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INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEVENTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

H. Res. 282

TO INVESTIGATE (1) THE EXTENT, CHARACTER, AND OBJECTS OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES, (2) THE DIFFUSION WITHIN THE UNITED STATES OF SUBVERSIVE AND UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA THAT IS INSTIGATED FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES OR OF A DOMESTIC ORIGIN AND ATTACKS THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT AS GUARANTEED BY OUR CONSTITUTION, AND (3) ALL OTHER QUESTIONS IN RELATION THERETO THAT WOULD AID CONGRESS IN ANY NECESSARY REMEDIAL LEGISLATION

COMMITTEE PRINT

Report on the Tule Lake Riot

(Not printed at Government expense)



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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
TO INVESTIGATE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

REPORT ON THE RIOT OF NOVEMBER 1, 1943, AT TULE LAKE SEGREGATION CENTER, TULELAKE, CALIF.

This is the second report of the committee dealing with the War Relocation Authority's handling of the Japanese in the United States. The first report, No. 717, which was filed with the House of Representatives on September 30, 1943, dealt principally with the War Relocation Authority's handling of subversive Japanese and its laxity in the release and resettlement of Japanese without sufficient investigation. The present report deals with the riot at the Tule Lake segregation center on November 1, 1943, which resulted in the Army taking over the camp 3 days later.

The first report came as a result of extensive hearings held by a subcommittee composed of Congressman John M. Costello, chairman, the Honorable Herman P. Eberharter, and the Honorable Karl E. Mundt. The subcommittee conducted hearings in California, Arizona, and Washington, D. C. During the course of these hearings it became apparent that a program of segregation was necessary for the proper administration of the 10 relocation centers where approximately 106,000 Japanese were residing following their evacuation by General DeWitt from the west coast.

Prior to the subcommittee's investigation and hearings, the War Relocation Authority had taken no steps to segregate the known disloyal Japanese from those who were assumed to be loyal. In February 1943 the War Department and the War Relocation Authority attempted to register all of the evacuee adult population of the various centers who were American citizens. Question 28 of the registration form read as follows:

Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and faithfully defend the United States from any or all attack by foreign or domestic forces, and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese Emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or organization?

According to the figures furnished the committee by the War Relocation Authority, 9,242 evacuees refused to give an unqualified affirmative answer to this question. The total number of persons registered was 74,466, with 3,488 evacuees refusing to register.

Mr. Dillon S. Myer, Director of the War Relocation Authority, testified before the subcommittee that some 7,000 evacuees had asked

to be repatriated to Japan. The above figures are cited to show that there were thousands of Japanese, a large percent of whom were American citizens, who were not loyal to the Government of the United States but rather held allegiance to the Emperor of Japan.

Since the War Relocation Authority had failed to segregate the disloyal from the loyal, considerable friction and disturbances arose within the various centers, the most serious of which occurred in the Manzanar center on December 6, 1942, resulting in bloodshed and loss of life before the Army was able to restore order.

After the subcommittee had focused attention on the danger of such a policy on the part of the War Relocation Authority and after the United States Senate adopted a resolution requiring segregation, the War Relocation Authority announced that they were inaugurating a program of segregation. The principal recommendation contained in the committee's last report on this subject was as follows:

That the War Relocation Authority's belated announcement of its intention of segregating the disloyal from the loyal Japanese in the relocation centers be put into effect at the earliest possible moment.

Late in July 1943, the War Relocation Authority set out to segregate the disloyal from the loyal Japanese. The Tule Lake relocation center, located at Tulelake, Calif., was designated to be the segregation center and plans were put into operation to remove the disloyal evacuees to that center. According to the testimony of Director Myer, the evacuees who were subject to removal to the segregation center came within three categories: (1) Those evacuees who, previous to July 1, 1943, had requested repatriation to Japan. This group, according to Mr. Myer, amounted to about 7,000 evacuees. (2) Those evacuees who had answered the loyalty question (question 28) in the negative and refused to change their answers at a rehearing given them by War Relocation Authority. Mr. Myer testified that from one-fourth to one-fifth changed their minds when given a rehearing. (3) Those evacuees found to be disloyal by the War Relocation Authority as a result of their investigation.

It is obvious that this was not a thorough method of segregating the loyal from the disloyal and one should not assume that all of the disloyal Japanese have been segregated to Tule Lake.

When Mr. Myer testified before the committee on December 6, 1943, he stated that the approximate population of the segregation center was about 15,000 and that approximately 3,000 known disloyal evacuees had not been transferred to the center. He further stated that 69 percent of the residents of Tule Lake were American citizens, 31 percent aliens.

The Tule Lake segregation center was operated on the same basis as the relocation centers with two exceptions: First, there was no provision made for a community government at Tule Lake as there was at some of the other centers, and, second, none of the evacuees at Tule Lake were eligible for relocation. As a general policy, however, Tule Lake was operated on the same basis as the relocation centers.

The internal security staff consisted of 6 unarmed Caucasian officers and in addition there were 101 Japanese evacuee wardens who were responsible only for order in the Japanese colony. To assume that 6 unarmed police could maintain peace and order and protect Government property in a center where 15,000 avowedly disloyal Japanese

were concentrated is utterly ridiculous. It is, however, indicative of the loose and irresponsible manner in which the War Relocation Authority has administered some of its activities.

When Mr. Myer was before the committee in December he testified "We tried to avoid the creation of an internment camp atmosphere." Certainly, 1 unarmed police officer for every 3,000 evacuees could not be interpreted as creating such an atmosphere. It is only to be expected that a sufficient police force will be maintained to protect life and property.

The staff at Tule Lake was definitely inadequate. The center was surrounded by a wire fence and Army troops were stationed outside and charged with the responsibility of guarding the exterior boundaries of the center. They were also in charge of the ingress and egress of persons going in and out of the center. However, the Army could not move into the center without being first formally requested by the War Relocation Authority.

EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE RIOT OF NOVEMBER 1, 1943

On August 15, 1943, approximately 70 evacuees who were employed to unload coal went on strike and refused to work for 3 days. On October 15, 400 evacuees who were employed on the center's farm went on strike and refused to harvest perishable crops. They refused to return to work and it was necessary to bring in 250 Japanese from some of the relocation centers to save the crop.

Mr. Ray Best, project director at Tule Lake, testified before the committee on December 20, 1943, in Washington, D. C., that on October 26 a delegation of 10 evacuees, led by George Kuratomi and the Reverend S. Kai, a Buddhist priest, called upon him and represented themselves to be spokesmen for the entire evacuee population. Mr. Best further stated that they made numerous demands upon him which he did not consider to be reasonable. The committee includes in the appendix of this report a transcript of the conference between the delegation and Mr. Best. This is being done to show that the Japanese were seeking to precipitate trouble by exploiting minor incidents and exaggerating conditions. A reading of the transcript will indicate that the Japanese, conscious of the lack of firmness with which the center was being administered, seized upon this weakness and by the use of strikes, intimidation, and strong-arm methods sought to direct the operation of the camp. It is this very failure on the part of the War Relocation Authority to adequately administer the center in which the self-admitted disloyal Japanese are located that our committee deploras.

About 10 a. m. on the morning of November 1, Dillon Myer, National Director of the War Relocation Authority, arrived at Tule Lake for the purpose of inspecting the center and conferring with the staff there. At 12:20 on November 1, according to the testimony of Mr. Best, an announcement was made in the evacuees' mess hall that they were all to come to the area surrounding the Administration Building to hear Director Myer speak. Mr. Best stated that he was advised of the announcement sometime between 12:30 and 12:40. Mr. Myer had authorized no such announcement. At approximately 12:45 thousands of the evacuees began to move in the general direction of the Admin-

istration Building. At the time, Mr. Myer and Mr. Best were together and they both testified that they made no effort to stop or control the crowd. The crowd moved from the Japanese colony to the area surrounding the Administration Building. This mob, estimated at from 3,000 to 8,000 persons, surrounded the Administration Building and the hospital and for a period of 3½ hours took physical possession of the center.

The following facts concerning this riot were established by the committee's investigation and by the sworn testimony before the subcommittee in Washington of three eyewitnesses to the riot, namely: Mr. Dillon Myer, Director of the War Relocation Authority, Mr. Ray Best, project director to the center, Dr. John T. Mason, at that time a member of the hospital staff at the center, as well as other witnesses who appeared before the committee and by statements and affidavits which were submitted to the committee. The committee's hearings and investigation have established that this riot was prearranged and well planned by the Japanese leaders and was carried out with complete surprise to Director Myer and the War Relocation Authority staff.

During the 3½ hours while the mob was in control of the camp, the following incidents occurred:

1. The hospital was overrun, Government property was destroyed, the Caucasian staff was threatened and intimidated, and the director of the hospital, Dr. Reese M. Pedicord, was severely beaten and kicked by a strong-arm squad of Japanese men who dragged him from the hospital and kicked him while on the ground.
2. The Caucasian Federal employees were herded into the Administration Building and kept there as prisoners for 3½ hours.
3. Abusive and insulting language was used by the Japanese upon the Caucasian employees.
4. The Japanese attempted to take control of the entrances to the center to prevent anyone from entering or leaving the center.
5. The Japanese installed loud-speaking equipment on the Administration Building over which the crowd was instructed and directed in Japanese by the leaders.
6. Director Myer and other officials of the War Relocation Authority were also held in the Administration Building while they were compelled to confer with a committee of 17 who purported to represent all of the evacuees. This committee made numerous demands upon the National Director.
7. Squads of Japanese marched through the Administration Building in an arrogant and military manner during the time the Caucasian employees were being held there.
8. The mob did not disperse until they were dismissed by a Buddhist priest who spoke to them in Japanese.

The fact that the above-mentioned disgraceful incidents occurred is evidence of the complete incompetence of National Director Myer and Project Director Best for the responsible positions they now have.

According to the official War Relocation Authority transcript of the meeting between Mr. Myer and the committee of 17, a telephone call was received by Mr. Best from the hospital reporting the incident there and requesting assistance. The following is quoted from the

transcript, the complete text of which is included in the appendix of this report:

Mr. Best received a telephone call reporting the incident at the hospital.

MR. BEST. What is going on at the hospital, George (Kuratom)?

KURATOMI. I don't know.

MR. BEST. They have beaten up Dr. Pedicord; they are tearing down property. Dr. Pedicord is badly beaten up, and they are going from one ward to another destroying property.

KURATOMI. We will stop it.

MR. BEST. They have beaten up Dr. Pedicord. That will have to be stopped right away.

Committee¹ sent some men over to hospital.

Even though Mr. Best received such a report in the presence of Mr. Myer, they began negotiating with the committee without taking any action themselves to stop, relieve, or to in any way investigate the situation at the hospital, although hundreds of armed troops were stationed outside the center only 100 yards away from the Administration Building ready to move in and restore order. They could not do this, however, without the permission of Mr. Myer or Mr. Best. An examination of the above-mentioned transcript would show that after the negotiations had begun with the committee of 17 another request for help was received from the hospital. In this connection the following is quoted from the War Relocation transcript:

BEST. They haven't stopped over at the hospital. Dr. Pedicord has been beaten very severely and is asking for military police. What would you boys do in a case like that?

KURATOMI. I don't know.

BEST. What would you think about it?

KURATOMI. Maybe if I read some more you can see some of the reasons.

MYER. I think we need to know about this now.

KURATOMI. Some of the reasons?

MYER. Not the reasons. We need to know who is going to be responsible for stopping this situation at the hospital right now.

KURATOMI. Some of the boys have gone over to stop it now. They came of their own accord. We didn't know they were going to do that. I think they will stop everything if we shall continue to talk this over.

MYER. No question of talking it over now. We can't sit here and let property be destroyed and Dr. Pedicord's life be jeopardized.

BEST. Something has got to be done right now.

KURATOMI. Shall we wait?

BEST. Yes; we will wait till it is stopped over there. That has got to stop.

KURATOMI. Will send some more boys over.

Thus, up to this point, Mr. Myer had seen fit to permit the leaders of the mob to send their own men to the hospital to restore order even though they were responsible for the violence and disorder in the first instance.

A further reading of the transcript will reveal that it was only after the discussions had lasted through 10 typewritten pages that Mr. Myers saw fit to send Mr. Schmidt, national director of internal security, to the hospital to check on the situation. It is significant to note that Mr. Schmidt was escorted through the mob by an evacuee.

When Mr. Myer was before the subcommittee he testified as follows:

MR. MYER. I recognized a dangerous situation at every minute of the afternoon; yes. I have never denied that I did not recognize that. It was tense. It was the kind of a situation where there could have been fireworks touched off that might have meant injury or even loss of life to a good many people.

The committee feels that this "tense" situation could have been averted if the National Director had acted promptly and firmly as

¹ Japanese committee.

would be expected by an official of this Government under such circumstances.

The committee of 17, lead by George Kuratomi, made a number of demands upon Mr. Myer. Mr. Myer advised them that he would not entertain any demands. Nevertheless, subsequent events show that Mr. Myer did accede to the principal demand of the committee which was that the entire Caucasian staff be removed from the hospital. This was done by Mr. Meyer the following day. The committee desires to call attention to the fact that Mr. Myer left the center on November 2 without taking any effective steps to adequately restore calm and order to the center. He continued on his routine inspection tour leaving the matter in the hands of Mr. Best. This appeasing and coddling strategy of Mr. Myer failed, however, for on the night of November 4 it was necessary to call in the Army to take control of the center after several hundred Japanese armed with clubs took over the motor pool, beat up several Caucasian guards, and marched on the home of Project Director Best with cries of "Get Best." Mr. Best promptly called in the military. As soon as the Army took possession of the camp order was immediately restored and there were no reports of any disturbances during the period they were in control. The center was turned back to the War Relocation Authority by the Army on January 14, 1944.

The committee received in evidence considerable testimony as well as affidavits given by present and former employees of the War Relocation Authority with reference to the lax manner in which the center was administered. For example, when Dr. Pedicord was placed in charge of the hospital, there was an excessive staff of 680 employees at the hospital, most of whom were evacuees. He reduced the staff to 227 which proved ample for the needs of the center.

As another example, the committees quotes from a statement from Mr. J. Davis, a foreman of the machine shop at the center, made on November 11, 1943, and submitted to the subcommittee by Mr. Myer:

Sure, they have made hundreds of knives. They spend a lot of time on it. I never saw a machine shop yet where the men who work in it do not make things in their off times and sometimes in their regular time. They get these pieces of broken spring and they make knives and they say it is for the mess hall. Maybe it is. I don't know. Some of them say they are making personal knives.

Surely, it could not be considered good administration to permit Japanese who had professed disloyalty to our country to use Government equipment to make "hundreds of knives."

The committee received in evidence an affidavit from Mr. Ralph E. Peck, who from August 28, 1942, to November 6, 1943, was employed as project steward and senior institutional manager at Tule Lake. It should be noted that Mr. Peck held this responsible position at Tule Lake for a period of 15 months and that he resigned on his own volition after the November 1 riot. This affidavit dealt with the wastage of food and misconduct on the part of the evacuees which occurred without any punitive action being taken by the administration. The following is quoted from Mr. Peck's affidavit:

All of these instances and many more made no difference to the administration. People were beaten, ridiculed, and frightened and the administration took no corrective action whatsoever. However, on November 4, when the Japanese threatened the lives of the project director and his family he lost no time whatsoever in calling in the Army, indicating the problem was not a serious one to him until his own personal safety was in jeopardy. I could go on and on

and on, ad infinitum, and enumerate incidents of sabotage of Government equipment, supplies, and subsistence items and give you names and titles of units and section heads who would, if properly questioned, verify my statements. This missive is merely an outline that will indicate the potential possibilities that are in evidence in connection with the mishandling of War Relocation Authority administration. They could be classed not short of criminal negligence which, in itself, is an extremely serious offense.

After reviewing this evidence, the committee is of the opinion that considerable responsibility for the riot of November 1 can be attributed to the lack of discipline and to the appeasement policy by which the camp was run over a period of months prior to the riot.

Illustrative of the maladministration prevailing at Tule Lake under War Relocation Authority is the fact that it was not until after the Army had assumed administration of the center was it possible for the Department of Justice to institute prosecutive action regarding the theft of Government property at the camp and the illicit manufacture of intoxicants. On February 1 an Associated Press dispatch from San Francisco announced that—

United States Attorney F. J. Hennessy has instructed Emmet Seawell, deputy United States attorney at Sacramento, to file complaints against Japanese involved in the theft of Government property at the camp and in illicit manufacture of intoxicants.

Among the witnesses to appear before the subcommittee in Washington was Attorney General Biddle. The following is quoted from his testimony:

A number of bills have been introduced for the treatment of Japanese, many of which are doubtful constitutionally, and some are close to the edge.

This, however, I think, might be considered: Take, for instance, Japanese-Americans who have said, as these men openly say, "We are loyal to Japan and do not want to be Americans." There is no reason why their citizenship should not be renounced under an appropriate statute. There is no statute for that purpose, but there is no reason that should not be done.

In other words, in wartime, gentlemen, it is inappropriate for a man to choose loyalty; and where he wishes to choose the Japanese loyalty he should be able to renounce his United States citizenship. His citizenship would then be removed and he would become an alien and could be interned, and there would be no legal problem left with that.

The committee concurs with the Attorney General in his statement that the citizenship of disloyal people should be renounced and that an appropriate statute should be passed for that purpose.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Since these hearings have been held and while this report was in the process of publication, the President announced that the War Relocation Authority had been transferred to the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior. This move is a belated recognition of the repeated demands of this committee, that a change be made in the administrative policy of the War Relocation Authority. However, because of the peculiar situation which exists at Tule Lake, where the disloyal evacuees are located, we make the following specific recommendations as a result of our investigation and hearings:

1. That Dillon S. Myer and Ray R. Best be removed from their present positions as National Director and Tule Lake project director respectively, because of their evident inability to cope with the problem of disloyal Japanese.

2. That the Tule Lake center and the disloyal Japanese segregated there be placed under the jurisdiction and administrative control of the Department of Justice.

3. That a report be submitted to the Congress at an early date listing the Japanese responsible for the attack on Dr. Reese M. Pedicord on November 1, 1943, and those Japanese guilty of inciting the riot which occurred the same day and also what disciplinary or legal action has been instituted against such persons.

4. That the duty of policing all Japanese relocation and segregation centers be carried out by Caucasians and in sufficient strength so as to guarantee protection to the lives and property of all persons residing therein.

CONFERENCE WITH EVACUEES, TULE LAKE CENTER, OCTOBER 26, 1943
(Official W. R. A. transcript)

Present: R. R. Best, C. E. Zimmer, H. L. Black, M. Lucas (reporter), Herbert Hoshiko, I. Hayashi, George Kuratomi, K. Yamamoto Kobayashi, Yoshiyama, Takada, Yoshida H. Mori, S. Kai (stenographer).

Mr. BEST. Who is to be spokesman?

Mr. KURATOMI. I am. First of all, I would like to ask if you would recognize us as being the representatives of Tule Lake evacuee residents?

Mr. BEST. Is that a question?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes.

Mr. BEST. There is that word "recognize" back again.

Mr. KURATOMI. I could put it a different way. We have been asked to represent center residents as all cannot come in.

Mr. BEST. And as such, will I agree to entertain you?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes.

Mr. BEST. Yes; but recognize—I do not like the word. It does not mean what is intended.

Mr. KURATOMI. I imagine the nature of some of these questions would be beyond your authority. If such a question should arise, would you be kind enough to forward the question to Washington or wherever necessary?

Mr. BEST. Wherever necessary.

Mr. KURATOMI. These are the questions that we have been asked to bring up.

Mr. BEST. Okay.

Mr. KURATOMI. The first of all, the residents of Tule Lake center wish to know the status of the people in here by the American Government and by the Japanese Government and what would be their status from the standpoint of international law.

Mr. BEST. This question should go to the Department of Justice or State Department. Mr. Myer probably should answer that. This question probably should be sent to the Spanish Consul.

Mr. KURATOMI. A supplement to that question—this center has been designated as a center for those persons who have either indicated they are disloyal or cannot abide by the laws of the United States Government or people who have expressed either desire to be expatriated or repatriated to Japan. It is the wish of the residents to get the clarification of the center established as soon as possible. Then, there is a strong feeling among the residents to re-segregate the residents between the people who have just said "no" to question 23 and the people who have intention for going back to Japan. They wish to know how soon such a question could be answered and how some such a plan could be worked out.

Mr. BEST. To further segregate?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes.

Mr. BEST. That is a good idea and is something that will have to be worked out.

Mr. KURATOMI. To go back to the automobile accidents.

Mr. BEST. Which accidents, the fire truck and farm truck?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes; the two that we had. The residents wish to have it clearly understood that W. R. A. should take full responsibility in regard to these accidents, and the residents want a public announcement made to that respect. Furthermore, the residents want the administration to express a regret concerning these accidents.

Mr. BEST. O. K. What is the next one?

Mr. KURATOMI. The project director has not expressed his condolences toward the people who have been the victims of the auto accidents, and they feel regretful that you have not taken any step to show your sympathy toward them, and they wish to know the steps which the administration has taken in regard to the people who have been injured or died from the accident. Maybe I could get answer from you in regard to compensation.

Mr. BEST. All forms have been properly complied with. The accident is under the United States Employees' Compensation Commission. It is not W. R. A. All forms have been completed and transmitted to that Commission. Does that answer it?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes; in regard to the late Mr. Kashima's funeral. The attitude taken by the administration of this center has been very inhuman, and residents wish to know the reason for such an attitude by the administration. Maybe you could answer me.

Mr. BEST. I couldn't answer your question because you made a definite charge that myself, as project director, is inhuman. Who is to be the judge of that?

Mr. KURATOMI. The judge is the rest of the people in the center. That is the way they feel.

Mr. BEST. I have no inhuman tendencies.

Mr. KURATOMI. Maybe I could add something. I imagine you have been approached by residents of this center to have you or one of your representatives at the funeral to send words of condolence and, if my report is correct, you have refused to do so.

Mr. BEST. Maybe I could tell you something. They didn't ask me, they demanded that I appear at the funeral and speak. They demanded that I transmit a letter of condolence to the widow. I do not recognize demands.

Mr. KURATOMI. Shouldn't you think the word "demand" could be interpreted in two different ways?

Mr. BEST. In my way—no. Your representatives that came down here didn't come down here with any other interpretation. They said, "You do it that way."

Mr. KURATOMI. I will have to verify that.

Mr. BEST. I know. I was right here.

(KuratomI talked to Takeda in Japanese.)

Mr. KURATOMI. Mr. Takeda is one of the persons who was here. According to his words they never used such a word. It would not be a very proper word to use even if they thought it was the proper thing to do. Here is one of the witnesses saying that they did not make any demands.

Mr. BEST. They told me to be there. If that isn't a demand, what is it?

(KuratomI talked to Takeda in Japanese.)

Mr. KURATOMI. What he said was to have you come, asked you to come—

Mr. BEST. It isn't anything to debate. I didn't go. I told the funeral committee not to have a public funeral—

Mr. KURATOMI. What do you mean by a "public funeral"?

Mr. BEST. Out in the firebreak, on the outdoor stage, or in the high-school auditorium.

Mr. KURATOMI. Do you think that the people could possibly get into a recreation hall or mess hall?

Mr. BEST. I think so.

Mr. KURATOMI. How could 10,000 people get into a recreation hall or mess hall?

Mr. BEST. I didn't say 10,000 people, I said the people who wanted to go to the funeral—

Mr. KURATOMI. How can you make such a statement?

Mr. BEST. If I told you that there were men forced to go to that funeral, would you say it wasn't so?

Mr. KURATOMI. Absolutely not so.

Mr. BEST. If I told you that certain people, when asked where they were going, and answered they were going to the store, canteen, or elsewhere, were told, "You are going to the funeral," would you say that is not so?

Mr. KURATOMI. I shall have to get witnesses on those.

Mr. BEST. We are not before trial. I am just telling you this for your information. I am telling you this: That the widow did not want a public display of a big funeral. I abided by the widow's decision.

Mr. KURATOMI. I will check up on that. I do not think your statement is correct. What will you do if that statement is not correct?

Mr. BEST. What would you do?

Mr. KURATOMI. I would apologize to the people. Wouldn't you?

Mr. BEST. You, or no one else, are going to tell me what to do in letters. Keep it informal. We will do this without putting me on the spot. I am not going to be put on the spot, and you are not going to come here and tell me what to do.

Mr. KURATOMI. I am asking you.

Mr. BEST. I am going to tell you a few things later. I am not ready yet.

Mr. KURATOMI. They wish to have a public report from the hospital about each of these cases of injury and the death. To prevent further occurrence of such accidents, what steps is the administration taking?

Mr. BEST. I don't know of any way of preventing a fire truck from turning over when a man turns a corner at an excessive rate of speed. Of course, they have governors on trucks, but fire trucks do not have governors. The person driving the first truck is no longer a truck driver. He asked to be relieved of driving.

Mr. KURATOMI. I don't know about that.

Mr. BEST. There is nothing that we could do to prevent the accident of the fire truck with an incompetent driver. I understand that a warden pointed and he immediately turned; is that correct?

Mr. KURATOMI. That part is not on the paper.

Mr. BEST. That is the report I have. I don't know how to prevent that. I am willing and would like to have any kind of suggestions if you could tell me how to prevent any of those types of accidents.

Mr. KURATOMI. Motor-pool drivers should be over 21 years of age.

Mr. BEST. That is right. That is the order. They should be 21 years old for trucks and passenger-car drivers 25 years old.

Mr. KURATOMI. The person who turned the fire truck over was only 17 or 18 years old.

Mr. ZIMMER. Eighteen.

Mr. BEST. Eighteen; which is a legal age in California.

Mr. BLACK. This has already been published and is in effect. The orders have already been issued. We do not have any drivers now that are not 21 or 25.

Mr. KURATOMI. Some of these additional people you have here as drivers don't even seem to know how to use the gear in reverse or the compound. There is quite a complaint in the motor pool on that. We feel that if the motor pool could more or less control such drivers, that is, if they could fire them or hire them, it would remedy this situation. The residents feel that the persons in the motor-pool division should be given more authority to supervise; or if not, recommend for the dismissal of the drivers if such a case should come up. The way it is, that is, the system, now the motor pool has nothing to do with hiring or firing of drivers.

Mr. BEST. That is an administrative instruction. The Employment Division hires or fires people. Each section does make the recommendation but the actual termination is through the Employment Division. That is an administrative instruction and cannot be changed, but we could recommend that it be changed in Washington. However, that is a mere detail and is something that will have to be worked out. Termination through the Employment Division is merely a mechanical detail of the operation of termination. It is an instruction that we didn't write or have anything to do with and it couldn't be changed here. It would make no difference where the termination is processed, a man would be terminated for inefficiency regardless of who does it.

Mr. KURATOMI. The mechanism of some of these automobiles is not adequate to transport people or haul goods and those automobiles should not be put into operation, especially the one that tipped over. Defects were found in the truck.

Mr. BEST. Of what nature?

Mr. KURATOMI. I did not bring the statement but I have a statement submitted from the garage in that respect. There were 9 or 10 items.

Mr. BEST. Just for my own information, what was the matter?

(Mr. Yoshiyama in Japanese to spokesman.)

Mr. KURATOMI. Shall I have him go after it?

Mr. BEST. No; that is not necessary now, but I would like to know just what it was.

Mr. KURATOMI. Going back to the farm. It is the feeling and it is the determination of the people that we should not farm any more than the acreage to feed the center residents.

Mr. BEST. Have you thought that through?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes.

Mr. BEST. In other words you don't want to ship anything out and you don't want anything shipped in?

Mr. KURATOMI. That is up to the Government.

Mr. BEST. No. The reason that other people are raising crops is so that they can ship us what we can't raise and we ship out what they can't raise. We are getting carloads of beef from Gila. The Government is going to feed you, certainly, but if you don't use what is raised here and exchanged with other centers it will have to be requisitioned from the quartermaster and you will have to take what comes. Have you thought that through? I am very much interested in that because I have something here this morning that I will show you in a few minutes.

Mr. KURATOMI. That is what we want, only raise enough for the residents of this center.

Mr. BEST. Have you discussed this to the point that you don't want beef that is raised in Gila? You would rather get it through the quartermaster rather than get it from Gila?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes.

Mr. BEST. You don't want to get any other than through the Government?

Mr. KURATOMI. No.

The reason we came here is because we cannot comply with or abide by the laws of the United States.

Mr. BEST. That is the reason this center was established. That is the reason I am trying to find out some of these things. I think you should think that through further, because a carload of beef from Gila will be ours if you want it. If we go through the quartermaster we will have to take what comes. Is that what you want?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes.

Mr. BEST. Mr. Zimmer, take this [telegram] and cancel it right now. We will have to wait 50 days before we get any.

Mr. KURATOMI. We would like to have a committee to decide how much we want to raise.

Mr. BEST. That is one thing that I would like to do. We have got all winter to plan that. I would like to have an agricultural committee so that we can plan what acreage we want. If we are not going to farm I want to know; if we are going to farm I want to sit down and decide how many acres we want to take care of. I presume there will be about 20,000 people here. Don't you think so?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes.

Mr. BEST. I want a good agricultural committee to sit down and plan, to see how much land we need, what crops we want raised. If we are going to raise chickens, how many? And to plan in advance. I want you to think about that. We can raise chickens and hogs. We cannot raise cattle. We can raise chickens, hogs, and turkeys and we can raise farm crops and we will want to figure them for 20,000 people. That is what we have to think about and I don't want to wait until next spring when we don't have time. We are going to be here and I want to get this planning done because we want to raise the crop—that is if you want the crop.

Mr. KURATOMI. Since it is evident that the acreage of the farm could be cut down there will be unemployment. So that it is the wish of the residents that these people should be given some other employment and if such is impossible then be given assurance of their well-being such as clothing, and of course the food and shelter is provided by the Government, and a little spending money besides. Also, is there any truth to the report that the farm products here have been sent to the Army or the Navy?

Mr. BEST. No truth to it. No farm products have been sent to the Army or Navy.

Mr. KURATOMI. Never has?

Mr. BEST. Never has.

Mr. KURATOMI. In regard to the public school here. Under what plan has it been operated and under what plan does it plan to open here?

Mr. BEST. Probably Mr. Black can tell you. The plan is to open school just as soon as we possibly can. You know what we were faced with here. The segregation movement, people coming in and people going out. We thought we would have to use the recreation halls for additional residents; however, we didn't have to. We had to use the high school for processing. I don't know how soon they can start, possibly next month.

Mr. BLACK. There is still some construction work to be completed before school can begin.

Mr. BEST. On the high school?

Mr. BLACK. On the high school.

