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7 of 23

Community Analysis Section
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FINAL REPORT OF THE
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION

Minidoka Relocation Center
Hunt, Idaho

Compiled by:
Elmer Smith, Community Analyst

Section Heads
John E. deYoung, March 10, 1943 to February 16, 1944
Elmer Smith, April 19, 1944 to October 25, 1945

FINAL REPORT OF THE
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION

ITS HISTORY, AIMS, METHODOLOGY AND PROBLEMS

The Community Analysis Section was more or less an afterthought as far as the administrative processes of a relocation center were concerned. At Minidoka the Analyst Section was not instituted until late in March of 1943, under the direction of Mr. John deYoung. It was a section under Community Management. The establishment of the Analysis Section was directly the outgrowth of experiences of Dr. Alexander H. Leighton and Dr. E. H. Spicer at the Poston Relocation Center and the organization of such a section was sponsored by Dr. John Embree and Dr. John Provinse of the Washington W. R. A. office.

Aims of Analysis Section:

The job of the analysis section was to interpret to the administrators the human beings whom the WRA program was designed to rehabilitate and to advise in the formation of policy and procedure. The analysis section was to furnish factual material about the center in terms of social composition of the community, problems of community life, reactions of the community to stated policies and rules set up by the administration, rumors and tension areas within the center

and their backgrounds. The analyst was not to act in any administrative capacity nor was he to be identified with any particular group or groups within the center -- either evacuee or appointed personnel. His sources of information were to remain confidential at all times, and he was never to be asked to investigate anything on a personal basis. The other members of the appointive staff were to give him full cooperation at all times and when requested to do so. The analysis section was to be composed of one analyst trained in the fields of social analysis and human relations, with an evacuee staff of assistants. The number of evacuee assistants at Minidoka never numbered more than 4 or 5 at any given time, and during the months of June, July, and August, of 1945, not more than 3. During September of 1945 no evacuee staff members were available due to the rapid relocation rate and turnover of evacuee employees.

Reports from the Analysis Section were to be submitted on various aspects of community life to the Washington Office of WRA and to the local administration. No definite period of time was set for the submission of these reports until after the meeting of the community analysts at Denver in September, 1944. At the Denver conference it was decided to have each analyst on the respective projects submit a weekly report to the Washington office for the purpose of more adequately keeping a "running picture" of the life on the centers. The

Washington office and the Project Director could and did request certain special reports on various aspects of community life from the analyst, and these were submitted as special reports. However, by and large, the analyst was left pretty much to himself as to how and what to study at given times. This was a necessary rule since the very dynamic aspects of center living made a cut and dried policy subject matter an impossibility. The analyst at Minidoka often sent specific memoranda to the local administration on certain situations that developed on a small scale and/or that had special interest at a given time in relation to a given situation.

History of Analysis Section at Minidoka:

As stated previously, the analysis section became active in Minidoka in late March of 1943 under the direction of Mr. John deYoung. Dr. E. H. Spicer had been on the Minidoka project for a few weeks previous to that time laying the groundwork for the appearance of Mr. deYoung. There have been, since the analysis section was established in Minidoka, 24 evacuee staff members and three analysts. Mr. John deYoung was analyst from March, 1943, to February, 1944. Mr. Gordon Armbruster was analyst from February 3, to March 4, 1944, but due to personal and family reasons left the project before any analysis was carried out. The present analyst, Elmer R. Smith, has been the analyst since April 18, 1944 to the closing of the

center, with the exceptions of the months of January and February, 1945, when Mr. deYoung returned as analyst while Smith was away on a special assignment in the Pacific Northwest.

The evacuee staff members have all either terminated on their own request for relocation purposes or for transfers to other jobs. No one has been terminated from the analyst's office for negative reasons.

As stated previously, the analysis section was under the Community Management Division, with very close relations worked out -- at least in the earlier days -- with the Project Director's office. As a matter of fact, in the early days, the analyst was under Community Management only in name. The analyst did all of his reporting both oral and written directly to the Project Director. The written reports were never filed with the Assistant Project Director in Community Management, but only with the Project Director's office. All reports of whatever nature went over the Project Director's desk, but personal letters were sent to the Washington Office direct. The present analyst (after April 18, 1944) began to carry on the same policy as that of the previous analyst in terms of reporting directly, and only, to the Project Director, but with the coming into the picture (week of August 12, 1944) of Mr. Edward Huberman as

Assistant Project Director in Community Management more and more direct contact and reporting followed the channels set up through the Community Management Division. However, in important confidential and pertinent instances the analyst still kept direct contact with the Project Director, especially when oral reports and discussions were to be carried out.

Problem of Methodology:

The problem of methodology was ever present to the analyst at Minidoka, and since the situation was new in terms of the social-cultural factors involved, some experimentation was carried out. This is too long a procedure to be discussed here, but suffice to say that a number of approaches were attempted, and were found wanting. It was found, furthermore, that methodology in a relocation center, when applied to analysis, could not be evaluated, at the time, exclusively in terms of its standard conformity to the more dogmatic procedures laid down by sociologists, economists, psychologists, and anthropologists. The standard by which, from the very nature of the problems presented by the administration to the analyst, the analyst evaluated his studies was by the effectiveness of the material for administrative purposes. This effectiveness of the material gathered by the analysis

section as an aid to the administrative program depended upon (a) timelessness, (b) the accuracy of the material collected as pointing to practical solutions and frames of reference, (c) method of presentation. Always facing the analyst was the demand of the administration to be practical and forget the frills. This is not to say, however, that the analyst did not use the necessary checks and balances in gathering and organizing his materials, but the standards applied by the administration had to be seriously and continuously considered. These standards of the administration were:

1. Whether our suggestions and material aided immediately in the solution of the current problems.
2. Whether it was felt that our data was representative of the evacuee feelings and problems. Always, it seems, the analyst's data remained but one element in the total situation to be dealt with. At times, this seemed to be unjustified, but the analyst was forced not to lose sight of the fact that policies and plans cannot always be fitted to the scientific facts, and that properly, from the administrator's point of view, the analyst's findings were merely one element in the total situation of administration.

