the Bell Tolls: Anthropologists Advising on Public Policy," *American Anthropologist*, vol. 82 (1980), pp. 88-90.
- 148 Robert F. Spencer, "Social Structure of a Contemporary Japanese-American Buddhist Church," *Social Forces*, vol. 26 (1948).
- 149 Robert F. Spencer, "Japanese Buddhism in the United States 1940-1946: A Study in Acculturation," Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley, 1946, p. ii.
- 150 Spencer, *op. cit.*, 1948, p. 284, grudgingly concedes that "The economic disorganization which accompanied evacuation and resettlement has worked its hardships on not a few families."
- 151 See Petersen, *op. cit.*, 1971, pp. 101-103, on the immediate postwar period. See also Katherine Luomala, "California Takes Back Its Japanese Evacuees: The Readjustment of California to the Return of the Japanese Evacuees," *Applied Anthropology*, vol. 5, no. 3 (1946).
- 152 Frank F. Chuman, *The Bamboo People: The Law and Japanese-Americans* (Del Mar: Publisher's Inc., 1976), p. 216.
- 153 *Ibid.*, pp. 204, 209.
- 154 *Ibid.*, p. 205. "The campaigns both for and against Proposition 15 were intense, sharp, and emotional." Largely by mobilizing the Japanese American community through the Japanese American Citizens League the proposition was defeated (707,067 for and 1,143,780 against). *Ibid.*, p. 206.
- 155 *Ibid.*, p. 221.
- 156 On housing discrimination against Japanese Americans in the Bay Area through the 1950's, see Harry H.L. Kitano, "Housing of Japanese-Americans in the San Francisco Bay Area," in Nathan Glazer and Davis McEntire (eds.), *Studies in Housing and Minority Groups* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960).
- 157 Two Western university student newspapers - Colorado's and Wyoming's - attacked discrimination against Nisei in their May 1943 editorials. The University of California (Berkeley) student newspaper came out with similar editorials in July of that year. See *Heart Mountain Sentinel*, "Discrimination against Nisei Hit by Two University Papers [University of Colorado and University of Wyoming]," May 15, 1943, and "Attacks on Loyal Nisei Rapped by U.C. [University of California] Student Publication," August 14, 1943.



