

DI. 01:2

2 of 2

67/14
C

JAPANESE EVACUATION: INTERIM REPORT

By

CAREY MCWILLIAMS

Commissioner of Immigration and Housing, State of California

Eighth Conference of the
Institute of Pacific Relations
Mont Tremblant, Quebec, Canada
December, 1942

American Council Paper No. 4

AMERICAN COUNCIL
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
129 East 52nd Street
New York

JAPANESE EVACUATION: INTERIM REPORT

By

CAREY MCWILLIAMS

Commissioner of Immigration and Housing, State of California

This study is submitted by the American Council as a document of the Eighth Conference of the IPR to be held in December, 1942. The Author alone is responsible for statements of fact or opinion in this study.

American Council Paper No. 4

AMERICAN COUNCIL
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
129 East 52nd Street
New York

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. BACKGROUND	2
Traditional Attitudes to Orientals.	4
II. AFTER PEARL HARBOR	6
Evacuation Begins	8
Complexity of Japanese Situation.	10
Voluntary Evacuation.	13
Voluntary Evacuation "Frozen"	15
III. RELOCATION	16
Selection of Sites.	18
The War Relocation Authority.	20
Rights and Privileges of Evacuees	22
The Educational Problem	24
Work Projects and Job Placement	27
Services Available at the Centers	33
IV. POSTWAR STATUS OF THE JAPANESE	34
BIBLIOGRAPHY.	40

JAPANESE EVACUATION: INTERIM REPORT

On November 1, 1942, virtually all of the Japanese evacuees had been removed from assembly centers to relocation projects, thus marking the end of still another chapter--but only a chapter--in the evacuation program. Since December 7, 1941, several rather clearly defined phases of the program may be noted: first, the period between December 7, 1941, and the date of the issuance of the first removal notices; second, the initial "evacuation phase" itself, being the period roughly from March 2 to June 8, 1942, during which the westcoast Japanese were being removed to temporary assembly centers; and, third, the period from June 8 to November 1, 1942, which represents the "transfer phase," that is, the shifting of the evacuees from assembly centers to relocation centers, or, to state it another way, the transfer of control from the Army to the War Relocation Authority.

This report is designed to cover the three phases outlined above and to bring the story of the evacuation program down to November 1, 1942. It should be emphasized, however, that the program is by no means concluded; hence, this statement is in the nature of an interim or progress report. Because the evacuation program was born of wartime necessity and will unquestionably be influenced by the entirely unpredictable course of the war itself, it would be idle at this time to speculate about future eventualities. I have, therefore, endeavored to confine myself to the recorded facts.

It should also be pointed out that this report does not include any discussion of the Japanese in Hawaii; that it purposely omits any mention of the Japanese in areas of the United States outside the west coast; and that it also ignores the evacuation problem in Canada.⁽¹⁾ Likewise it should be mentioned that several important studies of the relocation program have been started and that when these studies are completed it will be possible for interested groups to obtain further information. The most important of these projected studies is that being undertaken by Dr. Dorothy Thomas, of the University of California, with Dr. Robert H. Lowie, Dr. Milton Chernin, and Mr. Frank L. Kidner as faculty assistants. This ambitious study, financed by a grant from the Columbia Foundation, is tentatively projected for a period of three years. Also the American Red Cross, at the request of the Secretary of War, is making a study of the program under the direction of Dr. Harry H. Wann (I assume that this study will be primarily addressed to the public health and welfare aspects of the program). Also I understand that several individuals are studying particular aspects of the program.⁽²⁾

- (1) With regard to the general situation in Canada, see: "Japanese Evacuation in Canada" by Forrest E. LaViolette, Far Eastern Survey, July 27, 1942; also a discussion of the problem by Mr. Larry Tajiri in the Pacific Citizen, October 8, 1942.
- (2) See the Manzanar Free Press, September 7, 1942, where it is announced that Dr. Robert Redfield, of the University of Chicago, is studying some aspects of the program.

It might also be mentioned that a documentary film entitled Japanese Relocation, made under the direction of Mr. Guy Bolte for the Office of Emergency Management, has recently been released and, so I am advised, is available for showing to interested groups.

I. BACKGROUND

Historically Japan always opposed the emigration of its people. From 1638 to 1854 it was an offense punishable by death for any Japanese to emigrate; during the same period the building of all ocean-going boats was forbidden by imperial decree, to make certain, as Dr. Ruth Benedict has said, "that Japan would preserve her policy of isolation." It was not until 1884, in fact, that emigration was permitted. This reversal of policy took place as a result of the active solicitation of sugar interests in Hawaii who finally prevailed upon the Japanese government to permit the recruitment of workers in Japan for plantation employment in Hawaii. From 1884 to 1907, Japanese steadily emigrated to Hawaii, and, in time, the stream of out-migration came to have other destinations: Canada, the United States, South America.

While Japanese emigration to Hawaii took place over a period of years, most of the Japanese came to the mainland of the United States in a comparatively brief span of years. In 1890 there were only 2,039 Japanese in the United States; by 1900 there were 24,326 and by 1910 there were 72,157. A great many of the original immigrants to the mainland unquestionably came by way of Hawaii; but, over a period of years, the percentage of Japanese in California who had not made a stop-over in the islands steadily increased. In 1940, the Japanese population of the United States was 126,947; that of Hawaii was 157,905; and, in addition, there were 29,057 in the Philippine Islands, or a total of 313,909.

Of the Japanese on the mainland, 112,353 resided in the states of Oregon, Washington, and California, constituting 88.5% of the total in this country. (Virtually all of these Japanese have been removed from coastal areas under the evacuation program.) But, whereas the Japanese constituted only 1% of the total population in the three west-coast states--the states in which they were heavily concentrated--they constituted 37.3% of the total population of Hawaii, where, of course, they have not been placed in protective custody. Of 138,834 Japanese in the United States in 1930, 51.2% were foreign-born and 48.2% were native-born; but of 126,947 Japanese in 1940, only 37.3% were foreign-born and 62.7% were native-born.⁽³⁾ Roughly speaking, of the Japanese in the United States in 1940, some 41,000 were aliens and some

(3) "Immigrants and Citizens of Japanese Origin" by Shotaro Frank Miyamoto, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, September 1942, p. 107.

71,000 were American citizens. During the decade from 1930 to 1940, the alien element had decreased by 23,172 or 32.9%; the citizen-group had increased, during the same decade, by 16.5%. Insofar as the citizen-group was concerned, the sex ratio was almost normal: about 37,000 males and about 33,000 females.

Involved in the evacuation program, therefore, are really three groups: first generation (aliens); second-generation (citizens); and third generation (citizens). The first generation is usually referred to as the Issei, the second generation as the Nisei. To avoid confusion, however, I shall refer throughout this report to first, second and third generation. In 1940 the median age of foreign-born Japanese in the west-coast states was 50.1 years and the median age of the native-born Japanese was estimated at about 19 years. On an average, the first generation had resided in this country for about 30 years. Unfortunately, exact figures are not obtainable as to the size of the important third generation which, obviously, is made up of very young children.

The Japanese communities in the west-coast states were premised, as I have pointed out elsewhere, upon a too narrow economic base. Of 48,691 Japanese workers over 14 years of age in the three west-coast states in 1940, 45.2% were engaged in agriculture: 7,001 as farm-owners or farm-managers; 8,307 as paid farm laborers or foremen; and 4,832 as unpaid family farm workers. Listed in manufacturing were 1,978 workers: 769 in food products, 186 in textiles and fabricating, 60 in logging, 365 in saw and planing mills, 73 in chemicals, 10 in leather and leather products, 327 in printing and publishing, 5 in clay and glass products, 12 in iron and steel, 11 in machinery. Other lists are as follows:

Construction.....	96
Mining.....	12
Transportation and public utilities.	706(a)
Wholesale and retail trades.....	11,473(b)
Personal services.....	8,336(c)
Professional and related activities.	1,326
Amusement and recreation.....	251
Government service.....	126
Business and repair services.....	411

- (a) Railroads, including repair shops, 431; trucking 177; communications, 4; utilities, 16.
- (b) Wholesale, 2,190; retail food and dairy products, 4,972; eating and drinking establishments, 2,082; other retail trade, 2,228.
- (c) Domestic, 4,744; hotel and lodging houses, 1,335; laundry and dry-cleaning, 1,478.

A survey of skills in the assembly and relocation centers made in May 1942 (with the exception of those in the Pinedale assembly center), showed: 65 physicians; 29 medical students; 56 registered nurses; 77 student nurses; 42 practical nurses; 27 dentists; 9 technicians; 13 assistant technicians;

79 pharmacists; 24 optometrists; 12 dieticians; 27 laboratory assistants; and 2 X-ray technicians.⁽⁴⁾

Traditional Attitudes to Orientals

It is not my intention, of course, to review the history of Japanese settlement in California.⁽⁵⁾ On the other hand, it is impossible to appraise the situation which existed immediately subsequent to December 7, 1941, without having something of this background in mind. Suffice it to say that the Japanese immigrants on the west coast inherited the traditional hostility of the region to oriental immigration. Almost simultaneously with their arrival, agitation against them began and continued, with only minor intervals, from 1900 to 1940. For example, the first mass meeting in California directly concerned with Japanese immigration occurred in San Francisco on May 7, 1900.

Not only was the situation complicated by the earlier background of anti-Chinese agitation, but the Japanese arrived in California at a very inauspicious time, namely, just when Japan began to loom large upon the Far Eastern horizon as a great power. From the time of their arrival until December 7, 1941, the resident Japanese were constantly victimized by each and every disturbance in the international situation. The effect was of course reciprocal: anti-Japanese agitation in California tended to disturb relations between Japan and the United States; and, conversely, incidents in the Far East tended to disturb the situation in California.

To appreciate the effect of this complicated situation upon inter-racial relations in the west-coast states, all one needs to do is to ponder the chronology of "incidents" which occurred during the forty-year period from 1900 to 1940. I have not listed every such incident in the following table, but have merely jotted down the dates of a few major disturbances to show how continuous was the chain of events.

1. In 1905 the San Francisco Chronicle, in a series of sensational articles, really launched the anti-Japanese campaign in California.
2. On September 5, 1905, Japan emerged triumphant, rather to the surprise of the Western world, from the Russo-Japanese War.

(4) See Daily Press Review, War Relocation Authority, May 26, 1942, and May 27, 1942.

(5) A convenient summary may be found in the Findings and Recommendations on Evacuation of Enemy Aliens and Others from Prohibited Military Zones, being a report of the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, House of Representatives, issued in May 1942, pp. 59-90; also, for an excellent summary of the history of Japanese in California agriculture, see: statement of Dr. Vardon Fuller, Part 54, LaFollette Committee Transcript, 1940, Exhibit No. 8762-A.