The problem of speed in making a study of a given situation -- especially labor and administrative conflicts -- left the analyst very much at a loss as to the application of "tried and true" techniques. The administration, in such cases as the above, would demand an immediate report covering

the total situation, and this in many cases would preclude any elaborate system of "accepted and traditional technique" of approach. With these problems always present, the analyst used the informal approach as much as possible in the studies conducted of various situations. In his more leisurely (?) moments certain standardized studies were made. The informal approach was used in order to avoid as much as possible being identified with any given side in specific situations. This technique was used for another reason, mainly because the analyst had been associated with a study of persons of Japanese ancestry outside of a center, and formal questions, answers and other like interviewing methods were found to be unsuccessful (See - JAPANESE RELOCATION STUDY OF UTAH, Preliminary Report, Elmer R. Smith, April, 1944, University of Utah Report). The informal approach could be used with advantage because the persons and situations involved were not moving from place to place, the analyst lived and participated in the social life of the community and was acquainted with a large number of residents, thus formality was more or less a foreign element to inject into such a situation. Growing out of this basic informal approach the techniques used could be listed as follows:

1. General observation of what was happening and what was being said in all the parts of the community.
2. Intensive interviews which consisted in repeated discussions and "bull sessions".
3. Records were collected, in whole or in part, from all available sources, such as statistics, relocation office, school, guidance office, etc.
4. Personality studies of a small number of persons involved in given situations.

Public opinion polls and survey sheets were not used by the analyst because of the skepticism of the residents toward any such technique and the danger of such forms being considered as part of the relocation surveys and welfare surveys and studies being carried on at various times in the center.

It is believed by the analyst that a synthesis of the material so collected by the analysis section will be of use in the developing of a series of theoretical studies upon a purely scientific basis, especially since the material collected here can be counter-checked with material from other centers. Many of the basis factors stimulating certain types of behavior patterns at Minidoka were born from the same standardized policies originating from the WRA office in Washington, D. C., plus, of course, the recognition that individual personalities involved in the various centers

are taken into consideration. It is also to be suggested at this point that a very constructive and analytical study of methodology could be worked out by a number of analysts from the various centers combining their experiences and techniques in some sort of report. This report would be useful for later studies as well as a method of evaluating the total analysis program within the relocation centers.

The Community Analysis Section and its position in the center structure in terms of its problems, relationships, with the administration and the residents, and its evaluation in terms of community life is of paramount importance, and we will now turn to these aspects of the question for discussion.

Problems and types of Material Studied:

The problems of the analyst were many and varied, and may be divided into the following divisions: (1) Types of material studied by Analysis Section; (2) Trends in types of studies made and possible factors involved.

1. Types of materials studied:

The problem of choosing the type of subject to study was one always facing the analyst. However, for the purpose of classification and discussion two principal divisions may be made: General Social Structures and their Functions; second: Problems of Community Life in Relation to

-10-

Center Experience. These two main divisions may be more completely broken down in terms of the following:

- a. Recreational activities (plays, games, etc.)
- b. Folklore (stories, superstitions, rumors, etc.)
- c. Educational reports
- d. Population studies
- e. Center Problems (special reports)
- f. Weekly reports
- g. Reports on business meetings

The following table will summarize the number of reports under the above 7 divisions:

DIVISION	NUMBER OF REPORTS
Recreational activities.....	55
Folklore.....	48
Educational.....	19
Population studies.....	1
Center Problems.....	97
Weekly Reports.....	43
Reports on business meetings.....	<u>92</u>
TOTAL.....	355

It should be stressed in this connection that many of these separate studies often overlapped, since after all the phenomena being dealt with are parts of the total human experiences of people living in a given community.

The first studies conducted over at least a ten-month period were more along the lines of descriptive narratives of the social structures of the community with some historical material thrown in to give background to the customs, traditions, stories, games, etc. under description and analysis. During the earlier period of the life of the

-11-

analysis section on the project only a few specific problem situations or conflict conditions were reported. The latter part of the analysis sections' reports and studies dealt more with the problem situations both in general and in specific instances. This change of approach will be specifically discussed later in this report.

The present analyst has had a number of specific studies planned, but due to the urgency of specific other types of reports (labor, administration and evacuee conflicts, weekly reports, special reports requested by the administration), other activities and to the shortage of labor these studies were never completed. These types of studies included:

1. Problems of Leadership in a Semi-Closed Society
 2. Some General Social-psychological Principles underlying Prejudices on a Racial Basis in Minidoka
 3. Social-Group Rules and Their Origins in a Relocation Center
 4. Play Groups and appearance of "Dominant" Traits in Individuals
 5. Some Psychological Aspects of Adjustment to Relocation Center Life
2. Summary of trends in types of studies made and possible factors involved:

As stated above, there have been more or less two main trends noticeable at Minidoka in the types of material studied by the analysis section. Under the first analyst,

-12-

Mr. deYoung, the reports run more to the studies of social phenomena as such with a minimum amount of attention called to the specific problem situations involved. This is understandable for probably a number of reasons. First, the community was new, and little was known about the total community structure and function of a given semi-closed society such as a relocation center, especially one made up of a given ethnic group. It was, therefore, necessary to get background material for a better understanding of the life of the community. Second, in the earlier days of the center, no pronounced conflict situations developed between the administration and the evacuees, between evacuees and evacuees, and between the various groups in the administrative staff that were comparable to later developments. The first really serious conflict situation that came out into the open was the boilermen's strike in February, 1944. Third, the analysis section was new and it was necessary, at first, to study and report only on general topics that would not arouse the negativism of the residents as well as the administrative staff. The establishment of rapport in both groups was necessary step, and one that had to be worked out very carefully if the analyst was to perform his job efficiently and objectively. Fourth, the training and interest of the analyst must not be discounted in terms of

-13-

subject materials studied, and this factor perhaps had some significance as reflected in the reports submitted.