- The only student group at Berkeley which protested the evacuation was a handful of Quakers.
- 158 Although perhaps the fault of the editors of *Social Forces*, the journal in which his article appeared, another puzzling feature about Spencer's publication is the lack of any conclusive ending. The article reads as though an incomplete manuscript had been submitted. In a broader sense, the profound impact of American anthropological theories, including acculturation; in the postwar world, upon West European social sciences such as Germany's, which had no viable social sciences under Nazism, and some of the countries Germany had occupied, cannot be gainsaid. In some instances, such as the issue of foreign workers in contemporary West Germany and other West European nations, this American influence — especially acculturation theory — has been of questionable value, raising even greater doubts about the worth of a banal acculturation study, such as Spencer's. See Peter T. Suzuki, "Germans and Turks at Germany's Railroad Stations: Interethnic Tensions in the Pursuit of Walking and Loitering," *Urban Life: A Journal of Ethnographic Research*, vol. 4 (1976), p. 408 n20.
- Spencer's otherwise interesting paper on Japanese American speech is vitiated by remarks such as: "Not only is this American-born segment [Nisei] of considerable interest as bilingual, but, more significantly, the development of English follows a somewhat distinctive aberrant path." See Robert F. Spencer, "Japanese Language Behavior," *American Speech*, vol. 25 (1950), p. 242. Several pages on, one reads this: "One cannot but agree with Swadesh when he implies that a bilingualism which prevents mastery of either language reflects not psychic confusion... but rather feeble-mindedness." *Ibid.*, p. 244.
- 159 Rosalie Hankey Wax, "Field Method and Techniques: Reciprocity as a Field Technique," *Human Organization*, vol. 11, no. 3 (1952), "The Destruction of a Democratic Impulse: An Exemplification of Certain Problems of a Benevolent Dictatorship," *Human Organization*, vol. 12, no. 1 (1953), "Twelve Years Later: An Analysis of Field Work Experience," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 63 (1957), and *op. cit.*, 1971.
- 160 Marvin K. Opler, Review of *The Spoilage*, by Dorothy Swaine Thomas and Richard S. Nishimoto, *American Anthropologist*, vol. 50 (1948), p. 308.
- 161 *Ibid.*, p. 309.
- 162 Wax, *op. cit.*, 1957, p. 134; see also Wax, *op. cit.*, 1952, p. 36.
- 163 Wax, *op. cit.*, 1971, *passim*; see also Marvin Opler, "Narrative Report...", *op. cit.*, 1945, p. 14.
- 164 Dorothy Thomas, Letter to John F. Embree, July 14, 1943, p. 2.
- 165 For example, Marvin K. Opler, "Community Analyst's Letter," Tule Lake CAS, December 10, 1943, and "Community Analyst's Letter," Tule Lake CAS, December 29, 1943.
- 166 Thomas and Nishimoto, *op. cit.*, 1946, *passim*.
- 167 See, for example, Marvin K. Opler, "Possible Effects of Segregation...", *op. cit.*, 1943; "If Tule Lake Remains the 'Segregation Center'...", *op. cit.*, 1943; "Community Analyst's Letter," Tule Lake CAS, January 7, 1944; Letter to Edward H. Spicer, February 3, 1944; "Account of Discussion with the So-Called Minority Representative," Tule Lake CAS, February 18, 1944; "Notes on the Co-ordinating Committee," Tule Lake CAS, February 21, 1944; "Community Analyst's Letter," Tule Lake CAS, March 21, 1944; "Community Analyst's Letter," Tule Lake CAS, March 27, 1944; "Community Analyst's Letter," Tule Lake CAS, March 28, 1944; "The Okamoto Funeral Ceremony and Pending Decision in the Case," Tule Lake CAS, June 4, 1944; "Short History of Hoshidan," Tule Lake CAS, June 6, 1945; and Tule Lake CAS, "A Typical Block at Tule Lake Center," Project Analysis Series No. 22, Washington CAS, April 17, 1945 (mimeographed).
- 168 Thomas and Nishimoto, *op. cit.*, 1946, pp. 70 fn24, 91, 91 fn19, 96.
- 169 Wax, *op. cit.*, 1971, pp. 61 fn2, 382.
- 170 Weglyn, *op. cit.*, 1976, p. 317 n4.
- 171 See, for example, Tule Lake CAS, "The Movies at Tule Lake," June 1, 1944; "A Typical Block...", *op. cit.*, 1945, pp. 4-5; and *Newell Star* [Tule Lake], "In Retrospect," January 1, 1945, p. 5, (mimeographed). The article from the *Newell Star* lists the numerous social events which were held at Tule Lake during 1944. Also Sat Munekawa, "In Corporate Sano," *Newell Star*, January 1, 1945, pp. 14-15, lists the sports events which took place in Tule Lake in 1944. On *shogi*, including a brief section on its role in the relocation camps, see Peter Suzuki, "Japanese Chess [Shogi] and Strategy, Japanese Corporate Practices and International Diplomacy, and an Adumbration of National Character," *Ethnopsychologie*, forthcoming.
- 172 Some years later, Wax wrote a brief article on the *eta* (parish group). For a candid evaluation of Wax's field work techniques while at Tule Lake, see Marvin Opler, "Narrative Report...", *op. cit.*, 1945, p. 14.
- 173 LaBarre's 1945 article clearly disproves the shopworn thesis that all American anthropologists were relativists during the heyday of cultural relativism. Weston LaBarre, "Some Observations on Character Structure in the Orient: The Japanese," *Psychiatry*, vol. 8 (1945); see also Weston LaBarre, "Some Observations on Japanese Character Structure," *Topaz CAS*, Circa May 23, 1943. I conclude my analysis of LaBarre's 1945 publication with these words:
- Finally, LaBarre's article was a mean-spirited, shabby, and intellectually dishonest attempt to discredit the victims of a rape, and surely represents the nadir in publications on WRA internees by Community Analysts and former Community Analysts.