Mr. KURATOMI. Let me ask you this question: Would there be a flag ceremony in the morning?

Mr. BLACK. There will not be. It is planned to have a flag over the administration area here and not in the colony area. We have a number of teachers here, as you know, who have been doing other kinds of work and are ready to start teaching as soon as construction is finished. There are some stoves to be installed, some painting to be done, and installation of desks, tables, and chairs. The school census has been under way for several days but still is not completed and we have to wait for the results from the census to know how many classes are required, how many teachers will be needed, and what the division of classes will be. We hope to be able to start elementary schools about November 1, and every preparation is made to open just as quickly as facilities are available. High school teachers will be used in the elementary schools and elementary schools will be opened first. Later, when more facilities are available, we will open the high school, but not at the same time as the elementary schools. Because there are more children to go to school than there are facilities, it is planned to operate on a platoon system. Part will go in the forenoon and part in the afternoon. The students that live the nearest will go to school in the morning, and in the afternoon the ones who live farther away will come for their session, so we can start at 8:30 to 12:00, and from 1 to 5:30, and get pretty good school operation. Does that answer your question?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes.

Mr. BLACK. As facilities are available, either by using recreation halls or vacant apartments, we can make a transfer of elementary schools to those facilities and use the high school for high-school classes on a staggered system. The schools will be open for everyone who wants to go to school, but it is not required. It is a service rendered to the community and is agreeable to all the people, but will not be forced on them.

Mr. BEST. It is not compulsory.

Mr. BLACK. No; it is not compulsory.

Mr. KURATOMI. The people want a center organization to govern and take care of the welfare of the center residents, and this center organization would have every right and power to negotiate with the administration; that is, with you or with the other personnel if such case should arise. It is the feeling and the request of the residents that the whole set-up should be left to the free will of the center residents and that they wish to have you more or less recognize such a group in the center.

Mr. BEST. Just so that you be sure to get complete representation. I don't want it out of one block. I want complete representation. That is being worked on. We had to wait until all were here or it would not be a fair representation. I want you to have a working committee to go to the community-activities section to devise some kind of a program so that you can have an election to get the proper representation. Are you set up to do that at the present time? Or do you think you have it already? I don't care how big the representation is, just so it is not bigger than this group here. We can't work with a bigger committee than this and get anything done.

Mr. BLACK. May I ask a question?

Mr. BEST. Yes.

Mr. BLACK. We would like to have suggestions from the people on that plan. I believe that any workable scheme depends on working between members of the colony and of the administration. I have in mind to submit to the colony a proposal something like this: That an advisory council be composed which will be almost entirely selected by the people within a geographical area. In order to keep a committee of a workable size, it should be composed of a chairman and representatives from each of the seven wards. The chairman of the ward committee might be one of the block managers, or it might be any other person who residents of that ward would select. Certain groups such as the P. T. A., Red Cross, Y. M. C. A., religious organizations, Catholics and Protestant churches, and such other project-wide organizations as we have had would give us a representation but it would not be a geographical one, but rather would represent the interests of the whole project. We are having a meeting of the community management staff this afternoon in order to discuss that a little further, and then find out if you have this committee or another committee to represent the people in the development of such a plan. May I ask if this committee is specifically for the farm situation or whether it is an over-all committee. Could I have an answer to that?

Mr. BEST. He is asking whether this committee is a general or over-all committee or whether it is a specific committee for the farm situation.

Mr. KURATOMI. The farm problem became so big for the farm group that they asked for center-wide support to work out some agreeable solution of center-wide

problems in connection with the farm problem. Therefore, an election was held in each of the 64 blocks and each block sent in a representative elected by the people, and they came to a meeting and decided on some of the questions for clarification for the colonists. They chose a committee and we happen to be the committee to negotiate with the administration. What I was saying a while ago is this, that if something comes up the committee would bring it to your attention. The idea is that some of these people who have been here all the time and some have come in have different ideas, such as some people wish to go out on relocation or people who came in here with a plain "no" answer and the people who have a definite mind to go back to Japan when the opportunity arises. The ideas among those groups are definitely not the same. There will always be friction of some sort unless resegregation is carried out. I think it would be easier for you to run the center if such a program was put into effect.

Mr. BEST. Much easier. One of the things we are going to discuss when the Director is here is further segregation.

Mr. KURATOMI. That is about the biggest problem right now.

Mr. BEST. That is one of the things that will be taken up with the Director first.

Mr. KURATOMI. We should have a center organization eventually. Since this is such a large center and the problems concerned are so varied, it is evident that it will be necessary to have different committees to work in particular divisions. It is the idea that these committees or representatives groups be allowed to work in cooperation with the administration. Would it be possible to recognize such an organization in this center?

Mr. BEST. We are anxious to have that organization.

Mr. BLACK. We are anxious to have an organization to advise and counsel the administration for the over-all promotion of well being and welfare of the community, but I want to make it quite clear that there cannot be such a thing as self-government. I am asking that in lieu of self-government your committee and all of its personnel serve as an advisory committee to the administration or the project director so he may know what things you wish to have done. Does that make sense?

Mr. KURATOMI. Very logical. It is the feeling and request from the residents that these working committees be paid under W. R. A. wages.

Mr. BEST. They always have been.

Mr. BLACK. Block managers, wardens, public welfare, and so forth, are paid by W. R. A.

Mr. BEST. All committees under community activities.

Mr. KURATOMI. Offices should be set up in some central location in the colony.

Mr. BEST. Don't worry about offices. We will have office space for every activity that we need. Definitely we will have that.

Mr. KURATOMI. So that the central governing body from the center residents could get into direct contact with the administration to discuss all negotiations.

Mr. BEST. Yes.

Mr. BLACK. I don't like the use of the expression "central governing body." Should use the expression center committee or council.

Mr. KURATOMI. Is it perfectly agreeable with you to go ahead with the organization and submit the full plans to you?

Mr. BEST. That is what we are here for.

Mr. KURATOMI. It is the feeling of the residents that the block managers be put under the supervision of the center committee. That is the way the residents want it.

Mr. BEST. That would be right back to community government. We have to get away from that. We have no choice in the matter. Those are our instructions.

Mr. KURATOMI. What capacity are the block managers working under right now. Each block manager has a different interpretation of his powers, and so forth.

Mr. BLACK. They transmit to the people information that we feel is for their benefit and we have used that means in many instances to combat rumors that are not true. If the people want something done they tell the block manager. The block managers notify the people that their freight has arrived and letters are distributed through the block managers. Through the block managers come complaints and reports to the administration. Part of this work probably would be better served by the center committee. The main function of the block managers is the transmission and exchange of information with the administration.

Mr. BEST. We discuss the problem and lay our problems right out on the table for the block managers to discuss. We have no secrets. It is our desire to give information as far as the administration is concerned.

Mr. KURATOMI. What difference would there be if the block managers took orders from the center committee who represent the residents?

Mr. BEST. We don't want to try to get around the instruction that has been handed down to us. By reason that this is a segregation center we can't have self-government. I want to keep in the clear on that. The block managers might be on your committee though.

Mr. ZIMMER. Since the planning board and the city council dissolved during registration the block managers have been the clearing house for grievances.

Mr. KURATOMI. The people have right to ask for reelection of the block managers. The reason I say that is this: Since this is a segregation center the language of Japan has become predominant. Some of the block managers can't understand Japanese. They cannot transmit your instructions to the colony because they cannot interpret in the Japanese language.

Mr. BEST. I have thought there probably will be a complete change of block managers.

Mr. BLACK. Many people are not settled down. We have got to go through the process of having new people integrate with the community. It is better all around to have block managers who have been residents of Tule Lake before until the new people integrate with the community. It is better all around to have block managers who have been residents of Tule Lake before until the new people familiarize themselves and get settled down.

Mr. KURATOMI. In regard to the hog and poultry farm out there. There are quite a few doubts and questions among the residents in getting their share of the pork and eggs.

Mr. BEST. We can settle that quickly.

Mr. ZIMMER. Since the 22d of June there hasn't been a hog slaughtered from the farm. Every egg comes into the mess management warehouse and from there it goes to the colonists. Everything from the hog and poultry farm goes to mess management. We have nothing to do with it from then on. We deliver it to them. What they do with it from then on, I don't know.

Mr. KURATOMI. The people here haven't seen any pork.

Mr. ZIMMER. Haven't seen any since June 22 because we haven't slaughtered since then.

Mr. KURATOMI. They say there is 190,000 pounds of hogs on hand. Residents who have been here all the time tell us they haven't seen that much pork at any time even if it was divided among 16,000 people. Will you be kind enough to check this with mess management as to what basis these eggs and pork and other products are distributed to each mess hall?

Mr. BEST. We can find that out.

Everything from the hog or poultry farm is all going down to your mess and no place else. I can't tell you what happened in the past because I didn't arrive until August 1. We all have to live here, and I want to make it just as livable as possible. All the hogs and poultry are coming into the mess management warehouses. Now, if you have a tie-up and have no one out to the farm to work of course I am going to have to have to dispose of the produce. If you don't have a work crew out there we will have to find a buyer and sell it.

Mr. KURATOMI. As far as I know they are working out there.

Mr. BEST. I mean if you should stop working I couldn't give you any of the crop.

Mr. BLACK. With all the produce raised it doesn't begin to meet the requirements of the center. We still have to buy more all the time.

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Mr. KURATOMI. Will you please be kind enough to investigate this from the day you came here to the present date as to what basis farm products have been distributed to each mess hall.

Mr. BEST. That is a matter of record and should be easy enough to do.

Mr. KURATOMI. We would like to have you make a report to the people.

Mr. BEST. I think you have plenty of people working in the mess division who can tell you.

Mr. KURATOMI. Just want a verification.

Mr. BEST. I know we haven't shipped any out. We have to ship in all the time.

Mr. KURATOMI. This has come up often. The people would like to have latrinal facilities improved. If you came down to these blocks and could see the conditions—

Mr. BEST. We can see they are crowded but with the addition of the 10 blocks that is starting today, 3,750 people will be moved out of those blocks and will relieve the pressure and size of the blocks, and there won't be nearly so many

people using these facilities. We can't buy some of the fixtures and materials that is going into the new blocks. We want to improve conditions in the wash houses and the men's rooms. As soon as I came here that was one of the things we talked about, but we can't buy things like we used to. But I want to try to make this place just as livable as possible. This condition may be due to the fact that some of the blocks are overpopulated. There may be more men and there may be more women. However, the next adjustment in housing will relieve that.

Mr. KURATOMI. Can't even wash our faces in the morning. The hot water and the cold water won't operate. It is either too hot or too cold. No basins to accommodate the water.

Mr. BEST. You mean you can't mix the hot and the cold water.

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes; that's it.

Mr. BEST. That is purely a matter for local adjustment and I want to improve all such conditions.

Mr. KURATOMI. What about the lots around the barracks?

Mr. BEST. I am very much interested in that. I am getting kind of touchy about that. I don't want all those porches. They look terrible. We will have to have a committee to sit down and make plans. I think we can probably do this whole thing for about \$20,000. We will have to plan it and work it out. We can't just go up to people and say your porch looks terrible, tear them off. When we get a plan that all can agree on then we have to send it to Washington office for approval by the W. P. B. We have to have approval to buy lumber, approval to buy nails, roofing, and so forth. When we get that we can tell the people this is what we want to do.

Mr. BLACK. In that connection, there are rumors to the effect that we will tear the porches down and not replace them. That is definitely not true.

Mr. KURATOMI. The residents feel that since it was possible for the people in other relocation centers to receive first-class mail delivered to the individual units and since we are using the United States postage stamp that delivery of mail should be to each unit instead of to the block managers. Some of the mail which might be very important is missing. The people would like to get letters delivered to each unit.

Mr. BEST. That is a matter of adjustment later. Lots of cities this size don't have mail delivered to the door. But that is nothing. We will try to work that out as soon as possible. The people will get their mail even if it is still delivered to the block managers. That is what we will have to do next winter—work out details.

Mr. KURATOMI. The food is very poor in this center, especially food given to children. There is not nearly enough of some things such as milk and other essentials. They are not getting enough in quantity. The last 2 or 3 days some mess halls did not give out any milk.

Mr. BEST. That is probably the fault of mess management.

Mr. BLACK. Had a report yesterday that mess hall 16 or 44 failed to have their quota of canned milk delivered for infants and children. Mr. Peck explained that it had been a clerical error and that an allocation of milk would be made from another mess hall.

Mr. KURATOMI. That must have been in two or three blocks.

Mr. BLACK. I just heard about one block.

Mr. KURATOMI. This is a known fact—that there are slightly tuberculosis patients being sent back to the blocks. They should be segregated and sent back home.

Mr. BEST. Any matters pertaining to TB patients are referred to the medical staff.

Mr. KURATOMI. I think that the project director should check into these matters.

Mr. BEST. I understand that there are two buildings—919 and 913—housing TB patients. We know all about that. That is where they take arrested cases. That is what you are talking about, isn't it? 919 and 913?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes; that's it. Now, going back to food again; the food in this center is very poor.

Mr. BEST. When did it get poor? Just since you people came here? There hasn't been any radical change.

Mr. KURATOMI. The food is lots worse than when I got here.

Mr. BEST. The quality or the preparation?

Mr. KURATOMI. The quality.

Mr. BEST. Meats or staples?

Mr. KURATOMI. Especially breakfast. We get hot cakes and things of that nature but have never had eggs. Not once.

Mr. BEST. Eggs are on the menu every day.

Mr. KURATOMI. But we never have them.

Mr. BEST. Seven thousand people have been here 15 or 16 months. Do they find it bad, too?

Mr. KURATOMI. The people that were here have no way of knowing how the other centers were treated. When we compared notes they couldn't believe that other centers were treated so much nicer than this center. Food is the major problem of every individual.

Mr. BEST. I will tell you this so that you can make a big complaint about the food. When the Spanish consul comes again you holler about the food. He said he has never had any complaints about the food. So when he comes you complain about it to him. Now is your chance.

Mr. KURATOMI. At any rate, the fact that the food is not distributed according to the menu is a foregone conclusion. I wish you would check this matter with Mr. Peck and verify it.

Mr. BEST. Some places I have been, and I have seen it work very satisfactorily, is to appoint a Japanese head steward. Let him handle it. I haven't had time to get into details on some of these things, but I am very much interested in mess management. I can see no reason why we couldn't have a Japanese head steward here to correlate with Mr. Peck. We are bound by very strict rules. We can spend just so much. We can requisition just so much and the quartermaster buys it. It is our fault when we don't distribute it right or when we don't cook it right. I don't like to see food spoil either in the kitchen or in the warehouse. I would like to get into this thing myself. If you have someone in your organization, some good Japanese head steward, that can function as such, he could handle such things.

Mr. KURATOMI. I think all of us agree that the preparation was not adequate to meet the onrushing work of the incoming into this center when segregation took place. We wish to know whose responsibility it was.

Mr. BEST. I would say it was the Congress of the United States. They demanded and ordered segregation. The Tule Lake Center was selected as the place. We had all of these trains coming in and going out, and I don't believe that you or I or anybody else could have done better with what we had. We didn't have time. I didn't get here until the 1st of August. Other centers but Tule Lake had no preparations made and had no plans. Other centers moved out 1 to 3 trains. We moved 14 trains out and received trains from every center. I believe there were 18 or 19 trains in.

Mr. BLACK. Nineteen.

Mr. BEST. I guess we will just have to blame Congress. I don't want to blame you, and I don't want to take the blame. I guess the blame rests on Congress.

Mr. KURATOMI. In the event any strike or any other incident should take place within the center, and if the residents should fail to solve it, and there is any likelihood that it couldn't be mastered, then I imagine that the W. R. A. or administration would take steps to see that some quick solution be made.

Mr. BEST. Well, the W. R. A. is not going to call a strike, and the W. R. A. couldn't make a solution when you call a strike, when we don't know what is going to prevent it. A strike isn't the way to deal with me. We don't need a strike, and I can't tell you what will happen. If you want to find out what will happen, have a strike and find out. I am not going to call a strike, and I can't tell you there will be a speedy solution when I don't know what it is about. Possibly I don't understand you.

Mr. KURATOMI. I think you do, all right. The residents wish to know if we have been treated according to the Geneva Conference.

Mr. BEST. I imagine so. I don't know anything about that. But Japan didn't even sign the Geneva Conference. We are taking all of our orders from the Washington office, which is in contact with the State Department. The State Department would know all about the Geneva Conference. I am taking my orders from Mr. Myer, who is in daily contact with the State Department, and I would presume, and would say, that they are following the provisions of the Geneva Conference. I will tell you this: You are not prisoners of war, or anything like that, if that is one of the questions. You are not here as prisoners of war.

Mr. KURATOMI. Our status might change later.

Mr. BEST. I couldn't tell about that.

Mr. KURATOMI. In the past—it hasn't occurred here yet—but in other relocation centers when some articles belonging to the W. R. A. disappeared we, the residents of those centers, took the blame without any investigation. That has

been done in the past. If such a thing should happen in this center, I wish the Administration would investigate thoroughly before making any accusations.

Mr. BEST. What articles do you mean?

Mr. KURATOMI. In other centers such things as saws, hammers, and various other things. At Jerome at one time someone stole 38 brand-new double-edged axes. Without making a proper investigation, Mr. Cook, chief of internal security at that center, made accusations that evacuees were to blame for losing such items. I have heard that in other centers similar cases have taken place and evacuees were blamed and the Administration made reports to that effect.

Mr. BEST. We don't blame anyone around here without an investigation. I don't like to put those things in the paper anyhow. I can assure you that we will have an investigation.

Mr. KURATOMI. Some of these questions it will be necessary for you to refer to Mr. Myer?

Mr. BEST. That is right. He will be here on this center next Monday and Tuesday. I would like, as a matter of fact, to have a transcript of this for him to read so he can see how we are proceeding. If it is at all possible I would like to arrange so that we can sit down and talk with him.

Mr. KURATOMI. This is something I haven't clearly stated in the beginning. People going out to the farm realizing that this problem is too big to handle have made resolution to abide by the will of the residents and refrain from working until final words are received from you here or W. R. A. office in Washington. We will wait until then.

Mr. BEST. About what? What we are going to do with the crop?

Mr. KURATOMI. No. These questions.

Mr. BEST. In other words, you are going to tie all of the questions and the answers to the questions into the harvesting of the crop.

Mr. KURATOMI. No; the thing is—

(Reverend Kai talked in Japanese to Mr. Kuratomi.)

Mr. KURATOMI. The residents of this center are not clear as to the need of 3,900 acres of farm. They have had various reports that the crops are being sent to the Army or Navy.

Mr. BEST. No. None of it has been sent to the Army or Navy. Some of the crops have been sent to other relocation centers in the past. We get crops from them that we can't raise and we send them things they can't raise. It is worked on the basis of exchanging of commodities with other centers. Now, with this being a segregation center, it is your unanimous consent that you will not ship to any other center. That is the way I get it. Is that right?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes.

Mr. BEST. That is your choice. Nothing shipped out and by the same token there will be nothing brought in from other centers. We will have to get all our food through the quartermaster. The only thing I am concerned about is that it takes us 50 days to get our requisitions in. We are going to be short on some vegetables until they can be picked up, as long as we have our own crop out here and won't use it. I am going to sell this crop. There is a food shortage. There is a war on. We are going to salvage this food. I am going to sell it to the Government. We will never see any of the money. I am going to sell the crop to save it. The crop is going to be harvested. We will work out this winter what to farm and what size you want, if any. And I don't want to wait until next spring to do that.

(Kuratomi and Kai in Japanese.)

Mr. KURATOMI. I am sure the people will be satisfied with the statement you have just made.

Mr. BEST. You get a good agricultural committee. I don't want someone who doesn't know agriculture. Get yourselves some farmers. I assume you still want the hog and poultry farm, the pork, the chickens, and the eggs. You are still going to carry that on, aren't you?

Mr. KURATOMI. Never said such a thing.

Mr. BEST. You want that, don't you? You better meet to talk about that.

Mr. KURATOMI. We are still working on that.

Mr. BEST. I want to know. We can raise more hogs and we have quarters for 25,000 chickens.

Mr. ZIMMER. Twenty-one thousand.

Mr. KURATOMI. We will raise that if given assurance that they will be used for center consumption.

Mr. BEST. I will guarantee it. That is what they are for. There is no question about that.

Mr. ZIMMER. We have a quota of what we can slaughter in points on hogs. We can't slaughter more than what a ration book would be per person per week. We are duty bound to slaughter so many pigs according to the population. You are a little better off in here than on the outside, because you have 15,000 ration books, and on the outside you would have only 10,000 ration books.

Mr. KURATOMI. Are you finished?

Mr. ZIMMER. Yes; that's all.

Mr. KURATOMI. Then, have you any plan whereby center residents would not suffer any financial set-back in the future? From the way I can see it, it appears certain that each and every person who wishes to work cannot find employment. Have you plans made to care for those people?

Mr. BEST. There are instructions to govern all that and people that need clothing grants we have that. There is so much money appropriated to operate this center. We don't know exactly what the census is going to be or how many constitute a family. We haven't even got the school census broken down to exact figures. It takes time to get what the local situation is.

Mr. BLACK. I want to point out that people who haven't a work opportunity should be entitled to public-assistance grants. They would need to qualify by an investigation of need.

Mr. BEST. Yes; that is a detail of operation. There are instructions, there are rules that apply to this center. If they do not fit, they will be adjusted to fit, but we can't do anything until we know what the census will be. It takes a little time to work these things out. There is no ulterior motive along the line to work any hardship on anyone. We want to start making this center just as livable as we possibly can. I intended to see to that. I am here only because you are. You are not here because I am. I am here to carry out the Director's wishes clear up to the top, and I want you to know that I am here to make this just as decent a place as we can possibly make it. I want to ask you, What is your attitude, what is your thinking on internal security?

Mr. KURATOMI. We have been approached by Mr. Tsuda on that. Think we should wait until a representative committee is set up. Then it could be worked out for everybody.

Mr. BEST. Will do just what you want. If you want a good internal security, you can have it. If you want a bad internal security, you can have it. Suit yourselves. If you want law and order, you can have it. You can have trials and sentences and punish those who violate laws. You can have a jail if you want it. We will do what you want. I want you to talk about that.

Mr. KURATOMI. That is about all we have at this time. The minor details can be worked out with the committee.

Mr. BEST. That is fine.

Mr. KURATOMI. I want to mention to you that from time to time you have promised people certain things as they come in to talk with you, and we have talked with Dr. Opler and he feels the same, that to gain the confidence of the residents is the quickest solution to local problems.

Mr. BEST. I want that.

Mr. KURATOMI. I am sure you could get it very easily if you could fulfill your promises. Everybody is looking up to that. Such as the erection of uniform porches.

Mr. BEST. That isn't a promise.

Mr. KURATOMI. You promised.

Mr. BEST. No; I didn't promise. That is my personal desire and I want a committee to sit down with an engineer's drawing and a plan to see how many porches it takes. See what goes into them. That is my desire but not a promise. I will see that it will be given every consideration and see what we can get first; that is a promise.

Mr. KURATOMI. If you are going to build new ones, the old porches could be taken off.

Mr. ZIMMER. That will have to be the responsibility of your committee, to work out a plan. We couldn't just go down there and tear them off. If we did that, then we would be in bad. If we all get together on the detail for the new porches, if we can get a new one, and explain it to the people then the old ones could be taken off; but you can't just go to your neighbor and tell him his porch looks like the devil.

Mr. BEST. If we want to get together here and want to get in touch with your committee, can I contact you?

Mr. KURATOMI. You can contact Reverend Kai—503-B—on anything.

Mr. BEST. I have a lot of things to take care of, so you contact Miss Lucas when I am not here and she can tell you when I can meet with you here. I have got to go to San Francisco tomorrow night. I am coming back with the Director. I won't be here for a few days. Any other time get in touch with Miss Lucas.

Mr. KURATOMI. One more thing. It appears to me that the people who come in here as interpreters more or less give you a wrong interpretation from time to time, such as "demand," which we don't like. I want you to know we are just as anxious to work for the benefit of the colonists as you say you are.

Mr. BEST. You will find that I aim to.

Mr. KURATOMI. That is a promise. Don't make it a broken one.

Mr. BEST. There is not one thing we can't do if we sit in here and talk it over.

Mr. KURATOMI. I am going to see that you carry that out.

Mr. BEST. Getting back to internal security. I am very much interested in that. I wish you would do some thinking on that.

Mr. KURATOMI. We have a plan but we have to submit it to the people.

Mr. BEST. Internal security can be as good as the people want it. I want you to think that through. It is just what you make it. If you want lots of law and order you will get it. If you don't, well, that is your business; not mine.

Mr. KURATOMI. That covers everything. We will send in a committee as soon as we get it worked out.

Mr. BEST. I will be right here. There is no reason why we can't come to an understanding. We can lay our problems right here on the table. I am here to help you. I am not here for any other purpose. I want to spend 90 percent of my time with you and your committee. That is what I am here for. If you make it possible for me to do it, we can get together and solve our problems. There is no reason why we should get off on the wrong foot. I don't think there is a problem that we can't solve if we get together. We can work these things out just as they come up. I don't like to let things magnify and get worse. We can get right down to the bottom of these things. Come up again.

CONFERENCE OF EVACUEES, TULE LAKE CENTER, NOVEMBER 1, 1943
(Official W. R. A. transcript)

The following took place while the committee was assembling for a meeting in Mr. Best's office at 1:30 p. m., November 1.

Mr. Best received a telephone call reporting the incident at the hospital.

Mr. BEST. What is going on at the hospital, George?

Mr. KURATOMI. I don't know.

Mr. BEST. They have beaten up Dr. Pedicord; they are tearing down property. Dr. Pedicord is badly beaten up and they are going from one ward to another destroying property.

Mr. KURATOMI. We will stop it.

Mr. BEST. They have beaten up Dr. Pedicord. That will have to be stopped right away.

(Committee sent some men over to hospital.)

Meeting in Mr. Best's office at 1:30 p. m., November 1, 1943.

Present: Dillon S. Myer, R. B. Cozzens, R. R. Best, C. E. Zimmer, S. Cahn, Willard E. Schmidt, M. Lucas (reporter), Dr. P. A. Webber, Isamu Sugimoto, George Kuratomi, Mits Kimura, Matsunaka Nakao, Satoshi Yoshiyama, Senji Nodama, Maso Hatano, Herbert Hoshiko, Hijino Takada, Shizuo Kai, Kiachi Yamamoto, Harry Nogawa, Isamu Ichida, T. Inouye, Y. Kobayashi, Fred H. Mori, Ichiro Hayashi.

Mr. KURATOMI. I would like to ask about the notes of the meeting we held the other day. Is that ready?

Mr. BEST. It will be ready. I have been away and Miss Lucas had a lot of work to do. Will get it as soon as it is prepared. Didn't you have a copy?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes; but some questions were not answered and we are rather anxious to get it.

Mr. BEST. I told you that as soon as I got back I intended to meet with you and discuss every point in question, and we would go to work on that, which I will do.

Mr. KURATOMI. It is very unfortunate that it has come to this point. However, there are some things being brought up. The residents have asked that these be transmitted to you. Here are some of the things. First of all we want

you to know that we understand our position and status in here. We do not want to commit any riots or conduct ourselves in a disorderly manner. The people outside are here to express their dissatisfaction and anger about the center administration.

Mr. BEST. Just on the whole or do you charge on some specific thing?

Mr. KURATOMI. I don't know if you can call it a charge. I will explain those things later. We have been asked to bring up their grievances, requests, and demands to you—I don't know whether you like the word "demand" but nevertheless that is the word that has been used to us personally—so that you may be able to get an over-all picture of how ill administered this center is. This has been directed to Mr. Myer.

Mr. BEST. I will appreciate it if you will direct everything to me. It is very unfortunate that Mr. Myer is visiting here during a time like this. I will appreciate it if you will direct everything to me and we will leave Mr. Myer out of it. I am here and I want you to put it all to me direct.

Mr. KURATOMI. I will be frank with you. I know how unfortunate it is that this had to happen when Mr. Myer was present. Why this came up today will be explained later. Among other things we want to ask you today that we be treated humanely from this Government, this Government of the United States. If the administration should continue to treat us as it has been in the past, it is the feeling of the residents that we can report the whole affair to the Japanese Government through the Spanish Consul. These are not accusations or threats, they are facts to prove the things which we are bringing up now.

Mr. BEST. You will make specific charges, I presume.

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes; later. We believe the American democratic principles are at stake. The Congress of the United States should have an appropriation sufficient to care for the welfare and well being of the center residents. However, they have been insufficient and there have been mismanagements permitted by Caucasian personnel to greatly jeopardize the true intentions of the United States Government toward Japanese evacuees in the center. If such conditions are allowed to continue to exist, the democratic quality of the United States will be greatly injured. The Caucasian personnel at this center, with few exceptions, are known to be hostile to Japanese evacuees. Mr. Best has failed to keep faith with us. He has failed us within 2 days after promising to cooperate with us for the improvement of the center living conditions. By his deed and acts he has lost complete faith with the center residents. What Mr. Best says today is not to be applied for tomorrow. His inhumane treatment can be best illustrated by one incident which occurred very recently at this center. As all of us know, some 29 persons were injured in a recent auto mishap and the residents still feel that the W. R. A. has been responsible for the accident. Mr. Best, as project director, seemed very indifferent. He showed no concern over the accident apparently because not once has he expressed his regrets. When Mr. Kashima died as a result of the accident the center residents decided to make his funeral a center-wide affair. Mr. Best refused to grant the residents the use of the outdoor stage or the auditorium, the reason being that Mrs. Kashima, widow of the deceased, did not wish such an affair. He refused to send a representative to the funeral for the same reason. When Mr. Ernst, project director at Topaz, can send a telegram of condolence, why couldn't Mr. Best do the same, inasmuch as he is right here? If further verification is necessary, we are prepared to call in Mrs. Kashima. Deplorable conditions at the hospital have caused the ire of the center residents. It is a wonder beyond our imagination how the residents of this center in the past let such conditions exist at the base hospital. The residents feel that the W. R. A. should be held responsible for the ability and efficiency of the Caucasian doctors and nurses sent to this center.

Mr. BEST. They haven't stopped over at the hospital. Dr. Pedicord has been beaten very severely and is asking for military police. What would you boys do in a case like that?

Mr. KURATOMI. I don't know.

Mr. BEST. What would you think about it?

Mr. KURATOMI. Maybe if I read some more you can see some of the reasons.

Mr. MYER. I think we need to know about this now.

Mr. KURATOMI. Some of the reasons?

Mr. MYER. Not the reasons. We need to know who is going to be responsible for stopping this situation at the hospital right now.

