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Interview with Ruth Young, Sept. 7, 1943

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Ruth Young was Coverly's secretary throughout the period of the registration difficulties. When I interrogated Mr. Shirrell about the registration he asked Miss Young, who now works for him in Chicago, to give me her impressions. ~~This-she-did~~ We talked in a room by ourselves. Mr. Shirrell was not present. Miss Young had very little specific information and roughly outlined the administrative difficulties as follows.

In the first place, she said that the Tule Lake representative at the pre-registration Washington conference "did not attend all the meetings and came back with a complete misunderstanding of what the registration meant and what it was intended to do." He was completely vague as to whether registration was a WRA or a Selective Service measure and his lack of knowledge on this point, transmitted to Coverly and others, was reflected throughout the subsequent course of action.

In the second place, just before registration a circular letter was received at Tule Lake which said that registration was compulsory, that interference with registration would jeopardize the war effort, and that expatriation or repatriation were the only alternatives to registration. (In Washington this letter must be secured.) On the basis of this letter the members of the Tule Lake staff concluded erroneously that registration was a Selective Service order rather than a WRA order. This inference led, of course, to much of the administrative blundering that followed.

In the third place, Miss Young expressed her belief that in receipt of incomplete information and holding erroneous impressions Coverly was unable to tell the community in understandable terms what registration was and what registration meant. Added to the

fact that he possessed inadequate information was Mr. Coverly's natural disposition to tell the community a minimum of information and ~~to~~ his indisposition to use ^{an} extensive educational program within the camp. Along the same line, he did not take the Caucasian staff into his confidence and did not discuss with them the points on which he was unclear or on which, generally, the staff might have been helpful.

In the fourth place, Mr. Coverly's administration during the registration period suffered from his usual administrative habits. ~~of being uncommunicative~~. Miss Young said that many people, including Mayeda, Father Dai and Yamashita of the planning board, as well as several members of the Caucasian staff, knew that trouble was brewing and that something had to be done. But Coverly was hard to see and hard to talk to and refused to defer to the judgment of those that he did see.

Coverly's announcement that expatriation and repatriation were the only alternative to registration started the unfortunate rush for repatriation and expatriation forms.

"When the trouble came it all went off with a bang and nobody could stop it. Everything Mr. Coverly did was too late. The whole issue became one of the people versus the administration and to most people registration or non-registration had nothing to do with loyal or non-loyalty."

Grodzins, Morton
Sept. 7, 1943

TULE

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Interview with Elmer Shirrell, Tuesday, Sept. 7, 1943

ON THE RELATION OF THE TULE LAKE WRA STAFF WITH THE ARMY UNIT STATIONED THERE

When I first mentioned Capt. ^Patterson's name, Mr. Shirrell said, "That lousy bastard."

"When I was first hired by the WRA and first given authority over Tule Lake, one of the strongest orders given to me was that, under any and all circumstances, I had to get along with the Military personnel stationed at the camp. This was one of the strongest points made by Mr. Fryer in the early conversations I had with him. I tried conscientiously to live up to this order and failed for the good reasons that I shall outline later. One thing I immediately did--and this was one of the few very strict orders I made--was that all the relationships between the Army and the WRA would be handled by Jacoby and myself only and by absolutely no one else. I almost fired Ted Waller once for getting into an argument with the sergeant. I continuously emphasized at staff meetings that no matter what the Army personnel did it was no~~ss~~ business of WRA personnel. I insisted that our people refrain from any criticism of Army personnel action, and I lived up to this rule myself.

" But there was no bunch of people that more deserved criticism from the captain down to the meanest private. Captain Patterson was no fit representative of the United States Army and his camp ^{lacked} ~~lacked~~ all semblances of Army discipline. The captain was drunk at virtually every hour he was off duty and ~~ss~~ during many on duty hours. Hardly a day went by during which he was not suffering from a hangover. His men were also frequently drunk or suffering the after effects of drunkenness and there was hardly a Monday morning when enough men could be mustered to put out a full guard detail. The camp was dirty, the mess halls were run badly, no regulations with respect to military courtesy or uniforms were enforced and the men, generally, reflected the captain's own disgraceful state.

"One might think that Patterson thought his job a sort of holiday from the way he ran his camp. Much to the contrary, however, he took his duties ~~and~~ himself very seriously. He was jittery all the time. At least twice a week he wanted me to hold his hand and sympathize with ^{him in} his difficult task. His very jitteriness made both his job and my job more difficult. As a method of inflating his own importance, Patterson made many speeches to Legion posts, Rotary clubs and other groups. In ~~these~~ talks, he emphasized the danger of the Japanese and the great burden upon his shoulders and he, himself, added greatly to our difficult relations with the people in the surrounding communities. At one time for example, Patterson addressed legionnaires at Klamath Falls and there the gist of his remarks was 'I'm glad to be here to get acquainted with you because I never know when I'll have a rebellion on my hands and when I'll need you for reenforcements.' At another time, we discovered in the censorship of packages that a man had been sent a butcher knife. I investigated and found that the person receiving the knife was a cook and I did not think it unusual for such a person to want to use his own tools. Patterson, however, thought otherwise. In a speech before another legion a few days later, he declared that he had discovered a whole crate of large butcher knives being smuggled into the camp. All this of course scared the people in the surrounding territories to death.

"Patterson and his men directly added to our internal difficulties too. It was not easy, for example, to explain to the ~~settlers~~ colonists why soldiers of the United States Army could be drunk on the post when no liquor was allowed the colonists. Or why the soldiers could hunt ducks and geese both in and out of season. But more directly Patterson wasted a good deal of my time complaining to me of my laxity and telling me of the terrible ^{things} that might happen. To take in an extreme example, One day Patterson ~~we~~ rode me in a jeep to a meadow about a mile from the outskirts of the colony. It was completely removed from the camp and more than a mile also from the nearest guard tower.

Patterson told me he wanted to erect another guard tower in this meadow. I asked why in the name of Gpd this was necessary since we were so far removed from the camp and since other guard towers covered the approaches to this spot. I said that Patterson was responsible for external security and that I did not object to a guard tower on this spot but that simply I wanted to know why one was necessary. Patterson replied that he agreed that guard tower would be of no assistance in guarding the colonists but that the meadow was a perfect landing spot for enemy planes and that it would be easy for planes to land there with men and ammunition, easy for the occupants of the planes to rush the ammunition center of the M.P. unit, and easy for the enemy 'to liquidate the guards and to arm the Japs in less than half an hour.'

"So far as I know Patterson dropped the guard tower idea completely. I did not object to his fanciful thinking so much, in itself. Rather I did object in the face of the fact that he performed his obvious duties so badly. For example, he retained a very poor patrol system on the roads approaching Tule Lake. His lieutenants were badly instructed and they themselves were inefficient men. Early in the history of the project we discovered that three of the guards stationed at the front gate were completely illiterate when one of the Caucasian staff was allowed to enter when he showed his Standard Oil credit card by mistake. We tested these guards for several days and I got numbers of my staff through the guards on the most absurd slips of paper---one fellow came through on a bill he had just received from an Athletic Club in San Francisco. When I told Patterson that the men examining the entrance passes couldn't read he called me a liar but later came back and apologized to me. He also asked me to arrange for some ~~of my~~ member of my teaching staff to instruct these three boys in reading and writing, and I did make some arrangements ^{to} do this.

"After a Klamath Falls boy had been made ^{captain} ~~captain~~ following the Tokyo raid, a Jehovah witness pacifist demonstration was broken up in Klamath Falls. The next day Patterson came running to my office to tell me that he was ~~far~~ afraid

that the same group of vigilantes was getting ready to march on Tule Lake 'to shoot the place up'. He wanted me to call in all the people from the farm and close up the camp as tightly as possible. I asked him what he would do if a group marched on Tule Lake and he said he didn't know because he was not stationed there to fight white men. This is the first time that I blew up before Captain Patterson. I told him that his duty included the protection of the Japanese within the camp just as much as the protection of Caucasians outside the camp. I laid down the law on no uncertain terms, and I refused to put the camp in an uproar by closing up farm activities. I told Patterson that external guarding was his sole responsibility and that he had to protect the colonists against extra-legal action no matter what the price.

"In contrast to his abject fear at this time, Patterson was high and mighty when he made demands on me to be more strict with the colonists. He was always belly-aching about the use of automobiles and trucks by the colonists. Whenever one of his guards caught a colonist outside the line, ~~they would be loaded~~ the poor people would be loaded into a jeep and the jeep would come sailing up to the administration building with the siren on full force and the colonist would be bundled out and turned over to Jacoby or myself. Patterson always complained that we never punished these people, but he never made inquiries to find out what we actually did. He never got tired of telling me of the potential explosion that might take place, but it seemed to me that almost everything he did helped to create an atmosphere in which an explosion might take place.

"The matter of the mail censorship is a good case in point, ~~the~~ Army trucks took mail between the camp and Tule Lake regularly. One day the postmistress at Tule Lake called me on the phone to tell me that she would no longer accept postcards or letters written in Japanese. I asked her how she knew letters were written in Japanese and she said she would make guesses from the envelopes. ^{replied} She said that Corporal Wilson had given her this order and I immediately ^{replied} that she was taking orders from the Postmaster-General and not from Corporal Wilson. I told her that she was definitely breaking postal regulations

and she agreed to forget about the order from Copporal Wilson. He later dree
I later got Corporal Wilson on the carpet and, after first denying talking to
the Postmistress about it, he admitted it was his own idea and apologized,
begging me not to take the matter up with Captain Patterson. Later Wilson
took an open or ^{an} opened letter to Patterson which contained the mimeographed
map of Tule Lake ^{that had been} ~~which~~ distributed to all colonists on their arrival.
This happened during Rachford's period on the project and Patterson stomped
into Rachford's office to tell us that he was instituting an immediate cen-
sorship of all mail of colonists in order to prevent the leakage of subver-
sive or of dangerous information. I read to him from the WRA regulation which
specifically defined the ^{postal restrictions} ~~conditions of censorship~~ and told him bluntly that he
was disobeying both WRA regulations and the agreements between the WRA and the
Army. He said he was going ahead with the censorship anyway and left. Rach-
ford immediately called Fryer in San Francisco who promised to go to work on
settling the matter with Patterson's superiors who were stationed in Salt Lake
City. Several days past, the mail began to pile up and I lied to the community
saying there was no censorship. I did this because we had so many other press-
ing problems at this time and because I was sure the censorship would be lifted
before another day had passed. Unfortunately it was 10 days before we got
action. This action came after some phone calls to Washington and to Salt Lake
City and apparently came directly from Washington. Shirrell-hear- I heard the
order was coming but Patterson a day later came to me and told me that he him-
self was lifting the censorship because he had found it impossible to administer
since he had no people who could read Japanese.

"Despite his drunkenness and his inefficiency and stupid fears, I managed
to maintain at least workable relationship with Patterson until an incident
that happened in November. At first I even went out on parties with the captain
and his wife but since I don't like to associate with sops I soon actively
dodged as many social engagements as I possibly could that would bring me in
contact with Patterson. Patterson had become acquainted with Dr. Carson and

and his wife ~~when~~ because Carson had been taking the M.P. sick call in the absence of an Army doctor on the post. One day in November Dr. and Mrs. Carson were giving a little dinner party for two ~~of~~ evacuee doctors and their wives in the hospital wing that the Carsons were living in at this time. While they were eating Patterson and a visiting officer, both dead drunk, knocked on the door. Mrs. Carson answered and knowing Patterson's non-fraternization attitude, she tried to keep them from entering until the dinner was over and the evacuee doctors had left. Mrs. Carson told me that she had had plenty of experience with drunken men in her life but that Captain Patterson became 'just too damned amorous'. She had to call Dr. Carson, and he managed to get the two men to the quarters of a nurse who was away at the time. While Patterson and his pal waited for the colonists to leave, they virtually wrecked every piece of furniture in the nurse's apartment.

"After this I was through trying to maintain any amicable relations with the captain. I got the whole matter off my chest the next time I saw Fryer and really told him my complete story. Not long after this (and I don't know whether Fryer had anything to do with it) an inspection group unexpectedly appeared and caught Patterson's camp in its usual state of disorderliness. Mrs. ^{Patterson}~~Carson~~ told my wife that they had severely reprimanded the captain for the appearance and demeanor of the men as well as for the disposition of guards and for his own appearance. A short time later, of course, Patterson was transferred.

ON WHY MR. SHIRRELL WAS FIRED

"In December the grape vine from San Francisco informed me that I was to be put to work on resettlement and that I was to be replaced by Harvey Coverly at Tule Lake. I was not surprised therefore when I received a call from Mr. Fryer asking me to come down to San Francisco immediately. I didn't see Fryer until after lunch and he was very reluctant to come to the point. Finally, after much praise of my work at Tule, he said that in order to make WRA's relations with the Army more smooth, I was to be replaced by Coverly. The only criticism of my administration he made was ~~around~~ directed at the difficulties I had had with Patterson. I replied that I realized Mr. Coverly had seniority rights and that if he wanted the Tule Lake job he should have it. Mr. Fryer was highly indignant and immediately called Mr. Coverly into the office. Then both of them were indignant together. Mr. Coverly said that under no circumstances would he take the directorship at Tule Lake if I thought he was doing so only because he was out of a job with the closing up of the regional offices and because he didn't want to go to Washington. Mr. Coverly protested for more than an hour that the shift was only for the good of the administration and that my removal from Tule Lake reflected no discredit upon my work but rather was simply a means taken to further cement relationships with the Army. Indeed, I was told that it was all in the nature of a promotion for me. I would ~~be~~ have an opportunity to help in WRA's biggest job, resettlement. I understood the Japanese better than anyone else. All kinds of praise was heaped upon me the day I got fired."