Suzuki, "reference character (dential Association.) Coming (American Spicer, op. Spicer et Topaz Tin (mimeogr p. 1 (mim Russell A Historical in the app 178 John Wall Poston: A Managem op. cit., 1 of the Bur number p 179 Powell, op extremely his Navy o a great dea he was a sp p. 9, was e The So not too by Lieu barrier the Cen The Comm thropologi 1945 (?), p The Bur several only a d naval un medical to be a n personn interest of the B widely k about it.

180 Marvin K. O Center," *An "Two Japan of Anthrope lies and Pra American Y of a Kibei Y in Culture C and Marvin M Morris Ople logical study Hashima, "T Religion and vol. 48 (1946*



- 6, *passim*. Possible Effects of Segregation at Tule Lake Center," *op. cit.*, 1943; Spicer, "Discussion with the Tule Lake CAS, Co-ordinating Committee," April 21, 1944; Tule Lake CAS, March 1944, "Editor's Note," Tule Lake Center, "Analyst's Letter," "The Okamoto Case," "The History of Tule Lake Center," "Poston CAS," pp. 70-74.
- 174 Spicer, *op. cit.*, 1969, pp. 1-22.
- 175 Spicer et al. (eds.), *op. cit.*, 1969, caption, p. 137.
- 176 *Topaz Times*, "Resident Killed," April 12, 1943, p. 1 (mimeographed); and "Editor's Note," April 13, 1943, p. 1 (mimeographed).
- 177 Russell A. Banks, "The Wakasa Incident," *Topaz Historical Section*, May 5, 1943. The photographs are in the appendix of this report.
- 178 John Walker Powell, "Community Government in Poston: An Informal Discussion," Poston Community Management Division, June 1, 1946. See also Bailey, *op. cit.*, 1971, *passim*, for criticisms as well as praises of the Bureau of Sociological Research. Criticisms outnumber praises. Also see Note 179 below.
- 179 Powell, *op. cit.*, 1946, pp. 13, 16, *passim*, was also extremely critical of Leighton because he always wore his Navy officer's uniform in Poston, which aroused a great deal of suspicion among the administered that he was a spy. Embree, "Registration," *op. cit.*, 1943, p. 9, was equally harsh:
- The Sociological Research Unit (sic) at Poston is not too well appreciated. The Navy uniform worn by Lieutenant (sic) Leighton naturally creates a barrier difficult to overcome, and there are those in the Center [Poston] who regard him as a Navy spy. The Community Analyst later assigned to Poston, Anthropologist David French, "Final Report:...", *op. cit.*, 1945 (?), pp. 4-5, was no less severe:
- The Bureau was misunderstood by evacuees for several reasons - supervisor [Leighton] was not only a doctor and a psychiatrist but also wore a naval uniform (since he was a member of the navy medical corps). He was believed by some evacuees to be a naval intelligence employee, some appointed personnel employees [whites] believed his primary interest lay in psychiatry. Furthermore, the results of the Bureau of Sociological Research were not widely known because there was an "air of mystery" about it.
- 180 Marvin K. Opler, "A 'Sumo' Tournament at Tule Lake Center," *American Anthropologist*, vol. 47 (1945), "Two Japanese Religious Sects," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, vol. 6 (1950), "Japanese Folk Beliefs and Practices, Tule Lake, California," *Journal of American Folklore*, vol. 63 (1950), "Cultural Dilemma of a Kibei Youth," in G. Seward (ed.), *Clinical Studies in Culture Conflict* (New York: Ronald Press, 1958); and Marvin K. Opler and F. Obayashi, *op. cit.*, 1945. Morris Opler also co-authored an excellent anthropological study. See Morris E. Opler and Robert S. Hashima, "The Rice Goddess and the Fox in Japanese Religion and Folk Practice," *American Anthropologist*, vol. 48 (1946).
