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Kuratomi, George & Singsu

Longitudinal Oral history

(Kunitani, George + Joyce)

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LONGITUDINAL ORAL HISTORY OF GEORGE AND JOYCE KUNITANI

1944-1945

TULE LAKE SEGREGATION CENTER

"Our motive never was so much our release, but rather to prove our innocence . . . If accused, we wanted proof of our guilt."

*George Kunitani,
September 18, 1944.*

GEORGE AND JOYCE KUNITANI

Mr. Kunitani is deceased. If any part of this longitudinal case history should be considered for publication, I think that Mrs. Kunitani would probably permit the use of their real names. Interested persons should get in touch with Professor Arthur A. Hansen, Director of the Japanese American Oral History Project at California State University, Fullerton, California.

Mr. Kunitani was born in San Diego, California in 1915. He was taken to Japan at the age of 7 and returned to the United States at age 15. He graduated from high school in San Diego with honors. He spoke English and Japanese fluently.

He worked as sales clerk in a fruit and vegetable store and in 1937 he made another short trip to Japan. On his return to America he worked successively as manager of a retail fruit and vegetable store, as salesman and truck driver of a wholesale produce store, and as operator of his own produce store. In his spare time he served as Sunday school teacher and group leader in the Buddhist Church.

In April of 1942 he was evacuated to the Santa Anita Assembly Center, where he met Joyce, the young woman who was to become his wife. He and Joyce managed to get themselves transferred together to the Jerome Relocation Project by taking employment with the WRA as key personnel. As Joyce told me in 1981, "We were just going together. I had a crush on him."¹ But, since they were not yet married, George arranged for Joyce to live with a Buddhist minister's wife. "He was very religious, George was." At Jerome, George worked as foreman of a lumberjack crew. He also became associated with Reverend Shozo Abe with whom he vehemently opposed the military registration.

George and Joyce were segregated to the Tule Lake Center in September of 1943 and in October, when the farm accident occurred, George accepted the chairmanship of the Negotiating Committee of the Daihyo Sha Kai (Representative Body). After November 4, when the Army took control of the Center, George, Reverend Abe, and Mitsugu Tada, the head of the evacuee police force, tried to maintain a political relationship with the Army, presenting a plan for getting the essential workers back on their jobs. But negotiations proved very difficult and after the debacle of November 13, when the Army and WRA called a mass meeting at which no Japanese Americans appeared, the Army ordered the arrest of the members of the Negotiating Committee and other leaders. Kunitani and a number of other leaders went into hiding. Despite a camp-wide search on November 26, the Army was unable to find them.

On December 1 Kunitani and three other unapprehended leaders voluntarily gave themselves up, but they surrendered to the FBI and not the Army.² George Kunitani was confined in the stockade without trial until August 24, 1944.⁷

* * * * *

After the release of the leaders of the November uprising, I, of course, was eager to talk to them. I approached the Tsuchikawas, who were ardent Resegregationists, and who, I knew, had been among those involved in trying to obtain the release of the men in the stockade. They said they would make inquiries. (I did not, at this time, know that a schism had already developed among the Resegregationists, nor was I aware that Mr. Kunitani was not on the best of terms with Mr. Yamashita and the Tsuchikawas (See Thomas and Nishimoto, pp. 298-300). Nevertheless, on September 7, Mr. Tsuchikawa told me that George Kunitani "had been contacted and that he had said that he would be glad to see me at any time." I thereupon arranged for a meeting on the following morning and sat up far into the night, composing a list of questions. (Field Notes, September 7, 1944, p.9).⁷

1. See interview with Joyce Kunitani, p. 7

2. Almost a year later George hinted to me that they had escaped the search by dressing as a women.⁷

But when I arrived at Kunitani's apartment, his wife told me that he had been picked up by the Internal Security the day before and not yet been released. I subsequently learned that investigators from the District Attorney's office in Modoc County, had embarked on a re-investigation of the Noma murder and that they were questioning not only Kunitani, Abe, and Tada, but also such Resegregationist leaders as Mr. Tsuchikawa, and Kira.