Mr. KURATOMI. Some of the boys have gone over to stop it now. They came of their own accord. We didn't know they were going to do that. I think they will stop everything if we shall continue to talk this over.

Mr. MYER. No question of talking it over now. We can't sit here and let property be destroyed and Dr. Pedicord's wife be jeopardized.

Mr. BEST. Something has got to be done right now.

Mr. KURATOMI. Shall we wait?

Mr. BEST. Yes; we will wait till it is stopped over there. That has got to stop.

Mr. KURATOMI. Will send some more boys over.

(Waited for report from hospital.)

Mr. KURATOMI. Here are some questions I would like to ask that were not answered in the last conference, namely: What would be the status of these center residents by the American Government and by the Japanese Government from the interpretation of international law? Then, there is a demand from the center residents that this center should be designated for all those persons who have intention of going back to Japan when the opportunity presents itself. Can you answer me those questions, Mr. Best?

Mr. BEST. Will you read those questions again, George?

(Mr. Kuratomi re-read questions.)

Mr. BEST. If you mean are you considered as prisoners of war, I can answer that. You are not prisoners of war.

Mr. KURATOMI. We are called "segregants." Is there any other name applicable to the status of the center residents other than the word "segregant"?

Mr. BEST. If there is I don't know it.

Mr. KURATOMI. Mr. Myer?

Mr. MYER. Evacuees. We simply called this center the Tule Lake Center because it is not a relocation center. It is, as you know, for those people who want to return to Japan and other people who will not indicate full loyalty to the American Government. It is not an internment camp, such as the Department of Justice has jurisdiction over. It is not a prisoner-of-war camp. We expect, if it is agreeable to you people, to carry on a peaceable operation at this center and carry out the same policies, insofar as they can apply, as in other relocation centers.

That is our intention if it is feasible. The events today indicate that we may have some difficulty in doing that.

Mr. KURATOMI. In regard to the second question. The residents would have this center designated for all those who have intention of going back to Japan sooner or later. Would there be some solution to that?

Mr. MYER. Can't give you a final answer to that. It will have to be worked out on the basis of what is feasible from the standpoint of what is available in the way of a physical program to work that out. This is something that you and we, the W. R. A., have to work out. If it is not satisfactory we will look into it. I cannot make any commitment until the problem is studied more carefully.

Mr. KURATOMI. It is a possibility?

Mr. MYER. There is a possibility to anything that lies within the scope of my domain to decide. Nothing more than that.

Mr. KURATOMI. You wouldn't say there is a possibility?

Mr. MYER. No. Because I don't want to imply any promises that I can't carry out. I want to be very careful to have the policies understood. I don't commit myself if I can't produce. I don't want to do that until we can study the problem. We have to know how many people are involved—who should stay here and who can go somewhere else and a lot of other things have to be considered.

Mr. KURATOMI. Have you taken into note the friction between the people who have expressed their desire to go back to Japan and those who are still loyal to this country? There are still quite a lot in this center at the present time.

Mr. MYER. Certainly. Those who are considered loyal to this country will still have an opportunity to be considered for movement elsewhere. No question about that.

Mr. KURATOMI. How soon do you think the process of segregation can be completed?

Mr. MYER. I don't think it possible to estimate. Things are in a state of flux. We will have to get a program in order. I haven't been here long enough to know what the situation is. You people haven't given me an opportunity to talk to the people who have the records.

Mr. KURATOMI. Can you give us an answer before you leave?

Mr. MYER. I don't know if I can give an answer before I leave. It may take quite some time to study the situation. When you are dealing with thousands

of people, in order not to do an injustice to the people, it takes time to work out a procedure.

Mr. KURATOMI. Here is a question I would like to ask. It was announced the day after our conference with Mr. Best that all the farmers were terminated as of October 16 or 19, I am not sure about the date (19 confirmed), and consequently the farmers are very furious over the fact that they were more or less terminated without previous warning, so to speak, because there has been a statement that has Mr. Kallam's signature to the effect that these farmers did not go on strike. They merely stopped work until negotiations were completed. When we made the announcement over the result of our conference with Mr. Best, the farmers naturally felt they would be permitted to go back to work. However, just before they started back to work a notice was already published that they were terminated as of October 19, so the farm committee came to see Mr. Zimmer and tried to talk with him so that misunderstandings would be clarified. However, unfortunately for everyone concerned, the farmers' request to return to work was refused by Mr. Zimmer because, he stated, an administrative instruction No. 29; was that it, Mr. Zimmer?

Mr. ZIMMER. Twenty-seven.

Mr. KURATOMI. Cannot be altered. That was the statement wasn't it, Mr. Zimmer?

Mr. ZIMMER. Right.

Mr. KURATOMI. The people who worked in the packing sheds were terminated because there was no work for them. That statement is natural; however, they were given termination without at least a week's advance warning. Consequently, they are very much dissatisfied, and if my memory is correct, Mr. Best promised during our conference that he would talk things over with the farm committee which would be chosen from the people to talk and plan for the future farm at the center.

Mr. BEST. For next year, why don't you add?

Mr. KURATOMI. Now the question is what was the reason for terminating the entire farm workers without advance notice?

Mr. BEST. You want that answered now?

Mr. KURATOMI. Sure.

Mr. BEST. You were given every notice that if you did not go to work we would have to dispose of the crop. Your committee sitting in this room stated that you were not interested in harvesting this crop. Isn't that right?

Mr. KURATOMI. That is true.

Mr. BEST. When you represented all the farmers?

Mr. KURATOMI. That is right.

Mr. BEST. There isn't any farm now and there wasn't any farm from that time on.

Mr. KURATOMI. But that isn't the way we were terminated at Topaz. If a person—

Mr. CAHN. We don't have to give a week's notice for termination. On this project it has been the custom to give a week's notice if the administration terminated a person because there wasn't enough work to do or if the evacuee was terminating. Either way. It is sort of a gentlemen's agreement but is not a regulation. When people are away from work without an excused absence he can be terminated without notice. A penalty of an additional day for each day of unexcused absence can be imposed. However, this additional penalty was not imposed. It could have been. They were terminated for refusal to work.

Mr. KURATOMI. Mr. Kallam's statement mentioned the fact that this stoppage of work was not to be considered a strike.

Mr. CAHN. It wasn't considered a strike. If it had been a strike there would have been a conclusion to be reached between the evacuees and the administration and they would have been carried on the pay roll until the issue was settled. This was not a strike. There was no issue at stake. They just did not go to work. No one came to see anyone to say why they weren't at work. If you refuse to work, you can be terminated and penalized an additional day for each day you don't show up. Of course, there are many factors that can keep a person from working—illness or other emergencies at home, and there is the possibility that there would not be an opportunity to report the absence. We will wait 5 days for notice. We waited the 5 days. In this case did not penalize for special reasons. These people were terminated as of the date Mr. Best indicated there would be no harvesting of the farm.

Mr. KURATOMI. Of course, there is this point, too. That in the past Mr. Best repeatedly stated he would not recognize any representatives of any committee or any organization.

Mr. BEST. What? I never said that.

Mr. KURATOMI. That has been said. A statement was published in the Tulean Dispatch that I would, and wanted to meet with a representative committee, but they never came. After the statement was published the committee realized that you do entertain or receive representatives of any committee. Therefore they came to get assurance that the statement was correct and reported to the center representatives. Until that time no one came to see you for the reason just mentioned. I have enough people here to verify the fact that you wouldn't see a committee before that.

Mr. BEST. George, are you still referring to our first conversation?

Mr. KURATOMI. One of them.

Mr. BEST. Are you referring to the statement I made to you the first time you were in here?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes. Would you like to repeat it? Do you remember what you said?

Mr. BEST. Now I understand. That is where they got it. I definitely told you the very first time that you arrived that I would make no public statement at that time. You are the only ones I told it to. You know why I said it.

Mr. KURATOMI. Don't know what your intentions were behind saying that.

(Short discussion in Japanese.)

Mr. KURATOMI. The members of the farm committee said that the first time they found out that you accept representatives of any group was known to them on the 21st of October. Therefore, he feels that if the crews are to be terminated on the 19th they were, in a sense, terminated prior to the time they found out that you do recognize representative committees. They couldn't negotiate with you because of the statement they already had and didn't feel they could come unless some official announcement could be made from you that you do accept representative committees. They didn't come because they didn't want to be penalized for something they did not intend.

That is the answer for not coming to see you before that date.

Mr. BEST. Get along to the rest of the questions. I can't do anything about it because they didn't come in. We tried to have people come out in the open about it. Couldn't get anyone to come in. I asked them to, but nobody came up here. At the time you came up here they didn't want any farm. Get on to the next question.

Mr. KURATOMI. I think that everybody agrees that the Caucasian staff does not understand the Japanese. All these representatives here would agree to the statement right now that this whole incident started from the fact that the administrative personnel, as a whole, do not know the psychology of Japanese people, that is, you mention these things more or less from the standpoint of laws, rules, and regulations of the W. R. A. or any other agency. We desire to transmit your interpretation of your answers to the people and I am sure that the people will not be satisfied with your answers because that is something a little different as far as psychology is concerned. I, for one, know that if we are to make such a report as this to the people outside, we, as a committee, cannot very well guarantee what the reaction might be of the people waiting outside. I want you to give me an answer to this question in regard to the farm situation that I can transmit to the people outside.

Mr. MYER. I want to say this about the farm question. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Best on this problem. He had crops to be harvested. I authorized him to wait a few days, which he did, to see whether or not the folks would go to work. We took the chance of having the crops frozen.

No one came to discuss the situation or to negotiate with him for several days, as I understand it. When you folks said you didn't want the crops, I had Mr. Best make arrangements for getting it harvested. Such arrangements were made only as far as this particular crop is concerned. Mr. Best has indicated he is ready to talk about future crops next year. He had to look ahead. He did that on the authority of the National Director; I want you to know that.

From the standpoint of public relations and from the standpoint of future needs, we had to go ahead and get it done. That is all there is to say on it.

Mr. KURATOMI. At any rate, we here as a representative committee, feel that since this was brought up it has become a problem not only among the farmers but

it has become a problem for the concern of every single individual on the center. Therefore, as soon as this conference with you gentlemen is completed, we will make a report to the public to that effect. However, are you prepared to meet the representatives from the packing shed and from the farm crew at a later date, to discuss minor problems with them?

Mr. BEST. We will meet with any group, George, at any time and discuss any problems. I have assured you of that before.

(Kuratomi to Kai in Japanese; others in Japanese.)

Mr. KURATOMI. It is the unanimous opinion of the representatives that if you are willing and prepared to make such an agreement or such arrangements with the farm group or packing-shed crews at a later date to discuss minor problems with them that this will be worked out.

Mr. BEST. We discussed that with you the other day, I thought you understood it.

Mr. MYER. May I make another statement?

Mr. BEST. Surely; go ahead.

Mr. MYER. It is my understanding—and I think I do understand the situation, George—that your committee discussed this with Mr. Best before and indicated that you did not want the crops harvested; that you did not want to raise vegetables to be shipped out and did not want anything shipped in. There is a food shortage, and there are people dependent upon that crop. Mr. Best understood me, and I understood Mr. Best. We took action to have the crop harvested. I want that made clear on the record.

Mr. KURATOMI. The people in the center felt that they would harvest the crops necessary for this center.

Mr. BEST. You said you didn't want the crop. You said, "No." Definitely, no.

Mr. KURATOMI. If you will look back on the record, you will find that we said this: The people of this center are willing to harvest and raise a crop for this center.

Mr. BEST. I said we would work with you to get a good agricultural committee to start working this winter, so we would know what plans to make for the next year. This is exactly what I said.

Mr. KURATOMI. Will you meet with the farm crew with the status that they are designated?

Mr. BEST. We will meet them regardless of their status. Status doesn't mean anything to me. I will discuss any problem at any time with your group or any other group.

Mr. KURATOMI. Then the people here—I want you to get this straight, Mr. Best—the people here in this center were notified of the conference we had with you and an announcement came out the very following day. The people want that statement retracted. It is not so much from the standpoint of money but the principle involved of having an announcement made the day following after we had such an agreeable conference with you.

If the statement is retracted, we could make a report to the people. If we make a report as it is now, the people will not be satisfied. I don't expect you can understand that from a Japanese psychological standpoint. I assure you that I am trying to make you understand what I am talking about because it carries very heavy weight.

Mr. BEST. Can we speak frankly?

Mr. KURATOMI. Of course, Mr. Best. I am speaking frankly.

Mr. BEST. To use terms that I can understand, if I do not retract the statement you will lose face; if I do retract it, you will lose face. Is that it?

Mr. KURATOMI. I was not thinking about that necessarily. When we represent anybody, we talk for the people we represent. We have to work for the benefit and feeling of the people and we are thinking about them.

What I want you to understand is that if you should agree to this about retracting this statement which came out the day you were not here, then the people's feeling would calm down. I want you to understand that feeling.

Mr. BEST. Wasn't that a true statement I put in the paper? That is what you are talking about, isn't it?

Mr. KURATOMI. The statement to the effect that farm workers were terminated as of October 19.

Mr. BEST. I didn't publish anything like that.

Mr. KURATOMI. It had your signature on it, but it came out the day you were not here.

Mr. CAHN. He is talking about the statement regarding the badges.

Mr. BEST. Oh ; I thought he was talking about something different.

Mr. CAHN. As a result of termination, we asked them to turn in their badges by a certain date or pay 50 cents if they didn't turn them in.

Mr. MYER. May I ask a question? I am a little confused. It is not quite clear what statement it is that Mr. Best made that you would like to have retracted.

Mr. KURATOMI. The statement that came out about badges.

Mr. BEST. About badges? I don't know what you are talking about. I will have to see that.

Mr. MYER. May I make a suggestion? I certainly don't see any objection to holding that up until you have had a chance for negotiation.

Mr. BEST. That never came to me, evidently. It probably was sent out by the Pay Roll Section or the Employment Office.

Mr. CAHN. The statement probably was not interpreted correctly. It has been the policy of the placement office since the beginning of this project to turn in the badges upon termination, or pay 50 cents. We were running close to the end of the pay-roll period and the termination slips had to be prepared and processed, so we asked that the badges be turned in by a certain date or the 50 cents be paid.

Mr. KURATOMI. I think Mr. Myer has the right idea.

Mr. MYER. I want to make it clear. It doesn't make any change in policy if the badges are held until you have had a chance to meet with the farm committee.

Mr. KURATOMI. If you had talked with the committee and then put the notice out, that would make sense. I don't know if you get my feeling. I am trying to explain the best I can. The fact that the notice came out before the farm committee had a chance to talk with you angered the people. I am not talking for myself. I am talking for the people.

Mr. MYER. May I make another comment? I am sure Mr. Best understands, and I understand, that you felt you were representing the whole group, including the farm group.

Mr. KURATOMI. The farm workers felt that the problem was a little bit too big for them to decide, so naturally they brought the problem to the center committee which was chosen from one person from each block. After the center committee discussed this with the residents, they decided that they didn't want to harvest a crop beyond center consumption. Therefore, we made that statement when we came over here.

However, after the conference we had with you, Mr. Best, it was decided to turn the farm problem back to the subcommittee which represented the farm people to talk and discuss with you the minor problems as they came up. If they had talked with you before the notice came out, it would have been no problem. If you could retract that statement until after the farm group talks with you, there will be no problem.

Mr. BEST. We are not going to delay the pay roll.

Mr. KURATOMI. That is the point I am trying to emphasize. I am trying to tell you what the Japanese psychology viewpoint is. Some minor things seem important to you. It is not the standpoint of money that they want the statement retracted but from the standpoint of principle.

Mr. BEST. I certainly have no objection to leaving the point on badges until after we talk the whole matter over.

Mr. KURATOMI. Termination date and badges?

Mr. MYER. The termination date is a very definite thing. I am sorry we can't do anything about that, but we can hold off on the badges until the matter is talked over further.

Mr. KURATOMI. Here is the thing I want you to understand. We are not so much concerned about the pay. If the workers had been terminated on the 19th or 20th, it would make no difference if the workers had talked with Mr. Best first and knew what the date was.

The farm workers would have had knowledge of the procedure after the meeting so that they would not have felt so bad. That the announcement came before the farm committee talked to Mr. Best caused those problems from the farm crew. That is the point I am trying to emphasize; I am not telling you to change the date. I would be the 19th, 23d, or 25th, or anything, for that matter.

Mr. MYER. Let me make this clear. We cannot put the people back on the pay roll when there isn't any work to do at the moment. We can wait on the

matter of badges until we have a chance to look at the problem altogether, but I can't under our Government procedure put people back on the pay roll when they are not on the job.

Mr. KURATOMI. You don't understand. They don't want to be put back on the pay roll when they aren't on the job. As long as they were terminated on the 19th, that would be all right, if they had known it before they were terminated. They don't care what date it was, if they had known before.

Mr. MYER. That stands. I have already indicated that I think it perfectly all right to hold the badges and let this be the last phase of the story until we get a chance to talk to the farm committee.

Mr. KURATOMI. Then the statement will be retracted until after we have had a chance to talk it over.

Mr. COZZENS. It means that the badges will be held up, but they will still be removed from the pay roll as of the 19th.

Mr. MYER. It means just that, and they can't be put back.

Mr. KURATOMI. I am not talking about when they were terminated. My point is, as I said time and time again, we are objecting from a Japanese psychological standpoint. If this announcement to the effect that they were to be terminated on the 19th were to be held up, we don't care if they were terminated on the 20th or any other date. The only thing was that if the farm committee, which was working on this case, had a chance to talk with you and you named the date, and then the notice came out after they met with you, there would be no problem. I don't know if you get what I mean.

Mr. BEST. You can't do that on any employment. It is the practice to terminate people when they stop working in any business. You might not get to talk to a person for a long time after he quit working. It is a mechanical detail of employment. If a man never came to talk to you, then they would be on the pay roll forever. It just can't be done that way.

Mr. KURATOMI. Are you planning to continue such a practice in the future?

Mr. BEST. I am probably all mixed up on the point you are trying to make. But I will tell you this: We have a very established employment procedure. However, we are going—as I told you the other day—to have a better employment procedure. Mr. Cahn is very much interested in that and is working on that now. If there is anything in our present employment practices that doesn't meet with your approval, suggestions will be considered.

Mr. KURATOMI. That is not what I am talking about. It is the principle of it that is involved, not the terminating procedure. I am talking about the principle.

Mr. MYER. When you are talking about the future, is it as to whether the people will have an opportunity to talk to Mr. Best in the future before terminating?

Mr. KURATOMI. That is still another point. If the farm committee had met with Mr. Best and had understood that these workers were being terminated on the 19th, there would be no problem. Instead of that, when it came out, these people didn't know anything about it. That is what I am trying to get at. I don't think you quite understand my point.

Mr. ZIMMER. Here is what George means. If this statement were retracted till the farm committee were to meet, then you don't care what kind of a statement comes out; but to have it come out before the meeting, they think advantage has been taken of the committee. Is that the idea, George?

Mr. KURATOMI. That is the point; yes. It is a very important point, too.

Mr. BEST. There isn't anything very difficult about solving that problem in the future.

Mr. ZIMMER. Nothing difficult about solving it; no. It stands, whether it is retracted or not; but if that statement could have been—could be retracted until this committee met with Mr. Best, and then came out, it would be O. K.?

Mr. KURATOMI. That is the right idea.

Mr. BEST. No reason why it can't be done that way.

Mr. MYER. I want you to understand they will not be put back on the pay roll.

Mr. KURATOMI. That is clear now.

Mr. WEBBER. Couldn't you put it to the effect that it was a misunderstanding?

Mr. CAHN. That is not so. It was not a misunderstanding. The regulations provide that persons are automatically terminated 5 days after they do not report for work. An additional day of penalty can be added for each day over that. The penalty was not given. The project director has the right to remove the prejudice, if sufficient reason is given for not having worked.

Mr. MYER. Just say for the record that you will withhold the statement until after Mr. Best has had a conference with the committee.

Mr. CAHN. I just want it understood that it was not a misunderstanding.

(Received report from hospital at this point.)

Mr. BEST. They are still having trouble at the hospital. What are you going to do about it?

Mr. MYER. Let us stop this discussion until that sort of thing is stopped. We can't go on under that kind of a situation.

(Mr. Schmidt and an evacuee go to check up on the hospital situation.)

(Reported under control.)

Mr. KURATOMI. We are sorry about the interruptions.

Mr. BEST. How much longer are they going to carry on the demonstration outside?

Mr. KURATOMI. It is not a demonstration.

Mr. BEST. What would you call it?

Mr. KURATOMI. There has been no trouble at all. They are waiting for the answers to these questions.

(Returned with report from hospital that situation under control.)

Mr. MYER. Couldn't we move right along? My time is limited and we are going to have a lot of business to take care of.

Mr. KURATOMI. Are any Japanese persons, that is, loyal Japanese persons, coming to harvest the crop here?

Mr. MYER. May I answer that? We are going to take care of the harvesting of the crop outside and I have no comment to make now. You folks did not want to do it, so we arranged to have it done outside and I cannot make any comment. In view of the decision, we will have to keep that as a separate issue. I am sorry.

Mr. KURATOMI. The last 2 nights there has been merchandise taken out of the warehouse from this center. Do you know the reason?

Mr. BEST. We might take merchandise out any time. We are accountable for it and we can ship it out or we can ship it in any time we want to.

Mr. KURATOMI. We are interested in the merchandise taken out because of the fact that one mess hall couldn't receive their share of the goods that were to be distributed.

Mr. BEST. Let's get along. I will set down for the records that we will meet with any mess hall committee on those things. We haven't any records here and can't discuss those things at this time. If you want to get into details it takes time, George.

Mr. KURATOMI. We can't make such a report. They want a definite report, and I doubt if that answer will do.

Mr. BEST. It is our property and we are accountable for that property. We can do what we want to with it.

Mr. KURATOMI. Because of the fact that some merchandise was taken out of this center, some mess halls suffered a shortage.

Mr. BEST. I would want to get into that thoroughly. I would want to find out exactly what was supposed to be delivered and was not, and what mess halls were short. I want to know that.

Mr. KURATOMI. When you do find out what happened, will you take proper action?

Mr. BEST. What would be proper action? Maybe I don't know what the proper action is. I certainly will see that all staple commodities as far as the quartermaster can supply will be kept there. I will see that the mess department keeps those things in here and supplies them to the mess halls.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Best gave you his answer. I am sorry, but there will be no report why the food was taken out. I don't feel that it is necessary to report every movement made. If you request an investigation regarding such a case and if it is proven that they were short, proper action will be taken. We will have to wait and see the results of an investigation. I am sorry to say we cannot be in a position to report to the community on every movement of trucks. The residents are supposed to have food and if they don't get any, investigations will be made. We don't have time to go into all those details now. Proper action will be taken as far as we can do that, George.

Mr. KURATOMI. There are incidents in the hospital, too. Dr. Pedicord made two appendicitis patients wait until it was almost too late and this has happened in the last week's time. One person is suffering from meningitis. This man

took some of the children out on a picnic some place and one of the children struck his eye with a stick.

He couldn't bear the pain, consequently he went to the hospital and the Caucasian doctor over there said it was nothing serious and no need for him to worry and for him to go on home. It pained so he insisted on being examined. It was of no avail. He had to pick one of the evacuee doctors over there to examine him, but these doctors, as you know, are subordinate to the Caucasian doctors and have very little authority, almost no authority, in fact, and they have to get every little detail from the Caucasians.

The chief doctor tried to see if any case of meningitis was apparent but before he got to it they told him to stop such an examination so he went back and he still couldn't bear the pain. Then he came back to the hospital again, and the doctors do not know whether this man will survive.

Another case here in the hospital: One mother went over there because she had a baby, and the doctor, without taking proper precautions, gave her a couple of morphine injections. As a result, the baby came out dead. It was a still-born baby. There are many cases such as that to prove the inefficiency and indifference of Caucasian doctors in this hospital. It was decided by the evacuee doctors in this center that if such doctors are to stay in this center, and more or less see people die from day to day, they cannot stand to see such a thing exist.

So it was decided last night to ask the resignation of each and every Caucasian doctor and each and every Caucasian nurse who feel so superior that some of them believe they know more about medicine than the Japanese doctors who have had big practices and lots of responsibility. It has been said that some of the Caucasian doctors employed here don't even have licenses to practice medicine.

Dr. Pedicord allows only one ambulance to be in operation on Sunday for about 18,000 people. He takes the keys to the other ambulances and has forbidden the ambulances to be driven.

You must be aware of the complications which might arise from such an instance. We feel that the request and demands from the hospital evacuee staff to remove the Caucasian doctors and nurses from the hospital should be done as soon as possible for the well-being of the people in this center.

Mr. MYER. Are you through?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes.

Mr. MYER. In the very first place, we are willing to have any suggestions that you folks have. You can sit down and talk it over with Mr. Best. As I told you before, we can't operate on the basis of demands. We are willing to take criticisms from your group and check and investigate them, and take action accordingly. We are always willing to have criticisms and suggestions, but not demands.

Mr. KURATOMI. These are the criticisms by the evacuee nurses and doctors.

Mr. MYER. We will be very glad to check into it. In view of what has happened over at the hospital today it will have to be checked very thoroughly and will take some time. It will have to be checked and investigated.

Mr. KURATOMI. Whatever might have taken place over there and to Dr. Pedicord in particular, might be justified, and some of the boys couldn't wait until the conference was over.

Mr. MYER. We are not going to argue about that now.

Mr. KURATOMI. We have a man here who can tell you what happened to his family.

Mr. FUKAHARA. I am block manager of block 16. Sunday night at 7 o'clock I had a report from my sister-in-law requesting an ambulance because her child was burned with hot water. I rushed to the phone, which is only 35 or 40 feet away, and an ambulance came and he was taken directly to the hospital and given some kind of a treatment on the outside and bandaged and put in a room and left there until morning without being seen by another doctor, and when questioned by the nurses about his welfare was told by a Caucasian doctor, Dr. Marks, that it wasn't anything serious. A Japanese doctor was called in and there were four looking on when they injected plasma, or whatever it is called. They could find only one container of it, which is not sufficient to save a child. They worked desperately, but he died this morning at 2 o'clock. If the burn was as serious as that, why didn't the Caucasian doctor take care of him between 7:15 at night until early in the morning when the Japanese doctors took over?

Mr. MYER. I am certainly sorry about the baby.

Mr. FUKAHARA. It should be the responsibility of the War Relocation Authority or Dr. Pedicord to take full blame for what happened, as far as I can see.

The COMMITTEE. That's right.

Mr. MYER. We will go into the matter thoroughly. This case and any other case you may have will be investigated thoroughly. We can't do it in the face of demands. I think you folks are interested in having a peaceful center.

The War Relocation Authority is interested in giving it to you, but we can't operate on the basis of demands and scenes of the type we have here today. We just can't operate like that. Generally speaking, the record has been pretty good on medical service. We will go into that matter, however, just as soon as we can get to it. We can't go into it today. I am no judge of that particular type of thing. I will be glad to have all the facts and I am not going to make any commitment until I get them. A judge never makes a decision until he gets both sides.

Mr. KURATOMI. This is not a complaint. We don't get anywhere with complaints. Consequently, it is turning into demands. The people want the immediate removal of all the Caucasian doctors and nurses, and we want a definite answer today.

Mr. MYER. That is impossible because I have been on the project only 6 or 7 hours, and haven't even had a chance to look around.

Mr. KURATOMI. Let me say this much: This has been a request from the evacuee doctors and nurses that you arrange to have all the Caucasian doctors and nurses removed from this hospital for the reason that they don't want them and the people have the same feeling. Let me say this, Mr. Myer, I don't want to see any violence, however, unless you remove these people I have mentioned from the hospital until such time as an investigation has been held, I cannot guarantee the actions of the people. This is not a threat. I cannot stop these people from swarming over to the hospital and getting after the doctors. I don't want to see any violence take place, but I cannot guarantee what the people will do if we have to give them this answer.

Mr. MYER. I have never taken any action under threat or duress.

Mr. KURATOMI. It is not a threat; it is a fact. I am just explaining the actual tension.

Mr. MYER. I realize what exists. Someone is responsible for that. The people are pretty well shipped up. I am sure the tension would be much greater if I made concessions without going into the facts. I cannot make concessions without going into the facts of the matter. I am very sorry that is the situation. In view of what has happened at the hospital today I cannot take action until we investigate the matter. That is final.

Mr. KURATOMI. Do you want us to make the statement just as you said it?

Mr. MYER. You may state it as you wish. I hope you will give them the facts. Tell the people I am here. I hope to go quietly about my work looking into the problems of the center with the evacuees and the administrative staff.

This is my first trip since the segregation movements started. The movements are not yet complete. We hope to get a completely representative group of the Tule Lake center to come up here to discuss their problems. You folks are serving in a temporary capacity until a truly representative committee has been chosen. On matters of immediate concern, we will go into the matter. I am sorry but I will not make any commitments that require action of removal of any personnel without seeing the other side.

Mr. FUKAHARA. I don't belong on this committee. I am so grieved at the loss of my nephew that I wanted to speak to you so you can look into the matter. However, I am not being a party to any demands. I worked under Mr. Schirrell and Mr. Coverley and I don't want to make any trouble. I just wanted you to know the facts. I am glad to be excused; I felt out of place here.

Mr. KURATOMI. Remember what I said; This is not my personal feeling or personal opinion. We are here to represent the people and so speak for the people, and you might see this thing actually take place; I cannot say.

Mr. MYER. I don't think you or any member of this committee have any ulterior intentions and I certainly don't think you want anyone here asking me to make a commitment on 10 minutes' notice on a matter as grave as you have presented. I just couldn't do it.

Mr. KURATOMI. How soon can you make it?

Mr. MYER. I will give you an answer just as soon as I can. First, I have to get the facts together. If I can find time while I am here I will, but I can't promise you that I can get all the facts together in that time.

Mr. KURATOMI. Let me ask then that these Caucasian nurses and doctors refrain from coming into the hospital for the time being. This is not a demand

but a reasonable request. I don't think it is going to hurt anybody. We are asking you to do this because we don't want any violence.

Mr. MYER. I am not ready to do that under the circumstances. I have to get all the information together and know all the facts. I am sorry I can't commit myself now. We will go into the matter and give it further consideration.

Mr. KURATOMI. Mr. Peck, who is the head of mess management in this center, is responsible for making allotments of food to each mess hall. The goods were never brought in according to the menus. Many items such as milk and eggs are absolutely necessary to the growth of children. Before I go into this mess-management statement and its facts and figures, Mr. Sugimoto can present it for further clarification.

Mr. SUGIMOTO. These are the findings the food investigation committee gave me. This was necessitated by the fact that when we came in, the segregants felt that the food was qualitatively and quantitatively below that of the other centers. They waited a few days, but the food continued to be worse than it was in September, so with the records existing right here in the Tule Lake Center, these facts were investigated.