The present analyst, taking up the work of Mr. de-Young, on April 18, 1944, entered the project at the time of the beginning of a number of conflict situations. On the day of his arrival the project was in the middle of a strike at the warehouse area; this was followed by a series of conflict situations involving selective service, expatriation-repatriation, the "Irrigator" and the Reports Office, recreational relations, school complications, community council and administration relations, coal driver conflicts, trouble and misunderstandings between the administration and evacuees over the completion of the high school gymnasium, ending in a series of misunderstandings among the Council members, the residents and the administration. These situations were finally followed by an increased recognition of juvenile problems, especially in relation to the school, the lifting of the exclusion orders on the West Coast, and the announcement of the closing dates of the centers. Therefore, with this sort of a line-up of events, the analyst was forced to spend more of his time and attention to these types of relations than to some of the more general forms of social relations. This is, therefore, one of the explanations for the change in the type of reporting of

-14-

the analysis section after March of 1944. The training, background, and interest of the analyst in this time also is significant, but will be discussed in SUPPLEMENT I.

The weekly reports which grew out of the conference of analysts held in Denver in September, 1944, presented another type of reporting, which brought the analyst closer to the general everyday problems of the administration and the residents as well as trying to spot possible trends in human relations growing out of the situations as they developed from week to week.

Analysis Section and Administration:

The problem of relationships existing between the analysis section and the administration presented some real "cases". Previous to March, 1944, the analyst (Mr. deYoung) had direct contact with the Project Director and was on a very friendly and intimate basis with him. However, this did not "go" for the rest of the appointed personnel, who considered the analyst as: (1) A stooge for the Project Director as well as for the Washington Office; (2) Too young for the job; (3) He did not associate with the "bunch" enough; (4) And there was the question of exactly what was he doing here in the first place? However, no harsh and out-and-out antagonisms were shown to the analyst--

-15-

as far as I can learn -- from the direct administrative officers.

The present analyst, taking over on April 18, 1944, has not found himself at all times and in all predicaments on the positive side of the administration, nor getting the cooperation of some of the administrative officers when it was the most desirable. This is especially true where it became necessary for the analyst to present the evacuees' point of view on problem situations, in contrast to the view of the administration, or more specifically the view of its administrative officers. The analyst has been criticised a number of times for the material he included in his reports to the Washington office. This criticism revolved around at least the following points: (1) The material presented gives only a small minority's viewpoint among the residents (when called upon to show cause for this remark, no comments were usually made); (2) The analyst was pro-evacuee, therefore, he was to be discounted; (3) The analyst did not have all the facts (in this connection some letters of objections were written to the Washington Office concerning reports of the analyst); (4) The analyst was a "false prophet" -- no tension situations were in evidence all was going well; (5) the analyst was an anthropologist

-16-

and was, therefore, impractical, and "read too many books".

There were times, however, (and they were more frequent in number than the above remarks would have one to believe) when the administration called upon the analyst for a number of suggestions and analyses and these were used in the determining of policy. A few examples will suffice:

(1) The warehouse strike in April of 1944; (2) The problem of moving all persons out of block 22; (3) Background and handling of juvenile problems; (4) Sioux depot ordinance recruiting program; (5) Problems of the distribution of information for speeding up relocation; (6) Gymnasium conflicts on labor and labor relations. (*)

(*) For elaboration of this material from analyst's historical sketch of his experiences at Minidoka, see SUPPLEMENT I.

The real problem existing in the relationships of the analyst and the administration was, namely, "how the gap may be bridged between the technical information supplied by a scientific worker and the actual needs of the practical man when he is forced by a specific problem or decision." This gap, to some extent at least, was bridged by the following methods at Minidoka:

1. Special consultation between analyst and the Project Director
2. Special research requested of the analyst by the administration

-17-

3. The analyst became part of the upper administrative cabinet (until last 2 months of project -- See Supplement I), and had a chance to discuss, both formally and informally, problems of policy, etc.
4. The freedom exercised by the analyst to present various points of view (even under protest from some quarters), and the freedom others involved had in presenting their reactions and criticisms to the analyst's reports both the local and Washington administration.

Evaluation:

The evaluation of the efficiency of the analyst's section is one that must, for purely objective reasons, be left to others and to the time when comparisons can be made and perspective be attained concerning the total WRA picture. However, the following points may be made for what they may be worth:

1. The analysis section was effective in at least making some of the administrative officers conscious of other factors at work other than the purely "economic and political" ones.
2. Due to certain factual situations presented by the analyst, certain types of "steriotyped administrative techniques" for handling people were modified.
3. The residents, after they discovered what the analysis section was really for, became more positive toward certain administrative policies, because they "found out their points of view were being presented to the Washington office." (This statement has been made a number of times to the analyst by leaders in the resident community).
4. The analysis section, on the center level, was able to supply the administrative groups in Washington with background material and situations that would not otherwise have been available to the policy-making bodies on the national level.