On September 12 I visited the Tsuchikawas, who were deeply concerned over the threatened indictments. Mrs. Tsuchikawa told me that the District Attorney had told George Kunitani that if he came back to camp and gathered as much information as possible about the murder, he would be shown leniency. According to her, George said: "Of course, I'll do anything I can to help you sir." The reinvestigation, however, was abandoned after a few days, and I was able to make another appointment with Kunitani for September 18.⁷

SEPTEMBER 18, 1944

INTERVIEW WITH GEORGE KUNITANI, CHAIRMAN OF NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE OF THE DAIHYO SHA KAI

Mr. Kunitani was asleep when I arrived at his apartment, but his wife woke him. Like Mr. Kagawa, he was cautious and careful at the beginning of the interview, but at the end he spoke more freely. He appeared very nervous and highstrung. He smoked more of my cigarettes than I did, which is really going some. His hands tremble, his voice is strained, his attitude somewhat arrogant.¹ He had evidently prepared to tell me the story of the beginning of the trouble in his own way. I listened and wrote and later asked a few questions. He appears to have an inordinate contempt for Mr. Best.

First Impressions of Tule Lake

"First of all, it must seem peculiar to you because it would be more expected to see such an upheaval right after evacuation. To have a thing like this happen so long after evacuation would give the impression that something was wrong. But there were reasons.

I have lived only seven years in Japan and twenty-two in the U.S.

I strongly believe that my way of thinking might be different from other people's. I appreciate the idea of democracy and have a clear picture of what democracy stands for. Mr. McVoy, the Community Analyst at Jerome, knew quite clearly why I took my step to come to this center.

The immediate impression I received after coming here was the unpreparedness on the part of the Administration, especially in the field of housing and reception.

I arrived here at 5:00 p.m. on the 30th of September. That day the Army was good enough to give us a lunch. After we were through with the processing, it was well towards evening.

Eventually, we were thrown into an unpartitioned Recreation Hall. No mattresses were available. I got the block manager to find me a mattress. Even the stove wasn't ready for operation. The block manager had to get wood for us. I don't believe the block manager was even notified we were to be there. There were ten boys and they told us that between 20 and 30 would come, but they didn't know. They had no plan at all.

Before we left Jerome we had a talk with the Project Director and also with various high officials of the WRA. I can say that they were sympathetic and at least understanding.

We talked to Mr. Taylor and I believe Mr. Taylor realized that we cooperated with him in order to make the movement a smooth affair.

At that time, the people leaving the (Relocation) projects had the feeling they would like to be housed closely together, but realizing the conditions at Tule Lake, they didn't expect too much. But it was Mr. Taylor's feeling that the families should be close together. Not that we felt our treatment would be the same.

¹I. It would be more accurate to say that he was reserved and diffident. He was also very handsome.⁷

When I arrived here I heard so many complaints about the separation in housing. Even families were sometimes separated from one end of the camp to the other.

The train on which I came had Dr. Melton, the Assistant Project Director, as escort. He was kind enough to arrange an introductory meeting for us with Mr. Best. He called upon four or five persons whom he thought would be interested in being introduced to Mr. Best at that time. That was on the 1st of October

We had an interview with Mr. Best. I clearly remember what he said at that meeting. The impression he gave us then certainly betrayed his ability as a Project Director. Putting up his feet on the desk and talking was all right. I suppose many executives do that. But his attitude toward us was high pressure. He gave us the impression, 'I'm Project Director here, and I'm running this center. Nobody's going to tell me what to do.' The very thing he said was, 'I don't recognize any representative body.'

(I asked here how this had come to Mr. Best's mind, whether Dr. Melton had introduced this group from Jerome as representatives.)

"We weren't introduced as a representative body," said Mr. Kunitani. Dr. Melton would corroborate this.

"I'm not going to be high pressured by anybody." (said Best). "I'm not going to meet any demands from anybody at any time."