"But the strange thing is that when I saw Mr. Myer in

Chicago he didn't say a God damn thing about the necessity for pacifying the Army as the reason for my dismissal from Tule Lake. In fact, he advanced no reason whatsoever for it. And this further strengthened what I had known all along; namely, that Fryer had felt the necessity of finding a job for his buddy Coverly and ~~I was the~~ my job at Tule was the job Coverly wanted since it was well paying and since it kept him on the west coast. My relations with Patterson was just a peg to hang an affair on. The grapevine gave me this from several directions and every action of Fryer, Coverly, and especially Myer indicated the truthfulness."

ON REPORTS RECEIVED BY MR. SHIRRELL RELATIVE TO WHY HARVEY
COVERLY WAS A FAILURE AS PROJECT DIRECTOR AT TULE LAKE

"Many of my friends, of course, have written me to give me reports on Mr. Coverly's troubles and the reasons for these troubles. These reports including many very detailed ones from Ruth Young who was first my secretary at Tule, then Coverly's and who is now my secretary at Chicago, ^{and others} analyzed Coverly's position and related his personal habits very closely to his administrative difficulties.

"In the first place Coverly was interested exclusively in Tule Lake as a agency to administer and was completely disinterested in the people of Tule Lake, as people. His original error was not to bring his wife or children with him. The absence of his wife, when contrasted to the active part played in the community by Mrs. Shirrell, was taken almost as an insult by some of the colonists.

"In the second place Coverly time after time offended the colonists socially. He did not acknowledge invitations that were sent him and refused to even attempt to conform to the accepted social manners of the community. I had reported to me one incident when an invitation for a rather large party was addressed to Mr. Coverly, the invitation including Mr. and Mrs. Coverly. The colonists who sent the invitation, of course, knew that Mrs. Coverly was not on the project. Mr. Coverly did not acknowledge the invitation at all, but he told Ruth Young that he would attend. Ruth told the colonists, When the time for the dinner came, Mr. Coverly showed up and there was a place set next to him for Mrs. Coverly. The colonist ~~was~~ sat no one in the empty seat and my informants tell me that Mr. Coverly was

visibly embarrassed.

"In the third place, and this is probably one of the most important of Mr. Coverly's social difficulties, he was scared of the Japanese. Scared to death. He demonstrated this very early when he had all the locks changed in his living quarters on his arrival. It was all the worse because it stood in contrast to the fact that Mrs. Shirrell and I had never even used the keys to our house. When Roy Miura and Coffee Oshima came to see me several weeks ago they told me that Coverly's fear was so apparent at Council meetings that it was almost laughable. And the people in the Council continuously played up this fear. Miura said that he himself had begun the baiting of Coverly in this fashion and was sorry for it afterwards because it was taken up so enthusiastically by the others and was the cause of great discomfort to Mr. Coverly. Members of the Council and the community continuously joked about it among themselves.

"On the administrative side Coverly's main trouble was that he tried to use ~~the~~ accepted *all* administrative procedures and as a part of this program refused to see any person who could be pushed off on one of ~~th~~ his assistants. Ruth Young in her letters to me told me how mechanically Mr. Coverly ~~was~~ pushed off his callers. For example, if somebody wanted to see Coverly about a matter, it was necessary to explain it all to Ruth Young first. No matter what the emergency, Coverly would see no one before Miss Young told him of the purpose and the nature of the call. The necessity of divulging this type of information to a secretary was in itself discouraging. (Note: Miss Young collaborated this in almost the same words ~~when~~ later the same day.) Furthermore, Coverly took no cognisance of personalities or friendships. If

the persons calling wanted to talk about something and if Coverly thought it fell within the province of the assistant director, the caller was directed to the assistant director, even though he the former might be able to work much better, ^{perhaps} say, for example Jacoby or Fleming. Finally, if Coverly consented to see a person, then that person had to wait his turn on Coverly's appointment schedule and it was not unusual for the person to have to wait for several day. Only the gravest emergencies could upset the appointment schedule and even members of Coverly's own staff frequently could not see him when they wanted to."

ON SHIRRELL'S ATTITUDE TOWARD HIS STAFF

In a later interview I hope to discuss with Mr. Shirrell at some length his ~~personal~~ problems at Tule Lake. The following is a brief word he volunteered in a general discussion we had in his office on September 7:

"Sy Fryer was a good man and I liked him but he had one outstanding fault. He was the worst judge of character I have ever met in my life. His appointments were one of my biggest headaches. The ~~assistant~~ assistant director was the best example of this. He was called my assistant director but he was only that in title. His biggest service was to keep me busy getting him out of trouble. I did not trust his judgment at all.

"Eastman on the farm and *Slattery in Public Works (?)* were two other Fryer appointees who turned out to be completely sour. Actually, Fleming was my assistant director and he was one of the soundest men I have ever met. I referred to his judgment all the time."

Godzins E2010
On the relations of the Project with San Francisco and Washington.

The points set forth below are brought together from various phases of the four hour interview. At first, Mr. Shirrell was disposed to deal only in personalities. As the evening progressed, however, it was possible to direct his attention to larger issues.

Mr. Shirrell's first complaint was the fact that many of the decisions handed down from Washington and San Francisco were made from the viewpoint of forestalling adverse public opinion and without sufficient consideration for the consequences of the decisions on life within the centers. "The decision not to allow Issei to participate on the Community Councils is an example of a public relations decision as opposed to a project decision. It was especially bad at Manzanar where a Council, partly Issei, had already been formed and where it was necessary to fire the Issei from the Council. Nash said the consequences in the project there were appalling. At Tule, we had already started a temporary council but had only two Issei holding office. We met the Washington directive on self-government only half way; that is, we didn't fire our Issei council men, we simply made them temporary council men and they stayed in office until our permanent self government was organized. This only softened the original blow. It did nothing to mitigate the embarrassment we continuously had as the result of the non-participation of the Issei. Our Council was always a weak kneed sister, taking its cue from the Issei block meetings.

It was only after the OWI incident that the Council amounted to anything. (Cf. below on OWI incident.)

"Another example of a terrible public relations decision was the one that barred all reporters from Tule Lake for the first sixty days or so of its existence and that absolutely prohibited me from talking before any group or club. This, I think, originated from the San Francisco bunch who were scared to death. But they didn't realize that Tule Lake was the biggest news that Northern California ever had. And by barring reporters they started us off on the worst possible foot. In the absence of word from us, the papers picked up all sorts of rumors and gossip and printed it --- and of course it was all unfavorable. They would have printed anything we gave them. Instead, as a consequence of the policy from San Francisco and Washington, we gave them absolutely nothing and they printed every other thing they could get which was naturally all that our critics were saying. Before the first group of evacuees arrived, I managed to persuade Fryer (and it took a hell of a lot of work) to let me hold an 'open house' --- to let people drive through the place and let them see it. Fryer consented --- only after establishing the most rigid sorts of rules, that is, no cars could stop, no pictures could be taken, no questions would be answered, etc. We advertised our open house a little and had the most amazing response imaginable. A solid line of cars -- from as far away as Eugene, Oregon, drove through the project from early in the morning until late at night. There was hardly a break in the line all day. A few pictures were taken from moving cars for which I caught plenty of hell later on from Fryer. But the

whole thing demonstrated to me the tremendous interest there was in the Project. To me it was unbelievable that, after such a demonstration, San Francisco could retain a no publicity attitude for the Project. But they did. And we could do absolutely nothing. Until more than two months after the project was opened, not a single word could be said officially and publically unless it came from San Francisco."

Mr. Shirrell's second complaint with respect to the regional and Washington offices was that it was "most of the time downright impossible to get ANY decision." "This was the most continuous source of trouble to us and I think my greatest single worry. There were many times that a decision --- no matter what it was --- would have forestalled trouble. But my letters would go unanswered and even my telegrams would receive no replies. When I got desperate, I would phone Fryer. Then I might get something in a couple of weeks."

As examples of the inability to get any definite decisions, Mr. Shirrell mentioned:

a. Clothing distribution. "In the early days, WRA received a lot of surplus clothing from CCC, the Army, and other sources. A quantity was distributed to each project and we gave it away to workers who needed it. We didn't have any policy and didn't even give keep accurate records of who got what. If a coal unloader needed overalls and we had them -- then he would get a pair --- and that's all there was to it. When we ran out of the original allotment of clothes, we got permission from San Francisco and bought other stuff on the market -- especially work clothes and work shoes. When Myer was appointed and made his first swing through the projects, he was amazed to learn that

each project had a different system of giving away clothes and was alarmed at what might develop in the way of community demands after a clothing allotment precedent was set. So he called off all clothing allotments until a definite policy could be set. Well, I already had a quantity of work shoes in the Tule Lake warehouse for the men on the farm and I tried for weeks to get permission to distribute them, since they were badly needed. But I couldn't get anything from San Francisco; I was told the whole thing would have to wait until the August policy meetings. Protests did no good, I was just told to wait. Well, of course, the shoe situation is one of the things that set off the farms strike. It happened when we were supposed to be settling a policy on work clothes. Actually, however, the policy wasn't set until almost a year later. When the strike came, Fryer promised to back me up on the shoe deal and we later distributed shoes because they were needed and deserved and without waiting for a national policy --- which is what we should have done before the strike occurred. In all, I bet Washington changed its mind ten times on a clothing policy. Don't miss that file in Washington."

b. Lumber for Partitions in the apartments. "This was one of the worst affairs of all and one that could have been entirely avoided at relatively low cost if WRA people in the regional and national offices had acted promptly in response to the needs of the project. In the little question and answer book distributed to evacuees when they were still at the Assembly Centers the statement was made that lumber would be provided by WRA for both furniture and partitions. When the first colonists

arrived, there was plenty of scrap lumber around for them and everything was fine. But very shortly after the scrap was gone, new arrivals at Tule started coming around to my office to show me those lines that promised scrap lumber. I soon hated the sight of that damned little pamphlet. I thought the colonists were entirely right in their demand and told the regional office so --- which, incidentally, also agreed that the demand for lumber was a just one. But San Francisco did nothing. And all the project directors went to town on the problem in the August conferences. It was finally agreed that we would all make a survey of our partition and furniture lumber needs and that all the stuff would be ordered at one time. Well, it was September before all the estimates of need were in San Francisco. And it wasn't until September 17 that bids were advertised. Time went by and, since I had kept the project abreast of events, pressure increased on me. I kept the wires hot and, finally, in October, Cozzens told me that no bids had been received. More time passed and it was decided to readvertise for bids, this time through the army. Then, just about this time, we had priority difficulties, and the WPB refused to let us buy lumber for apartment partitions. But the WPB did approve the building of an auditorium. I ordered enough lumber to have some left over for partitions. Even though I then had the lumber on hand, the WPB refused to let me give it to the colonists. So the colonists stole it. By this time, even giving it away would have done little good. WRA had procrastinated so long that the colonists had entirely lost patience. And, more importantly, lost faith in the WRA. It was just one of those things that built up to make later troubles. Rapid action would

have solved the whole thing easily."

c. The Schools. "Nothing was more messed up than the schools and no where was the cause so plainly the inability to make a straightforward decision. First the Regional offices was to buy books and supplies. Then the Project. Then the Regional office -- then I don't know what. Lucy Adams had the Utopian idea that we had to work like a regular California school district and that, as a result of this, the State of California Legislature, through special measures, would award us a per capita (school children) grant for the running of the schools that would amount to more than a \$100,000 annually. I told Lucy from the very beginning that she was crazy. But she kept at the monkey business, and consequently everything we did had to be governed by the regulations of a regular California School District. Putting this on top of Civil Service rules, the special regulations of the WRA, the peculiar conditions of Tule Lake, the difficulties of getting personnel anyway --- and you know what Lucy Adams did to us. She made rules and then had to break them --- but the trouble was that we never knew what rules we could get her to break. Also Lucy loved conferences. She would drag Harkness and Fleming away from the project so often that it was a genuine hindrance to their work. And each time they would come back more and more disgusted. They said there would be plenty of talk and plenty of lofty ideas but no decisions and damn little practical talk. Their disgust was so marked that Lucy just stopped coming to Tule Lake. I like Lucy personally and admire her talents, but she is certainly one of the world's worst administrators.

Her inability to make decisions may not have been as noticeable as other things to the colonists but, administratively, it kept us in hot water all the time. Lucy still thinks that the California Legislature will recognize Tule as a special school district and play Santa Claus to its beloved Japanese kids."

In the third place, Mr. Shirrell criticized regional and Washington officials because of their ignorance of project life and the special problems of project administration. "The bright boys in the offices were interested in building themselves up and in maintaining their reputations so that they could get good post war jobs; they weren't especially interested in improving camp conditions. But more important than this, they simply didn't know anything about camp conditions and many of the mistakes they made can be attributed directly to this ignorance. The slowness with which decisions were made is in large part the result of this ignorance. Unless you have wrestled with project problems you can't appreciate the immediacy of what look like routine matters. Take the shoe distribution matter, for example. No one so far as I know denied that the farm workers needed shoes or denied that they should get shoes. Shoe distribution was postponed not because of any disagreement on the primary question of need but rather because of a secondary argument on an administrative level, that is, on the question of HOW shoes and workers' clothing should be distributed. This administrative tangle held up things for weeks. If the bright boys in Washington or San Francisco had realized how immediate the necessity for shoes was --- how important their distribution was for the peace of the community as a whole --- then I have no doubt that we

would have got more rapid decisions. As it was, the boys sat behind their desks and stalled. They did the same thing on the wood distribution and on twenty-five other things. Some time in a project should have been mandatory for every policy determining officer in WRA. After Sy Fryer tried out his hand as Project Director at Manzanar for a while he was a hell of a lot more understanding.