-18-

5. The Analysis section was able to gather much social-cultural material useful for more detailed studies of specific types of human relations.
6. The analysis section was unable to have as much of a positive influence on policy and techniques at the project level as might have been desired because: (a) the skepticism among the administrators of the purposes and techniques of the trained social scientist; (b) the suspicion in which the analyst was held by many of the appointed personnel because of the "reporting" and "snooping" into the various activities of the center; (c) the belief on the part of some appointed personnel that due to his association with the evacuees and his "reporting", that he was pro-Japanese, or at least a "Jap-lover".
7. Due to the "rush" and the "rapidity of happenings" on the center that were the analyst's job to know about, the time was not always available to develop sufficient "check techniques" for certain "moot" points with which the analyst had to deal.
8. Some positive contributions were presented by the analyst in the training program of appointed staff members.

NOTE:

For a subjective presentation of the analyst's experiences and opinions SUPPLEMENT I is recommended.

HISTORICAL SKETCH
of
ANALYSIS SECTION

Minidoka Relocation Center
Hunt, Idaho

Compiled by:
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Community Analyst

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SUPPLEMENT I

(To Historical Sketch of Analysis Section in Minidoka)
(By Elmer R. Smith, Analyst)

The following presentation is a subjective one from the point of view of the present analyst and is recorded for the purpose of attempting to show how he looked at certain situations at various times, the ways he attempted to make adjustments, and some of the personal experiences which might have bearing upon his recorded reactions. This does not claim to be "scientific" in the usually accepted sense of that term, but it is believed that even in this sort of a report, some objectivity due to previous training, will have some carry over into the viewpoints expressed.

The present analyst arrived at Minidoka to take up his job on April 18, 1944. Previous to that time he had been an assistant professor of sociology and anthropology at the University of Utah in Salt Lake City, and was granted a leave of absence from that Institution to become associated with WRA. The analyst, in other capacities, had visited another project (Topaz) a number of times before coming to Minidoka. I visited Minidoka for five days for the purpose of "looking over the field", and to have interviews with the Project Director and others before accepting the position of analyst. During this visit the Project Director gave me a running

-2-

account of the history of the project, and explained how he had always been considerate and willing to cooperate with the evacuees, but how the evacuees always tended to take advantage of his good intentions. The Project Director also explained how much he was impressed, in the favorable slant, by the previous analyst, Mr. John deYoung. It was made clear to me at that time that I would have to be "damn good" if I could occupy the type of "envious position" held by the previous analyst in the eyes of the Director.

I was interested in the following main problems in terms of community life and human relations on a relocation center basis:

1. Status-role relations within a semi-closed society such as a relocation center.
2. Personality integration and disintegration of Nisei in a relocation center.
3. Problems arising from the social relations, etc. existing between the WRA administration and the residents.

I had these specific interests upon my arrival due, no doubt, to the type of experience and training encountered in my professional work with minority groups elsewhere. This experience included work with persons of Japanese ancestry in Utah, including a study of "Japanese" Relocation in Utah, and as Nisei student advisor at the University of Utah, as well as a member of various inter-racial committees

-3-

in Salt Lake City, Ogden, etc. My professional training included psychology, sociology, and psychiatry as well as major in anthropology. Thus, with this background, I became conscious of the problems of personality integration and disintegration and their importance to the present abnormal situation. This short note is given here of my background to explain some of the possible interests shown in the reports written for "the record".

Upon entering the center I found to my surprise and satisfaction that a number of people already knew me by "hearsay" if not by sight. This evidently was due to a number of factors, among them were:

1. Some of the Nisei students at the University of Utah had parents and friends at Minidoka;
2. Some of the published material -- in the Pacific Citizen and newspapers -- by me had been read by some of the residents;
3. The work on inter-racial committees in Utah by me had been known by some of the residents.

With these factors in my favor, I was able to gain access to a variety of sources of information quite early "in the game". These sources were very helpful because at the time of the taking over of the job as analyst, Minidoka was in the midst of a fairly serious labor strike on the part of the warehouse workers.

-4-

The analyst's principal studies of "center problem situations" while working in Minidoka might be listed as follows:

- a. Warehouse strike and misunderstandings, April-May, 1944
- b. Reports Office and "Irrigator" relations, May, 1944
- c. Repatriation-Expatriation and relations to selective service, May, 1944
- d. Appointive staff conflicts in education and operation divisions, May-June, 1944
- e. Manpower commission conflicts, September-October, 1944
- f. Labor relations in Gate, Telephone, and coal crew groups, September-October, November, 1944
- g. Juvenile problems, September 1944 thru May 1945
- h. Community activities and labor relations, Oct., 1944
- i. Gym Labor relations, October-November, 1944
- j. Community Council conflict, Nov.-Dec. 1944
- k. Announcement of opening of Pacific Coast, December, 1944, thru January, 1945
- l. On Pacific Coast (Northwest) thru January-February, 1945 studying attitudes of communities relative to return of persons of Japanese ancestry
- m. Community activities revamping program, April, 1945
- n. Problems of information distribution in the Center, January thru July, 1945
- o. Labor restrictions and operations curtailment March thru July, 1945
- p. Announcement of closing of Units 2 and 3 at Poston and Canal Unit at Gila, June, 1945
- q. Announcement of closing dates of all centers, July, 1945
- r. Activities and problems on closing of Minidoka July thru October, 1945.

Besides concentrating on the above problems and problem situations, I attempted to gather information on various types of social behavior in the center as well as making two trips during the summer and fall of 1944, to various places in

-5-

southern and southeastern Idaho and the Ogden area in Utah to study the adjustments and problems and seasonal workers from Minidoka and other centers.

After I had been three weeks on the Minidoka project, I entered the following in my note book relative to my reactions to the picture as I saw it at that time. The following was written on May 8, 1944:

"At first one is impressed with the wide expanse of the project. One feels as if elbow-room was present. In contrast to the other centers, (example Topaz), where the barracks are all in rows and square blocks -- the Minidoka center is divided into 3 well-defined areas -- Administration area, Area A and Area B residential sections. Area B is the largest. The wide space between Area A and B and the spaces between the Administration Area and the residential areas, gives one a feeling of not being "behind barbed wire." One could also assume, as I did, that the psychology of the residents and the administration would be influenced.