Dr. Melton was surprised and I think he was sorry that he had ever suggested our meeting with Mr. Best. One of the boys was so angry he walked out in the middle of the interview.

(I remarked that this attitude of Mr. Best appeared strange indeed, and wondered what could have caused him to adopt it.)

It is possible that some other group had gone in to demand something of him. But certainly we wouldn't do that, especially with Dr. Melton there.

I got rather sarcastic. I said, "I'm still listening," after he started up. After that he was more reasonable.

Contrast with Facilities at Jerome

As far as Jerome was concerned, the facilities [at Jerome] were very good. Each latrine and urinal basin was individual and the interiors of the shower are very much better.

Food too was much better. This was especially strange, since Jerome raised so little. However, food there in comparison to this center was twice as good.

About six months before segregation took place, I was pretty well informed about the activity in centers through the Center papers. I thought I knew pretty clearly what this center was raising in the way of agriculture. It was only natural for me to take it for granted that there would be an ample supply of vegetables, chickens, and hogs.

I also knew the regulation of the WRA in providing 45¢ per day for food for the people. Of this, 14¢ was provided by project undertaking. When that problem came up in Jerome (It used to be 50¢ to 55¢ and was cut to 45¢), 35¢ was bought through government channels and 14¢ was raised on the project.

The question was put to Mr. Taylor at that time; how he expected to raise 14¢ at a place at Jerome. He said he'd do his best to raise 14¢ and in the event that he could not do it he would secure it through other channels.

When Kagawa investigated the mess here, his figures checked with the FBI accountants.

There was a great suspicion on the part of the evacuees as to what became of the goods being produced in the centers. There were 3,800 to 3,900 acres in cultivation at that time.

I went to the farm myself (in Tule Lake). I found that the hens were laying 6,000 to 7,000 eggs a day. There were 290,000 pounds of meat in preservation. We asked the former Tuleans and they said that they never received any portion of it. When we met Mr. Best, He said, "I've been here only since the first of August. What transpired prior to my arrival does not concern me."

The attitude of the Administrative officials toward our group was very cool. They had the conviction that the less they had to do with the Japanese, the better it would be for them. I often heard the remark, "I know how to handle the Japanese. Just leave it up to me."

Motives for Action of November 1

We had met Mr. Best on October 27. We went in there as a committee. There was no mass demonstration. I still had a vain hope at that time that he would listen to reason.

Ever since the farm accident the farm group was not working. The hogs, chicken and packing, being a different section, kept on working. Some representatives demanded that they all quit, but I myself didn't think that wise. I quashed that and the motion did not carry. I'm glad of it.

Going back to the October 27 meeting - realizing that so many people were on the verge of termination because of the strike, we stressed (to Mr. Best) that termination would not be good.

The farm incident had become so entangled that it had become a center-wide topic. The farm group realized that their task would be too great for them to handle and they felt it should be the concern for the center residents. The cry was coming from various other sections too, that unless they were safeguarded they would not go out of the center.

These feelings precipitated the election of the Daihyo Sha Kai. It may be that Mr. Best did not want to make such a big issue out of it. That's why he wasn't enthusiastic about the election of the block representatives.

As far as the election of representatives is concerned, I don't think I did wrong and I think I've been fair with the people. The request for the elections was put through the block managers by the farm group. It went through Tayama.

Then, the Administration was very anxious to terminate the farm workers. We spoke against that. We thought we had been able to convince Mr. Best and that if the termination was to take place, it would be gradual. However, the next day [on October 28] he left for San Francisco. During his absence, with his signature, came a statement: "All farm workers are terminated as of October 19." I don't think this is in the minutes of the October 26 meeting.

Naturally, after we had had the meeting with Mr. Best we made reports to the representatives and to the farm group in particular. That such a statement came out the following day threw suspicion on Administrative sincerity. Our immediate feeling was distrust of Mr. Best.