During the month of September the cost of food per person per day was 27 cents a day including the food products produced within this center.

I think you signed the administrative instruction, Mr. Myer, regarding 31 cents per person for whatever food products were consumed over and above the food produced at this center. But the way this food was computed in September it was all in one, with the amount of 27 cents per person per day including the food produced here.

The average cost of subsistence on October 3, which was an average day, one record was available and at that time the average was found to be 27 cents per person per day, including the food produced here.

Going back to the above statement, during the month of September vegetables and eggs and farm produce raised in this center was well over \$11,000 and this is equivalent to about 3 cents per person per day. That, included in the 27 cents, makes the cost per person per day about 24 cents.

The commodities brought and shipped in from the outside by War Relocation Authority are figured according to the Office of Price Administration meat ration system to feed 14,700 persons. By computing the points at 95,359, it was short-rationed to the evacuees and overrationed to the Caucasian personnel mess hall, which is in operation here, to the extent of 34,133 points, so there was enough shipped in to be distributed to the people in this center, but was evidently overrationed to the project employees, and 168,000 points of processed food was brought and shipped into this project where only 127,000 points were needed.

But the funny part of it is that it was overrationed to the extent of 7,325 points to the Caucasian mess hall and underrationed to the evacuee's mess halls according to the existing records in the warehouse.

And another item, between the time of September 17 and September 30 there is a record of 1,880 pounds of beef being dumped for reason of being unfit for human consumption and we thought this beef was to be Government-inspected.

Investigation reveals that the Caucasian mess hall not only gets some of the project meat but takes the choicest part of it. They get the cuts such as T-bone, rib steaks, and tenderloin steaks. That part goes to the personnel mess hall and the evacuee mess halls get what is left. All of these items are contributing factors about which these evacuees in this camp are complaining because they are not getting their proper share of food that comes into the project.

Mr. MYER. Let me say that if it proves to be true that you are not getting the food that you are supposed to be getting, that will be corrected immediately.

Furthermore, proper action will be taken to have someone operate it. I know that there are problems in mess management. We are investigating them. It will be necessary to go into the matter thoroughly. If you have any facts at all that will help Mr. Cahn or Mr. Best, they will be delighted to have them.

Let me say it is the responsibility of the War Relocation Authority to provide the proper food. If the evacuee mess halls are not getting the points because someone else is, that will be corrected. I hope we can get this matter taken care of quickly. I am just as much interested in it as you are.

I want to say one thing, that the development within the last week or two within this center may affect the immediate supply as it will take some time to get some of the products of the type that is produced in other centers. That will have to be taken into consideration in looking out for immediate needs.

I want to repeat it is the policy to trade with other centers to provide food in the quantity and quality necessary. Without that we will have to wait and get

what food is available from the quartermaster. I am sure Mr. Best and Mr. Cahn are just as interested in getting those facts because we have a record to take care of. We will be pleased to have any information we can so that we can get into it and get this straightened out soon.

Mr. KURATOMI. If we are called in to clarify these problems we will be glad to furnish any information we have and follow along, as food is the concern of all the people. We are not asking for the impossible. We are not asking for things that can't be had outside.

Mr. MYER. There is no argument about that between us. We are not going into that now.

Do you want to say anything, Mr. Best or Mr. Cahn?

Mr. CAHN. All these things we will clarify when going into detail.

We have been working on it for several weeks, checking ration points, taking inventory, and renting space in Klamath Falls. We had our own inspection of meat in the last 30 days. We had a Government inspector, for the first time, inspecting all meat and vegetables that came into this center. It is true that they did not approve all the meat, but the meat that was rejected was sent back to the point of origin.

Mr. KURATOMI. Going on to the question: As a request from the colonists, we want you to promise us that uniform porches, and latrinal-service improvements be made at once; dust control of the road should be attempted immediately. This has been more or less of a repetition. We have asked you for them before.

Mr. BEST. We agreed on that the other day.

Mr. KURATOMI. What later attempts have been made?

Mr. BEST. We agreed that you would have a committee and we would try to devise a standard porch and try to compute the total number of porches from that figure and prepare an estimate of what the entire program would cost, and if approval could be secured for lumber, nails, and other material going in there from the W. P. B. We said that we would consider it. We told you that the other day.

Mr. KURATOMI. Many units are still without brooms, buckets, mops, and other essentials. They still lack privacy, because the walls are up on one side only. The women cannot dress without being seen. There are still no closets. We are still waiting for buckets and brooms. This is my personal matter. I am not going to wait until the administration furnishes me with all these essentials. I am going to keep a record of it. If Mr. Myer wants to see all this, he can come down. It is a mess and I don't see how the people in responsible positions could be so indifferent to the welfare of the colonists.

It is a request from the center residents that at all times six ambulances should be in operation. This will be more or less of a repetition. Nevertheless, I will bring it up.

The center residents want you to recognize a central organization to report for the colonists on all matters concerning the welfare of the residents. They also want you to recognize various committees which will work with the administration on some of the functionings of the center.

They also want you to promise that the hospital be supervised more humanely and that the Japanese doctors in this center be given equal authority as those of the Caucasian doctors. As you all know, employment in this center is very grave, and the people want unemployment compensations made available to all the workers who find no employment, just as soon as possible.

Going back a little, what steps are being taken to furnish each unit with sufficient essentials?

Mr. BEST. I couldn't tell you. I don't know.

Mr. CAHN. We had a quantity of brooms on hand and issued those. We didn't have the buckets; we couldn't buy them. But I do think that Mr. Black has gone into the matter and has issued the brooms we had on hand. We had 2,000 at the time. I don't know if Pete Zimmer could tell you more about the buckets.

Mr. KURATOMI. There is an order out from the civic organization to all block managers, saying that no buckets, and so forth, were to be issued to the residents.

Mr. CAHN. I repeat, the instruction was to issue all brooms on hand. As I said, we had 20,000 in stock. We had no buckets and we couldn't buy any today any place. They just are not for sale.

Mr. KURATOMI. What do you want us to do?

Mr. CAHN. As I say, Mr. Black is working on that problem and also on what you can use in place of it.

Mr. KURATOMI. Well, who is responsible for putting us in these centers?

Mr. BEST. Let's not go into that now.

Mr. CAHN. I am only discussing the problem as it arose at that time. Orders were given to issue them. I know that the problem has not been dropped and that they are working on it.

Mr. KURATOMI. We have been told to leave the brooms and buckets in Jerome, because they would be reissued here, but nothing has been done about it. I certainly think that the administration should do everything within its power to acquire these for us, because I don't see how you gentlemen could be so indifferent. I wish you were in our position.

Mr. CAHN. The assumption that we have been indifferent is not so. The problem was approached by the community management division here immediately. I know they have taken steps to secure the necessary items for cleanliness and sanitation.

Mr. KURATOMI. About these units: They have only plasterboards on one side. You could hear people talking and you have to whisper all day long and the embarrassment to us is beyond words. Many are without closets and the women cannot change their clothes without being seen from the outside. I believe it is about time something should be done, at least to show that the administration is sincere about the welfare of the residents here.

Mr. ZIMMER. Do you realize that all partitions that are put in during the day disappear by night?

Mr. KURATOMI. Let me ask you this: Suppose you are put in a unit with nothing in there; wouldn't you do something like that?

Mr. ZIMMER. But can't you see that we can't gain on it at all? Housing tells us that this unit could be partitioned today. The partition is put in, but by tomorrow it's not there. It's gone. Somebody else has it. I would much rather they took material that is not put up. When they keep taking these partitions, we can't gain on our work. Do you realize what I mean? Over in block 66 we partitioned nine buildings. Only two partitions were left in a week.

Mr. KURATOMI. About this central organization or committee to work with the administration. I am sure that Mr. Best is in agreement with this.

Mr. BEST. I told you that if there is a fair representation to everybody, then that is what we wanted to work with. The quicker the better. Mr. Black was instructed to work through you or any committee you send to him to devise such a meeting.

Mr. KURATOMI. I am sorry that you gentlemen had to sit such a long time, but I think Mr. Myer, or any other gentleman, has heard all the grievances and dissatisfaction of the center residents that came to a voting point today. There is a statement here from the residents demanding the removal of Mr. Best as project director; Mr. Zimmer as assistant project director; Mr. Schmidt, who is head of the internal security division, for letting over 20 tons of goods pass without stopping it at once; Mr. Kallum, head of the agricultural division, who is directly responsible for the termination of the farm workers; Mr. Peck, who is responsible for the management of all the mess division; Mr. Kirkman, of the warehouse division, who allowed 20 tons of food to be taken out of the warehouse; all of the Caucasian doctors—five of them—and all the nurses to be dismissed from this center administration.

That is just about all that we have on hand, and there are many minor points that could be brought up which would take days to clarify.

Consequently, I feel that the committees should be entrusted with the responsibility of working out minor details. The last statement just made in my statement is a statement as requested by the center residents. I would like to emphasize that and repeat it. This is a request not among the representatives here but from the center residents, to have these persons removed from the center administration.

Mr. MYER. Have you finished?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes.

Mr. MYER. All I have to say further is this, I am glad to have had the opportunity to meet with you. I want to say that I have absolute confidence in Mr. Best, or I wouldn't have placed him here. I placed him here because I felt that he had understanding, courage, and would know how to work with you people in working out your problems. I still think that.

As far as personalities are concerned, I came up here to go over with him problems in relation to personnel or any other problems that he might have. I am going to accept his recommendations and will probably make a few of my own.

I want to make it quite clear that Mr. Best is in charge, and that we can't operate on the basis of demands, but only on the basis of sitting down and talking things over. There is only one agency I know of who operates on the basis of demands. We don't operate that way, I want to repeat.

The War Relocation Authority has been in operation for a year and a half. We have gone through a good many trials and tribulations and troubles. We have been investigated twice by the United States Congress, as regarding the population and problems of these people. They have said things about your problems which I haven't agreed with.

We have tried to get together on facts and have tried to do it within the limits of the policies and our particular administration. We hope we can work with you. If we can't, I presume there will be someone else working with you. I don't know who that would be. I am sure you are not interested in having trouble.

When I went into this position, I knew there would be some trouble and I was prepared for it. I am still prepared for it. When you have suggestions, bring them to Mr. Best. Don't bring them in the way of demands. That embarrasses him and it embarrasses you. We can't meet demands. We are operating under the United States Government and have to follow certain policies. We are willing to investigate charges and are willing to take action if we find they are based on facts.

I am much obliged to you for coming in. I am sure that you want to operate on that kind of basis, and, if you don't, there will have to be some other kind of basis worked out.

I am not here to make threats. I don't make threats. We stand on what we are trying to do. We think our program has been pretty sound so far, and that the evacuees generally understand that. I think you have some difference of opinion in this center. While I don't know how many people you represent, I doubt that you represent all of them.

I hardly think that you represent everybody's point of view. It is difficult to represent everybody's point of view when there are 15,000 people here.

I hope that I can have an opportunity to devote my time and attention to the problems represented here within the next 24 hours or so, and I want to get at some facts, and I am sure that is what you want me to do.

Mr. KURATOMI. That was just brought up. In block 34, I don't know which corner, there has been an evacuee picked up by an Army jeep and this man was inside a box. Around 50, rather stout, and he wore a beige hat, and I wonder if there is some way for you to check it up?

Mr. BEST. You say an Army jeep?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes. He was picked up, I imagine.

Mr. BEST. When?

Mr. KURATOMI. Just now. These people saw it: Kiyohara, Saito, and Kanano.

Mr. BEST. I can call the Army up and ask them.

(Upon later questioning Mr. Kuratomi was unable to furnish the name of the man in question.)

Mr. MYER. We will be glad to look into that. We are taking so much time, I feel we should get around and get the job done. We will check with the Army and will report the facts to you.

Mr. KURATOMI. I would like to say in a concluding statement that, as we have already stated, we are not here for trouble and we don't expect to have any unnecessary commotions, and we are sincere and feel that the rights of the evacuees here are being jeopardized and sometimes tramped upon, and I feel that you are a man of character and will see justice as it is and try to rectify some of the wrongs that might have been committed by some of the Caucasian personnel.

We are depending on you and would like to say that we would like to get these answers or questions clarified for answer just as soon as possible, because the people are waiting and the sooner we can give them the facts, the sooner these problems will be dissolved and we will have a peaceful center that much quicker.

Mr. MYER. First, gentlemen, it will not be possible to give you answers to all these questions this afternoon. Thank you very much for the compliment. We will try to operate on the basis of justice, and I want to repeat that I don't want any misunderstanding on that. Mr. Best has checked with me on policy every time. People do things that we don't always know about, both among the evacuees and the administrative staff. I am very much obliged to you and I hope that you

will remember that we cannot operate on the basis of demands, and the sooner we understand that, the better we will be getting along. We will operate on that basis, of sitting down with you folks as we have this afternoon.

Mr. KURATOMI. Will it be all right for us to report to the people?

Mr. BEST. You are reporting to your people? I don't know what you want to say to your people.

Mr. KURATOMI. Mr. Myer, will you say a few words?

Mr. MYER. I would be glad to say hello to your folks, if you want me to.

I will tell them in summary what I have told you. I will be very glad to tell them.



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REPORT
No. 717

REPORT AND MINORITY VIEWS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES ON JAPANESE WAR RELOCATION CENTERS

SEPTEMBER 30, 1943.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union and ordered to be printed.

Mr. COSTELLO, from the Special Committee on Un-American Activities, submitted the following

REPORT

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WAR RELOCATION CENTERS

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, considerable fear was rife among the residents on the west coast of the United States, where approximately 120,000 citizens of Japanese ancestry and Japanese nationals had concentrated. Because of this situation and particularly for military reasons, General DeWitt, commanding general of the Western Defense Command, early in 1942 ordered the evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry, United States citizens and aliens alike, from certain areas of the west coast.

The evacuation was first put on a voluntary basis and some 8,000 persons of Japanese ancestry removed themselves into the interior of the United States. However, this procedure proved to be ineffective and as a consequence on March 29, 1942, the voluntary evacuation was abandoned and a freezing order was issued by the commanding general of the Western Defense Command, which in effect held all persons of Japanese ancestry within the affected zones until some orderly procedure could be drawn up which would bring about the complete removal of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the military area of the west coast.

Meanwhile the War Relocation Authority was established on March 18, 1942, by Executive Order No. 9102, to carry out the evacuation and to care for the evacuees. This agency proceeded to construct 10 relocation centers in the following places: Colorado River relocation center, Poston, Ariz.; Gila River relocation center, Rivers, Ariz.; Manzanar relocation center, Manzanar, Calif.; Tule Lake relocation center, Newell, Calif.; Minidoka relocation center, Hunt, Idaho; Central Utah relocation center, Topaz, Utah; Heart Mountain relocation center, Heart Mountain, Wyo.; Granada relocation center,

Amache, Colo.; Rohwer relocation center, Relocation, Ark.; Jerome relocation center, Denson, Ark.

Following the issuance of the freezing order, all Japanese were removed to temporary assembly centers and from there were sent to the various relocation centers. The removal to the Relocation Centers began in May of 1942. Approximately 106,000 persons of Japanese ancestry were evacuated to the various centers.

THE COMMITTEE'S INVESTIGATION

From the second year of its work (1939) down to the present time, the Special Committee on Un-American Activities has carried on a continuous investigation of subversive and un-American activities among the Japanese who are resident in the United States.

Previous committee reports have dealt with many phases of the question of Japanese subversive activities. At the end of 1940 the committee issued a special report dealing with totalitarian propaganda in the United States which revealed that many tons of Axis propaganda were being unloaded from Japanese steamships docking at ports on the west coast of the United States. This report led to immediate action by the Post Office Department which ordered that all such propaganda material be seized on its arrival in this country. Early in 1942 the committee issued a special report which showed that numerous Japanese organizations operating in this country were fronts for the Japanese Government and that numerous members of these organizations were engaged in espionage for the Tokyo Government.

The present report reflects the current stage of the committee's continuing work on the question of the subversive and un-American activities of Japanese who are resident in the United States. The report deals primarily with Japanese subversive activities within the war relocation centers and with the possible release of dangerous Japanese agents of espionage from these centers.

During the latter part of 1942 and the first half of the present year, the committee received numerous complaints from citizens and organizations on the west coast and in Western States concerning the handling and release of the Japanese by the War Relocation Authority. The committee also received requests from Members of Congress and from State authorities of the affected areas to make an investigation of the relocation centers.

Early in May 1943 a member of this committee, Hon. J. Parnell Thomas of New Jersey, went to Los Angeles, Calif., and conferred with State authorities, various citizens, and groups, and reported back to the committee that he felt the Japanese situation and the administration of the War Relocation Authority needed an immediate and thorough investigation. He called upon the President to halt the then existing policy of the War Relocation Authority which called for the release of approximately 1,000 evacuees per week for resettlement throughout the country.

Pursuant to the recommendation of Congressman Thomas and at the request of Congressman Costello, a member of this committee, and a Representative in the House from the Los Angeles district, which is vitally affected by the Japanese problem, the committee ordered an investigation of the various relocation centers and detailed investigators to go to the centers and conduct an investigation.

The charges which appeared in the numerous complaints received by the committee and which were reflected in the preliminary investigations of the committee's agents were as follows:

1. That Japanese were being released at the rate of 1,000 a week and that it was very possible that among those released were some whose allegiance had been pledged to the Japanese Government.
2. That there were thousands of Japanese in the relocation centers who had openly expressed their loyalty to Japan and had requested repatriation.
3. That 24 percent of the evacuees of draft age (17 to 38 years of age) had stated on the questionnaire circulated among them by the Army that they were not loyal to the United States but held their sole allegiance to the Emperor of Japan.
4. That the loyal and disloyal Japanese were intermingled without any semblance of segregation, and were receiving the same treatment in the way of accommodations, food, etc.
5. That the Japanese evacuees were being supplied food through the Quartermaster Corps of the Army in greater variety and quantity than was available to the average American consumer.
6. That the discipline in the various relocation centers was very lax, and that considerable Government property had been destroyed by some of the Japanese.

The foregoing charges, which were embodied in complaints received by the committee and which grew out of preliminary investigations, were made the basis for a more thorough and formal investigation. On June 3, 1943, the chairman of the Special Committee on Un-American Activities appointed a subcommittee to conduct an investigation into these charges and make a report of its findings. The subcommittee was composed of John M. Costello, of California, chairman, Herman P. Eberharter, of Pennsylvania, and Karl E. Mundt, of South Dakota.

The subcommittee left almost immediately for California. From June 8 to June 17 the subcommittee held hearings in Los Angeles where it took more than 1,000 pages of testimony, principally from men who were then or had been recently on the administrative staffs of the relocation centers. On June 18 the subcommittee held hearings in Parker, Ariz., near the Poston Relocation Center. From July 1 to July 9 the subcommittee held its hearings in Washington, D. C., at which the principal witness was Dillon S. Myer, Director of the War Relocation Authority. Also among the witnesses in Washington were former officials of the Japanese American Citizens League whose Washington files the committee had obtained by subpoena on June 11, 1943. The committee also heard in executive session representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, and the War Department.

ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS OF THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

This committee does not consider it necessary to discuss in detail the administrative errors and deficiencies of the War Relocation Authority which were indicated by voluminous evidence received in the course of the subcommittee's hearings. The Director of the War Relocation Authority, Dillon S. Myer, was frank in admitting that many mistakes had been made. Only those administrative errors which bear directly or indirectly upon the subject of subversive and un-American activities come within the special interest of this committee.

The fitness of much of the personnel of the War Relocation Authority for its highly specialized task has been opened to serious question by the evidence which the committee has received. The committee

is convinced that this manifest unfitness may account in large part, or even entirely, for the errors of administration which involve the subject of subversive and un-American activities.

LACK OF JAPANESE EXPERTS IN WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Out of an administrative personnel of the War Relocation Authority which numbers approximately 2,500 persons, an absolutely negligible percentage seems to have been qualified for their positions by any knowledge, even elementary, of the language, culture, and ways of the Japanese. The Director of the War Relocation Authority himself appears to be typical of this total neglect to enlist an administrative personnel which possessed any degree of expertness or experience which would qualify them to handle 106,000 persons of Japanese ancestry. Mr. Myer had a record of 28 years as an expert in agriculture when he was called upon to administer the delicate, admittedly onerous, and largest mass resettlement program ever carried out by any government. It is apparent from the testimony given before the subcommittee that few, if any, among the administrative personnel of the War Relocation Authority had ever so much as read a book on the Japanese before they undertook their heavy responsibilities for dealing with this racial group. Certainly there exists within the War Relocation Authority a complete lack of familiarity with the subversive Japanese organizations or even with the general techniques of subversion.

SEGREGATION

When Mr. Myer was before the subcommittee, he stated that a program of segregating the disloyal from the loyal Japanese was to be inaugurated at an early date. While the committee heartily approves this announcement and earnestly hopes that it will be given speedy effect, it is impossible for us to excuse the delay in adopting a policy of segregation. The committee further notes that the War Relocation Authority's announcement of a segregation policy came after the United States Senate adopted a resolution requiring such segregation, and after the subcommittee of this committee had held public hearings which revealed the urgent need for segregation.

The committee is forced to conclude, on the basis of all the evidence before it, that the War Relocation Authority has been extremely dilatory in the matter of segregating the disloyal elements in the centers from those who are loyal Nisei or law-abiding Issei.

MR. EMPIE ON SEGREGATION

On June 9, 1943, in Los Angeles, the subcommittee heard the testimony of Augustus W. Empie, chief administrative officer, Colorado River War relocation project (Poston), near Parker, Ariz. Mr. Empie is in charge of personnel, communications division, supply and transportation division, procurement division, fiscal division, mails and files divisions, and has general supervision over the chief steward's office.

Mr. Empie's testimony brought out the fact that it was his opinion that much of the trouble at Poston could be attributed to the failure to segregate the loyal from the disloyal Japanese, and he was questioned specifically in this regard.

Mr. MUNDT. That was the next thing I was going to ask you about. I was going to ask you if you didn't feel that the fact you haven't segregated the bad fellows from the good ones has had a bad effect on the Japanese who might be inclined to work?

Mr. EMPIE. Absolutely. I think that is the first and foremost problem the War Relocation Authority should have attacked and solved immediately—they should have arranged immediately to get these people out.

GANGS AT MANZANAR

As an example, the need for segregation was long ago strikingly evident as a result of the operation of criminal and subversive gangs in the relocation center at Manzanar (Calif.).

Tokutaro Slocum, one of the few Japanese ever to be made a citizen of the United States by an act of Congress, was called as a witness before our subcommittee. Slocum was one of the evacuees who lived at Manzanar. When asked if he had gained any information concerning "organized groups of a secret character working in Camp Manzanar," Slocum replied:

Well, sir, I was a special investigator there, or inspector there, so it was my duty to obtain all this information and report that to the duly constituted authorities, so I happened to come across most of them, and many of them I would say were Blood Brothers, Black Dragon, the Dunbar Corps, or Dunbar Gang, and the San Pedro Yogores.

Slocum then testified concerning the methods of intimidation and terrorization which were employed by these gangs at Manzanar.

Slocum's testimony was completely substantiated by confidential reports which the subcommittee obtained by subpoena. The following are excerpts from those reports:

Now, with more leisure time, dormant forces are beginning to create disturbances. What has seemingly appeared to most Caucasian administrators as a placid community life in reality covered a cauldron in which differing ideologies, unmixable as oil and water, seethed and boiled. Surface indications of this internal strife have appeared from time to time. However, center officials have usually dismissed these symptoms with an academic leniency.

The real threat to peace and order within the centers will not come from individual lawlessness. The bombshell that will shatter these communities will be the blow-off of (1) accumulated resentments, (2) harbored injustices, (3) racial discriminations, (4) pro-Japan convictions, and (5) real and fancied grievances. As time goes on, rather than a settling process, mob outbreaks, mass demonstrations, gang atrocities, and acts of terrorism will recur frequently.

War Relocation Authority administrators must realize the dynamite they are dealing with; they must be realistic; they must not encourage the mushrooming of small incidents by condoning with official laxity; individuals advocating constructive attitudes and activities must be shielded from vengeful harm; deleterious elements in each camp must be recognized and intelligent yet stern methods must be instituted to curb them.

* * * * *

Numerically this pro-Japan element is small, but the damage their insidious propaganda can do to the peace and order of the community should not be too lightly regarded.

* * * * *

Internal security should be exactly what its title connotes. Reports issuing from some centers indicate that security of life and limb for those bespeaking constructive attitudes does not exist. On the other hand, malefactors have been so condoned that their nefarious beatings of decent citizens continues not only unabated but with increasing frequency.

* * * * *

Manzanar gangdom is usually identified by the people as one of three groups: (1) Terminal Islanders, known also as Yogores, or the San Pedro Gang, (2) the Dunbar Gang, (3) The Blood Brothers Corps, known also as Yuho Keshshidan.

* * * * *

THE BLOOD BROTHERS CORPS

This appears to be an underground movement political in nature. Unlike the San Pedro Gang or the Dunbar Gang, no member of this group has come out into the open and acknowledged himself as a Blood Brother.

* * * * *

On Friday and Saturday, November 6 and 7, the members of the Manzanar commission on self-government received letters via mail from the Blood Brothers. The following 17 persons, comprising the commission, were recipients: Frank Chuman, Dr. James M. Goto, Jack Iwata, Rev. J. A. Kashitani, Mrs. Niya Kikuchi, Choyoi Kondo, Joe Masaoka, Miss Chiye Mori, Rev. Shingo Nagatomi, Frederick Ogura, Togo Tanaka, Walter Watanabe, Frank Yasuda, Sho Onodera, Roy Tashimi, Kiyoshi Higashi, Tom Imai.

There were two sets of letters, both in Japanese, apparently written by two different persons.

Following is a literal translation of the shorter of the two letters:

"Think of the shame the American Government has put us into. Think of the disruption of properties and the imprisonment of the Nisei.

"To start a self-government system now is nothing but a dirty selfish scheme. As the Army put us in here without regard to our own will, we should leave everything up to the Army, whether they want to kill us or eat us.

"Because this is the only way the American Government can think of as a means of absolving itself from the blame of misconducting its affairs, the Government thought of a bad scheme, that is, this formation of the self-government system.

"The hairy beasts (white) are out to actually run the Government, while using you people who can be used. It is evident if you read article I of the charter, and can be proved by the facts of the past. You fellows who are acting blindly are big fools.

"If you do such things as those, which tighten the noose around the necks of your fellow people, some day you will receive punishment from Heaven, so beware.

"BLOOD BROTHERS CORPS WHICH
WORRY FOR THEIR FELLOW PEOPLE."

* * * * *

Following is a translation of the longer of the two letters: (Both translations by Akira Dave Itami of the Information Office.)

"Calling you fools who are running around trying to set up a self-government system.

"Think back. The fact that the positions, the properties, and the honor which our fellow Japanese built up and won by blood and sweat during the past 50 years have all been stamped and sacrificed by the arrogant and insulting American Government after we have been put into this isolated spot.

"For what are you beating around? What use is there for establishing self-government? Especially with such a charter so full of contradictions? Although we are ignorant people, we can foresee the tragic results which will come out of this self-government.

"Remember that the majority of our people are absolutely against the self-government system. What do you think of the fact that 6 months ago, in Santa Anita, the same attempt which you are now trying, was made, to organize a self-government, but it broke down before it materialized.

"Leave everything completely as the Army pleases. If you nincompoops realize the fact that you are Japanese, why don't you assume the honorable attitude which is typical of Japanese? What a shameful sight you are about to present by being fooled by the sweet words of the Government. By so doing, you are inviting suffering to your fellow Japanese.

"We fellow Japanese are all like fish laid on the cutting board, about to be sliced. To jump around at this stage is a cowardly thing to do. Better lay down and let the Government do as it pleases, either cook us or fry us.

"You should remain calm and conduct yourselves like nationals of a first-class power. Give more thoughts and deep reflections as to your attitude.

"BLOOD BROTHERS CORPS WHICH IS
CONCERNED OVER FELLOW NATIONALS"

* * * * *

THE LOYALTY QUESTION

The great need for a determined policy of segregation was amply indicated by the answers to the loyalty question contained in the Army questionnaire which was filled out by the Japanese in the relocation centers in February of the present year. An alarming proportion of Japanese American citizens of draft age (17 to 38), frankly refused to declare their loyalty to the United States.

The loyalty question read as follows:

Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and faithfully defend the United States from any or all attack by foreign or domestic foes and forswear any form of allegiance to the Japanese Emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or organization?

The following tabulation presents in the most simplified form possible the extent to which the Japanese-American citizens of draft age declared their loyalty to the United States:

Relocation center	Number registered	Number answering "No" to loyalty question	Number volunteers
Central Utah.....	2,420	806	116
Colorado River.....	3,355	671	238
Gila River.....	2,488	547	119
Granada.....	1,117	117	121
Heart Mountain.....	1,881	451	47
Jerome.....	1,341	110	33
Manzanar.....	1,826	913	101
Minidoka.....	1,607	32	310
Rohwer.....	1,585	306	37
Tule Lake.....	2,342	836	59
Total.....	19,963	4,783	1,181
Average, percent.....		24	6

The committee reiterates its conclusion that there was an alarming proportion of the Japanese-American citizens of draft age to avow their unqualified loyalty to this country. From the foregoing tabulation, it is apparent that avowed disloyalty reached the high percentage of 24.

A more complete break-down of the answers to the loyalty question is given in the following tabulation:

Relocation center	Total eligible to register	Total registered	Total accounted for	Yes	Non-affirmative answers	No reply	Yes (percent)	Non-affirmative answers (percent)	No reply (percent)
Central Utah:									
Hawaii.....	163	163	163	25	138	0	15.3	84.7	0
United States.....	1,477	1,477	1,477	1,015	462	0	68.7	31.3	0
Colorado River.....	3,405	3,405	3,211	2,601	596	14	81.0	18.6	.4
Gila River.....	2,630	2,588	2,502	1,599	901	2	63.9	36.0	.1
Granada.....	1,342	1,342	1,254	1,222	27	5	97.4	2.2	.4
Heart Mountain.....	1,964	1,963	1,963	1,609	253	101	82.0	12.9	5.1
Jerome.....	1,592	1,591	1,385	895	417	73	64.6	30.1	5.3
Manzanar.....	1,909	1,909	1,885	921	960	4	48.9	50.9	.2
Minidoka.....	1,629	1,603	1,580	1,497	61	22	94.7	3.9	1.4
Rohwer.....	1,608	1,608	1,410	1,150	252	8	81.5	17.9	.6
Tule Lake.....	2,960	2,330	2,274	1,489	783	2	65.5	34.4	.1
Total.....	20,679	19,979	19,104	14,023	4,850	231	73.4	25.4	1.2

The foregoing tabulation indicates that disloyalty among those of draft age at the Manzanar center was in excess of 50 percent. The committee is of the opinion that such a result obtained from the questionnaire called for immediate separation of the disloyal from the loyal, and is at a loss to understand the reasoning of the War Relocation Authority which prompted its inaction in so important a matter.

