

The Incident of November 4

On the night of November 4, affairs at Tule Lake reached a climax which resulted in the occupation of the center by the Army. The farm situation, never entirely out of the picture after October 15, figured prominently in the affairs of this night of November 4. A contingent of evacuee harvest volunteers from other centers was due to arrive by train at Klamath Falls late that night, and 3 cargo trucks were removed from the center motor pool to meet the train and transport the workers to the farm camp. The removal of these trucks produced the situation which gave rise to violence, for the strong-arm squad assumed that the trucks were to be used for taking more food from the center warehouses to the loyal evacuees at the farm.

The acts which culminated in military intervention were committed in high temper and on the spur of the moment by young men who were acting on their own initiative. There is no reason to believe that the political leaders had any more part in this uprising than they had had in the attack on Dr. Pedicord on November 1. In fact, the politicians were engaged throughout the evening in a meeting in the mess hall of Block 15 of the colony; they had called this meeting of block representatives for the purpose of electing a central governing committee. What precipitated the call for the Army happened swiftly, in the dark, and at some distance from the colony. Not more than a dozen WRA staff members and the 200 or so young men involved in the performance knew that anything extraordinary was happening until the racket of light tanks and scout cars and the glare of floodlights announced the entry of military troops.

At about seven-thirty that evening, the Project Director conferred briefly with the Commanding Officer of the Military Guard and then spent an hour driving around the center, on the lookout for any signs of irregularity. He reached the warehouse area at about eight-thirty, and at that time there were no evacuees in sight. Returning to the administration area, Mr. Best parked his car near the administration building and sat in the car in the dark for a time, watching this area for signs of irregular activity. All was quiet. At about 9:15 he was joined by the Assistant Project Director, who reported that the 3 cargo trucks had gotten off to meet the train. At 9:30 the Assistant Project Director remarked that it was time for him to leave to meet the escort coming in on the train and that he had to drive past his house to pick up his overcoat. Mr. Best went to the telephone office in the administration building, where housing records were kept at night, to check on the quarters assigned for the use of the WRA escort coming in on the train; within a few minutes he returned to his house. About 5 minutes after Mr. Best reached his house, the Assistant Project Director returned to report that in driving past the motor pool he saw that men were hurriedly gathering in that area. The two men went outside and could see possibly 50 evacuees armed with clubs milling about in the motor pool area. The Assistant Project Director walked around the end of Mr. Best's house and startled a number of men out from the shadows. Mr. Best went into his house and telephoned the Commanding Officer of the military troops to come in and take over.

The actual, violent engagements of that night happened suddenly and practically simultaneously in a very short interval,

roughly between the time when the Project Director telephoned for the Army to come in and the time when the Army arrived on the scene--about 10 minutes.

To complete the picture of what happened and give some idea of how it happened, it is necessary to go back to 8:15 that evening, when a staff member went to the motor pool to requisition the 3 trucks. He was refused service by the evacuees in the motor pool office. He left the motor pool and encountered Mr. Schmidt and several other staff members. Together they returned to the motor pool. The man who had originally requested the trucks got the keys from the board in the office and serviced the trucks himself, the evacuees looking on. Two Caucasian drivers joined him, and at about 9:10 the three men drove the trucks out of the motor pool and set off for Klamath Falls.

No sooner had the other staff members turned away from the motor pool than an evacuee jumped in a truck and headed at full speed for the evacuee colony, unquestionably to carry word that the trucks had been taken. Mr. Schmidt, anticipating a reaction to the removal of the cargo trucks, stopped at the room of the officer borrowed from Central Utah and assigned him to watch the broad, open space between evacuee colony and administration area for signs of action. He detailed another officer to stay with the switch-board operator at the telephone office to forestall any attempt to cut communications, and then went to the military compound to report the situation to the sergeant of the military guard and make sure that everything was in readiness for quick action. He proceeded to a building in the compound where 2 men from the Federal Communications Commission, San Francisco, were conducting

an investigation (instigated by Mr. Schmidt, himself) of an illegal radio transmitter within the colony.