In the fourth place, Mr. Shirrell complained of "the usual federal government fact that there was always a pip-squeak in Washington who had a veto power or at least a suspensive power over your decisions even though he had no idea of the kind of job you were doing or the type of thing you wanted done."

Shirrell specifically referred here to matters of personnel classification and the "obstructionist" attitude of some staff members of the U. S. Civil Service Commission. He said the "Washington check up" was the "curse" of all Federal agencies but thought it was worse in WRA than in any other he knew.

Finally, Mr. Shirrell was critical of the manner in which his Tule Lake staff was chosen and the almost complete lack of control he exercised over the recruiting of the staff. (Cf below for detail)

ON THE TULE LAKE STAFF

BEFORE

"~~AFTER~~ MY FIRST TRIP TO Tule, to get construction underway, Fryer told me that I would have a free hand in choosing the Tule staff, with the proviso that I would have to take ~~from~~ some of my people from the pool of employees already hired by Eisenhower and Rowalt. The word 'some' was the nigger in the woodpile. It meant ~~at~~ practically 'all' and certainly almost all of those that later caused trouble. I had to take Walter Chambers, for example, as assistant project director. He was impossible --- a nice chap, a politician, but absolutely no brains. After his four months temporary appointment was served out, I got rid of him. Since staffing was difficult anyway and since WRA salaries were considerably lower than salaries for the same type of work in other agencies, you can't blame the San Francisco office for some of their mistakes. Throckmorton was one good man they hired. But among others that I had to take you can recognize most of the duds." Among those named by Mr Shirrell as being hired in S. F. and Washington were: Pilcher, Peck, Niesse, Joe Hayes, Slattery, Kallam (an old friend of Cozzens), Eastman (an acquaintance of Rachford.) Those whom Shirrell chose himself include: Fleming, Jacoby, Frank Smith, Dr. Carson, Ken Harkness, Dr. Francis, Mary Ann Robertson." I had such a difficult time getting some of my own choices approved that I just had to give up and take what they gave me. I had so much to do and just didn't have the time to spend in argument over the qualifications of personnel.

WHY JOE HAYES BECAME ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

"When Rachford left and I had to pick an assistant project director, Fryer recommended taking him from the Project. At that time, Civil Service rated the assistant project director's job very low --- and such people as Fleming and Jacoby didn't want the job. There were only three people available Cook, Niesse, and Hayes. I wasn't overjoyed at ~~any~~ the prospect of having

any one of them. Actually i had no choice even ~~among~~ among the three evils. Fryer ruled out Cooke because he had not been in govern ent service long enough. Fryer ruled out Niesse because of personality difficulties. either I was not opposed to ~~either~~ of these decisions. But I was sick when this even though Hayes had worked efficiently for Fryer before. left Hayes ~~left~~ as the choice. So was Mrs. Shirrell. She almost cried. Hayes had come in as Chief of Transportation and had done a good job. He needed a great deal of guidance but he had lots of energy and drive. But he ~~also~~ possessed no diplomacy, no discretion and no tact. I knew he would be a poor assistant. ~~He served~~ He served as a decent leg man but that is all. He also served to get us in trouble more than once --- both with the appointed staff and with the colonists."

PERSONNEL DIFFICULTIES

"One of the greatest mistakes Fryer made was to hire men from other agencies who had worked ~~and~~ together and disliked each other. Niesse, Slattey, and Hayes had all been in soil conservation and they hated each others guts. This hatred came out ~~time~~ after time in staff meetings. Many of my administrative difficulties were with Niesse who was slow, over-cautious, lost his temper easily, and was the vainest man I ever saw.

"As for farm personnel difficulties, the seat of the trouble was that Kallam wanted Eastman's job and Eastman was a lousy choice for the job he held. When Fry, the first agriculture head left, Kallam worked his head off as acting head. He was very disappointed when Eastman was put in charge over him. Eastman was a mild man and a very poor administrator, having no idea how to handle Kallam's enmity. (Mrs Shirrell: "Off the record, Eastman was the most henpecked man I ever saw; his wife was a pure hell cat") Things became so much worse when we brought in Hudson to take charge of marketing.

Kallam fought continuously with Hudson and Eastman didn't do a damn thing about it. He would make absolutely no decisions. Finally, I just had to fire Eastman.

* * * * *

"The whole affair of Pilcher and the mess halls was a nasty one and one that ~~gave~~ caused me a great deal of regret. Peck had been steward for the contractor who had built Tule Lake. When Stultz resigned, we hired Peck. Other than the fact that he was a very heavy drinker, he was a good ~~steward~~ steward. Pilcher came as assistant steward from WCCA. I was told he had been at the Salinas center, but actually he had been at Walegra and had been very unpopular with the cooks there. If I had known that ~~he~~ had been from Walegra, I am pretty sure I would have been smart enough ~~to~~ not to hire him. But Pilcher was always more sinned against than the sinner. The same chefs who had had trouble with him in the Assembly ~~Center~~ ^{Center} set out to get him. Their strike was very clever because they ulled it the day Mr. Myer arrived on the project and did nothing more than switch all the meal hour around. The committee brought a long petition, signed by practically all the people at Tule, listing long complaints and asking for Pilcher's resignation. We held open hearings to examine the validity of the complaints. There were plenty of petty things, but not a single valid reason of sufficient ~~importance~~ importance to fire the man. Actually, Pilcher had given me ~~xxxx~~ his resignation even before the hearings were held. I refused to see the strike committee the day they wanted to see me, that is, the day Myer was on the project. But I did see them the next day and I told them what I thought, that I was accepting Pilcher's resignation but that it was a crime to do so and that I was breaking Pilcher's heart to do so. And I still believe I was right in what I said. The complaints were all petty things.

"Generally, it became clear to me at Tule Lake that no man was any good unless he had, in addition to all the other things necessary

for an administrator, ~~and~~ a special talent for getting along with the colonists. Pilcher was a good case in point. He was a good assisstant steward. But he just couldn't get along with the Japanese. There were others in the same category. Meade in the construction department was in the same boat. He was a very good construction man, perhaps the best one ~~we had~~ we ever had. But the colonists got the idea that he considered them as inferior --- and he had to leave the project. Rouser in the furniture factory was an even better example. He had visited the San Quentin prison furniture factory, as the best institutional set up in the country, just before he had left for Tule. He was ~~very~~ a very quiet man, and the colonists took this as meaning that he didn't like them. Actually he was enjoying his contacts so far as I know and I do know he was doing a very good job in the organization of the factory. One day when things were going very much to his satisfaction he remarked that the system was 'very much like San Quentin.' From that time, Rouser's usefulness at the project ended. The colonists were definitely antagonistic~~ly~~, trouble followed, and Rouser left the project.

"Dr Carson's trouble at the hospital was of a different character. A bad character among the colonists, Dr. Harada, was the thorn in the side there. Carson was my choice and he did a swell job --- he even unpacked all the medical supplies himself and from the very first day the project opened we had a working hospital. Carson came to Tule only because he had liquidated his own practice and was waiting for a navy commisssion. I had known him since he was a kid and and I liked him and I still do. The story is absolutely untrue that Carson ever put a Caucasian nurses over the Japanese American doctors. That story started because of Dr. Harada's enmity. Harada and the other Tule Lake doctor, Dr. Iki, were great enemies, ~~and~~ had been long before evacuation. Rachford had been so impressed with Carson that when it came time for the Heart Mountain hospital to be set up he asked me to lend

him Carson for a brief period. Knowing that it would be possible to leave both Harada and Iki behind, I told Carson to take one of them --- I didn't care which one. Carson took Iki and left Harada in charge of the hospital. Harada didn't like government red tape and he thought of himself as being very important as head of the hospital. He wanted to order some ~~xxx~~ supplies and the head nurse, Miss Graham, supplied him with the necessary requisitions. Well, he ordered a huge pile of stuff ---- ^{of some things} enough/I was told by Miss Graham to last us for ten years.~~xxxxxxx~~ When she brought me the requisitions I ~~xxxx~~of course scaled it all down ---- knowing that if I was wrong that Carson could correct the situation when he returned. Harada blew up sky high. He went around the colony telling everyone that he had been made a subordinate of the head nurse. Nothing, of course, was further from the truth.

WHY PAYROLLS WERE SLOW

"The answer to the slow pay rolls lies in all the defects of government ~~xxx~~ beaurocracy in wartime. The necessity of checking and re checking all points of evacuee labor --- time, rates, name spelling, etc---- was a laborious process in itself. Then Niesse, working more slowly than anyone else I ever saw, slowed up things considerably; he was another one of Cy Fryer's children and I finally kicked him out. Then the San ~~Francis~~ Francisco disbursing office was completely swamped by the payroll orders of all the new wartime agencies and they held up the payrolls for a long time. This was only in the early days though. Later, I managed to have our payr olls routed through the Portland rather than the San Francisco disbursing office and at one time ~~they were~~ Portland was achieving twenty-four hour service for us. And we managed to speed things up on the projet, too. It was only the first few months that were really bad.

TULE LAKE TROUBLES

"The book (Administrative Instructions) said that only in the greatest emergency was the military to be called into the center for policing duties. There were no 'greatest emergencies' at Tule Lake and that is the reason ~~why~~ why I never asked the military to intervene in center life. ~~center~~ The internal center was my business, the external guarding theirs. The military ~~was~~ has been called into a center once --- at that was at Manzanar. You know ~~what happened~~ there.

"My system in times of trouble was simple. I didn't get excited. I always spoke slowly and in a low voice. I let the committees talk just as long as they wanted to talk. I prolonged negotiations from day to day. I did my best to let the committee members, themselves, show each other how silly most of it all usually was. Then I would find a small point on which I could make concessions. This would save the committee members' faces and would make everybody happy. A good deal of our trouble, I think, was simply due to the fact that the workers were terribly bored most of the time. After the farm strike, for example, I had the definite feeling that the construction workers resented some of the limelight that the farm workers had put themselves into. I think the construction gang ~~and~~ was just plain jealous and wanted to be put in the same category as the farm workers --- that is, they wanted to be known in the community as a gang of people that was working for the interests of the community, they wanted to be talked about, they wanted to be admired. This, in great part, accounted for the construction strike. "

THE TULARE FARM STRIKE

"The causes of the farm strike were, in part, the causes of all the troubles at Tule Lake. Only the very immediate causes shifted from incident to incident. Two things were common to every incident involving workers. That is, in the first place, the wage scale was ridiculous in and of itself and, in the second place, nobody ~~nobody~~ HAD to work. Put these two things together and you have a fertile ground for all kinds of troubles with workers. There was another fundamental ~~is~~ point with the farmers: at one time they had caught some of Milton Eisenhower's ~~enthusiasm~~ enthusiasm for some sort of a productive cooperative, profits from which would revert to them. Many had the initial idea that hard work on the wonderfully fertile Tule land would make them rich. ~~Was~~ ~~The~~ contrast between this early idea and the actual wage scale made farm strikes all the more likely.

"More immediately, however, the farmers --- and especially the foremen --- were very dissatisfied with the way that Kallam was working the land. I suppose no man in Kallam's job could have satisfied all the people working on the farm. Many of them had been prosperous and enterprising agriculturists ~~or~~ in their own right before evacuation and the simple fact that they had to take orders from Kallam was displeasing. That he gave what they considered bad or foolish orders was that much more displeasing. Further, they were all very dissatisfied that we had completely inadequate equipment for the farm. Equipment had the discouraging habit of turning up two or three days after it was needed and after the job had been done in a laborious way by hand. In most cases this was not Kallam's fault, but the colonists working on the farm assumed that it was. This increased their discontent.

"The shoe issue, of course, brought the whole discontent to a head. As I told you before, we had shoes for the farmers in ~~the~~ the warehouse and were only waiting orders from Washington to ~~xxxxxxxxxxx~~ distribute them. The farmers had legitimate complaint on the shoe deal and I had acknowledged that. They struck while I was in San Francisco at a conference which was supposed to decide a system of clothing distribution. Actually, the conference did not solve this problem, though Fryer allowed me to put through immediate plans to meet the strikers' demand that work shoes be supplied them. Joe Hayes managed the strike very well in my absence. He did so by calling me about every hour and discussing the minute-to-minute development of events."

THE CONSTRUCTION STRIKE

This really was a trivial event. The workers were bored, they wanted some of the limelight the farm workers were basking in, and also wanted a little excitement. I actually forget what the issue was. I do know the strike was in great part the result of Slattery's stupidity. He tried to treat the colonist workers as if they were Mexican or Indian laborers. This wouldn't work under any circumstances; ~~indeed~~ it was bound to lead to trouble ~~having~~ under ~~re~~ relocation center circumstances. Slattery ~~was~~ ^{was} stupid enough to actually insult some of the committee members when they were in my office negotiating the difficulties. He put us back a week right there. I covered up by feeding them all in the administration mess hall

and by reprimending Slattery then and there. We talked for days and, as I recalled it, + saved the workers' faces by giving away on several minor points."