PRESERVATION AND PROMOTION OF JAPANESE CULTURAL TIES

Indicative of the same type of negligence which caused the War Relocation Authority to fail to adopt prompt and drastic measures of segregation in the centers, was the Authority's callous promotion of cultural ties with Japan.

Mr. Myer admitted in his testimony before the subcommittee that at one time the War Relocation Authority was paying at least 90 instructors in Judo at a single center. Judo is a distinctively Japanese cultural phenomenon. It is more than an athletic exercise. By the employment of 90 instructors at one center, the Authority was obviously promoting Judo among Japanese-Americans who did not already know it. Various other forms of so-called recreation which could only have the effect of a tie-back to Japan were likewise promoted in the centers and their promotion was paid for out of the War Relocation Authority's funds which come ultimately from the taxpayers of this country. The same is true of instruction in the Japanese language. It is one thing for the Government to give instruction in the Japanese language to those who, the Government has reason to believe, will shortly utilize that instruction in some intelligence agency. It is a totally different thing to post notices on the bulletin boards of the centers that one and all may enroll in courses in the Japanese language. American citizens are citizens regardless of their ancestry, and there is no possible justification whatever for a program which goes out of its way to stimulate the interest of an American citizen in the culture of a foreign country from which that citizen has presumably been completely separated by the very fact of his American citizenship.

Every fact adduced in evidence before the subcommittee indicated that the War Relocation Authority had before it an almost unparalleled opportunity to inaugurate a vigorous educational program for positive Americanism. At the same time, the committee is unable to arrive at any other conclusion than that the Authority treated this opportunity with the most reprehensible indifference. And not only that, but the Authority proceeded to make outlays of funds for the express purpose of forcibly reminding the residents of the centers that they stemmed from Japan, whereas the loyal at least should have been encouraged by every possible means to regard themselves as Americans and Americans only.

NORTH AMERICAN MILITARY VIRTUE SOCIETY (BUTOKU-KAI)

This committee has made an exhaustive study of the Japanese organization known as the Butoku-kai. It must assume that the War Relocation Authority has done the same or has at least availed itself of the information on the Butoku-kai in the files of the intelligence agencies. Among other highly important items of evidence bearing

upon the organization, the committee has obtained the names of several thousand members of the Butoku-kai from its own records.

There is no doubt whatever in the minds of any competent authorities, including all of the intelligence agencies of the United States Government, that the Butoku-kai is a subversive organization. The representative of the joint Japanese-American board who testified before the subcommittee stated that his board so regarded the Butoku-kai and that any Japanese evacuee in the relocation centers who was a member of the organization should be considered ineligible for release from the centers. This committee concurs completely in that view.

While it is overwhelmingly evident that the Butoku-kai is of a subversive character, it is extremely doubtful that the War Relocation Authority so considers it. This conclusion is borne out by the fact that the War Relocation Authority has approved the release of evacuees who have been members of the Butoku-kai.

The subcommittee submitted a list of the names of some of the members of the Butoku-kai to the Director of the War Relocation Authority with the request that he make a check to ascertain whether or not any of them had been released from the centers. Out of a possible 215 names which the War Relocation Authority was able to identify, 23 have been released by the Authority.

The committee does not allege that all of these 23 members of the Butoku-kai will proceed to use their freedom to commit acts of sabotage or espionage. The committee does hold, however, that the release of these 23 Japanese is evidence of the incompetence of the War Relocation Authority to exercise proper safeguards both for the national security and for the thousands of loyal Japanese as well.

The committee offers a brief summary of the evidence of the subversive character of the Butoku-kai to substantiate its conclusion that the War Relocation Authority has been negligent or incompetent in the performance of its duties.

The Butoku-kai had approximately 60 branches in the United States prior to Pearl Harbor. About 50 of these were in the State of California. Approximately 10,000 Nisei (American citizens of Japanese ancestry) were members of the Butoku-kai in this country.

The investigations of the Special Committee on Un-American Activities have established the following additional facts concerning the Butoku-kai:

1. Butoku-kai was the youth section of the Black Dragon Society of Japan.

2. Mitsuru Toyama, head of the Black Dragon Society in Japan, was adviser to the Butoku-kai in the United States.

3. The declared purpose of the Butoku-kai in this country was "To enhance the spirit of Japanese military virtue, to guide the citizens of Japanese ancestry, and to encourage physical culture."

4. The instructors who were engaged to teach the military arts to the Nisei in the United States under the banner of the Butoku-kai came to this country from Japan, and were principally Japanese Army and Navy men. However, local priests of both the Shinto and the Buddhist cults acted as instructors.

5. Butoku-kai was imported into the United States by one Tekichi Nakamura, who arrived here from Hawaii on September 27, 1929.

Nakamura came to the United States in the guise of a Korean, but later dropped that pretense. Nakamura began immediately to enroll Nisei in his organization and to give them instruction in swordsmanship.

6. In his youth, Nakamura operated as a bandit in Manchuria.

7. Immediately prior to his coming to the United States, Nakamura was received at the Yokosuka naval base by Kurozaki of the Japanese Navy who gave him the following commission:

Here comes the very messenger I desire. In the course of my military duties I have often been to America and have had familiar chats with our brethren on the coast there. Though they know something about the joys and sorrows of parents and guardians, I learned by discussion of all their joys and sorrows, the problem filling their hearts was about the rearing of the second generation (Nisei). * * * So, if you are going to America, how are you going to instruct and nourish the young people of Japanese lineage there? Put your mind on this problem first of all—and open out some good way for us.

8. On a return visit to Japan in 1931, Nakamura gained as patrons for his work in the United States General Suzuki, General Araki, and Admiral Kato. He returned to the United States in July 1931.

9. Shortly afterward, Nakamura—this teacher and leader of 10,000 Nisei in the United States—went once more to Japan, taking with him a party of 14. He and his party were received by Government officials at Yokohama and then proceeded to Tokyo where they worshiped at the imperial palace.

10. In 1933 Nakamura again went to Japan, taking with him a party of 14 Nisei. They again worshiped at the imperial palace in Tokyo and were received by all the Cabinet Ministers and by Admiral Togo. One of the members of Nakamura's party made a speech at a great public reception in which she (a Nisei) declared:

We, in whose veins flows the blood of the valiant Japanese people, must throw off the American atmosphere and learn the spirit of Japan's way of the warrior.

11. At Kyoto, ancient capital of Japan, Nakamura and his party of Nisei were received by Prince Nashimoto, himself a high official of the Butoku-kai in Japan, who declared to Nakamura: "Go on laboring still more for the sake of our country." The party returned to the United States in September.

12. In 1934, when the Butoku-kai held a national meeting at San Francisco, the Japanese consul general declined an invitation to address the meeting on the ground that he wished to "avoid rousing sleeping dogs."

13. In one of his latest reports, Nakamura boasted the following:

Thus the North American Butoku-kai has prepared firm fundamental organizations. By means of the discipline of swordsmanship, the Nisei have awakened to the Japan spirit.

14. When Nakamura sought to reenter the United States after his fourth journey back to Japan, he was detained by the immigration authorities at Angel Island for a period of 4 months and was then admitted after intervention on his behalf by the Tokyo government, Ambassador Saito, and numerous followers in the Butoku-kai.

15. Nakamura raised funds in the United States for the establishment of the North American College of the Imperial Way at Tokyo. The primary purpose of the college was for the instruction of Nisei sent from the United States. The college was formally opened on July 10, 1938.

16. The list of sponsors of the North American College of the Imperial Way included Mitsuru Toyama, head of the Black Dragon Society of Japan, 10 admirals of the Japanese Navy, 21 generals of the Japanese Army, and 82 prominent figures of the Japanese political world. The Special Committee on Un-American Activities has the names of all these sponsors.

17. In 1935, Consul Tomokazu Hori became president of the Los Angeles Butoku-kai. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hori made daily broadcasts from Japan. On his short-wave broadcast of April 23, 1943, Hori gloated over the execution of the American flyers who were captured after the Doolittle raid.

18. The president of the Seattle branch of Butoku-kai wrote the following:

If anything were to bring about the paralysis of our national character which has come down to us from our ancestors, or if we were to lose our Japanese spirit and morale, not only would the state of our country become precarious but it would meet the fate of utter destruction. This is as clear as day. Therefore we Japanese, whether at home or beyond the seas, without distinction, must polish up our Bushido spirit which is our own traditional nature. We should foster this with enterprising energy. At present our Empire is facing a crisis against the proud and unruly sword of China—for the purpose of creating a hundred years of peace in the Orient.

19. At a meeting of the Oregon branch of Butoku-kai in 1937, there was, according to the organization's own report, "silent prayer for the success of the Imperial Army," and at its conclusion "three banzais for the fall of Shanghai."

20. The Butoku-kai's official history of the Seattle branch states that there was a special demonstration in the White River district where a Japanese flag autographed by Mitsuru Toyama was presented to the Sumner branch of Butoku-kai. Toyama, it will be remembered, is the head of the Black Dragon Society of Japan.

21. The leader of the Seattle branch of Butoku-kai wrote as follows:

Your problem, however, is much more intricate because you have as your parents subjects of our Japanese Empire which is struggling for the top rank amongst the great powers of the world. * * *

I pointed out that the causes of Japan's foreign wars were unavoidable on account of the foreign races, but America's wars were based on her own ambition—so that there was a great difference between them.

BRANCHES OF THE BUTOKU-KAI

The committee was able to locate the locations or names of the following branches of the Butoku-kai:

Hawaii (Honolulu branch)	Bakersfield	Madera
Ono	Dominguez Hill	Fresno
Watsonville	Coast League	Reedley
Campbell	San Joaquin	Visalia
Sebastopol	Northwest League	Delano
Baggerville	Main office of Friends of Swordsmanship Society, Sumner	Livingston
Loomis	Concord	San Pedro
Oban	Monterey	Long Beach
Florin	Salinas	Norwalk
Lodi	Suisun	Seattle
Viola	Sacramento	White River
Farrar	Marysville	Tacoma
Dinuba	Taisho Division	Portland
Hanford	Stockton	South Park
Lindsay		

RELEASE AND RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM OF THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

The steady release since July 1942 of the Japanese from the relocation centers by the War Relocation Authority, to resettle and relocate in various sections of the United States, has given rise to considerable anxiety among the people of certain sections of the Nation. This anxiety has resulted from doubts as to the loyalty of the evacuees who are being released. It is this phase of the War Relocation Authority's program with which the committee is most concerned, for we feel that if this program of mass release is to continue it is imperative that the proper investigative machinery be set up to assure the citizens of this country that every person who is released from a relocation center has been thoroughly investigated and cleared as to loyalty by a competent and qualified board or agency charged directly with that responsibility. The release and resettlement program of the War Relocation Authority, in the opinion of this committee, has been very unsatisfactory, primarily for the reason that no thorough investigation by the proper authorities has been made of those evacuees who have been released, and, furthermore, if the present program of the War Relocation Authority is continued there is little hope that any such investigation will be made in the future.

The War Relocation Authority issues three types of leave:

1. Indefinite leave, which permits evacuees to leave the relocation centers after they have made arrangements for employment outside. There are no limitations placed upon them except to abide by the law and to remain outside of military areas from which they are excluded by military orders.
2. Short-term leave, which permits an evacuee to leave the relocation area for a limited period of time, not to exceed 30 days, to attend to affairs which require his presence or to interview a prospective employer, etc.
3. Seasonal work leave, which permits an evacuee to go to a particular locality to accept seasonal employment, such as work in beet fields, etc.

On July 6, 1943, Mr. Dillon Myer, Director of the War Relocation Authority, testified that as of July 3, 1943, there were 15,305 evacuees on seasonal and indefinite leave, 9,359 of which were out on indefinite leave and the remainder on seasonal leave, working largely in the agriculture fields and irrigated areas of the Midmountain and Western States. Mr. Myer told the committee that the War Relocation Authority was now in the midst of an intensive program of resettlement, and that they had been releasing approximately 500 evacuees a week on seasonal leave and 500 a week on indefinite leave, or a total of approximately 1,000 per week. He testified further that included in the group being released on indefinite leave were Kibei (born in the United States and educated in Japan), Issei (Japanese nationals) and Nisei (American citizens of Japanese ancestry). He stated that 15 percent of those being released for indefinite leave were Issei.

The leave and resettlement program of War Relocation Authority was first inaugurated July 20, 1942, by the issuance of administrative instruction No. 22 which permitted indefinite leave to citizens only. This program remained in effect until October 6, 1942, when the leave regulations were changed to permit citizens and aliens alike to apply for indefinite leave.

During this period, applicants for indefinite leave were subject to only two loyalty checks or investigations: (1) Home check; (2) name check against the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other intelligence agencies' records. In addition, their applications had to be approved by the Washington office of the War Relocation Authority. The home check was conducted by the War Relocation Authority and consisted of communicating with former employers, neighbors, and friends of the subject. In the case of the Federal Bureau of Investigation name check, the name of the subject was submitted to the Bureau which in turn ran the name against its records. This did not include a fingerprint check and the subject was not investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. If this check revealed any information it was transmitted to the War Relocation Authority for its information and guidance and without recommendation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

NO F. B. I. INVESTIGATION

The committee at this point would like to emphasize that at no time has the Federal Bureau of Investigation investigated the evacuees who were released for indefinite leave although this is the general impression throughout the country. This false impression in some measure was brought about by an erroneous statement made by an official of the War Relocation Authority to the effect that all evacuees who were released for indefinite leave had been investigated and cleared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This was later denied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the War Relocation Authority.

On April 2, the War Relocation Authority further liberalized its release program by eliminating the Federal Bureau of Investigation name check and the home check. Under the present program established by supplement 9 of Administrative Instruction No. 22, the project directors of the various relocation centers themselves can make their own determination (with certain limitations) as to the release for indefinite leave of an evacuee. In other words, the only check now in effect by the War Relocation Authority is the investigation made by the project director himself which is largely a questionnaire investigation and it is entirely within his discretion as to who will be released.

When Mr. Myer was before the subcommittee, he stated that all Nisei evacuees who were released would eventually be checked by the Japanese American Joint Board, which is composed of representatives of the Army, Navy, War Relocation Authority, and for a time, a liaison representative from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The subcommittee heard in executive session the officials of this Board and it was determined that the Japanese American Joint Board exercises no jurisdiction or authority over the War Relocation Authority except in the case where an evacuee is released for employment in a vital war plant or where the evacuee is to go into the eastern military area or southern military areas. The Federal Bureau of Investigation withdrew its liaison representative from the Board for the reason that the Board had no authority over the release program of the War Relocation Authority and could not enforce its decisions as to the loyalty or disloyalty of an evacuee upon the War Relocation Authority.

During the past week, hundreds of applications for indefinite leave have been submitted to the Civil Service Commission by

The Japanese American Joint Board was established by the War Department primarily to determine how many of the 38,000 citizen evacuees (Nisei) between the ages of 17 and 38 could be utilized in the Army or in vital war plants or in other employment in which they could assist the general war effort. In conjunction with this program, the Army set up a Japanese combat unit located at Camp Shelby, Miss., which now has an enlistment of approximately 7,000 Japanese American citizen soldiers. This Joint Board set out to determine the loyalty and qualifications of the 38,000 registrants. As previously stated, the committee heard in executive session the officials of this Board and we were very favorably impressed with the thorough job of investigation and classification which they are doing. However, the Board's authority does not extend far enough to permit it to exercise its authority over the entire release program of the War Relocation Authority. Within the next several months, according to the officials of the Board, it will have completed its investigation or screening process of the entire 38,000 evacuees. But during this period, under the present policy of the War Relocation Authority, it is possible that thousands of evacuees will be released without having been screened or investigated by the Joint Board. For this reason it is necessary that a new board with complete authority over the War Relocation Authority's release program be set up immediately or such authority be delegated to the Japanese American Joint Board.

SEASONAL LEAVE

During 1942 there was no check made against evacuees who were released for seasonal leave. However, this was changed late in 1942, and at the present time evacuees released for seasonal leave receive the same check as those who apply for indefinite leave. Mr. Myer told the subcommittee that many of the evacuees who left on seasonal leave found homes and steady employment and, therefore, applied for and obtained indefinite leave without having to return to the relocation center.

The committee is definitely of the opinion that the present release procedures of the War Relocation Authority are entirely too loose and it cannot be too emphatic in its recommendation for the immediate establishment of a competent and qualified board of agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Naval Intelligence, Military Intelligence, War Relocation Authority, and other pertinent agencies which would pass on every application for leave and with full authority to enforce its decisions. By such a procedure the people and the country generally and the communities where the evacuees are relocating would be assured that there was no question concerning the loyalty of these people. It would, therefore, relieve the released evacuees of any stigma of disloyalty and would at the same time bring about a more compatible degree of community acceptance for the evacuees.

AN INDEFENSIBLE RELEASE PROCEDURE

The War Relocation Authority, through its employment and re-settlement division, has recently set up a plan to place hundreds of Nisei in civil-service employment of the Federal Government. During the past few weeks hundreds of applications from Nisei evacuees have been submitted to the Civil Service Commission by

the War Relocation Authority. As is well known, the Civil Service Commission has always conducted a very thorough investigation of all applicants for Government positions with particular emphasis on the subject's loyalty. Such an investigation requires time and personnel.

Due to the peculiar nature of the Nisei cases which are now being submitted to the Civil Service by the War Relocation Authority, the committee believes that an even more thorough investigation should be conducted of these applicants. Yet War Relocation Authority officials, in their enthusiasm to relocate these people, are themselves now apparently seeking to have the Civil Service accept the War Relocation Authority's own assurances as sufficient to establish a subject's loyalty. To substantiate this, the committee includes in this report at this point a letter dated May 26, 1943, addressed to the Director of the Seventh Region of the United States Civil Service Commission, Chicago, Ill., from Elmer L. Shirrell, Relocation Supervisor of the War Relocation Authority.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY,
Chicago, Ill., May 26, 1943.

DIRECTOR, SEVENTH REGION,
United States Civil Service Commission,
Chicago, Ill.

(Attention: Mrs. Klieger.)

DEAR SIR: * * * now residing at * * *, Chicago, Ill., and whose application for Federal civil-service employment is attached, has been given indefinite leave from the Granada relocation center. The fact that she has been given this leave is evidence that she has been thoroughly investigated and has been found loyal to the United States. The War Relocation Authority approves her placement in any city in Illinois or Wisconsin as these two States have been determined to be safe places for private and public employment for Americans of Japanese ancestry.

We will appreciate whatever assistance you can give in placing * * *.
Very truly yours,

ELMER L. SHIRRELL,
Relocation Supervisor.

Particular reference is directed to the following language contained in this letter:

The fact that she has been given this leave is evidence that she has been thoroughly investigated and has been found loyal to the United States. The War Relocation Authority approves her placement in any city in Illinois or Wisconsin
* * *

According to the present procedure of the War Relocation Authority, the only investigation which was made to determine this party's loyalty was the so-called questionnaire investigation made by the project director of the Granada relocation center.

The committee would like to emphasize that no Federal Bureau of Investigation "name check" or War Relocation Authority "home check" was made of this applicant. Nevertheless, an official of the War Relocation Authority certified to the Civil Service Commission that a thorough investigation had been made and the applicant was found to be loyal to the United States.

It is to just this type of loose and dangerous procedure on the part of the War Relocation Authority officials that this committee takes exception. The civil-service agents who are checking these applicants against the files of this committee have already determined that some of these applicants were members of and affiliated with organizations

which were completely under the domination of the Japanese Government and so considered by every other investigative agency of this Government.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This committee recommends the following:

1. That the War Relocation Authority's belated announcement of its intention of segregating the disloyal from the loyal Japanese in the relocation centers be put into effect at the earliest possible moment.
2. That a board composed of representatives of the War Relocation Authority and the various intelligence agencies of the Federal Government be constituted with full powers to investigate evacuees who apply for release from the centers and to pass finally upon their applications.
3. That the War Relocation Authority inaugurate a thorough-going program of Americanization for those Japanese who remain in the centers.

MARTIN DIES, *Chairman*,
 JOE STARNES,
 JOHN M. COSTELLO,
 NOAH M. MASON,
 J. PARNELL THOMAS,
 KARL E. MUNDT.

MINORITY VIEWS OF THE HONORABLE HERMAN P. EBERHARTER

It is not possible for me to agree with the findings and conclusions of the other two members of our subcommittee, who constitute the majority.

After careful consideration, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the report of the majority is prejudiced, and that most of its statements are not proven.

The majority report has stressed a few shortcomings that they have found in the work of the War Relocation Authority without mentioning the many good points that our investigation has disclosed or the magnitude of the job with which the Authority is dealing.

Since the close of our hearings I have made some inquiries in order to clear up some points about which I was in doubt and on which the testimony did not seem to be sufficiently clear, the results of which inquiries have not been communicated to the other members of the subcommittee, because the subcommittee has never met to discuss the contents of a report.

There are a few basic matters that ought to be kept clearly in mind, which I wish to summarize here at the beginning before dealing with the body of the majority report of the subcommittee. It should be remembered that the relocation centers administered by the War Relocation Authority have been intended from the very beginning to be only temporary expedients. These relocation centers are not supposed to be internment camps. Dangerous aliens are placed in internment camps, but those camps are administered by the Department of Justice and should not be confused with the relocation centers. When the Japanese population was removed from the west coast they were at first free to go anywhere they wanted within the United States so long as they stayed out of the evacuated area. The first plan contemplated merely free movement and did not provide for any kind of relocation centers. For about a month thousands of evacuees were permitted to leave the west coast voluntarily for other parts of the country. Most of them have since continued to live anywhere they wanted to.

It was soon found not feasible to permit such voluntary movement to continue because trouble began to develop in places where people were not ready to receive these Japanese who had been ordered to move. It was then that the plan was changed to establish relocation centers in which the Japanese could live until it was feasible for them to get reestablished in normal life.

The dangerous aliens among the Japanese population on the west coast were picked up by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other agencies in the first few days after Pearl Harbor. Practically all the rest were presumed to be loyal and safe. It was necessary to evacuate the whole group, even after the dangerous aliens had been

picked up and interned, because there was danger that the west coast would be invaded by the Japanese Army. But once removed from the west coast it was believed these people presented no further danger.

Dillon S. Myer, Director of the Authority, has told this subcommittee that about two-thirds of the people removed from the west coast are American citizens. Such a proposition as this, of moving approximately 70,000 American citizens away from their homes, has never been attempted before. Our Constitution does not distinguish between citizens of Japanese ancestry, or of German or Italian ancestry and citizens of English, Scotch, Russian, or Norwegian ancestry. Loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry have the same rights as any other loyal American citizens. I believe the Government was entirely right, therefore, in permitting free movement from the west coast so long as that was possible, and then in providing relocation centers when that proved necessary. The whole point of the program is to help the loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry, and the law-abiding aliens, to leave the relocation centers after investigation, and become established in normal life.

The rights of citizens to live as free men are part of the "four freedoms" for which we are fighting this war.

The testimony produced before this subcommittee shows that large numbers of the Japanese-American evacuees are working in war plants and in agriculture, and doing a good job. The Army has found that many of them are so trustworthy that they are being used in Military Intelligence and other secret work of high military importance. The evidence shows there were something like 5,000 loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry in the Army before the evacuation. Early this year the Army organized a special combat team of Japanese-Americans which is now in training at Camp Shelby, and which is made up entirely of volunteers.

Life in the relocation centers is not a bed of roses. The houses are of plain barrack style. The food is adequate but plain. The great majority of the relocation center residents are working at necessary jobs in connection with running the camps. They are raising much of their own food. For this work they get paid, in addition to their keep, only \$12, \$16, or \$19 a month. Even loyal American citizens in the relocation centers are working for these low wages.

Because of these facts I am disturbed about some of the ridiculous charges that were made early in our investigation. Stories about the Japanese people hiding food in the desert and storing contraband in holes under their houses, were shown to be ridiculous when a project was visited. However, the majority's report fails to withdraw these charges.

The report of the majority makes a big point about 23 persons who were released from the camps and who are found to be members of Butoku-kai, a Japanese fencing organization. This is 23 people out of 16,000 released. Even in the case of these 23 neither the majority report nor the hearings offer any evidence that any of the 23 were subversive.

I, for one, want to emphasize that just because a person is a member of an organization alleged to be subversive, I do not ipso facto con-

clude that the particular person is subversive. Certainly, mere proof of membership in an organization alleged to be subversive does not provide legal grounds for arresting or detaining such a person. Proper investigation may determine such a person to be intensely loyal to the United States.

After all the wind and the fury of a long report that creates the impression that War Relocation Authority is doing a very bad job, the comments of the majority members are climaxed by three feeble, meaningless recommendations.

These recommendations hardly support the prejudiced tone of the report. I shall discuss them later. At this point I want to take up some of the specific matters discussed in the majority's report.

THE REPORT OF THE MAJORITY

Administration of relocation centers.

In the majority's report the following language appears:

This committee does not consider it necessary to discuss in detail the administrative errors and deficiencies of the War Relocation Authority which were indicated by voluminous evidence received in the course of the subcommittee hearings. The Director of the War Relocation Authority, Mr. Dillon S. Myer, was frank in admitting that many mistakes had been made. Only those administrative errors which bear directly or indirectly upon the subject of subversive and un-American activities come within the special interest of this committee.

The implication of this paragraph is that the administration of the War Relocation Authority program has been lacking in competency and efficiency, that many mistakes have been made, and that Director Myer acknowledged that this was true.

Actually, Director Myer expressed the judgment before the subcommittee that a good job is being done in administration of the relocation centers and of the program as a whole and that such mistakes as were made, particularly in the early months of operation, were largely such as would inevitably occur in the development of a new and unprecedented program. There was nothing in the evidence heard by the subcommittee that would bear out the implication that the program was being incompetently or inefficiently administered. All things considered the preponderance of evidence indicates that the War Relocation Authority is doing a good job in handling an extremely difficult problem.

Fitness of War Relocation Authority personnel.

The majority's report states that much of the personnel in the War Relocation Authority is manifestly unfit for the job. The only specific evidence which is referred to in the report or which was presented before the subcommittee to substantiate this conclusion was the assertion that few of the administrative personnel had a prior knowledge of Japanese culture, language, and habits. Director Myer, in his testimony, states that the War Relocation Authority staff included some persons who were especially chosen because of their acquaintance with Japanese culture and language and that these persons had served as advisers to other members of the staff. A considerable number of the staff were formerly residents of California and other Western States who in the past had a great deal of contact with persons of Japanese ancestry living in this country.

The fact that apart from these two groups most of the War Relocation Authority staff had no previous close contact with Japanese or Japanese-Americans seems not particularly significant. For one thing, there are comparatively few people in the United States who understand the Japanese language or are well acquainted with Japanese culture. Apart from that, it would have been unfortunate had the War Relocation Authority sought to employ a large number of such persons when actually they would have been and are more usefully employed by other agencies of the Government engaged directly in the war against Japan. Furthermore, the War Relocation Authority would be subject to severe criticism were it dominated by people who have previously been intimate with the Japanese or Japanese-Americans and therefore subject to the accusation of being unduly sympathetic toward them.

Americanization.

Anyone genuinely interested in the problem of continuing the Americanization of the Japanese-American population of this country must acknowledge that the greatest force for Americanization is free, friendly, and continuous contact with non-Japanese-Americans in normal communities. The evacuation and isolation of the Japanese population in relocation centers away from normal contacts is an almost overwhelming obstacle to the assimilation of the Japanese-Americans, as it would be to any immigrant population. To say, as the majority's report does, that—

the War Relocation Authority had before it an almost unparalleled opportunity to inaugurate a vigorous educational program for positive Americanism—

is an almost complete inversion of the true situation. Americanization is best accomplished not by formal programs of education, but by the continuous day-to-day mingling of the immigrant group among the general American population. By way of illustration, the story is told of an educated, loyal Nisei during the very early days of evacuation when his family was still in an assembly center, who protested bitterly that his children, who had always spoken good English, were learning broken English from their less well Americanized companions.

Far from having an unparalleled opportunity in the relocation centers to effect Americanization, the War Relocation Authority is confronted with the very difficult problem, under such artificial circumstances, of preventing the development of a distinct relocation center culture which is mostly American but partly Japanese. Anyone sincerely interested in the Americanization of the loyal Japanese must see that the best Americanization program is found in the relocation of evacuees in normal American communities.

The majority's report bases a strong criticism of the Authority on the fact that the Authority has carried on the evacuee pay roll at each center certain recreational supervisors who were especially concerned with sports and recreational activities of Japanese origin. Particularly, criticism has been directed against the teaching of Judo. Reference is made to the employment of 90 Judo instructors at one center. Director Myer explained that this overemphasis on Judo at that particular center had long since been corrected by the Authority. He also explained that such instruction in Judo as still continues at the centers is carried on under a program formulated after

consultation with competent intelligence officers of the military service. It is a matter of common knowledge that Judo is taught to soldiers in the United States Army and that Japanese-Americans from the relocation centers are often used as instructors in Judo classes outside the centers.

It was also brought out in Director Myer's testimony that the teaching of the Japanese language in the centers, originally prohibited, is now conducted largely for the benefit of persons who will become Japanese language teachers for the United States military and naval services.

As to Americanized recreational activities, the evidence indicates that baseball is the most popular sport among the evacuees at the relocation centers. Basketball and football are also very popular. Boy Scout work, Girl Scout work, and the like have a following multiplied many times over that accorded to similar activities of Japanese cultural origin. Among the evacuees there are many thousands of members of such organizations as the Young Men's Christian Association, Young Women's Christian Association, Girl Reserves, Hi-Y, Camp Fire Girls, and Future Farmers of America. A large proportion of the adult population belongs to parent-teacher associations, the American Red Cross, and similar organizations.

Evacuee food.

Among the complaints listed as reasons for this subcommittee's investigation is the charge that—

the Japanese evacuees were being supplied food through the Quartermaster Corps of the Army in greater variety and quantity than was available to the average American consumer.

