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Topaz

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Central Utah Project
Community Analysis Section
June 25
1943

Memorandum to Mr. Charles F. Ernst
Project Director

From Dr. Weston LaBarre (Topaz)
Social Science Analyst

Subject Report on Minidoka Charter

Minidoka's self-government has had everything stacked against it:

1. Sakamoto of the JACL, a nisei group one expects would be most familiar with democratic attitudes and procedures, was described to be personally "high-handed, and dictatorial." The evacuees had no confidence in him. The best bet for real strength of the democratic process was therefore sabotaged by the unfortunate personality of the leader of this group.
2. An unskillfully worded question gave an unhappy and confusing experience on the first referendum to public opinion. "Are you satisfied with the present evacuee management of the center?" - If they said "no" they thought all self-government would then cease, and the alternative "yes" was falsely interpreted to mean popular support of the JACL group then in power. The rise of strong anti-JACL gangs with threatening letters to the JACL head Sakamoto are evidences of the lack of popular support. If "official" organization does not channelize political pressures, unofficial groups surely will express these pressures and this is what happened here.
3. When the Project Director (himself decidedly luke-warm toward self-government) shelved the charter from November to March, the popularly elected pro-Charter group severly lost face and influence with people who elected them, and thus another pro-democratic tentative was sabotaged.
4. The Administration insisted on its theoretical over-all "community" plan and wasn't approving of or realistic in using natural units of social and political organization already present. A "benevolent dictatorship" opposed the block units by supporting the artificial ward system, by hamstringing block political influence and even block recreational unity. So the third chance of getting a self-government nucleus, block managers, was weakened and suppressed.
5. The Administration, besides side-tracking and skipping over (for partly good reasons) self-government nuclei like the JACL and the block managers group, also did not use Puyallup organization. The Issei in administrative positions of influence, who had been pre-evacuation leaders in Seattle, were supported by the Administration against the Nisei-JACL group that had emerged under evacuation conditions at Puyallup. This strengthened those unfamiliar with American democratic ways against those who were familiar with them.

6. The appointive personnel and the Administration were not basically sympathetic to self-government by evacuees. This influence must have affected the older Issei personnel who were working closely with the Administration. Besides, the Issei already had power as administrative personnel. The Administration and the Issei were therefore both against democratic methods and any naturally representative groups had been systematically undermined by the lack of Administration support.

7. As far as a self-government charter was concerned:

The Issei were against it since it implied more Nisei authority over the camp and the Issei already had the authority they wanted in their own hands.

The Nisei thought an Issei-weighted government would be factionalistic and non-democratic in manner and method, and they may have had good reason in regarding both the Administration and the Issei as paternalistic, authoritarian, and dictatorial, besides, why have "self-government" when it only strengthens Administration stooges;

The Administration had no confidence in the residents' abilities or potential abilities in self-government. There's no mystery that residents said, "Well, then we'll leave it all up to the Caucasians who brought about all this mess. Self-government is a farce, and we're only here temporarily anyway, so let them worry about it." In the end the permissiveness or non-permissiveness of the Administration, which has the real decisive power originally, controls the situation. No democratic organization can flourish unless there is some surrender -- gradual perhaps but it must be genuine -- by the autocratic source of authority. This never happened at Minidoka; instead, every group that did rise up was slapped down.

If this analysis of the forces at work is even partly correct, it is both gratifying and surprising that even 26% still wanted self-government.

Dr. Weston LaBarre
Social Science Analyst

WLB:ms

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Central Utah Project
Topaz, Utah

In reply, please refer to:
Comm. Analysis

November 8, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: Labor Committee
of the Community Council

FROM: Oscar F. Hoffman
Community Analyst

SUBJECT: Personnel Needs

The Community Analysis Section feels it cannot function efficiently with fewer than 5 resident employees. It hereby requests that number of workers.

I. PERSONNEL EMPLOYED AND PERSONNEL NEEDS

<u>Actually Needed</u>	<u>Type of Employees</u>	<u>Present Employees</u>
3	Research-Assistants	2
1	Senior Clerk	1
1	Stenographer	1

II. REASONS FOR REQUESTING 5 WORKERS

1. It is the purpose of Community Analysis to listen to and to understand the viewpoints of the residents. It is charged with the task of determining the effects of administrative policies and decisions upon the evacuee community. It must give special attention to developments that may improve social relations within the center or that might lead to crises.
2. The Washington Office of Community Analysis in late August, through Mr. Frank Sweetser, then acting head of Community Analysis, advised the Community Analyst to organize an evacuee staff of five members upon arrival at Topaz.
3. At the present time the section has in progress or is about to undertake a total of



12 studies for each of which 10 to 100 interviews are required.

