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GRANADA PROJECT
Anache, Colorado

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September 22, 1944

TO: Dr. Edward H. Spicer, Chief
FROM: J. Ralph McFarling, Community Analyst
SUBJECT: Weekly Report for 9/14 to 9/21 inclusive

Return to California

Letters written by a Heart Mountain woman who recently returned to Los Angeles were published in the Rocky Shimp and have been widely discussed. These letters expressed a favorable attitude toward the return of the Japanese to the West Coast, but cited certain physical difficulties such as the fact that it is necessary to pay rent 10 months in advance. While this was considered very difficult and would probably deter many from returning to the West Coast, it was thought to be only temporary. It was not taken to be an act of racial discrimination, since there are few Japanese there now, but the result of war-time conditions. News regarding California in these letters was accepted with satisfaction by the residents although it was generally believed that only those who owned property would be able to return there at first.

Several weeks ago, a Caucasian who operates a number of farms for center residents near Merced expressed the opinion that the Japanese people should not return a few at a time, but in large numbers which he felt would give greater security and mean less discrimination. This idea was not accepted by the people in general as sound.

An Issei grower who says he plans to return to California as soon as it is opened, estimates that not over 10 per cent of the people will return at first. Perhaps not over 20% altogether.

One of the problems which people who own property in California are concerned about is being able to get possession. Many people signed three year leases which will run out in May 1945; others signed indefinite leases such as for the "duration of the war". They do not know what is the status of these leases now in the event California is opened before the end of the war.

A Nisei girl expressed the opinion that the residents were not so much concerned about the attitude of the native Californians as they are about the attitudes of the new people who have gone to California since the war started, and who have never known Japanese people. However, they think that after the war is definitely over that many of these people will return to their original homes. They seem to constitute a threat in regard to housing, job opportunities, and racial discrimination.

Ishi Koen Kai (Doctor's Supporting Association)

The Council and Block Managers groups have been very much concerned during the past few weeks over the situation of the Japanese Doctors in the hospital. This problem has come up periodically in the past when Japanese Doctors have shown a tendency to resettle. Now with only three Japanese Medical Doctors left in the center, the various groups feel it necessary to provide all the inducement they can to keep them here. They realize that the doctors and dentists are sacrificing a great deal by working in the center at \$19.00 per month, when they could be making much more on the outside.

Ishi Koen Kai was organized with all groups in the center represented including Community Council, Block Managers, Booster Service, Women's Federation, etc. It has not been confined merely to the doctors, but the entire hospital service is included. Officers have been appointed, and by-laws written up. Block meetings have been held to get the support of the people which seems to be practically unanimous. The feeling of this group was that if the pay of the doctors could be increased from \$19.00 to say \$50.00 by collecting funds from the residents to supplement WRA wage that this would ~~be~~ help to do at least two things: 1) tend to keep as many Japanese doctors and dentists in the center as possible, and 2) tend to discourage personal gifts to the doctors by the residents, so that those who have little money may feel that they will receive the same treatment as those who are able to make generous gifts.

The general feeling is that it would be unfortunate for the residents if the Japanese doctors and dentists resettle, so that the hospital would have to recruit Caucasian doctors at the present time when there are so few good doctors available due to war conditions.

Ishi Koen Kai has asked the center residents including those out on seasonal leave to contribute five cents per month per person to aid the doctors. They also asked the Co-op to donate \$1000 to this fund. Practically a hundred per cent response was received from the residents and the Co-op donated \$500.00

Labor Problem and Community Government

The labor situation which has been acute for some time has recently become more so due to the return of 429 high school students to the classrooms, and the seasonal leave of 200 workers to the broom-corn harvest.

A number of weeks ago the Administration asked the Council to form a Man Power Commission of five members who would act with a similar number of Appointive Personnel in the Commission in working out the problems of center employment. The Council's attitude was that such a Commission should be appointed, but that the matter be first referred to the people in block meetings for two reasons: 1) to get the backing of people in the formation of such a commission, and 2) to get the co-operation of the people with the commission in any acts it performs after it is appointed. This seems reasonable, but instead of calling block meetings to discuss the matter with the people, a committee was appointed to discuss the matter with Mr. Lindley. Evidently some members of the Council thought of this committee as their representatives on the Labor Commission. After discussing labor problems and the functions of the council for two hours it was decided that this committee did not have the authority to represent the Council on the commission; that it was only a committee with power to discuss but not to act. It was felt by members of the Council that members of a commission would have greater responsibility and would be charged with powers to act such as naming priorities regarding essential and unessential employment, and that it might be necessary in some cases to assign certain people to definite undesirable jobs. In this respect it was felt that the commission had much broader scope than the committee and might run into difficult circumstances unless the people accepted responsibility for its development. One difficulty seen was that certain individuals might not want to be on the commission because of unfavorable criticism.

As a result a joint meeting of the Community Council and the Block Managers Assembly was held on Tuesday September 19. After free discussion it was decided to co-operate in forming the Commission with full power to act. A majority of both groups seemed favorable to taking the matter to the people first by holding block meetings. Another joint meeting was held on September 20. At this time the block managers reversed their opinion regarding asking the people and wanted to go ahead and form the commission at once. The Block Managers Assembly said "Let's vote as Block Managers". The Chairman of the Community Council then said to the Block Managers "You cannot decide as Block Managers, but as residents". The Block Managers then reacted to this statement by leaving the meeting in a body. In the ensuing discussion, the Vice-Chairman questioned the right of the Chairman to make such a statement to the Block Managers since they had been invited to the meeting by the Council, and since there had been no clarification at the beginning of the meeting as to whether the Block Managers were invited as Block Managers or as resident guests. However, the Council gave the Chairman a vote of confidence. In the writer's opinion there needs to be a good deal of clarification as to the function of a joint Community Council and Block Managers Meeting. The chief difficulty emanating from such a meeting seems to center around the fact that the

Block Managers is to all intents and purposes an executive group while the Council is a policy forming group elected directly by the people. There is a question whether such a meeting should be held at all except as a matter of expediency to obtain general discussion on a question and clarify thinking.

So far as the writer can discover there was no expressed difference in the two bodies regarding the forming of a Man Power Commission since both were in favor of it. However, the Council wanted to carry the matter to the people first, and the Block Managers wanted to go ahead and form the commission at once. In the meantime the Council went ahead and mimeographed a statement to the people requesting their opinion regarding the formation of this Man Power Commission, and with it enclosed a copy of a letter written to Mr. Lindley in which they stated that they had formed a Man Power Commission to meet with him, but which was not recognized by you." It went on to say that the Council and Block Managers had formed a five member Man Power Commission which was formally approved by the Council body subject to the approval of the people of Amaze. This two page mimeographed form was distributed to the blocks Thursday, September 20th, but we have received no report as yet on the results.

(Signed) J. R. McFarling
J. Ralph McFarling
Community Analyst

GRANADA PROJECT
Amache, Colorado

November 24, 1944

TO: Dr. John H. Provinse, Chief, Community Management Division
ATTENTION: Dr. Edward H. Spicer, Chief, Community Analysis Section
FROM: J. R. McFarling, Community Analysis Section
SUBJECT: Weekly Report

In my weekly report of November 10th, I discussed the thinking of the evacuee regarding indemnities. Certain reactions which have come to my attention since then leads me to think that this attitude may be undergoing change, and there is developing a very definite alternative which will be accepted by many in lieu of indemnities. However, that some measure of restoration to his pre-evacuation status is absolutely necessary, is one of the most important elements of the evacuee's thinking regarding resettlement; not only does he feel it is just, but he can see no other way out of his present situation. The alternative mentioned above is: to give special consideration to the relocatees by arranging loans on a long-term low-interest-rate basis. Provision of this sort would be accepted by many in lieu of indemnities, and would enable them to participate in their own restoration without actual cost to the government since the money would be paid back.

This attitude on the part of many evacuees is not motivated by the desire to get something for nothing, nor to take advantage of their position to bring pressure on the government to meet unjust demands. They feel that because of their unfortunate situation they cannot resettle without financial aid in the form of a loan. They reiterate over and over again that they want to pay the money back, and do not want charity. The source of the loan is of no particular consequence to them as long as they can be sure it will be made available without discrimination such as they experienced with government agencies in California. The amount of the loan is to be determined by need, but the upper limit some have set to be not more than one thousand dollars per person. Since it is a loan to be paid back the evacuee feels that no one will borrow more than he actually needs for his restoration, and that this fact will serve as a definite limit to the temporary obligation which the government would assume.

The reaction on the part of the evacuee is not so much one of attempting to figure up the total cost to him of his evacuation experience, but rather of trying to find ways and means of going on from

here. No matter how he approaches the problem, he discovers that it takes money to start over again whether it is farming or re-establishing a business in California or elsewhere. He also finds in the majority of cases that he does not have the funds of his own to do it. Nearly all came to the center with depleted resources, and have been paying insurance premiums and other center and extra-center expenses out of those resources. Many have had to give up their insurance policies, which to the evacuee is one of his most prized possessions, and is only done as a last resort.

The evacuee now feels that restoration to a semblance of his former economic status is definitely beyond his own control, and that government intervention is necessary. He, however, has little confidence in the already existing government lending agencies because first (see trend report of Nov. 10th) they are not geared to his special needs, and second while there may be no discrimination against him at the Washington level within these agencies, there has been discrimination at the local community level which he has experienced in the past. He feels that since he was placed here through no fault of his own that the government is responsible for his welfare. He is now waiting to see what definite plan the government will make for his rehabilitation.

This thing called resistance

1. Resistance implies something to resist

We hear a great deal about the evacuee's resistance to resettlement, as if the only factor which stands in the way of successful resettlement is the evacuee's individual and personal contrariness. Thus we seem to think of resistance as a one way proposition, when actually resistance by its very connotation implies that there is something to resist; that pressure is being applied by a force outside one's self. Therefore, it is certainly important to examine the nature of this pressure and the reasons for the evacuee's reactions.

2. Two lines of thought

Upon analysis we believe that the nature of the conflict situation is the result of two different lines of thought, namely: (1) WRA's thinking regarding evacuation which is motivated by intellectual concepts of what will work out for the best interests of this racial group in America for the future, and (2) the evacuee's own thinking regarding resettlement which is motivated by emotional attitudes, reactions, and cultural behaviour patterns.

A. WRA's philosophy of evacuation

If we state briefly WRA's philosophy of evacuation as we understand

it early in the program at least, it would be: "Evacuation is an unfortunate occurrence. However, it came about as a result of opposing social forces which developed on the West Coast due to the concentration of people of Japanese ancestry in that area. Therefore, the best thing for the Japanese people to do from here on is to resettle in communities throughout the country where they will be more easily assimilated into the life of the nation. Then there will be little or no chance in the future of intense anti-Japanese feeling developing in a small community which would effect the lives of the entire Japanese population. Therefore, we will implement this policy by setting up offices in the principal cities and rural communities where evacuees are likely to resettle in order to discover opportunities for them. We will go further, we will attempt to make available to them all the resources of those communities which are available to others."

This philosophy of evacuation was gradually understood, and accepted by the majority of the Nisei, and as a result many of them have acted upon it. However, it has gained little acceptance by the Issei which may be partly due to the difficulty of communication due to a difference in language, but is largely due to their different approach to the problem of evacuation.

B. The Evacuee's philosophy of evacuation

The Issei thought, and largely still thinks, of the relocation center as a temporary place of waiting until the forces which placed him here right themselves and takes him back again to the place he came from. The Issei probably accepted the evacuation experience much more easily and willingly than did the Nisei. However, he accepted it on the basis of his own thinking and his own emotional attitudes and not those of WRA. He not only did not realize at first just what the government planned for his future, he was so possessed with his own personal problems in arranging his affairs to be in the Assembly Center before the dead-line, that he did not think of the government as planning at all for his welfare other than to provide him a temporary place of residence.

Some groups were making plans for voluntary group resettlement before the compulsory evacuation order came through. One group had worked out a plan that if they could move to an area not too far outside the Western Defense Command zone, where they could be allotted the temporary use of land of one acre per capita that they could raise all their living with the exception of certain staple products such as rice and meat which the government would surely be willing to supply. They discussed the matter with the authorities who approved and told them to go ahead and make their plans. However, before these plans were complete, compulsory evacuation was announced and voluntary plans had to be abandoned.

Many people thought of evacuation as only a temporary measure, and that they would be back in their homes inside of a few weeks at the most. Some took only a suit-case of clothing with them. When they reached the relocation centers they realized only gradually that this was not just a measure taken for a few weeks, but that it might run into several months. However, it was still considered as temporary. Many who thought of the relocation center as a place of protective custody were amazed to learn that they could leave the relocation centers and resettle to other areas.

Now that evacuation has continued for two and one-half years, realization of what it really means has become crystalized in the minds of the residents. To them it has meant loss of opportunity for self-determination; recognition by the Issei that they are not only aliens but unwanted aliens and, uncertainty as to what sort of treatment they can expect from the people and government of the United States; recognition by the Nisei of their rights as citizens, and resentment that they have been singled out among all the other citizens for special treatment which limited their rights through limitation of the right of self-determination beyond that which others are limited due to the exigencies of war.

3. Evacuee's reaction to WRA's plan for his future

WRA says resettle and sets about finding opportunities for resettlement. When the evacuee does not take advantage of those opportunities, we say "here is resistance." The fact is that WRA's purpose in evacuation has resulted in an added program of resettlement while the Issei's purpose in evacuation is to wait until conditions right themselves and he has the opportunity to return to the situation out of which he came. The Issei has not been able to accept WRA's major premise, and resettlement under those conditions is just as much a matter of loss of self-determination as was evacuation. WRA's philosophy of resettlement no doubt constitutes an effective solution to many of the problems which brought about evacuation. However, the people have not been taken fully into WRA's confidence, nor has a full and complete discussion of the problems been held in order that the residents may have the time and opportunity to gain their own insight into the situation, and participate in working out the solution. Facing facts together leaves nothing to resist.

4. Typical behaviour patterns: WRA and Evacuee

WRA's typical behaviour pattern is to arrive at its own solution as to what is best for the people, to implement that solution with

opportunities which it feels are adequate, and by high pressure salesmanship to persuade the people to take advantage of these opportunities. The typical evacuee's reaction to this approach is first to distrust a cut and dried solution in the development of which they have not participated and to try to find the "bug" in the program feeling sure that there is a "bug" in it.

The very speed with which a program of resettlement is carried on such as recruiting for various industries is translated in the evacuee's mind into pressure, and pressure is translated into loss of self-determination, and loss of self-determination leads to resentment, and resentment results in emotional blocking and inaction or immobilization. Resistance then is a result of the evacuee's failure to accept WRA's solution to his problem, and this failure is a result of his not having the opportunity to develop the insight into his problem which the WRA has developed. Again it may partly be due to difficulty of communication, and partly due to unwillingness on the part of WRA to take the people fully into their confidence; to give opportunity and time for full discussion and insight and then to leave responsibility with them in working out their plans based on this insight.