So when Mr. Myer came we felt we had to show that we had support so that Mr. Myer could see with his own eyes the support we had. That was our paramount intention.

(I asked why the Negotiating Committee had asked Dillon Myer to dismiss Mr. Best.)

We felt that if a request were made to get rid of Mr. Best, Mr. Myer would investigate the matter. If he were investigated and remained, we could tell the people that an investigation had been made and that his position is vindicated. We asked for the resignations of Best, Zimmer (head of Operations) Sachs, Lummer and Jones (Mess Operations), and Pedicord.

Jones was thrown out of Santa Anita. He was caught in some kind of scandal there.

The request to remove the Caucasian staff from the hospital came from the hospital employees. I don't think they'd like to say that, but it's the truth.

One point I want to make clear was their feeling was that if the Caucasian doctors and nurses are human enough to realize the problem before them and are willing to work for the benefit of the people, it would have been all right.

Recognition of Negotiating Committee by Administration

(I then asked Kunitani what actual assurance Best had given the Negotiating Committee of recognition - that is, what prompted his statement to the Daihyo Sha that the committee had been recognized.)

Best said, "I would recognize any committee or group of committees. I don't care how good the organization is." He made the same statement when Mr. Myer was there.

Murder Indictment:

I have seen the statement myself, accusing me of murder and conspiracy of murder and asking the county grand jury to indict me. One thing, I am more or less on the lookout for a frame-up. I'm playing safe and am going to have a lawyer come in and go over the situation. If they try to connect me with this I'm going to have a real disillusionment in American democracy.

Visit of Spanish Consul on November 3:

(I have no data at all on this visit and the consul's talk with the Negotiating Committee, so I asked Kunitani about it.)

I think he came mainly to check up on the November 1 demonstration. He also asked about the auto accident - and the rest was of a personal nature. We did explain the situation to him. I also explained the proceedings of the conference with Mr. Myer.

That was one of the most amicable meetings we ever had. The atmosphere in camp (immediately after November 1) was very amicable. We had just had the celebration of Meiji Setsu too.

He asked, "Is it all right for me to leave?" I told him frankly that everything was under control. Then when he came back again /after the November 4 "incident"/ he was rather peeved with us.

Possibility of Returning Stockade Detainees from Santa Fe:

(Kunitani then asked me if I would do something for him. I asked what it was. He said that the "people in camp" were very anxious to have those persons who were sent to Santa Fe recently¹ returned to camp. He wondered if I could find out what chance they had. I said it was not likely that I could find out anything, but I would try.)

Our release is unconditional (the citizens' released after the hunger strike). They were sent to Santa Fe just because they were aliens. How could their return to Tule Lake be expedited?"

We (Negotiating Committee) haven't been disbanded officially. We want to disband. Until the Santa Fe question is cleared up I don't dare take a forward step.

Mr. Best promised us in front of Wayne Collins that he's willing to make any recommendations pertaining to these Issei returning to the camp.

1. These men may have been sent to Santa Fe in August, for which month my notes have been lost. They may be the men referred to by Michi Weglyn, "Years of Infamy", p.213./

The people have a very firm idea that the Issei sent to Santa Fe are just as innocent as the Nisei released outright. I know one or two families have received letters that the Justice Department is willing to return them.

Resegregation:

(Kunitani remarked that if the Santa Fe matter were cleared up there would be peace in camp. Knowing that this is not the view of the resegregation pressure group, I remarked that in my opinion, real order could not come without a separation of those who truly desired repatriation and the fence-sitters. I wanted to get his reaction, particularly since he had made no mention of resegregation and "status" so far. The minutes of meetings in my possession are full of impassioned speeches by him on these topics.)

When resegregation started out - all right. We had to have a clear status. Being that there were so many fence-sitters, the people who came in were forced into a position that looked queer to them at the time.

However, some of the people who are running the resegregation group (now) are more or less doing it for their own general benefit.

I predict that if you stay here six months longer you will see the resegregationists split up into at least three different groups. (I said I did not understand, but Kunitani refused to elaborate.)