This charge is repeated in the report of the majority members but it is not brought out that the evidence received before the subcommittee completely rebutted the charge. The facts which the subcommittee's investigators established and which were borne out by other testimony received by the subcommittee are these:

1. All rationing restrictions applicable to the general public are strictly applied in relocation centers.
2. Food costs have averaged about 40 cents per day per person and are subject to a top limit of 45 cents per day per person on an annual basis.
3. Director Myer testified, without contradiction, to the effect that the centers are instructed to refrain from purchasing commodities of which there are general or local shortages.
4. Within the limitations set by rationing and the 45-cent daily cash allowance, the Authority has provided an adequate diet meeting reasonable wartime standards.

Discipline in relocation centers.

Another of the complaints listed as reasons for the subcommittee's investigation was the charge that—

the discipline in the various relocation centers was very lax and that considerable Government property had been destroyed by some of the Japanese.

No specific comment is made concerning this complaint in the majority's report.

Actually, the evidence produced before the subcommittee indicated that there was much less crime of any kind in the relocation centers

than in the average American community of the same size. By and large the evacuees have cooperated with the administration of the centers in maintaining order and discipline. Considering the emotional and social demoralization involved in evacuation, the conduct of the evacuees has been exemplary. The evidence indicates that ordinary crime at the centers has been negligible.

Manzanar gangs.

In the majority's report considerable space is given to certain activities attributed to the Blood Brothers Corps at Manzanar. Two statements are necessary in reference to this discussion. In the first place, it should be pointed out that the War Relocation Authority did, according to the evidence presented to the subcommittee, take rather effective action in handling these gangs. An isolation center was established and the gang leaders were transferred to that place. At present it appears that activities such as those of the Manzanar gangs have been eliminated. Secondly, the evidence concerning existence of the Blood Brothers Corps is very indefinite. No one has been discovered who belonged to the supposed organization and the only evidence of its existence consists of certain apparently anonymous letters purporting to be written by a member of the corps. The point is that very little worth-while evidence is actually available on the existence of a Blood Brothers Corps. The evidence indicates that Manzanar probably had more troubles than any of the other relocation centers but the evidence also indicates that the sources of trouble there have now been eliminated.

Segregation.

In the majority's report the War Relocation Authority is severely criticized for not having entered upon a program of segregating disloyal evacuees from the great majority who are loyal before public hearings before this subcommittee had revealed the urgent need for segregation. Actually the facts are that on May 14, 1943, at a press conference in Washington, Director Myer announced the program of segregation and the announcement was given newspaper publicity. This was before the hearings of this subcommittee were begun and long before the United States Senate adopted the resolution referred to in the majority's report. Furthermore, Director Myer had in April written a letter to Senator A. B. Chandler, chairman of the Subcommittee on Japanese War Relocation Centers of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, in which letter he stated that a program for such segregation was being worked out. Senator Chandler gave this letter to the press shortly afterward.

Had it been physically possible to make a fair determination immediately at the outset of the establishment of the relocation centers as to the loyalty or disloyalty of each evacuee, many of the difficulties of the War Relocation Authority would have been eliminated.

Nevertheless, I believe that the War Relocation Authority could and should have speeded up the plan for segregation more than it did. I feel that the actual movement of segregants should have been initiated more quickly. It is true that intelligent determinations on the loyalty of more than 100,000 people cannot be made in a week or a month and the War Relocation Authority's efforts to be fairly certain in its determinations are commendable. However, many of

the evacuees who were known to be disloyal could have been moved out of the regular relocation centers sooner than was done. A certain amount of criticism on this point is therefore justified.

The legal aspects of the relocation program.

The constitutional difficulty of confining citizens not charged with any crime is not discussed in the majority's report. Legality of such detention becomes increasingly difficult to sustain when it involves citizens of the United States against whom no charges of disloyalty or subversiveness have been made, particularly, if the detention continues for a period longer than the minimum time necessary for ascertainment of the facts. The principal justification for detaining citizen evacuees in relocation centers is that such detention is merely a temporary and qualified detention. They are detained until they can be sifted with regard to their sympathies in the war and until jobs can be found for them in communities where they will be accepted.

Such action may be sustained as an incident to an orderly relocation program, but any unqualified detention for the duration of the war of loyal citizens would be so vulnerable to attack in court as to imperil the entire relocation and detention program. That the leave regulations are legally necessary is emphasized by a recent decision of the Federal court for the northern district of California which dismissed a petition for writ of habeas corpus brought by an evacuee, on the ground that petitioner had not exhausted her administrative remedies by applying to the War Relocation Authority for leave (*In re Endo*).

In *Hirabayashi v. United States*, decided on June 21, 1943, the United States Supreme Court heard an appeal by a citizen of Japanese descent who had been sentenced concurrently on two counts: First, for violation of curfew regulations, and secondly, for failure to report for evacuation. The Court sustained the conviction solely upon the basis of the curfew count and avoided consideration of the conviction on the evacuation count. The natural inference that the Court found it comparatively easy to uphold the curfew, while encountering comparative difficulty in determining the legality of the evacuation, is reenforced by passages in concurring opinions by Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Douglas. Mr. Justice Murphy, in his concurring opinion, said of the curfew orders:

In my opinion this goes to the very brink of constitutional power.

Since the detention accompanying the evacuation is a more drastic restriction of liberty than the mere evacuation itself, there is even more reason for the opinion that such detention is to be justified under the Constitution only if it is carefully limited with all possible respect to the rights of citizens in the current emergency. The legal problems of detaining citizens cannot be disregarded by the governmental agency responsible for administering the leave program.

It is apparent that the leave program of the War Relocation Authority has been formulated with a thoughtful view toward assuring the legality of the Authority's program as a whole, and it is probable that without the leave program the whole detention plan might well be subjected to successful legal attack. That this protection against such attack has been set up and put into effective operation, thus

giving greater assurance of the continued detention of those who under the program are not entitled to leave, is a fact for which the Authority is definitely to be commended.

Leave program for the War Relocation Authority.

A principal object of the War Relocation Authority's leave program, it seems, is the separation of evacuees believed to be loyal to Japan from those loyal to the United States. This is the same thing substantially as the segregation program. The best way to segregate the disloyal from the loyal is to relocate the loyal in normal life. That is what the leave program is designed to achieve. This takes time, however. It seems unfair to the loyal, in the meantime, to allow them to be confused in the public mind with the disloyal, therefore, segregation should be and is being undertaken as a separate program. As soon as segregation is completed it seems that the leave program itself for the loyal evacuees should be substantially speeded up.

Administration of leave program.

On October 1, 1942, the present basic leave regulations of the War Relocation Authority became effective, on publication in the Federal Register. They provide that any evacuee citizen or alien may request indefinite leave from a relocation center. To support the request, the evacuee must show that he has a job or can take care of himself, must agree to report changes of address to the War Relocation Authority, and must have a record indicating that he will not endanger the national security. In addition, the War Relocation Authority must satisfy itself that the community in which the evacuee proposes to relocate will accept him without difficulty.

Much of the substance of the majority's report is concerned with the problems of releasing evacuees from relocation centers. The essential question raised by the report is whether or not the War Relocation Authority has exercised reasonable precautions and careful judgment in determining which evacuees shall be granted leave. The majority's report concludes that it has not. As evidence for its conclusion, it relies chiefly upon two arguments: (1) 23 evacuees who have been given leave from the centers may be dangerous because they had some connection with an allegedly subversive organization known as Butoku-kai; (2) the present procedures of the Authority do not provide sufficient checks on the record of individuals released.

As to the first of these arguments, the majority's report does not allege that these 23 members of the Butoku-kai are subversive or dangerous, but does state that—

The release of these 23 Japanese is evidence of the incompetence of the War Relocation Authority to exercise proper safeguards both for the national security and for the thousands of loyal Japanese as well.

In a letter dated July 16, 1943, to this subcommittee, Director Myer gave specific information concerning the circumstances under which leave was granted to these 23 persons. It was brought out that, as to 16 of the 23, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had records which disclosed no report or derogatory information. As to 5 of them, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had no records whatever. One was released for school work under an agreement with

military intelligence. One, an alien, was paroled, under the regular sponsor parolee agreement prescribed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice. That accounts for all 23 of them. Director Myer states that no evidence was given to the Authority either from the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any other agency that any one of these 23 persons was dangerous or subversive.

Leave clearance procedure.

The second major argument advanced in the majority's report in support of its strong condemnation of the leave clearance procedures followed by the War Relocation Authority is that procedures have recently been so liberalized as to remove certain essential safeguards. It is stated that while originally the Authority made what is called a home check and a name check and all leave clearance was granted by the Director in Washington, since April 1943 project directors have been authorized to "make their own determination (with certain limitations)" as to the release for indefinite leave of an evacuee and that the home check and the name check have been eliminated. ("Name check" is the term used by the subcommittee to describe the process of securing such information as is available in the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation before granting leave to an individual.)

This statement is misleading in three respects. In the first place, "the certain limitations" are extremely important in that they withhold the right of the project director to grant leave to the following categories of people:

1. Evacuees who answered no or gave a qualified answer to the loyalty question during the Army registration.
2. Repatriates and expatriates.
3. Paroled aliens.
4. Shinto priests.
5. Those whose leave clearance has been suspended by the Director.

These categories include all evacuees about whom there is generally reason to have doubt. That these "certain limitations" are in force is established both by the provisions of the Administrative Instruction (No. 22) given in evidence, and by the direct testimony of Director Myer before the subcommittee.

In the second place, in discussing checks made on loyalty of evacuees applying for indefinite leave, the majority's report mentions a home check and a name check, but does not mention the check-up made at the project. Director Myer testified that such a check-up is regularly made. The project staff is in a position to know a good deal about the evacuees.

In the third place, the statement is made in the majority's report that on April 2, the War Relocation Authority further liberalized its release program by eliminating the Federal Bureau of Investigation name check. The evidence indicates that the Federal Bureau of Investigation name check has not been eliminated, but rather that all names of evacuee adults are being submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has almost completed its check on all the evacuees. As soon as a derogatory report is received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation on one of the individuals, the project director is notified and is instructed not to grant leave to the individual in question.

Japanese-Americans in the civil service.

The majority's report intimates that the War Relocation Authority has set up a plan to place hundreds of Nisei in civil service employment of the Federal Government and it describes, under the heading "An Indefensible Release Procedure," one case in which an attempt was made to secure civil service rating for a Nisei. In response to my inquiry, the following letter was received:

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY,
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR,
Washington, August 18, 1943.

HON. HERMAN P. EBERHARTER,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. EBERHARTER: I am glad to respond to your telephone request for information concerning the investigation made by the War Relocation Authority before issuing indefinite leave to the person named in a letter sent by Mr. Elmer L. Shirrell, a relocation supervisor of the Authority, to the director of the seventh region of the United States Civil Service Commission on May 26, 1943. The person referred to in the letter is Mary Nakasuji.

Mary Nakasuji applied to the War Relocation Authority for leave clearance in November 1942. A check of the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was made on December 12, 1942, which indicated that the records contained no information on the applicant. Reports were secured by the project internal security officer and by the evacuee's immediate employment supervisor at the center. Both reports were strongly favorable.

A letter received from a Mr. George M. Osborne, 4693 Alice Street, San Diego, Calif., dated December 31, 1942, states:

"I have known Mary and members of her family for several years. I sincerely believe her to be a very good American citizen. We know she is of Christian faith and has demonstrated to the utmost her democratic views regarding American ideals and our American standard of living. I highly recommend her as to character."

After considering the results of the name check, results of the check of the Federal Bureau of Investigation record, project report, and this letter of endorsement, this applicant was granted leave clearance on January 20, 1943. She left the Granada relocation center on March 13, worked as a secretary and book-keeper in the Young Men's Christian Association at 19 South La Salle Street, Chicago, and on June 6 went to work with the Roberts Manufacturing Co. at an increased salary. She is still employed there. Reports on her work are favorable. She has not yet taken a civil-service examination, but has filled out Standard Form 57 in order that her eligibility for civil service may be determined.

On July 2, 1943, the Japanese-American Joint Board concurred in the granting of indefinite leave to Miss Nakasuji.

If you would like any further information concerning this case, or any other aspect of our work, please do not hesitate to call on me.

Sincerely,

D. S. MYER, Director.

In view of the facts, I believe the letter written by the relocation supervisor seems fully justified in this case.

It is unfortunate that the majority's report should have relied so heavily upon a mistaken interpretation of the facts in this case when the true facts would have been readily available.

Conduct of evacuees who have been granted leave.

It is worthy of note that of all the evacuees who have been released on both seasonal and indefinite leave by the War Relocation Authority, numbering more than 16,000, no report of disloyal or subversive activity has been made to the Authority or to this subcommittee.

Moreover, among the Japanese-American population numbering 290,000 in the continental United States and Hawaii, only 32 percent of whom are in relocation centers, there have been no established cases

of sabotage while there are thousands of cases of loyal workers in industry, agriculture, and in the armed forces of the United States.

When proper weight is given to the importance of preserving democratic and constitutional principles in the treatment of the Japanese-American population with, at the same time, proper regard for national security, it is evident that the relocation centers and the outside relocation program are being administered efficiently and well.

The recommendations of the majority report.

I have already commented on how mild the recommendations of the majority report seem after the severe language of its findings.

I agree fully with the first recommendation, that segregation of the disloyal should be put into effect at once. As I have said, I believe the War Relocation Authority should have moved faster on this than they did, although it is not an easy thing to distinguish the loyal from the disloyal among 100,000 persons.

The subcommittee's second recommendation is that a new board be established, made up of representatives of the War Relocation Authority and the various Intelligence agencies of the Federal Government to investigate evacuees who apply for release from the centers and to pass finally upon their applications. The subcommittee's investigations have made clear that there has always been close cooperation between Army Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, and the War Relocation Authority. The War Relocation Authority has always had access to the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I do not see any necessity for establishing still another board. I do not see that the results would be any different than they are now since the records of all these Intelligence agencies are now available to the War Relocation Authority. Such a board would simply divide responsibility among a number of agencies, and then no one person or agency could be held responsible for results.

There is nothing in the record of leave clearance granted by the War Relocation Authority that justifies the setting up of a board to take over this function. Moreover, it seems pretty clear that the agency of the Government charged with the detention of citizens, particularly those to whom leave is denied, should be the agency which makes the actual determination to grant or deny leave in individual cases. In short, the granting of leave is an essential part of the legal basis for detention and should not be separated from the administration of relocation centers.

No recommendation for the establishment of such a board as is recommended by the subcommittee majority was made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, or the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department.

The third and last recommendation of the majority's report is in favor of a thoroughgoing program of Americanization for Japanese who remain in centers. Of course I am in favor of that; everybody is in favor of Americanization just as everybody is against sin. Of course I am sure the majority members of the subcommittee would not want to push this idea so far that they will turn these camps into a "social experiment."

Mr. Myer testified that there is a great deal of Americanization work going on in the centers. The schools are active in this work, and many of the younger people are members of Future Farmers of

America, the Red Cross, the Boy and Girl Scouts, Camp Fire Girls, and similar agencies. Adult English classes are provided for hundreds of aliens.

Certainly, we would need an extraordinarily intensive Americanization program for loyal American citizens who are detained in seeming contradiction of American principles and the "four freedoms." Certainly, also, the best way to push Americanization of this group is for the War Relocation Authority to go ahead with its program of restoring full freedom of movement to the loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry and the law-abiding aliens who are now in relocation centers.


I believe the War Relocation Authority should complete its segregation program, should continue its Americanization program, and should, by all means, go ahead with its resettlement program.


Summation.

It is my conclusion that, considering the magnitude of its job, the difficulty of the legal issues involved, and the complexity and delicacy of the problem of resettling a large group of people in the midst of a war, the War Relocation Authority has acted, by and large, efficiently and capably, and has carried out the spirit and intent of the President's Executive order under which it was established. I think it is better to let the War Relocation Authority carry on unhampered by unfair criticism.

Respectfully submitted.

HERMAN P. EBERHARTER.





INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SEVENTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

H. Res. 282

TO INVESTIGATE (1) THE EXTENT, CHARACTER, AND OBJECTS OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES, (2) THE DIFFUSION WITHIN THE UNITED STATES OF SUBVERSIVE AND UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA THAT IS INSTIGATED FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES OR OF A DOMESTIC ORIGIN AND ATTACKS THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT AS GUARANTEED BY OUR CONSTITUTION, AND (3) ALL OTHER QUESTIONS IN RELATION THERETO THAT WOULD AID CONGRESS IN ANY NECESSARY REMEDIAL LEGISLATION

COMMITTEE PRINT

**Majority and Minority Report of the Subcommittee
Investigating War Relocation Authority**

Printed for the use of the Special Committee on Un-American Activities



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WASHINGTON : 1943

INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN
PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE
UNITED STATES

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SEVENTY-FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

H. Res. 282

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN
ACTIVITIES, WASHINGTON, D. C.

JOHN M. COSTELLO, California, *Chairman*

HERMAN P. EBERHARTER, Pennsylvania

KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota

ROBERT E. STRIPLING, *Chief Investigator*

J. B. MATTHEWS, *Director of Research*

II

COMMITTEE PRINT

Majority and Minority Report of the Subcommittee
Investigating War Relocation Authority

Printed for the use of the Special Committee on Un-American Activities



UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1935

3000

[COMMITTEE PRINT]

**SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON UN-
AMERICAN ACTIVITIES REPORT ON JAPANESE WAR
RELOCATION CENTERS**

HON. JOHN M. COSTELLO, HON. HERMAN P. EBERHARTER, AND
HON. KARL E. MUNDT

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WAR RELOCATION CENTERS

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, considerable fear was rife among the residents on the west coast of the United States, where approximately 120,000 citizens of Japanese ancestry and Japanese nationals had concentrated. Because of this situation and particularly for military reasons, General DeWitt, commanding general of the Western Defense Command, early in 1942 ordered the evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry, United States citizens and aliens alike, from certain areas of the west coast.

The evacuation was first put on a voluntary basis and some 8,000 persons of Japanese ancestry removed themselves into the interior of the United States. However, this procedure proved to be ineffective and as a consequence on March 29, 1942, the voluntary evacuation was abandoned and a freezing order was issued by the commanding general of the Western Defense Command, which in effect held all persons of Japanese ancestry within the affected zones until some orderly procedure could be drawn up which would bring about the complete removal of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the military area of the west coast.

Meanwhile the War Relocation Authority was established on March 18, 1942, by Executive Order No. 9102, to carry out the evacuation and to care for the evacuees. This agency proceeded to construct 10 relocation centers in the following places: Colorado River relocation center, Poston, Ariz.; Gila River relocation center, Rivers, Ariz.; Manzanar relocation center, Manzanar, Calif.; Tule Lake relocation center, Newell, Calif.; Minidoka relocation center, Hunt, Idaho; Central Utah relocation center, Topaz, Utah; Heart Mountain relocation center, Heart Mountain, Wyo.; Granada relocation center, Amache, Colo.; Rohwer relocation center, Relocation, Ark.; Jerome relocation center, Denson, Ark.

Following the issuance of the freezing order, all Japanese were removed to temporary assembly centers and from there were sent to the various relocation centers. The removal to the Relocation Centers began in May of 1942. Approximately 106,000 persons of Japanese ancestry were evacuated to the various centers.

THE COMMITTEE'S INVESTIGATION

From the second year of its work (1939) down to the present time, the Special Committee on Un-American Activities has carried on a continuous investigation of subversive and un-American activities among the Japanese who are resident in the United States.

Previous committee reports have dealt with many phases of the question of Japanese subversive activities. At the end of 1940 the committee issued a special report dealing with totalitarian propaganda in the United States which revealed that many tons of Axis propaganda were being unloaded from Japanese steamships docking at ports on the west coast of the United States. This report led to immediate action by the Post Office Department which ordered that all such propaganda material be seized on its arrival in this country. Early in 1942 the committee issued a special report which showed that numerous Japanese organizations operating in this country were fronts for the Japanese Government and that numerous members of these organizations were engaged in espionage for the Tokyo Government.

The present report reflects the current stage of the committee's continuing work on the question of the subversive and un-American activities of Japanese who are resident in the United States. The report deals primarily with Japanese subversive activities within the war relocation centers and with the possible release of dangerous Japanese agents of espionage from these centers.

During the latter part of 1942 and the first half of the present year, the committee received numerous complaints from citizens and organizations on the west coast and in Western States concerning the handling and release of the Japanese by the War Relocation Authority. The committee also received requests from Members of Congress and from State authorities of the affected areas to make an investigation of the relocation centers.

Early in May 1943 a member of this committee, Hon. J. Parnell Thomas of New Jersey, went to Los Angeles, Calif., and conferred with State authorities, various citizens, and groups, and reported back to the committee that he felt the Japanese situation and the administration of the War Relocation Authority needed an immediate and thorough investigation. He called upon the President to halt the then existing policy of the War Relocation Authority which called for the release of approximately 1,000 evacuees per week for resettlement throughout the country.

Pursuant to the recommendation of Congressman Thomas and at the request of Congressman Costello, a member of this committee, and a Representative in the House from the Los Angeles district, which is vitally affected by the Japanese problem, the committee ordered an investigation of the various relocation centers and detailed investigators to go to the centers and conduct an investigation.

The charges which appeared in the numerous complaints received by the committee and which were reflected in the preliminary investigations of the committee's agents were as follows:

1. That Japanese were being released at the rate of 1,000 a week and that it was very possible that among those released were some whose allegiance had been pledged to the Japanese Government.
2. That there were thousands of Japanese in the relocation centers who had openly expressed their loyalty to Japan and had requested repatriation.

3. That 24 percent of the evacuees of draft age (17 to 38 years of age) had stated on the questionnaire circulated among them by the Army that they were not loyal to the United States but held their sole allegiance to the Emperor of Japan.

4. That the loyal and disloyal Japanese were intermingled without any semblance of segregation, and were receiving the same treatment in the way of accommodations, food, etc.

5. That the Japanese evacuees were being supplied food through the Quartermaster Corps of the Army in greater variety and quantity than was available to the average American consumer.

6. That the discipline in the various relocation centers was very lax, and that considerable Government property had been destroyed by some of the Japanese.

The foregoing charges, which were embodied in complaints received by the committee and which grew out of preliminary investigations, were made the basis for a more thorough and formal investigation. On June 3, 1943, the chairman of the Special Committee on Un-American Activities appointed a subcommittee to conduct an investigation into these charges and make a report of its findings. The subcommittee was composed of John M. Costello, of California, chairman, Herman P. Eberharter, of Pennsylvania, and Karl E. Mundt, of South Dakota.

The subcommittee left almost immediately for California. From June 8 to June 17 the subcommittee held hearings in Los Angeles where it took more than 1,000 pages of testimony, principally from men who were then or had been recently on the administrative staffs of the relocation centers. On June 18 the subcommittee held hearings in Parker, Ariz., near the Poston Relocation Center. From July 1 to July 9 the subcommittee held its hearings in Washington, D. C., at which the principal witness was Dillon S. Myer, Director of the War Relocation Authority. Also among the witnesses in Washington were former officials of the Japanese American Citizens League whose Washington files the committee had obtained by subpoena on June 11, 1943. The committee also heard in executive session representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, and the War Department.

ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS OF THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

This committee does not consider it necessary to discuss in detail the administrative errors and deficiencies of the War Relocation Authority which were indicated by voluminous evidence received in the course of the subcommittee's hearings. The Director of the War Relocation Authority, Dillon S. Myer, was frank in admitting that many mistakes had been made. Only those administrative errors which bear directly or indirectly upon the subject of subversive and un-American activities come within the special interest of this committee.

The fitness of much of the personnel of the War Relocation Authority for its highly specialized task has been opened to serious question by the evidence which the committee has received. The committee is convinced that this manifest unfitness may account in large part, or even entirely, for the errors of administration which involve the subject of subversive and un-American activities.

LACK OF JAPANESE EXPERTS IN WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Out of an administrative personnel of the War Relocation Authority which numbers approximately 2,500 persons, an absolutely negligible percentage seems to have been qualified for their positions by any

knowledge, even elementary, of the language, culture, and ways of the Japanese. The Director of the War Relocation Authority himself appears to be typical of this total neglect to enlist an administrative personnel which possessed any degree of expertness or experience which would qualify them to handle 106,000 persons of Japanese ancestry. Mr. Myer had a record of 28 years as an expert in agriculture when he was called upon to administer the delicate, admittedly onerous, and largest mass resettlement program ever carried out by any government. It is apparent from the testimony given before the subcommittee that few, if any, among the administrative personnel of the War Relocation Authority had ever so much as read a book on the Japanese before they undertook their heavy responsibilities for dealing with this racial group. Certainly there exists within the War Relocation Authority a complete lack of familiarity with the subversive Japanese organizations or even with the general techniques of subversion.

SEGREGATION

When Mr. Myer was before the subcommittee, he stated that a program of segregating the disloyal from the loyal Japanese was to be inaugurated at an early date. While the committee heartily approves this announcement and earnestly hopes that it will be given speedy effect, it is impossible for us to excuse the delay in adopting a policy of segregation. The committee further notes that the War Relocation Authority's announcement of a segregation policy came after the United States Senate adopted a resolution requiring such segregation, and after the subcommittee of this committee had held public hearings which revealed the urgent need for segregation.

The committee is forced to conclude, on the basis of all the evidence before it, that the War Relocation Authority has been extremely dilatory in the matter of segregating the disloyal elements in the centers from those who are loyal Nisei or law-abiding Issei.

MR. EMPIE ON SEGREGATION

On June 9, 1943, in Los Angeles, the subcommittee heard the testimony of Augustus W. Empie, chief administrative officer, Colorado River War relocation project (Poston), near Parker, Ariz. Mr. Empie is in charge of personnel, communications division, supply and transportation division, procurement division, fiscal division, mails and files divisions, and has general supervision over the chief steward's office.

Mr. Empie's testimony brought out the fact that it was his opinion that much of the trouble at Poston could be attributed to the failure to segregate the loyal from the disloyal Japanese, and he was questioned specifically in this regard.

MR. MUNDT. That was the next thing I was going to ask you about. I was going to ask you if you didn't feel that the fact you haven't segregated the bad fellows from the good ones has had a bad effect on the Japanese who might be inclined to work?

MR. EMPIE. Absolutely. I think that is the first and foremost problem the War Relocation Authority should have attacked and solved immediately—they should have arranged immediately to get these people out.

GANGS AT MANZANAR

As an example, the need for segregation was long ago strikingly evident as a result of the operation of criminal and subversive gangs in the relocation center at Manzanar (Calif.).

Tokutaro Slocum, one of the few Japanese ever to be made a citizen of the United States by an act of Congress, was called as a witness before our subcommittee. Slocum was one of the evacuees who lived at Manzanar. When asked if he had gained any information concerning "organized groups of a secret character working in Camp Manzanar," Slocum replied:

Well, sir, I was a special investigator there, or inspector there, so it was my duty to obtain all this information and report that to the duly constituted authorities, so I happened to come across most of them, and many of them I would say were Blood Brothers, Black Dragon, the Dunbar Corps, or Dunbar Gang, and the San Pedro Yogores.

Slocum then testified concerning the methods of intimidation and terrorization which were employed by these gangs at Manzanar.

Slocum's testimony was completely substantiated by confidential reports which the subcommittee obtained by subpoena. The following are excerpts from those reports:

Now, with more leisure time, dormant forces are beginning to create disturbances. What has seemingly appeared to most Caucasian administrators as a placid community life in reality covered a cauldron in which differing ideologies, unmiscible as oil and water, seethed and boiled. Surface indications of this internal strife have appeared from time to time. However, center officials have usually dismissed these symptoms with an academic leniency.

The real threat to peace and order within the centers will not come from individual lawlessness. The bombshell that will shatter these communities will be the blow-off of (1) accumulated resentments, (2) harbored injustices, (3) racial discriminations, (4) pro-Japan convictions, and (5) real and fancied grievances. As time goes on, rather than a settling process, mob outbreaks, mass demonstrations, gang atrocities, and acts of terrorism will recur frequently.

War Relocation Authority administrators must realize the dynamite they are dealing with; they must be realistic; they must not encourage the mushrooming of small incidents by condoning with official laxity; individuals advocating constructive attitudes and activities must be shielded from vengeful harm; deleterious elements in each camp must be recognized and intelligent yet stern methods must be instituted to curb them.

* * * * *

Numerically this pro-Japan element is small, but the damage their insidious propaganda can do to the peace and order of the community should not be too lightly regarded.

* * * * *

Internal security should be exactly what its title connotes. Reports issuing from some centers indicate that security of life and limb for those bespeaking constructive attitudes does not exist. On the other hand, malefactors have been so condoned that their nefarious beatings of decent citizens continues not only unabated but with increasing frequency.

* * * * *

Manzanar gangdom is usually identified by the people as one of three groups: (1) Terminal Islanders, known also as Yogores, or the San Pedro Gang, (2) the Dunbar Gang, (3) The Blood Brothers Corps, known also as Yuho Kesshidan.

* * * * *

THE BLOOD BROTHERS CORPS

This appears to be an underground movement political in nature. Unlike the San Pedro Gang or the Dunbar Gang, no member of this group has come out into the open and acknowledged himself as a Blood Brother.

* * * * *

On Friday and Saturday, November 6 and 7, the members of the Manzanar commission on self-government received letters via mail from the Blood Brothers. The following 17 persons, comprising the commission, were recipients: Frank Chuman, Dr. James M. Goto, Jack Iwata, Rev. J. A. Kashitani, Mrs. Niya Kikuchi, Choyoi Kondo, Joe Masaoka, Miss Chiye Mori, Rev. Shingo Nagatomi, Frederick Ogura, Togo Tanaka, Walter Watanabe, Frank Yasuda, Sho Onodera, Roy Tashimi, Kiyoshi Higashi, Tom Imai.

There were two sets of letters, both in Japanese, apparently written by two different persons.

Following is a literal translation of the shorter of the two letters:

"Think of the shame the American Government has put us into. Think of the disruption of properties and the imprisonment of the Nisei.

"To start a self-government system now is nothing but a dirty selfish scheme. As the Army put us in here without regard to our own will, we should leave everything up to the Army, whether they want to kill us or eat us.

"Because this is the only way the American Government can think of as a means of absolving itself from the blame of misconducting its affairs, the Government thought of a bad scheme, that is, this formation of the self-government system.

"The hairy beasts (white) are out to actually run the Government, while using you people who can be used. It is evident if you read article I of the charter, and can be proved by the facts of the past. You fellows who are acting blindly are big fools.

"If you do such things as those, which tighten the noose around the necks of your fellow people, some day you will receive punishment from Heaven, so beware.

"BLOOD BROTHERS CORPS WHICH
WORRY FOR THEIR FELLOW PEOPLE."

* * * * *

Following is a translation of the longer of the two letters: (Both translations by Akira Dave Itami of the Information Office.)

"Calling you fools who are running around trying to set up a self-government system.