When word reached the colony that the trucks were taken, about 150 to 200 of the strong-arm squad rallied with the intent of preventing the trucks (which were already well away from the center) from being loaded with food and taken from the center. The messenger's truck and others similarly appropriated from the motor pool were used to carry men to the motor pool and to the warehouses to mount guard; auxiliaries set off for these areas on foot. Trucks darted about the center in pursuit of the missing trucks. Failure to find any trace of the three trucks baffled and enraged the young men. A number of them were armed with base ball bats, pick handles or short lengths of two-by-four lumber. Internal Security men on patrol or guard duty began to be aware of groups congregating in the shadows of the warehouses and around the motor pool. The guard at the high school called his chief to report that gangs of men were robbing the lumber pile (which was the source of their improvised clubs). Two officers in a patrol car had their way blocked by a black pick-up whose evacuee driver announced emphatically to them that no produce trucks were going to get out of the center that night. However, the evacuee shortly drove away, leaving the way clear. The officers headed back to the administration building to report.

In the Military Compound, Mr. Schmidt noted that the Japanese music being broadcast over the illegal transmitter stopped abruptly at 9:25. As it normally continued to a later hour, Mr. Schmidt suspected that the cutting off of the music might be a signal. Stopping only to tell the sergeant of the guard that a

request for the Army to move in would probably be made very soon, he drove into the center, stopping about 75 yards within the gates when a car approached him and shone a spot light in his face. Thinking it an Army radio patrol car, he got out and walked over to it to find that it was the black pick-up previously mentioned. There were men riding in the rear. One of these and the driver jumped down and tried judo on Mr. Schmidt--who happened to be more expert at it than they. After a brief but vigorous interchange, Mr. Schmidt got back into his car and headed for Mr. Best's house. He parked his car across the road from the house and walked toward the house, suddenly perceiving 30 or 40 men with clubs in the shadows. Six of these attacked him, but he used the judo hold on two of these, wrenching an arm of each from its socket. In the lull which followed upon this feat, he got back to his car, hearing the men yell in English: "Get Best! Take Best!" Mr. Schmidt started in his car for the military area and out-maneuvered the driver of the black pick-up who tried to cut him off, reaching the military area to call in the Army, a few minutes after the Project Director had made the same request by telephone.

In the meantime the two men on patrol and the officer assigned to the area between colony and administration area reached the telephone office in the administration building, intending to report by telephone to their chief. The switch was open and they overheard the Project Director's call to bring in the Army. They started on foot for Mr. Best's house, hearing the cries of "Get Best! Take Best!" Just outside the administration building, the driver of the same black pick-up attempted to run these three men down, but they jumped out of the way and the

driver had to stop to avoid hitting some posts. He and his men jumped out of the pick-up and a fight began, in which one of the officers was injured. The other two, re-inforced by several staff members from the administration building, fought off the others and took 3 prisoners in the few moments that remained before the Army arrived and took over.

In all, 18 prisoners were taken on that night, all of whom needed first aid for injuries received during capture or questioning. They were hospitalized under guard after questioning, and were later removed to a stockade. Possibly six shots were fired (none by evacuees as no firearms have been found in their possession in centers at any time) but no one was found to have been wounded by gunfire. At the entry of the Army, the strong-arm squads took to their heels. Most staff members as well as the majority of the evacuee residents were unaware that trouble was brewing until the noise of Army light tanks and scout cars indicated that something extraordinary was going on.

By agreement between WRA and the Army, once the Army is called into a center, it takes control until military decision removes the troops. On January 14, 1944 at 9:00 P.M. WRA resumed control of Tule Lake. In the interval of Army occupation WRA staff cooperated with the military and served in an advisory capacity.

The Aftermath of the Tule Lake Incident

Following November 1, the more responsible newspapers and wire services had made an effort to verify the stories about Tule Lake, while the less reputable ones were publicizing all the rumors that were flying thick and fast. Those in the former cate-

gory called WRA by telephone, asking specific questions. The Director, on the basis of his own knowledge, was able to deny roughly half of the rumors; to the remaining questions, he replied for the most part that a check was being made but the facts had not yet been established. Rumors multiplied rapidly, while facts were established slowly, and the less responsible newspapers were quick to utilize the rumors and publish accounts which day by day displayed higher color and diminishing accuracy. For a week or so in early November, the affairs of Tule Lake Center displaced the activities on the battle fronts in news interest with the West Coast press.

