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AMERICAN REFUGEES: EXODUS AND DIASPORA

California is about to pay a debt. Some 25,000 workers and farmers from the West Coast will head this Spring for the Middle West, whence other thousands came a few years ago from lands of dust, drought, and despair to seek new fortunes in the Golden West. The forces of Nature, made dangerous through man's mishandling of his soil, drove the Okies into unplanned and unprotected flight. In California, it was social and economic forces -- among them some of the most dangerous in American life -- that forced the controlled exodus of the Japanese-Americans.

These people were not, and are not, dangerous. In spite of rumors, repeatedly denied by all official sources, there is no record of a single act of sabotage either in California or in Hawaii, where tens of thousands are employed on secret military preparations, and where ten thousand of them have volunteered for the Army. In California, their major crime was to have created hundreds of millions of dollars in agricultural wealth which some of their neighbors sought to control by forcing the racial issue under the forced draught of war fears. The Military, for no reasons which it has ever explained, capitulated. The Government took charge -- at an estimated cost, thus far, of about \$2,000 per person.* This is probably the most costly experiment in controlled migration ever made.

Torn from the farms, jobs, homes, and clustered communities along the Coast and in the inland valleys of California, 110,000 persons were placed in flimsy camps, artificial communities in a sort of benevolent concentration. From these camps they are now being dispersed throughout the North Central States and into the East. The diaspora is being controlled, safeguarded, and largely financed by the Federal Government. But its success in reinstating these thousands in the normal channels of American productive life will depend upon the people of the communities into which they go.

The evacuee going East faces not prejudice, which he had adapted to in California, but a dense wall of ignorance about the Japanese-American. East of the Rockies, people are surprised to learn that most of these people are ~~surprised to learn that~~ ~~most of these people are~~ citizens, and speak English, and have very technical competence and training. Only face-to-face acquaintance can breach this wall of ignorance. But we who have worked with these neo-migrants during the past year can at least offer some useful clues to what a year of discriminatory seclusion has done to prepare them for American life.

* Unofficial estimate

Imagine, first, a flat brown plain, from which the flood fattened mesquite has been torn up by the roots, leaving gritty brown talcum-powder dust a foot deep over all the baking treeless miles, shimmering under the 120-degree heat of Arizona. Now, project upon that desolation a square mile of black tarpaper barracks, a hundred feet long by twenty wide, placed row on row in mathematical monotony. Each barrack holds four 25-foot rooms, unfinished, bare studding up the flimsy walls, bare rafters under the peaked roof, and wide cracks between the rough pine boards of the floor. Fourteen of these barracks, back to back, with an open one for "recreation" and a double barrack for the dining hall; with an unpartitioned latrine for men and one for women inside the double row: this is a "block". Into these 25-foot rooms will live as many as eight people, perhaps one family, perhaps two, perhaps some unrelated bachelors with a young couple and their child, perhaps a mother and her school-age girls with another mother and her sons. No privacy of bath, toilet, or beds is there provided. A common mess-hall feeds the whole block of 300 people, dissolving families, weakening the father's headship, destroying conversation and manners.

The blue-print of this city was made for young male soldiers in active field service. I can imagine no plan less suited to the living of a complex community of families, with all their necessities of work, of worship, of social life and play, of government and administrative services, of privacy and decency, morality and manners. Remember that there was no stick of furniture in any house; no scrap of recreational equipment; no schools, no churches; but little water, and that undependable.

I wish you had been there to watch the "intake", the process by which from 500 to a thousand people were received and housed every day or two, until 18,000 were living in our three separate camps. Under the blazing sun of May or June the empty barracks wait. A messhall and an open barrack, facing each other across the trampled dust, are set with rows of tables, and behind the tables wait the Intake and Housing workers -- who themselves, perhaps, arrived only a few days ago, and who are ready now to help receive the late comers.

Into the roped-off area roll the enormous busses, filled with people exhausted by the relentless drive through the baked valleys of inland California. Out of the busses, down the lines of tables, showing papers and signing papers, receiving papers, slowly move the families: the old farmer, head of the family, and the son or the daughter who does the talking for him, while mother and grandmother stand by, the grandmother gathering itself, rescues its meagre handbaggage from the pile, and climbs into a canvas-covered Army truck which will drop them at the door assigned to them. The hot sun fades redly, the bleak electric lights insult the lifting moon; the choking dust rises slowly in a solid shroud over the stage; and still the line moves on, the sleeping children on their parents' sagging shoulders, the ice-water gone from the iron buckets, the working crews still checking the family lists and assigning them to rooms. The trucks transport the last family to its room, and leave it there with its grandeur: 20 x 25 feet of pine floor, canvas Army cots

rolled up and wired obstinately, a cotton bag for each cot's mattress, and a bale of straw to fill them with before the travellers can rest. The last harried mother has returned to search the luggage pile for mislaid bundles -- the lost nighties, the undiscovered blankets, the missing soap and toothbrush and the baby's bottle. The staff, the registrants, and the guides have trudged back to their rooms, aching with the burden of those thousand lonely, patient, apprehensive people, robbed of what had been their past and future, and given in exchange this faceless poverty, these barracks and this straw. Only the moon is left to watch over the littered tables, the trampled ground, the exhausted sleepers: The moon, and the solid cloud of dust still standing in the motionless air.

Then, I would have you visit the block with me a week later. The meagre piles of scrap lumber, left by the contractor, have melted into tables, chairs, and shelves. Blankets have been hung for privacy, and all the block's washing hangs along improvised lines beside the laundry house. Beside some of the barracks, the ground is furrowed, seeds are in, laths make a fence and a shade for the doorway. A Block Manager, with one room for his office, issues keys and tools and toilet paper and soap. Hoses from the spigot outside each barrack are damping down the dust, or giving the cracked floors their daily washing -- a quick house-cleaning that also cools and lays the dust beneath the house. When the next arrivals pile out of the hot busses to go through the weary intake, these earlier comers are old residents, who stand outside the ropes to shout, "Hey, Bill!", "Hi, Mariko!" and "Yoo-hoo, Nakamura San," at friends in the line.

In a month, the block will have not only a Manager but a Block Council, and an identity. Over half of its people will be working on Project jobs. Its young children will be going to one of the nursery schools; its young men will have their soft-ball team entered in the league. The Christians will be attending church, prayer and bible meetings, and "singspirations" in recreation halls set aside for the fundamentalist-revivalist religion of the residents. The Buddhists will have their church. Girls and boys from the older group will be volunteer teachers in "vacation schools" for the younger ones. And the block will have two men -- an older and a younger -- on the town's Council.

As one walked down the long streets in the dusk, when the fierce heat had abated and life was expanding out into the front stoops and side yards, it was a scene of peace. Neighbors calling across from door to door, young people in threes and fours exchanging the evening gossip and repartee of young people America over, and children playing hide-and-seek around the barrack; the tone was familiarly American, its overtones and the old people's quick foreign syllables, almost such as one has heard in Milwaukee, in Hamtramack, in New York and San Francisco.

Here, then, were the evacuees, patiently and cheerfully adjusting the expression on the face of life to suit the new surroundings; gradually unpacking their baggage and their minds to live in Poston. Schools started; mothers' clubs, English and college-level classes started; a huge variety of familiar American and old-world Japanese games and shows and cultural activities set themselves in motion.

The older women, in particular, enjoyed the greatest emancipation. Released from the drudgery of field and household labor, they flocked into English classes, flower-making and flower-arrangement classes, clubs, and needlework groups. They showed themselves eager learners, trying at last to pull themselves up by each others' bootstraps from the 1870 fashions of their minds, as nearly as possible up to the 1940's in which their children live.

The older men, who had always been the social and economic authorities in these communities, found Government put in the hands of their sons, administration monopolized by the Hakujin personnel and those evacuees who spoke English readily again, the younger people. So the old men took to their avocations, cultivated their plants and criticized the young.

The young men, about a quarter of them college students or recent graduates, were nervous in the face of their new responsibilities. At home, all authority had been in the hands of the Issei, the first generation, whose average age was nearly sixty. Here, authority was placed on men whose average age was hardly over twenty: inexperienced, unsure, and under fire from their elders. They resorted to "advisory committees" of their fathers and uncles: but, in every block, the old friction between the immigrant generation and their American children grew sharper: that friction which you people know in so many other of our immigrant Americans: the language barrier, the mutual embarrassment of old and young in the presence of each other's manners, the conflict between family-group and age-group orientations.

The young men were due to take over in a few years. All that war and relocation did was to anticipate the transfer of authority. But it did so at a crucial time: when the young people were almost ready, and when the old people were almost willing but not quite. It is, however, these young people who will lead the migration into the new areas, into the central United States. They will be the job holders, the homefinders, the spokesmen, the go-betweens with local agencies and authorities. Therefore, I shall speak chiefly of the Nisei, the young citizens. It is they with whom this nation broke faith; and it is they whose faith in themselves as Americans must be restored.

During the period of intake, and for days afterward, one saw the small children being carried everywhere by their parents. Around the barracks, along the roads, in the canteen, at the entertainments, it seemed as though half the shoulders had those lively round black eyes peeping over them. At first

I thought it was to keep the children out of the dust; but that was impossible. Then I thought the children were frightened and clinging to their parents; but I saw they were not afraid and wanted to be set down. At last I understood that it was the parents who were frightened, it was they who were clinging to their children, after everything else -- possessions, jobs, hopes, pride -- had been taken from them.