As an example: WRA says, because you are going to resettle in communities throughout the country and become assimilated into the life of those communities you had better learn to speak English. So we will set up English classes in our adult education department and teach you English. The Issei do not show up for English classes in large numbers, and we interpret it as resistance. In reality he does not accept the premise WRA starts with and therefore does not see the need for learning English. This may be interpreted as resistance while it actually constitutes two different lines of thought.

5. Need for better understanding through discussion

To bring these two lines of thought together requires full and complete discussion between WRA and the center residents regarding the place of people of Japanese ancestry in the future of this country. Only thus may insight be developed by each party to the discussion which will lead to modification of both attitudes in the interest of a common solution.

J. R. McFarling
Acting Community Analyst

December 9, 1944

L 5.71

SECOND MEMORIAL SERVICE FACTOR IN
DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE ATTITUDES IN CENTER

Japanese Relocation Papers
Bancroft Library

The second memorial service held in the High School Auditorium about two weeks ago for seven Nisei killed in action in the European theatre of war was well attended. The service was conducted in Japanese except for the Caucasians on the program and in both Christian and Buddhist. The service was arranged by the Blue Star Service composed of relatives and friends of Nisei in the U. S. Army, and as a result the Blue Star Service has emerged as one of the strongest organizations in the center. Starting with many handicaps and without full resident sympathy, it has grown in stature in the past three months. The Blue Star Service was first composed of mothers of Nisei in the Army and was known as Blue Star Mothers Club. The name was later changed to Blue Star Service thus broadening the membership to include all relatives and friends of Nisei in the army. Many people are offering their assistance to this organization who at first took no interest at all. This change in attitude is expressed as follows: we see that Nisei are taking an active part in the war and are giving their lives for this country. We appreciate the contribution they are making and realize that many of them are making the supreme sacrifice of giving their lives for the principles of democracy. We also should forget our past bitterness and go forward with them in working for those principles in any way we can.

Due to the sacrifice of Nisei in the army the center residents are coming to a realization that they have a definite stake in America, and have a duty to perform to those Nisei who both offered and gave their lives. This change of attitude expresses itself in constructive thinking regarding resettlement. *I am enclosing a digest of the statements made by the various speakers on the Memorial Service program. In connection with this changing attitude toward the Blue Star Service, some definite feeling is being expressed regarding Nisei in the center who are classified 4C. It is generally recognized that most of these boys have received this classification due to the fact that they spent several months or years in Japan in the past few years. There is a definite feeling that this residence did not change the attitudes of these young men and that they should not be deferred because of this fact. Many residents feel that these 4C boys are rather snug in their security, and that they are sitting back at ease in the centers while their friends who never visited Japan are carrying the full responsibility of the war. This is considered to be unfair and unjust.

Reactions of a Nisei on a Recent
Week's Visit in Los Angeles, California

One older Nisei resident recently visited Los Angeles on the permission of the Western Defense Command to transact some personal business. His general reaction was that California looked good to him. However, since he was a former market man, he was particularly interested to see what changes had taken place in that field. He was advised that it would be better if he did not visit the markets during business hours as there was a good deal of antagonism of market men to the return of the Japanese.

*See page seven

population. However, he did have an opportunity to see a number of his friends and acquaintances in the market business. His reaction was that it will take considerable time for the Japanese to re-establish themselves in the market business in Los Angeles. Caucasian market men have taken leases on the stores and markets formerly operated by the Japanese residents and it will be difficult for the Japanese to work back into the economic picture of Los Angeles. It took the Japanese residents years to work into the market field and now it will be a long time before they make a place for themselves again. He feels that the market men there have organized the labor unions to oppose the return of the Japanese residents, and this will be very difficult to overcome. Thus, he feels that economically the farmers should return first, but socially it will be more difficult for them, and they might not create the most favorable impression. In this connection the Nisei would be more readily accepted socially, but since most of the Nisei were market and business men, it will be difficult for them to do this due to the lack of support from the farming element. Consequently there is a question as to which horn of the dilemma to grasp.

This Nisei carefully observed reactions to his presence in various places including auto courts, Union Station Restaurant, shoe shine parlor, stores, etc. Every where he went, he was accepted without question, and no unpleasant experiences developed anywhere.

During a part of the week, he chaperoned three Nisei soldiers on their way to Hawaii. They had many service decorations, and created some attention, but it was entirely favorable.

He felt that there was a definite housing shortage in Los Angeles due to the fact that many defense workers including negroes are now living in the district formerly occupied by the Japanese residents.

He returned to the center in an automobile belonging to one of the center residents. In coming through San Gabriel Valley, he stopped to visit for two hours with friends, and was told that the residents of the valley had instructions to call the local police whenever they saw any Japanese in the valley. He had stopped at several houses on the way to inquire directions so a number of people knew he was there. However, it is apparent that none of the residents felt any concern since no one notified the police and he continued on his way after two hours.

Community Government

A good deal of interest has developed at the last moment in the nominations of councilmen for the election on December 15th. The election committee of the Council requested the Block Managers Assembly to arrange for and conduct the election as usual. However, opinion has been developing in the past few months that it is important to have the

ablest men in the center on the council since many important problems of center wide concern will undoubtedly develop within the next six months. It is felt that the next six months are crucial ones for the center residents. As a result a center wide committee of ten influential men developed rather spontaneously to work for greater interest in the election. The feeling expressed by them and others was that the elections have been somewhat haphazard in the past due to the fact that it has been difficult and often impossible to get the best men to accept the nomination. Often a block will choose the best man, and he will refuse. Then they choose the next best man, and he refuses. They go on down the list until they are finally willing to choose any one who will accept the nomination. The above-mentioned committee offered to meet with the Block Manager's committee in each block and help them emphasize with the block people the importance of choosing good men to the council and if necessary help the committee persuade the able men to agree to accept the nomination, by pointing out that they have a public service to perform. However, the block managers felt that anyone coming into the block from the outside would not be accepted by the block people, and that the committee should not visit any block unless they are invited. Expressing themselves as a body they felt that they would need no help from the center wide committee, but that if their help were needed they would be notified of that fact.

Since interest in the election is developing belatedly, some members of the Council considered the possibility of setting the time of the election back two weeks. However, it was decided not to do this since it might be confusing to the blocks. At present about 19 blocks have held their nomination meetings with ten more scheduled for Friday and Saturday night.

One Issei's Attitude Regarding the Effect of the War on Resettlement

In a recent discussion with an Issei in Block 6G, the following attitude was expressed in regard to the position he felt the government was in, in working out a more definite plan for resettlement of Center residents. In effect, he said: America is at war with Japan, and in a time of war it is necessary to keep up the fighting spirit. Maintaining hatred of the enemy is one essential element in keeping up this fighting spirit. This hatred of the enemy includes hatred of any person or group of persons associated in the minds of the people with the enemy. It is difficult for the government to differentiate in the minds of the people of the country between hatred of the enemy, and hatred of center residents who are associated racially with the enemy. Therefore, the government cannot do anything out of the ordinary for us (center residents) now without defeating the purposes of her war propaganda. I believe that after the war, and after the need for the fighting spirit ceases to exist, that the government will help us to become re-established by some definite program which will restore us to some semblance of our pre-evacuation status.

But on the other hand, he felt that the Orient and other peoples are watching America to see how she treats the Japanese minority in this country. They will feel that this is a good example of the way America will treat other minority peoples in other parts of the world. They will study this situation carefully to see whether America is really sincere in her war aims of establishing racial and national equality. Japan in particular will certainly use the evacuation and the development of Relocation Centers to telling effect in the Orient against America if there is any possible way to do so.

Other racial minority groups also are watching this program to see what influence it will have on their status, and whether it represents a trend in treatment of minority groups.

Thus we recognize the two horns of the dilemma. Wouldn't a greater purpose be served if the government really came to grips with this problem now? We went through a national election during the war. Can we not also solve this problem during war time? Certainly mutual respect between Caucasians and people of Japanese ancestry in the United States would help materially to strengthen the peace of the post-war era.

An Example of Effective Work in Juvenile Delinquency

About November first, fourteen boys ranging in ages from twelve to sixteen were brought into the police department on a charge of mischief. It was the practice of a group of these boys to waylay another boy while one of the group beat up on him. The Chief of Internal security held a hearing at which the boys and their parents and the writer were present. The Chief explained to them that there had been very little juvenile delinquency in the center when compared with other communities of comparable size, but that, nevertheless, such behaviour, when it did occur, was not conducive to the welfare of the community. He spoke to them in a friendly way about the trouble their behaviour caused their parents and the community at large. He also said he was sure that the parents by keeping a closer supervision could prevent a great deal of the difficulty. He said he would not carry the matter further if the parents would see to it that the boys were at home by 8:00 p.m. until January first, unless the parents gave them special permission to be out later. Also he suspended pass privileges unless the parents were with them until January first. The police force was to check up from time to time to see that the rules were being observed. In the event none of them disobeyed the rules and no one got into difficulty, he would suspend the sentence in thirty days. The boys and their parents accepted these terms and expressed their appreciation to the Chief for the manner in which the matter was handled.

As a result, none of the boys got into any difficulty, and the rules were observed, so that the Chief called another meeting of the

boys and their parents thirty days later, and suspended the sentence. At this meeting refreshments were served, and the boys became better acquainted with the Chief and the evacuee police force. They went away feeling that the personnel of the Internal Security Division were their friends and not their enemies.

The writer feels that the manner in which this case was handled represents one of the most effective ways of meeting the present delinquency problem, and will lead to prevention of much of it in the future. He also feels that the Chief of the Internal Security should be commended for the understanding and consideration which he showed in meeting the situation.

December 9, 1944

DIGEST OF STATEMENTS MADE
BY EVACUEES IN MEMORIAL SERVICE

Representative, Community Council

Mother-love is universal. We are sure that the mothers of these brave soldiers who have died are really proud of their sons who sacrificed for their beloved country's sake. We are unable to find any suitable words of condolence to mothers under these circumstances. Our sincere sympathy, thanks, prayers and blessings shall be with you and them forever. We are watching for a beautiful harvest of their splendid deeds.

Representative, Blue Star Service Club

At this occasion of memorial service let us honor those seven heroes. On Nisei's bravery in Italy and France all Allies as well as enemies pay high tribute to them. Especially it will be retold of the brilliant deeds they have done in saving the entrapped Texas Battalion. We know that the whole United States is thankful for them. We condole wholeheartedly with mothers and relatives and pray for blessings on their heroes.

Representative, Block Managers Assembly

In the midst of the world-wide tragedy for the creation of a new order, our brave soldiers offered their precious lives for their country. Let us honor them and pray for their soul's blessing. We also extend our sincere sympathy to their mothers and relatives.

Christian Minister

St. Paul declared in the Roman prison that he had done his mission throughout his life well, satisfied and thankful. He was also determined to be ready to accept his worst fate which was his death to come. Any and every soul lives to serve for the promotion of human welfare. It is our constant effort and prayer that cannons be remodeled into plows and for the eternal peace of God's will. Those of our dear heroes gladly offered their precious lives for noble ends.

Let us offer our deepest sympathy to those honorable souls, to their young wives, mothers and relatives.

It is taught, and we believe that our second life is glorious and victorious. We are going to meet our loved ones again and be together in our Lord's mansion.

It is our earnest prayer for those families blessings.

Buddhist Priest

Our Buddhism's founder Shakamuni taught us that among many of human agonies the departure from loved ones is the bitterest. However, Japanese parents and young wives of those brave heroes feel pride in spite of their choking grief. Those seven honor-rolled soldiers, who willingly surrendered their service, lived and died for the protection of democracy. Everyone of us pay our hearty respects to those heroes and their bereaved families.

43 telegrams and 2 letters were read

One of the two letters was from Mr. Dillon S. Myer, Director, WRA
Its outline was Thanks and sympathy; also America will not forget their sacrifice.

GRANADA PROJECT
Amache, Colorado

T-7

AIRMAIL

December 20, 1944

TO: Dr. John H. Provinsé, Chief, Community Management Division
ATTEN: Dr. Edward H. Spicer, Chief, Community Analysis Section
FROM: J. Ralph McFarling, Acting Community Analyst
RE: First reactions to lifting the ban on the West Coast

The first reaction to lifting the ban on the West Coast by the Army was a rather stunned surprise at the suddenness of the move. This was followed by an undercurrent of joy on the part of the younger people and children. The reaction of the older groups, who are never given to an outward expression of their feelings, may be more nearly expressed as a sense of relief. This is not so much relief at being able to return to their homes on the West Coast, but is rather relief of their civil rights, release from discrimination, release from the burden imposed by a sense of rejection, and relief that this is a tangible evidence of their acceptance by America.

Their reaction toward actual return to California, however, is ambivalent. Many, not all by a great deal, definitely would like to return to the West Coast. This reaction was stated negatively by many on the first day the ban was lifted when they said "If they (the residents of the West Coast) don't want us, we don't want to go back." Stated positively, they want more than anything else to be "wanted" by their former friends and neighbors of the West Coast.

While lifting the ban on their return is definite evidence of acceptance by the government, and perhaps a sizable segment of the nation at large, it is not definite evidence of acceptance by the West Coast residents. Consequently, their attitude regarding actual return to the West Coast is one of "wait and see whether public sentiment there is favorable or unfavorable to us."

I would like to stress further the importance of this desire for acceptance on the part of the evacuee, which I believe in its various forms of expression is the underlying motivation of all their behaviour in the past and the present. By acceptance, I do not mean merely the act of being tolerated, but something much stronger, to be actually "wanted" to be given the recognition which they feel they have earned by their behaviour and culture which expresses itself in their way of

living. When the Issei settled in California, they assiduously practiced what they were told were outstanding American virtues which happened also to be Japanese virtues, namely: industry and frugality, which together make up the simple life. As we all know these virtues were a fetish to America because they were so necessary to life on the frontier. These virtues reinforced by the Japanese culture were practiced by the Japanese people to the extreme. Why? Secondly they wanted to make money but primarily they did it because they thought this was the way to gain acceptance by the American people. They reasoned that these and other Japanese virtues are also American virtues, therefore, we will follow them strictly, and American people will be proud of us, they will point to us and say, "see what fine people these are, they are truly Americans." And as a result they will accept us and we will then really be Americans too. They wanted the appreciation and recognition on the part of the American Public which go along with acceptance, and they were willing to work hard and undergo many hardships to gain it--to prove themselves worthy of recognition. They maintained close supervision over their children in order to insure that no taint of delinquency should mar their record of good citizenship. Not only that, but they felt that the very absence of delinquency among their children, the good marks they worked hard to gain in school and the many who attended college would result in their being recognized and applauded. These attainments they felt would be additional proof of their worth, and of their having earned the right to citizenship and to acceptance on the part of the American people.