3. In 1906-07, California was disturbed by the "school board incident" in San Francisco, in which President Theodore Roosevelt was forced to intervene.
4. On March 14, 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt, by executive order, stopped further Japanese immigration to the mainland from Mexico, Canada, and Hawaii.
5. In 1907 the Gentlemen's Agreement was negotiated to stop the further immigration of Japanese laborers (applied voluntarily by Japan to the Hawaiian Islands).
6. In 1908 the important Root-Takahira notes were exchanged.
7. Subsequent to 1907 the "picture bride" agitation developed in California, culminating in February, 1920, when Japan stopped the further emigration of so-called "picture brides."
8. In 1910, American public opinion was greatly disturbed by Japanese aggression in Korea.
9. In 1912, the Magdalena Bay furore was widely reported in the west-coast press.
10. In 1913, the first Alien Land Act was adopted in California, despite the intervention of President Woodrow Wilson.
11. In 1914, sensational stories appeared in the American press in connection with the Zimmermann affair and the Kaiser's statement about "the yellow peril."
12. In 1914, the Manchuria Railway incident occurred (followed later by the Shantung incident, and the controversy over the Island of Yap).
13. In 1915, the Sino-Japanese Treaty aroused widespread uneasiness in this country.
14. In 1917, the Lansing-Ishii notes were exchanged.
15. In 1919, the suppression by Japan of a rebellion in Korea was widely reported in west-coast newspapers.
16. In 1920, the issue of "white supremacy" was directly raised in state elections in California; a congressional committee of inquiry visited the state on the eve of a presidential election; and, by a vote of 3 to 1, the people of California re-enacted the Alien Land Act, with important amendments, as an initiative measure.
17. On November 12, 1921, the Washington Naval Conference convened.

18. On November 13, 1922, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in the famous Ozawa case (holding that a Japanese was not a "white person" and was, therefore, ineligible to citizenship).
19. In 1924, a new Immigration Act was passed which contained the prohibition against immigrants "ineligible to citizenship." The passage of this act occasioned the resignation of our ambassador in Tokyo and the resignation of the Japanese ambassador in Washington. President Coolidge, with stated reluctance, signed the bill.
20. In 1925, an "incident" occurred in Toledo, Oregon, in which a mob forcefully deported a small group of Japanese workers. In subsequent court actions, indemnities were paid.
21. Following a momentary lull after 1925, the tempo of events begins to quicken in the early thirties (see for example, my article in The Nation, "Once Again the Yellow Peril," June 26, 1935).
22. The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 once again aroused anti-Japanese sentiment on the coast.
23. In 1940, Japan joined the Axis.
24. On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor.

From a mere glance at this inadequate time-table of events, it is apparent that Japanese residents on the west coast (particularly in California) have been continuously involved in the Far Eastern crisis. The revival of anti-Japanese agitation on the west coast after the first World War has been directly attributed to the increasing tension in Far Eastern affairs.

One further note should be added: insofar as the Japanese were concerned, the general social situation was always quite different in Hawaii. Anti-Japanese agitation never reached serious proportions in the islands. Merely as a symbol of the different attitude prevailing in Hawaii, one might refer to the fact that the islands have never adopted a miscegenation statute. This difference in the general climate of opinion in Hawaii accounts in large measure, I believe, for the fact that the Japanese in the islands, to date, have not been subjected to the same precautionary measures taken in this country.

II. AFTER PEARL HARBOR

The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, had the momentary effect of paralyzing public opinion on the west coast. The people were so stunned by the attack itself that, for a brief period, slight attention was paid to the problem presented by the large resident Japanese population. The Governor of California made an admirable plea for tolerance; and

the Committee on Fair Play, which had been established in Northern California prior to December 7, issued an excellent statement.

A number of incidents soon occurred, however, which pointed to the fact that trouble was imminent. On December 27, 1941, a Filipino-Japanese riot took place in Stockton, California⁽⁶⁾ and, on January 1, 1942, unknown persons fired 13 bullets through the windows of the home of one Kazuo Ouchida in Gilroy, California.⁽⁷⁾ A number of similar incidents were reported shortly after the first of the year in other areas, principally in rural areas. The situation was, however, far from being "out of hand." On the contrary, numerous stories appeared in the press during December and January commenting upon the admirable spirit that prevailed and especially commending the tolerant attitude that prevailed in the public schools.

During January and February, agitation for the removal of the Japanese steadily mounted in California, as public officials, law enforcement officials, and various groups and organizations began to pressure the national administration for action. An appeal was addressed to the resident Japanese by Governor Culbert L. Olson suggesting that they voluntarily move from coastal areas. Because of the uncertainty and the confusion which prevailed, however, such appeals did not meet with marked success. Sensing the developing tension in California, I wired Congressman John Tolan on January 26, 1942, urging that the Tolan Committee come to the west coast immediately and hold a series of public hearings on the problem. Subsequently the Committee did visit the Pacific Coast, holding hearings in Portland, Seattle, San Francisco, and Los Angeles, between February 21 and March 12, 1942.

Before the Committee arrived, however, the Roberts Report on Pearl Harbor was released to the press on January 24, 1942. Moreover, while the Committee was holding hearings on the west coast, a submarine (presumably Japanese) shelled a California coastal area on February 23, 1942. The conjunction of these two events had a marked effect upon public opinion. Also the generally adverse reports on the situation in the Far East, particularly the consternation occasioned by the fall of Singapore on February 15, 1942, had a noticeable influence.

While the Roberts Report refers specifically to espionage activities in Hawaii, it is silent on the question of sabotage. This distinction was not generally noted at the time; in fact, the Roberts Report was commonly referred to as proof of the fact that sabotage had been practiced in Hawaii. At the same time, wild rumors began to circulate on the west coast about the extent of alleged acts of sabotage in the islands. In order to appreciate the damaging effect of such rumors, all one has to do is to examine the transcript of the Tolan Committee Hearings. During the course of these hearings, Congressman Tolan repeatedly asked Japanese witnesses what comment they had to make concerning the acts of sabotage which had occurred in Hawaii.

(6) See Sacramento Bea of that date.

(7) See Los Angeles Times, April 24, 1942.

These questions, naturally, assumed a fact not in evidence, namely, that any sabotage had occurred. Unquestionably Mr. Tolan asked these questions in entire good faith, but later the staff of his own committee received convincing proof that no acts of sabotage were reported at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.⁽⁸⁾ Subsequently these wild rumors were investigated in a scientific manner by responsible persons with the result that, so far as I have been able to determine, not a single one was verified.⁽⁹⁾

Evacuation Begins

Under the authority of Presidential proclamations issued on December 7 and 8, 1941, the Department of Justice had, of course, rounded up all "enemy aliens" suspected of being dangerous. Subsequently by a series of orders, the first of which was issued on January 29, 1942, the Department of Justice ordered the removal of all "enemy aliens" from a large number of designated areas on the west coast. These orders were limited to enemy aliens, and referred to designated strategic areas such as harbors, airports, bridges, and power plants. Generally speaking, all enemy aliens were ordered from these designated areas by February 24, 1942. As it subsequently developed, this initial evacuation was, in effect, a "dress rehearsal" of the general mass evacuation subsequently ordered. In Los Angeles County it was estimated that about 10,000 aliens were affected by these initial Department of Justice orders. The largest single group of Japanese affected was the fishing colony located on Terminal Island in the Los Angeles Harbor district. This initial evacuation, effected pursuant to orders of the Department of Justice, occurred between February 9, and March 9, 1942.

By reason of the fact that these initial evacuees were ordered to move on extremely short notice and with little preparatory planning and with only slight public assistance, the movement unquestionably occasioned considerable hardship and distress. Some of the wives, children, and relatives of the men who had been arrested by the Department of Justice immediately subsequent to December 7 were left without any means of support and with no clearly formulated plans for their care. Much confusion prevailed, since these initial evacuees could obtain no authoritative assurance as to the areas into which they might move. For the most part, therefore, they moved into nonprohibited coastal areas in the same county and took up their residence with friends or relatives. This initial experience, on a limited scale,

(8) See, for example, the correspondence and affidavits appearing in the Findings and Recommendations of the Committee, issued in May 1942, pp. 48-58.

(9) See, generally, "The Japanese in Hawaii" by Blake Clark in The New Republic, September 14, 1942; a series of articles by Mr. Robert J. Casey of the Chicago Daily News, referred to in the Pacific Citizen July 23, 1942; and a report by Mr. Bill Moran, a political writer for the Hawaii Hochi, appearing in an interview reported by the San Francisco Chronicle and digested in the Pacific Citizen for October 22, 1942.

clearly indicated the necessity for a planned resettlement program, under the sponsorship of the federal government, should general mass evacuation be ordered.

Thereafter, on February 13, 1942, the Pacific Coast congressional delegation recommended to the President "the immediate evacuation of all persons of Japanese lineage and all others, aliens and citizens alike, whose presence shall be deemed dangerous or inimical to the defense of the United States, from all strategic areas." (10) Six days later the President signed the executive order hereinafter referred to, initiating the mass evacuation of the Japanese from the west coast.

According to a manuscript report of the War Relocation Authority:

Two primary reasons motivated the evacuation of the Japanese from their homes in the strategic coastal military zones and their placement in Relocation Centers farther inland. One was the safety of the Japanese against possible emotional upsurges on the part of the remainder of the population. That this was a real danger was amply demonstrated by several incidents both in the military areas and elsewhere. The other and more important reason was the matter of military necessity and the security of the Commonwealth. Fear was expressed by military and civil officials, and by citizens, that the presence of such large numbers of persons of Japanese ancestry might open the way to espionage and sabotage--and confusion, if not actual cooperation with the enemy, in the event of an attempted invasion.

As to what constituted this "military necessity" in the strict sense of the phrase, reference might be made to the speech by Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen, Assistant Chief of Staff, of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, before the Commonwealth Club of California in San Francisco. The speech is too long to quote, but it constitutes the most succinct summarization of the "military necessities" of the situation that has been issued to date. Virtually all of the witnesses who testified before the Tolan Committee agreed that, in the last analysis, the question of whether mass evacuation should or should not be ordered was essentially a decision for the military, particularly since the entire west-coast area is a theater of war. The arguments for and against mass evacuation, therefore, really entered into the problem only in the sense of possibly affecting the decision as to which groups were to be removed, the procedure by which they were to be removed, and the manner and methods by which relocation was to be effected. As to the larger question itself, these arguments were pointless once there had been a determination that evacuation must be ordered as a matter of military necessity. The comment of the Tolan Committee, in its preliminary report (p. 15), is essentially conclusive on this point: "The decision of the military, whatever the influence brought to bear by public opinion, is a

NOTES
// -

(10) See: Preliminary Report of the Tolan Committee, March 19, 1942, p. 3.

prima facie acknowledgement that threats of espionage and sabotage are real and present and not wholly preventable by the constituted authorities."

Complexity of Japanese Situation

The phrase "military necessity," however, fails to characterize the complex situation which existed on the west coast in relation to the resident Japanese. For example, it should be remembered that California has a large resident Chinese and Filipino population. Mounting racial antagonism was, therefore, a factor to be carefully considered. Unlike the German and Italian aliens, moreover, the Japanese are easily recognizable. There was reason to anticipate, therefore, the possibility of violence to all persons of Japanese ancestry resident on the west coast. Virtually every law-enforcement official on the west coast, according to the record of the Tolan Committee, was convinced that the problem of surveillance was, from a civilian point of view, insoluble and that the situation warranted military action.

Many Japanese settlements were, in the words of Colonel Bendetsen, "deployed through very sensitive and very vital areas." For the most part, this was a matter of coincidence, since the presence of the Japanese in these areas may be readily explained in most instances. One such colony was located on Terminal Island, in the center of Los Angeles Harbor; another was located on Bainbridge Island, in Puget Sound, near the Bremerton Navy Yard. In Seattle, the Japanese operated 206 hotels, many of them along the waterfront, and it was known that these hotels provided an almost impenetrable screen for possible espionage activities. So many of these Japanese settlements were near strategic areas that a mere relocation within the area would have involved nearly as much dislocation as total mass evacuation. Furthermore, since the Japanese settlements were made up of businesses operated by and for Japanese, they naturally suffered severe economic losses after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Import and export firms were closed down; banks and produce houses had their funds impounded; fishing in coastal waters was suspended for the duration; and, gradually, a paralysis crept over the settlement. This development would sooner or later have forced governmental intervention, since the resources of the Japanese communities were not unlimited.