Gradually, the horizon of security widened, and the children were set down to run at liberty. But the dismal diapason of insecurity remains the deepest and most universal index to the behavior of the evacuees. To an unprecedented extent, their lives have become a search for security. It is far from the only index; but every attitude, from that toward authority and government to that toward relocation and jobs, is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of anxiety.

It is this anxiety, bred of successive shocks and losses and abrupt moves, that makes the people cling with the Projects. Like shipwrecked sailors on a raft, each family clings to its own room, its little pool or garden. Even overcrowded families, quarreling with each other, refuse to move to empty rooms a few blocks away. Parents shiver at the thought of their children going out into new shocks and hazards, and plead their own needs to keep the children home.

Our job, yours and mine and Mr. Holland's, is to urge these people out, and to make their way as secure as we can. I recognize that "security" is a doubtful word just now; but what I mean is that we must restore, to these young people from whom we took it away, the sense of belonging to this nation, and of sharing in its vicissitudes on an equal basis.

Economically, the Project itself offers the securest life. But it is from precisely that kind of security that the young Americans must be rescued, and at once. They are being destroyed on these Projects, with their racial segregation, their Japanese language reversion, their unreal existence. The Project is a concentrated WPA camp, with the same characteristics of made-work and relief wages. They are breeding the old WPA attitudes toward work, toward Government as a source of obligatory benefits, toward organized begging as a responsible mode of life. Here, as in those far-off days, the workers with responsible and professional jobs -- the teachers, doctors, nurses, group-workers, and administrative aides -- are doing magnificent work without a stint. But the majority of jobs are just something to do -- or, not to do and get paid a pittance for it. Fine minds, trained skills, are wasting on the Projects. Untrained youth, who would have gone through ~~security, and without~~ training to achieve their ends of status, acceptance, and security, are without the means to get training there. With only minor exceptions, we cannot train workers on the project: largely because most Project jobs cannot be taken seriously, and are not often keyed to outside types of work.

The insecurity of the young dates from the days of their struggle to escape from the well-organized group-authority of the Japanese communities on the Coast, out into age-group and

job association with the Hakujuin. But California -- far more than Hawaii, whose Japanese-Americans show significant differences in personality -- screened them out, forced them back into Japanese employment far below the level of their training. A few were getting through the screen, out into technical positions and FSA homes. The rest had come to see that their only escape into acceptance, function, and status outside the Japanese community was through technical channels. Throughout the extraordinary educational record of the Nisei runs this almost exclusive emphasis on technical vocational training. In the Army, which had some thousands of Nisei in it when 1942 began, nearly all of them were technical men.

All at once, without regard for citizenship or Army service the Nisei were swept up along with their elders, swept out of the Army and Civil Service and into the old family controls, multiplied a thousand times. I think every young person I know on the Project has said to me, in despair, "I never saw so many Japanese people before in all my life" -- and some of them added, "You know, I don't like these Japs." But America had said to them, "You're all Japanese in here"; and the parents were quick to use the same leverage to draw them back under the old controls.

The most courageous of the young people have held their faith in their American identification. These are, in general, the ones who are going out most rapidly at present. A small number have lost that faith entirely, and have been convinced that their future lies with Japan. Most of these will not leave the Projects for some time. In between is the greater number: fearful of their future, of their reception by people outside, of their survival in jobs when the soldiers return. Most of all, they are watching the careers of those who go out first.

These earlier adventurers into the world that once forsook them are very conscious of their responsibility as ambassadors. And it is essential that the rest of us realize that in our fair and friendly acceptance of these emissaries lies our only hope of reclaiming thousands of first-class young Americans whom we have thus far frightened almost out of their trust in us and in themselves. Their security can no longer, in their fathers, whose power and property have been taken. Yet it cannot be in themselves: the largest age-group is between 16 and 21, and the older Nisei from whom leadership can come are very few in number.


They are, therefore, still seeking their security, their leadership, and their models among the Hakujuin. When one is friendly, and gives them genuine share in the work to be done, no workers can be more conscientious or devoted. One's friendships with them are warm and wholehearted. But they are unsure of their welcome, and easily estranged. Because they have little strength yet as a group, they tend to seek their fortunes individually as opportunity offers. Characteristically, they are not sympathetic with other minorities, not even wholly with their own; and they feel no identification with Labor. In the stress of their need to escape into status, they usually ignore the larger collective issues.

Yet, in every crisis, they have responded to the wider loyalties. In the face of demobilization and evacuation, more than a thousand of the eligible young men have volunteered for Army combat service. Hundreds more are only waiting to be called; and hundreds of the girls are pleading for admission to the WAAC's. Other hundreds, in the face of the heat and of the contractor's betrayal of his contract with them, continue to break all production records in turning out camouflage nets needed by the fighting troops.

When we have persuaded all we can to leave the Projects, there will remain the old, the sick, the breakdowns, the inert, the fearful, the Japanese-thinking -- and the children. Saving the children for America is the Project's problem. Yours is to help receive and place the thousands who can and must be saved from sub-citizen status, from permanent dependency, from defeat by the fears we ourselves have instilled in them.

These people who are coming to your cities are not Japanese. They are Americans. Take them, trust them, give them genuine work and responsibility to carry. No people on earth need America more than these, at this time; and there are none whom America needs more, or who will serve her better.

3/29/43
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1. Coordination around the Family.
2. Coordination around Leave and Employment.
3. Coordination around maintaining active Community Life.
4. Coordination around those who do not leave Poston.

Poston, Arizona
April 15, 1943

Mr. Mills

COLORADO RIVER RELOCATION CENTER
Preston, Arizona

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The attached memorandum was dictated at intervals between October 1943 to January 1944. When I started, it was in lieu of the Community Analysis report, since the project had no analyst. As I finish, it is submitted in lieu of various weekly narrative reports which have had to be omitted. It has no status other than that of personal reflections, and no purpose other than that of stimulating further reflections.

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John W. Powell
Assistant Project Director
Community Management Division

2/2/44

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Segregation*
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SOME COMMENTS ON A POST-SEGREGATION COMMUNITY: POSTON

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In July this year we explained to ourselves, to each other, to the residents, and to any others who would listen that the confusions and internal tensions of the relocation projects were about to be simplified by the expedient of placing in one center all of those who professed a Japanese orientation or were clearly unsympathetic with the American war effort in its relation to Japan. Since these persons obviously could not be released throughout the country at large, it was administratively much simpler to place them together in one project whose members comprised the total stop list of W.R.A., while nine other projects reflected the American orientation of the majority and all of their residents were cleared for leave.

At the Denver conference, I voiced my doubt that there would be much difference in practice between Tule Lake and the other nine centers except for the leave status of their residents. I believed that relocation would soon be scraping the edges of the barrel in the cleared centers, and that the appeal machinery at Tule Lake would soon be geared to let loose the young people who discovered belatedly that they should have relocated. ✓

The comments I have to offer now concern the internal community and its cultural orientation as evidenced in the last few weeks.

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A religious evangelist was given permission to show news reels, commercially released, some of them by the Navy. These releases included photographs of Japanese planes over Pearl Harbor, photographs of MacArthur, of General Wainwright's surrender in the Phillipines, and scenes taken from captured Japanese films. These pictures were shown publicly in four places in Unit I, to rather large audiences. In all cases, enthusiastic ovations greeted the pictures of Japanese troops, planes, flags, and of Wainwright's surrender. On one occasion, a few of the younger people applauded General Mac Arthur's appearance and were hushed by their elders. On the other occasions, only an eloquent silence greeted the symbols of American military power and prestige.

I do not believe that we should have suppressed these pictures. They have been seen by audiences all over the country, and they caused no disturbance here. I cite these incidents only to remind the Authority that the voice of Poston, so far as the bulk of its permanent residents is concerned, is a voice that is accustomed to cheering for its own team just as it is accustomed to applauding its own music and its own drama.

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The Poston General Hospital has had a staff of exceptionally brilliant young American-trained physicians, a few American-trained registered nurses, and a large and very loyal corps of nurses' aides. With this personnel, it has received approved status among American hospitals and has maintained approved practices and standards.

The last of the young doctors will go soon. The present nurses' aide registration for the class starting in October is 8. The older physicians, who have been successfully contained thus far in the outpatient clinic--where, as the Chief Nurse put it, "we can usually get to them in time,"--are now making their old world influence felt in the health program. The Chief of the Health Section spent an arduous hour recently ejecting a block midwife who had come into service an accouchment with the approval of the Issei physician in charge.

It is already clear that the line of approved hospital practice can be held only with the aid of an increasing number of American-trained graduate nurses; and it is a question in the minds of the Health staff how long that line can be held.

In a dispute recently between the young receptionist and a group of police who had brought a patient in at night, the police expressed their conclusion to the argument by saying that if the receptionist had any sense, character, or good breeding, she would be speaking in Japanese and showing respect to her betters; to which she replied that they were a bunch of dumb Japs. This is neither a serious nor an unusual altercation; but the records will soon show that she has gone out to work, and they are securely in possession of the institutional manners of the community.

A number of social welfare organizations have sprung up under the leadership of older residents of the project. Their

functions are dual to those of the Welfare, Health, Employment, Legal, Property and Administrative services of the project administration. Their philosophy and practice generally differs sharply from that of the professionals in the administration. My guess is that a larger number of problems are now being handled by these agencies, with their roots in the rural California Japanese culture, than ever before in proportion to those handled by officials of the Project.