COAL TROUBLES

"Coal troubles were perennial because unloading coal was hard, dirty work. Sometimes the issue was protective clothing, sometimes it was the frequently broached proposition that coal workers should be paid a full days work on the basis of a unit of work done rather than on the basis of a full time day. This last was a logical proposition since the coal work was so tough and since, as I pointed out before, nobody had to work anyway. But it was ~~absolutely~~ absolutely against government regulations. Withall, I don't blame the coal workers. In addition to everything else, we never had enough trucks to use, the switch engine was always late, and nobody seemed to appreciate the coal workers' efforts.

THEATRE ISSUE

"In June I told the community that the WRA would build ~~xxxxxxx~~ an auditorium, a city hall, and a church. At this time, all these things were planned and I made my statement in good faith. But the WPB came along and completely killed the auditorium. After much wrangling, the WPB later said we could ~~sk~~ have a small auditorium in connection with the high school. But before this, at Slattery's suggestion ~~Wra~~ WRA bought the contractor's buildings across the tracks. Slattery thought we could use reclaimed lumber from these ~~buildings~~

buildings for at least a small auditorium. We never made a bigger mistake. When we started to pull the old structures apart, we found the poorest possible grade of lumber. Most of it split as we pulled it away. And every piece of good lumber that we reclaimed was promptly stolen. It was ~~some time~~ ^{around this time} ~~after~~ ~~xxxxx~~ this that Kendall Smith, ~~xxxxxx~~ in a meeting with Fryer and me, showed how a theatre-auditorium could be build with money from the community enterprises that ~~was held~~ was held in a sort of loose trusteeship. Smith had vereything worked out to the last detail and hes howed us how the theatre could be built and paid for out of the income from the theatre in the space of ten months. All that was necessaryw was the immediate purchase of sufficient lumber before an impending freeze of lumber purchases. Fryer approved the whole deal and Smith purchased the lumber. Smith had previously bought all kindsof equipment on exactly the same basis --- shoe repair stuff, barnier shop material, etc. His purchase of the theatre lumbr was exactly the same kind of a deal. The people became aroused and accused Smith of doing ~~xxxxxxx~~ something he had no right to do. This was nonsense. What the people were really angry about was the fact that they feared a theatre, charging admission prices, would drain off the financial resources of the camp.

Of course, I think that the theatre issue, itself, had very little to do with the row itself. Rather, the theatre issue was a joust for power between Nisei and Issei. The Council approved the theatre, the Issei in block meetings and other places raised hell, and then the Nesei Council backed down. It was a clear Issei victory --- and one of the things leading up to the OWI incident that clearly showed the Council's iipotence and the Issei dominance.

Chapman 6/6/51
BHO
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THE OWI BROADCAST

"I was completely opposed to the whole idea of us trying to get colonists of Tule Lake to do overseas broadcasts ~~in~~ for the OWI. I pleaded with Rowalt not to send the OWI to Tule and at first he accepted my decision. But later he called to tell me that Elmer Davis was insistant on the broadcasts because of the great use Japan was making of the evacuation in Japanese propaganda broadcasts in the Far East. ~~Still~~ ^{but} I still ~~ppro~~tested ~~and~~ the OWI team came to Tule Lake despite my protests. When they came, they just appeared in a big truck and I had no opportunity to prepare the community for them. This was a great mistake. The Council ~~ok~~ approved the idea when it was presented to them ---- but backed down as per custom in the face of ~~xxxxxxx~~ block meeting opposition. One of the most disgraceful things that ever happened at Tule Lake was the general meeting that was held to discuss the matter. The ~~xxx~~ OWI representatives, themselves, were unfortunate choices --- one fellow who thought he could speak Japanese creating an instant dislike for himself and his unit with his terribly garbled use of the language. He was so bad that he could not follow the very bad translations that were made -- both from Japanese into English and from English into Japanese. I had a little fellow translating for me ---- and I don't think there were ever more Un American statements made than during this meeting. It got so bad that I stood up and requested my own staff to leave and suggested to the OWI leader that he do the same for his staff. Later, several Issei came and apologized to me --- for both what was said and for the dishonest translations.

"As a whole, the OWI incident demonstrated that the colonists could not be pushed into anything they didn't want to do --- even under the banner of patriotism. The thing might have succeeded if ~~it had~~ the community had been better prepared --- ~~but~~ it had no chance

without community preparation and with the unfortunate choice made by the OWI in the matter of personnel at the project.

"But in ~~inex~~ one way, at least, the OWI incident was fortunate. It demonstrated to the Nisei Council, better than anything had done before, how subservient it was to the Issei Council meetings. And it gave the Council some new backbone. Mrs Shirrell and I always felt that the OWI incident was the very lowest point in the project's history."

AFTER THE OWI INCIDENT

"From the OWI incident onward, the Project progressed nicely. ~~The~~ Conditions continuously improved. For one thing, the Council was disposed to assert itself more vigorously. For another, Shibata and I were successful in getting the ~~the~~ Issei Advisory Council ~~xxxxx~~ approved by the Council and set up. (Miyamoto knows this story ^{it} and/isn't not being ~~ix~~ written up here.) For another, I felt that my regular meetings with the Issei block representatives were definitely helpful in maintaining better relations between the administration and the community. There is no doubt that I, personally, got along better with the community after the OWI incident. I could feel this. And I knew the general administration was ~~gxxxx~~ more successful. Things were swining along wonderfully when BANG! I was pushed out. The very fact that we were getting along so well accounts for how badly I felt when I was fired. (For the reasons given to Mr Shirrell for his being fired and his own analysis, ~~CF~~ ~~Sh~~ First Shirrell interview.)

MISCELLANEOUS

"The Issei Planning Board was one of the most successful institutions set up at Tule Lake. It was a most cooperative body and it worked very hard. It also accomplished results. For example, it was only through the Board's efforts that the messes ~~and~~ in the eating halls and the hospital were fixed to the community's satisfaction. After the Council's work, we had practically no trouble on these matters. One of Coverley's greatest errors was the fact that he practically ignored the Planning Board when he came to Tule. In the mass arrests during the registration trouble, Coverley had old Yamashita, Chairman of the ~~planning~~ Board, picked up and tossed into jail. He did this without consulting Jacoby and Jake went absolutely wild. This was the parting of the ways between Coverley and Jacoby; they didn't get along at all after this. Yamashita only spent one ~~day~~ night in jail and was released the next morning. But Coverley never went around to apologize, I am told he said 'The United States Government cannot make mistakes in its dealings with individuals and cannot apologize to ~~individual~~ individuals.' In any case, the Planning Board passed out of existence with this incident. It might have stopped a lot of the subsequent trouble over the registration. As it was, all the preparatory work with the Board was lost at a time of crisis when it was needed most. . . ."

"We enjoyed very cordial relations with the ~~County~~ officials of Modoc county. Very luckily we were not in the County of Siskyou --- where public sentiment against the 'Jap Camp' was very high. The County seat of Modoc ~~Modoc~~ was at Alturus and I achieved a sort of friendship with the County Judge, Coroner, Sherriff, etc. They came right to the camp when we needed

their services. In this respect, we at Tule were lucky to miss all the trouble that, say, Nash had with the Inyo County people. If we had been in Siskyou, it would have been a different story for us. . . ."

"You can be damn sure of one thing. The Regional offices were closed up for only one reason: the WRA was not big enough to hold two big men --- Fryer and Myer. It wasn't a question of personal animosity was much as it was a matter of disagreement over certain basic policies. At that, at the bottom, I think it was more than anything Fryer's insistence on the ~~immed~~ immediate definition of policy and the inability or indisposition of Myer and the Washington bunch to make early decisions. Before the August policy meeting, the grapevine had it that Fryer was going to quit unless Myer came through with definite decisions. We were stalled on all kinds of things --- leaves, clothing, pay --- damn near everything.

"Fryer did a very clever thing before these meetings. He got all the regional people and the project directors together a couple of days before the Washington bunch were due to arrive. We ironed out all our difficulties in advance through a series of committee meetings and when the Washington boys came on the scene --- we were prepared ~~it~~ with a solid front. Most of the things decided in August ~~were~~ had already been decided before Myer arrived.

"But essentially the trouble remained and after August, ~~Regional~~ Regional-National relationships rapidly deteriorated. At the Salt Lake ~~conf~~ Conference in November, we already knew that the Regional offices were going to be closed up. Administratively, moving to Washington

was the silliest damn thing I had ever heard of. It would have been much better to move the central offices Westward."

Re: the question of DST that there was a shortage of food when the Pinedale and Walegra groups were moved in unexpectedly:
Shirrell: "I don't recall a thing about that.. I don't think we ever had a real shortage of food and I don't recall any unexpected arrivals from Pinedale or Walegra."

"There was never any friction between me and Halle on one side and Jasoby and Fleming on the other.. Actually, Halle was in a very difficult position and we all sympathised with her. The Regional and Washington offices just wouldn't make any decision on public assistance grants. It was ~~after~~ well into August before a decision was made. Then there was no decision about whether the grants would be paid in cash or by check. All this added to all our worries. Halle was in the center of it but I do not think Jacoby or Fleming were ever after her seriously."

"The boilers busted doen because nobody realized, ~~that~~ during the construction days, how much ~~the~~ hot water the colonists would demand. Tule Lake used mor water per capita than any other comparably sized city.. The boilers were overtaxed and continuously overheated. A few were defective. They had all been made on special order and no more were being produced. Therefore, when one broke down it was virtually impossible for us to replace them."

Grodzins Interview with Dillon, Myer, Elmer Rowalt, and Philip Glick,
September 13, 1943

WRA

E2-10

Mr. Myer called Glick and Rowalt into his office shortly after I entered in order that the three of them might give me some general ideas as to methodological procedures in examining data of the WRA. In addition to their ~~methodological~~ advice, the three men threw light on the following matters:

~~xxxxFirst POLICIES~~

FIRST POLICIES

Glick pointed out that a memorandum of Mr. Eisenhower dated May 5, 1942, outlining tentative policies of WRA was one of the "organization's fundamental documents." It "gives a complete picture of the trend of WRA thinking throughout the whole regime of the first Director and by following through on subsequent administrative instructions, it is possible, by starting from the May 5 document, to follow the changes in virtually every policy of the Authority." (The file department supplied us with a copy of this memorandum and the first job of our secretary is the compilation of a complete set of subsequent Administrative Instructions, Solicitor's ~~reports~~ Opinions, etc. These documents, once gathered, may be retained by us and they will form the essential body of official orders, necessary for a study of WRA's administration.)

VOLUNTARY EVACUATION

Rowalt: "The decision to stop voluntary evacuation was our 'first general act'. It was an absolutely necessary decision. When we first moved to San Francisco, we couldn't get anything done. We were kept busy answering the phone. Sherriffs call~~ed~~ complaining about Japs moving through their jurisdiction, Japanese called to tell us they were stuck and that nobody would sell them gasoline, the newspapers were howling --- and we just ~~had~~ had to create a little order out of chaos. So we made the recommendation to De Witt and he issued the freezing notice. It was only after the freezing order that the army ~~and~~ and WRA ~~thought~~ saw it was necessary to go through the process of building both assembly and relocation centers.

FIRST PLANS

FIRST PLANS

Rowalt: ~~Refx~~ "Before the freezing order was issued, the Army had plans for a few Assembly centers. But it was their idea that more than half the total Japanese population would be able to meet the evacuation deadlines for voluntary movement and would leave the prohibited area. For these people, the army had no plans --- they were to be free agents. For the other half of the West Coast Japanese population, the Army had plans for two very large concentration points. Those people who would not or could not move voluntarily were to be moved to Manzanar and Poston. These were to be very large centers, Poston to hold more than 40,000 people. The centers were conceived to be no more than resting points from which the Japanese, once there, could proceed further Eastward once ~~exj~~ they had secured jobs and community acceptance. Actually, no-one thought much of community acceptance. Public opinion was omitted from consideration.

Glick: "We made somewhat the same mistake. Our first idea for WRA was that it would serve three functions. First, we were to provide financial aid for Japanese who wanted to move but who were unable to do so for the lack of funds. Second, we had the idea of small CCC sort of work camps, ~~withcax~~ hundreds of them scattered all over the country, the working population in each camp being employed in the surrounding neighborhood. Thirdly, we thought we would set up a group of way stations, perhaps as many as fifty, holding from 1,000 to 1,500 people. These, ~~too~~, would be scattered but, rather than being work camps, they were to be filter points from which evacuees could proceed to jobs in urban centers or to farm work, as individuals or as single families. In early March, we had no conception of Relocation Centers as they finally evolved."

place. Army authorities agreed but apparently didn't want Justice to do the job. I don't think Justice wanted it either. In any case, WRA started through the efforts of Jim Rowe in Justice working with McCloy in the War Office and the Bureau of the Budget. As early as March 1 or 2, Eisenhower had thought the thing out to some extent. He had been contacted by the Budget Bureau and on that date showed me a rough draft of the executive order. I actually wrote the Exec. order as it was signed, working from a draft prepared by the Budget Bureau and Eisenhower's notes. Afterwards a couple of paragraphs were added ~~by~~ at the War Office's suggestion. I'll identify the War Office's paragraphs for you later. Wayne Coy of the Budget Bureau is a good man for you to see on the early stages."