November 4 Meeting of Kaihyo Sha Kai:

(I asked Kunitani to give me an account of what really happened at this meeting and what his intentions were at that time.)

Our main object was to elect our permanent committeemen. Previous to that we had had a meeting and it was suggested that capable persons from their respective blocks should be nominated from the block people for the seven or eight committees we were to have. This was still to be approved by the Administration and by the people.

At the same time, if any persons who were chosen were not capable, it would be entirely up to the liberty of the people to refuse them. If the people wanted some other committeemen, or wished to subtract a committee, this was also up to them.

At the same time, it was our sincere desire to resign because we were only a temporary group. After our resignation, what would take place after the body was recognized was up to them. The Administration and the people might have many suggestions. The entire body of the Daihyo Sha Kai intended to resign and be replaced.

That night, we were choosing the names of the permanent committee members from nominations that had been submitted by the residents of the blocks. We selected the names of people whom we thought would be capable.

That night we had a so-called committee to choose from the nomination lists. After the committee members had filled in the names, they asked the block representatives for their approval. The only thing left to do was to bring this up to the Administration for their approval. We also intended to have the mass meeting /scheduled for November 13/ and explain this to the people.

Kunitani continued his narration:

The people signed two resolutions expressing their whole-hearted support of the block representatives and of the Negotiating Body.

After the Negotiating Committee was put on the spot and was hunted down by the Army, the remaining block representatives didn't feel they should elect any other body until the incident was satisfactorily closed. So they felt they shouldn't elect any committee to negotiate with the WRA and the Army and that was the greatest difficulty. So as a substitute they had the so-called, I believe it is translated Coordinating Committee, but that really isn't a proper name, on which were Murakami, Shigemitsu, and Uno. They made themselves clear that they would not negotiate except through the Negotiating Committee.

We could have kept on hiding. But we felt it was for the interest of the people to give ourselves up. The main reason we gave ourselves up, was that our first resolution (the petition of November 13) was vague and just stated that the people were supporting the Negotiating Committee. The second resolution (November 30) stated our position more clearly.

It was in that resolution that we stated that we wanted all the staff to resign.

(I asked respectfully, what the reason for this demand was.)

Reason for Asking Resignation of all WRA Personnel:

The reason we wanted all the staff here before November 1 to resign; the point is that the people were fed up with the Administration. They were more or less under the impression that WRA officials were under the influence of Mr. Best and had taken over Mr. Best's unfavorableness. If there were some clear thinking and decent minded persons, we thought that by this time some step would have been taken whereby the situation would have been cleared and the Negotiating Committee vindicated.

We were in hiding and these things were brought to us.

/I asked what role the Planning Board had played./

That was a leftover of the pre-segregation days. It was like a city council. Instead of the block managers the planning board functioned in that capacity. The planning board was all Issei, since the council could only be Nisei. This body was in a sad state when we got here.¹

/I asked how the ACLU had been approached./

That was instituted by the people in the colony, especially by Mr. Yokota. He suggested it.

All along we knew what the Administration was doing toward us was an invasion of our constitutional rights. All our mail was censored. We could not initiate anything like that.

From the very beginning, I've maintained that anything we have done wasn't any too radical or against our constitutional rights. As chairman of the committee I conducted the job in a correct manner. And the job was difficult because the people didn't understand.

Hunger Strike:

The motive for the second strike was about the same as the first one. We had been promised from way back that we'd be released in the near future. I was called into Mr. Best's office and fed the same thing. At the end, the boys would say to me, "What's the use to go to see him? His promises don't hold water."

By the time the strike started we were told plainly that by the end of June the stockade would be liquidated. I even asked Mr. Best for his interpretation of the word "liquidate." It wasn't impossible that he might mean to liquidate the existing stockade and put us in another.

The plaster board was put up.² Things were bad enough without being accused of murder. Mr. Best insinuated that, and said that some people in camp had told him that I had something to do with the murder.