"Think back. The fact that the positions, the properties, and the honor which our fellow Japanese built up and won by blood and sweat during the past 50 years have all been stamped and sacrificed by the arrogant and insulting American Government after we have been put into this isolated spot.

"For what are you beating around? What use is there for establishing self-government? Especially with such a charter so full of contradictions? Although we are ignorant people, we can foresee the tragic results which will come out of this self-government.

"Remember that the majority of our people are absolutely against the self-government system. What do you think of the fact that 6 months ago, in Santa Anita, the same attempt which you are now trying, was made, to organize a self-government, but it broke down before it materialized.

"Leave everything completely as the Army pleases. If you nincompoops realize the fact that you are Japanese, why don't you assume the honorable attitude which is typical of Japanese? What a shameful sight you are about to present by being fooled by the sweet words of the Government. By so doing, you are inviting suffering to your fellow Japanese.

"We fellow Japanese are all like fish laid on the cutting board, about to be sliced. To jump around at this stage is a cowardly thing to do. Better lay down and let the Government do as it pleases, either cook us or fry us.

"You should remain calm and conduct yourselves like nationals of a first-class power. Give more thoughts and deep reflections as to your attitude.

"BLOOD BROTHERS CORPS WHICH IS
CONCERNED OVER FELLOW NATIONALS"

* * * * *

THE LOYALTY QUESTION

The great need for a determined policy of segregation was amply indicated by the answers to the loyalty question contained in the Army questionnaire which was filled out by the Japanese in the relocation centers in February of the present year. An alarming proportion of Japanese American citizens of draft age (17 to 38), frankly refused to declare their loyalty to the United States.

The loyalty question read as follows:

Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and faithfully defend the United States from any or all attack by foreign or domestic foes and forswear any form of allegiance to the Japanese Emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or organization?

The following tabulation presents in the most simplified form possible the extent to which the Japanese-American citizens of draft age declared their loyalty to the United States:

Relocation center	Number registered	Number answering "No" to loyalty question	Number volunteers
Central Utah	2,420	806	116
Colorado River	3,356	671	238
Gila River	2,488	547	119
Granada	1,117	117	121
Heart Mountain	1,881	451	47
Jerome	1,341	110	33
Manzanar	1,826	913	101
Minidoka	1,607	32	310
Rohwer	1,585	306	37
Tule Lake	2,342	836	59
Total	19,963	4,783	1,181
Average, percent		24	6

The committee reiterates its conclusion that there was an alarming proportion of the Japanese-American citizens of draft age to avow their unqualified loyalty to this country. From the foregoing tabulation, it is apparent that avowed disloyalty reached the high percentage of 24.

A more complete break-down of the answers to the loyalty question is given in the following tabulation:

Relocation center	Total eligible to register	Total registered	Total accounted for	Yes	Non-affirmative answers	No reply	Yes (percent)	Non-affirmative answers (percent)	No reply (percent)
Central Utah:									
Hawaii	163	163	163	25	138	0	15.3	84.7	0
United States	1,477	1,477	1,477	1,015	462	0	68.7	31.3	0
Colorado River	3,405	3,405	3,211	2,601	596	14	81.0	18.6	.4
Gila River	2,630	2,588	2,502	1,599	901	2	63.9	36.0	.1
Granada	1,342	1,342	1,254	1,222	27	5	97.4	2.2	.4
Heart Mountain	1,964	1,963	1,963	1,609	253	101	82.0	12.9	5.1
Jerome	1,592	1,591	1,385	895	417	73	64.6	30.1	5.3
Manzanar	1,909	1,909	1,885	921	960	4	48.9	50.9	.2
Minidoka	1,629	1,603	1,580	1,497	61	22	94.7	3.9	1.4
Rohwer	1,608	1,608	1,410	1,150	252	8	81.5	17.9	.6
Tule Lake	2,960	2,330	2,274	1,489	783	2	65.5	34.4	.1
Total	20,679	19,979	19,104	14,023	4,850	231	73.4	25.4	1.2

The foregoing tabulation indicates that disloyalty among those of draft age at the Manzanar center was in excess of 50 percent. The committee is of the opinion that such a result obtained from the questionnaire called for immediate separation of the disloyal from the loyal, and is at a loss to understand the reasoning of the War Relocation Authority which prompted its inaction in so important a matter.

PRESERVATION AND PROMOTION OF JAPANESE CULTURAL TIES

Indicative of the same type of negligence which caused the War Relocation Authority to fail to adopt prompt and drastic measures of segregation in the centers, was the Authority's callous promotion of cultural ties with Japan.

Mr. Myer admitted in his testimony before the subcommittee that at one time the War Relocation Authority was paying at least 90 instructors in Judo at a single center. Judo is a distinctively Japanese cultural phenomenon. It is more than an athletic exercise. By the employment of 90 instructors at one center, the Authority was obviously promoting Judo among Japanese-Americans who did not already know it. Various other forms of so-called recreation which could only have the effect of a tie-back to Japan were likewise promoted in the centers and their promotion was paid for out of the War Relocation Authority's funds which come ultimately from the taxpayers of this country. The same is true of instruction in the Japanese language. It is one thing for the Government to give instruction in the Japanese language to those who, the Government has reason to believe, will shortly utilize that instruction in some intelligence agency. It is a totally different thing to post notices on the bulletin boards of the centers that one and all may enroll in courses in the Japanese language. American citizens are citizens regardless of their ancestry, and there is no possible justification whatever for a program which goes out of its way to stimulate the interest of an American citizen in the culture of a foreign country from which that citizen has presumably been completely separated by the very fact of his American citizenship.

Every fact adduced in evidence before the subcommittee indicated that the War Relocation Authority had before it an almost unparalleled opportunity to inaugurate a vigorous educational program for positive Americanism. At the same time, the committee is unable to arrive at any other conclusion than that the Authority treated this opportunity with the most reprehensible indifference. And not only that, but the Authority proceeded to make outlays of funds for the express purpose of forcibly reminding the residents of the centers that they stemmed from Japan, whereas the loyal at least should have been encouraged by every possible means to regard themselves as Americans and Americans only.

NORTH AMERICAN MILITARY VIRTUE SOCIETY (BUTOKU-KAI)

This committee has made an exhaustive study of the Japanese organization known as the Butoku-kai. It must assume that the War Relocation Authority has done the same or has at least availed itself of the information on the Butoku-kai in the files of the intelligence agencies. Among other highly important items of evidence bearing

upon the organization, the committee has obtained the names of several thousand members of the Butoku-kai from its own records.

There is no doubt whatever in the minds of any competent authorities, including all of the intelligence agencies of the United States Government, that the Butoku-kai is a subversive organization. The representative of the joint Japanese-American board who testified before the subcommittee stated that his board so regarded the Butoku-kai and that any Japanese evacuee in the relocation centers who was a member of the organization should be considered ineligible for release from the centers. This committee concurs completely in that view.

While it is overwhelmingly evident that the Butoku-kai is of a subversive character, it is extremely doubtful that the War Relocation Authority so considers it. This conclusion is borne out by the fact that the War Relocation Authority has approved the release of evacuees who have been members of the Butoku-kai.

The subcommittee submitted a list of the names of some of the members of the Butoku-kai to the Director of the War Relocation Authority with the request that he make a check to ascertain whether or not any of them had been released from the centers. Out of a possible 215 names which the War Relocation Authority was able to identify, 23 have been released by the Authority.

The committee does not allege that all of these 23 members of the Butoku-kai will proceed to use their freedom to commit acts of sabotage or espionage. The committee does hold, however, that the release of these 23 Japanese is evidence of the incompetence of the War Relocation Authority to exercise proper safeguards both for the national security and for the thousands of loyal Japanese as well.

The committee offers a brief summary of the evidence of the subversive character of the Butoku-kai to substantiate its conclusion that the War Relocation Authority has been negligent or incompetent in the performance of its duties.

The Butoku-kai had approximately 60 branches in the United States prior to Pearl Harbor. About 50 of these were in the State of California. Approximately 10,000 Nisei (American citizens of Japanese ancestry) were members of the Butoku-kai in this country.

The investigations of the Special Committee on Un-American Activities have established the following additional facts concerning the Butoku-kai:

1. Butoku-kai was the youth section of the Black Dragon Society of Japan.
2. Mitsuru Toyama, head of the Black Dragon Society in Japan, was adviser to the Butoku-kai in the United States.
3. The declared purpose of the Butoku-kai in this country was "To enhance the spirit of Japanese military virtue, to guide the citizens of Japanese ancestry, and to encourage physical culture."
4. The instructors who were engaged to teach the military arts to the Nisei in the United States under the banner of the Butoku-kai came to this country from Japan, and were principally Japanese Army and Navy men. However, local priests of both the Shinto and the Buddhist cults acted as instructors.
5. Butoku-kai was imported into the United States by one Tekichi Nakamura, who arrived here from Hawaii on September 27, 1929.

Nakamura came to the United States in the guise of a Korean, but later dropped that pretense. Nakamura began immediately to enroll Nisei in his organization and to give them instruction in swordsmanship.

6. In his youth, Nakamura operated as a bandit in Manchuria.

7. Immediately prior to his coming to the United States, Nakamura was received at the Yokosuka naval base by Kurozaki of the Japanese Navy who gave him the following commission:

Here comes the very messenger I desire. In the course of my military duties I have often been to America and have had familiar chats with our brethren on the coast there. Though they know something about the joys and sorrows of parents and guardians, I learned by discussion of all their joys and sorrows, the problem filling their hearts was about the rearing of the second generation (Nisei). * * * So, if you are going to America, how are you going to instruct and nourish the young people of Japanese lineage there? Put your mind on this problem first of all—and open out some good way for us.

8. On a return visit to Japan in 1931, Nakamura gained as patrons for his work in the United States General Suzuki, General Araki, and Admiral Kato. He returned to the United States in July 1931.

9. Shortly afterward, Nakamura—this teacher and leader of 10,000 Nisei in the United States—went once more to Japan, taking with him a party of 14. He and his party were received by Government officials at Yokohama and then proceeded to Tokyo where they worshiped at the imperial palace.

10. In 1933 Nakamura again went to Japan, taking with him a party of 14 Nisei. They again worshiped at the imperial palace in Tokyo and were received by all the Cabinet Ministers and by Admiral Togo. One of the members of Nakamura's party made a speech at a great public reception in which she (a Nisei) declared:

We, in whose veins flows the blood of the valiant Japanese people, must throw off the American atmosphere and learn the spirit of Japan's way of the warrior.

11. At Kyoto, ancient capital of Japan, Nakamura and his party of Nisei were received by Prince Nashimoto, himself a high official of the Butoku-kai in Japan, who declared to Nakamura: "Go on laboring still more for the sake of our country." The party returned to the United States in September.

12. In 1934, when the Butoku-kai held a national meeting at San Francisco, the Japanese consul general declined an invitation to address the meeting on the ground that he wished to "avoid rousing sleeping dogs."

13. In one of his latest reports, Nakamura boasted the following:

Thus the North American Butoku-kai has prepared firm fundamental organizations. By means of the discipline of swordsmanship, the Nisei have awakened to the Japan spirit.

14. When Nakamura sought to reenter the United States after his fourth journey back to Japan, he was detained by the immigration authorities at Angel Island for a period of 4 months and was then admitted after intervention on his behalf by the Tokyo government, Ambassador Saito, and numerous followers in the Butoku-kai.

15. Nakamura raised funds in the United States for the establishment of the North American College of the Imperial Way at Tokyo. The primary purpose of the college was for the instruction of Nisei sent from the United States. The college was formally opened on July 10, 1938.

16. The list of sponsors of the North American College of the Imperial Way included Mitsuru Toyama, head of the Black Dragon Society of Japan, 10 admirals of the Japanese Navy, 21 generals of the Japanese Army, and 82 prominent figures of the Japanese political world. The Special Committee on Un-American Activities has the names of all these sponsors.

17. In 1935, Consul Tomokazu Hori became president of the Los Angeles Butoku-kai. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hori made daily broadcasts from Japan. On his short-wave broadcast of April 23, 1943, Hori gloated over the execution of the American flyers who were captured after the Doolittle raid.

18. The president of the Seattle branch of Butoku-kai wrote the following:

If anything were to bring about the paralysis of our national character which has come down to us from our ancestors, or if we were to lose our Japanese spirit and morale, not only would the state of our country become precarious but it would meet the fate of utter destruction. This is as clear as day. Therefore we Japanese, whether at home or beyond the seas, without distinction, must polish up our Bushido spirit which is our own traditional nature. We should foster this with enterprising energy. At present our Empire is facing a crisis against the proud and unruly sword of China—for the purpose of creating a hundred years of peace in the Orient.

19. At a meeting of the Oregon branch of Butoku-kai in 1937, there was, according to the organization's own report, "silent prayer for the success of the Imperial Army," and at its conclusion "three banzais for the fall of Shanghai."

20. The Butoku-kai's official history of the Seattle branch states that there was a special demonstration in the White River district where a Japanese flag autographed by Mitsuru Toyama was presented to the Sumner branch of Butoku-kai. Toyama, it will be remembered, is the head of the Black Dragon Society of Japan.

21. The leader of the Seattle branch of Butoku-kai wrote as follows:

Your problem, however, is much more intricate because you have as your parents subjects of our Japanese Empire which is struggling for the top rank amongst the great powers of the world. * * *

I pointed out that the causes of Japan's foreign wars were unavoidable on account of the foreign races, but America's wars were based on her own ambition—so that there was a great difference between them.

BRANCHES OF THE BUTOKU-KAI

The committee was able to locate the locations or names of the following branches of the Butoku-kai:

Hawaii (Honolulu branch)	Bakersfield	Madera
Ono	Dominguez Hill	Fresno
Watsonville	Coast League	Reedley
Campbell	San Joaquin	Visalia
Sebastopol	Northwest League	Delano
Baggerville	Main office of Friends of	Livingston
Loomis	Swordsmanship Soci-	San Pedro
Oban	ety, Sumner	Long Beach
Florin	Concord	Norwalk
Lodi	Monterey	Seattle
Viola	Salinas	White River
Farrar	Suisun	Tacoma
Dinuba	Sacramento	Portland
Hanford	Marysville	South Park
Lindsay	Taisho Division	
	Stockton	

RELEASE AND RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM OF THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

The steady release since July, 1942 of the Japanese from the relocation centers by the War Relocation Authority, to resettle and relocate in various sections of the United States, has given rise to considerable anxiety among the people of certain sections of the Nation. This anxiety has resulted from doubts as to the loyalty of the evacuees who are being released. It is this phase of the War Relocation Authority's program with which the committee is most concerned, for we feel that if this program of mass release is to continue it is imperative that the proper investigative machinery be set up to assure the citizens of this country that every person who is released from a relocation center has been thoroughly investigated and cleared as to loyalty by a competent and qualified board or agency charged directly with that responsibility. The release and resettlement program of the War Relocation Authority, in the opinion of this committee, has been very unsatisfactory, primarily for the reason that no thorough investigation by the proper authorities has been made of those evacuees who have been released, and, furthermore, if the present program of the War Relocation Authority is continued there is little hope that any such investigation will be made in the future.

The War Relocation Authority issues three types of leave:

1. Indefinite leave, which permits evacuees to leave the relocation centers after they have made arrangements for employment outside. There are no limitations placed upon them except to abide by the law and to remain outside of military areas from which they are excluded by military orders.

2. Short-term leave, which permits an evacuee to leave the relocation area for a limited period of time, not to exceed 30 days, to attend to affairs which require his presence or to interview a prospective employer, etc.

3. Seasonal work leave, which permits an evacuee to go to a particular locality to accept seasonal employment, such as work in beet fields, etc.

On July 6, 1943, Mr. Dillon Myer, Director of the War Relocation Authority, testified that as of July 3, 1943, there were 15,305 evacuees on seasonal and indefinite leave, 9,359 of which were out on indefinite leave and the remainder on seasonal leave, working largely in the agriculture fields and irrigated areas of the Midmountain and Western States. Mr. Myer told the committee that the War Relocation Authority was now in the midst of an intensive program of resettlement, and that they had been releasing approximately 500 evacuees a week on seasonal leave and 500 a week on indefinite leave, or a total of approximately 1,000 per week. He testified further that included in the group being released on indefinite leave were Kibei (born in the United States and educated in Japan), Issei (Japanese nationals) and Nisei (American citizens of Japanese ancestry). He stated that 15 percent of those being released for indefinite leave were Issei.

The leave and resettlement program of War Relocation Authority was first inaugurated July 20, 1942, by the issuance of administrative instruction No. 22 which permitted indefinite leave to citizens only. This program remained in effect until October 6, 1942, when the leave regulations were changed to permit citizens and aliens alike to apply for indefinite leave.

During this period, applicants for indefinite leave were subject to only two loyalty checks or investigations: (1) Home check; (2) name check against the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other intelligence agencies' records. In addition, their applications had to be approved by the Washington office of the War Relocation Authority. The home check was conducted by the War Relocation Authority and consisted of communicating with former employers, neighbors, and friends of the subject. In the case of the Federal Bureau of Investigation name check, the name of the subject was submitted to the Bureau which in turn ran the name against its records. This did not include a fingerprint check and the subject was not investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. If this check revealed any information it was transmitted to the War Relocation Authority for its information and guidance and without recommendation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

NO F. B. I. INVESTIGATION

The committee at this point would like to emphasize that at no time has the Federal Bureau of Investigation investigated the evacuees who were released for indefinite leave although this is the general impression throughout the country. This false impression in some measure was brought about by an erroneous statement made by an official of the War Relocation Authority to the effect that all evacuees who were released for indefinite leave had been investigated and cleared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This was later denied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the War Relocation Authority.

On April 2, the War Relocation Authority further liberalized its release program by eliminating the Federal Bureau of Investigation name check and the home check. Under the present program established by supplement 9 of Administrative Instruction No. 22, the project directors of the various relocation centers themselves can make their own determination (with certain limitations) as to the release for indefinite leave of an evacuee. In other words, the only check now in effect by the War Relocation Authority is the investigation made by the project director himself which is largely a questionnaire investigation and it is entirely within his discretion as to who will be released.

When Mr. Myer was before the subcommittee, he stated that all Nisei evacuees who were released would eventually be checked by the Japanese American Joint Board, which is composed of representatives of the Army, Navy, War Relocation Authority, and for a time, a liaison representative from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The subcommittee heard in executive session the officials of this Board and it was determined that the Japanese American Joint Board exercises no jurisdiction or authority over the War Relocation Authority except in the case where an evacuee is released for employment in a vital war plant or where the evacuee is to go into the eastern military area or southern military areas. The Federal Bureau of Investigation withdrew its liaison representative from the Board for the reason that the Board had no authority over the release program of the War Relocation Authority and could not enforce its decisions as to the loyalty or disloyalty of an evacuee upon the War Relocation Authority.

The Japanese American Joint Board was established by the War Department primarily to determine how many of the 38,000 citizen evacuees (Nisei) between the ages of 17 and 38 could be utilized in the Army or in vital war plants or in other employment in which they could assist the general war effort. In conjunction with this program, the Army set up a Japanese combat unit located at Camp Shelby, Miss., which now has an enlistment of approximately 7,000 Japanese American citizen soldiers. This Joint Board set out to determine the loyalty and qualifications of the 38,000 registrants. As previously stated, the committee heard in executive session the officials of this Board and we were very favorably impressed with the thorough job of investigation and classification which they are doing. However, the Board's authority does not extend far enough to permit it to exercise its authority over the entire release program of the War Relocation Authority. Within the next several months, according to the officials of the Board, it will have completed its investigation or screening process of the entire 38,000 evacuees. But during this period, under the present policy of the War Relocation Authority, it is possible that thousands of evacuees will be released without having been screened or investigated by the Joint Board. For this reason it is necessary that a new board with complete authority over the War Relocation Authority's release program be set up immediately or such authority be delegated to the Japanese American Joint Board.

SEASONAL LEAVE

During 1942 there was no check made against evacuees who were released for seasonal leave. However, this was changed late in 1942, and at the present time evacuees released for seasonal leave receive the same check as those who apply for indefinite leave. Mr. Myer told the subcommittee that many of the evacuees who left on seasonal leave found homes and steady employment and, therefore, applied for and obtained indefinite leave without having to return to the relocation center.

The committee is definitely of the opinion that the present release procedures of the War Relocation Authority are entirely too loose and it cannot be too emphatic in its recommendation for the immediate establishment of a competent and qualified board of agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Naval Intelligence, Military Intelligence, War Relocation Authority, and other pertinent agencies which would pass on every application for leave and with full authority to enforce its decisions. By such a procedure the people and the country generally and the communities where the evacuees are relocating would be assured that there was no question concerning the loyalty of these people. It would, therefore, relieve the released evacuees of any stigma of disloyalty and would at the same time bring about a more compatible degree of community acceptance for the evacuees.

AN INDEFENSIBLE RELEASE PROCEDURE

The War Relocation Authority, through its employment and resettlement division, has recently set up a plan to place hundreds of Nisei in civil-service employment of the Federal Government. During the past few weeks hundreds of applications from Nisei evacuees have been submitted to the Civil Service Commission by

the War Relocation Authority. As is well known, the Civil Service Commission has always conducted a very thorough investigation of all applicants for Government positions with particular emphasis on the subject's loyalty. Such an investigation requires time and personnel.

Due to the peculiar nature of the Nisei cases which are now being submitted to the Civil Service by the War Relocation Authority, the committee believes that an even more thorough investigation should be conducted of these applicants. Yet War Relocation Authority officials, in their enthusiasm to relocate these people, are themselves now apparently seeking to have the Civil Service accept the War Relocation Authority's own assurances as sufficient to establish a subject's loyalty. To substantiate this, the committee includes in this report at this point a letter dated May 26, 1943, addressed to the Director of the Seventh Region of the United States Civil Service Commission, Chicago, Ill., from Elmer L. Shirrell, Relocation Supervisor of the War Relocation Authority.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY,
Chicago, Ill., May 26, 1943.

DIRECTOR, SEVENTH REGION,
United States Civil Service Commission,
Chicago, Ill.

(Attention: Mrs. Klieger.)

DEAR SIR: * * *, now residing at * * *, Chicago, Ill., and whose application for Federal civil-service employment is attached, has been given indefinite leave from the Granada relocation center. The fact that she has been given this leave is evidence that she has been thoroughly investigated and has been found loyal to the United States. The War Relocation Authority approves her placement in any city in Illinois or Wisconsin as these two States have been determined to be safe places for private and public employment for Americans of Japanese ancestry.

We will appreciate whatever assistance you can give in placing * * *.
Very truly yours,

ELMER L. SHIRRELL,
Relocation Supervisor.

Particular reference is directed to the following language contained in this letter:

The fact that she has been given this leave is evidence that she has been thoroughly investigated and has been found loyal to the United States. The War Relocation Authority approves her placement in any city in Illinois or Wisconsin
* * *

According to the present procedure of the War Relocation Authority, the only investigation which was made to determine this party's loyalty was the so-called questionnaire investigation made by the project director of the Granada relocation center.

The committee would like to emphasize that no Federal Bureau of Investigation "name check" or War Relocation Authority "home check" was made of this applicant. Nevertheless, an official of the War Relocation Authority certified to the Civil Service Commission that a thorough investigation had been made and the applicant was found to be loyal to the United States.

It is to just this type of loose and dangerous procedure on the part of the War Relocation Authority officials that this committee takes exception. The civil-service agents who are checking these applicants against the files of this committee have already determined that some of these applicants were members of and affiliated with organizations

which were completely under the domination of the Japanese Government and so considered by every other investigative agency of this Government.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This committee recommends the following:

1. That the War Relocation Authority's belated announcement of its intention of segregating the disloyal from the loyal Japanese in the relocation centers be put into effect at the earliest possible moment.
2. That a board composed of representatives of the War Relocation Authority and the various intelligence agencies of the Federal Government be constituted with full powers to investigate evacuees who apply for release from the centers and to pass finally upon their applications.
3. That the War Relocation Authority inaugurate a thorough-going program of Americanization for those Japanese who remain in the centers.

**MINORITY VIEWS OF SUBCOMMITTEE OF SPECIAL
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES ON JAPANESE
WAR RELOCATION CENTERS SUBMITTED BY HON.
HERMAN P. EBERHARTER**

MINORITY REPORT OF THE HONORABLE HERMAN P. EBERHARTER

It is not possible for me to agree with the findings and conclusions of the other two members of our subcommittee, who constitute the majority.

After careful consideration, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the report of the majority is prejudiced, and that most of its statements are not proven.

The majority report has stressed a few shortcomings that they have found in the work of the War Relocation Authority without mentioning the many good points that our investigation has disclosed or the magnitude of the job with which the Authority is dealing.

Since the close of our hearings I have made some inquiries in order to clear up some points about which I was in doubt and on which the testimony did not seem to be sufficiently clear, the results of which inquiries have not been communicated to the other members of the subcommittee, because the subcommittee has never met to discuss the contents of a report.

There are a few basic matters that ought to be kept clearly in mind, which I wish to summarize here at the beginning before dealing with the body of the majority report of the subcommittee. It should be remembered that the relocation centers administered by the War Relocation Authority have been intended from the very beginning to be only temporary expedients. These relocation centers are not supposed to be internment camps. Dangerous aliens are placed in internment camps, but those camps are administered by the Department of Justice and should not be confused with the relocation centers. When the Japanese population was removed from the west coast they were at first free to go anywhere they wanted within the United States so long as they stayed out of the evacuated area. The first plan contemplated merely free movement and did not provide for any kind of relocation centers. For about a month thousands of evacuees were permitted to leave the west coast voluntarily for other parts of the country. Most of them have since continued to live anywhere they wanted to.

It was soon found not feasible to permit such voluntary movement to continue because trouble began to develop in places where people were not ready to receive these Japanese who had been ordered to move. It was then that the plan was changed to establish relocation centers in which the Japanese could live until it was feasible for them to get reestablished in normal life.

The dangerous aliens among the Japanese population on the west coast were picked up by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other agencies in the first few days after Pearl Harbor. Practically all the rest were presumed to be loyal and safe. It was necessary to evacuate the whole group, even after the dangerous aliens had been picked up and interned, because there was danger that the west coast would be invaded by the Japanese Army. But once removed from the west coast it was believed these people presented no further danger.

Dillon S. Myer, Director of the Authority, has told this subcommittee that about two-thirds of the people removed from the west coast are American citizens. Such a proposition as this, of moving approximately 70,000 American citizens away from their homes, has never been attempted before. Our Constitution does not distinguish between citizens of Japanese ancestry, or of German or Italian ancestry and citizens of English, Scotch, Russian, or Norwegian ancestry. Loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry have the same rights as any other loyal American citizens. I believe the Government was entirely right, therefore, in permitting free movement from the west coast so long as that was possible, and then in providing relocation centers when that proved necessary. The whole point of the program is to help the loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry, and the law-abiding aliens, to leave the relocation centers after investigation, and become established in normal life.

The rights of citizens to live as free men are part of the "four freedoms" for which we are fighting this war.

The testimony produced before this subcommittee shows that large numbers of the Japanese-American evacuees are working in war plants and in agriculture, and doing a good job. The Army has found that many of them are so trustworthy that they are being used in Military Intelligence and other secret work of high military importance. The evidence shows there were something like 5,000 loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry in the Army before the evacuation. Early this year the Army organized a special combat team of Japanese-Americans which is now in training at Camp Shelby, and which is made up entirely of volunteers.

Life in the relocation centers is not a bed of roses. The houses are of plain barrack style. The food is adequate but plain. The great majority of the relocation center residents are working at necessary jobs in connection with running the camps. They are raising much of their own food. For this work they get paid, in addition to their keep, only \$12, \$16, or \$19 a month. Even loyal American citizens in the relocation centers are working for these low wages.

Because of these facts I am disturbed about some of the ridiculous charges that were made early in our investigation. Stories about the Japanese people hiding food in the desert and storing contraband in holes under their houses, were shown to be ridiculous when a project was visited. However, the majority's report fails to withdraw these charges.

The report of the majority makes a big point about 23 persons who were released from the camps and who are found to be members of Butoku-kai, a Japanese fencing organization. This is 23 people out of

16,000 released. Even in the case of these 23 neither the majority report nor the hearings offer any evidence that any of the 23 were subversive.

I, for one, want to emphasize that just because a person is a member of an organization alleged to be subversive, I do not ipso facto conclude that the particular person is subversive. Certainly, mere proof of membership in an organization alleged to be subversive does not provide legal grounds for arresting or detaining such a person. Proper investigation may determine such a person to be intensely loyal to the United States.

After all the wind and the fury of a long report that creates the impression that War Relocation Authority is doing a very bad job, the comments of the majority members are climaxed by three feeble, meaningless recommendations.

These recommendations hardly support the prejudiced tone of the report. I shall discuss them later. At this point I want to take up some of the specific matters discussed in the majority's report.

THE REPORT OF THE MAJORITY

Administration of relocation centers.

In the majority's report the following language appears:

This committee does not consider it necessary to discuss in detail the administrative errors and deficiencies of the War Relocation Authority which were indicated by voluminous evidence received in the course of the subcommittee hearings. The Director of the War Relocation Authority, Mr. Dillon S. Myer, was frank in admitting that many mistakes had been made. Only those administrative errors which bear directly or indirectly upon the subject of subversive and un-American activities come within the special interest of this committee.

The implication of this paragraph is that the administration of the War Relocation Authority program has been lacking in competency and efficiency, that many mistakes have been made, and that Director Myer acknowledged that this was true.

Actually, Director Myer expressed the judgment before the subcommittee that a good job is being done in administration of the relocation centers and of the program as a whole and that such mistakes as were made, particularly in the early months of operation, were largely such as would inevitably occur in the development of a new and unprecedented program. There was nothing in the evidence heard by the subcommittee that would bear out the implication that the program was being incompetently or inefficiently administered. All things considered the preponderance of evidence indicates that the War Relocation Authority is doing a good job in handling an extremely difficult problem.

Fitness of War Relocation Authority personnel.

The majority's report states that much of the personnel in the War Relocation Authority is manifestly unfit for the job. The only specific evidence which is referred to in the report or which was presented before the subcommittee to substantiate this conclusion was the assertion that few of the administrative personnel had a prior knowledge of Japanese culture, language, and habits. Director Myer, in his testimony, states that the War Relocation Authority staff

included some persons who were especially chosen because of their acquaintance with Japanese culture and language and that these persons had served as advisers to other members of the staff. A considerable number of the staff were formerly residents of California and other Western States who in the past had a great deal of contact with persons of Japanese ancestry living in this country.