What was their dismay, and complete bewilderment to discover at the time of the Exclusion Act of 1924, that they had been utterly mistaken in their reasoning. For not only did it turn out that their virtues of industry and frugality, and being law-abiding citizens fail to gain them acceptance, but that it contributed to the opposite result of gaining them rejection by the American people. This was inconceivable, yet it was true. Where they thought the U. S. valued people who worked hard and saved their money, they found that instead the residents of the West Coast much more readily accepted people such as the Mexicans, Negroes, and Filipinos who were slipshod in their work habits, did not pay too great attention to cleanliness, were not particularly law-abiding; did not save their money, but spent it as fast as they received it.

The resultant thought in the mind of the Japanese population was that the practice of virtue was not enough to gain acceptance in the minds of the public, because Caucasian public did not want to accept

them on a plane of social equality and resented their gaining economic equality. They discovered that the public only accepted the Mexicans and Filipinos because they never threatened to raise themselves to the social and economic equality or status of the Caucasian population. However, the Japanese people could not throw away their virtues and become as the Negro and the Mexican, because those virtues were a part of their individual lives and their cultural background. It was only left to them to accept the fact of rejection on a racial basis and to continue in competition with the Caucasian population on an economic basis; a sort of economic armed struggle which they felt the Caucasian population finally won due to the intervention of the government at the time of evacuation.

And now they are told they can go back home. There is a certain nostalgia about home which was expressed by a group of Nisei during the lunch hour on the day the ban was lifted who were heard singing "There's a Long, Long Trail A-Winding", and "Keep the Home Fires Burning". They sang with suppressed feeling indicating the dawning of hope for acceptance which would enable them to return home, but without much substance in the way of tangible evidence for such hope to feed upon. But there are also the facts of reality in returning to their homes; the hard economic and social competition; the racial discrimination and the stronger Anti-Japanese feeling due to the exigencies of war; the sense of rejection, and the physical difficulties of again making a place for themselves. It is understandable when they say "we have seven strikes against us before we come to bat." If they felt they were wanted, no hardship would be too great to overcome. But if they are convinced they are not wanted, the simplest hardship becomes mountainous.

Therefore, the evacuee now says in effect; the people of California know what we are, what we can do, how we work, and how we live. Now the question is, "do they want us to come back?" "If they do, we will go." Their decision will be based quite largely on what reactions the people of California and the West Coast show to their proposed return within the next few weeks. In communities where it is favorable a number will return but in communities where they feel they are not wanted few will go.

Quite often the physical problems connected with resettlement are given as the real reasons for inaction, when in reality the underlying motivation is both the desire for acceptance and the feeling of rejection by public sentiment. The WRA has been concerned quite largely with the solution of these physical problems. They are

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difficult problems, nonetheless, and are already being expressed by the evacuees in their thinking about their return. The most important and difficult problem in this connection is housing. The evacuees know that there has been a tremendous shift in population to the West Coast during the war. One man reports that where he and his family of five formerly lived there are 20 people living now. They know that Negroes, Filipinos and Mexicans and others are living in areas that they once occupied, and that the concentration of population in those areas is greater than when they lived there. They know that their jobs and small business enterprises have been taken over by others and that leases have often been made for years in advance. They believe that licenses will be difficult to obtain if they as a people are not accepted. They remember that land laws were made restrictive and that they had no voice in the making of those laws which victimized them. They remember that they had to employ lawyers at great cost to maintain their rights. They see their return to be as difficult as the Issei's first entrance into California from Japan years ago, rather they see it as more difficult due to the unfavorable sentiment which has developed.

Some have expressed the opinion that housing may be available to those returning to rural areas which are not near defense industries, but that the housing situation in the cities is nearly hopeless.

It has been expressed often by evacuees in the past two days that those who own property can and probably will return first because it will be easier for them on a physical basis. Then if favorable sentiment develops, others will follow gradually.

There are two rural groups in Granada, Livingston and Cortez, comprising about 150 families of whom about 99 percent own their land. It is expected by both that evacuees and the administration that these will probably be the first to return. The Cortez group had a strong co-operative association. During evacuation most of the land has been rented to a Caucasian land agent who has been sub-letting the land to others including Italians and Mexicans. The farms were sub-leased in November for the coming year, so that if the owners returned now they would have to work for the Caucasian land agent on their own farms until the lease to the present tenant is ended. This, as one member expressed it, they would be willing to do. She said they could probably be housed in some public building nearby or some could probably make out by living in the barn or some other out building on their farms. However, this group at present has no leader as their former co-op manager is now working in Denver. As a result they are

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disorganized and have no unified plan. It was reported by one member that the land agent did not want the Japanese people to return because he was making a great deal of money out of the present situation.

The Livingston group, is united under their leader who has remained with them in the center, and will probably be the first to return.

It is thought that many already relocated will probably go back first since they have had experience with outside conditions. There is also a small group of individualists who feel that if they get back first (providing sentiment is satisfactory) that they will have the first chance at the best jobs or business opportunities and thus will profit economically.

There is a definite fear of personal violence from individuals or small groups of individuals who may be personally angered at the evacuee's return.

The feeling is strong that Issei and Nisei should go back together since the Issei are old and could not start over by themselves. In many cases these Nisei are in the army which creates a problem for their parents.

A mother with two sons in the army, both of whom have been injured, feels that she could not go back without their help. One is in a government hospital in Chicago. She would like him to go back with her.

There is a definite unwillingness to take advantage of help extended by the Department of Public Welfare because this is still considered to be charity. They say they want opportunities where they can take care of their own old and handicapped people without resorting to charity.

The writer was interested to observe the effect of lifting the ban on those who had already completed plans for resettlement elsewhere in the country. In no instance have I heard of such an individual changing his plans due to this new development.

While the classic answer to queries regarding plans for return to the West Coast is "I don't know; have to wait and see," the writer feels that the atmosphere of the present situation constitutes a very healthy condition for planning for the future, whether that future lies on the West Coast or elsewhere in the country. Mr. Knodel, Relocation Program Supervisor reports that people interviewed in his office in the past two days have been much more serious in their planning, and showed much greater willingness to make adjustments.

J. Ralph McFarling
Community Analyst

GRANADA PROJECT
Amache, Colorado

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AIRMAIL

December 30, 1944

TO: Dr. John H. Provinse, Chief, Community Management Division
ATTN: Dr. Edward H. Spicer, Chief, Community Analysis Section
FROM: J. Ralph McFarling, Acting Community Analyst
RE: Present trend of reactions to returning to the West Coast

This office is not concerned with judging the right or wrong of people's reactions, nor of assessing praise or blame for them. We are concerned with recognizing the fact of those reactions and attempting an interpretation on the basis of understanding their causes and results. We believe it our duty to present those facts and interpretations in an objective and unbiased manner in order that WRA's policies may be shaped or reshaped to meet the problems presented by those reactions. We further believe that to "beg the question" by ignoring the fact of those reactions, or to "pre empt the issue" by attempting to hurdle through assuming they are not real is not only ineffective but is definitely harmful to the program. We believe that the solution of the problem of resettlement on the West Coast or elsewhere does not lie at the center of the evacuee's thinking about the problem, nor does it lie at the center of WRA's formulated program as expressed through its instructions, but that it does lie at the point of interaction of these two ways of thinking. Interaction between two ways of thinking is only possible if both remain flexible; is extremely difficult if one remains rigid since it invites rigidity on the part of the other; and is impossible if both remain rigid, and unyielding since there is no opportunity for the give and take atmosphere so necessary to the successful working out of a problem.

In the light of this we believe that WRA's policies regarding return to the West Coast should be flexible enough to permit interaction with the evacuee's thinking in order that a practical solution may be worked out on the basis of self-determination and the preservation of individual and family welfare.

After twelve days since the ban was lifted on return to the West Coast, the evacuee's thinking has not had time to crystallize into definite trends, nor have any very definite groups formed. They are now in the formative state and therefore easily influenced both negatively and positively.

At present there is a strong desire on the part of a large number of evacuees to return to the West Coast. This attitude is based on their present nostalgic memories of their former homes and all which their former social situation entailed. When they think of return on a more practical basis, they think of the situations as they believe them to exist today, which are often distorted by rumor and imagination which they are unable to distinguish from reality.

At present there is a general feeling of uncertainty which is real and which breaks down into the following:

- Uncertainty as to public sentiment in their former communities
- Uncertainty as to the availability of housing
- Uncertainty as to the possibility of securing loans for farming and other business enterprises which require capital
- Uncertainty as to whether they will be able to secure farm land or business property for lease
- Uncertainty on the part of those who own land or other property as to when they will be able to repossess it for their own use, and as to the effect on public sentiment if they attempt to do so.
- Uncertainty as their priority for buying farm machinery
- Uncertainty as to the availability of labor
- Uncertainty as to their economic and social status in California

This problem of the fact of uncertainty cannot be solved by "begging the question" nor by attempting to hurdle the issue through assuming that it is not real. It can only be solved by understanding the implications of each uncertainty and then finding the most practical means to alleviate it.

Take for example the feeling of uncertainty as to the possibility of securing loans for farming and other business enterprises. It is not enough merely to say that there are many government lending agencies to whom the evacuees may apply. Such a statement does not alleviate the uncertainty on the part of the evacuee because he considers, and rightly considers, that he is in an extraordinary and unnatural situation, and that these lending agencies were set up and geared to meet the problems of people in ordinary and natural situations. Also due to past experiences of discrimination and restrictive measures on the local level the evacuee has the least confidence in local government and local offices, and only gains confidence as he approaches the federal government. Therefore the most practical measure for alleviating the evacuees uncertainty regarding government lending agencies must come from the federal level. If for instance, the federal heads of the RFC, the FSA, the FCA, and other federal agencies were to state in writing to the Director of WRA that

they understand the extraordinary situation in which the evacuees are placed, and that they are ready and willing to accept the responsibility of meeting those needs within the limits of their particular realm of endeavor, and state what those conditions are which must be met by the evacuee in order to secure a loan, such letters could be mimeographed and distributed among the residents of the center. If also the heads of these federal agencies could assure the evacuees that the processing of their applications would be expedited due to their extraordinary situation, then the evacuee's uncertainty in this respect could be to a large extent dispelled.

At this present formative stage of the evacuee's thinking assurance of this nature will do much to tip the scales on the side of positive action, and tend to lessen the influence of the at present small "sittight" group.

J. R. McFarling
J. Ralph McFarling
Acting Community Analyst

GRANADA PROJECT
Amache, Colorado

AIRMAIL

January 2, 1945

TO: Dr. John H. Provinse, Chief, Community Management Division
ATTEN: Dr. Edward H. Spicer, Chief, Community Analysis Section
FROM: J. Ralph McFarling, Acting Community Analyst

In my report dated December 30, 1944, I mentioned the necessity of maintaining a flexible program of resettlement on the part of WRA during the liquidation period which would encourage flexibility in the evacuee's thinking and permit the interaction of the two so necessary to the successful working out of the evacuee's problems. The flexibility of the WRA program will depend, not entirely, but to a large extent on the attitudes of the appointive personnel. At present there are factors in the situation which tend to place the personnel on an emotional tension such as: a healthy desire to stay with the program as long as it lasts and to discharge their full responsibility coupled with an equally healthy desire to secure their own future by looking for another job equally as good; a feeling that it would be much easier to step into a good job now than it would be after the war is over; pressure from Washington to empty the center within a certain time limit. Thus, it would be easy, for the personnel to adopt a hard-boiled attitude in his relationships with the evacuees. This would certainly be unfortunate as it would provide a focus for all the potential negative attitudes of the center residents; without such a point of focus the evacuee's thinking will be far more positive and realistic.

I am convinced that one can take a positive, constructive and realistic attitude toward the resettlement of the residents without taking a hard-boiled attitude. I am further convinced that a hard-boiled attitude is not only undemocratic due to its coercive nature, but also that it has been proved by administrators and counselors in business, government, educational and social service organizations to be plainly ineffective since it yields the opposite result of the one expected or hoped for.

The problems which the evacuee faces in making his decision regarding resettlement are charged with emotion and uncertainty. If

he is faced with a hard-boiled attitude on the part of the personnel during this period it will only serve to increase his emotional uncertainty, and render him more incapable of resolving his problems. A steady, positive, understanding, and above all unemotional attitude on the part of the personnel is the most favorable atmosphere in which the evacuee can make an intelligent and positive decision. The atmosphere of hard-boiled attitudes and treatment only leads to confusion and the development of negative emotions.

I am thoroughly convinced that every problem connected with resettlement can be solved positively and constructively, but I believe it will take a lot of work and patience and understanding on the part of the personnel to do it.

Most of the people in the center are fathers and mothers with children. The problems they have to work out concern not only the physical matters of where to go, how to get a house and furniture, how to make a living, but also the emotional and intangible factors of will this community accept or reject me and my children, will they be given an opportunity to live normal lives, or will they have to face insults and jeers in school, and what effect will this have on their later lives. The evacuee has gone through years of discrimination in business and social life, he has suffered rejection and financial loss through evacuation, and many of the older nisei have gone through trying experiences in their school life prior to evacuation. They as fathers and mothers naturally want their children to grow up under the most favorable atmosphere possible, to be free from discrimination, and not to have to go through what they went through. Therefore they are going to be slow about making up their minds until they are fairly sure that they are going into a situation which will be favorable to their own and their children's welfare.

Consequently, any hard-boiled attitude during this time of decision will only complicate their problems. How can they be sure that the people in the community into which they are going will be favorable if the appointive personnel in the center do not show an understanding attitude? Any attempt to push them into a situation of which they are uncertain will only result in resistance, and as so often happens the resistance generated becomes greater than the pressure so that their stay in the center is far longer than it ordinarily needs to be.

I believe that the knowledge that the center will close within six months or a year is enough pressure to place on them, and that any additional pressure on individuals will have a definitely harmful effect to the program.

J. Ralph McFarling
Acting Community Analyst

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GRANADA PROJECT
Amache, Colorado

AIRMAIL

January 18, 1945

TO: Dr. John H. Provinse, Chief, Community Management Division
ATTEN: Dr. Edward H. Spicer, Chief, Community Analysis Section
FROM: J. Ralph McFarling, Community Analysis Section
RE: Weekly trend report

REACTIONS ON RESETTLEMENT TO WEST COAST

Individual Reactions

Petaluma poultry farmer. Mr. A. owns a seven room house, ten acres of ground and poultry houses and equipment for a flock of eight to ten thousand. When evacuation order came through he was one of the first to sell his flock. He had a flock of 8000 laying hens. He rented his place fully furnished including house furnishings for \$45.00 per month. During the first year after he paid taxes, insurance, upkeep and fee to friend who was looking after his property for him he had \$25.00 left.