"The Administrative staff at once held my interest because, immediately, I could see a type of 'caste' psychology among them as applied to themselves. The school teachers considered themselves and were considered by others as being more-or-less apart; the upper administrative officers, lesser members and finally the general staff members all tended to make up groups unto themselves. This division was noticeable in social activities, and especially at meal times. This grouping was also cross-cut by the staff members living on the project and the ones not living on the project.

"After a few days around the AP (appointive staff) staff members one could begin to place them through conversations, etc. into the following categories -- and still can after three weeks have elapsed:

"1. The definite anti-Japanese group. The attitudes presented by this group were voiced in some instances in terms of "the yellow bellied bastards". Another attitude expressed by considerable numbers in this group was that a person of Japanese ancestry cannot be treated as a common human being nor as an American no matter where his birthplace. This group

-6;

uses the word "Jap" when referring to the residents. This group believes in "showing the "Jap" where he belongs", and "the Caucasians are boss."

"2. Another group is more or less on the fence. They are willing, to a degree, to give the Nisei a chance, but an Issei is to be doubted, no matter in what situation or upon what basis. This group moves back and forth as far as policies and cooperative attitudes are concerned. However, when their own particular line of duty happens to be questioned by a resident, they fall into the general "dictatorial" attitude of group 1, and are inclined not to budge in their position even though they admit, ideally, they may be in the wrong.

"3. This group is "all out" in sympathy for the residents. They use arguments that

- a. The Japanese are to be pitied because of their treatment
- b. They should be considered in as sympathetic a manner as other refugees
- c. All Japanese are in the same general category, namely, are poor, unfortunate creatures of circumstances.

"On the whole, this group is made up of AP members who look upon the Japanese as their special problem, to be mothered or fathered into being once again legitimate members of American democratic society. This group is made up of (a) church officials, (b) some school teachers, (c) missionaries, (d) and a small smattering of social workers.

"4. The fourth and by far the smallest group is made up of individuals who have had either thru schooling or practical experience or both, an objective understanding of human nature and its various personal and social-cultural ramifications. These persons, instead of being purely sympathetic upon an emotional basis, recognize the importance of understanding the actions of individuals as well as groups, upon the basis of social-psychological, economic, political and other cultural factors. These persons recognize the need for cooperative effort in bringing about a workable and constructive policy for the control of the community activities. The members of this group can be counted on the fingers of the two hands and still probably have some fingers left over.

"The AP personnel in groups 1 and 2 seem to be increasing since the turnover in personnel is very high, and also, because older persons with more outside anti-Japanese

-7-

pressure thru society are being hired. This is not to mean, however, that efficient men and women are not being employed. As far as their own particular specialty is concerned they are highly efficient in the long run -- but this does not mean that they know how to get along with people in a "tension" and abnormal situation such as one finds in a WRA relocation center. This is especially true when one considers their dominant emotional leanings toward "anti-Japanesism".

"The third group -- the emotionally sympathetic group -- is fairly stable in numbers since they are women (mainly) fired with a missionary complex.

"This situation thus created a set of problems to be met by the WRA if the center is to be run in a cooperative manner. These problems might be summarized as:

"1. The problem of ever-growing tensions between the residents and group 1 and some members of group 2 among the AP's.

"2. The problem of controlling or/and ameliorating conflicts between members of the AP staff in groups 1 and 2 and groups 3 and 4.

"3. The problem of re-educating the members of especially group 2 (group 1 members are probably hopeless).

"4. The problem of either controlling or getting rid of group 1 members and replacing them with persons who are both efficient along particular specialized lines and at the same time conscious of the need for total objectivity and social-psychological understanding.

"5. The problem of getting members of group 3 to view certain things more objectively and less emotionally.

"How these problems are to be met, I have not the faintest idea at present -- one is required, as an analyst to sit back and see what happens, but conscious all of the time of the inadequacy of human beings to efficiently handle and to understand one another.

"The residents of the community at Hunt, who are of Japanese ancestry, too, have their class systems. They might be summarized as follows:

"1. Old leaders, who established themselves in non-relocation center life.

-8-

"2. Leaders who are the result of center and evacuee life.

"3. The persons with fair-sized property interests on the coast.

"4. Residents from:
Seattle and vicinity
Portland and vicinity
and outsiders -- especially California

"5. Rural and Urban

"Among groups 1 and 2, especially, we find a very high degree of antagonism -- especially in some instances. However, this whole class system as far as status-role relations are concerned is cross-cut by another division or divisions which is (are) more important in the life of the resident community. For most practical purposes these divisions are:

"1. The "pro-Japanese" element.

"2. The "uncertain" but in most instances appeasive group. Called by me for convenience, the plus-minus group.

"3. The positive, or pro-American group, made up primarily of Japanese-Americans (Nisei) of the Japanese-American Citizens League members and their non-member sympathizers.

"4. And finally a questionable number of persons who are not -- overtly at least -- identified with any other group, but may at opportune moments throw their weight one way or the other and decide an issue or a leader's position.

"The number 1 group places itself against:

- a. WRA-resident cooperation
- b. Selective service and enlistment
- c. Against the positive pro-American group

This group is for:

- a. Repatriation
- b. Expatriation
- c. Fighting the selective service and refusing to report for induction.

-9-

d. Using as many instances as possible for putting the WRA and the federal government on the spot, and to use various incidents and persons as possible who are "pro-American" to embarrass the administration and resident leaders who are not once with them.