4. To mention only 1 item, in a study, a day's work for a research assistant is to take and to write up 4 interviews. Obviously, if 2 research-assistants worked full time, a study requiring 96 interviews would have to be extended over a period of 2 weeks for the mere interviewing, to say nothing of the additional time necessary for the coding, analysis, and typing of the completed study.

Oscar F. Hoffman
Oscar F. Hoffman
Community Analyst

OFH:ty

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
CENTRAL UTAH PROJECT
TOPAZ, UTAH

November 23, 1943

COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT DIVISION

TENTATIVE PRESENTATION OF COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION

I. Function of Community Analysis

1. To define social groups in the center.
2. To charter social trends.
3. To discover significant attitudes and group behavior as an Administrative aid.

II. Relation to other sections and units

1. This section has no administrative responsibility.
2. It reports to WRA Washington Office on public, not individual, cultural patterns and attitudes. This gives residents an opportunity to channel their true sentiments to the National Director.
3. Advises the Project Director locally about public sentiments relative to functioning of some administrative program.
4. The section cannot be expected to divulge the individual sources of its records and its reports.

III. Frame of references

It is assumed that the following basic factor explain functioning of this as well as any other community:

1. Biological heritage
2. Social or cultural heritage
3. Organization of the community
4. Geographical factor.

IV. Research technique

1. Drawing a sample
 - a. Random sampling of the population
 - b. Contacting the best informed residents
2. The schedule

The approach varies from the usual public opinion poll in that questions used are broad and give the person interviewed the opportunity to discuss

his feeling at some length. The resident is prompted to indicate why he feels as he does.

3. Interviewer's role

He makes no suggestions to influence the respondent's thinking. Interviewer's function is neither that of an educator nor a missionary but that of an impartial observer. No matter how much he may privately disagree with the attitudes he encounters, it is not his function to enlighten or convert.

V. Briefly, it is the function of Community Analysis to become an authority on resident sentiments and feelings. It is not our business to talk but to listen and to understand.

[Dec, 17, 1943]

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Washington

~~D. S. Myer~~
Ade, Lester K.
Arnold, Edwin G.
Baker, John C.
Barrows, Leland
Cross, Frank
Dolins, Robert
French, Fern E.
Gifford, Selene
Glick, P. M.
Hoffman, Luther T.
James, Harold
Kimball, Solon T.
Lee, H. Rex
McVoy, Edgar C.
Marks, Edward B.
Mills, Duncan
Provinse, John H.
Richardson, Gerald
Sabin, Donald R.
Schmidt, Willard
Stauber, R. R.
Thompson, G. D. Carlyle
Tozier, M. M.
Utz, E. J.
Wilson, Col. Erle M.

When routing is finished
return to Community Analysis
Section, Room 512.

Mr. Myer:

Mr. Provinse tells me you have not seen recent reports by the Topaz analyst. Here is one which indicates one of the factors underlying tensions on the project.

E. H. Spicer

Central Utah Project
Topaz, Utah

Comm. Analysis
Dec. 17, 1943

Mr. Dillon S. Myer, Director
War Relocation Authority
Barr Building
Washington, D. C.

ATTENTION: Dr. John Provinse
Mr. Edward Spicer

SUBJECT: Re-evaluation of the Role of the Community Council

On Thursday, November 18, 1943, the Community Council resigned, six weeks before the expiration of its term of office. Since this action came as a complete surprise to the residents as well as the members of the appointive staff, this may be the opportune time to discover if possible what were the issues involved, if any, and especially to take a second look at the role of evacuee government at Topaz.

1. Resignation of the Council

The incident which started off the series of events finally resulting in the resignation of the Council was a Federal Bureau of Investigation questioning of the Council Chairman. On November 15, 1943, Dr. George Ochikubo was approached by a secret service agent and asked whether he had made a statement to the effect that he would rather see the potatoes rot at Tule Lake than to have local residents recruited for the harvest. This investigation so disturbed the Chairman that he called the Council together in a special session, related to them what had happened, and tendered his resignation. At its next meeting the Council debated the question of resigning in a body. Those most intimately associated with the Chairman and for the most part supporting his policies in the past, advocated that the whole Council resign. Some argued that inasmuch as the Council had been elected by the people, it was up to the voters to decide whether or not that body should dissolve itself. They voiced the opinion

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that since no great issues were involved, there was no point in taking such drastic action. The majority of the membership seemed not to have any strong conviction on the question and when the vote on resignation was put, the majority of the Council joined with the Chairman's group for resignation en masse.