After the lifting of the exclusion order he considered carefully possibilities of returning, and finally decided not to go back but instead to go east for five or six years. His reasons: (1) the uncertainty of being able to get good poultry to start building his flock over again. He feels that the poultry being hatched out now is of poor quality, and you cannot be sure of what you are getting, thus the chance for a great loss due to poor stock. (2) The price of food is so high now that there is no money in meat birds. (3) In order to develop a flock of laying hens he would have to arrange capital and put out money for a period of six months before he would begin getting any return. Also it would take 10 years to build up a flock of 6 or 8000 laying hens. (4) He will have to arrange for finances with credit companies. While friends are writing to ask him to come back, he is wondering if the credit men will give him a break, and even if they do want to will pressure be brought against them in the form of a boycott so that his source of credit is out off. (5) If he were already established and had his flock developed, he would be able to continue even in spite of difficulties, but to attempt to start over again from scratch would be uncertain.

He feels that vegetable or fruit farming in the east or south for the next few years ^{would} yield greater returns for the least risk.

Orange County Nisei Vegetable Farmer. Mr. B. was discussing the possibilities of returning to California. He and his brothers resettled on leased land near the center in 1943. They had their farm machinery shipped out from California to Colorado at their own expense which came to \$1500.00 including packing, hauling, and freight charges. Mr. B's brothers have already leased land near the center for the coming year and plan to remain here at least for the coming year. Mr. B., however, is free to return to California. He speaks excellent English and is a fully Americanized Nisei. He has a cheerful disposition and a positive approach. His family in the past have operated land on a large scale and he is used to farm management and planning. The family owns no land, however, He was not so much concerned about public sentiment as he felt it could be overcome in time. His problems were:

1. The availability of land for farming purposes in California. With his knowledge of the arable land in the vicinity of Los Angeles, and after talking to various people who have knowledge of the present conditions there he came to the conclusion that land was available. However, he felt he would have to stay away from defense zones including land close to air ports as in these areas he might be suspect in case any difficulty arose in the plant or air port.
2. He was concerned about the availability of farming equipment. He felt it would be unlikely that he would be able to get high priority for the purchase of farm equipment. He also felt that his brothers would need their farm equipment to farm in Colorado so he would be unable to ship any back to California for his own use. He had heard of cases where unused farm equipment of Japanese farmers in California was being confiscated and that Japanese were being compelled to sell that equipment which they had stored. He felt that if that is true that farm equipment must be very hard to get. Therefore, instead of farming a large acreage which he had been used to doing, he would have to limit his farming to 20 acres which he could handle with a small amount of equipment.
3. It would be hard to get laborers since there is already a labor shortage in California. He felt it would be unlikely that laborers in the center would return to California in numbers at first and that it might be months before they were able to do so. They would probably wait until their grower friends returned before they would have enough of a feeling of security to return. Here again is a limitation on the amount of land he could farm due to the lack of an available labor supply.
4. He wondered just where he would market his products. Knowing that the produce men in Los Angeles are opposed to the return of Japanese, he wondered if this would extend to buying from Japanese growers. He came to the conclusion that the produce men probably would play ball and

probably would be plenty glad to buy his produce as they were in the past. He felt, however, that he would not want to sell to those produce men who had worked hardest for Japanese exclusion, ~~abutt~~ that he could sell to those who had only adopted exclusion attitudes through expediency.

5. He wondered where he would be able to get finances. In the past he was able to borrow money from produce dealers, but while they may be willing to buy his produce he felt it unlikely that they will loan him money for farming operations. And even if they did loan money, they would require mortgage on personal property, farm machinery etc., in addition to crop mortgage in order to secure the loan. "Since I would not have any chattel property, how could I borrow money to get started on?" The F.S.A. was discussed, but it did not produce much enthusiasm. Some one suggested that he had heard of a Japanese grower in Ohio getting a loan through the F.S.A. and another heard of a farmer in Texas negotiating for a loan, but he didn't have it yet. Altogether Mr. B. felt rather dubious about the possibilities of financial assistance.

6. Would he be able to get housing? He felt this would not be a serious problem in a rural area although the closer he came to urban centers the more difficult would the housing problem become.

Nisei Woman. Mrs. D's husband died shortly after evacuation. She is about 25 years of age. She has a small child 4 years of age. She is living with her parents in the center. Mrs. D. is well-educated, efficient, capable, has a pleasant disposition, fully Americanized. She was formerly a bookkeeper for a produce concern in Southern California. She would like to go back to California but is "in no particular hurry." Her problem was how to obtain work in order to support her four years old child. If she went back without her parents she would have to employ someone to take care of her child and that would be expensive and difficult. If she went back with her parents, her mother would probably take care of the child while she herself obtained employment. Her father could only get light employment due to his age. She decided it would be better to take the family with her even though it might be difficult to secure a job which would pay enough to support all of them. She decided she would rather go to a city, a big city, as there would be more and better job opportunities. She wondered whether she would be able to get a clerical position in California, that is whether she would be accepted in such a position. She felt she would be unable to do hard manual labor and that a domestic job would not pay enough to support the family. She was also uncertain as to where she could find a house to rent if she went to Los Angeles.

The problems and uncertainties looked so great to her that she was temporarily putting it off, hoping that something would break to make it easier.

The Sebastopol Group. The reactions in this farming group from north of San Francisco center about reactions to an incident which occurred there two days after the exclusion order was lifted. The incident concerned an eighteen years old Nisei boy of the E. family. An older brother was killed in Italy last summer. At the time the family property was in his name including a fifty acre farm at Sebastopol. The parents were opposed to this older brother's marriage and there has been friction between his wife and parents. Now that all the family property is in the name of the daughter-in-law, there is a great deal of uncertainty as to whether the family will be able to recover a portion of it. The younger son arrived in Sebastopol on a visitor's permit from the Western Defense Command just two days after the ban was lifted on the West Coast. The family had rented the farm to one man who had in turn hired another man to farm it for him. The boy went out to the farm to look over the property. Shortly afterward someone called on the telephone and asked the lady of the house if there were any Japs there. She said no. The man on the phone told her that if there were to tell them that if they did not leave town by midnight, that the house would be burned down. The boy went to San Francisco and reported it to the WRA office. One of the officers, Mr. Fisher, who formerly worked at Granada Center, went back to Sebastopol with him and they laid the matter before the District Attorney, who tried to help them. He told the boy to go back to the farm and he would try to trace the telephone call in case another came. When the second call came it was traced to a telephone booth but identification was impossible. The boy stayed two days and returned to Granada.

The Sebastopol group feel that it will be better to wait a while and see how things come out. One of them will probably make an attempt to return sometime in February or March. If no more incidents occur, others will return.

Livingston and Cortez Farm Groups. As mentioned in my Trend Report dated December 20th, 1944, the above named groups were expected to spearhead the return of the rural groups to California. They have close knit farmer's cooperatives and about 99 percent own their own land. The land of the Livingston group was all leased to a Mr. Momberg of Livingston who is a land agent and who in turn sub-leased it to others. Mr. Momberg made a visit to the center last week, and urged the Livingston group to let the leases made in November 1944 run until they expire in November 1945. This, the group finally agreed to do. However, they are concerned as to where they will go in case the center closes before November 1945. They feel that in that case they will have to make some arrangement for living quarters near their homes.

However, this is a definite set-back to relocation, not only because of the group itself but because of the loss of the incentive other farm groups would have gained by the return of this group which is a model to other farm groups in their cooperative development and spirit.

General Reactions

Reaction to WRA policy of not taking responsibility for finding housing or job opportunities. (Manual 150.1.5 (2) Practically every group discussion of resettlement problems centers around: housing, a job, and finances. Since WRA does not accept its direct responsibility in the realm of housing and jobs which are all important to the evacuee, that it shows an insincerity on the part of WRA in returning people to the West Coast. Many evacuees feel that lifting the exclusion order does not mean a great deal since responsibility in those things which are most important and difficult are placed on the evacuee himself. In regard to housing and a job they say, "how can we make these arrangements 1000 miles away; such arrangements require negotiation and require a great deal of time and work even when one is on the ground." They say, "before we left California, we had a home (it may have been rented, but it was still a place to live.). We had jobs, businesses, etc., now we have none of these. It is not a matter of whether we want to go back--of course we do--but how to do it." They say, "The WRA says if you have a house and a job we will approve your return, but how can we get these beings so far away?" As a result they feel the WRA is either shirking its responsibility, or it is insincere about their return.

These reactions do not mean that people are not thinking concretely about their plans within the framework of the present WRA policies, they are, and on the whole the outlook is healthy. However, when they discovered what WRA's policies were they did not fit in with what the evacuees expected they would be. They themselves had thought of return to the West Coast as the evacuation experience in reverse which would be to move from the Relocation Center to an Assembly Center on the Coast near their former residence, and from there to their homes. They figured that on this basis it would take at least a year to complete the process.

Reactions to Relocation Services. It is interesting to note that in spite of all the information which has been given to center residents regarding the various resettlement services including Family Counseling that many are not yet aware of these services. A member of the Community Council this week was amazed and pleased to learn of the help in planning being given by Family Counseling. The only explanation to be given is that prior to this time resettlement information has been largely ignored by the Issei, at least, because they were not ready to avail themselves of it, and now that they are beginning to think concretely about resettlement they have to start from scratch in learning about the various services

available to them. Information which the appointed personnel and most of the Nisei take for granted seems to be entirely new to many of the Issei. For this reason it is essential for WRA to repeat over and over the various services and how they operate.

COMMUNITY GOVERNMENT

The new Community Council has got off to a good start. A great deal of interest and a cooperative spirit is being shown. This is largely due to the fact that many of the differences which existed between the old council and the administration were resolved during a meeting held by the Project Director with the Executive Committee of the old council early in December. At this time their differences of opinion were thrown open to free discussion, and both the administration and the Executive Committee came to a better understanding of each other. The writer wishes to commend this type of approach and believes that even though all problems may not be solved through free discussion that they at least can be clarified which is the beginning of solution. At present the Community Council is taking an active interest in resettlement problems and is holding block meetings for the purpose of focusing thinking on these problems.

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

- This center has achieved a remarkable success in the matter of prevention of Juvenile Delinquency. In fact there was no act of Juvenile Delinquency in the center from September 15, 1944 to December 30, 1944. This achievement was due largely to the understanding treatment by the Chief of Internal Security of two cases of Juvenile Delinquency which occurred prior to that time and each of which involved about 12 boys. It was also due to the development of parental interest through the work of the Welfare Advisory Committee which enlisted the support of Community Activities, Block Managers, Community Council, and other groups in the center. During this time many block and community activities were developed to keep the children busy and a great deal of stress was laid on the responsibility of parents.

J. Ralph McFarling
Community Analyst

GRANADA PROJECT
Amache, Colorado

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AIRMAIL

January 23, 1945

TO: Dr. John H. Provinse, Chief, Community Management Division
ATTN: Dr. Edward H. Spicer, Chief, Community Analysis Section
FROM: J. Ralph McFarling, Community Analysis Section
RE: Weekly trend report

Young People High School Age and Above

A group of girls in this age group from a Los Angeles Block were discussing resettlement to West Coast. The consensus of opinion was that they would rather go east than to return to West Coast. The principle attraction seemed to be friends scattered throughout the eastern states and the favorable reception they have received, plus the adventure of experience in a new territory. Most of them were thinking on an individual basis with little thought of their parents going east. Some thought they would at least go east for a time until their parents were able to return to the West Coast; when that happened they seemed to feel it their duty to go to California with them. However, they assumed their parents would not be returning for some months yet. In regard to their parents resettlement they felt that those who owned property were likely to go back, but they also felt that those without property would do better to try a different area.

Several in this group had never had very much contact with Caucasians in California, but attended predominantly Japanese populated schools, and found their social activities within a very circumscribed section of Los Angeles. Others who lived outside this area were in constant contact with Caucasians in school and social life.

Individual Reaction

A Kibei with a large family who has never even discussed relocation before, now desires to resettle. He has been excluded by the Army from the Western and possibly the Eastern Defense Command. Four other families wishes to resettle with him, and he is seeking information regarding the limitations on his resettlement, and on opportunities for the five families.

Potential Hemp Mill Workers

A Nisei who went to work for the War Hemp Mills in Shabbona, Illinois

about a month ago has been back in the center for the past week recruiting workers for the Hemp Mills. Since there is no housing for families the Mills have been concentrating on single men for whom housing is provided. This recruiting agent came to the center with a prospective list of fifteen workers, friends of men already working in the Mills. All but two or three of these, however, have backed down due to the restrictive visiting regulations. They are men who have friends in the center but few have relatives. They feel that eventually they would like to relocate with those friends. However, since the principal basis for granting visitor's privileges in the center is to discuss relocation with their families, they feel that they would be denied these privileges, therefore, they feel it is best to wait here rather than in Illinois to see what their friends will do.

In general the visiting restrictions have had a negative reaction among center residents far out of proportion to their value to WRA. They have been considered by the residents as a personal affront. No doubt if the restrictions had not been made by WRA they would have been called for by the residents to ease the burden on the centers of a large number of visitors. A similar development occurred last summer when the man power shortage in the center became acute. This problem was considered by the residents to be due to the large number of seasonal leave workers. The council reflected the indignation of the residents that these men went out every spring and summer to earn money and returned to the center in the fall when most of the work was done. It was decided by the residents to demand that each of the seasonal workers pay something into the block treasury in order to pay creis to the workers who remained in the center and bore the burden of keeping the work in the center going. It is interesting in this connection that no indignation was expressed by the residents toward people who took indefinite leave even though they left their unemployable relatives in the center. The residents felt that this was a constructive step and were willing to cooperate with the WRA and the relative on indefinite leave even though it meant an additional burden to the workers in the center.

Issei 55 and Over

The Issei talk about possible return to the West Coast without a great deal of emotion. They have no illusions about pioneering over again. They say, "we were pioneers once, now we are old." "We were taken out of California and there must have been some reason for it. Now we are on a spot in going back." They cite the "Doi Incident" (see page 5) as an example of what they expect to happen, and feel that in going back they will be the focus for attack by all the anti-Japanese elements. They say nothing can be done about incidents like this until the war is over.

The Issei's reaction is not at present related to the question of "should we relocate or not." Most of them take for granted that they should relocate, but the question which is uppermost in their minds is "how?" In other words it is not a pre-determined negative reaction but is a negative reaction related to what they feel are the inadequacies of the WRA program. They say the most important elements in resettlement are: housing, jobs, finances, and public sentiment. With reference to the first three, WRA does not accept responsibility; with reference to public sentiment WRA is trying to create favorable opinion, but this may be beyond WRA's ability. "If" they say "WRA comes out with a positive program of help we could go. If the present program is all they have to offer, we will have to wait until the war is over and our boys come back from the army, and anti-Japanese feeling dies down." They feel that the government is responsible for them, but they feel that they do not have tangible proof that the government is going to discharge its responsibility to them.