"It is in group 1, I am sure, that one can "track down" various negative rumors based sometime on half-truths and again on down-right falsehoods, and upon misunderstandings. As to these misunderstandings -- often in the relations between the various groups and AP's and groups 2-3 and 4 of the residents, certain misunderstandings legitimately arise, and when such do come to the foreground these negative groups use them as a basis for propaganda to increase their own status and role. It is here that some of the AP's are taken into camp and are by their own negative, non-cooperative acts and utterances made a tool of this negative group of residents. It is in this type of situation that the pro-American and positive group of residents find themselves forced, out of self-protection, to object to certain treatments and utterances made by the AP staff members, so that a simple misunderstanding increases the major proportions in the community and among the AP staff members. Also, the other two resident groups are -- in such instances -- forced to take sides and again fall into the hands of the negative resident group.

"It should not be lost sight of the fact that the various negative experiences that the evacuees have been through are always potent "frames of reference" used -- by necessity -- as a measuring stick of their position in American democracy. Many still feel "lost" as to what they should really do and think in terms of cooperation with the government. The negative group of residents play upon this "frame of reference" in various ways. The positive group can only use theoretical principles and idealistic concepts to combat the "negative experiences of evacuation", and the concrete examples are few and far between. This is especially so when this positive group is forced -- in some instances -- to take issue with certain policies and actions of the negative AP staff group. As a matter of fact when certain anti-Japanese utterances and "harsh" acts are committed by the various groups of AP's, the negative group of leaders among the residents use this as proof that the positive group of evacuees are foolish, unrealistic, and are "dogs", "baboons", etc. By this method one often finds the "plus-minus" and the "questionable" groups of residents being definitely influenced.

"In summary of this general condition, one might say:

-10-

"1. The negative members and leaders of both the AP staff and the residents are playing the same game from opposite ends of the string.

"2. The "on the fence group" of the AP staff and the "plus-minus" and "questionable" groups of the residents are able to be influenced by the particular situations played up by the negative groups.

"3. The positive group and leaders among the residents find themselves between two fires -- the negative resident group on one side and the negative AP group on the other. Often being forced, out of consideration for the resident community, to take sides to some degree and upon some issues with the negative resident groups -- thus losing ground previously gained at some other time.

"4. The "emotional" and sympathetic group of AP's are fairly safe in their idealistic approach thru their missionary philosophy -- but still look upon all persons of Japanese ancestry as being "ill done by".

"5. The last group of AP's are caught literally on the horns of a dilemma -- seeing both sides of the problems they are unable to understand why each group acts as it does, but due to technicalities are forced to give in once here, again there until neither side will take seriously their analysis or solutions."

I am still under the same general impression at the time of this writing (October 8, 1945) as when I entered the above in my notebook nearly 18 months ago. There are, however, a few explanations that should be given of the above statements in the light of later developments. The AP staff did add more of the "anti" types of individuals to the staff as suggested by the above report, and there were definitely antagonistic developments within the staff, resulting in the termination of a number of AP's (see Analyst's Final Report on Minidoka Community). The groups developing within the AP staff became

-11-

more set as time went on and conflicts arose between the administration and the residents. At the time of closing of the center only a very few persons remained on the AP staff who attempted to make adjustments on the individualistic basis. Most of the AP's were "program minded" to the point where the only thing that mattered was to get the evacuees out at whatever cost to the individuals or families concerned. As a matter of fact, the Acting Project Director in the last week of September said: "It is not our worry as to what happens to the evacuees when they get outside. That is the worry of the field offices. We are interested in clearing the center."

This type of philosophy seems to dominate the relocation division and their personnel particularly. This is also the philosophy back of the serving of 3-day notices to persons who do not have dates of departure or places to go. As a matter of fact, when the relocation division was recruiting personnel from the center staff, one AP remarked to a prospective worker: "Why don't you go into relocation. You had just as well get your pound of flesh along with the others." The relocation division officer in some of the relocation staff meetings was heard to say: "Administration Notice No. 289 now gives us a chance to get even with some of our 'friends'".

The emotional and "missionary complex" group of AP's were thinned out during the summer of 1945, until at the close

-12-

of the project one finds only the negative, anti-group (in the majority by a large number), a few middle of the roaders, and a small, very small number of the positive, understanding group. The anti-group was further increased by the fact that labor shortage developed on the project, and it was necessary to bring in a large number of temporary workers from the outside. This group of workers were ignorant of the whole problem of WRA, were anti-Japanese to the extent that they knew nothing of the background of evacuation, and had received their "mis-information" by the way of the Hearst newspapers and local rumor.

The AP's and their attitudes were definitely influenced by the experiences received outside the center in the surrounding communities. The people, in certain areas surrounding Minidoka, were negative to persons of Japanese ancestry; this was especially true around Buhl, Rupert, and Gooding. Gooding got better in terms of positive attitudes as time went on. A large number of the AP staff lived off the project -- in Twin Falls and Jerome -- and thus had very little contact with the residents except during working hours. The AP's, even then, knew very few of the residents, and then only on a very formal basis. Thus they built up attitudes on the basis of rumor and gossip. This formal contact was further built up by the traditional "institutional type of behavior"

-13-

philosophy that was dominant at Minidoka. This type of philosophy held that social and friendly contacts between AP's and residents should not be allowed, but that contacts should always be on a formal and business basis.

A work of explanation should be given as to what I mean in the discussion carried out above by the word "group". This term "group" is not meant to convey the idea that a closely organized group existed either to fight or to cooperate with the administration. The "group" under discussion at any specific time was a spontaneous affair and leaders -- if one can use such a term -- of such groups were usually persons who were spokesmen for the community as a whole, and who had gained status by experiences either outside or inside the center. They were, more often than not, chosen or became leaders in a spontaneous manner, very much as the groups themselves were formed around a given issue.