- 181 Harvey M. Coverley, Letter to Dillon S. Myer, December 14, 1942, pp. 1-2.
- 182 Marvin Opler, "Possible Effects of Segregation...", *op. cit.*, 1943.
- 183 See Weglyn, *op. cit.*, 1976, pp. 245-246, 249-251.
- 184 A 133-page single-spaced typed manuscript on Heart Mountain, WY, families by Hansen, *op. cit.*, 1945, is deposited in the National Archives. Although Spicer had encouraged the Community Analysis Section of Minidoka, ID, to use Ralph Linton's concepts of form and meaning to undertake analyses of Japanese American culture pattern when he visited that camp, and he himself later undertook a functional analysis of a wrestling (*sumo*) tournament in that camp, the report remains unpublished. On his advice to the Minidoka CAS, see Spicer, "Advice to Minidoka CAS," 1943.
- On his document on *sumo*, see Edward H. Spicer, "Sumo Tournament," Minidoka Field Report No. 20, Minidoka CAS, April 3, 1943, (initialed "EHS" as the author). See also K[aisho] I[shii], "Sumo Tournament for the First Time in Minidoka Center," Minidoka Field Report No. 19, Minidoka CAS, April 10, 1943; Marvin Opler, "A 'Sumo' Tournament...", *op. cit.*, 1945; and Roy Katsumi Otsuba, "Sumo," *Out of the Desert: Poston Junior Red Cross Album*, April 1, 1943. Likewise, his ethnographic piece on *shibai* (variety show) at Minidoka remains sitting in the National Archives. See also M[ary] W[atman], "Block Shibai," Minidoka Field Report No. 284, Minidoka CAS, March 4, 1944. Colson's 20-page manuscript on the family in Poston is also in the same status. See Colson, *op. cit.*, 1943.
- 185 There is strong support for this perspective. Three detailed surveys of anthropological theory, by Marvin Harris, *The Rise of Anthropological Theory: A History of the Theories of Culture* (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1968); Fred W. Voget, *A History of Ethnology* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1975); and John J. Honigsmann, *The Development of Anthropological Ideas* (Homewood: Dorsey, 1976), make no mention of the contributions of these anthropologists regarding WRA work despite attention to parts of their works to applied anthropology. (Voget and Honigsmann devote generous portions of their books to applied anthropology. See Voget, *op. cit.*, 1975, 721-785; and Honigsmann, *op. cit.*, 1976, pp. 363-364, and *passim*.) There is a brief criticism by Marvin Harris of Weston LaBarre's 1945 publication on the Japanese national character as a Freudian interpretation, but not as a publication based upon field work in Topaz. Harris, in fact, used a secondary source (Victor Barnouw) as a basis for discussing LaBarre. See Harris, *op. cit.*, 1968, pp. 434-444. See also Suzuki, "A Retrospective Analysis...", *op. cit.*, forthcoming.
- 186 Leonard Broom [Bloom] and John I. Kitsuse, "The Validation of Acculturation: A Condition of Ethnic Assimilation," *American Anthropologist*, vol. 57 (1955).
- 187 John H. Provinse, "West Coast Locality Groups of Manzanar Residents," Washington Community Management Division, May 29, 1944.