/1. The Planning Board had served pre-segregation Tule Lake as a kind of Issei community council./

/2. After the Noma murder the authorities hung heavy plaster board on the stockade fence so that no one could communicate with or even see the men in the stockade.

Of course the mail was stopped. That was after Noma's death. They even refused to bring out food to the gate. It was all these things combined. Our motive never was so much our release but rather to prove our innocence. We wanted some statement from the Administration. If accused, we wanted proof of our guilt. We wanted to be tried. They even accused us of giving notes to the driver (of the wagon which delivered food).

Sachs:

When we started the second hunger strike around June 23¹, he (Sachs) came into the Stockade for the first time in his life and told us how hard he was working for us. He told us, "You might think I'm a son of a bitch, pardon the language,² but some day you'll find out how much I work for you." He was trying his best to show his kindly intentions to the stockade boys.

The 21st of August - That was the first time we were allowed to see our families - except for the case of Mrs. Yamada. On August 21, Mr. Akashi saw his wife and children. (However, George was not allowed to see Joyce and his newborn child.)

Mr. Besig suggested to the Administration that some visiting day should be allowed because even penitentiary criminals were allowed visits. Mr. Best said it was his jurisdiction and he would not allow it.

Kunitani Interrogated on Noma Murder:

At the Modoc County jail I made this statement, "It would be very hard to apprehend the murderer in this camp. There is no cooperation between the Caucasian personnel and the Japanese. The chief reason is the great fence that Mr. Best has put up at government expense."

One of the men in Internal Security was quite a decent fellow. He said the he would like to be more friendly with the Japanese but the rules did not allow it. It is an order from Mr. Sachs that the Internal Security carry guns at all times.

I found it interesting that Mr. Kunitani did not volunteer a single remark about the repatriates, nor did he mention any antipathy which the incoming segregees felt toward the "fence-sitters." It should be noted that he avoided telling me of the "personal matter" which he discussed with the Spanish Consul on November 3. His prophesy of a split among the resegregants is something I will keep in mind.

He appears to have considerable respect for Dr. Osler, and remarked that he had talked matters over frequently with him before the outbreak of the "trouble". Osler had promised to do what he could to make Best "see the situation". However, says Kunitani, Osler is weak and doesn't get the ear of the Administration.

Kunitani said he will give me his copies of the Daihyo Sha Kai minutes in a month or two, when he has them corrected, the lost parts fixed up and in good shape.

1. One of us made a mistake here. The second hunger strike began on July 19.⁷

2. "Pardon the language" was addressed to me. R.H.⁷

I did not visit George Kunitani again until October 19. My long sessions with other ex-stockade detainees consumed a great deal of time and, after September 21, when Mr. Yamashita showed me the second Resegregationist petition and pamphlet, I concentrated on visiting a great variety of respondents to obtain their reactions to the petition. Meanwhile, I heard a few vague rumors that Abe and Kunitani were not getting along well with the Resegregationists and on October 4 (p. 10), Mr. Robertson told me that Dr. Osler suspected that Abe and Kunitani had pulled away from the Resegregation Group. On October 9, (p. 15) however, Mrs. Tsuchikawa, really let me have it.

OCTOBER 9, 1944

TALK WITH MRS. TSUCHIKAWA ON KUNITANI

The Abe-Kunitani Schism

For weeks I have wanted to know if there is any truth in the rumor that Abe and Kunitani have broken with the Resegregation Group. As a chance shot I asked Mrs. Tsuchikawa whether she thought it would be all right if I went to see George again sometime in the near future.

Well, we've been hearing bad things about George. It seems the people in his block are trying to kick him out.

In a way Rev. Abe and George are outcasts now.

We gave them full cooperation. We thought we owed them giri. When they came out of the stockade they didn't live up to their purpose, and giri, and cooperation. They were independent. They took steps to tie up with Tada.