1. Underlying Reason for the Chairman's Resignation

On the face of it, it looked as though the Chairman resigned from the Council merely because of the humiliation he suffered at the hands of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. However, from a remark made in his resignation speech he evidently suspected in the investigation a well laid plot against himself. And, contrary to what one might expect in a caste society, he did not point the accusing finger at the Caucasians but at the group of Council members who had opposed him in Council deliberations. His remark that "no Caucasians were present" at the Council meeting when the Tule Lake affair was discussed and when the Chairman was alleged to have made the remark which prompted the FBI to inquire, left no doubt as to his suspicions. In his opinion, one or more of the opposition Councilmen were responsible for resorting to the contemptible expedient of using the FBI to rid the Council of its Chairman.

Apparently the Council Chairman felt that he had sufficient grounds to suspect that "dogs" lurked in the Council. On several questions he had previously clashed with these members and he had in consequence threatened to resign on at least two occasions. The most serious differences arose over the question of the observance of ordinances passed by the Council. Some members had neglected living up to the ordinances themselves and the Chairman had to reprimand them for it.

Others, he felt, did not pursue their duties with the necessary zeal. In short, the Chairman regarded this group as disloyal to him and to the principles for which he and the Council stood. Of course, the opposition group and quite a sizeable block of residents interpreted the clash in terms of the Chairman's personality. They explained that he is an only child, and that he constantly wishes to carry a torch. For that reason he shows a tendency to be dictatorial and of feeling that when Council members oppose him they are opposing the policies of the Council.

In any event, the Council Chairman and his group of advisors, both in the Council and on the outside, saw in the FBI investigation a splendid opportunity for strengthening their hold on Community Government. The plan called first for the resignation of the Chairman and then immediately a demand on the part of his friends for the resignation of that body. This strategy would not only provide the Chairman with the opportunity of being reelected by his own block and thus proving to all the residents that he retained the full support of his constituency, but also of providing him and his advisors with the opportunity for defeating undesirable Councilmen and thus strengthening the Chairman's group in the Council.

2. Why Members Resigned

In line with the agreed-upon strategy, the Chairman's friends in the Council immediately urged that the whole Council resign in support of the resignation of the Chairman. Like their leader, they felt they could not function as a responsible body if there were among them such as were willing to stoop to acting as informers to the FBI. On the

other hand, a vocal minority, mostly Nisei, argued that the Council had no good reason for resigning. This "willful" group contended that they had been elected by the people and that it was up to the people to decide whether or not they should resign. One of them argued that the Council had no authority to resign as a body. The large majority of members agreed that the Chairman should not be asked to stand alone in this crisis, and so they voted with the Chairman's chief advisors for mass resignation.

3. Resident Reaction to Council's Resignation

For a few days the residents were so disturbed over the resignation of the Council that that organization's future existence was in doubt. About half of the blocks, when asked to re-elect a new councilman, were momentarily inclined not to send representatives to the Community Government. Thinking residents asked themselves whether the Council as it had functioned up until now was worth saving. A few were of the opinion that the Block Managers group could take over the functions of the Council and operate more efficiently than the old Council.

Contrary to the position taken by the Council Chairman suggesting that one of the Council members had acted as informer, some resident leaders said that it was the continuing policy of the Project Administration to use FBI investigators for bringing into line any residents in responsible positions who dare to be critical of WRA policies or who disagree with the Administrative program at the Project level. To them the issue was the question of the freedom of speech! Possibly a number of acts and statements on the part of the Community Council Chairman could be characterized as indiscreet, they said, but if that official were investigated for making such a remark, how could any resident in a responsible posi-

tion be assured he would not be subjected to a similar grueling in the event he should oppose the wishes of the Administration as did the Council Chairman on the question of whether or not laborers should be recruited for harvesting the crops at Tule Lake.

In short, some of the resident leaders outside the Council were evaluating the role of the Council in terms of its future usefulness to the people and in terms of WRA interference with the right of freedom of speech, whereas, the Chairman and his supporters in the Council were thinking in terms of personal issues and how they might eliminate "undesirable" members from the Council.