The fact that apart from these two groups most of the War Relocation Authority staff had no previous close contact with Japanese or Japanese-Americans seems not particularly significant. For one thing, there are comparatively few people in the United States who understand the Japanese language or are well acquainted with Japanese culture. Apart from that, it would have been unfortunate had the War Relocation Authority sought to employ a large number of such persons when actually they would have been and are more usefully employed by other agencies of the Government engaged directly in the war against Japan. Furthermore, the War Relocation Authority would be subject to severe criticism were it dominated by people who have previously been intimate with the Japanese or Japanese-Americans and therefore subject to the accusation of being unduly sympathetic toward them.

Americanization.

Anyone genuinely interested in the problem of continuing the Americanization of the Japanese-American population of this country must acknowledge that the greatest force for Americanization is free, friendly, and continuous contact with non-Japanese-Americans in normal communities. The evacuation and isolation of the Japanese population in relocation centers away from normal contacts is an almost overwhelming obstacle to the assimilation of the Japanese-Americans, as it would be to any immigrant population. To say, as the majority's report does, that—

the War Relocation Authority had before it an almost unparalleled opportunity to inaugurate a vigorous educational program for positive Americanism—

is an almost complete inversion of the true situation. Americanization is best accomplished not by formal programs of education, but by the continuous day-to-day mingling of the immigrant group among the general American population. By way of illustration, the story is told of an educated, loyal Nisei during the very early days of evacuation when his family was still in an assembly center, who protested bitterly that his children, who had always spoken good English, were learning broken English from their less well Americanized companions.

Far from having an unparalleled opportunity in the relocation centers to effect Americanization, the War Relocation Authority is confronted with the very difficult problem, under such artificial circumstances, of preventing the development of a distinct relocation center culture which is mostly American but partly Japanese. Anyone sincerely interested in the Americanization of the loyal Japanese must see that the best Americanization program is found in the relocation of evacuees in normal American communities.

The majority's report bases a strong criticism of the Authority on the fact that the Authority has carried on the evacuee pay roll at each center certain recreational supervisors who were especially concerned with sports and recreational activities of Japanese origin. Particularly, criticism has been directed against the teaching of Judo.

Reference is made to the employment of 90 Judo instructors at one center. Director Myer explained that this overemphasis on Judo at that particular center had long since been corrected by the Authority. He also explained that such instruction in Judo as still continues at the centers is carried on under a program formulated after consultation with competent intelligence officers of the military service. It is a matter of common knowledge that Judo is taught to soldiers in the United States Army and that Japanese-Americans from the relocation centers are often used as instructors in Judo classes outside the centers.

It was also brought out in Director Myer's testimony that the teaching of the Japanese language in the centers, originally prohibited, is now conducted largely for the benefit of persons who will become Japanese language teachers for the United States military and naval services.

As to Americanized recreational activities, the evidence indicates that baseball is the most popular sport among the evacuees at the relocation centers. Basketball and football are also very popular. Boy Scout work, Girl Scout work, and the like have a following multiplied many times over that accorded to similar activities of Japanese cultural origin. Among the evacuees there are many thousands of members of such organizations as the Young Men's Christian Association, Young Women's Christian Association, Girl Reserves, Hi-Y, Camp Fire Girls, and Future Farmers of America. A large proportion of the adult population belongs to parent-teacher associations, the American Red Cross, and similar organizations.

Evacuee food.

Among the complaints listed as reasons for this subcommittee's investigation is the charge that—

the Japanese evacuees were being supplied food through the Quartermaster Corps of the Army in greater variety and quantity than was available to the average American consumer.

This charge is repeated in the report of the majority members but it is not brought out that the evidence received before the subcommittee completely rebutted the charge. The facts which the subcommittee's investigators established and which were borne out by other testimony received by the subcommittee are these:

1. All rationing restrictions applicable to the general public are strictly applied in relocation centers.

2. Food costs have averaged about 40 cents per day per person and are subject to a top limit of 45 cents per day per person on an annual basis.

3. Director Myer testified, without contradiction, to the effect that the centers are instructed to refrain from purchasing commodities of which there are general or local shortages.

4. Within the limitations set by rationing and the 45-cent daily cash allowance, the Authority has provided an adequate diet meeting reasonable wartime standards.

Discipline in relocation centers.

Another of the complaints listed as reasons for the subcommittee's investigation was the charge that—

the discipline in the various relocation centers was very lax and that considerable Government property had been destroyed by some of the Japanese.

No specific comment is made concerning this complaint in the majority's report.

Actually, the evidence produced before the subcommittee indicated that there was much less crime of any kind in the relocation centers than in the average American community of the same size. By and large the evacuees have cooperated with the administration of the centers in maintaining order and discipline. Considering the emotional and social demoralization involved in evacuation, the conduct of the evacuees has been exemplary. The evidence indicates that ordinary crime at the centers has been negligible.

Manzanar gangs.

In the majority's report considerable space is given to certain activities attributed to the Blood Brothers Corps at Manzanar. Two statements are necessary in reference to this discussion. In the first place, it should be pointed out that the War Relocation Authority did, according to the evidence presented to the subcommittee, take rather effective action in handling these gangs. An isolation center was established and the gang leaders were transferred to that place. At present it appears that activities such as those of the Manzanar gangs have been eliminated. Secondly, the evidence concerning existence of the Blood Brothers Corps is very indefinite. No one has been discovered who belonged to the supposed organization and the only evidence of its existence consists of certain apparently anonymous letters purporting to be written by a member of the corps. The point is that very little worth-while evidence is actually available on the existence of a Blood Brothers Corps. The evidence indicates that Manzanar probably had more troubles than any of the other relocation centers but the evidence also indicates that the sources of trouble there have now been eliminated.

Segregation.

In the majority's report the War Relocation Authority is severely criticized for not having entered upon a program of segregating disloyal evacuees from the great majority who are loyal before public hearings before this subcommittee had revealed the urgent need for segregation. Actually the facts are that on May 14, 1943, at a press conference in Washington, Director Myer announced the program of segregation and the announcement was given newspaper publicity. This was before the hearings of this subcommittee were begun and long before the United States Senate adopted the resolution referred to in the majority's report. Furthermore, Director Myer had in April written a letter to Senator A. B. Chandler, chairman of the Subcommittee on Japanese War Relocation Centers of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, in which letter he stated that a program for such segregation was being worked out. Senator Chandler gave this letter to the press shortly afterward.

Had it been physically possible to make a fair determination immediately at the outset of the establishment of the relocation centers as to the loyalty or disloyalty of each evacuee, many of the difficulties of the War Relocation Authority would have been eliminated.

Nevertheless, I believe that the War Relocation Authority could and should have speeded up the plan for segregation more than it did. I feel that the actual movement of segregants should have been initiated more quickly. It is true that intelligent determinations on

the loyalty of more than 100,000 people cannot be made in a week or a month and the War Relocation Authority's efforts to be fairly certain in its determinations are commendable. However, many of the evacuees who were known to be disloyal could have been moved out of the regular relocation centers sooner than was done. A certain amount of criticism on this point is therefore justified.

The legal aspects of the relocation program.

The constitutional difficulty of confining citizens not charged with any crime is not discussed in the majority's report. Legality of such detention becomes increasingly difficult to sustain when it involves citizens of the United States against whom no charges of disloyalty or subversiveness have been made, particularly, if the detention continues for a period longer than the minimum time necessary for ascertainment of the facts. The principal justification for detaining citizen evacuees in relocation centers is that such detention is merely a temporary and qualified detention. They are detained until they can be sifted with regard to their sympathies in the war and until jobs can be found for them in communities where they will be accepted.

Such action may be sustained as an incident to an orderly relocation program, but any unqualified detention for the duration of the war of loyal citizens would be so vulnerable to attack in court as to imperil the entire relocation and detention program. That the leave regulations are legally necessary is emphasized by a recent decision of the Federal court for the northern district of California which dismissed a petition for writ of habeas corpus brought by an evacuee, on the ground that petitioner had not exhausted her administrative remedies by applying to the War Relocation Authority for leave (*In re Endo*).

In *Hirabayashi v. United States*, decided on June 21, 1943, the United States Supreme Court heard an appeal by a citizen of Japanese descent who had been sentenced concurrently on two counts: First, for violation of curfew regulations, and secondly, for failure to report for evacuation. The Court sustained the conviction solely upon the basis of the curfew count and avoided consideration of the conviction on the evacuation count. The natural inference that the Court found it comparatively easy to uphold the curfew, while encountering comparative difficulty in determining the legality of the evacuation, is reinforced by passages in concurring opinions by Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Douglas. Mr. Justice Murphy, in his concurring opinion, said of the curfew orders:

† In my opinion this goes to the very brink of constitutional power.

Since the detention accompanying the evacuation is a more drastic restriction of liberty than the mere evacuation itself, there is even more reason for the opinion that such detention is to be justified under the Constitution only if it is carefully limited with all possible respect to the rights of citizens in the current emergency. The legal problems of detaining citizens cannot be disregarded by the governmental agency responsible for administering the leave program.

It is apparent that the leave program of the War Relocation Authority has been formulated with a thoughtful view toward assuring the legality of the Authority's program as a whole, and it is probable that without the leave program the whole detention plan might well

be subjected to successful legal attack. That this protection against such attack has been set up and put into effective operation, thus giving greater assurance of the continued detention of those who under the program are not entitled to leave, is a fact for which the Authority is definitely to be commended.

Leave program for the War Relocation Authority.

A principal object of the War Relocation Authority's leave program, it seems, is the separation of evacuees believed to be loyal to Japan from those loyal to the United States. This is the same thing substantially as the segregation program. The best way to segregate the disloyal from the loyal is to relocate the loyal in normal life. That is what the leave program is designed to achieve. This takes time, however. It seems unfair to the loyal, in the meantime, to allow them to be confused in the public mind with the disloyal, therefore, segregation should be and is being undertaken as a separate program. As soon as segregation is completed it seems that the leave program itself for the loyal evacuees should be substantially speeded up.

Administration of leave program.

On October 1, 1942, the present basic leave regulations of the War Relocation Authority became effective, on publication in the Federal Register. They provide that any evacuee citizen or alien may request indefinite leave from a relocation center. To support the request, the evacuee must show that he has a job or can take care of himself, must agree to report changes of address to the War Relocation Authority, and must have a record indicating that he will not endanger the national security. In addition, the War Relocation Authority must satisfy itself that the community in which the evacuee proposes to relocate will accept him without difficulty.

Much of the substance of the majority's report is concerned with the problems of releasing evacuees from relocation centers. The essential question raised by the report is whether or not the War Relocation Authority has exercised reasonable precautions and careful judgment in determining which evacuees shall be granted leave. The majority's report concludes that it has not. As evidence for its conclusion, it relies chiefly upon two arguments: (1) 23 evacuees who have been given leave from the centers may be dangerous because they had some connection with an allegedly subversive organization known as Butoku-kai; (2) the present procedures of the Authority do not provide sufficient checks on the record of individuals released.

As to the first of these arguments, the majority's report does not allege that these 23 members of the Butoku-kai are subversive or dangerous, but does state that—

The release of these 23 Japanese is evidence of the incompetence of the War Relocation Authority to exercise proper safeguards both for the national security and for the thousands of loyal Japanese as well.

In a letter dated July 16, 1943, to this subcommittee, Director Myer gave specific information concerning the circumstances under which leave was granted to these 23 persons. It was brought out that, as to 16 of the 23, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had records which disclosed no report or derogatory information. As to 5 of them, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had no records whatever. One was released for school work under an agreement with

military intelligence. One, an alien, was paroled, under the regular sponsor parolee agreement prescribed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice. That accounts for all 23 of them. Director Myer states that no evidence was given to the Authority either from the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any other agency that any one of these 23 persons was dangerous or subversive.

Leave clearance procedure.

The second major argument advanced in the majority's report in support of its strong condemnation of the leave clearance procedures followed by the War Relocation Authority is that procedures have recently been so liberalized as to remove certain essential safeguards. It is stated that while originally the Authority made what is called a home check and a name check and all leave clearance was granted by the Director in Washington, since April 1943 project directors have been authorized to "make their own determination (with certain limitations)" as to the release for indefinite leave of an evacuee and that the home check and the name check have been eliminated. ("Name check" is the term used by the subcommittee to describe the process of securing such information as is available in the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation before granting leave to an individual.)

This statement is misleading in three respects. In the first place, "the certain limitations" are extremely important in that they withhold the right of the project director to grant leave to the following categories of people:

1. Evacuees who answered no or gave a qualified answer to the loyalty question during the Army registration.
2. Repatriates and expatriates.
3. Paroled aliens.
4. Shinto priests.
5. Those whose leave clearance has been suspended by the Director.

These categories include all evacuees about whom there is generally reason to have doubt. That these "certain limitations" are in force is established both by the provisions of the Administrative Instruction (No. 22) given in evidence, and by the direct testimony of Director Myer before the subcommittee.

In the second place, in discussing checks made on loyalty of evacuees applying for indefinite leave, the majority's report mentions a home check and a name check, but does not mention the check-up made at the project. Director Myer testified that such a check-up is regularly made. The project staff is in a position to know a good deal about the evacuees.

In the third place, the statement is made in the majority's report that on April 2, the War Relocation Authority further liberalized its release program by eliminating the Federal Bureau of Investigation name check. The evidence indicates that the Federal Bureau of Investigation name check has not been eliminated, but rather that all names of evacuee adults are being submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has almost completed its check on all the evacuees. As soon as a derogatory report is received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation on one of the individuals, the project director is notified and is instructed not to grant leave to the individual in question.

Japanese-Americans in the civil service.

The majority's report intimates that the War Relocation Authority has set up a plan to place hundreds of Nisei in civil service employment of the Federal Government and it describes, under the heading "An Indefensible Release Procedure," one case in which an attempt was made to secure civil service rating for a Nisei. In response to my inquiry, the following letter was received:

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY,
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR,
Washington, August 18, 1943.

HON. HERMAN P. EBERHARTER,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. EBERHARTER: I am glad to respond to your telephone request for information concerning the investigation made by the War Relocation Authority before issuing indefinite leave to the person named in a letter sent by Mr. Elmer L. Shirrell, a relocation supervisor of the Authority, to the director of the seventh region of the United States Civil Service Commission on May 26, 1943. The person referred to in the letter is Mary Nakasuji.

Mary Nakasuji applied to the War Relocation Authority for leave clearance in November 1942. A check of the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was made on December 12, 1942, which indicated that the records contained no information on the applicant. Reports were secured by the project internal security officer and by the evacuee's immediate employment supervisor at the center. Both reports were strongly favorable.

A letter received from a Mr. George M. Osborne, 4693 Alice Street, San Diego, Calif., dated December 31, 1942, states:

"I have known Mary and members of her family for several years. I sincerely believe her to be a very good American citizen. We know she is of Christian faith and has demonstrated to the utmost her democratic views regarding American ideals and our American standard of living. I highly recommend her as to character."

After considering the results of the name check, results of the check of the Federal Bureau of Investigation record, project report, and this letter of endorsement, this applicant was granted leave clearance on January 20, 1943. She left the Granada relocation center on March 13, worked as a secretary and book-keeper in the Young Men's Christian Association at 19 South La Salle Street, Chicago, and on June 6 went to work with the Roberts Manufacturing Co. at an increased salary. She is still employed there. Reports on her work are favorable. She has not yet taken a civil-service examination, but has filled out Standard Form 57 in order that her eligibility for civil service may be determined.

On July 2, 1943, the Japanese-American Joint Board concurred in the granting of indefinite leave to Miss Nakasuji.

If you would like any further information concerning this case, or any other aspect of our work, please do not hesitate to call on me.

Sincerely,

D. S. MYER, *Director.*

In view of the facts, I believe the letter written by the relocation supervisor seems fully justified in this case.

It is unfortunate that the majority's report should have relied so heavily upon a mistaken interpretation of the facts in this case when the true facts would have been readily available.

Conduct of evacuees who have been granted leave.

It is worthy of note that of all the evacuees who have been released on both seasonal and indefinite leave by the War Relocation Authority, numbering more than 16,000, no report of disloyal or subversive activity has been made to the Authority or to this subcommittee.

Moreover, among the Japanese-American population numbering 290,000 in the continental United States and Hawaii, only 32 percent of whom are in relocation centers, there have been no established cases

of sabotage while there are thousands of cases of loyal workers in industry, agriculture, and in the armed forces of the United States.

When proper weight is given to the importance of preserving democratic and constitutional principles in the treatment of the Japanese-American population with, at the same time, proper regard for national security, it is evident that the relocation centers and the outside relocation program are being administered efficiently and well.

The recommendations of the majority report.

I have already commented on how mild the recommendations of the majority report seem after the severe language of its findings.

I agree fully with the first recommendation, that segregation of the disloyal should be put into effect at once. As I have said, I believe the War Relocation Authority should have moved faster on this than they did, although it is not an easy thing to distinguish the loyal from the disloyal among 100,000 persons.

The subcommittee's second recommendation is that a new board be established, made up of representatives of the War Relocation Authority and the various Intelligence agencies of the Federal Government to investigate evacuees who apply for release from the centers and to pass finally upon their applications. The subcommittee's investigations have made clear that there has always been close cooperation between Army Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, and the War Relocation Authority. The War Relocation Authority has always had access to the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I do not see any necessity for establishing still another board. I do not see that the results would be any different than they are now since the records of all these Intelligence agencies are now available to the War Relocation Authority. Such a board would simply divide responsibility among a number of agencies, and then no one person or agency could be held responsible for results.

There is nothing in the record of leave clearance granted by the War Relocation Authority that justifies the setting up of a board to take over this function. Moreover, it seems pretty clear that the agency of the Government charged with the detention of citizens, particularly those to whom leave is denied, should be the agency which makes the actual determination to grant or deny leave in individual cases. In short, the granting of leave is an essential part of the legal basis for detention and should not be separated from the administration of relocation centers.

No recommendation for the establishment of such a board as is recommended by the subcommittee majority was made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, or the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department.

The third and last recommendation of the majority's report is in favor of a thoroughgoing program of Americanization for Japanese who remain in centers. Of course I am in favor of that; everybody is in favor of Americanization just as everybody is against sin. Of course I am sure the majority members of the subcommittee would not want to push this idea so far that they will turn these camps into a "social experiment."

Mr. Myer testified that there is a great deal of Americanization work going on in the centers. The schools are active in this work, and many of the younger people are members of Future Farmers of

America, the Red Cross, the Boy and Girl Scouts, Camp Fire Girls, and similar agencies. Adult English classes are provided for hundreds of aliens.

Certainly, we would need an extraordinarily intensive Americanization program for loyal American citizens who are detained in seeming contradiction of American principles and the "four freedoms." Certainly, also, the best way to push Americanization of this group is for the War Relocation Authority to go ahead with its program of restoring full freedom of movement to the loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry and the law-abiding aliens who are now in relocation centers.

I believe the War Relocation Authority should complete its segregation program, should continue its Americanization program, and should, by all means, go ahead with its resettlement program.


Summation.


It is my conclusion that, considering the magnitude of its job, the difficulty of the legal issues involved, and the complexity and delicacy of the problem of resettling a large group of people in the midst of a war, the War Relocation Authority has acted, by and large, efficiently and capably, and has carried out the spirit and intent of the President's Executive order under which it was established. I think it is better to let the War Relocation Authority carry on unhampered by unfair criticism.

Respectfully submitted.

HERMAN P. EBERHARTER.







INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SEVENTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

H. Res. 282

TO INVESTIGATE (1) THE EXTENT, CHARACTER, AND OBJECTS OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES, (2) THE DIFFUSION WITHIN THE UNITED STATES OF SUBVERSIVE AND UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA THAT IS INSTIGATED FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES OR OF A DOMESTIC ORIGIN AND ATTACKS THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT AS GUARANTEED BY OUR CONSTITUTION, AND (3) ALL OTHER QUESTIONS IN RELATION THERETO THAT WOULD AID CONGRESS IN ANY NECESSARY REMEDIAL LEGISLATION

COMMITTEE PRINT

Minority Views on Tule Lake Segregation Center

Presented by Herman P. Eberharter

(Not Printed at Government expense)



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INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE,
TO INVESTIGATE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

MINORITY VIEWS ON TULE LAKE SEGREGATION CENTER PRESENTED BY HERMAN P. EBERHARTER

In June 1943, the chairman of the House of Representatives Special Committee on Un-American Activities appointed a 3-man subcommittee to investigate the program of the War Relocation Authority. This subcommittee has now submitted two formal reports. The first, dealing with the War Relocation Authority program in general and consisting of both majority and minority views, was presented to the Congress on September 30, 1943. The second was concerned specifically with events which took place at the Tule Lake segregation center in early November 1943, and was released to the press on February 28, 1944.

Inasmuch as I find it impossible to agree with the intimations, conclusions, and recommendations of the majority report, I submit this separate minority report as a means of making my views known to the Congress and the people.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MAJORITY REPORT

The report of the majority members is rather brief. It deals only in the sketchiest summary form with the mass of evidence presented to the subcommittee, and it systematically excludes all the evidence which indicates that War Relocation Authority has a difficult assignment and that it is doing a capable job.

The majority report contains four specific recommendations. The first of these recommendations is that Dillon S. Myer, National Director of the War Relocation Authority, and Ray R. Best, Tule Lake center director, be removed from their positions because of their "evident inability" to cope with the problem of disloyal Japanese. I have neither seen nor heard any evidence which would justify such a recommendation. In fact, throughout the hearings held by the subcommittee I was continually impressed by the magnitude and complexity of the job which Mr. Myer and Mr. Best have faced in administering the Tule Lake center and by the seasoned judgment they have displayed in carrying out their responsibilities. The measure of the men is amply indicated, I think, by their actions on the afternoon of November 1, 1943. On that afternoon a crowd of several thousand men,

women, and children gathered around the administration building at the Tule Lake center in response to an unauthorized announcement and remained there while Mr. Myer and Mr. Best listened to the demands of a self-appointed negotiating committee inside the building. The atmosphere was tense and charged with potentialities of serious trouble. The easy way to have handled the situation would have been to call in the troops stationed immediately outside the center and disperse the crowd by force. But such action might well have led to bloodshed involving innocent women and children. It would almost certainly have had repercussions in the Far East where thousands of American soldiers and civilians are still held as captives by the Japanese. And it would scarcely have been the kind of action in which a democratic nation can take justifiable pride. The course which Mr. Myer and Mr. Best actually followed was much wiser and more statesmanlike. Instead of being panicked into rash action, they met with the evacuee committee, rejected all demands that seemed unreasonable, and then gave both the committee and the crowd a forthright and uncompromising statement of the Government's position.

The test was a severe one. Decisions had to be made quickly and a single unwise move might have had reverberations extending thousands of miles beyond the segregation center. A careful reading of the transcript which is included in the majority report shows that both Mr. Myer and Mr. Best consistently displayed the qualities of judgment and emotional stability which this country has a right to expect of its Government administrators. I cannot help wondering what action my excessively critical colleagues would have taken under similar circumstances. The role of "Monday morning quarterback" has never been a particularly difficult assignment.

The second recommendation of the majority members is that the Tule Lake center be transferred to the administrative jurisdiction and control of the Department of Justice. Here again, I am unable to understand how my colleagues arrived at such a conclusion. In testifying before the subcommittee, the Attorney General of the United States made it very clear and emphatic that it is not his desire to have administration of the Tule Lake center transferred to the Justice Department. Nothing he said could be construed that he felt such a transfer necessary or desirable from any standpoint. Testimony submitted by Mr. Myer and other War Relocation Authority officials was naturally silent on the advisability of transfer but indicated plainly that the job of administering the segregation center is far from a simple one and that a background of experience in handling evacuees of Japanese descent is essential for efficient operations.

This testimony, for example, brought out the fact that the segregation program is unlike anything the United States Government has previously attempted, and that it has been widely misunderstood. The population at Tule Lake, according to Mr. Myer, includes some of the most troublesome individuals of Japanese ancestry who were previously scattered throughout 10 War Relocation Authority centers. But it also includes hundreds of women and children who are living there merely because of family ties and who have given no indication of disloyalty to the United States. It is composed both of Japanese

nationals, whose interests are protected by international agreement, and of American citizens, who are guaranteed certain basic rights by the American Constitution. Obviously, efficient administration of such a community cannot be measured by prison standards or by the standards of an Axis concentration camp. It calls for a blend of restraint, tolerance, and sound common sense, together with the necessary degree of firmness which will indicate without question that Government officials are actually in control under any and all circumstances. By such standards, the record indicates that War Relocation Authority—far from doing an inefficient job at the Tule Lake center—has actually handled its difficult assignment with commendable effectiveness.

The third recommendation of the majority calls upon the War Relocation Authority to provide the Congress with a report which would do two things: (1) List the individuals responsible for the beating of Dr. Pedicord and for fomenting the incident of November 1, and (2) indicate the legal or disciplinary action taken against these individuals.

When Mr. Myer appeared before the subcommittee, he was asked to supply this same kind of information. At that time he indicated that individuals responsible for the Tule Lake incident were being gradually apprehended and that action was being taken to isolate them from the remainder of the community. He added that Dr. Pedicord had so far been unable to identify his assailants. This is not surprising since several thousand of the Tule Lake residents had come into the center only a few weeks before the incident occurred. I can readily understand why the majority members of the subcommittee might want more up-to-date information on the status of the troublemakers at Tule Lake. But I cannot understand why they recommend that a report be submitted to Congress. That seems to me to be the direct responsibility of this particular committee, which has all the requisite powers, including that of subpoena, to obtain the desired information. Although the wording of the recommendation does not say exactly by whom such a report should be submitted, I assume it was intended that the War Relocation Authority submit directly to Congress such a report—a procedure without precedent. Furthermore, I think it can be fairly stated that the War Relocation Authority fully cooperated with the committee throughout the investigation and hearings insofar as the furnishing of information was concerned.

The final recommendation of the majority members is that policing activities at Tule Lake and all other War Relocation Authority centers be carried out exclusively by Caucasians in sufficient strength to protect the lives and property of the residents. I may be mistaken, but my impression is that protection of lives and property at War Relocation Authority centers is primarily a responsibility of the United States Army which seems to me to be amply equipped to handle the job. As I understand it, the internal security force which War Relocation Authority maintains within the centers is intended chiefly to handle minor infractions of the regulations and the day-to-day duties of patrolling the residence area. Evacuee residents are used in this work not only for reasons of governmental economy but because knowledge of the Japanese language is frequently necessary in dealing with some of the older alien residents. Whenever violence seems imminent

or danger threatens, War Relocation Authority's long-standing agreement with the War Department provides that troops stationed outside the center can be called in immediately to maintain order. Troops have recently been called upon to maintain order in large, well-governed centers of population, such as Los Angeles and Detroit. The calling of troops in an emergency does not necessarily indicate a permanent break-down of civilian governmental authority. As long as War Relocation Authority's agreement with the Army remains in effect, it seems doubtful if the system of protection can be improved by adopting the recommendation of the majority members. Aside from increasing the costs of operating the centers considerably, the recommendation would appear to involve an unnecessary duplication of effort. Furthermore, it is my understanding that minor policing in prisoner-of-war camps, internment camps, concentration or detention camps, in all the countries, including those of our enemies, is performed by the residents of the camp.

Were the recommendation of the majority of the subcommittee on this subject to be followed, it would mean a departure by the United States from the practice followed throughout the world.

INVESTIGATING TECHNIQUES

When the subcommittee to investigate the War Relocation Authority program was established in June 1943, I agreed to serve as a member with certain definite objectives in mind. I have always felt that congressional investigation groups have a most valuable function to perform in our democracy, not only because their membership is small, but because they possess extraordinary powers; they can examine the operations of Government agencies and inquire into questions of public policy in comprehensive detail and report the essence of their findings to the Congress as a whole and to the people. By the nature of their position and powers, they can provide a useful check on the executive branch, and can also insure that funds appropriated by Congress are being used in the public interest.

But if congressional investigations are to perform their true function and serve their highest purpose, they must approach their task with an open mind and a real zeal for finding out the facts. They must carefully weigh all the available evidence before formulating conclusions and making recommendations. They must be both scientific and judicious. They must keep constantly in mind the heavy responsibility incumbent upon them to present accurate, unbiased information and recommendations as a guide to legislative action.

With these principles in mind, I have participated in the investigation of the War Relocation Authority program with a growing feeling of apprehension. From the beginning, it has been apparent that my associates on the subcommittee and the staff investigators have a conception of our assignment which is fundamentally different from mine.

An onlooker would have concluded that the committee was acting in the role of prosecuting attorney rather than as judge or as grand jury. It seemed that every opportunity was pounced upon to ferret out minor flaws, and to get abundant publicity on the wildest allegations. Testimony of discharged or disgruntled former employees re-

ceived close attention and, in my opinion, was given undue credence. The cross-examination to which the War Relocation Authority officials was subjected did not add to the dignity or prestige of the proceedings. No effort was made to learn or understand the problems and policies of the War Relocation Authority from the highest officials of the agency until after a large portion of the public mind had been thoroughly poisoned by sensational charges, none of which (of any moment) were subsequently proven. It is not too difficult to distort the true function of a congressional investigation.

In peacetime, an ordinary Government agency can usually withstand a congressional investigation of any type. But this particular investigation has centered on a wartime program that has no real parallel in American history—a program shot through and through with explosive possibilities and posing questions of the gravest national and international consequence.

The need for thoroughness, discretion, and balanced judgment in investigation is imperative; the possibilities for harm through biased or inadequate investigation are enormous. Yet the investigation has seemingly been conducted with a view to obtaining maximum publicity for the most irresponsible charges. On the basis of slim and unreliable evidence, the American people have been led to believe that the War Relocation Authority is pampering the residents of relocation centers and that it is deliberately or heedlessly turning potential spies and saboteurs loose upon the Nation. Groundless public fears and antagonisms have been stirred up at a time when national unity is more than ever needed, and widespread distrust has been engendered toward the operations of a hard-working and conscientious agency. Even more important, the investigation has encouraged the American public to confuse the people in relocation centers with our real enemies across the Pacific. Thus it has fostered a type of racial thinking which is already producing ugly manifestations and which seems to be growing in intensity. Unless this trend is checked, it may eventually lead to ill-advised actions that will constitute an everlastingly shameful blot on our national record.

In view of these facts, it is my considered opinion that the "investigation" of the War Relocation Authority program has not only been a painful parody on fair-minded and constructive congressional inquiry but a serious disservice to the American people.

The other two members of the special subcommittee are personally friendly to me, as I am likewise personally friendly to them. We have spent many days and many hours together, and not for an instant do I question their sincerity of purpose. I am indeed most sorry to say I honestly believe they have been lured into following techniques which in my conception are contrary to democratic processes. However, the issue is too important to permit personal consideration to intervene.

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Very truly yours,
 [Signature]