The Japanese settlements, moreover, were of a rather peculiar sort. Americanization of the Japanese, as of other groups, increases with length of residence and loss of contact with the homeland. Not only were the Japanese recent immigrants, but a number of factors served to preserve their ties with the homeland. Through the presence on the west coast of numerous Japanese mercantile and financial concerns, the local immigrant groups were tied to the Japanese-controlled firms, in many cases, and through these firms to the local Japanese consulates. Unlike most other immigrant groups, the original Japanese immigrants were barred from becoming American citizens. A number of observers have pointed out that the Exclusion Act of 1924 had the effect of stimulating nationalistic sentiments among the resident Japanese. Mr. B. Schreike, in 1934, called attention to the fact that the number of Japanese-language schools increased after the passage of the act. There is

reason to believe that, over a period of years, some of the resident Japanese had come to harbor deep-seated resentments against this country.

The cessation of further immigration in 1924 created an abnormal population structure for the entire group. It resulted in fewer persons in the age-group, say, from 30 to 50, than would normally have existed but for the Exclusion Act. Thus the economic and social and, to some extent, at least, the political leadership tended to remain in the first generation, to the exclusion of the second generation. Anxious to maintain some ties with the homeland, the parents in many instances sent their children to Japanese language schools or arranged for them to receive part of their education in Japan (it is estimated that almost 12,000 American-born Japanese received part of their education in Japan--the so-called Kibei).

Much the same considerations were responsible for the failure of many of the second generation to carry through formal renunciation of Japanese citizenship. In 1930 Dr. Edward J. Strong, Jr., of Stanford University, estimated that one-third of the Japanese children born in California were registered as citizens of Japan (that is, they possessed dual citizenship). Mr. Miyamoto, in the article previously cited, lists three important factors as making for this rather exceptional degree of social and economic introversion within the Japanese communities; Japanese tradition and the necessity of developing the optimum competitive strength of the Japanese within the American economy; sentimental and kinship attachments to Japan; and the ineligibility of alien Japanese for naturalization. (11)

No one has doubted, and least of all the second generation themselves, that there were disloyal elements among the resident Japanese. Those individuals known to be dangerous were, of course, seized at the outset and are now in internment camps in Montana, North Dakota, and New Mexico. But if, in an effort further to segregate the potentially dangerous, the aliens alone had been evacuated, it would have resulted in splitting families, creating juvenile delinquency, and jeopardizing the success of the relocation projects which, in general, stood in need of the special talents and skills of the second generation. To have evacuated the aliens alone would have been tantamount to saying that none of the second generation were suspect. If the citizens had been left behind and the coast were to be bombed, there was always the danger of mob violence, which might have affected other oriental groups, since, in a moment of hysteria, people would not have distinguished between Japanese, for example, and Koreans, Chinese, and Filipinos. It was deemed essential, therefore, that the general population receive emphatic assurance that all Japanese had been removed, so that they might then know that any remaining orientals were non-Japanese.

Law enforcement officials testified before the Tolan Committee that they had been plagued no end with 'phone calls and complaints concerning Japanese residents subsequent to December 7, and that, as civilian officials, they lacked authority to take measures which, in their judgment, were deemed essential to the protection of public order and safety. It was the existence

(11) See also his volume: Social Solidarity Among the Japanese in Seattle, December, 1939, Vol. II, No. 2, University of Washington Publications in the Social Sciences.

of such considerations, in addition to those related solely to "military necessity," which prompted the Pacific Coast congressional delegation to make its recommendation of February 13, 1942. (I should like to add, however, that I was opposed to mass evacuation and presented a proposal to the Tolan Committee for selective evacuation based upon a system of hearing boards.)(12)

The basic document, insofar as the evacuation program itself is concerned, is Executive Order No. 9066, issued by President Roosevelt on February 19, 1942. The pertinent portions of this order read:

I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of War, and the Military commanders whom he may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to provide for residents of any such area who are excluded therefrom, such transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary, in the judgment of the Secretary of War or the said Military Commander, and until other arrangements are made, to accomplish the purpose of this order.(13)

It will be noted that this order does not provide for a declaration of martial law. It provides for the creation of military areas from which any and all persons might be removed. Previously, on December 11, 1941, all that portion of the United States lying within the states of Washington, Oregon, California, Montana, Idaho, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, and the Territory of Alaska, had been established as the Western Defense Command, designated as a Theater of Operations, and placed under the command of Lieutenant-General J. L. De Witt. Following the President's Order of February 19, the Secretary of War had designated General De Witt as the military commander to carry out the terms and provisions of the order.

Pursuant to this authorization, General De Witt issued Public Proclamation No. 1 on March 2, 1942, setting up Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2 embracing the states of Washington, Oregon, California and Arizona. Military Area No. 1 included approximately the western half of the three Pacific Coast states and the border regions of Arizona, and Military Area No. 2 the remainder of those states. In addition there were set up in Military Area No. 2 numerous prohibited zones in the vicinity of power plants, railroads and other installations of a national defense character. The proclamation

(12) See part 31, Tolan Committee Transcript, pp. 11788-11797.

(13) The text of the entire order appears in the Preliminary Report of the Tolan Committee, March 19, 1942, p. 5.

prescribed that "such persons or classes of persons as the situation may require will by subsequent proclamation be excluded from all of Military Area No. 1 and also from such of those (prohibited) zones. . . as are within Military Area No. 2".

The physical task of evacuating the Japanese from their homes in the excluded areas, placing them in the assembly centers and providing for their welfare while there, as well as supervising the settlement of their property affairs, was given to the Wartime Civil Control Administration. This civilian affairs branch of the General Staff was created by General De Witt in March, and brought together numerous agencies of the federal government equipped to be of assistance in the evacuation program. To direct it, General De Witt designated Colonel Bendetsen, of the War Department General Staff. Numerous federal agencies were also designated to co-operate with the WCCA to expedite the program.

Voluntary Evacuation

From February 19 to March 27, 1942, Japanese were at liberty to depart voluntarily from Military Area No. 1. The failure of voluntary evacuation to effect the desired removal of all Japanese from Military Area No. 1 was largely responsible for the subsequent orders for general evacuation. During the period mentioned, it is estimated that some 10,231 Japanese voluntarily moved from Military Area No. 1, but, of this number, some 4,825 merely moved from Military Area No. 1 into Military Area No. 2. In some cases, this meant merely a removal of a few miles. It also had the effect of concentrating evacuees in certain rural areas in Central California, where, by their presence, they aroused suspicion and tended to aggravate an already tense situation. In the nature of things, voluntary evacuation could hardly have been successful, since few resident Japanese had friends or relatives in the middle west or east and had no place to go. Many of them, moreover, lacked the necessary funds to finance a long-distance removal; and, besides, they were uncertain about the kind of reception they might encounter in other areas. Of those who did voluntarily depart, some 5,396 went to areas outside both Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2. Some of the states to which these voluntary evacuees went are shown in the following table:

Colorado	2,264	Nevada	7
Utah	2,062	New Jersey	6
Arkansas	3	New Mexico	56
District of Columbia	3	New York	19
Idaho	350	North Carolina	6
Illinois	74	North Dakota	6
Indiana	20	Ohio	11
Iowa	5	Oklahoma	40
Kansas	6	Pennsylvania	11
Kentucky	1	Texas	61
Massachusetts	2	Virginia	1
Michigan	24	West Virginia	1
Minnesota	45	Wisconsin	20
Missouri	25	Wyoming	67
Montana	126	Canada	2
Nebraska	71		

Of the number who originally moved, during the period of voluntary evacuation, it was estimated that some 1,200 shortly thereafter returned to Military Area No. 1.(14)

Another important limitation to voluntary evacuation should be noted. In attempting to remove themselves beyond Military Areas No. 1 and 2, evacuees either had to cross through the intermountain states or to locate in these same states. The 1940 Census showed that only a few Japanese were located in the intermountain region: 508 in Montana; 1,191 in Idaho; 643 in Wyoming; 2,734 in Colorado; 186 in New Mexico; 632 in Arizona; 2,210 in Utah; and 470 in Nevada. In February, Congressman Tolan had wired the governors of these (and other) states, inquiring about the possibilities of relocating Japanese. The replies were--with the exception of Governor Carr of Colorado--uniformly adverse to the suggestion. Typical of the replies received was the comment of Governor Homer M. Adkins of Arkansas: "Our people are not familiar with the customs or peculiarities of the Japanese. We are always anxious to cooperate in any way we can, but our people, being more than 95 percent native born, are in no manner familiar with their customs and ways and have never had any of them within our borders, and I doubt the wisdom of placing any in Arkansas."(15)

Sentiment in these intermountain states was not only opposed to relocation, but indicated that evacuees might face many unpleasant incidents even in attempting to move further eastward. For example, Governor Payne Ratner, of Kansas, stated that "Japs are not wanted and not welcome in Kansas," and directed the State Highway Patrol to turn back any Japanese trying to enter the state (reported in the Las Vegas Daily Optic, April 1, 1942). One Japanese group, consisting of seven adults and a baby, was stopped at nearly every Colorado town en route to Greeley, Colorado. On March 7, 1942, the press reported that Japanese, attempting to cross through Arizona, were stopped by State Highway Patrolmen. Similar incidents were reported throughout the area. Typical of the general reaction was the statement of the Nevada Bar Association: "We feel that if Japs are dangerous in Berkeley, California, they are likewise dangerous to the State of Nevada." The State-Tribune (Wyoming) stated editorially in its issue of March 8, 1942: "It is utterly unequitable and unfair to subject Wyoming to the bureaucratic dictum that it shall support and find employment for Japanese brought here from Pacific Coast defense zones." In its issues of March 2 and 9, 1942, the Denver Post carried similar statements. The mere fact that Congressman Tolan had wired the governors of eleven states, asking about the possibility of relocation, served to bring down upon these governors a flood of protests from their constituents.

(14) See: Daily Press Review, WRA, May 16, 1942.

(15) See: Preliminary Report of the Tolan Committee, March 19, 1942, pp. 28-30, for copies of the replies received.

Voluntary Evacuation "Frozen"

The vigorous expression of such attitudes and the recurrence of incident after incident involving Japanese attempting to travel eastward, clearly indicated, early in March, that voluntary evacuation would not be successful. The same situation equally indicated that evacuation would have to be federally supervised, that minimum measures of protection would have to be taken, and that further voluntary evacuation would have to be curtailed. Consequently, on March 27, 1942, General De Witt issued Proclamation No. 4, prohibiting all alien Japanese and persons of Japanese ancestry from leaving Military Area No. 1, except as provided or authorized by the WCCA; and, on June 6, 1942, all further voluntary removal from Military Area No. 2 was similarly "frozen."

On March 24, 1942, General De Witt issued the first order excluding persons of Japanese lineage from a specific area. This order was followed by the issuance of some 108 separate exclusion orders, until by June 5, 1942, all of the Japanese had been removed from Military Area No. 1 or placed under supervision in centers located within the area. On June 2, 1942, General De Witt ordered all persons of Japanese lineage excluded from Military Area No. 2, and, by August 7, this area had likewise been cleared.