1980, p. 88. A most Douglas Nelson, Mountain, WY, of the camps: bers, ovens or S.S. less a concentra- operation in- only of legal onal Western als, and human lists...," *op. cit.*,

see Bloom, *op. of the Province McVoy, "Social er," Social Forces, al. (eds.), op. cit., p. 88, has made government in*

ople. They lived strative decree. ion Authority a self-government." red.) Solon Kim- ernment. See t, *Community ers* (Washington, 1946) (by Solon n community iled description see Leighton,

Looks at the mmunity Analysts, . 3. Similar expres- *cit.*, 1945, p. 17; " *op. cit.*, 1946, 1979, p. 231,

Washington official, tion on developments l was able to make sibilities as a top sion of Community

found in Spicer, this observer, it ap- own role vis à vis was primarily with ity Analysts com-

*op. cit.*, 1944, p.

Close coordination between the field was essential, but project [camp] personnel tend to be defensive about their administrative problems, vis à vis (sic) Washington, and hence tend to frown on any objec- tive analysis or even mention of local trouble.

- 196 Hansen, *op. cit.*, 1946, p. 21. He describes the same in Washington CAS, "Discussion on Field Techniques," *op. cit.*, 1944, pp. 2-4.
- 197 See Washington CAS, "Community Analysis Section Annual Report...," *op. cit.*, 1944, p. 10. On Edgar McVoy, see Note 70 above. Apparently, this kind of pressure, from camp administrators to Community Analysts, came to the attention of WRA's head, Dillon Myer. In November 1943, he wrote a special memorandum to all camp directors to order them not to have Community Analysts do "operations work" and to leave such work to "Internal Security and Family Welfare." Dillon S. Myer, "Community Analysts," Memorandum to all Project Directors, November, 1943. This is significant because very few extant documents by Myer deal with Community Analysts or the Community Analysis Section. Even in his book of 360 pages there are but three brief sentences that refer to the Community Analysts, and only John Provinse is mentioned. Myer, *op. cit.*, 1971, p. 280.
- 198 Washington CAS, "How Washington Looks at the Projects," *op. cit.*, 1944, p. 5. All of Edgar McVoy's six interviews (see Note 66, above), carried internee names. These were then inked out (presumably by the Washington Office) except for the initials. The same is also true of John Rademaker's report to the camp director on a disturbance in one of the barracks at Granada. John A. Rademaker, Letter to James G. Lindley, September 29, 1943. ("Confidential."). See also the Restricted document by John de Young, Covering letter to Edward H. Spicer, *op. cit.*, 1943.
- 199 Embree, "Community Analysis...," *op. cit.*, 1944, p. 283; repeated in Embree, "Attitudes Toward Selective Service and Relocation...," *op. cit.*, 1944, p. 10 ("And the analyst should never be put in the position of giving names of informants or principals"). Original emphases. Stressed again in Washington CAS, "Discussion on Field Techniques," *op. cit.*, 1944, p. 5.
- 200 Washington CAS, "How Washington Looks at the Projects," *op. cit.*, 1944, p. 5.
- 201 See Washington CAS, "Morning Session," *op. cit.*, 1944, p. 17. In a combination of wanting to please Dorothy Thomas, director of the Evacuation and Resettlement Study, and proving to herself that she was capable of doing good field work, Rosalie Wax, *op. cit.*, 1952, pp. 36-37; *op. cit.*, 1957, pp. 140-142; and *op. cit.*, 1971, pp. 74-75, on the other hand, found gathering data (essentially of a political nature) at Tule Lake, CA, to be her "transcendental task." Wax, *op. cit.*, 1971, p. 139.
- 202 Embree, "Community Analysis," *op. cit.*, 1944, pp. 284, 288. The priorities obviously changed under Spicer. See Spicer, "Final Report...," *op. cit.*, 1946; *op. cit.*, 1969; *op. cit.*, 1977; and *op. cit.*, 1979.