EARLY DISAGREEMENT WITH THE ARMY

Rowalt: "After first plans for the large Relocation Centers were under way, we of course had frequent conferences with the army. The ~~army~~ ~~officials~~ ~~took~~ ~~exception~~, especially, to two aspects of our planning. They were pretty insistent on the points but we gave away on neither of them. In the first place, they strenuously objected to our plans for self government. They pointed out that they (in WCCA) had tried self government of a sort and that they had had to call it all off completely. They tried to demonstrate that their experience was conclusive and that all other plans for self government within centers would be doomed to similar failure. We had assumed self-government from the very beginning and were not disposed to give away at all. We didn't. Within the WRA ourselves, our only discussions were with respect to the type of self-government. (To see Rowalt later on ~~various~~ various types of self-government discussed within the agency.) In the second place, the army officials objected even more violently to our internal security plans. We had thought in terms of an all

Japanese police force ~~and~~ with one or two Caucasians to head it up. WCCA people practically insisted that we take from 30 to 50 Caucasian police men in each of the centers. It was a very hot issue."

DIES AND CHANDLER COMMITTEES

Myer: "It wasn't only the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce and other Chambers that got Mr Dies after us. It was also Chaillaux and his National Americansim Committee of the American Legion. If, as you say, Costello is the mouthpiece of the Los Angeles Chamber, then certainly the Dies Committee is the mouthpiece of the ~~Chandler~~ Chaillaux (sp?) Legion Group. Chaillaux claims that he pushed Dies into the WRA investigation when he saw that Chandler wasn't doing the right kind of a job. Chandler was investigating ---- not condemning enough. So the Dies investigation was the result of diverse factors: the Costello-Chamber tie-up, the Legion desires and, I am convinced, the fact that Dies was left somewhat floundering with the folding up of the Communis International.

PUBLIC OPINION AND THE FORMATION OF POLICY

Myer: "I am ready to admit that we must shape policy to fit the public demand from time to time. But Public Opinion, strictly speaking, never actually moves policy alone, rather it's just an additional factor to consider. For example, the ~~Costello~~ ^{Chandler} and Dies investigations certainly hurried the segregation. But we had been in the process of planning segregation for more than a year and the registration issue hurried us even more than Dies and ~~Costello~~ ^{Chandler} did. For another example, we had been on the fence for weeks in considering allowing the use of short wave radios in the inland centers. Alien enemy regulations prohibit their use

on the coast, of course. ~~It may very well have~~ Our discussions may very well have resulted in allowing the use of short wave radios in the inland centers. But when Dies moved in, we simply had to cease our consideration of the ~~an~~ matter. We'll have to talk at length about this."

MISCELLANEOUS

See: On general Administrative problems, especially employment and reimbursement ("greatest and most complex administrative problem," Myer.) - Barrows and Rowalt.

On early stages: Rowalt and Glick.

On Segregation: Rowalt

On Resettlement: Myer (Also story of Stimson letter.)

On Dies and Chandler: Myer

Grodzins
Interview with Dillon Myer September 29, 1943

WRA

E2-10

RESETTLEMENT

"This has been fully documented, especially in the early history, by Tom Holland in a long memorandum. You must get a copy of this memo (We already had! and it is the best ~~xxxx~~ single document on policy that we have.)

"Mr. Eisenhower, in the very beginning of his WRA work, thought largely in terms of resettlement by individuals or by small groups in ~~WCCAxxxx~~ CCC-like camps scattered out through the entire country. But the April 7 meeting at Salt Lake City, to say nothing of the experience of the voluntary evacuees, made Eisenhower change his mind completely. Almost exclusively because of the public acceptance idea, he began to think ~~exclusively~~ ^{entirely} in terms of permanent relocation centers, large ones which the WDC would be willing to ~~defend~~ guard, and in which the Japanese Americans would stay for the duration of the war. Though completely discouraged over the ~~prospects~~ prospects of any large scale resettlement, he never closed the door. For example during the early period, two factors were important. In the first place, College Relocation was started and encouraged. In the second place, the WCCA and the WRA worked out procedures by which workers could be recruited in groups for the sugar beet fields. Despite the fact that ~~xx~~ evacuation movements were still under way and the fact that there were complicating overlapping lines of authority between the WCCA and the WRA, some 1700 workers were recruited (mostly from Assembly Centers because that's where most of the evacuees were).

"During this first recruitment period, Tom Holland had left for the field and he returned just ~~xxxx~~ several days ~~later~~ after I sat down at this desk. We held a staff meeting ~~and~~ at which Holland recommended

9/29/43

Myer interview -2-
Grodzins

that we abandon the whole work corps idea and that we immediately inaugurate an intensive program of resettlement. New as I was, this sounded like good sense to me and so we immediately held a series of discussions. These eventuated in our first cautious administrative instruction on resettlement on July~~xx~~ 20, 1942.

\\ Well, things moved fast during July, August and September. Our greatest pressure during these months was from agriculturists who needed labor. Before the harvest season was over, we had in the neighborhood of ten thousand workers out in the fields. In the very states from which had come the ~~great~~ burst of anger at the April meeting at Salt Lake. This certainly indicated that we could get public acceptance for an indefinite leave program. At the August conference in ~~the~~ San Francisco, we worked over the leave program and, after later refinement, the San Francisco program is what we published in the Federal ^{Register} ~~Record~~ of September 29, 1942.

" In the summer months, we thought and hoped that it would be possible for local groups to handle the resettlement program in the communities to which evacuees might go. We were thinking in working out the program on somewhat the same lines that we had worked out college relocation with the Friends group. We soon changed our minds, however, and realized that, if we were to pursue resettlement vigorously, we would have to do it ourselves. The setting up of the relocation field offices was just a natural step. It came too late to suit me, and I hit Tom Holland pretty hard once when he seemed to be following the thing with less drive than I thought it ~~deserved~~ deserved.

It was during my field trip in November that we hatched the relocation office idea, and worked it up to substantially the form it finally took.

\\ On this trip, I discussed the program for more than an hour with General DeWitt. He expressed no open disapproval, other than asking about the danger of sabotage at a place like Salt Lake City, for example, where there was bound to be a rather large concentration of people relocating.

I told him very straightforwardly that I thought there would be no greater danger from this group than from any other, even in the event of a Japanese attack on the coast, and he plainly didn't like that. At only one time did it seem to me that I got any real response from the General. That is when I told him that the agricultural groups were so insistent on recruiting labor that, ~~if~~ even if we wanted to keep the evacuees in the camps for the duration, we would find it impossible to do. The General said 'I can understand that.' It was even before this trip, just before it, that I told a staff meeting in Washington that we were going all out on a program of relocation and that we were to subordinate all other things to this program. (We have verbatim minutes of this meeting.) From this announcement to date, resettlement has simply progressed in a normal line, with the succession of administrative notices showing the steps we have taken to speed up the process and increase the effectiveness of the program." (CF below, for part ~~of~~ hope-to-speed-~~up~~ relocation played in registration difficulty.)

EARLY UTOPIAN PLAN OF EISENHOWER

"I agree with you that the plan ~~first~~ outlined in Eisenhower's first policy memorandum of June 29 was an Utopian scheme, and one that would have had the Congressmen howling 'Communism'. But Eisenhower, for a while, had both Fryer and me sold on it. It seemed the only feasible way of working the evacuees themselves out of a terrible position, especially in view of the wage scale that Eisenhower had felt impelled to impose in the face of public hostility. The whole thing fell through for two reasons. In the first place, it was administratively impossible, absolutely impossible. In the second place, it was ~~at~~ at direct variance with the program of resettlement and any success of the share-the-profit plan would have been in direct ratio inimical to the progress of relocation. To accomplish relocation successfully, it is imperative that we maintain a minimum of living standards; relocation would stop if the camps became too comfortable or even if people

have the hope of eventual profit." (Cf later interviews with Glick and Barrows for further comment on why early scheme failed.)

(Aside on THE AUGUST POLICY MEETING IN SAN FRANCISCO)

"We went over the entire gamut of policies from one end to the other at this meeting. (We have agenda with committee line-ups.) Policies on leave, employment, education, procurement, relief, cooperatives, religion, food, ~~inter~~ evacuee government and many other things, all the administrative instructions that were issued in the month and a half following, were evolved at least in the rough at San Francisco. The whole matter of segregation was also gone over. Glick and one or two others had just come from Manzanar and were impressed by the signs of unrest there. The first Kibei meetings had just been held and had reverberated throughout the colony. I was urged to accede to a policy of segregation. ~~Remove the troublemakers~~ 'Remove the troublemakers', I was urged. 'How can we pick them out,' I replied. And nobody could tell me how it could be done. But, after much discussion, I did tell them I was ready to move on those people who had clearly decided to throw in their lot with Japan, that is, the repatriates and expatriates. I told them we would move with this ~~segregation~~ segregation policy if we could find a place to put ~~them~~ these groups to be segregated. The trouble, of course, was that we couldn't find the space. ~~But~~ You, of course, have already traced our earlier segregation discussions. It is interesting to know that we actually had a definite first policy as early as August, 1941 --- we just could find no means of carrying it out."

MOAB AND LEUPP

"No, emphatically no, Moab and Leupp were in no sense the outcome of any early ideas on segregation. Speaking very frankly --- and I hate to admit it --- Leupp and Moab were pure accidents. We had discussed the troublemakers at San Francisco in August, of course. After this meeting,

Fryer went out into the field and made promises to the Project Directors, especially at Manzanar, that we would make some provision for the troublemakers and that there just wouldn't be any more troublemakers in the camp. Then came the troubles at Poston and Manzanar, and the Project Directors really put the ~~new~~ screws on us. In spite of the commitments made by Sy Fryer, I held out against the whole thing for several days. These were very tense days in my relationships with Fryer. I was very worried about the 'due process' involved in such a segregation movement and opposed it on mainly those grounds. In the face of Fryer's commitments and Fryer's ~~pressure~~ pressure, however, I approved the setting up of Moab. Nobody knew what Moab was or what it was going to be. We didn't know whether it was a jail, a rehabilitation camp, or what. We still don't know about Leupp. They were definitely never considered as segregation centers, in line with the general ~~practices~~ policies of segregation with which we had been so preoccupied. The camps were always, and Leupp still is, simply a place where we can keep people whom we consider trouble makers but whom, speaking very ~~fr~~ frankly, we don't have enough evidence to take into Civil Courts. After we once set the place up, we had a lot of trouble with the Project Directors who wanted to use Leupp (which was substituted for Moab at the end of January because it had superior accommodations) for their gamblers, their petty thieves and ~~and~~ ^{nearly} everyone else about whom they had doubts.

"I didn't like the Leupp idea from the start and I still don't. I hope to be able to get rid of it someday. Nevertheless, Leupp has accomplished several good things, ~~mainly~~ in great part because we have been lucky in having Best and Robertson to treat the people there with firmness and yet with understanding. For one thing, the whole idea has had a salutary effect on the public. For another, it really has had a great deal to do with keeping the so-called Kibei group in hand. And these two things --- plus the work of Best and Robertson --- have justified the thing,

I suppose. But I still don't like it and I still hope to close the thing out.

"Now don't ^{put} me on the spot about the legality of Leupp. I have said from the first that it's illegal and I still think so. I'm not at all proud of Leupp even though it has been effective. At first, we weren't even giving hearings to those that were sent there. Now, of course, we are. But that doesn't improve things very much at all. At least, though, I did one thing before I gave the O. K. sign for Moab. That is, I got Roger Baldwin and Alexander Meiklejohn into this office and told them what we were going to do. I told them that it was a purely emergency matter and I told them frankly why it was necessary. I also told them to hold off any action --- or at least, if I didn't do it that directly, I indicated that we needed their sympathetic understanding in the whole process. We have always been very cordial in our relations with the Civil Liberties group, and both men showed a fine understanding.

"I had hoped to do something about Leupp long before this. Just as we sort of slipped into the idea in the first place, so it has limped along. That's because our key personnel has been tied up in all the much more important events of December, January, and February. I had hoped to send Glick and Provinse out to regularize the whole thing and perhaps even work out a scheme for liquidating the camp --- but you know what has happened since it was set up. But I still hope to get rid of the thing. Don't ask me when."

At staff meeting 10/6/43 & Myer announced conferences being held looking forward to closing up of Leupp.

NISEI IN THE ARMY

"Immediately after my first field trip in July, I began talks with Mr. McCloy urging that the Nisei be drafted into the army through regular procedures of Selective Service. McCloy agreed with my viewpoint, and he immediately started procedures to get it under way. By September,

it seemed reasonably sure that we would succeed.

~~The War~~ "The War Department set up a special board to consider the matter. Tom Holland sat with the Board at one meeting. It called in a lot of people and took testimony from a number of witnesses. Among the witnesses was Col. Pettigrew, who had had many years of experience in Japan. Col. Pettigrew was very emphatic in his recommendation that the Nisei be drafted just like any other group/ On the other hand, many others with the Western Defense Command point of view gave opposite recommendations and the Board, itself, reported adversely. Col. Pettigrew saw this recommendation before it was generally circulated. He immediately addressed a memorandum to Mr. McCloy, attacking both the procedure and the recommendation of the ~~War~~ Board, his strongest point being that it had called witnesses who had no special knowledge of the Japanese question in American and who were, by and large, incompetent to pass on the matter of their army service. Mr. McCloy was impressed by this memo and had Pettigrew detailed to his office. McCloy gave Pettigrew the job of working up a program and the Colonel did a very thorough job, coming over here, going to Selective Service headquarters and even making a visit, I think, out to the West Coast. McCloy told me that Pettigrew recommended the ordinary Selective Service procedures for the Nisei, and McCloy, ~~xxx~~ early in November, told me that the draft for Nisei was ~~xxxx~~ definitely coming. I suggest that you check this whole thing with McCloy, himself.