Evacuation proceeded, as I have indicated, on an area-by-area basis. The first step in the process was the establishment of civil control stations for each area having a minimum of 1,000 persons to be evacuated. At these designated control stations, evacuees were registered and to these stations they reported on a specified date for movement to an assembly center. In a period of about 28 days, Army Engineers constructed shelters in assembly centers for 100,000 people.

In the selection of these assembly centers, WCCA showed great ingenuity and resourcefulness. Use was made of fair grounds, parks, and race tracks. In California, assembly centers were established at Marysville, Sacramento, Tanforan, Stockton, Merced, Turlock, Salinas, Fresno, Pinedale, Tulare, Santa Anita, Pomona, Manzanar; in Oregon, at Portland; in Washington, at Puyallup; in Arizona, at Cave Creek and Mayer Camp. In general, residents of a particular area or community went to the same assembly centers (the same policy of preserving, so far as possible, community patterns, has been followed by the WRA).

By June 8, 1942, the entire movement from points of residence in Military Area No. 1 to assembly centers had been completed as the assembly center population reached a total of 99,770 Japanese. By that date, therefore, virtually every Japanese, citizen and alien alike, in the three west coast-states and portions of Arizona was in an assembly center; and shortly thereafter those remaining in Military Area No. 2 had likewise been moved into assembly centers. The only exceptions noted were those few Japanese confined to institutions, such as hospitals, prisons, insane asylums, orphanages, and sanatoria.

The rapidity with which this vast movement was effected represents a miracle of efficiency. For it must be remembered that this movement represents, as Dr. Paul S. Taylor has observed, "the largest, single, forced

migration in American history." Not only did it represent the largest forced migration in our history, but it involved men, women, and children, and it was effected in a remarkably brief period of time. Observers have noted nothing but praise for the tact, efficiency, and despatch with which the army executed this unique assignment. Colonel Bendetsen was, therefore, well within the facts when he stated that the entire movement had been effected "without mischance, with minimum hardship, and almost without incident."

As to conditions in the assembly centers, I have described in a recent article (Harper's, September 1942) the nature of one of the largest of these centers, that at Santa Anita. A reference to this article will provide a general description of what the assembly centers were like, how they were organized, and the manner in which they were governed. A fairly good description of the manner in which evacuation to the assembly centers was effected may be found by reference to a series of articles in the Los Angeles Times, May 12, 26, 27, and 28, 1942. Naturally conditions varied to some extent from one assembly center to another.

As might have been expected, hardship was occasioned by reason of the hastily improvised character of these temporary shelters. There was overcrowding; conveniences were lacking; and there was, inevitably, great confusion. It should be noted, however, that the assembly centers were never intended (with the exception of the Manzanar center) as permanent relocation projects. All that these temporary shelters aimed to achieve was to provide shelter and maintenance. It should, therefore, be emphasized that some of the critical articles which appeared at the time refer to conditions in assembly centers, not in relocation projects.⁽¹⁶⁾ Naturally a much stricter type of surveillance had to prevail in assembly centers than in relocation projects. I am not attempting to minimize the force of such criticisms as were voiced, but the distinction noted might well have been emphasized in those articles.

III. RELOCATION

On March 18, 1942, by Executive Order No. 9106, President Roosevelt created, within the Office of Emergency Management, the War Relocation Authority. Under the terms of the order, the Director of the Authority was authorized to provide for "the relocation, maintenance, and supervision" of the persons designated for removal by the Military Commander. To effectuate such steps, the Director was given specific authority to:

(16) See; for example; "Citizens Behind Barbed Wire," by Charles Iglehart, The Nation, June 6, 1942, and a letter in the same issue; and "Concentration Camp: U. S. Style" by Ted Nakashima, in The New Republic, June 15, 1942.

(a) accomplish all necessary evacuation not undertaken by the Secretary of War or appropriate military commander, provide for the relocation of such persons in appropriate places, provide for their needs in such manner as may be appropriate, and supervise their activities.

(b) provide, insofar as feasible and desirable, for the employment of such persons at useful work in industry, commerce, agriculture, or public projects, prescribe the terms and conditions of such public employment, and safeguard the public interest in the private employment of such persons.

(c) secure the cooperation, assistance, or services of any governmental agency.

(d) prescribe regulations necessary or desirable to promote effective execution of such program, and, as a means of coordinating evacuation and relocation activities, consult with the Secretary of War with respect to regulations issued and measures taken by him.

(e) make such delegations of authority as he may deem necessary.

(f) employ necessary personnel, and make such expenditures, including the making of loans and the purchase of real property, as may be necessary, with the limits of such funds as may be made available to the authority.

By the terms of the same order, the Director was also authorized to assist "all other persons removed" in the "management and disposal of their property." At the same time there was created within the WRA a Liaison Committee on War Relocation, consisting of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Labor, the Federal Security Administrator, the Director of Civilian Defense, and the Alien Property Custodian, or their respective deputies.⁽¹⁷⁾ Mr. Milton S. Eisenhower, formerly Land Use Coordinator in the Department of Agriculture, was appointed as the first Director of the WRA. He was subsequently succeeded by Mr. Dillon Myer, also from the Department of Agriculture.

Once the determination had been made by the Military Commander to move all Japanese from the west-coast states, there were three principal alternatives open to the federal government. These were: (1) internment in concentration camps; (2) voluntary resettlement outside the prohibited military areas wherever and under whatever circumstances they could themselves arrange; and (3) resettlement in an organized plan of relocation under

(17) For the full terms of the Executive Order, see: Preliminary Report of the Tolan Committee, March 19, 1942, Appendix C.

the supervision of the federal government in inland areas where they could be protected, have the opportunity of living reasonably normal lives, and be able to engage in the production of foodstuffs and articles for themselves and the nation at war. The first alternative was, in effect, ruled out by the President's original executive order since it clearly did not contemplate such drastic action. By March 18, 1942, when the WRA was established, voluntary evacuation was a demonstrated failure. There remained, therefore, the third alternative mentioned.

Selection of Sites

The first task confronted by WRA was that of selecting sites for relocation projects. More than 300 proposals for relocation sites scattered from the Pacific Coast states eastward to the Mississippi River were analyzed by the economists, engineers, and technicians of the WRA staff, with the assistance of numerous other federal agencies. Some of the requirements for sites have been described by the WRA as follows:

Due to the special uses to which these areas were to be put, minimum requirements were necessarily numerous and rigid. In the first place, an area had to contain a large acreage of good agricultural land, an adequate water supply, and climatic conditions which would make possible the production of all or at least most of the food consumed by not less than 5,000 evacuees. (This number of evacuees was stipulated since a small detail of troops could guard and protect 5,000 evacuees as easily as 500). About 7,500 acres of good agricultural land was usually necessary to meet this requirement. Furthermore, the land had to be in a single block remote from military establishments and military zones.

An important consideration was to select areas where only a few, if any, persons now living on the land would be displaced and where the attitude of the surrounding communities was not antagonistic. Because of the rubber shortage and the scarcity of other critical materials, it was necessary that the area be readily accessible to the established adequate power lines, railroads, and highways. Another requirement, particularly for an area with limited internal agricultural possibilities or with a long winter season, was that it offer opportunity for the establishment of industries capable of using considerable non-agricultural labor.

In addition to these requirements, WRA was faced with the fact that, in essence, it was attempting to reverse the tide of migration which, historically, has always been westward. The attempt to find sites in the intermountain area was, therefore, largely an up-stream movement.

A further obstacle, encountered at the outset, was the firm opposition to the establishment of relocation projects voiced by the governors of some ten western states. Early in the program, Mr. Milton Eisenhower met with the governors of the western states in Salt Lake City. With the exception of Governor Ralph Carr of Colorado these officials voiced the same objections that they had previously expressed in wires to Congressman Tolan. Somewhat indicative of the early reaction of these officials to proposals of this sort was that of Governor Chase Clark, who, speaking at Grangeville, Idaho, on May 22, said: "The Japs live like rats, breed like rats, and act like rats. We don't want them buying or leasing land and becoming permanently located in our state. I have always been willing to help the army in every way possible with the evacuation of Japanese from the coast, but I don't want them coming into Idaho, and I don't want them taking seats in our university at Moscow vacated by our young men who have gone to war against Japan."⁽¹⁸⁾ Stated the State-Tribune (Wyoming) in its issue of March 5, 1942: "Every congressman from beyond Salt Lake City is buried under an avalanche of mail protesting that the government is entirely too scrupulous in respecting the privileges of citizens of Japanese ancestry. We can't tell a good Jap from a bad one." In May 1942, the Office of Government Reports stated that "there exists definite suspicion and antagonism towards Japanese in Arizona, California, Colorado, Kansas, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington."

Finding sites, therefore, was not an easy matter. Many sites were immediately rejected because they were too small and many others were refused clearance by the military authorities. Still another difficulty was that proposed sites had to be already owned or controlled (at least in large part) by the government, since WRA wanted to eliminate the possibility of speculation in the sale of proposed sites and to insure the fact that improvements made at public expense would inure to the public benefit. Complications in titles and scattered ownership, in some cases, ruled out proposed sites.

Faced with these difficulties, WRA naturally turned to the two federal agencies which had long-term development projects in contemplation, namely, the Reclamation Service and the Indian Service. Since most of the development projects contemplated by these two agencies were located in the intermountain region, it followed that most of the sites finally selected by WRA were in this region. Hence WRA tended to move "more or less in the direction of 'wilderness' areas - among others, to the desert-type terrain of western Arizona, to the intermountain country of Wyoming not far from Yellowstone National Park, to the delta section of Arkansas only recently reclaimed from periodic floods."⁽¹⁹⁾ To date the following relocation centers have been selected and approved (and in most cases completed and occupied):

(18) Spokesman-Review, May 24, 1942.

(19) See Relocation Communities issued by WRA, September 1942, p. 2.

<u>Name</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Evacuee Capacity</u>	<u>Gross Acreage</u>	<u>Suitable for Agriculture</u>
Manzanar	California	10,000	6,000	500
Tule Lake	California	16,000	26,000	24,000
Colorado River	Arizona	20,000	72,000	41,000
Gila River	Arizona	15,000	16,467	14,750
Minidoka	Idaho	10,000	68,000	17,000
Central Utah	Utah	10,000	19,900	10,000
Heart Mountain	Wyoming	10,000	45,000	26,000
Granada	Colorado	8,000	10,000	6,500
Rohwer	Arkansas	10,000	10,000	9,000
Jerome	Arkansas	10,000	9,500	8,500
	Totals	119,000	282,867	157,250

It is estimated that, by November 1, 1942, all of the assembly centers (with the exception, again, of Manzanar) will be vacated and the evacuees re-established in the relocation centers designated above. Thereafter the entire administration of Japanese evacuees will be in the hands of WRA, a civilian agency. Presumably WCCA will continue in existence for some time, although its main function seems to have been discharged. In selecting sites, WRA was not primarily or even incidentally concerned with obtaining a typical distribution of the Japanese throughout the intermountain region. But, if one examines the location of the various projects selected to date (and apparently no more will be selected), then it becomes apparent that the Japanese population, long concentrated (perhaps to its disadvantage) in California, has been widely distributed. For example, the Japanese population in California has been reduced from 93,717 on December 7, 1941, to around 26,000 (representing the population of the Manzanar and Tule Lake centers). To be sure, there is no assurance that, at the termination of the emergency, the Japanese will remain in the areas in which they are, for the time being, residing. But there is at least an inference that a considerable number of them will relocate in those general areas.