The first version of the November 1 demonstration to reach the public was provided by the first person to leave the center after the crowd in the administration area dispersed. This was a rancher of the vicinity who had at one time been employed by WRA to manage the butcher shop at the center. He had called at the center that Monday afternoon just in time to be ushered into the administration building by evacuees and detained there with staff members for the remainder of the afternoon. His not altogether objective account of the episode was soon embellished with details furnished by some of the staff members and their families who were too overwrought to remain on the center and so spent the nights in Tulelake or Klamath Falls. The impressions and opinions of highly excited and frightened persons were seized upon and published as fact.

Until the Army occupied the center on the night of November 4, press representatives had their customary privilege of visiting the center for purposes of first-hand coverage if they chose to

do so. By November 4 a few reporters were in the vicinity of the center, and one, a United Press man from San Francisco, was actually quartered in the center as the guest of the Project Director. From his room, one barrack away from Mr. Best's house, he was in position to see such part of the action as took place within his range of vision and was not obscured by darkness. He was not permitted to wander around the area at random, and shortly after the Army moved in, he was taken from the center to the town of Tulelake. Immediately upon occupying the center, the Army camped down censorship on news. Again the press had little but rumor to work with, and again rumors abounded.

The facts of the November 1 episode, which had been gradually emerging and which were being released, were mild and colorless in comparison with the tales which had already been published and accepted as truth by most papers. When actual violence, justifying Army occupation, occurred on the night of November 4, the newspapers that had previously made a conscientious effort to get at the facts were left with the impression that WRA had been withholding information and that the more sensational accounts of the situation at Tule Lake Center were true.

Typical of the reactions of these more responsible newspapers was that of the San Francisco Chronicle of November 4, in which the "New Jap Riot" was announced in a 7-column headline and described in a garbled account labeled "Special to the Chronicle" from Tule Lake, November 4. The article stated correctly that one Internal Security guard was beaten by evacuees, but increased

the number of evacuees arrested by the Army for questioning from the actual 18 to an illusory 500, converted the removal of WRA staff families from one section of the residence area to the Military Compound until midnight to a mass evacuation of the entire staff from the center to the town of Tulelake, and transformed the attempt of one evacuee to run down three staff members into a concerted attempt of the evacuees to run over the military force that entered the center. The same issue carried an editorial that began by denouncing WRA for trying to "cover up" and continued with an elaboration of charges that WRA officials were "phonies" and "bad public servants".

Immediate results of the press stories were numerous resolutions and recommendations emanating from communities, organizations, state and city officials, and in some instances private citizens. These documents stressed the need for 1) further investigation of WRA; 2) permanent control of Tule Lake Center by the Army; 3) placing all the relocation centers as well as Tule Lake under the Army; 4) simply the immediate dissolution of WRA. The resolutions were effective in producing investigations of WRA.

For a month or more, investigations of all kinds were made, some at Tule Lake Center, others in Washington, D.C. The Tenney Joint Fact-Finding Committee of the California Legislature sent a senatorial committee headed by Senator Hugh P. Donnelly to Tule Lake Center to conduct hearings. While these were going on, the Spanish Consul arrived to investigate on behalf of the Japanese nationals. Representative Clair Engle of the 2d district in California was on the premises when the Donnelly committee

arrived, engaged in conducting a one-man investigation on his own initiative. He and an investigator sent out by the Dies sub-committee sat in on the Donnelly committee hearings and also talked to certain staff members and residents of the surrounding area. A little later Senator Sheridan Downey of California made a quick trip to Tule Lake from Washington, also on his own initiative. The FBI representatives spent some time at the center making an investigation. In Southern California the California Assembly Committee headed by Assemblyman Gannon conducted an investigation of the Pacific Coast Committee on American Principles and Fair Play, moved to such action by the interest the latter organization has shown in the constitutional rights of the evacuees. In Washington, D.C., the Director of WRA appeared before the Senate Military Affairs Committee in executive session, the West Coast Congressional Delegation, and the Dies sub-committee. Just before Christmas when the Project Director of Tule Lake visited the Washington Office, the Dies sub-committee re-opened their hearings on Tule Lake for the purpose of questioning him.