Issei 55 and Under

This group pretty much follows the lead of the older Issei, but with a good deal more of emotion and bitterness. They say, together with some older Issei and some of the Nisei "it looks like the government is only interested in getting us out of the center, and does not care what happens to us once we get out." "Eventually we want to go back to California," this has been repeated so often by the Issei it is nearly a refrain.

"If we decided to sit-down and stay here and if there were 3000 or so here at the end of the year, what could the government do about it? They would have to continue the center." The attitude is, we don't want to do that, we want to go along with the government's program, but it may be necessary if a more adequate and positive program is not developed which will give us definite help. They say "yes, the people with property can go back, their problems are not so great, but what is WRA doing for us who do not own property?"

Nisei

On the whole the Nisei in the center are definitely thinking and planning resettlement but in most cases they are planning to resettle in the east. Some say, "we never want to go back to California," while others say "we would like to see how conditions are in the east first, we may go back to California later if conditions are favorable." However, there is a comparatively small percentage of Nisei in the center, and their influence with the Issei is not great because opportunities for which they are equipped are seldom available to the Issei. Also their experience in working with Caucasians is much more varied than that of the Issei.

Army Wives

This group takes the rather general point of view of "the WRA tells us that the 48 states are now open to us. But what can we do? How can we make a living? We would have to supplement our present income with additional earnings. We know we should relocate and that center life is not the thing, but how can we do it? The government should help us instead of just shoving us out." Some say, "they put us in here and they can't just kick us out." This also is not a determination to "sit-down" tactics, but is the expression of resentment toward what they consider to be ordering center closure too early, and to what they consider to be inadequate help on the part of WRA.

Issei Business Men

There has been a good deal of discussion among this group about the possibility of obtaining licenses to start a business. Prior to the evacuation there were restrictions on aliens holding liquor licenses. During evacuation licensing has become even more restricted. What is the situation now. Would we be discriminated against by local officials in obtaining licenses? And if we did obtain a license would we be boycotted if we started a business? There is a feeling that Issei business men would have to depend to a certain extent on the trade of their fellow Japanese. But there may be no appreciable number of these return in the next few months, and what can we do but wait and see what the others are going to do. We, more than others, have to follow the crowd.

Reaction to Signing Relocation Grant Form

Considerable uncertainty was expressed by the Issei in regard to the form to be signed at the time of receiving their relocation grant. This was related to the confusion of the grant with the right to apply for indemnities. Many felt that by signing the form they were waiving their right of filing claims. It became necessary for the relocation office to translate this form into Japanese so the Issei could be assured that they were just signing the application for the grant and were not forfeiting any future right or claim.

Livingston Group

It seems evident now that the Livingston group will be unable to return to the operation of their farms until November 1945. It is also rumored that some of the tenants are saying they will move in November if they are able to find houses, which leaves considerable doubt in the minds of the evacuee owners as to whether they will be able to take over their farms even then. However, about nine or ten of the men are planning

to return this spring and erect a building on one of the farms to live in in order that they may be able to secure employment in the vicinity and be near their farms.

The Doi Incident

The following is a newspaper account of the Doi incident which appeared in the Lamar Daily News, January 22, 1945:

ROUGH RECEPTION FOR AMACHE JAP FAMILY CALIFORNIA

NEWCASTLE, Cal. (UP) The Placer county sheriff's office Saturday disclosed the first case of attempt violence against returning Japanese-Americans with the announcement that unidentified persons first tried to burn and then dynamite a building on the ranch of Sumio Doi.

Doi, who returned recently from Lamar, Colo, with his parents called the sheriff's office early today to report that several carloads of persons had driven onto his property and parked near his packing shed. Shots were being fired at his house, he said, in an effort to keep him and his family indoors.

As a patrol car of sheriff's deputies turned into Doi's ranch, a group of cars were seen speeding away.

Nine sticks of dynamite were found in the packing shed along with a litter of burned matches. The fuses attached to the sticks had burned out and it was believed the trespassers were frightened away by the approach of the patrol car.

Packing Shed in Flames

Doi told officers that he had awakened the night before to find the packing shed in flames. He and his father succeeded in putting out the fire. An investigation showed the building had been sprayed with gasoline.

Doi a 26 year-old American-born Japanese, has a draft deferment for agriculture work. His two brothers are in the Army.

State highway patrol officers announced that road blocks had been placed at the three roads leading into the Doi Ranch and Sheriff Charles Silva said armored patrols would maintain vigilance over all Japanese-owned property in the area, estimated to cover about 20 square miles.

While the Placer county district attorney's office said anyone discovered molesting the property would be "vigorously prosecuted."

* * * * *

The Doi's (son and parents) returned to their farm in Placer County, California about three weeks ago. Two weeks ago many rumors circulated in the center regarding acts of violence to them which were later proved to be groundless. However, last week attempts were made to burn and dynamite his packing shed. The administration immediately secured the facts from the San Francisco Office of WRA and presented them to the Block Managers and other groups in the center. As a result there was a less violent reaction to the facts of an actual incident than there were to the groundless rumor of two weeks ago. The intensity of this reaction varied from block to block. Some blocks reacted strongly, but most blocks took it in their stride. This tempered reaction was partly due to the administration's willingness to get the facts and present them to the residents good, bad or indifferent; partly due to the fact that emotion expressed two weeks ago over a groundless rumor in regard to the same family had acted as an emotional catharsis; and partly due to the fact that actual facts always have positive elements (in this case the encouraging attitude taken by sheriff, neighbors and government) no matter how bad they may be, while rumor is entirely negative and therefore entirely destructive of morale.

Many evacuees say "well, that's what we were afraid would happen." It reinforces their fears, but they are also encouraged by the way in which the civil authorities are handling it. The incident has had the effect of delaying action on the part of several who were planning to return to California in the next few days.

J. Ralph McFarling
Community Analyst

T-12

GRANADA PROJECT
Amache, Colorado

AIRMAIL

February 3, 1945

TO: Dr. John H. Provinse, Chief, Community Management Division
ATTEN: Dr. Edward H. Spicer, Chief, Community Analysis Section
FROM: J. Ralph McFarling, Community Analyst
RE: Weekly trend report

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1. Housing. Since the West Coast is already overcrowded, will we be able to find houses? What is WRA doing to solve the housing question? If WRA does not help us find houses, how can we find houses to live in 1600 miles away?

2. Financial Aid for Living Expenses. What provision is being made for living expenses while we are becoming re-established and before we have an income of our own? The \$25.00 grant will be only a drop in the bucket during this period.

3. Will government protection be given to returning evacuees in the event properties are damaged or when there are occurrences of any physical violence?

4. Financial Aid in re-establishing former business. What commitment can be made before individuals leave the center that they will be able to obtain the necessary loans to set up business enterprises?

5. Will the government provide insurance for relocating evacuees?

6. Will aliens' rights to sue in court be recognized? Several Isseis had civil actions against Caucasians pending in the courts prior to evacuation and were advised by the Judge and the attorney to drop them. What is the present tendency in this respect? Also one Issei maintains that according to international law enemy aliens cannot bring suit in the courts of the country in which they are living. Is this true?

7. Whenever deemed necessary may Isseis (enemy aliens) consult the Spanish Consul on personal matters?

8. Can Isseis still secure licenses?

9. Lifting of travel restrictions of aliens.

10. Are there any plans by the WRA for those unable to relocate due to chronic illness, old age etc.?

11. Would a mass movement to an assembly center be possible?

12. The evacuees were compelled to sell their personal household goods and farm equipment at the time of evacuation. Will the government make arrangements so that relocatees can obtain such things again?

13. Most male Isseis are over 60 years old and before the evacuation were engaged in independent farming or business. They cannot stand hard labor. If they had been allowed to stay in their old places, they would have been able to continue to work in their respective fields.

14. Will WRA approve plans and pay transportation costs of group representatives on investigatory trips to the West Coast?

When the above questions came up in the Council for general discussion, Mr. Hugo Wolters of the Washington who was in the center at the time was invited to participate which in itself is an indication of the healthy attitude on the part of the Council, and a corresponding healthy reaction on the part of the residents whom the members of the council represent. Mr. Wolters was able to clarify a great many points for the Council. However, since Mr. Wolters statements were verbal, the council felt that it was more or less unofficial, and therefore, intend to present the same questions to the Washington Office of WRA through the Director, Mr. Lindley, in order that they may be able to get a written clarification which will be invaluable in getting information over to the residents. Further written clarification of these questions and especially the conditions under which Resettlement

Assistance will be given and the conditions under which evacuees can obtain loans through government agencies will be helpful to the Council in their constructive work with center residents.

Since the discussion of the above questions with Mr. Wolters, most of the blocks have held a second meeting to pass on this information to center residents.

The Council has voted its approval of an all center conference somewhere on the West Coast. They feel that this survey of center questions and problems will be helpful to them in this conference.

GENERAL REACTION

The most general reaction is evidence of a continuing trend that the residents are adopting a healthy and constructive attitude toward resettlement. Of course, there are negative attitudes being expressed of "the government can't close the centers", but these are definitely in the minority, and are losing strength rather than gaining.

Discussion of resettlement center around "how" shall we go about resettlement and not around "shall we" or "shall we not" resettle. The question of "shall we", or "shall we not" resettle will in the last analysis depend on the natural forces which motivate all people such as: 1. The desire to live independent normal lives in a normal community; 2. the desire to order one's own life and not have it ordered by others; 3. The desire to return to one's former home and familiar surroundings; 4. the desire to correct an unsatisfactory experience; 5. the desire to work for the future of selves and children; 6. the desire to re-establish civil rights for the group. Therefore, the question of "shall we" or "shall we not" may safely be rested with these natural forces.

The question of "how" or "by what means" shall we resettle is the practical question which WRA can do most about. As one man put it "yes, we know we have to get out, but "how". I have a small child, my wife is ill, and I am old. What can WRA do to help me re-establish myself and family?" Another said "we Issei came to the U.S. years ago and have gone through many ups and downs of life in California. I was young then and strong. Now I am old. I will need help to start over again as I cannot work as hard as I used to."

It seems evident to me in my contacts with people that intellectual concepts and logical argument have very little weight with them in motivating to action, especially the Issei due to the handicap of language and the fact that they had little opportunity to obtain higher

education. But the thing which influences them the most and which they pay the greatest attention to is successful demonstration of what can be done in resettlement. If they are able to see actual demonstration of the effectiveness of WRA's program of helping people to obtain the resources necessary to successful resettlement, and as a few return to the West Coast and they see that sentiment is favorable, that they will themselves take advantage of this help in their own resettlement.

A NISEI REACTION

One Nisei who feels considerable responsibility to the group had little desire to return to California when the exclusion order was first lifted. At that time, he felt that the east offered the best opportunity. Since then, however, he has been more and more impressed with the attitude of the Issei that "eventually they expect to return to the West Coast." He was also been favorably impressed with the work WRA and civilian groups have been doing on the West Coast. At present he intends to return to California for, he says: "There are plenty of jobs; the government is working hardest for the Japanese people at the present time; and air-minded civilian groups are becoming organized and are working for us." He feels it is highly possible that the situation in California may be better now than it was before evacuation.

RECOMMENDATION REGARDING TRANSPORTATION ASSISTANCE

Several weeks ago the following recommendation was made by the Project Director regarding the transportation assistance ruling.

According to existing instructions 150.1.8 evacuees are divided into two groups: those who relocated prior to the lifting of the exclusion order and those who are still in the center. Both groups may receive transportation grants from the point where they are now residing to the West Coast. Center residents may receive transportation grants from the center to any place in the continental United States, but they cannot receive a transportation grant to some point outside the evacuated area, and later receive a transportation grant to the West Coast in the event they decide they would be better off there, or in the case their plans do not work out successfully.

This is undoubtedly a reasonable ruling on the surface. However, it does not further the purpose of relocation of center residents to points outside the evacuated area. In fact it creates a temporary immobility of center residents until they can see which direction

public opinion on the West Coast will turn. If public sentiment on the West Coast turns out to be favorable the ruling will be for the best, if it does not, the ruling will act to further immobilize center residents who will continue to hope that it will later become favorable. In the meantime since they have only one choice they will wait and see. This wait and see policy is not only wait and see how things turn out on the West Coast, but also how things are going with their relatives and friends who have already relocated in the north, east and south.

On the other hand relocated evacuees have two choices: to remain where they are, or to go to the West Coast. Since it is the group remaining in the center who have been and still are the most conservative and therefore, the hardest to move, the most important factor is to create mobility by increasing their number of choices.

Lifting the exclusion order on the West Coast has created a restlessness in the center which could easily be translated into mobility which we feel is most important to successful resettlement. If we can get people out of a sit-tight position and develop incentive to moving around, they will more quickly find the situation in which they can provide for their own needs. However, if their choice is an either or proposition this restlessness will settle down again to immobility of waiting and hoping that public sentiment on the West Coast will become favorable to them. On the other hand, if center residents in their present restless psychological condition had the opportunity to resettle in the east or north or south in the meantime while they are waiting until opinion on the West Coast crystallizes, many of them would do so because many of them have relatives in those areas. And judging by the great percentage of those already relocated outside the evacuated area who plan to stay where they are and not return to the West Coast we are confident that an equally large percentage of center residents who would consider resettlement outside the evacuated area (as long as they could return to the West Coast with transportation paid during the lifetime of WRA) would also remain there and there would be comparatively few who would apply for transportation grants to the West Coast. This would help to reunite families outside the evacuated area and give center residents the incentive they need to take a chance. It would also have the psychological effect of freeing people mentally and emotionally to consider resettlement possibilities.

At the same time creating mobility among possibly one-fourth of center population would influence the balance to think constructively about resettlement and begin to act.

J. Ralph McFarling
Community Analyst

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T-12

GRANADA PROJECT
Amache, Colorado

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J. Ralph McFarling
Community Analyst

C O P Y

T-13

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION

GRANADA PROJECT
Amache, Colorado

AIRMAIL

February 6, 1945

TO: Dr. John H. Provinse, Chief, Community Management Division
ATTENTION: Dr. Edward H. Spicer, Chief, Community Analysis Section
FROM: J. Ralph McFarling, Community Analyst
RE: Weekly trend report

PLACER COUNTY, CALIFORNIA -- Social Background

Placer County is considered by the evacuee as one of the "hot spots" in California. The Doi Incident has reinforced feeling in the center that Anti-Japanese sentiment is strong there.

The following information was obtained from a Nisei who owns forty acres of land near Auburn, California about five miles from Newcastle where the Doi incident occurred. His reaction was "It looks like Placer County doesn't want us. I guess we will have to wait for a while." "The incident did not mean bodily harm to the Doi's but it might have and we don't want to court danger of physical injury." He and other former residents of Placer County are depending on a report from Mr. Kubo of Gila who is in Placer County now as to the situation there. Mr. Kubo was formerly head of the Penryn Marketing Association.