A fair illustration is the matrimonial service inaugurated by the Chairman of the Red Cross Chapter, whose conception of this service is stated in the following paragraphs.

"KINDS OF SERVICE OFFERED"

"Go-between or Matchmaking Service:

"Receiving marriage applications and filling of applicants' records.

"Investigation and collecting information as to reputation, integrity, etc. of the applicants. (by checking with the census office records, contacting the applicant's employers, teachers, preachers, etc.)

"Recommending suitable candidates out of the applicants, not only within any particular center, but also from all the center.

"Facilitating courtship by proper introduction, offering the use of the Reception Room etc.

"Giving legal, medical and other advices pertinent to marriage and after-marriage living.

"Services to the lovers who are facing with various difficulties to marry:

"Cases in which family objection prevent marriage.

"Cases in which some legal difficulties are involved.

"In cases where pre-marriage pregnancy occur.

"Services to the parents who request to stop their children's undesirable love affairs."

In a recent conference which I called to consider child welfare and youth guidance procedures, the familiar dilemma became evident: whether the project services should stand back to be called upon by the residents, or the professionals in the project administration should reach down into the blocks to direct the living of the residents along the lines which we approve. In the discussion several interesting observations were offered by a young Japanese-born, American-educated Block Manager who has had social work experience in connection with a California Juvenile Court.

He agreed that the life of the project is now sharply separated in its orientation around two opposite poles: the California Japanese culture, which, as he reminded us, is at least 20 years behind the social progress of the Mother country which these people left at least 20 years ago; and the professional Americanism of the schools with their curricula, their recreation and activity programs, and their appointed teachers from all over the country. The first pole represents the orientation of what he called "the core of the community." To belong to this core, one must have been for years a member of one of the Japanese cultural clusters from which the residents came. The process of relocation, he said, has simply drawn off the individuals who were farthest from the core--like molecules escaping by evaporation from the surface of a liquid.

Relocation, in fact, he asserted, has de-Americanized the core community. The young people who are left (as the staff has noted in many ways) are increasingly reabsorbed into the culture of the core. They are learning more Japanese--with or without Adult Education's sanctions; are conforming more closely to family expectations; are marrying rather unexpectedly with non-English speaking Kibei; and for the most part, are "postponing" their plans for relocation to some indefinite date. This is not to say that the stream of relocation will not continue for some time yet, but it is to say that when that stream has thinned to a trickle, there will still be many young people, largely, but by no means all, girls, still on the project, accepting its modes of life. It is worth noting, in this connection, that even some of the young people who went to Tule Lake did so for fear they would have to relocate if they stayed in Poston.

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(Dictation resumed six weeks later)

The differences between the Poston and Tule Lake communities have appeared in a highly exaggerated form in the last few weeks, though I still believe they will simmer down to points which are comparable and which differ largely in degree. It is obvious that, as I anticipated on page one, the relocation efforts of the W.R.A. and young people at Tule Lake are gaining momentum in reaction against the "radical" controls established there by the true segregationists. In Poston, the relocation emphasis has gone into hibernation, at least for the winter period. Some blocks report that none

of their people are expecting to go out in any planned future. Some families that are going soon have refused invitations to appear publicly at meetings about relocation, arguing that relocation is a man's own business and no more to be interfered with than a vote on loyalty or in elections. I might add, no less interfered with also; for in other instances, individuals have refused membership on a committee to help stimulate relocation planning, with the statement that if they identified themselves with the administration's effort to stimulate relocation, the pressures against them would be heavier than they care to risk. People are still going and planning to go, but the stream has dwindled to a winter trickle and the mind of the community is by no means ready for the spring freshet.

At one rather significant point, the comparison is strongly in Poston's favor. At Tule Lake, individual personal pressure is being applied to outlaw the talking of English in the community. At Poston, there are still more than two dozen English classes going, and I have not encountered any resistances to my proposals to expand and accelerate the English teaching activities.

Some minor indications during the past weeks have further implemented my earlier observations. When the Adult Education Department set up its first college study seminar in 1942, half of the 16 members were also members of the Community Council. Almost none of them spoke Japanese. Most of them were under 24 years of age. Each succeeding Council election has seen the age level rise; and when the present Council was sworn in a few weeks ago, the oath of office had to be translated for them and explained in Japanese. The Adult

Education Department also began the Cooperative Study Group as an English-speaking seminar in the early summer of 1942. I attended last week a meeting of 200 delegates to the Cooperative Congress of the three units, and in a four hour meeting, there were no speeches made in English. During these same months also, the age of the baseball players on most local fields has diminished until baseball is played in English almost solely by school boys, though there is an "Old Timers' League" which plays in both languages; and the major athletic attraction this fall is high school touch tackle football. The circulation of books in English has not decreased markedly in the public libraries, since there were never enough to fill the need; but the Japanese book collection is being used more than before.

These observations are submitted merely as a reminder to ourselves that the situation of the project is becoming, in one sense, simpler, even while it becomes more remote from the kinds of procedure which we took for granted when we had more of the young English speaking people to rely on to carry the administrative ball. In recent releases on relocation, it has become evident that even Washington is now willing to face the fact that hundreds, maybe thousands, of our residents may decide, on quite legitimate grounds, to remain on projects as long as Congress will let them. Is it not time, therefore, that some of the original restrictions, regulations--particularly those which forbid the accumulation of money through individual enterprises, and those which have made difficult the resettling of farm families in the Parker valley itself--should be rethought in terms of the psychological health of a relatively long

term Japanese speaking community, whose center of gravity is shifted to the older people whose habits and capacities are not subject to change by administrative instructions?

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On the point of accumulating money, I believe a change of policy at this point would increase the security of the residents and would in many cases lead directly to relocation both through the increase in confidence and through the accumulation of funds with which to go out. One source of our insecurity is the economic vacuum in which we live. Any bridges across a gulf between individuals here and business opportunities outside will encourage travel. On the point of cultural activities, I believe we should free ourselves from our guilt and anxiety--from the timidity which has lately marked the Authority's attitude toward Japanese cultural activities as such. On some projects, the schools have refused to permit shibai and odori, utai and shigin, naniwabushi and Issei talent performances to occupy their stages. Our employment policy also belittles the legitimate desires of the older people to provide for entertainment which is to their taste. As a matter of fact, this official shamefacedness about Japanese cultural activities deepens the shame which the Nisei feel about the strange taste of their parents. Much of the shallowness of Nisei taste is, I think, due to their rejection of the parent culture, because the people around them reject and belittle it. It would be far healthier for the young person to approach American culture with the confidence engendered by a genuine respect

for his parent's culture, a belief that that was a valid set of arts, and a belief that this country is willing to extend its appreciation to those arts.

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By arrangement with the Office of War Information in San Francisco, the project has been receiving recorded transcriptions of the official news releases of this government broadcast in Japanese by shortwave and beamed on the Orient. Our purpose in getting these records was to supply news service to those Issei who have no access to the news in English.

One or two of these records were played to the block managers in Unit I, and they were asked for their comments on the desirability of such a program. At the time, there was very little comment, but word began to trickle back soon afterwards that they would prefer not to have the program presented in their blocks, and not to be identified with it themselves. Among their suggestions was one that the Tokyo radio broadcast received by the F.C.C. Monitor should be made available to people on this project. The actual essence of their reaction is that the old people--including some of their own numbers--would be interested in the news from Japan but not in propaganda from this government.

Some 400 new applications for repatriation have been received since the last train left for Tule Lake.

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The segregation of those politically oriented, economically

oriented, or oriented by family and emotional concerns in the direction of Japan, together with their children and with those who are not ready to swear allegiance to this country has not led to the happy clarification which was hoped for. Just as Tule Lake is not all Japanese, so Poston is by no means non-Japanese. The essential differences are that Tule Lake is an angry sort of center, Poston a peaceful one. If the Authority is ready to recognize that a proportion of our residents will be in centers till the end of the war and perhaps after, I believe it should be ready to reconsider certain of the practical corollaries of this conclusion. The more highly assimilated and assimilable element of the evacuated population is being drawn off. We should not assume that, beyond keeping the American practices of schools and hospitals, we can resist indefinitely the re-crystallization of the California rural Japanese pattern of mind, of family, of economic incentive, and of cultural activity.

The most feasible way to re-introduce the influence of complete American acculturation would be, I believe, encouraging selected ones of those who have made successful resettlements to the middle west and the east to return to the projects with Civil Service status and salary for brief periods. For example, in connection with the program of family counseling about plans for the future, we should like to see a number of people who have gone from Poston into government service be detailed back to the relocation and welfare sections for perhaps two to three months each. We would suggest limiting the choice to persons who had been out of the center not less than six months already; and we would suggest having only a

few of them here at a time. As the WRA staff and procedure become more crystallized, and as the community purifies its homogeneity in terms of Issei practices, it will be more true than ever before that the appointed personnel will be talking to themselves when they talk about the glories of the middle west and satisfaction of "freedom". The only effective voice that can discuss relocation in concrete terms that will reach the ear of the older people is the voice of those of their own number who have been there and have seen it for themselves--and done it for themselves--but they must return with all the evidences of their successful adaptation: that is, they should come back as employed members of the American working community, not as volunteers or missionaries.