4. The Election

Significantly, the election passed quietly. The rank and file showed itself unwilling at this time to decide the bigger issues involved in the resignation of the Council and unwilling also to fall in line with the strategy of the Council Chairman. Twenty nine blocks out of thirty four blocks reelected their former representatives without putting up opposition candidates. Only in three blocks was there a real election with two or more candidates in the contest.

Various factors contributed to this unexpected turn of events, that is, the reelection of the whole Council almost unchanged. Voters seemed not ready to give serious consideration at this time to the question of the future role of the Council and to the wider issues involved in that question. They asked the former Councilmen to return to their duties and complete their term of office. The election for a new Council was to be held December 14th, so why bother with a new election. A large majority of the former Councilmen

were ready to return to their posts after having been reassured of block support. In a majority of blocks no other candidates would stand for nomination either because they felt that the Council as at present constituted did not challenge their best capabilities or because they felt there was no point in running for election for a short term.

What then does the re-election mean? To serious-minded residents, when they viewed the spectacle of former Councilmen accepting their former positions without much ado, the resignation and re-election was a farce. No real issue but rather petty politics had played the important role. To these people the whole affair merely substantiated their former conviction, namely, that the Council was made up of a body of second, third or fourth grade leadership which did not have the ability to distinguish between what was significant and what was not, or to stand up under fire. Not too highly regarded before, the Council has lost ground and prestige as a governing body for Project operation.

The experience has had the unfortunate result of arousing bitter anti-Administration feeling. Vocal leaders contended that the FBI investigation proves that there can be no freedom of speech for resident leaders and that if the Council does continue to operate it must do so as a tool of the Project Administration. They argue that under these circumstances the Council does not belong to the people in the true sense of the word and that the best leaders cannot be expected to serve either as Councilmen or in some other responsible positions.

Finally, the re-election experience has strengthened the position of those leaders who have argued that all community government should be vested in the Block Managers since that body for the most part is made up of a capable and articulate leadership, an organization that disposes of its administrative

business with intelligence and dispatch.

5. Recommendations

Repeated efforts at clarification of the role of the Community Council is imperative both for the purpose of bringing about effective community management and for the purpose of holding to a minimum misunderstanding and disputes between the residents and the Administration. Obviously, when the Council, limited as it is as a self-governing body, considers a problem only to find itself eventually frustrated in the final solution to that problem because of WRA administrative directives, its members and the residents point to this as evidence that the Administration interferes at will with Council prerogatives. The Council thus acquires the label of being powerless to act on important issues and unhappily becomes stamped as the tool of the Administration. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the Council and the residents be made fully aware of the clear outline of the area in which that body acts in an advisory capacity to the Administration, then the field in which the Council shares power with the Administration, and finally, the area in which it can exercise full authority.

Some elements are advocating that the governmental machinery be revised to provide for a bicameral legislative body, the Council assuming the role of the Senate, and the Block Managers the role of the House of Representatives. In the opinion of the writer, such a step would merely complicate further the machinery of government in the Center without effecting a corresponding advantage in terms of solving difficult community problems. Serious observers of the activities of the Council during the past two months feel the membership of that body is at present too large (a total of thirty four), that a group of seven to nine members seems more ideal from several points of view. It could, for

Mr. Dillon S. Myer
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instance, act with far more dispatch than the present much larger group which has labored long and hard without producing many fruits in the way of constructive legislation. It is assumed that a Council of nine would challenge abler and more respected leaders to accept the responsibility of the office. Both Administration and resident interests lie in the direction of drafting the ablest leaders a far too large a percentage of whom have up to now assumed no community leadership in a formal capacity.

Oscar F. Hoffman
Community Analyst

(Signed)

This analysis has been read by the Project Director but does not necessarily represent his interpretation of the available data.

OFH:sn
12/15/43

It is planned to write another chapter on the subject of the Role of the council and this will be ready for transmittal in the course of the next ten days.

*Community
Analysis*

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Central Utah Project
Topaz, Utah

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO:
Item #107

February 4, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Raymond P. Sanford
Assistant Project Director

FROM: Oscar F. Hoffman
Community Analyst


SUBJECT: Summary of the Policies of Community
Analysis

The policies and aims of Community Analysis are as follows:

1. To aim at objectively reporting Center life.
2. To adapt the methods of reporting to the peculiarities of this Project and to make the analyses and recommendations comprehensible and useful for the Project Director and his staff in making day to day administrative decisions.
3. To submit materials bearing on over-all WRA policies and programs and materials which give insight into local project relationships significant in the interpretations of events at the Project.
4. To steer a neutral course and not become identified with any administrative program or with any appointive or resident groups with an axe to grind. Further, Community Analysis attempts to avoid at all times assuming the role of a missionary or a torch bearer.