The War Relocation Authority

WRA is a unique agency - a product of crisis government. It will be noted that, in WRA, the policy-making function and the administrative function are, essentially, fixed in one and the same person, namely, the Director of WRA. To date about all that Congress has had to say about the agency has been to make an appropriation of \$70,000,000.00 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1943 (\$34,566,700.00 for supplies and materials; \$15,766,800.00 for personal services and cash advances to enlistees; \$7,229,000.00 for investments and loans; and \$3,370,500.00 for rents and utilities). Congress, as such, has defined no policy for WRA nor has it established any standards or fixed any limitations within which policy is to be determined. To this statement one exception should, perhaps, be noted: the recommendations made by the Tolan Committee, many of which seem to have been followed by WRA. (20)

(20) See Findings and Recommendations on Evacuation, May 1942.

While in effect no policy has been defined for WRA, nevertheless policy is made within a stated frame of reference. First, policy must be made in the light of the provisions set forth in the President's executive orders authorizing the evacuation and establishing WRA. Second, WRA must operate within the framework of the war plans of the government. These plans influence policy in several respects, as, for example, in the selection of projects, such as the planting of guayule, the establishment of camouflage net-making projects, and so forth. Third, WRA must act within the restrictions of the Geneva Convention which, for example, provides that enemy aliens cannot be employed on war work. Fourth, WRA must work in conjunction with the War Department and the Department of Justice both of which still retain, under the President's Executive Order, important phases of jurisdiction. Essentially WRA has had to make policy as it proceeds with the program - to adapt policy to meet developing needs and situations. That it has done so in a realistic and effective manner is, I believe, demonstrated by its record to date. It is to be hoped, however, that in the near future the President will define in a comprehensive manner the national objectives of the program.

At the present time, WRA maintains its central headquarters in Washington, D.C., and also maintains field or regional offices in San Francisco, Denver, and Little Rock. The line of authority proceeds from the Director, to the Regional Director, to the project directors. Various aspects of the work have been departmentalized, with the establishment of a legal division, an employment division, a property division, and related phases of the over-all program. Because of the fact that WRA is a newly created agency .. an agency that is feeling its way along, so to speak, with a difficult and complicated task - it is impossible at this time to give a comprehensive statement of its procedures and policies. Even within the short period of its existence, policy has changed and is changing and many extremely important matters have not as yet been clarified by the adoption of a fixed policy. The relocation aspect of the program really dates prospectively from November 1, 1942 and, therefore, it would be idle to speculate, in this report, about what may or might happen in the future.

It is possible, however, to touch upon a few matters of particular interest. Under the terms of Regulation No. 34, issued August 24, 1942, WRA has announced its policy of self-government within the projects. When each project shall have been 75% occupied, then the project director selects an organization commission to prepare a plan of community evacuee government. Once this plan is formulated, it is reviewed by the project director and then submitted to a secret ballot by the camp residents and becomes effective only when it has been approved by a majority of the qualified voters (all those over 18 years of age) at a special election. All residents of the project 18 years of age or over are eligible to vote; but only citizens may hold office. Members of the first generation, however, are eligible for appointment to the various committees and commissions created under the community plan. The plan must provide for a community council which shall be authorized to make regulations (within certain limitations) for the government of the camp, to pass resolutions ~~on to the project director~~, and to fix a system of licenses and fees for enterprises carried on within the project.

The general policy also contemplates the creation of Judicial Commissions which shall have authority to handle minor offenses against project rules and regulations. The Judicial Commissions, as such, are authorized to hold hearings, to issue subpoenas, and to render advisory opinions to the project director. Such a provision has been deemed necessary by reason of the fact that federal courts have no machinery for handling petty crimes and misdemeanors committed outside National Parks. Recourse can always be had, of course, to state and federal courts in the handling of serious offenses; and, additionally, WRA possesses a federal power which is concurrent with state authority, to take such measures as are deemed necessary to maintain order within the projects.⁽²¹⁾ "By and large," to quote from a speech made by Mr. Roy Nash, "these evacuees are an exceedingly well-behaved group."⁽²²⁾ Only in one or two instances, for example, have evacuees attempted to escape from relocation centers without having obtained permission to leave.⁽²³⁾

Rights and Privileges of Evacuees

"It is the desire and the intention of the War Relocation Authority," to quote again from Mr. Nash's speech, "to grant evacuees every freedom consistent with military necessity." First of all, complete freedom of religious worship is assured to all evacuees and religious services of all types may be found in the project centers. If the camp occupants so desire, they may publish a center newspaper. According to Mr. Nash: "We intend that it shall be free in fact as well as in name, a press with full editorial freedom to criticize at will, and subject only to the restraints which all American journalism accepts as a necessity in time of war." To date a number of these center newspapers have been established and they are, indeed, remarkably interesting and well-edited publications. Open meetings may be held in the project centers by arrangement with the project director as to time and place and, at these meetings, both English and Japanese may be spoken.

Occupants of the centers may receive any type of publication, periodical, newspaper, or book that they may desire, even including publications in Japanese (provided, of course, that the project director will not knowingly permit the circulation of any publication, regardless of the language in which it appears, which is subversive of the war aims of the United Nations). New items appearing in the center newspapers are, in one or two of the newspapers I have seen, usually translated into Japanese, with both English and Japanese texts appearing in the same issue. While residents of

(21) See, generally, Daily Press Review, WRA, July 27, 1942; and a note on the Judicial Commissions by Mr. Franklyn Sugiyama in the Pacific Citizen, September 3, 1942.

(22) Manzanar Free Press, August 5, 1942.

(23) See: Daily Press Review, WRA, September 24, 1942.

the centers probably feel under some constraint merely by reason of their being in a relocation project, nevertheless, within the wide limits I have noted, they enjoy a full measure of freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and freedom of press. The Japanese-American Citizens League, from Salt Lake City, issues its official publication, the Pacific Citizen, which is not published in a project center and which has precisely the same freedom as any newspaper enjoys at the present time.

As to the right of franchise, the second generation adults enjoy the full possession of this right. In an opinion from the Solicitor of the War Relocation Authority (Opinion No. 20, September 2, 1942), this matter is discussed at length. Generally speaking, the situation is as follows: citizens of Japanese ancestry cannot qualify as voters in the areas to which they have been removed since they lack technical "residence" within the meaning of state statutes; however, they may continue to vote, by absentee ballot, in the communities in which they formerly resided. This decision has obviated the difficult problem which otherwise might have arisen in such communities as Owens Valley where the Manzanar project is located. There, were the second generation evacuees qualified to register as local voters, they could probably dominate county elections. Any such possibility would, of course, greatly disturb community relations.

Newspaper accounts would indicate that the second generation members of voting age have, thus far, not hesitated to exercise the voting franchise. The Pacific Citizen for August 13, 1942, states that the Japanese-American Citizens League distributed 15,000 absentee ballots for the primary elections in August. Generally speaking, to quote from an opinion by the Solicitor for WRA, "evacuees preserve all their rights and obligations as citizens of the state where they reside, as well as the United States, excepting only those rights and obligations which military necessity requires temporarily to be curtailed."⁽²⁴⁾ Complicated questions have arisen as to the rights of evacuees with respect to social security benefits, but these complications seem well on the way to being satisfactorily solved.⁽²⁵⁾

An important decision was made by the WCCA on August 6, 1942, with respect to mixed-marriage groups. This policy, as announced to me by Major Norman Beasley, is as follows:

Mixed marriage families composed of Japanese husbands, Caucasian wives and their mixed blood children, or Filipino husbands, Japanese wives and their mixed blood children, may be eligible for release provided they leave the Western Defense Command Area; and that families composed of Caucasian husbands who are citizens of the United States, Japanese wives and their mixed blood children may be eligible for release and residence within the Western Defense Command Area.

(24) Pacific Citizen, August 13, 1942.

(25) See: Daily Press Review, WRA, May 21, 1942.

Some 39 families of mixed Japanese and Caucasian blood were located in one project alone (Colorado River). In this connection, it is interesting to note that a recent survey of the Japanese group in New York City (1,750 in number), indicated a high percentage of mixed marriages and a large number of Eurasians.(26)

On the general question of the constitutionality of the evacuation program, suffice it to say that test cases are now pending in the federal courts which raise each and all of the issues involved.(27) It might also be mentioned that in the matter of Regan vs. King in the Southern Division of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, No. 22178-S, decided on July 2, 1942, it was held that persons of Japanese ancestry born in the United States are citizens thereof, and that, as such, they have the right to vote. While an estimated 5,000 persons of Japanese ancestry are serving in the armed forces of this country, at the present time persons of Japanese descent are classified as 4-C in the draft, as Major-General Lewis B. Hershey has declared that persons of Japanese parentage are not acceptable to the United States armed forces.(28) Soldiers of Japanese ancestry may now, with the proper permission, visit their relatives in the relocation centers while on furlough.(29) The Nisei have, however, suffered one serious deprivation: most of those who held civil service positions with city, county, and state governments have, in effect, been forced to forfeit their civil service status without due process.(30) But it should be pointed out that this is a matter over which the WRA has no control.

The Educational Problem

Another important problem with which WRA has been concerned is that of providing educational facilities in the relocation centers. By reason of the irregular age distribution of the Japanese population, there are many youngsters of school age in the projects. In some of the projects, for example, almost a third of the residents are of school age. In general, WRA is attempting, in the face of numerous difficulties, to provide proper school

(26) See: Pacific Citizen, August 13, 1942

(27) These cases are summarized in The Open Forum, publication of the Southern California Branch of the American Civil Liberties Union, September 26, 1942.

(28) Arizona Republic, September 1, 1942.

(29) Daily Press Review, WRA, October 21, 1942.

(30) See Pacific Citizen, October 15, 1942.

facilities. It has been difficult to secure an adequate teaching staff, since only about 16 of the needed personnel could be recruited in the centers and, also, because other available teachers had already signed contracts for the 1942-43 season. Insofar as possible, WRA is attempting to set up standards which will meet the requirements of the various states in which projects are located - no small task in itself since these standards are by no means uniform.

Typical of the general arrangement which WRA has sought to work out with state educational departments is that which prevails in California:

- (a) The Department of Education of the State of California will furnish free elementary text books for the projects in California.
- (b) The Department will provide consulting service on school construction and will aid in making contacts with local school districts and superintendents of education.
- (c) The WRA will employ personnel and operate the schools for the first year in close cooperation with state and local authorities.
- (d) During this year, an attempt will be made to get the state legislature to adopt legislation which will enable the creation of local school districts to operate these schools in the future.
- (e) At the beginning of the second school year, the schools will be entitled to state funds on the basis of average daily attendance during the first year.

Important programs have, also, been instituted in the field of adult education and the evacuees are showing a lively interest in these courses.

Unfortunately local school officials have not been uniformly cooperative. Proposals that evacuee youngsters be admitted to the state universities in Arkansas have been met with active opposition. The trustees of two state-maintained educational institutions have gone on record opposing the admission of Japanese.⁽³¹⁾ Requests from the WRA that the University of Arizona provide extension courses, library books, and faculty lectures for Japanese in relocation centers in that state, have been denied. In the words of President Alfred Atkinson of the University of Arizona: "We are at war and these people are our enemies."⁽³²⁾ Even the request of WRA to have 12 or 15 Japanese children admitted to the Oregon School for the Deaf has been curtly denied by the authorities. "This is no time," to quote the Oregon State Board of Control, "to admit Japanese children to the Oregon deaf school, particularly in view of the war."⁽³³⁾

As of November 1, 1942, some 400 colleges had expressed a willingness to receive Japanese students; of this number 284 institutions have been approved by the Army and Navy. Many of the colleges approved are small rural

(31) San Francisco News, August 21, 1942.