With the exception of the FBI representatives, the investigators who went to Tule Lake were somewhat restricted in their activities by the refusal of the Army to allow them to subpoena evacuees. The Donnelly Committee, in session at Tule Lake on November 8 and 9, summoned a carefully selected group of witnesses, including 3 residents of the nearby town of Tule Lake who had made occasional trips to the center or had at least driven past it, and certain disgruntled former employees of WRA. The committee called on the Chief Medical Officer and questioned him, making a transcript of the interview but not including it in the transcript

of the hearings. The Project Director and the Field Assistant Director from San Francisco were the only key staff members questioned at the hearings, and they were not summoned; they volunteered testimony.

Considerable time and attention were given by this committee to episodes of Tule Lake's early days as a relocation center, long before there was any thought of Tule Lake becoming a segregation center and involving persons long since removed from Tule Lake. Statements totally unsupported by evidence were accepted and utilized by the committee in its subsequent report of findings. On the basis of these findings, the committee telegraphed the President, the Secretary of War and the Chairman of the California Congressional Delegation, urging the continuation of Army control at Tule Lake Center and the continued exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast area for the duration of the war.

Congressman Engle and the Dies sub-committee investigator had attended the Connelly committee hearings and held further informal conversations with out-going personnel of WRA. Congressman Engle gave testimony at all the subsequent hearings in Washington. His testimony was shaped and colored by his acceptance of stories told by prejudiced, ill-informed and utterly unreliable witnesses at Tule Lake. Demands for continued Army control of Tule Lake and the 9 relocation centers received a set-back when War Department representatives, appearing before a Senate Military Affairs committee hearing and also before a meeting of the Pacific Coast Congressional Delegation, expressed the unwillingness of the War Department to assume jurisdiction over the

12
centers. The Justice Department also reacted negatively to suggestions for its supervision of the centers.

The Dies Sub-committee, with Representative John M. Costello of California as Chairman, conducted intermittent hearings in Washington from the end of November to the 20th of December. These hearings, nominally concerned with the Tule Lake situation, were in reality a continuation of the over-all investigation of WRA made by this committee earlier in the year, and re-opened a number of issues which had supposedly been settled during the summer hearings on WRA, the majority report and minority views on which were published in September of 1943. The majority report had contained 3 recommendations:

"1. That the War Relocation Authority's belated announcement of its intention of segregating the disloyal from the loyal Japanese in the relocation centers be put into effect at the earliest possible moment.

"2. That a board composed of representatives of the War Relocation Authority and the various intelligence agencies of the Federal Government be constituted with full powers to investigate evacuees who apply for release from the centers and to pass finally upon their applications.

"3. That the War Relocation Authority inaugurate a thorough-going program of Americanization for those Japanese who remain in the centers."

The minority views of the Honorable Herman P. Eberharter, of Pennsylvania, express his conviction that "the report of the majority is prejudiced, and that most of its statements are not proven." He comments: "After all the wind and the fury of a long report that creates the impression that War Relocation Authority is doing a very bad job, the comments of the majority members are climaxed by three feeble, meaningless recommendations." He took up the specific matters discussed in the majority report

one by one, supplying facts which had been omitted, and, except on the question of segregation, disagreeing with his fellow committee-men on all points. In summation, he had this to say:

"It is my conclusion that, considering the magnitude of its job, the difficulty of the legal issue involved, and the complexity and delicacy of the problem of resettling a large group of people in the midst of a war, the War Relocation Authority has acted, by and large, efficiently and capably, and has carried out the spirit and intent of the President's Executive Order under which it was established. I think it is better to let the War Relocation Authority carry on unhampered by unfair criticism."

This second series of hearings conducted by the Dies subcommittee opened with the testimony of a physician who had been employed in the Tule Lake Hospital for 10 days at the time of the Hospital incident and who turned in his resignation the following day. The second and third days were given to the testimony of Representative Engle of California, who recommended that the Army remain in control of Tule Lake Center. With the exception of a short period devoted to statements made by Representatives Lowell Stockman of Oregon and Norris Poulson of California, the fourth, fifth and sixth days were spent in questioning the National Director of WRA. On the seventh day of hearings, the United States Attorney-General appeared before the sub-committee, and after stating emphatically that the Department of Justice did not want jurisdiction over the evacuees, explained the nature of the problem WRA was created to cope with, specifically pointing out the doubtful constitutionality of detention of American citizens, a matter which, he stated was soon coming before the Supreme Court of the United States. On the 20th of December the sub-committee went into a final session on the Tule Lake situation, in order to question the Project Director of Tula Lake.