"However, McCloy told me that he had a hell of a time getting it through the Generals and that he practically had to crawl over the dead body of DeWitt, as well as a couple of others. There is no doubt that McCloy put everything he had behind the draft for Nisei. But all he could get was a compromise. The compromise

was the combat team idea. It was the best that ^{McCloy}~~McClroy~~ could get.

"This was early in January. And this was the time that my personal relationships with MCCloy reached their lowest state. Because I frankly raised the devil about the combat team. I told them the ~~re~~ would be very great resistences to ^pvolunteering and predicted that they wouldn't get many more than a thousand to volunteer. I pleaded, at least, that they use selective service along with the volunteering and argued that those ~~be~~ drafted be scattered throughout all army units without segregation in any one place. At these meetings, I did not get across the point that selective service should be used on a non-segregated basis. But I was assured that Selective Service would be used if the combat team quota was not filled by volunteering. We had several conferences with Selective Service officials and all of us came away with this definite understanding. I, of course, accepted this in good faith and I told this to the projects --- Topaz I remember put the specific question to me. When trouble came at Tule and the FBI was asked to aid in making arrests, the FBI office contacted the Washington Selective Service group and were told that the registration of male citizens, even though it ~~was~~ ~~carried out on a Selective Service form,~~ was carried out on a Selective Service form, was NOT a Selective Service act, and that no drafting of Nisei was contemplated. This, of course, was transmitted to us and we were amazed. The Selective Service liason men in the army, with the Army people connected in the matter, had simply come to this policy without either informing ~~me~~ or McCloy or anybody. McCloy and Scobey had been working on precisely the same assumption that I had been and both were simply sick. It was a real mess and took more than ~~threxxxxxxx~~

E2.10

The question: Why the decision not to allow Issei to hold office in the Community governments.

GLICK'S ANSWER:

There were wide differences in opinion among staff members about both office holding and voting for Issei. Two ideas stood out:

1. The Relocation Centers should be run no differently than any other American community. (Stauber and others.)

2. Provinse and Glick held the contrary view that this was an over mechanical and fictitious idea, that the city governments had to geared to fit the program of the ~~XXXXX~~ WRA and that, specifically, they should emphasize training in Americanism and prepare the residents to take their place in normal communities again. (NOTE: Provinse in interview of 10/7/43 said that he opposed barring Issei from office because "as a sociologist, I knew that government on such a basis would not have a solid foundation in the community." This differs somewhat from Glick's recollection, as below.) Prov. and Glick said there was nothing ordinary about the relocation ~~ax~~ centers and that sociologically they were abnormal communities and therefore they ~~xx~~ had to have abnormal governments to fit, sociologically, the situation as it existed. Specifically, these are the arguments used by Glick and Provinse in holding for an Issei vote but in opposition to the Issei holding office:

1. If aliens were allowed to hold office, they would get all the offices. Experience with preliminary government at Manzanar demonstrated ~~thatx~~ this, Issei were completely dominant there.

2. This would work directly contrary to the first interest of the authority, namely, the encouragement of

leadership and ~~Americanism~~ Americanism among the Nisei. "We were afraid of the politeness, the propensity of the Nisei to step aside in deference to the elders."

3. If Issei took over the offices, the assembly would carry on its business in Japanese. This, both for the community and for the public, would be extremely bad.

4. To the extent that the council was to become the spokesman and the symbol of the community, it had to be an American group. To have the governing body a symbol of Japanese culture rather than American "would have been directly contrary to everything we were trying to do."

5. Public opinion --- the "danger that a Congressional investigator would stick his nose into a Council meeting and hear Japanese being spoken" ---- was a paramount factor. This "simply could not be faced."

6. Issei had been taunting Nisei that citizenship meant, nothing at all and that, despite their citizenship, they were behind wires just like the non-citizens. By discriminating in favor of citizens in the community government set-up, it was thought that an additional premium could be paid to the benefits of citizenship.

These arguments carried the way in staff meetings. They were persuasive to Glick and to others and they are still persuasive to Glick. But he admits the whole idea simply was no good --- simply because it didn't work. This is why it didn't work:

1. The premium on citizenship idea was backfired. Issei snorted that if this was all citizenship meant, then it still didn't amount to a damn.

2. ~~zZuevfuetzthaz~~ In fact, Nisei felt their exclusiveness in the council was an effrontery to the Issei. The citizen group, itself, would not accept the logic or the necessity of the type of thinking outlined above. They were not willing to accept responsibility knowing that the elders were the real leaders and that their own leadership was forced.

3. The fact that no provision was made for even a minority of Issei (even one or two would have helped) made Nisei unwillingness even stronger than it might have been.

4. There already existed a strong conflict between young and old, citizen and alien. The No-Issei-on-Council ruling aggravated this tension. "It was too crude, too raw, too open an effrontery. It had none of the niceties needed to ~~to give~~ give the Nisei ^{an} ~~and~~ advantage. It lacked sophistication."

5. The Issei felt the discrimination strongly and actively worked against the council, either by evolving methods to by-pass it or by ignoring it or by playing up its impotence.

6. Many protests from both colonists and administrators were received. "I felt all along that the Project Directors were not in ^{syn}pathy with the thing and that their attitude was one that actually sabotaged any success the scheme had. (A letter of September or October (we have) shows that ~~we~~ Glick and Provinse still held sway in September and October of last year and demonstrates how strongly they were in support of the original idea.)

~~Prappx~~ As time went on, it became evident that there would have to be a change and that Issei would have to be allowed to hold office. Following are the strongest considerations that led to the change of policy:

1. The councils just weren't working out well.
2. The colonists complained and petitioned for Issei representation.
3. The Project Directors wanted the change.
4. Glick and Provinse remained isolated in their opposition to the change. That ~~ex~~ isolation, itself, was a factor in making these men give way. The Director held out with Glick and Provinse. When they flopped, so did he.
5. "Even my Project Attorneys rebelled and kept on my tail!"
6. It was clear that the change was to be made. ~~xxxx~~ But it would not have been good administration to omit an original error so everybody cast about for a good rationalization. The rationalization that was actually found was so good that it/made ~~an~~ argument for the change, though Glick emphasized that it didn't have anything to do with determining the change. The rationalization: so many Nisei were leaving camps that adjustments had to be made in community representation.

In Summation: "I am still persuaded by the original arguments that our first plan was a correct one under the circumstances. Furthermore, I cannot be persuaded that it might not have worked if everybody --- and especially the Project Personnel --- had given it a fair trial. But this is only an opinion and I may very well be wrong.

"We, of course, did consider an Issei advisory board ~~xxxxxx~~ after we had decided that there would be no representation ~~xxxxxx~~ for Issei within the Council. But we did not want to spell out the thing too closely because we were convinced that it would be better for the commu-
to work out their own specific plans. This, it seemed to us, would make self-government mean more. But it is not impossible that we spelled out too much with the plan we did lay down; or having gone as far as we did, that it would have been better to spell everything ~~out in detail~~ to the very last detail.

"As I rethink the whole thing through, it seems to me that we might have ~~xxx~~ done one of two definite things and that our greatest error lay in the fact that we did something in between. On one hand, we might have decided that law and order did not fall within the scope of community government at all. Actually, of course, it didn't, because in every case the ^Roject ^Director must have the last say. I am one who thinks that law and order could have been omitted from the scope of community government and that a satisfactory community government might have been set~~xxx~~ up without ~~xxxxxx~~ any such functions. But since we put law and order within the scope of community government, we gave it such complex problems that we should have spelled out the entire organization in the great^{est} detail.

"On the other hand, we might have left ~~with~~ community government without authority over law and order and given it advisory functions, communications, social, recreational and other spheres of action. This would have been more realistic. In such a case, we could have left the organization completely

open, given the merest suggestions, and let each community work out its own organization.

"We might have given the governments law and order functions and spelled out a detailed organization or we might have abstracted law and order and let the communities work out their own governmental destinies. We did neither and I am inclined to think that there was our greatest error."

EISENHOWER'S UTOPIA (The Producer cooperative idea)

Glick: Eisenhower, really, was the only man to take this idea seriously, and he was cold on it even before he left. I felt, and I am sure almost everybody else did, serious doubts about the whole thing. Nevertheless I had great inhibitions about dissuading the boss or discouraging him. In the first place, it was because I had such tremendous respect for the man. In the second place, I realized -- or thought I did --- that he, himself, was groping in the dark, that he didn't think the thing would work, but that he thought it was the only plan that MIGHT rescue the program from doldrums that he saw ahead. Therefore I couldn't crack down. Eisenhower didn't like the evacuation in the first place. He was sick that he was forced to levy the low wage scale. He didn't think the wage scale was fair but was forced to adhere to them ~~ex~~ because of the force of public opinion~~x~~. So the producers' cooperative was simply a groping device to solve a bad problem. He thought of it as a problem of social engineering, he knew the producer's coop. was a bad device but he clung to it as something to work on and to improve. Because of his dilemma, we couldn't tell him flatly it was no good.

Barrows has entered and lolls on the couch like a Roman Senator: "Hell, Phillip, you know damn well that

7. Glick ~~1/10/43~~ (Barrows)
Grodzins

that all of us were just afraid to tell the boss what we thought of the idea because we respected him so much. But the essential point is that even he discovered that it wouldn't work after a very short time. It was administratively impossible, absolutely the most impossible administrative job that could be found. For example, the projects were supposed to return money to the colonists if the project showed a profit, but what were the expenses to be charged against the project. We were pretty well agreed that construction costs could not be charged against the project. (But how about the costs of the administrative salaries?) Then somebody pointed out that those people on the lands that were well subjugated and that would produce would have a great advantage over those on non-subjugated and non productive soil. So we tried to think through an amalgamation of all the projects in on large cooperative. But this had a hundred thousand holes in it. As I myself, was convinced from the very first that the plan would not work for one simple reason, that is, it was impossible for any method to be set up with any degree of honesty that would enable the project to show any profit whatsoever. Relocation Centers were expensive war babies. No amount of social engineering could have made them show a profit for distribution to evacuees. Incidentally, I am not at all sure that Philip is right when he says only Eisenhower was seriously interested in the Utopia. I think Kimmel and Holland were definitely of the opinion that the thing was feasible. Kimmel was ahsamed of the wage scale (especially since it had no clothing allowance attached as it has now). He wanted to supplement the wage without exciting public wrath, and, in the second

S-Glick - Oct. 1. 1943 (Barrows)
Grodzins

place, he wanted to supply an incentive for the people to work. He did not think they would work for such small wages as had been set up. I forgot to mention another reason why I objected so strongly to the idea. I didn't only think that it was impossible to make a profit and still use any honest bookkeeping methods, but I also thought (and still think) that pecuniary motives are not the only ones that will make a person work. There is an instinct for workmanship that, in the circumstances of the relocation center, must be emphasized, and which no amount of planning can get around."

Glick: X The administrative problems were only a small part of it. There was absolutely no way, that I could see, through which it would be legally possible for us to set up, with government funds, a cooperative enterprise that would pay profit back to the workers. This, I realized from the first, and no amount of cogitation on our part would solve this difficulty.

Grodzins: All agree as to the summary that, if the emphasis on resettlement, ^{eliminated} namely, industrial projects from the Centers, then it was fiscal, legal, and administrative difficulties that made the producers' cooperative impossible. The latter was dead, even before the emphasis upon resettlement.

Glick: O.K., but note that as late as the May 29th statement, "Weasle words" were used in describing possibility that later remuneration be given to evacuees. This irrational process in government well exemplified even then, I was sure, that the whole thing was no good.

9- Glick, Oct. 1, 1943 (Barrows)
Grodzins

EISENHOWER AND PUBLIC OPINION

Barrows: "I have never seen any administrator more sensitive to public opinion than Milton Eisenhower. Eisenhower resolved practically every problem in terms of public relations." The wage policy, of course, is one of the best cases in point. Some stupid WPA administrator at Manzanar announced that we were considering the payment of WPA wages to evacuees. This, of course, created a furor. Actually, we had held practically no discussions at all about wage scales. Nevertheless, Mr. Eisenhower almost immediately issued a statement to the effect that wages lower than soldiers' wages could be paid evacuees. The sole basis for this announcement was the force of public opinion. It was a shot in the dark, but actually, it turned out to be a pretty good one. The wages we set later, in conformance to Eisenhower's announced policy, were just about the best wages we could have found by a more intellectual process. They are just about what we can afford, and though some families come out a little too good, they nevertheless are not designed so as to hinder our resettlement program."

Miscellany

Clothing allowances are given only to workers and as a part of the public welfare program. They are therefore a part of wages, not subsistence. When added to subsistence, clothing, plus the cash wages, amounts to what Barrows was talking about above.

Glick drew up ^{#106} 9066 from Eisenhower's notes, and it was adopted in substantially the same form that he evolved. The Army added paragraph 10 only.