(32) See: Salt Lake Tribune, October 1, 1942.

(33) The Oregonian, October 8, 1942.

institutions: to date, for example, neither the University of Chicago nor Columbia University has been approved (although Barnard College has). Only American citizens are eligible for release to attend colleges and universities. The college must signify its willingness to accept the student; adequate assurances must be given WRA that satisfactory arrangements have been made with state and local officials; and the FBI must clear the student for release. No Kibei are eligible for release (according to WRA definition of Kibei). Ten colleges in the Western Defense Command have now been approved - three in Washington, two in Idaho, two in Utah, and one in Montana. As of November 1, 1942, 2,140 students had applied to WRA for permission to attend eastern and middle-western colleges and universities; of this number 340 permits had been granted and about 300 were actually in school. An additional 250 had been accepted by colleges, but for one reason or another could not go.

Private organizations have been actively interested in the problem and have cooperated splendidly with WRA. Over \$35,000.00 in gifts has been contributed to the private organization principally involved in student placement. Indicating the large number of students in some of the project centers, reference might be made to the situation at Manzanar. There some 750 students have been registered for the three grades in senior high, 530 in junior high and 850 in elementary grades.

The school problem is admittedly serious and complex. At the Minidoka project are some 1 $\frac{3}{4}$ Japanese evacuated from Alaska. Of this group, 45 are of mixed ancestry. In Alaska, they lived in native Indian villages, hunted whale and seal, and they speak a jargon of English-Eskimo-Indian-and-Japanese. Several in this group have never, in fact, associated with Japanese people. On the subject of languages, it is interesting to note that only 15% of the Nisei and Kibei were able to pass a test in oral Japanese; only 5% were able to read the test newspaper clipping in Japanese which requires knowledge of some 200 or 300 Japanese characters. I mention the fact as indicating that the Japanese language schools were, apparently, not conspicuously successful.

Public health problems have, generally, been satisfactorily handled by WRA. Each project has a hospital and a staff of doctors, dentists, and nurses, made up, for the most part, of Japanese evacuees. The principal difficulty seems to have arisen in connection with nurses. Admittedly there is a shortage of nurses. But considering the size of the relocation population and the sharp variations in climatic conditions, it is indeed remarkable that the public health problem has been met as well as it has. For example, on one day the temperature was 95 degrees at the Arizona project and 23 degrees at Tule Lake, with five inches of snow at the latter project. Also it should be remembered that many evacuees are, for the first time in their lives, living in cold climates. Institutionalized cases have been permitted to remain behind. However, on June 19, 1942, the children in the Japanese Children's Home in Los Angeles, 43 in number, were moved to Manzanar, where an orphanage has been improvised for their care. Since Pearl Harbor, some 66 Japanese have been admitted to state insane asylums in California. In such cases, WRA defrays the cost of their maintenance and treatment. (34)

(34) San Francisco Examiner, August 21, 1942.

Work Projects and Job Placement

Broad basic policies have been outlined by WRA within which work projects have been and are being planned. For example, WRA has announced:

- (a) That suitable work projects are planned and conducted in accordance with the requirements of the national emergency and the long-term plans for the development of regional resources.
- (b) That labor within the relocation area is fully and economically utilized with suitable equipment in order that governmental cost for providing the essentials of living may be minimized.
- (c) That labor needed for private employment outside the relocation centers is made available on a voluntary basis only under arrangements which guarantee fair working conditions and wages, and afford adequate protection.

Since 45% of the Japanese evacuees were engaged in agriculture before the war, it follows naturally that farming will be the principal industry in the relocation areas. Foodstuffs are raised for the support of the camp residents in the particular center, for exchange of products between centers, and, also, for sale to the armed forces and for lease-lend purposes. Remarkable progress has been made in this phase of operations. Important project industries have been established, but "no plans are contemplated for the manufacture of articles which can find their way into regular trade channels."⁽³⁵⁾ Some of the project-industries established include: garnishing of camouflage nets; a garment factory; a furniture plant; and a lens manufacturing plant. Extremely important public works projects have been established. In this connection it might be said that important long-range development plans of the Reclamation Service and the Indian Service will be completed, in areas leased or otherwise turned over to WRA by these agencies, within a much shorter period than originally contemplated.

Employment in the relocation centers runs the whole gamut of occupations to be found in communities of comparable size. Large numbers of the evacuees are employed in the kitchens and mess halls, in policing and fire prevention, in laundries, in hospitals, libraries, schools, recreational activities, community stores, project newspapers, and clerical work. All work is on a strictly voluntary basis. Recruits are paid on the following schedule: unskilled, \$12 a month; semi-skilled, \$16 a month; and skilled, \$19 a month.

The most remarkable progress has been made, however, in the matter of job placement. Before mass evacuation was ordered, a number of Japanese voluntarily moved into the Malheur farming region of Oregon in an effort to resettle. The movement into this area at the time provoked the sharpest official and unofficial protests. But so rapidly has the manpower crisis developed that, by May 15, 1942, an almost complete reversal of attitude was noted. I have already quoted Governor Chase Clark's (Idaho) rather notorious

(35) Information furnished the writer by San Francisco regional office.

"Japs is Rats" speech. But by May 25 Idaho sugar beet interests were actively seeking evacuee labor. When they went to the Puyallup Center in Washington to recruit evacuees, they found a clipping of Governor Clark's speech posted on the bulletin board and discovered that evacuees were not eager to work in Idaho.

Almost immediately thereafter, official Idaho attitudes began to soften. Typical of the changed situation was a resolution of the Montana sugar beet growers, passed on April 9, which reprimanded some "people in Montana who are using every means of arousing public opinion against the use of the only labor now in sight for our sugar beet fields." So swiftly did these official attitudes change that on May 15, 1942, WRA could announce the conclusion of an agreement with the Governor of Oregon (who had violently opposed the voluntary movement of Japanese evacuees into the Malheur region a month or so previously) for the release of evacuees to work in the beet crop. Fortunately for the program, the farm labor shortage was, so to speak, a twin of the evacuation program. Thus WRA "backed into" the matter of job placement in agriculture, not by accident, but by the natural course of events.

The development of policy, here, has been gradual and realistic. The first Civilian Restriction Order was issued May 19, 1942, followed by the second on May 20. As the pressure for the release of evacuees for farm labor increased, particularly in sugar beet areas, more and more workers were gradually released. Thus by July 20, 1942, WRA could announce the issuance of its Regulation No. 22 which considerably expedited the release of evacuees for farm labor. Most interesting are the general precautionary measures taken by WRA in releasing evacuees for farm work. These are, as stated by the WRA:

- A. Assurance from the governor of the state and from the principal law enforcement officials in the locality that law and order will be maintained.
- B. Assurance from the employer that transportation by bus or rail will be provided by the employer from the center to the place of work and return, or, if the assembly center has been evacuated in the meantime, assurance that the employer will compensate the military authority in an amount equivalent to the cost of returning the evacuees to the assembly centers.
- C. Assurance by the employer that not less than the wages prevailing in the locality will be paid the evacuees, and that any legal minimum wage requirement will be met.
- D. Assurance by the employer that adequate provision has been made as to housing and sanitary facilities for the evacuees without cost to them.
- E. Assurance by the employer that adequate provision has been made as to cooking facilities for the evacuees, or assurance that board will be furnished by the employer at cost.

- F. Assurance by the employer that adequate provision has been made as to medical attention for the evacuees or assurance that medical attention is readily available to them at rates commensurate with wages.
- G. Assurance by the United States Employment Service that provisions made by the employer for housing, sanitary conditions, and medical care are satisfactory.
- H. Assurance by the United States Employment Service that labor in the locality will not be displaced by the evacuees, that a genuine labor shortage exists in the locality, and that wages offered by the employer are not less than prevailing wages in the locality and not less than the minimum required by law.
- I. Assurance by the United States Employment Service that it will make a weekly telegraphic report to the WRA on general conditions in the area of employment.

Recently WRA has released a new set of regulations governing releases. These regulations may be found in the Federal Register for Tuesday, September 29, 1942. They provide for three types of leave: a short-term leave, for not more than 30 days, for attending to affairs requiring the applicant's presence outside the relocation area; a leave to participate in a work group, for employment and residence with a group of center residents outside the relocation area, or for such employment, with residence remaining within the relocation area; and an indefinite leave, for employment, education or indefinite residence outside the relocation area. The first two types of leave are approved by the project director; the third type of leave is issued by the Director. Applications for indefinite leaves must, also, be cleared by the FBI. In making application for indefinite leave, the applicant must furnish stated types of proof as to employment, area of residence, and so forth, and the Director may attach such special conditions to the leave as may be necessary in the public interest. Generally speaking, all camp residents are eligible for such leaves, but naturally precautions have been thrown around the program.

The development of this program has, indeed, been remarkable: some 9,000 evacuees are, at the present time, at work outside the centers on short-term leaves or furloughs. Probably 2,000 of those now on work furloughs may remain outside relocation centers during the winter. Only some 9 indefinite leaves have been granted to date; but the new regulations have been in effect ~~for~~ only a short period of time. An employment division has been set up within the WRA which is making extraordinary headway in the placement of evacuees. Recently applications have been received for many types of workers: for hotel employees; for railroad employees; for mining employees. Japanese workers today are harvesting sugar beets and potatoes, working as general farm hands, stock feeders, sheep herders, irrigators, and turkey-pickers. Dozens of applications have been received for domestic services and for many types of workers who, at the moment, cannot be obtained from the ordinary labor market.

The development of this program is, indeed, a remarkable demonstration of the fact that, when economic realities collide with emotional prejudices, a change is usually worked in the latter. Recently Dr. Dillon Myer, WRA Director, has estimated that 25,000 or perhaps more evacuees may eventually be relocated.⁽³⁶⁾ "Our first concern," Mr. Myer has stated, "is not the post-war period, but the problem of relocating residents outside the center before the war is over."⁽³⁷⁾

There is no doubt whatever that the release of Japanese evacuees materially assisted in saving the sugar beet crop this year in such states as Utah, Idaho, Wyoming, and Montana. "To many responsible farmers," says Mr. Frank A. Cleland, Montana manager of the American Crystal Sugar Company, "Japanese labor is a plain means of crop salvage."⁽³⁸⁾ "If it had not been for Japanese labor," states the Deseret News (September 2, 1942), "much of the beet crop in Utah and Idaho would have had to be plowed up."

Public officials throughout the intermountain region are now clamoring for more evacuee labor. Recently Senator Murray of Montana discussed with the President ways and means of even further expediting the release of evacuees for farm labor.⁽³⁹⁾ Favorable editorial comment on Japanese labor has recently appeared in a number of newspapers throughout the region.⁽⁴⁰⁾ In area after area public officials, formerly quite hostile to the mere suggestion of the use of Japanese as farm workers, have recanted (possibly under pressure from some of the more realistic interests in their communities) and are now urging WRA to release more workers. It is hardly an exaggeration to state that, within a period of six months, a revolution in attitudes has occurred.

This is not to say, of course, that all Japanese can be relocated before the war is over. There are definite limitations to the possibilities in this field which may, however, be still further removed as the manpower crisis deepens. Some limitations may be noted. For example, many Japanese lack essential skills; they would probably not be acceptable in certain types of employment involving special hazards; and, as a precautionary policy, they might not be assigned to certain industries.

(36) Pacific Citizen, October 22, 1942.