The majority report on the Tule Lake investigation was

14
released to the press on February 28, 1944. It was much briefer than the report issued in September but it contained 4 specific recommendations: 1) the removal of Director Myer and Project Director Ray Best from their positions because of their "evident inability" to cope with disloyal Japanese; 2) the transfer of Tule Lake Center to the administration and jurisdiction of the Department of Justice--regardless of Justice's wishes in the matter; 3) provision by WRA of a report to Congress which should list the individuals responsible for the beating of Dr. Pedicord and for formenting the incident of November 1 and indicate (Neither Dr. Pedicord nor witnesses to the attack could identify a single assailant) the legal or disciplinary action taken against these individuals; 4) policing of the centers to be carried on exclusively by Caucasians.

Again Mr. Eberharter disagreed, and on this occasion with no reservations. In his minority views he said of the majority report: "It deals only in the sketchiest summary form with the mass of evidence presented to the subcommittee, and it systematically excludes all the evidence which indicates that War Relocation Authority has a difficult assignment and that it is doing a capable job." After showing that each of the 4 recommendations was out of order, Mr. Eberharter summed up the investigating techniques of his colleagues as follows:

"An onlooker would have concluded that the committee was acting in the role of prosecuting attorney rather than as judge or as grand jury. It seemed that every opportunity was pounced upon to ferret out minor flaws, and to get abundant publicity on the wildest allegations. Testimony of discharged or disgruntled former employees received close attention and, in my opinion, was given undue credence. The cross-examination to which the War Relocation Authority officials was" (sic) "subjected did not add to the dignity or prestige of the proceedings. No effort was made to learn or understand the problems and policies of the War

15
Relocation Authority from the highest officials of the agency until after a large portion of the public mind had been thoroughly poisoned by sensational charges, none of which (of any moment) were subsequently proven."

He concluded his description of investigating techniques with the comment: "In view of these facts, it is my considered opinion that the 'investigation' of the War Relocation Authority program has not only been a painful parody on fair-minded and constructive congressional inquiry but a serious disservice to the American people."

Tule Lake Center since January 14, 1944

The segregation center has continued to be the knottiest administrative problem that confronts WRA. The population as of June 30, 1944 had reached 18,656. The last transfers occurred in the first half of June. The housing problem at Tule Lake was acute as the fiscal year of 1944 ended. To make room for the last contingent of segregants to arrive, it was necessary to partition 20 recreation halls into apartments. The housing situation had already necessitated the conversion of 51 recreation halls for purposes other than their original one to accommodate. Only 3 of the 74 recreation halls remained available for recreational use exclusively. There remain small numbers of people eligible for segregation at the relocation centers as individual hearings take place or applications for repatriation or expatriation have been made. They cannot be received at Tule Lake until the housing problem has been solved.

While the majority of the Tule Lake population has continued orderly and desirous of peaceful living conditions, there has remained a strong minority working in opposition to the administration. Much of the work of this minority has been under

cover, and it has been exceedingly difficult when not altogether impossible to identify the leaders. Unrest has never subsided at the segregation center.

Immediately after November 4, a stockade was prepared for the detention of persons suspected in complicity in the outbreak. In all, both during and after the period when the Army was in control of the center, 350 segregants (111 aliens and 229 citizens) have been confined in the stockade. During April, May and June, a total of 26 Japanese aliens were transferred to Department of Justice internment camps, leaving at the end of June only 25 citizens within the stockade. The others who had been detained and were judged to be good risks for release were returned after varying periods of confinement to the residence area of the center.

Early in January a Coordinating Committee of evacuees was formed to work with the administration. It sponsored a return to work movement and was bitterly opposed by those who favored the status quo. The question of returning to work was put to a referendum and by a majority of only about 400 votes the status quo was broken. The upholders of the status quo wanted employment to stop with essential public services; as more and more people went back to work, the resentment of the opposition increased. The Coordinating Committee functioned until the latter part of April. It made the mistake of claiming credit for effecting releases from the stockade. It actually had no voice in the matter at all, but made a bid for community approval by asserting that its recommendations were heeded. This assertion boomeranged when certain men detained in the stockade were not released. The community blamed the Committee, and it fell into disrepute.