Interview with Leland Barrows
Monday, October 4, 1943
Grodzins

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E2.10

Project Employment and Indefinite Leave

Most of the WRA officials were not, and are not, interested in employment on the project level. They have been too busy with other things. This goes for Eisenhower, Myer in his earlier days, and --- most strangely of all, Holland, who was supposed to be in charge if project employment. Nevertheless, in our First Appropriation Hearings we talked exclusively about employment on the projects--- relocation was not mentioned once. Except for a preliminary statement that contained only one policy --- that work would be ~~applied~~ supplied to everybody who wanted to work --- we had no ideas about project employment, particularly. Administrative Instruction #27 was a lousy statement of a lousy, indefinite policy that we had. It was Fryer's idea to lump housing and employment in one department and we, having no ideas of our own, just let it go at that.

The Reduction of Project Employment

We reduced the number of people who could hold jobs on the project, so far as I am concerned, ~~because~~ for the sake of better efficiency and for no other reason. In the days of WRA's troubles, when we had strikes, sitdowns, etc, everybody said that the trouble was caused by the fact that people were dissatisfied with a maximum wage of \$19.00, and that we had to expect labor troubles. I have always been opposed to this idea that the pecuniary incentive is the only one that produces efficient work. I wrote a memo to the Director to this effect, recommending that project ~~em~~ employment be tightened up all around, that superfluous workers be fired wherever possible, and that where this created a pool of idle workers, new jobs on new projects should be created.

This, I think, was the first proposal to cut down on project employment. But my own ideas were soon perverted when the employment office boys pointed out that cutting down on project employment might have a ~~serious~~ good effect on the leave program. So far as I am concerned (and I think the Director would go along with me on this) the new order cutting project employment by some 30% was a move for better efficiency; on the other hand, many people here think that firing people on the projects will help relocation.

~~Fin~~ FINANCES

The cost of this program is staggering and disgraceful. WRA is doing a damned economical job but the job, itself, ~~costs~~ will cost this nation a staggering sum. We had \$8,000,000 from the President's emergency fund. But we by no means spent all of this. For our first fiscal year, we received ~~an~~ \$70,000,000, and again we spent less than we received. Despite Senator Chandler's statement that we asked for \$80,000,000 for our ~~first~~ second fiscal year (this made good head lines but was absolutely false), we asked for some \$54,000,000 and, ~~except~~ ~~for~~ a few cuts by the budget bureau and a \$25,000 cut in traveling ~~on the house~~ ~~floor~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~House~~ ~~Committee~~, we got exactly what we asked for. (On the Senate floor, Bridges wanted to know 5 million off our appropriation and Chandler made a speech in which he stupidly raked us for not spending our complete appropriation in the previous year and the Senate cut us the 5 million. But it was restored in conference.) In all (this from JOHN CLEAR) ~~we~~ ~~have~~ ~~spent~~ WRA has spent from March 18, 1942 to June 30, 1943 (Includes money from President's emergency fund) \$57,157,236.00. ~~XXXXXX~~ (This is cost of operations plus cost of land acquisition. To find

total cost of evacuation up to June 30, 1943, add all costs of army and cooperating agencies, including cost of basic construction at WRA centers.

Our second ~~xxxxxxx~~ fiscal year estimate to the budget bureau was made on the assumption that we would have 107,000 people in the center throughout the fiscal year, despite the fact that we hoped for a considerable savings through the resettlement program. We made our ~~xxxx~~ request in this fashion because we were uncertain over the progress of the resettlement and with the pledge that we would return as much money as possible, as we had at the end of our first fiscal year. The Budget Bureau made some downward revisions and we are paying for that now. All the savings of relocation are being eaten up by the cost of segregation. Whatever that great movement is actually worth to the nation, it is costing the taxpayers ~~xxxxxxx~~ somewhere between 5 and 6 million dollars!

You may see the proud boast of the WCCA that it operated at the cost of come \$2.40 per evacuee per day. All of WRA's fiscal activities are based on our estimate ~~xxx~~ that each evacuee day cost \$1.20.

FOOD AND POINT RATIONING

When rationing was first being considered by OPA, WRA knew it was in for a lot of headaches. OPA, early in the game, pointed out that we could live the easy life of an exempt purchaser if we could get a statement from the State Department to the effect that we were working under international commitments. We could have easily have procured this statement but we chose the hard road of rationing. We all ~~xxx~~ Thank God for that. Food shortages andb warehouse space difficulties at the Army

led to the great overabundance of food stored at Heart Mountain and the great stink of the Denver Post. Actually, the Post's attack was based on two misconceptions, i.e., in the first place the misconception that storage was the equivalent of consumption and the misconception that storage ~~was~~ meant even FUTURE consumption. Actually, of course, Heart Mountain ~~is~~ was not at the time, and did not contemplate, using all the food stored there. Much of it was to be shipped to other WRA centers and to army camps. Nevertheless, Heart Mountain, though it had no more than a 60 day food supply at any time, actually had more than 20 million blue points on hand --- whereas the whole WRA now has less than 19 million. This could have created an even worse situation than actually existed, if the Post men had been smart enough to figure ~~the message~~ it out.

MISCELLANEOUS

Bendetsen wanted WRA to take over the Assembly Centers (WPA continuing to administer the camps, themselves) but WRA refused. Eisenhower was willing to give all the WPA people four month temporary Civil Service appointments, but refused to commit himself for any more lengthy period. Nicholson, "the worst goddammed political dealer I ever saw", wanted to be made Deputy Director and to let his own gang run the Centers. When Eisenhower said no, Nicholson walked out in a huff.

Overcrowding people in centers, especially Gila, before the construction was finished, was due to two facts: One, Army engineers refused to put themselves on record before DeWitt to the effect that they had not made their impossible deadlines; DeWitt, himself, was a deadline bug and refused to accept excuses. At Gila, an engineer lieutenant refused to wire headquarters that people should not be moved in ~~xxx~~ because facilities were not ready.

INTERVIEW WITH JOHN PROVINSE -- 10/7/43
Grodzins

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COMMUNITY GOVERNMENT

Where administrators on a project wanted assistance from the evacuees and encouraged the evacuees to show an initiative in their own problems, then the project would get an adequate and decent self-government under way. Where, however, the chief administrators wanted to be overssers and make all the decisions themselves, then no self-government ~~xx~~ was evolved. Provinse thinks ~~it~~ was possible to have self-government within almost any restrictions. It was not the limitations of self-government that made the ~~xxm~~ difficult to set up, rather it was the attitude of the project administration. Stafford, at Minidoka, definit~~x~~ely discouraged self-government, telling his people that it would lead to trouble and that, in any case, Stafford was boss. Nevertheless, did call in evacuees for discussion and a meeting of minds was frequently gained.

Stafford made a claim that, though he had authority, the responsibility for ultimate success on any given issue remained with the evacuees. Therefore, Provinse thinks ~~z~~ that Stafford could have evolved a decent program and he has high hopes that he will evolve one now.

The dominance of Issei in the ~~early~~ organization at Manzanar made Provinse worried about the possibility of Issei participation in the Councils. Though he was skeptical about the Councils ~~xxf~~ of Nisei only, "since they would have no broad sociological base," he nevertheless thought the danger of Issei diminution was the greater.

"The only place where self government would really work has been

2. Interview with Provinse-- 10/7/43
Grodzins

in the cooperatives. Richardson has been a fine job here and the cooperatives have been uniformly successful despite difficulties of administrative acceptance.

Only John Embree expressed any vocal doubts about real resistances that might be met in the registration. Embree was especially skeptical over the idea of the Army that the registration had to be rapidly conducted.

Junior colleges on the project were considered and recommended, but their plans were not carried through because of the likely unfavorable reaction of the public.

WRA has embarked on a program of training and retraining as a means of aiding resettlement under the direction of Mr. Samler, who formerly was with the National Refugee Council of New York.

WRA's program consists of:

1. Out of school youth aid. Federal funds given to state for training in such things as metal trades. A good program but limited by size of federal appropriation and by willingness of states to devote part of funds to Japanese.
2. Quick courses for high school graduates in stenography, typing, etc. WRA funds in center.
3. An elaborate apprentice program. The employment section in project is training people in project departments in skilled jobs --- mechanics, teachers, nurses aides, etc. WRA funds.
4. State Vocational Training. Mostly agricultural. Varies from state to state in ratio to state funds and state willingness.

In addition to these there was:

5. NYA program which blew up for reasons documents show.
6. Student Relocation Council work. A little different but along the same line. The SRC is going out of business in about six months.

E 2.10
C.2

THE WORK CORPS

The Work~~x~~ Corps was Eisenhower's ^{baby} ~~idea~~, and behind it were the following ideas;

1. Psychologically, it was an idea of enlistment under the Commander-in-chief, as a means of making evacuees believe they were a part of a larger war effort and of inducing them to work better under generally unsatisfactory conditions.

2. It was also designed to strengthen the hold of WRA over the colonists through a program of continued detention.

3. Vaguely, Eisenhower thought the work corps would provide a sociological structure, within which ~~would~~ a ~~social~~ structure might be ~~built~~ built, with ranks, a hierarchy of positions, distinctive badges, etc, etc,

Glick believes that the work corps idea had some genuine merit, but that it was ~~not~~ "not thought through with sufficient care" and "especially, the administration of it was very badly handled." In the very first place, the work corps ~~provided~~ provides another example of an idea that failed (of community government) ~~because~~ because the administration were not sold on its feasibility. Tom Holland was the worst offender. "Holland was interested in Project Employment, he therefore was not interested in the Work Corps idea, and therefore he deliberately sabotaged the whole thing." Actually, the Work Corps was not given any adequate chance to work because of the faulty way it was first administered. It might have worked, if it had been sincerely tried and ~~not~~ adequately administered. The enlistment form was badly drawn up and when the first enlistments failed in the Assembly Centers (partly through lack of cooperation of the WCCA), everybody threw up his hands and let it go at that. But the whole thing was never given a good try.

REGISTRATION

1. There was no idea of using answers on registration forms for the purposes of segregation. No ~~great~~ trouble at all was anticipated, as a matter of fact, and therefore no data for segregation was anticipated.

2. The idea of registering for leave clearance with army registration was just a convenient method of killing two birds with one stone.

The above are "official answers" to the two questions that I put to Glick. "ALTOGETHER UNOFFICIALLY" Glick said:

1. The whole mess of registration is most directly attributable to the lousy administrative methods of Tom Holland -- "a man that I like and admire ~~admire~~ immensely but certainly the worst administrator that I ever met in my life." Holland, for example, made no objection to questions 27 and 28, though it was he that reviewed the forms which were drawn up by the army (from forms that Holland, himself, had made out for the early leave clearances. Further, Holland did not send the forms to the legal department of WRA for clearance. Glick is positive that "one of the ~~lawyer~~ lawyers" would have picked up the impossibility of the questions and "at least brought the problem up at a staff meeting." "As it was, however, Holland did everything practically in secrecy. He didn't keep us informed, he did not allow any check on the work he was doing, he kept me in the ~~dark~~ deliberately, I think, and Myer in the dark purely as the result of administrative slothness." Myer, himself, is somewhat to blame, Glick thinks (who readily admits his own share of culpability) ~~for~~ for not insisting on greater accuracy and frequency in Holland's reporting, and especially for not insisting that the verbal agreement with Selective Service

be put in writing. "No lawyer would ever have pulled a trick like that."

2. Once they had ~~exclusive data~~ collected data suitable for segregation ---- even though they realized much of it came as the result of administrative blunders, it was decided to use the data. "We have ~~given~~ taken every effort to ~~back~~ correct our administrative mistakes, and to give those people angered by those mistakes to change their minds. We admit our mistakes to ourselves, try to make amends, but that is all we can do."

Dillon Myer 10/12/43
Grodzins

-1-

(BAD INTERVIEW: Myer interrupted frequently; his recollection bad at points.)

NOTE: Get Congressional Record, Oct. 8, '43, Statements of Elliott of California, Rankin, and Eberharter, pp. 8286-90.

The Plan "C" letter. Its leak was anticipated by Myer but he does not think this had much to do with the Congressional investigations, the upsurge of interest on the part of the Congressmen, or the trip East by Leonard Read of the Los Angeles C. of C. Stimson's letter of May 10, 1943 (then not found -- now we have copy) was in reply to the Plan "c" letter and it made Myer mad. We have both drafts of the reply and it is notable as the sharpest response ever made by WRA to the army.

The Congressmen

When Myer first came to WRA, Eisenhower took him over to meet with the Ford sub-committee. "It was the most terrible meeting I ever attended." Ford shouted and cussed (at that specific moment in opposition to college relocation) and Myer immediately saw that Eisenhower had made a great mistake to ever meet with that group, and he resolved never to go back again. He never did.

CHANDLER COMMITTEE. Myer doesn't know the exact genesis of the Chandler investigation but he ~~knows~~ has strong reasons to believe that the Chaillaux group of the American Legion were primarily responsible for getting the Walgreen bill introduced and the Chandler subcommittee constituted. Myer heard ~~about~~ about it first just before he was leaving for his January field trip. He was brusquely told to appear for a hearing on the Walgreen bill. Myer wanted to defer his appearance until after his trip but "Chandler was very nasty" and he had to change his field trip plans. The bill, itself, was not at all discussed at the hearing (transcript has been printed.)

but everybody tried to get a lot of anti-Japanese stuff into the record and Myer was very disappointed that he was given but very little chance to straighten things out.