The project has reached a stage in which the resident community is much more homogeneous in its beliefs and methods, and in which the administration is more crystallized in its procedures and requirements; we know better than before how we want to run the project, and the residents are in a clearer position to run it their own way. The inevitable tug-of-war which will result will, I am confident, be peaceful; but it will revolve primarily around the issue of relocation, which has mixed up in it both the psychological fears, the economic promises, the social identifications, the administrative prestige, and all the other obscure fuels that turn the wheels in this curious civilization known as Poston. The measure of the skills and insight both of the administration and of the residents will be reflected in the success of the relocation planning program of the next few months.

There is genuine significance in the fact that the retiring head of the Relocation Division, Mr. Zimmerman, has come to rely more and more upon a few very able and energetic Kibei, whose command of Japanese gives them full communication with the residents, and whose successful adjustment to American ideas and purposes give them full communication with the administration. I believe that this group--that is, the boys of this type, ranging between 25 and 30 in age; most of them, as a matter of fact, on the stop list because of education and residence in Japan--is the key group between the Authority and the community, between the youngsters in the American schools and the oldsters with their Japanese tradition, between the America east of the Rockies and the Little Tokyo west of the Sierras. There is a fine capacity for understanding, for leadership, for individual initiative, and mature counsel being revealed among the members of this group. So far, at least, as Community Management and relocation are concerned in Poston, our reliances are being placed more and more heavily upon them. I cannot say to what extent this is a matter of local accidents of personnel. I believe, however, that it represents a real development in the situation as it has grown up in the relocation centers; and I should be interested to hear to what extent similar groups are emerging into key positions on other projects.

JWP/py

1/21/44

*file
Poston
Reverend*

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
COLORADO RIVER RELOCATION CENTER
Poston, Arizona

In reply, please refer to:

May 3, 1944

Mr. Dillon S. Myer
Director
War Relocation Authority
Harr Building
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Myer:

An earlier memorandum of mine commented on the increasingly Issei and rural character of the Poston community. In wondering what this might mean for Community Management policy, I find myself led to consider more fundamental problems. I am submitting to you the latest installment of my cogitation, and I shall also present it as my thesis at the Denver Conference on Community Management.

This month begins my third year in Poston, which I reached in the middle of May 1942. The present memorandum has been taken by some of my friends as evidence that I am myself turning into an Issei, if not a Harding Republican. I resist both charges, but I do sometimes wonder what one does turn into after two years on a floating island. I am not at all sure I should stay here much longer, and I suspect that when you have read this manuscript you will agree on that point at least.

I have not focused my argument into any single concrete proposal. What lies at the back of my mind is the offer of leasehold on land to agricultural collectives which would begin within the Centers, possibly, and would move toward independence under expert government supervision, with government-subsidized services being gradually withdrawn as the earning power of the community increases; if not withdrawn altogether, at least transferred to supplemental agencies such as Federal Security, Farm Security, etc. It does not seem wise to me to present this proposal in the discussion of general policies, or in a paper which may circulate into quarters outside the necessity of discretion.

I think the essence of my present argument lies in the suggestion that the Centers not be considered dead-end alternatives to life, but be considered as having in themselves potentialities for the redirection of life. The Japanese never mastered cooperative organization, even of marketing alone. Gregarious as they are likely to be, I believe that encouragement should be given toward successful experience in this form



May 3, 1944


of production and community organization, while they are in a position to take advantage of all the help Government can give. I feel very decidedly that we are at present in a cul de sac. One decisive alternative would be to liquidate our own responsibilities for the problem. This would have some of the advantages of boldness, but it seems to me that it would accomplish little more than fractioning the responsibility among a variety of agencies less experienced in the problem. I doubt that it would shorten the duration of the problem itself.

To give creative direction to the Centers with productive opportunities would invite some political storms in such states as Arizona; but I do not believe that as brilliant a warrior as you have shown yourself to be need be deterred from a possible line of genuine rehabilitation by the opposition of a few unreconstructed political elements within a restricted area.

The problem might be stated as one of relocating our own point of approach. It is perhaps the hardest job I can think of at the moment; but I should think it preferable to saying either "We will fight it out on this line if it takes all the rest of their lifetime", or "The hell with it. Let's give it up and let them start over".

As you perceive, I think we are in a tough spot. I should like to say, however, that I could not choose better company with which to share such a spot. I have been proud to be a member of the Authority's staff, and I am confident that such a staff has both the wit and the courage to help the people in our Centers find their way back out of the wilderness.

Sincerely,


John W. Powell, Chief
Community Management Division

cc: Mr. Duncan Mills
Dr. John Provinse
Field Assistant Director

copy

Powell, John W.


May 1, 1944

The Community - and the Management
1944-46

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to introduce the bearer, a series of remarks entitled The Community and The Management. This paper has no official status. Its birth was registered in the names of Experience and Policy, but rumor has it that the true parents are Frustration and Exhaustion. In any case, the offspring is dedicated to the propositions that WRA is lost in the forest of its own policy commitments; that it has staked its entire program, and the lives of its charges, on relocation in wartime; that it yet bears the Nation's obligation to restore these charges to self-responsible participation in the Nation's patchwork of social process; and that this obligation requires WRA to re-study its compass, its map, and its strategy, to the end that this episode in the fight for democratic decency may end short of disaster for those involved in it: not only the participants, but the four-score-and-ten thousand residents and citizens of this country whose own lives are the battlefield.

John W. Powell



MAY 1, 1944

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Powell, John W.
The Community - and the Management

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
The Community -- and The Management

1944-1946

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In our case, the pole of the past is represented by the California-Japanese cultural clusters, mostly rural in setting and agricultural in occupation, which branched off from the parent country some forty years ago and developed indigenous variants that were, literally, Japanese-American. The pole of the future is represented by standardized professional procedures developed or adopted by the administrative bureauculture of Washington.

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The Community -- and The Management


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
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or the other pole, we can now see whole clusters of individuals, like molecules in a solution, flowing forward and escaping into a free condition, or flowing back and settling into crystallized attitudes of inertia.

At the end of its second year, the War Relocation Authority is confronted by the possibility that its temporary shelter-camps may be housing virtually permanent communities. The more mobile, more easily employed, more highly assimilated young people have nearly all been drawn off. The residue, progressively de-Americanized by relocation, shows a steadily higher average age, lower average use of English, and more deliberate passivity toward resettling. In addition, the two-year old community is developing institutions which its members prefer to those offered by "outside" cities, and which tend toward the permanence of the center.

This tendency of the camp community to put down institutional roots has been alertly resisted by the Authority. The right to earn money has been denied, because it might tend toward permanence; only the Government's standard cash allowance may be retained by the individual. The tendency of employable workers to make a career of center employment has been discouraged by quota cuts. Permanent improvements and permanent buildings have also been discouraged. The residents have been persistently reminded, in many ways, that they are only transients. Progressively more liberal inducements have been found to encourage resettlement, and the Authority's staff, budget, and program on the resettlement side are



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


steadily growing.

It is the more significant, therefore, that in the little more than a year since relocation became a serious program, at least as many persons have deliberately chosen to be segregated for the duration as have resettled to work outside the centers. Poston alone has over 2000 segregated or candidates for segregation, and more than 3000 out on leave, mostly indefinite. But a recent Council poll on relocation prospects received only 3000 answers out of 8500 questionnaires, and only some 600-odd indicated a desire to leave.

It is our basic duty to provide the circumstances by which these people, for whom we are now responsible, may return to being responsible for themselves -- during the war if possible, after the war in any case. So far as voluntary relocation goes, it is quite certain that there will still be, at the war's end, scores of thousands of Japanese evacuees living in shelter camps; old people, school children, invalids, landless farmers, and some young people subdued to the Japanese pattern. Their greatest peril is that of becoming permanent wards of Government, alien, indigent, and apathetic.


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
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II

Basically, it is our insistence on the temporary nature of the camps which is driving them into permanence.

The people with whom we have to deal are refugees from a disaster area, and our policies are roughly those of temporary disaster relief. If the disaster had been physical -- earthquake, flood, fire -- it would not have struck at the roots of the people's confidence and will. Because it was an act of human violence, its results in loss of property are of far less enduring import than its results in loss of group security, self-confidence, and incentive. The only serious epidemic in the centers has been Anxiety, which is both communicable and crippling. The processes of center life have been rather diagnostic than therapeutic: they have revealed major foci of infection, but they have done little to check the progress of the disease, or to restore the healthy growth of confidence, security, and self-responsibility.

The chief complaint, in clinical terms, is loss of motivation. In employment, in education, in activities, and ultimately in the relocation program, we have been baffled by the fact that the momentum our people brought with them has been running down; that the wellsprings of renewed incentive seem to be drying up; and that




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
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
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Motivation is that in a man which carries him through the efforts necessary to get from where he is to where he will be. It has to be understood in terms of ends, of values. Its proper question is What for? A man in Poston must be asked "What did you come here for?", "What are you here for?", and "Where do you want to be next -- and what for?" We know the answers to the first two; we should not be surprised that he finds it hard to answer the third. People are in centers not because they wanted to be, but merely because someone else did not want them somewhere else. The entire motive was other people's. People are afraid to leave the centers because they feel they are not wanted where they might want to go. Again, other people's motives are decisive. And all we have been able to do, by our thesis of transience, is to make them feel that they are not wanted here, either. True, we have assured them repeatedly that those who wish to stay may do so. But we have not been able to cloak the fact that those who do stay may expect to be punished: punished by loss of economic rights, by loss of free choice of their own institutions and controls, by loss of sympathy and regard. Our actions have always been listened to more deeply than our words; and despite our statements about the friendliness of the country east of the Rockies, American's impatience over the



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


whole problem is what we have communicated through our actions.