Oscar F. Hoffman
Oscar F. Hoffman
Community Analyst

OFH:sn



WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Central Utah Project
Topaz, Utah

Handwritten: ef. The 7th man, Pa.
Handwritten initials: *OFH*

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. R. P. Sanford
FROM: Oscar F. Hoffman
Community Analyst
SUBJECT: July 1, 1944, at Topaz

Much dissatisfaction was expressed by the young people of the camp due to the inactivity during "the 4th". They were looking forward to a carnival which it was rumored would be held. Also it was rumored that there was to be a food sale on this date. This too did not materialize as it has been postponed until two or three weeks hence when the PTA will sponsor it with the proceeds to go toward the student aid fund.

The only attraction for the young was the sumo tournament last night to which a considerable number of issei were attracted although many of the "pipe line crew" participated whether they knew the art or not. They were interested in winning the prizes that were offered at the tournament. On account of the heat and mosquitoes at the open-air pit in the high school plaza, the audience was not as large as was anticipated. At least three appointive personnel were in attendance.

On such a national occasion it is my belief that the education department of the CAS should see to it that some sort of patriotic program be presented to keep the residents in tune with the times as well as with the historical significance of the day which we should not lose sight of especially when the young people must someday make their way in this country. Serious efforts should be made to help them love their country in spite of the fact that they have been treated rather badly. The nisei must be given this hope for the future in America in order to help them be ambitious and studious.

Oscar F. Hoffman
Community Analyst

OFH:mn

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Community Analysis

TO: RAYMOND P. SANFORD

DELTA, UTAH

FROM: COMMUNITY ANALYSIS

DATE: July 24, 1944

SUBJECT:

Be advised that we have sent the data as indicated on the attached sheet to Marvin K. Opler, Community Analyst, Tule Lake Center, Newell California.

O. F. HOFFMAN
Community Analyst

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
TULE LAKE SEGREGATION CENTER
Newell, California

July 10, 1944

Community Analysis Section
Topaz Relocation Center
Topaz, Utah

Dear Dr. Hoffman:

We are attempting, in Community Analysis, a comparative study of school enrollment and personnel.

I would appreciate your assistance in furnishing the following information at your earliest convenience.

Total Center Population	*6484	M	3260	F	3224
Total Enrollment-Elementary	537	M	295	F	242
Total Enrollment-High School	949	M	486	F	463
Total Enrollment-Special Class, PG Courses	0	M	0	F	0
Total Enrollment-Adult Classes	2254	M		F	
Total Teaching Staff-Elementary Caucasians	10		Asst.		0
Total Teaching Staff-High School "	25		Asst.		0

If there is any information you need regarding this center, I will be happy to furnish it for you.

Sincerely yours,

Marvin K. Opler
Community Analyst

*Not including 401 out on seasonal or short term leave.

#36836

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Central Utah Project
Topaz, Utah

October 12, 1944

ORIENTATION FOR NEW COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION EMPLOYEES

The orientation of a new employee starts with the Personnel Officer and proceeds to the division, section, and unit to which the person has been assigned. During this orientation period, the new employee should be left with the following impressions:

1. That the Project is glad to have the services of the new appointee and not that the Project is accommodating the new employee by giving him a job.
2. That the orientation period is a definite part of the responsibility of those giving the orientation information and not that this orientation period is time stolen from other essential duties.

The Community Analysis Section Head will use the following outline:

1. Activities of the Community Analysis Section
 - a. To study resident community social structure and to study appointed personnel
 - (1) To determine the role of various groups
 - (2) To ascertain attitudes of the various elements of the Center
 - (3) To ascertain attitudes of appointed staff toward minority groups, especially Japanese, in so far as these attitudes may affect Center activities
 - b. Information gathered by the Analyst is to be used to develop a cooperative attitude on the part of all groups to the end that group relations be conducive to good working relations
2. Working relations among members of the Community Analysis Section
 - a. Absolutely confidential information in so far as any respondent is concerned
3. The relation of the new employee with the employees in this division and with the employees of other divisions
 - a. Only for sampling of opinions and of attitudes
4. The new employee's job description
 - a. The specific work to be performed. (To be given by

Orientation for New Community Analysis Section Employees
page 2

the new employee's immediate supervisor.)

5. Arrange schedule of conferences
 - a. Almost daily and continuous