17

About the time that the Coordinating Committee collapsed, the administration attempted to form a Representative Committee with which the Project Director might at his discretion consult on questions of community organization and management. Elections were scheduled for May 18. The Project Director called for nominations to be made through a Ward Assembly Committee. Each block was to send 2 representatives to the assembly, and the Ward assembly was to choose a nomination committee on Ward representation. There were 8 Wards, and the nomination committee could have either 8 or 12 members chosen on a geographical basis. However, very few blocks held meetings or selected delegates. Election day was indefinitely postponed, and as of June 30, there was no organized representation of any kind existing at Tule Lake. The opposition to the administration and to the cooperatively inclined part of the population was trying to force evacuees out of employment even in such essential fields as teaching and hospital work.

The Transfer of WRA to the Department of the Interior Incident and the attending sensational publicity was the transfer of WRA to the Department of the Interior.

Formal steps toward the change in status for WRA were initiated by Attorney General Biddle on December 30, 1944. On that date he addressed a memorandum to the President in which he presented an analysis of the problem of Japanese evacuees and the performance of WRA. He conceded that WRA had handles a thankless task rather well, and that its policies, especially the one of relocation, were fundamentally sound. However, in the light of all the public criticism of WRA and the "unanimous" feeling in the California delegation in Congress that WRA should be abolished,

he suggested that WRA should not be required to bear the brunt of this public and political pressure alone and as a small, independent agency; but that WRA should be made part of an established Department, mentioning either Justice or Interior, but favoring Interior as having resources and personnel suited to the job.

The memorandum was referred to Mr. Byrnes, Director of War Mobilization for consideration; Mr. Byrnes concurred in Biddle's recommendation, and the President referred the matter to Judge Rosenman with the request that he see that an appropriate executive order be drafted to attach WRA to the Department of the Interior.

On January 11, Mr. Myer learned through Budget Director Harold W. Smith, through whose hands all executive orders pass, of the proposal and the forthcoming executive order. A series of conferences on the subject between Mr. Myer and the various officials interested in the transfer ended with one with Mr. Smith in which the latter gave assurance that any change could be delayed until Mr. Myer had met current obligations on the West Coast and should appoint a suitable date.

On February 16, 1944, Executive Order No. 9423 transferred WRA to the Department of the Interior. On the same date, the Secretary of the Interior issued Order No. 1922, the Delegation of authority to the Director of the War Relocation Authority. The Order read:

"The Director of the War Relocation Authority is hereby authorized, under the supervision and direction of the Secretary of the Interior, to perform the functions transferred to the Secretary of the Interior by Executive Order No. 9423, of February

19
16, 1944, until the further order of the Secretary."

The effect of this transfer has been the strengthening of WRA's position in the official category and with the public. Policy and personnel have undergone no significant changes since the change in status.

Recent Developments in the WRA Program

Administration of the Refugee Shelter at Oswego.

On June 9, 1944 the Director of WRA learned that WRA was to have the responsibility of administering the shelter planned at Camp Ontario in Oswego, New York, for the reception of 1000 European refugees invited by the President to stay in the United States for the duration of the war. As the fiscal year closed, preparations were being made to send a WRA official to Southern Italy to help in the selection of the thousand and escort them back to America. Policy for administering the shelter was in process of development.

The Closing of Jerome Relocation Center.

In view of the gradual depopulation of the relocation centers by relocation and by segregation, it was announced on February 22, 1944 that Jerome Relocation Center would be closed, its population to be transferred to other centers. Careful planning and the experience gained through segregation in the movement of large numbers of people resulted in a very smooth operation. The transfer movements began on June 6, and by June 30 all evacuees and most of the personnel were out of the center. Four centers received the former residents of Jerome:

Rohwer -----	2489
Heart Mountain-----	499
Gila River -----	2049
Granada -----	549
TOTAL	<u>5586</u>

Only a skeleton staff remained after June 30 to handle the transfer of property to other WRA offices and centers or to the Treasury. Full reports on the first closing of a center are being prepared.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Tule Lake Center
Newell, California

~~Mr. Best~~
J. Neubauer
Tule file

November 5, 1943

At 9:50 P.M. Thursday, November 4, 1943 Project Director Raymond R. Best phoned the Commanding Officer at the Military Post to take over the project to protect government property and to prevent physical violence to Caucasian appointed persone. The Commanding Officer assumed command immediately. The soldiers entered the center, some of whom manned the eight tanks and other cars began immediately to patrol the Administrative center, and pick up evacuees wherever found.