About four hundred Japanese families formerly lived in Placer County; forty of these are in Granada Center. Of these forty families about 30 of them owned land. These Japanese families were accepted, prior to evacuation, on an individual basis, but the Japanese people were never accepted on a group basis. During the voluntary evacuation of the Japanese from the coast one business man in Auburn said to the informant, "We don't want these Japs to settle here. Oh, I don't mean you; you are one of us. I mean these Japs from the coast. We don't want them here."

The Japanese families mentioned above lived in Placer County for about 35 or 40 years and their children were born there. There has always been a certain amount of discrimination. Segregation was practiced in the schools at Newcastle and Penryn up to the fourth grade. Loomis, also, tried it but found it not feasible economically so finally gave it up.

The principal crop consisted of tree fruits including plum, pears, peaches, cherries and sour grapes. The Placer Fruit Marketing Company was organized about 1935 and was located at Penryn. The fruit was shipped to Chicago and eastern markets. There was some resentment to this marketing association by the other fruit houses at first but as it started in a small way and gradually expanded, it did not cause a great deal of antagonism.

The immigrant population was pretty well divided between the Portuguese and the Japanese, with a few Italian landowners. Both groups came to Placer County about 35 or 40 years ago; if anything the Japanese population came first. Both groups began as laborers and gradually accumulated enough money to buy land. During this time the Caucasian population took sides between the two groups. There was constant friction between the Japanese and Portuguese due to social and economic competition. The Portuguese finally won, however, since they were Europeans and came to be more generally accepted by the Caucasian population. The Portuguese faced some discrimination at first but as their social status was increased by their becoming landowners they intermarried with the Caucasian population.

Some of the Portuguese first generation became naturalized citizens and some of them did not. They were predominantly Catholic in religion which was also the predominant religion of the resident Caucasian population of Placer County. The Japanese on the other hand were predominantly Buddhist.

There were very few representatives of other minority groups in the county. Very little migratory labor was used as the farmers had enough workers in their own families to harvest the crop and to help their neighbors.

Some of the biggest Portuguese farmers who used Japanese laborers are now loudest in keeping Japanese out.

Quite a campaign of anti-Japanese sentiment developed in 1923 at the time of the passing of the Japanese Exclusion Act. A man by the name of Livingston who is a Rancher and real estate man in the county and who also has an interest in various fruit marketing organizations was one of the prime movers in this campaign. The campaign was not directed at the resident Japanese population so much as it was at Japanese outside the county.

At the time of evacuation the majority of the farmers leased their orchards to the fruit houses who then sub-let them to other farmers. Some of the leases were made on a yearly basis, some for two or three years and some to expire at the end of the war. At the present time some of the fruit houses would like to have the Japanese back, because the management of the farms has been a headache to them due to lack of labor and inability to get competent fruit growers.

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GRANADA PROJECT
Amache, Colorado

T-14
RESTRICTED

AIRMAIL

February 9, 1945

TO: Dr. John H. Provinse, Chief, Community Management Division
ATTEN: Dr. Edward H. Spicer, Chief, Community Analysis Section
FROM: J. Ralph McFarling, Community Analyst
RE: Weekly trend report

A study of the attitudes and reactions of center residents during the past week indicates a normal development in their thinking regarding resettlement. The situation can best be evaluated on the basis of the groups in each of the three progressive steps in thinking which lead to definite action by leaving the center.

1. The first group made up of older Issei (primarily around 60 years of age and over) is uncertain as to what stand to take regarding resettlement and therefore susceptible to influence both positive and negative. Their predominant interest is to remain in the center for the duration of the war. However, since they have no basis for thinking that their remaining here will insure that the center will remain open and since no center-wide organization has developed to crystallize and reinforce a "sit-tight" attitude, they are uncertain as to whether such an attitude is tenable. Therefore, their situation as evidenced by their own confusion is fraught with apprehension. They have been unable to make the initial decision in a series of decisions which and in actual resettlement.

The underlying motivation for this reaction is a complex emotion made up of many experiences (often of a frustrating nature) and feelings of the past. Primarily this reaction centers around their consciousness of their status as "enemy aliens" and their acceptance of the solution for their position as "protective custody" by the government. They feel that regardless of whether evacuation was necessary or not, that the fact of evacuation (of their being singled out from among other enemy aliens for special treatment which carries with it a stigma on their individual and racial character) has changed their situation entirely by making them especially vulnerable to lawless elements who are likely to commit acts of violence against them. They feel that the public in general does not know or appreciate all the reasons for evacuation nor for their being released from relocation centers at this time. To qualify that statement they feel that although the thinking people may understand, that the lawless elements, whom they fear

the most, are not capable of understanding nor appreciating their position. They say they were moved out once for reasons which have never been fully clarified and that a stigma attaches to their status. Moreover due to their racial facial characteristics they are easily identifiable for the purposes of being stared at, pointed out, and made the victim of violence by lawless elements.

One expression of fear which always comes out in this connection is a more hypothetical and nebulous fear that some act of the Japanese government may occur in the course of the war which will suddenly inflame public sentiment and lead to mob action against the relocated evacuees. Such occurrences may be: 1. the release of information regarding atrocities of the Japanese Army; or 2. the possibility that Japan may by some means drop a few bombs on the West Coast. Even though it were merely a gesture, or token raid, it would inflame public sentiment and easily lead to mob action against the relocated evacuees who are already vulnerable because of their stigma of having been once evacuated.

Therefore, the Issei feels that it is essential for him to remain in the relocation center for the duration of the war because it is the safest place to be under the circumstances.

A little more positive variant to this attitude runs as follows: I am an enemy alien singled out for special treatment from among other enemy aliens. But I became an enemy alien not by my own choice. This status was thrust upon me by acts of governments. First by the U. S. government in prohibiting me from becoming a citizen; 2. by the declaration of war on the U. S. by the Japanese government; 3. by evacuation. As a result, his present status has its benefits, and he does not want to lose those benefits by his own act of will or choice unless there are greater benefits to be gained. Underneath he is hoping for America to change his status for him by special recognition, acceptance and treatment.

Another attitude involved in his consciousness of his "enemy-alien-singled-out-for-special-treatment" status and his acceptance of "protective custody" for the duration of the war as the best solution under the circumstances is the fact that relocation centers may be considered as small areas of at least partial neutrality amid two nations at war. The older Isseis' attitude may best be described as "passive loyalty." That is, they feel they owe the U. S. government a great deal for the opportunities they have experienced here, and they in return lean over backwards in abiding by all the laws, strive to merit citizenship, and would under no circumstances commit an act against this government. Yet, on the other hand they have experienced social and economic discrimination because of their race, and have been prohibited citizenship.

in the U. S. which necessitates that they retain their Japanese citizenship through no fault of their own. They reason they have no control over nor choice in the matter of their citizenship. The only thing they could do would be to renounce citizenship in Japan which would mean they would have no citizenship anywhere. This, they feel can be expected of no one. Hence they are pawns of two governments, and hence their "passive loyalty" to the U. S.

The older Issei seem to feel divorced from the struggle going on between the U.S. and Japan and of having no particular part in it. While they love America, they have no particular hatred of Japan. Some lean more toward Japan and some lean more toward the U.S., but there is little variation from the neutral position. They seem to have adopted the attitude of the more or less detached observer with no decisive taking of sides as is possible with both the native citizens of the U.S. and of Japan. There is a feeling of respect for all peoples regardless of nation similar to the peace-time reaction of all Americans. Thus they seem to be a group set apart, a small island of neutrality within the world struggle.

Two factors tend to tip the scales of this "passive loyalty" in favor of more active loyalty to the U.S.; 1. the fact that they are old and have only a few years of life left at most, so that their status does not count for too much in their own eyes. But their children are citizens of the U.S. and they tend to do that which will further the welfare of their children. 2. Nisei participation in the war, and especially those who give their lives brings the Issei and especially the parents of Nisei soldiers to a greater realization of their stake in the cause of America. This influence has become more and more pronounced after the holding of three Memorial Services.

Other factors tend to counteract this tendency of tipping the scales of "passive loyalty" in favor of active loyalty to the U. S. They are: 1. the fact that most Isseis have relatives in Japan whose welfare they fear may be jeopardized; 2. a feeling of kinship with all Japanese people due to their common racial and national origin; 3. and the agitation of West Coast groups for the deportation of all people of Japanese ancestry, Issei and Nisei alike, when the war is over. This tends to confuse the Issei and renders their decision as to how their present acts will affect their children's future more and more uncertain, and their feelings about it ambivalent.

An alternate method of evaluating the "sit-tight" reaction is that the group is composed of: 1. those few who have plenty of money who could just as well leave the center one time as another. They are not interested in investing money in a business at this time when values are

inflated, and the center offers them the best security with the least expense and danger. They think primarily of themselves and have little thought for the group as a whole, or their influence upon it. Due to their position they influence others who do not have money and cannot afford to take such a position. 2. The other group is composed of those who have no money or property, but who have large families and often sick, old age, and otherwise dependent members of their family. 3. There is another group who have remained in the center for various reasons up to now, in which the head of the household would like to go out now and make enough money between now and the time the family resettles in order to finance their re-establishment. They would like to see the centers stay open as long as possible in order to give them a chance to make a better start in the meantime.

There are a number of arguments which carry weight with the proponents of the "sit-tight" attitude. Among them are: 1. Regardless of the reason given for wanting to keep the centers open we must take for granted that the WRA means what it says when it announces that the centers will close within a year. If we proceed on any other assumption and influence others to do so, we are apt to do ourselves and others a grave injustice, as somebody may get hurt. We can't afford to take the responsibility for assuming that the center will not be closed. 2. One Issei councilman puts it this way: when the war is over we will have to leave the centers, that is certain. Economically that will be the most difficult time to re-establish ourselves. It is much better to plan resettlement now when the opportunities are greatest.

3. The entire country is developing a favorable understanding of our problem. The WRA is working hard for us, on the West Coast and throughout the country in general. Civic groups are organizing on the West Coast and elsewhere to help us. We have to meet them half way and show our appreciation of their efforts by resettling or these friends of ours may lose interest.

It is interesting to note in this connection that while the center endorsed the Inter-Center Conference by blocks, that the "sit-tight" element feels a definite threat from this conference. Their argument seems to be that since the council seems to take for granted that the centers will close and is working entirely on the problems connected with the means to resettlement that they will make some proposals to WRA regarding changes in the mechanics of resettlement. Then if WRA accepts those proposals, all the people in the center will have no recourse but to resettle. Thus the last remaining tangible reasons for remaining in the center will be out from under them.

II. The second group in the progressive thinking toward resettlement is made up of those who have successfully resolved the initial decision to resettle and are considering the problems connected with the means or mechanics of resettlement. This group includes most of the Nisei, the thinking and more active groups among the Issei, nearly all the community council and others who feel responsibility not only for themselves but for the welfare of the group as a whole.

It is to be noted, however, that the thinking of this group is also fluid and therefore also susceptible to positive and negative influences. If a bottle neck in respect to the means of resettlement develops this group may retrogress to a "sit-tight" position and use as their reasons that no matter how much they want to resettle, the means are not adequate and therefore resettlement is impossible. This group's uncertainty may be only a lack of adequate information as to the full scope of WRA's program of resettlement. There is every indication that as they get more information on the background of thinking which has gone into the WRA program that they become more and more confident of the possibility of the success of the resettlement program.

Their first principal concern is with housing. They say that not more than 10% of the people own their property. Here it is a question of when they can get possession without creating antagonism on the part of the present tenants and the surrounding community.

A few may receive assistance in renting houses through friends. Also civic groups may be helpful in making available to them the few vacancies which exist. But, since California's population has increased by about 23 percent since the war began, that there are just not enough houses to go around. Therefore, the solution for the major part of the problem will rest with the FHA and other government agencies concerned with building dwelling units.

It is recognized that it would be much easier for the FHA to build housing for defense workers, many of whom now reside in houses formerly occupied by the evacuees. However, since people are already crowded in apartments and often undesirable dwellings that the FHA would be unable to keep up with the demand for houses. And since the evacuee is not on the ground to rent houses when they become vacant, that others would move into them as soon as a defense worker moved into an FHA unit.

Therefore, they reason that the only solution in the cities, at least, is for the building of FHA housing especially earmarked for the evacuee. They realize this would be difficult due to community sentiment and building priorities. They conclude, that if there are no houses available, and people are unable to leave the center by the end of the year, what will become of them?

They greet with a good deal of enthusiasm the opening of hostels on the West Coast, which would give a limited number of families the opportunity to be on the ground to look for houses.

They also say, if houses are not available in California, some people who really want to go back there, will have to go elsewhere where houses are available.

The next step is: assuming that we get housing, can we get priority to buy stoves, refrigerators and other household equipment?

Their second principal concern is: regardless of whether we are Issei or Nisei, there is a possibility of violence on the part of scattered groups. What assurance do we have of protection by the government?

The third principal concern is with financial aid, both financial assistance in regard to establishing the household and paying initial living expenses until earnings of the head of the household begins, and in regard to capital loans to re-establish a business or farming enterprise.

The other questions being asked by this group in regard to the mechanics of resettlement were listed in my weekly trend report of February 3rd.

The Council is continuing to compile questions and problems of this nature as they are expressed by the people. They have drawn up a list of these questions to be handed to Mr. Dillon Myer when he arrives on Sunday in order that he will be in a position to clarify them in his speeches and conferences in the center.

It is to be remembered that these questions do not necessarily present the Council's thinking on resettlement, but they do represent the peoples' thinking and uncertainty. The Council feels it their responsibility as representatives to present all the questions to the WRA administration which are raised. The writer feels that this is a very constructive approach and the questions should be very helpful to Mr. Myer in his discussions.

The Council is to be commended on their cooperation not only in compiling the most important questions expressed by residents, but also on carrying back the information to the residents in block meetings. The present plan is to compile the information Mr. Myer gives in his stay in the center and then hold block meetings to pass it on to the

Issei who are unable to understand English. They are very conscientious in regard to their responsibility in giving all the available information to their people.

It is recognized that many people in the center cannot fathom the complications of the resettlement assistance and other WRA programs. As a result they are suspicious of their workability. The Council and other thinking people see the necessity for simplifying the information for the people and to insure that every step in the program of resettlement assistance is full proof and assured. When they are certain themselves of the program, and have confidence in its practicability they are better able to alleviate the uncertainty and suspicion of the people.

Many people need to be assured not only that they will receive help through resettlement assistance in re-establishing their home, but that they will also be able to receive help at some future time during a period of need due to illness, loss of employment etc.