- 203 Washington CAS, "Morning Session," *op. cit.*, 1944, p. 2.
- 204 E. Adamson Hoebel, "Community Analysis Program, July-September 1944, Granada Relocation Center," Memorandum to Edward H. Spicer, July 14, 1944, pp. 288-289.
- 205 Hoebel, "Community Analysis Program...," *op. cit.*, 1944, p. 1.
- 206 *Ibid.*, p. 2.
- 207 E. Adamson Hoebel, *The Law of Primitive Man* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954).
- 208 See LaViolette, *op. cit.*, 1943, pp. 2-8; McVoy, "[Jerome] Community Analysis Section Operation," *op. cit.*, 1943, and "Social Processes...," *op. cit.*, 1943; and Oscar F. Hoffman, *op. cit.*, 1945, pp. 18-19.
- 209 Embree, "Community Analysis...," *op. cit.*, 1944, p. 288.
- 210 E. Adamson Hoebel, "Memorial Services for the War Dead, Granada Relocation Center," Granada CAS, August 23, 1944, pp. 4-5.
- 211 Rademaker, Letter to Edward H. Spicer, May 18, 1944, *op. cit.*, 1944, p. 9. In his history of the Community Analysis Section, Spicer, *op. cit.*, 1945, p. 14, was highly critical of Rademaker. Yet, this sociologist, one of the few Community Analysts to have undertaken empirical research on Japanese Americans before the war, was not criticized in the same report for having done intelligence work. Rather, he was criticized for such things as having submitted letters instead of formal reports and for not having followed the authorized channels of communication within WRA. For Rademaker's doctoral dissertation on Japanese American farmers, see John A. Rademaker, "The Ecological Position of the Japanese Farmers in the State of Washington," Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Washington, 1939; see also his article on Japanese Americans: John A. Rademaker, "Japanese Americans," in Francis J. Brown and Joseph S. Roucek (eds.), *Our Racial and National Minorities* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1937).
- I came across no documents in the National Archives to indicate that Rademaker was anything other than just a Community Analyst, contrary to a suggestion which was made to me by an anonymous source.
- Upon leaving Granada, CO, Rademaker eventually went to Hawaii, to "test the value of community analysis in more normal communities in less critical times."
- John A. Rademaker, "Community Analysis in a Free Community in Peacetime," *Applied Anthropology*, vol. 6, no. 3 (1947), p. 9. The following statement regarding Rademaker, recently made by Edward Spicer, *op. cit.*, 1979, p. 223, is erroneous: "... Laviollette (sic) and Rademaker resigned after only short tours of duty." Rademaker began his assignment as Community Analyst at Granada on May 13, 1943, and left in June 1944, more than a year later. (These dates are in Spicer, *op. cit.*, 1945, p. 14.)
- 212 Wax, *op. cit.*, 1971, p. 173.
- 213 On the very day that he left Heart Mountain to return