An estimated crowd of five hundred evacuees had a few minutes before come from the village through the warehouse area, and had proceeded to the Project Director's home, where Mr. Edward Borbeck, a member of the Internal Security, was stationed. Several evacuees pounced on Mr. Borbeck and beat him severely. He was later removed to the hospital of the military compound, where he was treated. Almost simultaneously, Mr. Wilfred Schmidt, on detail on the project from the Washington office, was stopped in his car near the military compound. Thinking the order to get out of his car came from a soldier on guard, he did so, and was surprised at being threatened by a burly Japanese. Another Japanese hid behind his car in an attempt to take the car away from him. Mr. Schmidt defied the orders given him by the Japanese and, regaining possession of his car, drove to the entrance of the military compound to warn of the uprising. He then drove toward Mr. Best's home, where an estimated two hundred Japanese had congregated. He overheard one Japanese say "That's the Project Director's home, get him."

On hearing the commotion about his home, Mr. Best telephoned the Commanding Officer of the military compound and the call had only been consummated when several Japanese entered the telephone operator's room and forced Mrs. Winifred Bolts away from the switchboard.

Immediately after the motors of the tanks, jeeps and patrol cars began purring--the noise could be heard throughout the administrative area--colonists who had come to the administrative area to beat and abduct Mr. Best and hold him hostage, became fearful and started disbursing, running in all directions toward the village.

Shortly before this, soldiers had entered the administrative area and overpowered a number of evacuees. Several soldiers fired shots at fleeing evacuees and stopped them in their tracks.

In all, about twenty-four evacuees were rounded up. Some were beaten while attempting to escape, and others were beaten in altercation with members of the appointed personnel. These evacuees were brought into the administration building where they were made to sit on the floor with hands up, and were guarded by approximately twelve soldiers while other soldiers patrolled the whole project area.

At approximately 2 P.M. this afternoon the Reports Officer, John D. Cook, went to the Project Director's office to give him the facts that had just come to his knowledge:

(1) The Project Director had before noon given the Reports Officer a story for publication in the Dispatch that afternoon. This story confirmed the Project Director's verbal instructions that, to prevent unnecessary incidents which might accompany any large assembly of people, no public gatherings would be permitted beyond the west line of the fire break of the main gate of the military area to the south line perimeter fence. Upon reading this, Masako Sugimoto, reporter, laughed sarcastically and said "Is that so?"

(2) That the writer had just been notified of meetings throughout the project immediately after lunch, at which the Hawaiian Kibei group had announced their intention of demanding that a fence be built in the village to separate the repatriates and expatriates from the "no no" group. That they had announced that a project wide vote would be taken on this issue, and that the fence "would be built with or without the permission of the Project Director."

(3) That the writer had been informed that trouble was brewing in the village, and that a lot of people were going to be hurt.

Later on in the afternoon, the writer had told the duplicating department employees, of which there are three--two mimeograph operators (male) and one stencil cutter (female)--that the mimeograph machine would be removed to warehouse #332 that afternoon. The writer had made this recommendation to Director Dillon S. Myer at a conference with him on Monday, November 1. On hearing the news, all three looked thoroughly frightened and said they would not work in the warehouse because it was too isolated a spot, and that they were fearful of being away from the administrative area or the Dispatch office. The writer asked whom they were afraid of, and they replied, "There's plenty to be afraid of, there's trouble brewing."

Mr. James Davis, Head of the Motor Repair Shop, was asked by a Kibei woman who acts as supply room clerk if he were going to resign. Mr. Davis said "No". Whereupon the woman intimated in a covert manner that it would be better for some Caucasians to get off the project. This warning was given in a friendly manner.

At approximately ten o'clock this morning evacuees began to congregate in the section of the village in an apparent attempt to hold a meeting. The soldiers drove a tank through the village, and threw tear bombs into the crowd and disbursed it. The colonists fled in great haste only to reappear shortly after in various blocks to play basketball and other games.

John D. Cook.
John D. Cook
Reports Officer

P.S. More films.