Another argument of this general group, not the council, is: "granted that resettlement assistance is adequate for re-establishing one's home, and is the best solution to the problem, it still does not provide the inducement necessary to motivate people to action. If an additional grant or compensation to all for cooperating with the government in evacuation could be made it would have a great psychological effect on the evacuee. The present grant of \$25.00 is totally inadequate to provide this inducement."

In presenting the questions which the Council has compiled, one has recently been asked many times. "Recognizing that loyal evacuees are afraid of violence would it be possible to continue several relocation centers in operation for the duration to provide them protective custody?" This question was added in order to adequately represent the wishes of the first group mentioned above who cannot make the initial decision to resettle due to fear.

Another recently expressed attitude is that "WRA has a blue-print for liquidation of the center which it has not been expedient to announce as yet. Because we don't see how, under the present program, the centers can possibly be closed in a year."

III. The third group are those who have overcome the two above mentioned hurdles: have completed their plans for resettlement and are ready to leave the center. Since January 3rd, 25 people have

relocated to the evacuated area, and 76 have relocated to areas other than the evacuated area. At present over 300 people have approved plans for their return to the West Coast.

J. Ralph McFarling
Community Analyst

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GRANADA PROJECT
Amache, Colorado

AIRMAIL

February 15, 1945

TO: Dr. John H. Provinse, Chief, Community Management Division
ATTEN: Dr. Edward H. Spicer, Chief, Community Analysis Section
FROM: J. Ralph McFarling, Community Analyst
RE: Weekly trend report

Mr. Dillon S. Myer was in the center from Sunday until Tuesday evening. During this time he addressed a mass meeting of the residents in the High School Auditorium on Sunday evening, and met with various groups including the Block Managers Assembly, the Community Council, the Co-ordinating Committee, the board of directors of Co-operative Enterprises, the High School students, the Women's Federation, the Church groups and others.

It is possible to give only general reactions to his visit at this time. The general reaction of the thinking people both Nisei and Issei is very favorable. The residents generally recognized and responded to the Director's sincerity, to the hard work which has been done and is being done for them on the West Coast and throughout the country. There is an increasing awareness of the real situation which they face, and of the need to think about their future status in America.

The thinking residents seem to have been aroused out of their more or less fatalistic attitude that no one, least of all themselves, could do anything about public sentiment in California, that the only effective solution was military protection, to a pleased realization that something has been done about it and that the WRA is fighting their battles for them. Thus the elements of cooperation and participation are supplanting resistance. Many have said in the past two days, "We see what Mr. Myer has been doing, and that he has had a hard job, he is working for us, and now it is up to us to have faith in him and to cooperate with him and the WRA program." People are realizing that WRA is not just trying to shove them around, but that it is cooperating with them for their own welfare, and that there is something which they as evacuees can do to further their own future welfare by resettling this year. Every indication is that the thinking people (including both Nisei and many of the younger Issei) are seeing the problem in a more positive light which will eventually lead to action. These are they who are receptive, and when a trend develops in this group, the less

reception older Issei will follow.

CHURCH GROUPS

Representatives of the Protestant Churches held a meeting on Tuesday evening which lasted until midnight. At this meeting they formed a Resettlement Committee to assist not only in the Church problems in connection with resettlement, but to help work out individual problems of church members and others. They have expressed their desire to work with the Community Analyst and the Evacuee Relocation Information Bureau who are now housed in once office near the Co-op. Representatives from the Church group will be appointed to work in this office.

The present plan of the Church group is to help in the dissemination of resettlement information to their people, and to develop hostels on the Coast. One of the ministers is leaving for a tour of the West Coast today. He will finally settle in Los Angeles to establish a hostel there. Another minister who recently resettled to Idaho will go to Los Angeles some time in March to work in the same hostel. Another minister still in the center plans to go to Sacramento within the next few weeks to establish a hostel for Sacramento and the surrounding community including Walnut Grove, Marysville, Yuba City, Livingston etc. Their plan is to use the churches in the various areas as hostels. This will call for temporary remodeling of the churches to provide separate quarters. Since most of the churches have kitchens, meals can be served on a communal plan. They would like to work out some plan for financial assistance with WRA and the American Friends Service Committee for the development and operation of these hostels. They feel that hostels established at Los Angeles, San Francisco, Sacramento, Stockton, and Fresno will be able to provide temporary quarters for evacuees returning to these areas which include the most important centers of their former occupation.

COMMUNITY GOVERNMENT

Mr. Myer's speeches in the center reinforced the Council's constructive stand that there is no advantage to be gained in questioning the fact of the center's closing, and that the important problems are those connected with the means of resettlement. The Council has translated Mr. Myer's speeches and they have been distributed to the blocks; a number of block meetings have already been held which have been successful in getting over this positive and constructive approach to the residents.

Three delegates left Tuesday evening for the Inter-Center Conference at Salt Lake City, since they had already planned on it. However, with the clarification of the WRA program by Mr. Myer, there seemed to be a less urgent need for the conference in the minds of the Council members.

ISSEI

The "sit-tight" position of many of the older Issei has become even less tenable as a result of Mr. Myer's visit. Their usual statement in regard to his speeches is "so that's it, well...." In saying this they indicate not merely that they had expected more and were therefore disappointed, nor merely that after all the resettlement problem is still the same old problem fraught with the same difficulties, but something else a little more positive, that "something new has been added", a new idea, the beginning of a new awareness of the problem, possibly the beginning of hope that the situation is not as bad as it was looked to be.

One of the younger Issei who has given a lot of thought to resettlement and to the problems of the residents sees a definite need to develop some more meaningful label for the Issei; a name which when spoken would instantly differentiate them from the Japanese in Japan or "enemy Japs" as he put it. As he sees it the average Caucasian when he asks your nationality immediately becomes suspicious when you say Japanese, because he immediately connects you in his own mind with the "enemy Japs" in Japan; he does not realize that your loyalty to America has been proven. But if such a name could be developed, and a campaign carried on through the reports office and newspapers to make it and the loyal evacuee synonymous, that this would make life much more secure for the Issei outside Relocation Centers. If a hyphenated name is used, he prefers American-Japanese instead of Japanese-American because the former puts the emphasis on the American. However, this title is not completely satisfactory to him. He also feels that the Nisei should drop the name of "Nisei" and be known outright as Americans.

J. Ralph McFarling
Community Analyst

RESIDENTS' QUESTIONS COMPILED BY COUNCIL

The following are the questions compiled by the Community Council. They were handed to Mr. Myer on his arrival, and were used by him as a basis for his discussion with the Council on Monday afternoon.

AMACHE COMMUNITY COUNCIL
Amache, Colorado

A SUMMARY OF PROBLEMS AND QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY CENTER RESIDENTS

1. Housing
 - (a) Has the government any plans relative to housing problems of relocatees (in the Western Coast states or elsewhere)?
 - (b) The problem will be solved if the government build houses for evacuees through the P.H.A.
2. Financial Aid
 - (a) Anxious to obtain further detailed clarification on Resettlement Assistance Program (amounts appropriated by Congress, States, etc.).
 - (b) Would like to have assistance procedures simplified; For instance, a certificate stating the total amount of assistance to be granted by the involved agencies Federal and Local, be issued to eligible evacuees before they leave the center for resettlement.
3. Protection of Life and Property
 - (a) Anxious to have a Presidential proclamation issued so that full protection be extended to relocatees and their properties.
4. Financial Aid to the Re-establishment of Former Enterprises
 - (a) Having lost practically everything at the time of evacuation evacuees are incapable to re-establish themselves in their former economic enterprises unless some forms of financial aid be made available to them, preferably by the Federal Government.
 - (b) Is it possible for the government to make long-period loans at low interest-rates?
5. Insurance
 - (a) Will the Federal government exert its influence over private insurance companies so as to make available various forms of insurance to relocatees?

6. License
 - (a) Will Mr. Myer be kind enough to make such recommendations to the various local governmental authorities concerned so that all kinds of license be made locally available to relocatees?
 - (b) Unless such licenses be granted without discrimination, evacuees cannot re-establish themselves in licensed trades, services, etc.
7. Movement Restrictions
 - (a) Would like to find out whether or not the travel restrictions be alleviated for alien members of the families whose sons, daughters, husbands or brothers are serving in the armed services as well as for those aliens whose loyalty to the U.S. government has been proved and is recognized.
8. Priority for Necessary Goods
 - (a) On such goods as farm machinery, household furnishings, etc., unless some special considerations (priority) are given, relocatees cannot settle and earn livelihood.
9. Cancelling of Leases
 - (a) Long-term leases (for the duration) were made on farms, houses, and other properties at the time of evacuation. Unless such leases are rendered legally cancellable, the evacuees thus tied up find it impossible to resettle.
10. Evacuee Property Removal
 - (a) The announced time for removing evacuee property from the warehouses governmental or the WRA creates hardships; to alleviate the situation, the property owning evacuees would like to have an extension of time for the following reasons:

Due to unsettled conditions and the lack of space in new homes to be, most of the household goods cannot be used or stored in such homes.
11. Power of Attorney
 - (a) Would like to have further clarification.
12. Legal Advising Offices
 - (a) It is desired that legal offices be established in various localities to render free legal sides to relocatees who intend to resettle in such places.
13. Naturalization of Issei
 - (a) Anxious to know whether or not the government intends to make those loyal Issei eligible for naturalization.

14. Schools

- (a) Anxious for continued operations of the schools until the center is closed.

15. The foregoing quires constitute the more important of the problems relative to relocation and re-settlement as the center residents think on the basis of their desire to carry out the government's announced policy. They are presented to the authorities concerned for their serious, sympathetic consideration. That the residents are in need of the assistance along the line is obvious. There are doubtless some (may be many) loyal evacuees who desire to remain in this center (or in some other center) for the duration for the simple reason of their inability to see how they can relocate and re-settle outside unless they are given the assistance indicated above. As it is well-known many men are aged. Their sons are in the armed services. Their female dependents are mostly also old or minors. Those in productive age-groups are relatively few in number.

GRANADA PROJECT
Amache, Colorado

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AIRMAIL

March 10, 1945

TO: Dr. John H. Provinse, Chief, Community Management Division
ATTEN: Dr. Edward H. Spicer, Chief, Community Analysis Section
FROM: J. Ralph McFarling, Community Analyst
RE: Weekly trend report

GENERAL REACTIONS TO RESETTLEMENT

The impetus given to positive planning for resettlement by Mr. Myer's visit to the center continues strong. There is general acceptance of the fact that the centers will close within the year. Nearly everyone you talk with now has some plan in mind; they are either planning to go east or west sometime during the year. Many Issei who, prior to lifting the exclusion order did not even discuss resettlement, now are saying: "Our friends are going out or planning to go out, we don't want to be left here alone; we had better find some place to go too."

In regard to California, many are waiting a month or so until the weather is a little warmer, or until they are a little more sure that sentiment is satisfactory, or both. They seem to feel that by May both factors will be favorable. By that time the steadily increasing trickle of returning evacuees will have resettled many people in their former homes in California, and they will be in a position to be helpful to others in resettling. At the same time, sentiment will have been given an adequate test. At present the general attitude is "wait a little while longer; it will work out, but don't be in too much of a hurry."

During the fourteen day period from February 20th to March 5th, 135 terminal leaves were issued. Of these 114 left the center; 45, or roughly 40 percent returned to the evacuated area and 69, or roughly 60 percent went to areas other than the evacuated area. This represents a gradually accelerated resettlement over the previous 14 day period.

INTER-CENTER CONFERENCE

The delegates returning from the Inter-Center Conference at Salt Lake City, Utah, have made their report to the Council. They also reported to the center at large by means of a mass meeting at which the attendance was approximately 150. There has been very little noticeable reaction. People in general do not seem to be thinking on a group basis

such as that implied by the Inter-Center Conference. They are rather thinking and planning resettlement on an individual family basis which is continuing at an accelerated rate.

The first few days of the conference were spent in arranging the program and the agenda through committees. The agenda committee compiled all the problems brought to the conference by the delegates in written form. There was a total of 175 which the committee reduced to 33 requests and 15 statements of fact. These were then discussed in open conference and finally reduced to 21 requests and 12 statements of fact.

There was a readily apparent division in attitudes of the various centers. Topaz, Heart Mountain, Gila, Poston and Minidoka were committed, apparently, to a strong resolution in favor of keeping the centers open for the duration while Granada and Rohwer were convinced that such a resolution would not be accepted by WRA and that there was nothing to be gained in pushing it.

The Topaz delegation, it is alleged, came to the conference with three propositions, the first of which was a strong resolution for keeping the centers open for the duration. It is alleged the Topaz delegation demanded that this proposition be passed on favorably by the conference first before anything else was done or it would withdraw its delegation from the conference. Granada and Rohwer opposed this type of pressure. The Granada delegation went on record that if such a method were used that there would be no use of holding a conference at all. Mr. Kawashiri, Granada Council Chairman, recommended that this resolution be considered last instead of first. This suggestion was finally adopted.

Early difference arose over the number of delegates to be seated. Granada and Rohwer each had 3 delegates but some of the larger centers had 4, 5 and 6 delegates. It was argued by the larger centers that delegates should be seated on the basis of population represented rather than by centers. This proposal was opposed by Granada and Rohwer, but was passed over their opposition.

Another point which was discussed at length was the matter of inviting the Spanish Consul to the meeting. Here again Granada and Rohwer opposed, arguing that the Spanish Consul's interest was only with the Issei and that their problems should be taken up with him on an individual basis at the centers. This attitude prevailed and the matter was tabled.

The final resolution regarding center closure was a compromise which tempered its tone from a rigid demand to a more flexible request in which

the conference in making it did not go out on a limb, and did not assume a position from which it could not retreat.

There is some interest in the center over the answer to this resolution, but after Mr. Myer's visit few here have any illusions about the success of the resolution and are continuing their planning on an individual family basis.

RESETTLERS OUTSIDE THE EVACUATED AREA

Many of the older Nisei and younger Issei who have families and are looking to the future are not at all sure they ever want to go back to the West Coast. They are dissatisfied with their treatment there and are pessimistic as to possible improvement of sentiment in the future. They would like better opportunities for their children and a sense of freedom from restrictions for themselves. They feel confident of their ability to make a place for themselves in the east.

One such man has spent several months in Kansas City, worked during the harvest of peaches in Colorado, has visited Texas and recently made a trip to his home community in California where he owns property which is leased until November 1st. He reports that California is livable for the evacuee, and that conditions are such that the evacuee can return if the return is undertaken slowly and is not concentrated in a few areas. He felt, however, that California might be more desirable as a relocation possibility for the Issei because they do not mind so much being segregated. They have been used to such restrictions in the past, and they have their Issei friends upon whom they can depend for their social life which is satisfactory to them because of their inability to speak English. In other words it is an adaptation made by the Issei to his social situation which has compensations for him. However, he felt that for the Nisei, such an adaptation held neither compensations nor a hopeful outlook for the future. He felt the social climate of California was not as good as it was in pre-evacuation days. Also he has worked in Kansas City and elsewhere outside the evacuated area and has experienced acceptance without racial discrimination. When he compares this new sense of freedom with a California which is not as good as it was before evacuation, he has little desire to return. He says, "When you have been outside California, and have come into contact with people who have a more broadminded attitude toward race, and then return to California where the situation is less favorable than it was prior to evacuation, you are not encouraged to go back, but rather to go somewhere else."