- to Canada, Forrest LaViolette "blasted" the Evacuation in his farewell speech. See *Heart Mountain Sentinel*, "Analyst [LaViolette] Leaves for McGill U.," October 2, 1943; also see his scholarly and sensitively written book on the Japanese Americans: LaViolette, *op. cit.*, 1945. See also Morris Opler, *op. cit.*, 1945; and Collier, *op. cit.*, 1949.
- 214 In an article on applied anthropology in public service, Margaret Lantis, "Applied Anthropology as a Public Service," *Applied Anthropology*, vol. 4, no. 1 (1945), for example, made no mention of WRA or her past work in WRA, although it was she who had first approached WRA regarding field work in one of the camps, and she later became a Community Analyst. See Lantis, *op. cit.*, 1942.
- 215 See Marvin Opler, "A 'Sumo' Tournament at Tule Lake Center," *op. cit.*, 1945; "Two Japanese Religious Sects," *op. cit.*, 1950; "Japanese Folk Beliefs and Practices...," *op. cit.*, 1950; and *op. cit.*, 1958; and Marvin Opler and Obayashi, *op. cit.*, 1945. In a touching tribute to Tuleans, he dedicated the republished article on *senryu* poetry in Tule Lake to the former inmates of that tragic camp. Marvin Opler, *op. cit.*, 1958, p. xx. It should be remembered that Wax did help prevent one Tulean from being confined with renunciants. However, I believe the mischief she caused at Tule Lake is incalculable. Because of the gross unfairness of the evacuation and detention — to say nothing of the loyalty oath and segregation — not a single Japanese American, Issei, Kibei, or Nisei, should have been sent to Japan; least of all because of an *inu* (informer) anthropologist, who, at one time, had considered herself a "true Japanese" (i.e., one who was pro-Imperial, -fascist Japan). There were no "fascists" or "democrats" (see Rosalie Hankey Wax, "The Development of Authoritarianism: A Comparison of the Japanese-American Relocation Centers and Germany," Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago, 1951, and *op. cit.*, 1953) among the 110,000 Japanese American inmates; there were only victims.
- In the context of the previous paragraph, note the following statement by Marvin Opler, "Narrative Report...," *op. cit.*, 1945, p. 14, about Wax while she was at Tule Lake:
- Some essential material, though not essential to the understanding of the Washington office, had thus willfully been secreted in our files, on the assumption that reports labeled "Confidential" were not so treated as regards the Thomas study.
- 216 *Newell Star Tule Lake*, "Sociology and Anthropology Taught at 701," May 11, 1944, p. 4 (mimeographed).
- 217 Peter T. Suzuki, "Planned Communities in Wartime America: A Province for the New Urban History," *Societas: A Review of Social History*, forthcoming.
- 218 Bailey, *op. cit.*, 1971, p. 111.
- 219 See Spicer, *op. cit.*, 1979.
- 220 Technically, there were sociologists in these camps as well, as was indicated at the beginning of this paper. However, for all practical purposes, the WRA social science project was an anthropological enterprise from beginning to end, and from "top to bottom." This was also true of the two who did research for the Evacuation and Resettlement Study. Consequently, no distinction is made between anthropologists and sociologists and between anthropology and sociology in the paragraphs that follow.
- 221 See Spicer et al. (eds.), *op. cit.*, 1969, pp. 317–331, for a good bibliography on the camps, in which almost every publication by the Community Analysts is also included. On pp. 301–316 of the same book is a complete bibliography of the mimeographed reports by the Community Analysts, in addition to a few miscellaneous items.
- 222 Goldschmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 295.
- 223 The temper of what WRA anthropologists were to do may have been set fairly early by Embree. In a confidential report to the FBI, declassified in 1975, he wrote the following in March 1943, in response to the FBI's recommendation "That the division of internal security arrange to have all questionable meetings monitored, so as to keep the administration informed at all times as to any unrest that may be developing, or any issues that are being seized upon to create mass demonstrations": "... The control of community activities through the Community Activity Supervisor as provided in Administrative Instruction No. 73 could be made a channel of information, and the Documentation Section Reports Office and the newly organized Community Analysis Section can be expected to provide additional channels. The information should be obtained and should be brought to the project director's attention, but the task had better be undertaken by some other unit than the Internal Security Section." John F. Embree, "Comments on: Recommendation 105 of the FBI's 'Federal Bureau of Investigation's Survey of Japanese Relocation Centers: Part I, Recommendations,'" Box Title: "Washington Central Files: Confidential, Justice Department — Federal Bureau of Investigation Correspondence — Gurnea Report," Record Group 210. (Italics added.)

## CASE S

PETTY CRAFT  
REPUBLIC C

Eric J. Arnould

## INTRODUCTION

Studies of the plastic arts, the symbolism, abundant in West Africa have also received. However, community of the social of the craft production. Rarer still are the features of craft production through the into the world. paper reports on the impact of the upon petty commerce a regional capital. Research was. Archival material. Department in enabled a ward population for subsequently I inter

Eric J. Arnould is a Ph.D. in Anthropology at the University of Arizona. His paper was conducted between the postmaster.