Chandler said he wanted to visit the centers ~~xxx~~ and he agreed that he would time his ~~xixixix~~ visits so as not to interfere with registration. He also wanted Myer to go with him and Myer agreed. Suddenly, however, Chandler turned up in Los Angeles (he had been visiting his movie star daughter), and announced he was going to start his visits. Malone, the chief Chandler investigator, was very agitated and called Myer to apologize for the whole thing. Chandler went to Manzanar with two FBI men (who had made arrests in the camp previously) and Malone, his wife, accompanied by two army officers as guards. Merritt wrote Myer a personal letter describing this visit that Myer has hidden away. Substantially it says: everytime Chandler got two people together he made a speech; he damned the god damned japs loudly; Mrs Chandler was obviously scared to death and would not let the armed officers get more than an arm's distance away; One of the officers had borrowed a gun at Lone Pine at Mrs Chandler's insistence; Mrs Chandlers said at one point in earshot of several evacuees that "as far as I am concerned, you could take the whole bunch of them and drown them in the Pacific."

Chandler kept his mouth shut at Manzanar, probably because Merritt refused to give him registration results because they were "incomplete". Chandler tried to browbeat an army lieutenant at Lone Pine to give him this data, but he was unsuccessful. Through Washington, however, he was given the first results (which constituted a double cross of Myer by the Washington army office) and it was at Poston that Chandler popped off so loudly about the very high percentage of disloyal japs.

Myer 10/12/43
Grodzins

-3-

When Chandler later came out for a program of releasing loyal Japanese, and when it became apparent that ~~Max~~ Malone was doing serious investigating rather than devoting himself full time to smearing WRA, the Chailloux legion group became very dissatisfied. Out of this dissatisfaction, Myer is convinced that the Dies-Costello investigation came. Costello was interested in a smearing job and nothing else. We have a good documentation on the whole Dies business.

E 2.10

Interview with John Burling, asistant to Edward Ennis,
October 13, 1943
Grodzins

G

The meeting was in the nature of a rapprochemnt with Burling following a misunderstanding via letter during the past year. Though the misunderstanding, itself, was not mentioned at all Burling obviously appreciated the senitments and talked freely for more than an hour, in addition to showing me some file data.

1. After the widely publicized FBI raid, in the spring of 1942, there ~~were~~ great differences of opinion between Western Defense Com - man and Justice Department as to the significance of the raid, and of the contraband collected. DeWitt and Marshall wanted everybody who was caught with contraband interned, irrespective of intent or of any linkage between the contraband and possible danger to internal security. DeWitt sold this idea to Marshall, who in turn got after Roosevelt, who in turn ordered the Solicitor General (Biddle out of town) to follow Marshall's recommendation. An order was issued and chaos followed. People were detained for having flashlights, Red Cross medals, rusty pistols, etc., etc. Biddle came back and was convinced by the Alien Enemy Unit of the absurdity of the whole thing. A corps of lawyers was set to work analyzing the cases of those interned. The results were ludicrous. An alien woman (German in this case) being detained, for example, because she had in her ~~possession~~ possession the sword of her husband, which hebhad received upon his graduation from Annapolis; a Japanese was interned because the FBI man discovered that his radio had a short wave band still working, even though the man presented incotrovertible evidence to demobstrate that he had paid to have the short wave band removed. Such cases were very numerous.

2. Even J.E. Hoover, on May 5, 1942, wrote a memorandum advocating extreme toughness with those caught with contraband and a broad interpretation of what contraband consisted of.

3. Attached is a memo written by Burling and Ennis for Biddle's signature which points out allthe absurdities of the tremendously publicized FBI raids. This is an important document, even though it was probably never sent to the President. It shows that desptite the tremendous load that Hoover collected in his raid that "We have not . . .uncovered through these searches any dangerous person, that we could not otherwise know about."

4. Unfortunately, the case~~s~~^s digested were never tabulated statistically because the policy was changed before that was necessary. It might be a good idea for us to try to get the digest so that we could tabulate them ourselves.

MR STAUBER - 11/13/43 E 2110

of "educational thing"
was planning for
the execution
Gt. Ex.
HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH INDEF. LEAVE

90% of those asked for by Japan
refused to go back to Japan. Before
March. But with registration -
whole new rush of registration x
6-7000 after registration
3000 before registration.

Early days: - Eisenhower wanted info.
War Dept. considering other uses of Ives & team's.
asked Stauber to head "KK" division (G2) -
to maintain contact with War Dept. &
other depts. State Dept + (T) + WD liaison
Keep Eis. informed in the treatment of Japanese.
Stauber - is a liaison man.

Notes: Stauber worked out under, Col.
with EDC.

After they in - wanted central file
Kollard counteracted, & so did it off -
whole stat of case thing - to Stauber.

only in Sept - 42 - was statistical
set a set up. 1st job was
to get locator files,

statistical set up in Relocation
Planning Division,

Relations with J. Embassy

liaison with Justice

Paroles
Visits from Paroles, etc

Reprobation
Alien Property Custodian

MG Interview with Dillon Myer, January 22, 1945

E2.10

Relocation and Lifting Blanket Exclusion Orders

Mx

Mr. M. Has written a detailed memo. for the files which gives the history of the negotiations about the return to the coast. This document, with the actual correspondence available to me in the files, will provide a "well documented story."

Generally:

1. The Secretary of War and the Attorney General (with concurrence of General Bonesteel on coast) agreed to the lifting of mass exclusion early in summer of 1944.

2. Things, generally, were "set" and even Acting Secretary of State Stettinius had given his approval. Then the "political advisors" of the President got busy on the thing and on June 12 or thereabouts the President wrote to Stimson ~~skying~~ a general letter saying that the time was not propitious and that the idea of scattering Japanese throughout the country was a good one.

3. All the press releases that had been prepared and the speeches that had been written thereupon had to be put away.

4. ~~WRA~~ WRA (speaking through Abe Fortas, undersec of Interior) engaged in a brief controversy with War Dep't. re: interpretation of President's letter, WRA holding that it had not ruled out some relocation to coast and some publicity about that return through army channels. But army had its way, going on with individual permits and WRA taking rap in subsequent regional protests.

5. First cabinet meeting after election, Ickes, Stimson and Biddle got FDR's approval for return. Discussion

started by Biddle who was positive that detention policy was unconstitutional and who said that if Administration wouldn't start the return on controlled basis, a Supreme Court decision might start it uncontrolled.

6. Big controversy immediately arose Army against WRA (Interior) and Justice. Latter wanted Army to announce return and wanted no further processing of evacuees --- with continued detention or continued exclusion for ONLY those denied leave by WRA. Then, was WRA plan, to ~~ix~~ re-process those denied leave, especially expatriates and repatriates.

7. Army refused at act on this basis, General Wilbur (second in command to Pratt on coast) insisting that mass of records collected by ~~Western~~ Western Defense Command be utilized ~~to~~ to exclude some Japanese and to detain others without regard for WRA leave clearance. Issue hot and tossed around for number of days. Then (MG comment: here's the big error made by WRA) WRA agreed to army proposal --- since it was believed this was the only way to get Army to carry public relations burden for the entire program. Wilbur promised the maximum number to be detained or excluded would be 5,000. Myer opposed in principle but had to agree that this number would not mess up his administrative plan to liquidate his agency.

8. Will get exact numbers of detainees and excludees later. Repatriates not included. 3,361 at Tule excluded, of which 2,660 detained. *Total, approx 9,000 excl., of which 4,400 detained.* Biggest headache, many on army list of both excludees and detainees were persons in WRA centers already given leave clearance or actually out of centers on indefinite leave. Army reluctantly promised not to serve those already out with detention notices (~~next~~ (this ~~xxxxxxx~~ "even more illegal"

than holding Japanese in centers) but will proceed to serve individual exclusion orders on them.

9. Myer angry about whole army stand. Thinks its program unnecessary and unnecessarily gumming up the works. He does not know basis of Army's lists, but thinks they are put together by running IBM cards through machines, and totalling arbitrarily such weighted factors as education in Japan, No No answers, repatriation requests, FBI reports, etc. If total "score" reaches certain point, that person either detained or ~~excluded~~ excluded. This "canned" system Myer thinks is nonsense. Wilbur is boy insistant on program and Wilbur is "tremendously impressed" with big room full of cards put together by Neilson and Myer on West Coast.

10. Myer also does not like the Justice Dep't renunciation of citizenship law. He was not consulted about it at all. He thinks renunciations may pile up in same manner and for same reasons as the NO No answers during registration. He especially tried ~~xxx~~ to get the JD to hold off procedures for allowing renunciation until after the present crisis, but JD worried about its own Congressional relations and insisted on proceeding. Myer still hopes to get Burling out of Tule Lake at earliest possible moment.

All this received in short time. Will examine documents and get more satisfactory ~~xxx~~ into view on this specific problem before I leave Wash. Also will interrogate Myer re: what will happen if people refuse to leave camps.

E2-10

This interview was primarily for the purpose of allowing history of the me to clear up the gaps in the/revokation of mass exclusion, and my notes on the documents themsleves reflect what I learned. As for other matters:

Resegregation

Myer was always opposed to the idea of moving people out of Tule Lake under pressure from the pro-Japanese ~~ex~~ element and his ideas are reflected in a memo. from Ickes to Hull on the matter. On the other hand, Myer pointed out that a rather thorough going resegregation is now going on --- "though in the opposite direction." That is to say, The Justice Department is now moving considerable numbers of people out of Tule. By the end of this week, almost a thousand expatriates and aliens with troublesome project records will have been sent to Justice Department alien enternment centers. Eventually, the families of these people will join them. If the Justice Dep't then moves to other centers all those persons now on the army detention lists --- Tule Lake will be left with a residue "we can work ~~ix~~ with." Maybe, M. Thinks, many of these will be relocated.

Justice Department Pressure to Keep Centers Open

Myer is definitely set on this topic and is more positive in his stand than on ~~at~~ any other subject ~~with which~~ about which I have talked to him. He says he will not budge an inch. He is determined to close out the centers as per schedule. If he fails, that is his responsibility, he says. But he will not announce a refuge program. If the Justice Department wants to administer such a program, he is willing to step down. If the Justice Department carries such a program over his head (either through Ickes or the President) and he is overruled, then he will resign. He is convinced the closure policy is ~~h~~ "best for the evacuees and for the nation"

He is, incidentally, unconvinced of the cogency of the Justice Department's argument, i e., that the closure policy will provoke new waves of citizenship renunciation. He is more concerned with 1) the Justice Dept's sudden interest in accepting renunciations and 2) the procedures by which the Justice Department will review the cases of citizens slated for detention under the army set-up. He feels that unless these detainees are given an immediate review of their cases, the injustices involved may provoke a wave of ~~active resistance to relocation~~ resistance to relocation and maybe even citizenship renunciations in centers other than Tule. He therefore is pushing the Justice Dept to institute immediate procedures to reexamine the citizen detainees --- and especially those who are making relocation plans.

Further Army Disagreements

The documents, of course, are full of this. Myer is now fuming because the revocation of exclusion from the Eastern and ~~Western~~ Southern Defense Commands has not yet been announced --- and this is impeding the relocation program. Original individual exclusion orders/~~called for exclusion~~ also specified exclusion from Eastern and Southern Coasts. American Civil Liberties Union protested vehemently (have document) and Army reversed itself. This more than three weeks ago --- and public announcement not yet made. This makes Myer (justifiably) mad.

Myer on Segregation

As an "administrative confession", the Director of his own initiative said he wanted to tell me what his greatest "error" had been during his administration of the WRA program. In his opinion it was undertaking the segregation program. ~~Myer~~ Myer said he thinks he could have withstood outside pressure (from Army Dies Committee, etc) but it was impossible for him to stand up against his project directors who were unanimous in insisting on the necessity for segregation. Myer blames no-one but himself. But "with hindsight" he thinks segregation would have been avoided, that by doing so the relocation program would not necessarily have

suffered, and that thousands of young Nisei would not have been "caught" as they ~~were~~ have been at Tule Lake. "From the standpoint of the evacuees and the nation, segregation was my greatest mistake. The only thing I will have left on my conscience when this thing is over is the plight of the youngsters at Tule Lake."

In comparison to segregation, Myer thinks the errors of registration were "administrative and tactical rather than strategic." Segregation, however, falls in the category of strategic errors, he believes. If any considerable number of people are "saved" from Tule Lake, Myer thinks even the error of segregation may be reduced in consequence. "But only the history of the next year will tell whether we succeed here."

On Irrelocatables

I put the question bluntly: "What will you do on next January and if when you have several thousand persons still unrelocated."

Myer answered --- Smiling but very serious: "We just won't have anybody in the centers a year from now --- except those detained by the Justice Department following Army recommendations. The WRA is going out of ~~business~~ the center business a year from now. We believe we ~~will~~ have a practical plan to relocate and take care of every single person eligible to leave. We are putting those plans in effect. We are ~~deadly~~ convinced of their practicality and we are ~~determined to live up to~~ ~~determined to live up to~~ determined to live up to our announced goal.

Grodzins: But what if you do have people left?

Myer: "We won't have. We can't have. We have no provisions for them. We have no alternative plans. We are out to empty the centers -- because if we don't do it now we will never do it. There is nothing else to do and there are absolutely no plans to do anything else. Once we convince the center populations that we are set in this respect --- and we are --- then I think we will get their cooperation and closures will move forward on schedule. In the final analysis, ~~we~~ there just won't be a WRA and there just won't be anything else ~~for~~ for the people to do except leave. There will be hardships and suffering, of course, but it is small when compared to what will ensue if we don't adhere to the closure policy. I will have no part in

creating a reservation population. I refuse to make plans for such a contingency. Closure is the policy and there are absolutely no alternatives to that policy."