We have, I think, confused the people with the centers. Because the centers are temporary, we have been treating the people themselves as though their economic and social needs were temporary too; as though not only our responsibility for them, but their very existence, were to be of brief duration. The temporary nature of the centers was given in their creation. We had to recognize it. The kinds of permanence we are creating were not given: permanence of insecurity, of dependency, of apathy, of injury. They are undesirable, and they are avoidable.

We must rebuild our approach on the recognition that the people are in America not for the duration, but for the rest of their lives. We must alter our perspective, which is now limited by the wartime emotion over Japanese, to align the problems of these resident immigrants with those of the scores of other immigrant "issei" communities--Polish, Finnish, Greek, Chinese, Italian, German. The future health and function of Wops, Hunkies, Chinks, Japs, Russkies, Dutchman, and damn-Swedes depend on like factors, and must receive our equal regard and equal treatment.

If there are no opportunities where the people want to go, it is our obligation to give them opportunity where they are. If we want them to adopt our forms of institution and manners, we must first show respect for theirs, and build bridges from theirs to ours. If we want them to respect our policies, we must give them a genuine share in the building of policy. If they are to believe our protes-



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
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
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Further, the survival of Community Management as the major staff division for dealing with the human relations and social processes of the centers will be in serious doubt. It is already. To a crowd of refugees huddled on a station platform, waiting for trains they do not want to take, Community Management can perform the function of First Aid. It can carry out the intentions implied in such titles as Education, Community Government, Internal Security, only if it has power to co-operate with the members of an empowered community in the creation of devices to reach goals mutually agreed upon. Short of such power, the staff of the professional division becomes only a collection of insentient fingers, playing a tiresome tune upon a single Manual.


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
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
on the community's behalf, that the Authority looks for the necessary incentive-building, security maintenance, and spiritual repair which parallel the building and maintenance services of the other divisions. Administrative Management need not be concerned with the duration of the centers. As long as they last, it will be needed, and when they dissolve it will liquidate them. The Operations Division is concerned over the decision between permanence and dissolution, but not in the deciding of that issue. To take one notable example, it is obvious that the physical establishment at the centers--their housing, in particular--will not stand up through a very long war. But it will not be Operations that decides, even on this basis, whether the communities stay or vanish. As nearly as any one factor of internal administration can be, it is Community Management's attitudes and policies that will be decisive.

It is in the sensitive institutional barometers of project feeling that we read the falling pressure in the center. It is in the sphere of human relations--in education, health, family welfare, community activities, the co-ops, the Councils, law and order patterns worked out between the police and the people--that we discern the trend toward a self-consistent Issei culture, and measure the effects of the loss of Nisei colleagues. To the Relocation Division's quantitative analysis of forces pulling or holding, we must add a more qualitative analysis of the nature and value of the forces themselves. In the developing Family Counseling program, there is a tendency for Relocation to regard a plan for staying in Poston as a dead end.



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
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Community Management, which I abbreviate locally as Commun. Man., has an equal responsibility for the future welfare of all families, whether they stay or go. It is in the light of that responsibility that the Division must plead the demands of policy not only for itself but for the Authority. First, we want to create the healthy confidence which carries families back into self-responsibility outside the centers -- now. Second, we want the families still in centers at the war's end equally healthy and self-confident. We shall not reach either end by limiting the autonomy and enforcing the beggary of the people in the centers.

It is in the interest of the Division's obligation to the people that I therefore propose the following propositions:

1. The Authority should reopen economic opportunity at the centers by restoring the right to produce for sale, the right to the title to the goods produced, and the right to the proceeds of the sale, even though this be limited by the establishment of trust funds under collective guarantees approved by the communities.
2. The Authority should restore to the centers increased rights to decide matters of local concern, relying less upon the predigested Manual and more upon the wit, sensitiveness, and judgment of the people -- appointed and evacuees -- at the centers, and thereby restoring the participation of the residents in the making of policies and decisions governing their own interests while at the



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
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
same time giving them an education in the wider perspectives and necessities which govern the action of the Authority on the national level.

3. The Authority should admit qualified evacuees to administrative rank, in Washington and on the centers.

III

The difference between WRA and WPA is only a single stroke, one leg of a single letter. Economically, the residents lack even that leg to stand on. It is largely for lack of such a stroke that the present emphasis is on "Projects" rather than on Relocation.

It has been difficult for us to explain, even to each other, why the Authority that inherited the disinherited, along with their staggering losses in property and income, and that cannot itself restore those losses by outright grant, should forbid individuals to earn their own means of release from the centers. The money alone would not be decisive; families with enough money are staying, while the penniless sometimes go. What evacuation took from these people was right to earn, the confidence that they would be allowed to earn again. Residence in the relief centers has further robbed them of their confidence that they can hold their own in competitive production. When we say to them, "You must not produce for sale, because your competition would anger the workers outside," we are not bolstering their confidence in their reception by competitors after they have left the shelter of WRA. Once more, we are saying in words




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
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"America wants you as producers," and saying by our rules "Don't you dare produce, you'll get the whole country down on us."

On the centers everything is given, nothing may be earned. Housing and food are supplied, alike to all. Clothing money, though inadequate to actual budgets for clothing needs, is available to all, either as a reward for working or as public assistance. A token allowance is given those who accept approved employment -- and no other is permitted. Strict equality is enforced. No one may be in a position to receive more than his neighbors, save for the \$3. differential allowed for extra responsibility or unusual docility toward hard labor. Of course, those families with outside incomes are not stopped from enjoying them; but those with earned resources of extra skill, experience, or interest are forbidden to cash in on them -- save by relocation. I agree it is better to export the producer than the product, in this case. But we are deliberately penalizing those who cannot leave their families, those who have lost their tools and capital, and those who merely accept our assurance that "they can remain if they wish to."

Only one independent economic institution is permitted: a portion of the money spent in the canteens for personal necessities may be diverted to pay the wages of co-op workers. In Poston, where 4000 families support 225 co-op employees, this constitutes a gratuitous tax on family income. Prorated, it means that every family contributes more than a dollar a month to the co-op wage bill, with about eighteen families chipping in to support each worker. But this,



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
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The rate at which Poston families have been eating into their liquid resources is indicated by the fact that the money spent in local canteens, plus that sent out in money orders, equaled about twice the project cash allowances paid by the WRA, for the first year and a half of the center's history. The recent fall in the export of money may indicate the rate at which family resources are being exhausted. The whole figure indicates fairly precisely the extent to which the relief allowance fell short of minimum demands of health, decency, and comfort.

The waste in potential productive effort is great. But worse is the permanent atrophy of productive confidence and productive skills for which our policies are responsible. It is confidence, at bottom, that carries our people over the project fence. It is skill that keeps them solvent outside. We have served confidence with words, and skill with abortive plans for training; but we have failed them both, in fact. We have not, in the whole range of project employment, created any genuine sense of job-responsibility where it did not exist before; and all our testimonies agree that there has been, in the mass, a deterioration of habit.

What are we afraid of? First, resistance to competition. Then let us emphasize (a) non-competitive handicrafts, and (b)

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
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
direct contracts with the Government itself, with evacuees acting as the contractors. A fraction of the farmers in Poston could have subjugated this rich virgin valley, and fed the Project and themselves at a saving to the subsistence budget. More than one group sought to do so, and were refused.

Second, we are afraid that those who could earn money would stay here, stay segregated, stay Japanese. To this hoary spectre of the WRA there are several answers. The best is that by not permitting production we are guaranteeing the permanence of segregated Japanese colonies anyway, and it will be far worse for them to be unproductive, inert, relief camps than to be self-respecting and in part self-supporting. To avoid the reproach of productive segregation by encouraging segregation in relief is a curious preference. Further, the Authority should weigh the fact that most of the farmers who have relocated have gone to areas where other Japanese had preceded them and would be their neighbors. Our hygienic program of atomizing the evacuees is in effect a violent discrimination between them and the other immigrant foreign-language clusters that dot our land. The fear of being denied neighbors of the same language is a major source of resistance to issei relocation; and we have to recognize it as a legitimate fear. More farm families will stay in centers, on relief, in order to be near their own kind than will gamble their chances of social acceptance against their drive to get back into self-supporting production. At the average age of our farmers, we can hardly expect them to be enthusiastic about learning New England agriculture through



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
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the medium of Basic English and with only the security of Christian charity to fall back on. They will go in groups, or stay in groups; but groups we must accept. Finally, when the war ends with these tens of thousands in the centers, what may we expect? If the readjustment throws its customary millions back on the land, there will be no chance to un-segregate our centers. If wise planning achieves the miracle of full employment after the war, we need not fear the continuance of Japanese communities, few and scattered as they will be. What we have to fear is they will be, even before it ends, incapable of productive enterprise.

A minor point is that many of the wives in Poston have skills that could be developed and marketed, that would serve to augment the family income outside. Here again, letting them build up a market, and confidence in their own marketability, would encourage their leaving.