(37) Topaz Times, October 7, 1942.

(38) San Francisco Chronicle, October 12, 1942.

(39) Salt Lake Tribune, October 16, 1942.

(40) See, for example, Great Falls Tribune, October 16, 1942.

Thus within less than a year the cycle of evacuation has almost come to a full circle; evacuation, temporary resettlement, transfer to relocation centers, and movement out to permanent individual relocation. The emphasis now being placed on permanent individual relocation is most significant. It is apparently the belief of many WRA officials that a strenuous effort should be made now, before the war is over, to effect individual relocation. It is probably the theory, here, that by so doing, the evacuees may be spared the shock of still another dislocation after the war. The trend that policy has taken has a number of important implications. If it is projected still further, as seems likely, then projects established within the centers may necessarily have to be curtailed. So many Japanese have already left the Minidoka center to take jobs that "the colony itself is faced with a critical labor shortage,"⁽⁴¹⁾ The new development has, also, created some uneasiness within the relocation centers. I quote from a letter recently received from a friend in the Central Utah project (dated October 19, 1942):

The present WRA policy, as announced by Dillon Myer, has had the effect of keeping the evacuees restless. "If we are going to be asked to leave the center before the war is over we can't plan much," they say. If they do succeed in so doing the original plan of the military authorities to remove them from the coast areas will be completed. If they do scatter themselves around throughout the land in small groups of three, four, and five families, they will be somehow absorbed into America - absorbed to the extent that every big small town in America has a Chinese hand laundry and a chop-suey house. But what about the possibility of small democratic communities which the Japanese, under government help, could establish in various localities? Perhaps we progressives were utopians when we hoped that out of the relocation areas would come farms and factories operated on a cooperative basis.

Interesting variations have been noted in the communities to which Japanese workers have been assigned. In some of these communities, such as Twin Falls, Idaho, the community attitudes have been most favorable. Japanese workers eat in the restaurants, play pool in the pool halls, drink beer in the bars, and are served in stores and barber shops with no apparent discrimination. In other communities, a much different attitude has been noted, with the small towns showing considerable hostility but the farm groups, as such, evidencing a friendly attitude.

Letters received from the evacuees show the same variations. In one letter from Emmott, Idaho, dated September 21, 1942, an evacuee states:

(41) Pacific Citizen, October 15, 1942.

Don't worry about me, because I'm sitting pretty good out here in Idaho. - Boys already here have been making all the way from four to nine and ten and thirteen dollars a day picking prunes. - We are living in a fairly good American house. The inside sure is fixed good and clean, - plaster walls and linoleum floors. Everything is completely furnished us. Modern electric range, new big refrigerator, heater, all the kitchen utensils, and even a console radio.

On the other hand, another letter from Corvallis, Montana, dated September 27, 1942, states:

Thought you would like to know something about Montana and beets. Briefly - very sad. We've been working since Tuesday and only averaged about a couple of dollars a day. - Our grand abode looks like something brought over from the Kentucky hills or the Oklahoma dust bowl. - Six of us went into town for the first time to attend church and to take in a show. We were very well received at church with all the old ladies and gents greeting us that they're glad to see us here and all. So we left the church to get our noon lunch and bang! one place kicks us out, and another refuses service and finally we went to a place and waited for service. The waitress didn't kick us out but they just passed us for a heck of a long time.

The letters, in fact, are so conflicting that it is impossible to give a general statement.

In the main, the Japanese have adapted themselves admirably to the areas in which they are working. This is all the more remarkable by reason of the fact that Japanese workers in Utah, Idaho, and Montana are encountering climatic conditions which are new to many of them. In some center areas, an attempt has been made to set up citizens committees outside the center for the purpose of promoting friendly relations. Such a committee was established in Owens Valley, but on July 13, 1942, it reported to the project director at Manzanar that it intended to disband, since "public opinion was still too strongly against the committee to permit it to function at all successfully."

In area after area, the Japanese themselves have made every effort to demonstrate their patriotism and their willingness to serve in the war effort. At Manzanar the evacuees voluntarily requested a 7-day, 24-hour week, in preparing the center for occupancy. Four crews worked 6-hour shifts around the clock in camp work and planting crops. In Salt Lake City, more than 8 tons of scrap metal were gathered by the Japanese-American Citizens League and contributed to the scrap salvage drive.⁽⁴²⁾ Center

(42) Salt Lake Tribune, October 9, 1942.

residences have contributed heavily to the Red Cross and have steadily purchased a surprisingly large amount of defense bonds and stamps.

Services Available at the Centers

The general needs of center residents are being, in general, satisfactorily met at the present time. The WRA has established a system of relief payments for needy individuals, principally those unable, because of physical handicaps, to work. These relief allowances range as follows: for men, \$4.75 per month; for women, \$4.25 per month; for children (13-17), \$2.50 per month; for children under 13, \$1.50 per month. Relief allowances are not to be extended for more than 30 days at one time.⁽⁴³⁾

One interesting development has to do with the WRA policy on co-operatives. By Regulation No. 26, issued on August 25, 1942, cooperative enterprises may be established: (a) to aid evacuees in obtaining goods and services not provided by WRA; (b) to enable evacuees to procure goods and services of good quality at low cost; and (c) to provide means by which individual needs, desires, and tastes may be satisfied. Private enterprises operating for sale, at a profit, of consumer goods and services to center residents, are not permitted. Cooperatives may be formed under state laws and grants and loans may be obtained from WRA. These cooperatives must provide for unlimited voluntary membership therein of all evacuees in the particular center; only one vote per member is allowed; and a limitation is placed on the earnings of such cooperatives. During the interval between the time that such cooperatives are proposed and cooperative associations can be formed, they can be operated by WRA with center residents employed at project wages. It is proposed in certain centers to tax the profits of co-operatives for welfare purposes. At Manzanar the WRA-operated store did a gross business of \$1,700 the first day it opened. Its gross sales for the period from May 24 to June 30, 1942, were \$63,919.33 - a greater gross business than any other two stores in Owens Valley.

It should also be noted that WRA has an admirably functioning legal department. Lawyers of Japanese ancestry are available in most of the centers. They are employed in the legal department of the center at project wages and their services are available without cost. Bona fide litigants may obtain and have obtained permission to leave the centers in those cases where their testimony in court would not be effective if taken by deposition.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Also on July 15, 1942, WRA established a Property Division which has taken over the matter of advising evacuees concerning property matters - a function formerly discharged by the Farm Security Administration and the Federal Reserve Banks as part of the WCCA program. In my testimony before the Tolan Committee, I stressed the importance of having property

(43) Manzanar Free Press, August 26, 1942.

(44) The set-up and functions of the legal department are summarized in Administrative Instruction No. 52, issued October 6, 1942.

custodianship constituted as an integral part of the evacuation program. Had this policy been adopted at the outset (which was probably not possible in view of the time element involved), it is altogether probable that losses sustained by the Japanese might have been minimized. Undeniably such losses have been sustained. Even branch banks have now been established in one or two of the centers. Thus it is difficult to imagine an essential service that is not available to evacuees (if imperfectly and crudely): from schools to hospitals; from banks to lawyers; from shoe repair shops to canteens; from churches to beauty parlors.

IV. POSTWAR STATUS OF THE JAPANESE

It is difficult to speculate about the various turns and twists which public opinion is likely to take on the Japanese problem in the future. There is already a movement under way seeking to exclude the Japanese altogether from the United States after the war. Generally speaking, this movement has taken two forms: (a) a rather vague expression of an intention to "deport" all Japanese; and (b) a more specific plan to deprive the second generation of American citizenship if necessary by constitutional amendment. One proposed bill which has received much comment is that introduced by Senator Stewart of Tennessee (S. 2293). It purports to authorize the detention of all persons of Japanese descent for the duration.⁽⁴⁵⁾ The Native Sons and Daughters of the Golden West (which has never admitted native-born Japanese to membership) has taken the initiative in advocating measures designed to strip the Nisei of American citizenship. Senator Holman of Oregon, on September 21, 1942, proposed a constitutional amendment to the effect that persons who under the laws of any foreign nation are deemed to be citizens or subjects of such foreign nation shall not become citizens of the United States whether born in the United States or not, except to the extent and subject to such terms and conditions as Congress may prescribe.⁽⁴⁶⁾

Even in British Columbia, Ian Mackenzie, British Columbia's representative in the cabinet at Ottawa, has stated that he would favor deportation of all Japanese after the war.⁽⁴⁷⁾ The first instance, to my knowledge, of the question of possible postwar deportation being raised as a political issue occurred in Salinas, California, where Mr. Al J. Dingeman, candidate for Congress, declared that he was in favor of deporting all Japanese in the United States.⁽⁴⁸⁾ Such an expression is dangerous since it indicates the possibility that the same issue may be raised in many congressional fights in the future. To raise such an issue in time of war, almost precludes the possibility of a debate on the merits.

(45) See: The New Republic, August 10, 1942.

(46) See Interpreter Releases, October 9, 1942.

(47) See Christian Science Monitor, October 19, 1942.

(48) Pacific Citizen, October 22, 1942.

As a sample of what may reasonably be expected, I quote a portion of the report of the Americanism Committee of the American Legion Convention as reported in The National Legionnaire of October 1942:

Whereas, all Japanese, both alien and native born, were ordered confined in concentration camps for the duration of the war; and

Whereas, while the Military authorities were in charge of these camps, there was no complaint from the Japanese as to their loss of privileges or confinement in these camps; and

Whereas, since June 1, 1942, when the authority over these camps was turned over to civilian control board, discipline has been relaxed, no fences have been built and discontent has been bred among the Japanese confined there; and

Whereas, a campaign is under way to allow 2,000 Japanese students to leave the camp and continue their education at different schools and colleges; and

Whereas, thousands of our sons have had their educational program cut short by being drafted into the military service in defense of our country;

Now, therefore, be it resolved, by the American Legion in national convention assembled at Kansas City, Missouri, that we go on record as being opposed to any special privileges being granted Japanese in these camps and that they be denied the privilege of leaving these camps under any pretext for the duration of the war and that control over these camps be returned to the military authorities; and

Be it further resolved that those Japanese that escaped to states east of the Rockies be taken into custody and placed in these different camps or that they be placed under military control in their present location.

The interesting point to note about this resolution is that, so far as I know, the national administration has never ordered Japanese confined to concentration camps for the duration of the war.

It should be remembered also that the political phase of the problem is likely to arise this winter when most of the state legislatures of the intermountain region will be in session. Unquestionably there will be some concerted effort made to pass discriminatory legislation. Reports from Utah indicate that groups have already gone on record in favor of asking the Governor to call a special session of the legislature, should reported rumors of Japanese land purchases and leases be confirmed.⁽⁴⁹⁾ Similarly

(49) Salt Lake Tribune, August 23, 1942.

the Utah State Federation of Labor has gone on record opposing the employment of Japanese in certain trades.⁽⁵⁰⁾ Several state Legion groups have passed resolutions (Nevada is a case in point) advocating an amendment to the constitution to prevent children of parents ineligible to citizenship from becoming citizens.