The evacuee group activities broke down during the summer and fall of 1945. This was due to the rapid movement out of the center of the population. However, in the later part of September, and the first part of October a group did get fairly well organized against the "forced relocation" by means of the three-day notice. This group was made up primarily of the persons desiring repatriation to Japan. (See Analyst's Special Report for September 25, 1945.)

-14-

After I had spent three months (July 18, 1944) at Minidoka, I entered in my notebook the following statements.

"In order to show the attitudes of some of the Appointive Personnel, the following notes on some personalities follow:

"(1) Mr. A. and his background:

a. He was born in the South, Georgia to be exact, and he was brought up in the racial atmosphere of that region. He is about 61 years of age. The experience of A. revolved around the newspaper business, having worked for the Hearst chain as reporter at one time. He also worked on the WPA writers' program in Washington, D. C. He was associated with the WRA reports office for some time in Washington, D. C. before coming to Minidoka.

b. Mr. A. is definitely a racist in his thinking as can be seen from the following listed incidents:

"1. He criticized an editorial in the IRRIGATOR when tolerance toward Negroes and other minority groups was suggested. As a matter of fact, being Reports Officer at Minidoka, he caused this editorial to be "cut" from the paper.

"2. He stated in private conversation with me, that he came to Minidoka with an "open mind about the Japs", but that they were just like all other colored people.

"3. When I submitted a public speech of mine to him, he stated after some changes had been made, that he would not agree "with anything" I had said. The speech was on "Civil Liberties and Minorities" and was delivered before the Utah State Conference of Social Workers.

"4. Mr. A's sympathies were definitely with the anti-evacuee group of AP's, and when in private discussion he tends to voice more anti-evacuee statements than any other.

"Mr. A. is not happy in his activities here. As evidence:

- a. Is always "griping" about food
- b. Is overbearing with mess hall attendants at meal time
- c. Criticising others on the basis of small petty acts
- d. Does not enter into the community activities especially where evacuees are associated
- e. Is not physically well
- f. Creates problems by short-cutting certain lines of activity that would bring about more cooperation.

-15-

"Mr. A's attitude is one which holds that he is not interested or concerned with evacuee attitudes, but rather with what the outside public will think about certain things associated with WRA. This was shown by the way in which he played up the visit of Sgt. Ben Kuroki in the IRRIGATOR even though the people within the center resented the "play-up" and criticized the evacuee staff on the IRRIGATOR for allowing such a thing to happen. This attitude was shown again in the case of the canal "rip-rap" fire. The canal company was willing to let it drop, but Mr. A. played the thing up in the paper, putting the blame on the residents. This "tagged" him, as far as the evacuee was concerned, permanently with the anti-evacuee group, and he will not get their cooperation from now on no matter what the issues.

"(II) Mr. B has been with WRA since a few months after its establishment at Minidoka. He is in relocation, and is thus in a very strategic position in influencing the residents for good or bad reactions relative to their dealings with the administration.

"His personality is one of aggressiveness and self-centeredness. He is very rough spoken in meetings and in his personal contacts. A number of times he has stated that he believes in the use of "axe-handle psychology" in dealing with the "Japs".

"He is in the very good graces of the administration. For example, recently (July 1, 1944) he was acting in the following capacities all at one time; relocation officer, statistician, acting assistant project director in community management, and acting project director.

"The technique used by Mr. B. is one of evasion, vague statements, appearing to agree with the person being interviewed, and then doing very much as he sees fit or as he wishes. This has created a feeling of distrust on the part of the residents and some of the more "people-minded" AP's.

"He seems to rest upon his reputation for having more persons relocate from Hunt than have relocated from any other center, but this showing may have nothing to do with the way in which the relocation office is run. There are other factors that are evidently more powerful than the constructiveness of the relocation office and/or officer. Some of these other possible factors are:

"1. The residents from Hunt are mainly from Washington and Oregon, and thus not so faraway from their old homes.

-16-

"2. Many are farmers, and by leaving the center and going to western Idaho and eastern Washington and Oregon, they are close to their old homes, and are doing the kind of farming they have been used to doing.

"3. The residents of Hunt, were not as clannish in pre-evacuation days as in other areas -- thus they were willing to go on-their-own again.

"4. Better pre-evacuation days relationships existed between the Hunt evacuees and Caucasians then in some other areas, thus making many of them more hopeful of being able to find a new place in American society.

"5. Many Hunt residents were from the city and were willing to go to other cities and try and make "a go of it" again.

"6. Some definite and positive relocation attitudes were held by resident leaders about evacuation, thus aiding in stimulating relocation.

"The residents do not like nor trust Mr. B. in most respects. The reasons given are:

- "a. He is overbearing;
- "b. His judgements are made on his own personal likes and dislikes;
- "c. He is not trustworthy in dealing with them. His "assistance" is based upon the principles of "getting people out" and with little concern for their personal or family welfare. He fights any increase in welfare aid, even though this aid is the lowest of any center.

"(III) Mr. D., was until recently, Assistant Project Director in Operations. He was associated with WRA early in its organization and evacuation. He served in the San Francisco offices in 1941 and 1942 under the WCCA. He lived in California prior to the war. Mr. D. was well liked by the evacuees, and has a large number of friends among them. At a number of "crisis" situations he was the one that was able to carry on a certain amount of necessary activities. However, in some instances, he became the "fall guy" for both groups (the AP's and the evacuees).

In any discussion of the work of any one person in a relocation center, the problems of cooperation and negative

-17-

relations on the part of the other persons involved always enters into the picture. The analyst was no exception. As I stated in the "History, Aims, and Methodology" of the analysis section, my contacts with the residents were always of a positive nature, and the cooperation and understanding shown by the large majority of them made my work much more pleasant and profitable than can be imagined. A few of the residents were, however, skeptical of some of my activities and considered me as a "snooper" for the WRA and the FBI, but these were definitely in the minority. Even this group, toward the end of the life of the project, took me into their confidence and seemed to understand the purpose of my work -- mainly of finding out for "the record" and for administrative purposes at the Washington level their problems and their attempts at adjustment as well as their attitude toward the policies and rules of WRA.