Specifically, I would suggest modifying the prohibition on non-WRA or Co-op employment by permitting producers exchanges or corporations to be established, for the production of goods for sale on or off the projects. Limitations on the amounts made available to the producers while on the center might be suggested; I still think my device of a trust fund for earnings to be paid on relocation is sound. But I should leave the working out of specific plans to each center, since the situation of each differs somewhat from others in terms of personalities, skills, contacts, methods, and other vital factors. I would suggest study of contracts, such as were being built up in 1942



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
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


only to be swept away by the Director's New Economic Policy: contracts with Government, preferably, and next with private enterprises. I suspect that as fast as such project enterprises developed, there would be a ready market for both managers and workers. I would not discourage their going: my point is still that relocation would be speeded by a more realistic treatment of the center community in economic terms, while at the same time the long-term health of those communities would be shored up by more familiar sources of incentive.

A second specific suggestion would be that we explore the arithmetic of having certain classes of employees receive prevailing wages, and remunerate the projects for their maintenance. Employees under private contracts, including Community Enterprises, should be the first considered. If Government employees received the price of their maintenance as part of their cash wage, the ostensible class differentiation of those whose "outside" wages came all or partly from outside sources of earned income would not loom so large. The most important caution should be that the increased wages must not come out of the pockets of the sixteen-dollar workers. A percentage of the higher wage might go, as Poston's camouflage-net factory workers agreed into a community fund. Again, part might be held in trust for relocation. The fear that people earning more money will stay in the centers is probably based on fact. We must not forget, for example, that service wives will be receiving from fifty to more than a hundred dollars a month, and will for the most part stay on the centers. But it is also true that those with money are readier to leave than those without;




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and that the re-institution of the incentive of self-support will be reflected throughout the life the center community. We must not regard center residence as a moral blight outweighing the deterioration of personality through the permanent acceptance of relief and the enduring sense of unfair discrimination.

It will never be possible to employ the full complement of our residents on jobs justifying full prevailing wages. More and more, as the proportion of the old, the mothers, and the school children grows in the total population, we shall have to curtail our Washington-approved work projects. Even now, new instructions to the centers call for new positions which we cannot fill, and established projects ranging all the way from road construction to pre-school teaching are dwindling for lack of applicants. But it is also true that there are people here who would work at jobs of their choice, jobs with meaning in the outside world, if these jobs carried the normal rights of access to means of work and title to the proceeds of work.


Restoration of normal earnings for some groups would complicate administration. It would not threaten the community with a new class structure. Economic income classes already exist here, represented for example by those with outside income property and by service wives. But they are hardly visible in the center, for lack of the means of conspicuous display or special privilege. Barrack housing, no cars, clothes limited by the practical demands of climate and living conditions; even furniture is limited by space, and food by lack of access to adequate markets. Income, therefore, becomes savings; and the pos-



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session of money, in general, tends to create pressure toward relocation.

The rule of equality in center economics is not a rule of equity. Social equity requires only that no one shall be forced to accept less than will meet the minimum demands on him by the society. To require that no one increase his standards and his opportunities can be defended only as a matter of administrative convenience; to set the equal standard low can be explained only in terms of political prudence. We are not, on these centers, engaged in an experiment in economic democracy. We are, it may be, engaged in a battle of administrative survival. But until the alternative is finally forced upon us, we have no right to purchase administrative convenience at such a cost to those administered.

It may be that our administered eleemosynary equalitarianism is merely ahead of its time. Even if that were the unhappy case, it would still breed insecurity and apathy among those who were its premature victims. We may not refuse to make our own job harder, if there is a chance that we can come closer thereby to meeting our obligation.

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
One major alternative remains: the possibility of liquidating the Authority before the end of the war. I say the Authority, because I suspect it may be less easy to liquidate the centers themselves. Once again, we should be beating the tocsin of "we don't want you here"; and this time might be once too often. But, on the positive side, there will be good reasons for not closing centers too fast. Relocation

into California will have ample support among the evacuees, but their actual replacement in areas where they no longer have land, leases, or implements will not take place automatically.

Let me again take the case of Poston, with its large groups from the Imperial and Salinas valleys and Orange County, its lesser groups from San Diego county and Los Angeles itself.

First, the people will still want to stay in groups large enough for the security of social intercourse and personal security. This we should accept. Second, there will be large numbers who would prefer relief to re-establishment in self-support. This we must take some responsibility for, and make some provision for. Third, there will be some who see in the Colorado River Valley a new Imperial Valley, and who will ask to stay here and develop it as their homestead. This I think we should accept also. It should mean help in learning the collective techniques of farm production, to replace the small individual farm methods these people are used to. This would call for immediate investigation--with evacuee aid--of the possibilities of leasehold, equipments, and capitalization. Whether the people stay under WRA, or stay under their own power, such steps are equally urgent in their behalf.

Finally, even if WRA is not liquidated, but successive canters are closed, my argument proposes that the enduring emphasis be placed on the centers that offer self-supporting productive possibilities, such as Poston; and that our policies be modified at once in the direction of making productive self-support possible.




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First, the people will still want to stay in groups large enough for the security of social intercourse and personal security. This we should accept. Second, there will be large numbers who would prefer relief to re-establishment in self-support. This we must take some responsibility for, and make some provision for. Third, there will be some who see in the Colorado River Valley a new Imperial Valley, and who will ask to stay here and develop it as their homestead. This I think we should accept also. It should mean help in learning the collective techniques of farm production, to replace the small individual farm methods these people are used to. This would call for immediate investigation--with evictees aid--of the possibilities of leasehold, equipments, and capitalization. Whether the people stay under WRA, or stay under their own power, such steps are equally urgent in their behalf.

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


IV

Government is the act of a people in making its own decisions, and seeing that they are carried out. By derivation, Government is the machinery through which decisions are reached and controls maintained. Administration, on the other hand, is the function of government -- that is, of making decisions -- delegated to one group of people on behalf of another. By derivation, it is the offices and procedures responsible for reaching decisions about other people's business.

The relocation center is an administered community. We have at some centers elaborated the simulacrum of community government, with its councils, commissions, and courts. But in fact the whole power depends from the single stem of the Project Director's disciplinary power. It appears to be self-government by permission from above, but actually is administration with or without assent from below. It is the self-government of a penitentiary, a boarding school, or a company union.

The Project Director and his staff, in turn, are agents of a remote control. Over the months, the policy decisions of the remote control have been crystallized in a Manual of procedure and policy which pre-decides most issues that may arise on the centers. In the course of time, as the staff personnel changes, the Manual becomes at once more binding, and more irrelevant. More binding, because the newcomers have no local experience or background on which to base their judgment, and so must rely wholly on the gospels and on their supple-




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mentary revelations. The Manual, incidentally, is almost as restricted in its circulation as the medieval Bible; and it is coming to pass that a mere reference to The Manual (section 50.9.68B) is sufficient to quell all disputes -- and to end all creative effort to develop new solutions to urgent problems.

More irrelevant, because as the younger evacuee administrative aides and advisers leave, the core-community emerges ever more solidly in its homogeneous but alien character: alien, that is, to the Anglo-Saxon bureaucracy and its approved institutions. Increasingly, the instructions received from Washington require more cautious and more leisurely interpretation and transmission to the community. Increasingly, the community tends to nod politely, to say "Is that so!" -- and to find ways of continuing its own controls in the interest of its own values.

More and more frequently, the Project Administration is put in the middle, the worst of all administrative positions: where if it sides with the Authority against the residents, or sides with the residents against the source of its own authority, it is equally lost. In turn, the administrative aides from the resident community are forced into the same dilemma, at the cost of either their community or their administrative reputation.

The remedy does not lie in letting the residents decide policy. It lies in enlisting them, quite intimately and genuinely, in the shared making of shared policies. Washington has to be guided by larger and longer considerations of necessity than concern the local

community. But there is a difference between having Washington's necessities understood and accepted by the residents, and having resident affairs decided only by remote control. When the policy power is unilateral, we have to expect loss of interest, loss of co-operation, and increasing machineries of enforcement. The result, for our evacuee communities, is a general apathy and a specific growth of evasive mechanisms, neither of which contributes to their long-run welfare or health.


There is a further consequence in the bewilderment of the center administration, and in the weakening of its interest and its authority. Too many times, the center administrations have had to say "We don't know why this has to be done, but these are our instructions." The telephone, the teletype, and the mails, even conferences and visits from Washington staff, have not prevented the center administrations from being caught again and again by decisions which embarrassed them, and with which they did not agree, but which they were required to enforce.

Only if more discretion is left to the centers can the residents be given a share in policy decisions. And only by giving them a genuine share can we preserve any sense of adult autonomy in their community. The general tendency of Washington controls is toward uniformity among the centers. The general tendency of the centers is to create a variety of new institutional machineries, built like all institutions around their own personalities and circumstances. In general, therefore, Washington's role is negative toward center proposals.

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


This is unfortunate; and I think it is not altogether necessary.

I hesitate to adduce Poston too frequently as my example, though it is the center of my own experience. But I suggest that a study of the number of long-distance calls from the centers to Washington would suggest data that might be correlated with Poston's community integration, staff-resident integration, and stubborn preference for independence.