MODESTO

There seems to be a pretty general feeling among former residents of Modesto that sentiment there is not favorable. It is tied up with knowledge regarding the government hospital which is established there and house about 2,000 convalescent sailors. The reason given for this fear of the unfavorable attitude of sailors is that there are no Nisei in the Navy and therefore, the sailors have had no opportunity to come into contact with Nisei. Soldiers on the other hand have been fighting along side of Nisei and respect their ability and spirit.

LOS ANGELES PRODUCE DEALERS

Former Los Angeles produce dealers feel that there will be little opportunity for them to get back into this business at once. They say that the Fruit Wholesalers have organized unions to restrict the time of opening markets to 6 a.m. This they feel is unfair to Vegetable Wholesalers because fruit can be put into storage without harm, but vegetables have to be sold the same day they are picked. Vegetable men start their day at somewhere between midnight and 3 a.m. They sell to retail dealers within 300 miles of Los Angeles who buy early and then truck the produce to their stores and put them on display in time for the day's trade. Thus the action of the unions in this instance is unfair to vegetable wholesalers. Whether this regulation is specifically designed to restrict opportunities of evacuees in the produce business is not known.

A former market man says that Mr. Robertson, WRA Officer, in Los Angeles and himself a former market man has expressed his opinion that it would be better for the evacuee not to return to the 7th and 9th street markets because of the opposition there of those who have taken over the markets, but to start anew in some other section.

MR. SASASHIMA'S VISIT TO FRESNO

A good deal of concern is felt among both the administrative staff and the evacuees in the center over the experience of Mr. Sasashima and Mr. Yamashita on an investigatory trip to Fresno last week. The purpose of the trip was to investigate an offer made in Mr. Yamashita by Dutch Leonard who wanted to employ 50 to 100 evacuees in his 1400 acre vineyard six miles east of Fresno.

The center Relocation Office in a telephone conversation with the Fresno Office understood that the Okonogi Hospital in Fresno was being used as a hostel since it was no longer being used as a hospital due to the fact that Dr. Okonogi is in the army.

Mr. Sasashima and Mr. Yamashita left quite hurriedly to investigate the employment opportunity offered. Mr. Sasashima expected to be gone for 30 days at least and Mr. Yamashita for 10 days. They both returned unexpectedly within a week. I am attaching a report made by Mr. Sasashima of their experience while in Fresno.

The two investigators felt definitely that the Fresno Office had not followed through in helping them to arrange plans for the relocation of themselves and 50 or more families.

They plan to return, however, with 50 heads of families to work for Mr. Leonard about the first of April. However, in the meantime they feel that the situation in Fresno requires considerable attention to insure favorable consideration for the group.

The local office is making a complete report together with a copy of Mr. Sasashima's report to the San Francisco Office.

J. Ralph McFarling
Community Analyst

Report by Mr. Sasashima on Visit to Fresno,
California

On February 27, 1945, Mr. Yamashita and I left Amache by train for Fresno, California, on a short term leave, arriving at Fresno Santa Fe depot at 8:20 p.m. on March 1st. As we entered the waiting room we noticed 3 Filipino men loitering around, but didn't pay much attention as we thought they were waiting for their train. So I went into the telephone booth to call Mr. Fischer, WRA Relocation Officer there, but I didn't know his telephone number, so I asked the operator to connect me with Mr. Paul J. Fischer of the WRA office. The operator's reply was, "Sorry, no such name or address in the directory." I repeated again, but her answer was the same. Disgustedly I stepped out of the booth and noticed the three men watching us cautiously.

Then we hired a taxi to go to Okonogi Hospital (former hospital, now used as a rooming house) as recommended by Mr. Knodel as this place was being used as a hostel. We neared the hospital so I looked back to see if the men were following us. Yes, they were right behind us in their car. As we stopped in front of the Okonogi Hospital, they parked behind us, so I walked up to their car and asked, "What's the purpose of following us?" They replied, "What business have you coming here?" I answered, "What business have you to find out? I'm working for the WRA. Give me your name, address, and license number." That seemed to have scared them, as there was no answer and they immediately shifted the gear and sped away. I looked for the license but the tail light was completely out.

After the incident, we went up to the Okonogi Hospital and knocked on the door. Mrs. Diel answered the door and asked us to come in. As we entered, we told her pre-arrangement had been made thru Mr. Knodel to stay there. She informed us that she did not have any word from the WRA office about their coming, nor arrangement to use the place as a hostel. Mrs. Diel further stated that she was just hired by Dr. Okonogi, who is now in the Army, to act as caretaker of the property. While we were talking to Mr. and Mrs. Diel, a young Japanese boy, who was staying there, came out and he suggested Tom Inouye's place as he had heard they had some extra beds. We later learned that the fellow's name was Kawai. Late that night we walked to Tom Inouye's home which was 6 blocks away from Okonogi hospital.

We spent that evening at Mr. and Mrs. Inouye's home and early next morning we went to a nearby restaurant (former Japanese section) to have breakfast and again we were followed by groups of Filipinos. We were being watched as we ate breakfast and as I went up to the cashier to pay, they stood around the cashier counter. Then we hired a taxi to go to the WRA office. Mr. Fischer was in the office so we mentioned to him about the Okonogi hospital not being used as a hostel. Mr. Fischer's statement was, "It's too bad you didn't have better arrangement, but it's none of my business to find you a sleeping place." "I'll drive you two over to

Dutch Leonard's place in my car." (The purpose of our trip was to see Dutch Leonard on a farm contract deal.) This was 6 miles east of Fresno.

As we reached there, Mr. Fischer said, "Here we are boys," and he introduced us to Mr. H. B. Leonard (elder brother of Dutch Leonard) and he returned to town saying that he was too busy. Mr. Leonard told us that Dutch was still in bed and he showed us around the ranch for about an hour. Then we came back to Dutch Leonard's home and talked with him all afternoon about the deal. He wanted 50 family heads at present and later need about 150 men. He also stated that rooms will be furnished, wages will be \$.80 an hour, \$1.50 meal charges per day.

About 8:00 that evening, Mr. H. B. Leonard drove us back to Tom Inouye's home, and we again spent the night with them. While we were talking with Mr. and Mrs. Inouye that evening, they mentioned that the Chief of Police and detectives of Fresno had said to them, "What did you come back for?" "It's no time to come back; better go back to camp." Then we told them about the Filipino incident and Mrs. Inouye said that Mr. Kawai and they had same trouble with the Filipinos. So they were quite worried.

Next morning, March 3, 1945, we telephoned Dutch Leonard to come into town to finish up the deal. Mr. Leonard arrived about 11:00 in the morning and talked for about two hours. He took us to the WRA office, but Mr. Fischer was ready to leave for San Francisco to attend a meeting so he didn't have much time to talk to us but we asked again to make arrangement for us for a place to stay, but he said, "I don't know anything about outside, I just follow the WRA policy." Mr. Fischer was rushing as he had to catch the 2:00 p.m. train. We didn't have a chance to tell him about the Filipino incident as he left immediately.

And we left Fresno that evening to return to Amache.

We are now back in Amache to arrange 50 men to take back with us to Fresno around the first of April.

GRANADA PROJECT
Amache, Colorado

T-17
Cup

AIRMAIL

March 17, 1945

TO: Dr. John H. Provinse, Chief, Community Management Division
ATTN: Dr. Edward H. Spicer, Chief, Community Analysis Section
FROM: J. Ralph McFarling, Community Analyst
RE: Weekly trend report

FRESNO RESETTLEMENT GROUP

Last week we enclosed with our weekly trend report a copy of Mr. Sasashima's report on his scouting trip to Fresno. The substance of which was that he and Mr. Yamashita had not received the help they had expected to receive from the WRA Office in regard to making arrangements for employment, temporary living quarters and resettlement assistance. And that further they had experienced acts of intimidation by Filipinos who followed them around.

This report was made to the Council and the Co-ordinating Committee. The Assistant Co-ordinator asked the Vice-Chairman of the Council to assist Mr. S. in writing up his report in order that the problem could be presented to the Head of the Relocation Division in Washington for appropriate action. This was done.

This week Mr. Y. appeared before the Council and stated that Mr. S.'s statement was grossly exaggerated, that Filipino boys did not follow them and that Mr. S. had reported what he had heard and not what he had experienced.

In the meantime, Mr. S.'s statement had appeared in the Pioneer and caused many who had planned to go to the Fresno job to change their minds.

It appears that there were two motives involved in these two reports. Mr. S. desired to influence WRA to greater activity to correct a situation in Fresno which he considered to be unfavorable to resettlement with the idea that he could not encourage evacuee friends to go to Fresno unless some action were undertaken by the WRA there. Mr. Y., on the other hand, was not concerned about the situation in Fresno but only about the effect of Mr. S.'s report on the center residents.

In the meantime a Mr. Konno from Rohwer was in the center to consult with Mr. Y. in regard to recruiting a number of the workers needed from Rohwer.

Plainly Mr. Y. and Mr. S. were competing for leadership of the group. This came out not only in the way each presented his information, but also in the plan for board of the men at the vineyard. There is a boy's camp on the ranch which is to be used to house about 100 men. Mr. Y. favored the plan of recruiting single men and to board them at the camp there for \$1.50 per day each. This would be sufficient to pay one person for the operation of the camp. An alternate plan was suggested by Mr. S. to hire a cook and divide the expense of the food among the boarders. Thus it was felt that each man would only have to pay 70¢ or 80¢ each per day. Mr. Leonard agreed to pay the salary of the cook and helper and provide the housing without cost.

Since the latter plan was adopted on a trial basis for two months, it may have been the cause of the disagreement between Mr. Y. and Mr. S. Mr. Y. was interested in managing the boy's camp on a profit basis. As a result, he has been primarily interested in recruiting single men for the work presumably because they would remain as constant boarders of the boy's camp. Heads of families would leave the boy's camp as soon as they made arrangements for housing for their families on the ranch. Mr. S. was primarily concerned with recruiting heads of families because he felt they would be more stable influence in the community, and it would enable them to bring out their families as fast as the tenant houses on the ranch were vacated.

Disagreement between Mr. Y. and Mr. S. was finally resolved in the typical fashion through the medium of an evacuee go-between in the Vice-Chairman of the Community Council. It was finally decided that Mr. Y. should be the leader and Mr. S. would go along with him.

The Council and the Evacuee Information Bureau is writing a statement for the Pioneer to counteract the negative effect of Mr. S.'s report and to assure the residents that WRA is taking definite action to provide protection for people going to Fresno.

At this date the whole affair seems like a tempest in a teapot, but it reinforces the conviction that there is no substitute for accurate information presented without bias, whether it is presented by the evacuee or the administrative staff. It appears that Mr. S.'s report was colored by his desire to influence WRA to action and as such became propaganda. Also Mr. Y.'s report was colored by his desire to recruit men and also was propaganda. Somewhere in between lie the actual facts which if accurately presented would probably have accomplished both purposes without creating negative repercussions.

In any situation involving information the evacuees feels that WRA is apt to paint "too rosy" a picture and to leave out the unfavorable features. On the other hand, the personnel is apt to feel that the evacuee is too willing to believe the unfavorable things he hears and too unwilling to believe the favorable reports. However, all groups have worked together in this case to bring about complete understanding of the situation and provide a basis for future dissemination of information adequately tested for accuracy.

At present eleven men are committed to go to the Leonard Ranch near Fresno on March 30th. The date of departure may be delayed a few days in order to give time for WRA to present additional information regarding its action in Fresno to improve the situation there and to recruit more men in the center.

RESETTLEMENT ASSISTANCE

Many center residents both employable people who have no household goods and permanent dependents are looking forward in their planning to resettlement assistance as an important aid in helping them to re-establish themselves. Not only are a lot of questions being asked about it, but they are waiting anxiously for the booklet describing the procedures for obtaining it in detail which was promised by one of the Washington Officials visiting in the center.

The pattern of reaction to this type of aid is familiar to center personnel since it follows the pattern in regard to many other WRA policies. There was at first a great deal of protest against the necessity of applying for assistance on a need basis since it implied charity. There was later protest that this important function (since it became accepted that this type of assistance was to be used instead of a blanket grant) was being turned over to other agencies and was not to be handled by the WRA. Here it is evident that transference has led to a sense of dependency which is satisfying to the evacuee. He naturally resists any change in this relationship at first and experiences all the fears, doubts and sense of rejection of the individual who is required to reassume responsibility for his own life in a normal situation.

In this connection also WRA was a known quantity and even though its policies were not always acceptable, to the evacuees way of thinking, still they felt that WRA personnel understood the evacuees' position better than other agencies. On the other hand, the Welfare Group outside the centers was an unknown quantity as few people had had any dealings

with it before evacuation therefore they felt insecurity when it was assigned this important function. It would have been the same had it been any other agency as the evacuee has little confidence in local officials.

After careful explanation on the part of the personnel, this attitude was later followed by an acceptance of the Social Security Board as the agent for resettlement assistance. But in explaining the work of the Board and in developing assurance in the evacuee that the Board would function to their advantage, WRA no doubt over-emphasized the dependence which could be placed in it and the range of the service which would be available.

Now that the evacuee has accepted this procedure, WRA learns that the local welfare boards have certain limitations in acting as an agent for the resettlement assistance fund, as it in some cases is felt to impair their program of categorical assistance by setting precedents which cannot be extended to its other clients. WRA then faces the problem of working within the limits of its agent the Welfare Board. If so the success of the resettlement program may be impaired by the limitations of the agent.

At the beginning of the planning there was a felt necessity recognized both by the evacuee and the WRA that financial assistance is needed by a certain percentage of resettlers in re-establishing the household. The necessity still exists and is in no wise lessened by the mere fact that the agent has inhibitions. The only difference is that the method of providing assistance has proved inadequate. The need remains the same.

At present it appears necessary to discourage the evacuee who is employable from applying for resettlement assistance for household goods because Welfare Officials do not provide furniture for their own people except in the case of fire, flood or disaster. It is difficult to see how loss of furniture due to the exigencies of evacuation is any different in net-result from loss of furniture due to fire, flood or disaster. The effect on the evacuee of this situation is not only to confuse him, but also to cause him to further lose faith in WRA's policies.

Stories of people applying for resettlement assistance on the outside and being referred from place to place without receiving help circulate extensively in the center with definitely harmful effect.

J.R.McFarling
Community Analyst