The administrative staff members were, by and large, merely tolerant of the analyst most of the time, and but passingly curious as to his business. There was a time, however, when the analyst was used as one of the members of a group to aid in orientating newcomers, that he was properly identified as a "person studying the social life of the community". A few of the administration, especially the "upper officials", became conscious of the analyst's position in the community early

-18-

in my experience in Minidoka. I was looked upon with skepticism by most of them. I was immediately identified with the pro-evacuee group by some of these AP's because of my early reports on the warehouse trouble in April, 1944. Most of these persons, however, left the project soon after the warehouse trouble ended. A few stayed on, however, and after a few more tension situations developed between the AP's and the evacuees, in which I wrote reports, the analyst became increasingly viewed as a "thorn" in the side of some of the administrators.

The administration, in terms of some of the upper officers, made statements of the following type about the analyst and his work:

"1. I can see no reason for having sociologists and anthropologists around. This is a practical problem in administration, and there is no place for any frills." Assistant Project Director in Administrative Management.

"2. The analyst has been reading too many books, again." Assistant Project Director in Operations. This remark was made at an Administrative staff meeting where I was present, and was made relative to a quotation given by me from a book on criminology concerning juvenile delinquency.

"3. I can see now what the late President Roosevelt meant when he said he had been the victim of Peglerization." Project Director. This remark was made after the Project

-19-

Director had given me a 30-minute verbal criticism of a weekly report I was sending to Washington, D. C.

"4. These reports should not have been given to the analyst. They are to be considered confidential. Suppose these materials would be presented to the public." Superintendent of Education. This remark was made to one of the school office AP members concerning some background material on some cases studied in juvenile delinquency I was making, and obtained from this school office member.

Many others might be given, but these will suffice to show the reactions to some of the upper officials to the work that I did and to some of the reports submitted. It should be added in this respect that written criticisms were given to some of my reports to the Washington office. This was as it should be, and I was happy that such criticisms were submitted. However, everyone presenting a negative side to analysis at Minidoka seemed to hold the analyst personally responsible for what was submitted. They did not, and would not, realize that the analyst was reporting what the community said and did. The Project Director would at many instances accept the analyst's report as it was intended, but even he at some points in the program would "jump to conclusions" and assume that I was saying my own say in the matter.

-20-

I was not considered as a member of the upper administrative staff meeting until I had been on the project for nearly a year. It was not until April of 1945 that I was asked to be at their regular meetings held on Tuesday mornings at 8:30. This was so until September 1, 1945, when the Project Director left and the Assistant Project Director in Operations was made Acting Project Director. At that time the "cabinet" was reshuffled and again the analyst was left out of the meetings, except when I requested to be present. This is understandable because the now acting project director never was in sympathy with a community analysis section nor with the analyst. Time and time again when I submitted an analysis of some situation in the center, he would state: "There is no tension or trouble there. I am against sending this in to Washington in this manner."

The social welfare section under the present supervisor was, when she first arrived here, very considerate of the analyst and showed considerable understanding. However, after a few reports by the analyst on the negative reactions of the evacuees to social welfare, the supervisor took this, evidently, as a personal insult from the analyst, and has had very little to do with the analyst ever since.

The relocation division has never been very trusting as far as the analyst was concerned. This grew out of the reports

-21-

submitted by the analyst concerning the reactions of the residents to the policies and personnel of the relocation division. Again, as in the case of social welfare and the others mentioned, the misunderstanding of what the content of my analysis contained lay at the foundation of this skepticism and negativism. The purpose of analysis and an explanation of the contents did not succeed in breaking through this ignorance on the part of many concerned.

There were a number of instances where the analyst was consulted and where it is believed was instrumental in influencing actions. The project attorney, internal security, the last reports officer, and the community management division assistant project director (starting with the assistant project director in August, 1944, through to the present) have been cooperative, understanding and accepted the analyst's report in the light in which it was the most useful. It was through these officers that the analyst was able to contribute to the accommodation and adjustment of some of the younger people in the center, especially in the work with the juvenile delinquent groups. This type of work with young Nisei occupied much of the analyst's time during the spring and early summer of 1945, at which time work was done in studying their personality integration, disintegration, social group problems and family

-22-

relationships. This type of material collected aided in the solution of some of the more serious juvenile disturbances that took place in the center during the months of March, April, and May of 1945.

The analyst aided in the orientation of new staff members by summarizing, at meetings, the social, psychological, and cultural backgrounds and problems faced by persons of Japanese ancestry in an abnormal situation. He also had special individual discussions with various new staff members, especially if they were associated with the school, social welfare, and in some instances relocation.

The analyst was also called upon by the administration to "keep them informed" on trends revolving around the various labor disputes, rumors, and tensions; problem areas within the resident community. It was, however, exactly in these realms of reporting and study that the analyst was most severely criticized by some members of the administration, however, some positive steps did develop out of this type of work. The analyst attempted to keep himself divorced from such problems, but due to the nature of personal contacts with the residents and with the administration, he often found himself identified with one or the other group -- usually with the residents. This was one of the chief drawbacks as far as reporting was concerned. Human nature being what it is in terms of cultural

-23-

stereotyped thinking about matters relative to human relations the analyst -- or anyone else -- cannot exist as in a vacuum, and thus be in all cases free from being identified as belonging to one or the other of a group.

The final chapters in the life of Minidoka must wait to be written in the future when one will have time to stop the moving picture of events and examine them expertly with the microscopic eye of further analysis, comparison and synthesis.