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Here, again, we encounter the possibility of liquidating some or all of the centers during the war. Since the population is not in them from choice, we tend to assume that they will leave them without regret. Experience has taught us that the residents even of a given block, or barrack, will resist moving to another. It has also taught us that such movements, even between centers, can be accomplished. It is the possibility of a final eviction from all the centers that raises the real question: shall such a move be a joint decision, or a dictated eviction? Such a move will not be read by the residents as an expression of our confidence and good-will. They will see in it our impatience with the whole problem, and our recognition that we have failed to solve it. Unless such a move has the consent of the residents, it is likely to throw us under the wheels of the State Department and the Protecting Power. But the consent of the residents means the participation of the residents in making the decision and planning the machinery.



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One project director remarked of his meetings with the Council, "I meet with them not to ask what they think but to tell them what to expect". This is not what I have in mind.

It is not only a matter of consulting the centers. It is a matter of presenting alternative paths of decision, of opening up contacts with other agencies through which new opportunities might be worked out -- including opportunities for some communities to remain where they are, if in their judgment, knowing all that we know, that is where their choice should lie,

Our failure has not been in lack of consultation with the residents. It has been a failure to respect the choices that they make. We feel responsible for these people. We shall not restore their responsibility for themselves until we begin also to feel responsible to them.

The third prime requirement is that we admit qualified evacuees-- those whose qualifications include successful resettlement into the larger arena -- to administrative rank and civil service status, on the centers and in the field.

There is the more need for this as the gap between staff and residents widens in both language and understanding of the background. The last of our capable bi-linguists will soon be gone; indeed, I rather think the stop-list is all that has upheld the level of administrative competence for the past few months. That there are competent and qualified individuals among the evacuees, none of us doubts. The return of a few score individuals out of the 20,000-odd already relocated would not impede the assimilation of the group, and would instead improve its faith in America's recognition of its abilities and its needs.

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
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We who proclaim the right of the Nisei to be accepted for employment can not afford to discriminate, as we are now doing, against him - and him alone.

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And if the centers close, what workers have the best background and training for following the interests of the Japanese group through the employment and security services? Then and there, the need for qualified Nisei will be supreme. If we have not prepared the way and the precedent, we shall be in no position to recommend the practice to others.

Specifically, I propose that certain positions, including Welfare, Security, Education, Enterprise, Health, below the rank of Section Head, be opened to evacuees now resettled in the east; and that the Activities supervisorship be opened to them also. This last is on recommendation of our present supervisor. In addition, field positions should be set up (a) in employment and social adjustment, now subsidized by religious agencies, and (b) in new positions approximating the duties of a traveling co-ordinator, working among the various remaining centers. If it is objected to this suggestion, which originated with an evacuee administrator, that the coordinators will become "walking delegates" to organize

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the centers behind certain demands, I can only ask whether our policy, like that of some industrial empires, is to be founded on the device of division with the purpose of suppression.

I feel pride, not shame, in work undone because a worker left. In general, my own preference is to export the able. But, in the long run, the problems of the Japanese in America over the next ten years will be of consistent concern only to their own members. We are not justified in refusing to them alone the career of administering the handling of those problems, which have been their own, and which require their language in the handling. The time to start is now.

VI

There remain certain questions of attitude, and certain proposals for Community Management sectional programs during the next year. These are closely related to the matters I have been discussing, and I shall append them here.

A. The first concerns the recent decision to recede from the simplified Tule-Lake-is-Japanese position taken, for public relations reasons and for administrative convenience, last summer.

The segregation of those "oriented toward Japan" by emotional, political, or economic interests has not led to the happy clarification that was hoped for. Just as Tule Lake is not all Japanese, neither are the issei of other centers ready and eager for assimilation to Main Street. Even as the Tule trains left Poston, the most disturbing sense one got was that no one, staying or going, was aware of any clear difference between goers and stayers. A recent wave of repatriations

in one Poston unit followed not only the announcement of the Nisei draft, but the visit of a Relocation Team. The goal, on analysis, appeared to be simply duration residence with the whole family together; its initiators were the parents.


We cannot pretend that even the issei cleared for leave are "American" in my sense opposed to being "Japanese". In relation to the war, most of them are like rooters whose tickets placed them in the wrong bleachers. They are silent out of prudence and politeness, but like all old alumni their hearts respond to the sight of the old flag, the sound of the old music, and the belief in the invincibility of the old team. On the centers, they tend to regard Allied communiques as propaganda, Japanese communiques as news.

Yet hundreds like them are living peacefully in areas outside the zones of evacuation and -- shall we say, centration. The legal and logical box enclosing the evacuees has one open side: the Japanese who lived east of the military zone, or left it early, and among whom are repatriates, members of Japanese societies, people who speak no English, and other counterparts of those who have difficulty leaving our centers. The honest decision to make repatriates eligible for leave clearance removes the last excuse for our elaborate pretense that our candidates for acceptance are "really" American, and not Japanese.


Our salesmanship has been built on a denial that our people are Japanese, or at least on an attempt to screen that fact with a brave show of baseball, movies, Boy Scouts, and patriotic cliches. By our actions toward the issei, from the first denial of their political rights to the last cut in the employment of their artists and actors,

we have announced to the Nisei that they should reject their Japanese heritage, and to the Issei that we respected that heritage only so long as they maintained it out of their own pockets, and out of sight of the public. Not once has an investigating committee complained of the cultural activities of the old people; only one Shibai instructor went from Poston to Tule. But we have changed their names on the payroll, and we are now admonishing our old ladies to walk with a swinging stride and shake hands with their hostesses. What is all this? Is our cultural activities program the guardian of Loyalty, or may we trust the intelligence agencies with that duty? Has our society ever developed a genuine cultural appreciation in second-generation immigrants by conscientiously making them ashamed of the culture of the first generation? In this war, we have not yet banned the music of Beethoven from our stages -- nor his language from our schools.

Nisei Americans are Japanese Americans. That is their identity, and their pride. In the last two years, we have repeatedly asked them to choose between their heritage and their citizenship, though these are not exclusive of each other. We foster the nationality-pride of the Irish American, the Scandinavian American; we must recognize that the Nisei identifies himself as a Japanese, and not any the less an American thereby. Is it Okamoto, Nishimoto, Sakai, Yamaguchi, whom we accept as colleagues and fellow-citizens, or is it only their reassuring taste for Bob Hope and an Allied victory? And, if they are to be non-Japanese, what type of Americans are they to be instead: Celtic, Nordic, Jewish, Negro, Mediterranean, Indian, -- or At Large?



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Toward both Issei and Nisei, we need to square up our policies of employment, of activities, of recognition of their interests. Most of our students of Japanese are Nisei, in their twenties, who have both a student interest in the language they speak a little, and a practical interest in reading and writing letters. I do not believe that by denying them access to Japanese education they will be made happy and courageous Americans. So far as my own center goes, therefore, I propose to maintain and support such Japanese activities as either young or old have respect for and desire. And I still wish to renew the rejected proposal that Japanese be taught, like Spanish to Mexican children, in our schools.


B. On the adult level, I have dreamed of a plan for taking English instruction out of the classroom, and making it a matter of all-out promotion through every medium of communication within the center. To do this, we should need a dual basic vocabulary: basic daily Japanese, and basic daily English, the two vocabularies as nearly equivalent as the languages permit. Every Project bulletin, every canteen sign, every issue of the newspaper, would be edited into the dual-basic. Japanese pages would be vertically interlined, at first, with English. Gradually, some English phrases would be used within the Japanese; and, gradually, the area of English would expand. Meantime, those who wanted to attain the basic Japanese would have equal opportunity to do so (though less likelihood!)

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-- in Japanese. But it will face the almost insurmountable obstacle of incentive. Many will come, many of those will learn; but most will not come. We have not even enough rooms for more than a few classes; we have even fewer who can or will teach, even under careful supervision. And to those who say, "Why should I learn?", we shall, I am afraid, have no answer as things are now.

The only real hope of teaching English is in making the entire center one inescapable classroom, in which every ordinary bread-and-butter communication is a lesson, and all one's neighbors are both students and fellow-teachers.

Give me a man with the soul of a teacher (I will not examine his credits), and I can show you a center where everyone is a student.

C. I cannot take Vocational Training too seriously under our present conditions. Apprenticeships go begging, and those who start as apprentices in one or another of project trades have a way of relocating, in midcourse, into whatever offers: usually something quite different from what they were training for. In practice, the apprenticeships are little more than a means of serving notice that one is willing to relocate, but unsure of what to do.


The training is half-hearted, because the boy while still in the center is as yet unsure whether the outside world will admit him to its probation, and unsure that what he is learning is what he will be given the opportunity to do. And the alternative motive, of training to take over a project job, is weak because neither he nor we know whether either he or the project will be here when he is ready. The apprentice is not a young man readying himself to be an adult in a producing community of adults. He is readying himself for escape, with the possibility always shadowing him that if the Army doesn't

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
get him he may merely grow up to be another resident/on relief.

The same holds true throughout our educational program. The motive of education is the sense in a young person that there is something he wants to be, something he has to do, somewhere he must go. Education is what he does to make himself from what he is into what he must be. In the present center community, that motive does not exist in its affirmative form. The Nisei have above all to escape, merely in order to stay what they are and not become Issei. Whatever they make of themselves must be made outside the Issei community. This is the reason we terminated the study program in Poston, and threw our energies into helping the Nisei escape. That motive does not apply to the Issei. And it is for the sake of giving the high school generation a more positive goal in their education that I urge the conversion of these centers into communities of living people rather than stubborn shadows of despair.