At the 24th Annual Convention of the American Legion in California, Mr. Robert F. Garner, Jr., state commander, stated: "We want Japanese kept where they are until we have won the war. All efforts to bring them back to California as farm laborers will be vigorously fought by every one of California's American Legionnaires."⁽⁵¹⁾ It should be noted, however, that the California Legion recalled a resolution originally passed asking for the deportation of all Japanese after the war.⁽⁵²⁾ Also the California State Federation of Labor rejected a resolution which advocated a constitutional amendment designed to revoke the citizenship of Japanese Nisei and deport them to Japan.⁽⁵³⁾

While it is impossible, at this time, to analyze the currents and cross-currents of feeling that have existed in the assembly and relocation centers, nevertheless a word or two of comment might be helpful. The evacuation experience has demonstrated, I believe, that there was a current of pro-Japanese feeling among the first generation. For example, by October 8, 1942, WRA had received 1,250 applications from center residents for repatriation. While this number of applications is not large, nevertheless it does indicate that a considerable number of evacuees feel, for various reasons, that their ties are with Japan. Various expressions of opinion given at the time these applications were received are illuminating. "Desire to join relatives"; "win, lose or draw in this war, Japan is the best bet"; "Even if America wins, there'll be small chance for us Nisei"; "if citizenship is going to be taken away, I'm going to Japan."⁽⁵⁴⁾ At Manzanar, 170 center residents including 6 Kibei, signed up for repatriation. "I can't speak English," one was reported as saying, "and I don't see why I should hang around here." In one center, to give an indication of the distribution of applications, 350 aliens, 25 citizens, and 103 of dual citizenship, signed up for repatriation.

This indication of pro-Japanese sentiment is not surprising. The editor of Doho (a progressive Japanese newspaper formerly published in Los Angeles) declared on December 11, 1941, that "it is a known fact that the

(50) Salt Lake Tribune, September 23, 1942.

(51) San Francisco Examiner, August 16, 1942.

(52) Pacific Citizen, August 27, 1942.

(53) Greater Los Angeles Labor, October 1, 1942.

(54) Quotations from Daily Press Review, WRA, August 5, 1942.

majority in our Japanese communities have long been under deep Japanese influence and still are." The evacuation program seems to have heightened already existing tensions within the Japanese communities and to have deepened already existing cleavages. In certain WRA centers, this cleavage has been quite noticeable. The Manzanar Free Press, in an editorial in its issue of August 12, 1942, fairly well summarizes the issue:

Two thirds of the center residents are American citizens. The majority of the citizens are loyal to this country despite evacuation and its concomitant hardships. The mature Nisei realize that their future is deeply rooted in democracy's soil. Their background is American, their thinking American. They realize that with their limited knowledge of Japanese they would be a persecuted minority in Japan.

Then there are others whose natural sympathy for Japan has increased with the hardships of the last few months. This group is not limited to the Issei or Kibei, for the arrows of fascist propaganda have found their mark in a few embittered and gullible Nisei.

Occasional references in center newspapers to acts of "hooliganism" and "ruffianism" and rather vague references to "gangsterism,"⁽⁵⁵⁾ clearly indicate that there is a small but troublesome minority in some of the centers. Embittered Issei have been known to remark to their anti-fascist children: "You see - where's your American citizenship now? So you abandoned your parents, your religion, your nationality, and what did it get you?"

As to the general loyalty of the group, as a group, there can be little question. "I would say," testified Mr. Milton Eisenhower, formerly WRA director, "that from 80 to 85% of the Nisei who are American-born citizens are loyal to the United States. I just cannot say things too favorable about the way they have cooperated under the most adverse circumstances."⁽⁵⁶⁾ Referring to the Nisei, a Naval Intelligence Officer has written: "I consider that at least 75% of them are loyal to the United States."⁽⁵⁷⁾ Prior to the appearance of this article, Colonel Bendetsen had stated (June 5, 1942), that "the behavior of the Japanese has been such that in not one single instance has any Japanese reported disloyalty on the part of another specific individual of the same race." But the author of the article in Harper's states quite unequivocally that he received, as an intelligence officer, cooperation from the Nisei. The testimony of this intelligence officer is, in fact, quite impressive. It should be pointed out, however, that Japanese evacuees

(55) Manzanar Free Press, August 3, 1942.

(56) Pacific Citizen, July 16, 1942.

(57) Harper's, October 1942.

cannot be grouped or classified with respect to loyalty on the basis of their being Issei, Nisei, or Kibei. The real test must be made that of political ideology, and not that of birth or residence. All the Issei are not disloyal; all of the Nisei are not loyal; some of the Kibei may be loyal.

The difficulty of determining loyalty or, as the author of the Harper's piece so well says, the degree of probable menace, might have been resolved at the outset, and should still be resolved, through the establishment of hearing boards to pass upon each individual case. Such a procedure would eliminate the odious doctrine of guilt by association and the inference that race, per se, can be made the basis of determining loyalties. I cannot agree, however, with the suggestion made in the Harper's article that selected Nisei should serve on such hearing boards. It seems to me that such a procedure would only intensify already existing dissensions within the Japanese community and, besides, it would be unfair to ask any Nisei to assume such a responsibility. As to further suggestions on hearing boards, I can only refer to my testimony before the Tolan Committee.

Much might be written as to the outlook of the evacuees, but the situation is so changeable, so variable, that it is dangerous to generalize. I should like, however, to refer to a report by an official of the Authority, which I was privileged to read in manuscript, relative to prevalent fears in the Tule Lake community. The dominant fear of the people, the one which most influences their daily behavior, "is the concern about their livelihood in the postwar period." The author then goes on to catalogue certain fears frequently expressed by center residents: fear of financial dependency; fear of postwar unfavorable treatment; immediate needs, such as fear of food shortages, clothing shortages, winter shelter and fuel; fear of fire, of violence, of disease; parental fears relating to the education, ~~manners~~, morals, and conduct of children; personal fears, such as fear of immobilization ("God, I'm getting tired of this place"); stagnation, fear of further evacuation, of strangers and sectionalism; and a general fear of the outside. Then there are fears connected with marriage ("I can't get married on \$16 a month"). "The fears catalogued," states the report, "are by no means all the fears that exist in the community or will exist. With each change in the condition of livelihood here, new feelings of insecurity may crop up, or old fears may die out." These fears are unquestionably related to the marked tendency for rumors to sweep like wildfire through the centers, usually with no foundation whatever in fact.

This tendency is also related to the circumstance that wild rumors about the centers sweep through the communities in which they are located. Wholly irresponsible stories and rumors about the luxury enjoyed by the evacuees, the alleged ease of their lives, spread throughout the immediate locality and poison public opinion against the evacuees. Outside communities give credence to such stories as that the shortage of milk (an assumed fact) in Arizona was due to the amount of milk consumed in the WRA center; that the WRA is grabbing all the available teachers to the detriment of local communities; that the meat shortage is due to WRA purchases. Repeatedly the

false charge of "luxurious ease" is made against the WRA centers.(58) Occasionally center residents complain about the fact that they must constantly associate with "Japanese." One Morris E. Suyetomi stated that he hated the Japanese so much that he preferred to go to jail rather than be sent to a relocation center;(59) and one little girl at Tanforan asked her mother: "when are we going to get out of Japan and back to America?" Many center residents are, for the first time in years, actually associating with their own people.

It should always be remembered that it is in relation to this general background, this atmosphere, and in relation to these and a hundred other difficulties, that WRA must operate. When due regard is given to these difficulties, then the record of WRA to date is one in which any American can take great pride. Acquaintance with WRA personnel, in the regional office in San Francisco and in the field, has inspired in me the utmost admiration for their spirit, their loyalty to the program, their patience, and their efficiency. In conclusion, I should like to repeat a comment made by the Tolan Committee in its report:

The curtailment of the rights and privileges of the American-born Japanese citizens of this country will furnish one of the gravest tests of democratic institutions in our history. As with all previous crises in the nation's history, the preservation of liberties will depend upon the degree to which clear vision is applied to momentary difficulties. Realism must go hand in hand with a profound sense of responsibility for the maintenance of our way of life.

And, also, a comment from my article in Harper's:

Great issues are at stake in the evacuation program: the question, for example, of whether a democracy can fight a total war and preserve its freedom. The issue is fraught also with great international significance in terms of our relations with colored peoples generally. There is no reason why the relocation projects cannot be successful, cannot in fact reflect great credit upon us as a nation - provided a majority of the American people will insist upon fair treatment of the Japanese and not succumb to demagogues and race-baiters.

(58) See: Klamath Falls Herald, October 14, 1942.

(59) San Francisco Chronicle, October 10, 1942.

Los Angeles, California
November 1, 1942.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

West Coast

- "The Japanese in Our Midst," pamphlet, Colorado Council of Churches
- "Aliens, But Useful," Business Week, February 21, 1942
- "America's 150,000 Japanese," by E. O. Hauser, American Mercury, December, 1941
- "California and the Japanese," by Carey McWilliams, New Republic, March 2, 1942
- "California Gets Tough," by J. Bruce, New York Times Magazine, March 15, 1942
- "Churches Act to Shield Japanese," by A. A. Hunter, Christian Century,
December 31, 1942
- "Cool Heads or Martial Law," by Robert Bendiner, Nation, February 14, 1942
- "Evacuating American Citizens," by F. B. Duvenock, Nation, May 9, 1942
- "Help for Japanese Refugees," by P. R. Hare, Christian Century, March 18, 1942
- "Japanese Out of California," by Carey McWilliams, New Republic, April 6, 1942
- "Japanese Saboteurs in Our Midst," by Stanley High, Readers Digest,
January 1942
- "Our Japanese Refugees," by Galen M. Fisher, Christian Century, April 1, 1942
- "The People Nobody Wants," by F. J. Taylor, Saturday Evening Post, May 9, 1942
- "Plight of the Nisei," by Howard Costigan, Nation, February 14, 1942
- "What Shall We Do with Our 150,000 Japanese?" by D. Eddy, American Magazine
March 1942
- "Evacuees to Farms," Business Week, September 19, 1942
- "Japanese Americans and the Law," by Roger Baldwin, Asia, September 1942
- "Are Evacuees to Become Peons?" Christian Century, August 12, 1942
- "Outcast Americans," by W. Robinson, American Magazine, September 1942
- "Problem People," by J. Marshall, Collier's, August 15, 1942
- "Later May Be Too Late," by T. Fukuyama, Christian Century, July 15, 1942

- "Life is Hard in Evacuee Camps," by A. A. Hunter, Christian Century, July 15, 1942
- "Eyewitness Story of the Evacuation of the Japanese" by E. Clement, Christian Century, August 5, 1942
- "Help for the Nisei Students," by R. W. Barstow, Christian Century, July 1, 1942
- "Japanese at Work," by L. E. Davies, New York Times Magazine, June 21, 1942
- "West Coast Japanese," by G. E. Wills, Asia, August 1942
- "Business in Evacuee Centers," Business Week, July 18, 1942
- "Protective Custody of the Japanese," by C. W. Piersol, Christian Century, August 12, 1942
- "Our Stakes in the Japanese Exodus," by Dr. Paul S. Taylor, Survey Graphic, September 1942
- "Evacuation: American Style," by George D. Nickel, Survey Midmonthly, April 1942 and October 1942
- "Japanese Evacuation," by Galen M. Fisher, Far Eastern Survey, June 29, 1942
- "Japanese Evacuation: Policy and Perspectives," by Carey McWilliams, Common Ground, Summer 1942

Hawaii

- "Brother Enemy," by M. W. MacKay, Asia, March 1942
- "Japanese in Hawaii," New Republic, April 6, 1942
- "Stranger Without Our Gates," Time, January 19, 1942
- "Hawaii's 150,000 Japanese," by Albert Horlings, Nation, July 25, 1942
- "Japan-in-Hawaii," by B. Henderson, Survey Graphic, July 1942