D. What activities shall we provide money for this coming year? The best answer is, Travel. Let us send delegations of young people to national organization meetings, to other centers, to cities where something is happening that is proper to their interests, and to the center's needs. Let us send teams. Let us welcome delegations to our own centers. And let us have Conferences to which the Counseling Aides go, to which the Activities Co-ordinators go, to which the police captains, the PTA officers, the Service Men's Wives, go. Some of this we have done. Its increase will show returns by squares and cubes of the returns from our initial efforts. Let us have money, and permission to use it to keep our people moving into the world's affairs.

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
VII

The migratory labor camps of FSA did not breed permanent camp-residents. The resettlement and socialization policies of TVA did not breed apathy and insecurity. Nor were the traits which disturb us now present in the rural California Japanese communities.

Somehow, in the last two years, timidity, distrust, confusion, and dependence have been created and institutionalized among some ninety thousand people. I do not take this lightly.

We are meeting, in a series of conferences, to plan policy for the next period of the Authority's life. The argument of this paper is addressed primarily to the Chiefs of Commun., Man., who meet next week. What I have tried to say is that Community Management may become a set of agencies for effectuating the Manual, or it may become a set of services which share with the community the task of creating institutions that will work. The test of such institutions is whether they generate enough confidence, and receive enough respect, to overcome the community's loss of direction and momentum, its doubts about status, its embarrassment of being Japanese, its difficulties with language, its resentment over loss, and the feeling that its present state of disadvantage is permanent and intentional on the part of the American people.

The major corrections are up to the Authority itself. Its schizoid division between Relocation and Welfare is producing a paranoid illusion among the evacuees that they are living inside a potato ricer, with the pressure disc steadily being lowered on them.




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
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Because we are afraid to have the relief camps become permanent, we have killed every effort toward autonomy and self-support; we are killing the courage and the incentive to move, and withholding the means of movement. Even if the dream of a return to California were to become reality within wartime, we should be shocked to find how many would resist eviction and "re-evacuation" into areas where they no longer have land, money, equipment, or hope of friendly support; into areas already desperately afraid of post-war indigestion from too many thousands of unassimilable wartime immigrants.

Whatever their function turns out to have been, permanent settlements, relocation transient camps, or California-bound involuntary-vacation centers, -- these communities need the reviving influence of self-responsibility, wherever it can be administered and in the largest feasible doses. I may be accused of homeopathic theories in urging that the community be treated as a living body, and allowed more freedom to generate its own sources of regeneration. But I am more afraid of the osteopathic manipulation of the bones of administrative procedure, when the disease is cancer of the will.

In the face of the terrible danger, shall we refuse to try the remedies that seem indicated by the symptoms of the disease? Shall we refuse to permit the re-establishment of habits of productive enterprise, if that method promises any benefits at all? Shall we manualize the native wit and judgment out of our staffs and their evacuee colleagues, on the ground that if we all act alike none can act wrongly? Can we any longer deny to evacuees a share in the responsibilities of center administration, and in the transitional administrations that will inherit these problems?




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Community Management has not lacked courage. It initiated some of the boldest of our early policies. It has proposed some of the changes here argued, but has been refused on the grounds of higher policy. It must keep the courage to do them yet. We who are in the closest touch with the residents in their daily living are sometimes accused of becoming, ourselves, Issei. But we cannot evade our obligation to sustain the health and the courage of the people we work with. We have to deal with them as adults, lest they begin to believe they are indeed children. Nor can we say to them, "America doubts, but we believe in you". It is in us that America deals with these communities; and it is our own doubts that they read in our regulations for their behavior.

It is my judgment that Community Management now stands between a fighting chance and a ghastly failure. For the sake of all we hope that we are fighting for on this earth, let us not fail.

Poston, Arizona
May 1, 1944



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COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT

John W. Powell
Community Management Division

This division deals with people, as opposed to the division--roughly--of things, money, and procedures. The position of the division is somewhat ambiguous, for the personnel must decide to what extent it is its function as a professional staff to manage the community, and to what extent it is a resource, a set of services to be drawn upon when needed or wanted by the residents. Should the Welfare Section, for instance, reach out to the families and raise questions as to their plans and problems? Should the Education Section create a pattern of professional Americanism for a Poston child? Should the Community Activities Section maintain leaders for those activities the community wants, or should it direct the interests of the community into approved channels? These problems make it evident that Community Management is not a clear and indicative title. In general, however, it can be described as the division of professional service.

On the chart, the administrative organization looks logical, as if it were part of the order of nature which happened to have been noticed by some perspicacious eye. As a matter of fact, it has grown up haphazardly. On the Washington level one sometimes suspects that a division developed from a group of people who happened to work well together. There is admittedly some inherent logic in the arrangement of things, but there are also many details which seem to have been quite fortuitous, such as the status of education and health, by rights separate divisions, and the location of Community Government, which really belongs directly under the Project Director. The first title used for the division was that of Community Services, but there was a good

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deal of confusion as to what that included. Sewing schools, churches, athletics, English classes, were lumped together as "recreation," and thrown together with Welfare, Employment, and other matters, in the same division. Miss Findley was in charge of Community Services, and for a time practically constituted in person the health and welfare sections. Gradually some order emerged, and people and functions were sorted out.

At the same time, Community Government in the two forms of the Block Managers and the Community Council was emerging. The course of development of these two groups happened, in Poston, to reflect the competing ideas of the two members of the appointed personnel who happened to be in charge of them: one, a conservative paternalist; the other a radical democrat.

The existence of the three units created problems of administration; it had not been settled, in June 1942, whether we should have one project staff or three. The organization of the entire staff had to be worked out on the spot as we went along. Many of what are today full-fledged sections were at first not even clear cut functions. Eventually they acquired independence. We are approaching, though we have never fully achieved, the organizational perfection of the chart.

One of the questions which we face is that of whether or not to institute professional standards and insist that the community maintains them. Some aspects of the problems Welfare faces, for example, are peculiar to this situation. It constantly comes face to face with old habits and values of the people with whom it works, which often do not fit easily into modern techniques of social service. The Red Cross has developed as an alternative organization, performing many of the same functions with a different emphasis and used particularly by the older members of the community.

community of theory is identical for all relocation centers, because the things that all centers have in common are the basis for the regulations and the procedures. The points of differences are points of friction between the two communities, the real and the theoretical; and these friction-points differ somewhat from center to center.

Community management is divided between its obligation to enforce the manual and its responsibility to help the people of Poston maintain institutions which are important to their stability. These may be peculiar institutions, and counter to professional standards. The chiropractic clinic, recently discontinued, to the dismay of many who derive a great deal of security from such treatment, is one example of such institutions. Another is the Marriage Bureau. I cannot say I regret their passing.

A distinction must be made between genuine and spurious institutions. We have discontinued many in the last eight months, and sometimes such action is destructive. Many old people think it is important for Nisei to continue to learn enough Japanese to be able to write. We have instructions not to teach it, because it retards assimilation. The Adult Education section, however, teaches it but requires valid reasons for learning the language. At one time we had nineteen go teachers, now we have none. We once had about twelve judo instructors and now have only one. Interest in judo has declined but not proportionally to the cut. Paid positions in connection with shibai have been terminated, but performances have gone on in spite of this discouragement.

Education too, has fought a sometimes losing battle for possession of the children's minds and habits. Pupil English vocabularies have slipped by as much as four full grades, since the Fall of 1942.

To maintain professional standards it is becoming necessary to

Situations of this sort bring into focus the background conflict: we are dealing with two communities, one of fact and one of theory.

In the community of fact, the majority of the residents were originally citizens, young people who had been escaping through school experiences from parental controls and issei institutions. The remainder were people who had retained an alien culture, used their own language, and were mostly engaged in growing things. They had not been too successful, though their situation had been improving. They had retained institutional forms and beliefs stemming off from the Japanese culture, carried to this country and perpetuated by people who left Japan forty years ago, at an average age probably less than twenty. At the time of evacuation, the young people were not old enough to assume control. Their average age, in turn, was under twenty. Their parents were over fifty, the men almost sixty. If the war and evacuation had come five to ten years later the entire structure of relocation centers, and of the problem as a whole, would have been different. As it was, the WRA gave the job of leading the community to young citizens who were not yet ready to wield power, before the older men were ready to relinquish it. Eventually the older people reasserted themselves through political action.

During the last year and a half the center has been de-Americanized by intentional relocation. Most of those who have gone have been young men and women. In another year those left in the center will be the older people, mothers of school children who hesitate to go out because of their children, and those young people who have consented to accept the culture of their parents.

The community of theory is described in the manual and handbook. There are points of contact with the community of fact. However, the

import trained personnel, to hold our own line against the regressive tendency of the issei community. In the case of tuberculosis control and discipline, for example, we have to contend with the repudiation of the disease by their culture: the disgrace and ostracism involved; and the fact that the patients are not amenable to any control in which they do not believe. Should tuberculosis patients be subject to coercion?

Community Analysis is the spectroscope by which Community Management analyses the permanence and necessity, the genuineness and importance of the institutions at stake, trying to guide our judgment in preserving those which are valid.

Thus Community Management has three responsibilities: 1) to Washington; 2) to the professional standards of the fields it includes; and 3) to the integral goals of the community it serves. Under the superior pressures of the first two, it is the third which usually gives way.