When there were those indictment rumors . . . Tada, Abe and Kunitani spread the rumors and tried to get the Resegregation Group to put up the money for Tada. They said they would put up the money for Tada if he really needed it, but he wasn't a member . . . Of course, the Resegregation Group didn't do this in a meeting but that was what was in the air. Tada didn't take action with us. He wasn't Japanese.

We knew the indictment business was fishy anyway. He wanted our financial support.

Certain people who had done a lot to get Mr. Besig here went to Kunitani and said, "You and Rev. Abe are members of the Resegregation Group. And we're sorry because if you take action with Mr. Tada, we cannot support you."

George and Rev. Abe said, "You folks are too darn narrow minded."

It was just a rumor anyway. You didn't know what Mr. Tada is up to.

So George and Abe are outcasts.

Besides, they should have published a statement as soon as they got out (of the stockade), thanking the people for their support and for the money. But they didn't give a word of thanks.

Instead of thanking the Saiban-in-kai, the "Trial Committee" (Mrs. Tsuchikawa refers to the group of relatives and friends who called in the ACLU) they didn't even think of this. In a lot of instances, they didn't live up to Japanese manners.

They think we took the wrong action and they believe everything Tada says. Even Rev. Abe, none of his congregation go to see him. They say he's too darn conceited.

We think November 4 [when the Army took control of Tule Lake] was these boys' fault. They tried to organize the whole center when they didn't even know what kind of people the center was composed of. If one of them was elected to a position, one of the others would be jealous and would inu. They should have considered these things. They were too ambitious . . . Of course, we always say that WRA caused the riot. . . But if these boys hadn't been so ambitious. . .

The least they should say is to say to the people: "Due to our carelessness and youth we were sorry to cause such a disturbance among you."

Out of courtesy Rev. Abe should have done that. Of course, we can't outspoke and ask him to do it, but he ought to. He didn't live up to our expectation.

If they had stayed quiet it would have been all right but they took sides right away with Tada.

(I'd certainly like to get George Kunitani's version of this story, however, I think it will have to be done very carefully. In time I'll have to talk to Mr. Tada. It's too dangerous to try to contact him now.)

OCTOBER 19, 1944

CALL ON KUNITANI

Decided to risk the possibility of being seen by the Tsuchikawas and called on George today. I found him friendlier than at my last visit. One of the ex-stockade internees, Mr. Yoneda, was also present. I started out on the right foot by congratulating George on the accuracy of his prediction about the coming split in the Resegregation Group. Yoneda, George, and I talked for about two hours, and though much of the conversation was carried on in Japanese style, such as discussing individuals whose names were not mentioned, I got along better than I had anticipated. George did not seem concerned about my visiting the Tsuchikawas. Throughout the conversation, it was apparent that George still regards himself as a very important man.

I made an oblique reference to the difficulties of my present position, remarking that it is tough enough to study a camp divided into two groups and that when additional splits occur, my work becomes such that only an optimist would attempt it. I made no uncomplimentary remarks about the Resegregationist leaders, but George and his wife expressed their attitudes in several instances.

George said with determination:

Only definite status for this camp will solve the question. That's why we brought the point up in the meeting with Best and Myer.

On the question of the return of the Santa Fe internees and Best's promise about the Department of Justice, he said:

I think Best is holding off from day to day. He doesn't know what to do.

Mr. Yoneda asked me if it were true that Mr. Black is leaving the center. I said I did not know.

I asked George if he thought that the renunciation of citizenship would have any significant effect on camp attitudes. He thought not. However, it depends, said he, on how the statements are made in it. He remarked jokingly that he guessed the government would not approve his application. *They'll figure they better keep a guy like me here for the duration.*

I then asked about the yakuza (the organized gambling gangs of Japan).¹ George said he knew quite a bit about them but could not speak with any authority.

I. Several respondents had hinted that Mr. Tada ran a gambling house. Some had referred to "the gamblers". I hoped that by asking about the yakuza I might get a little more information. I didn't. By mid-November, however, many persons spoke openly of the "gamblers", young men who were supposed to be followers of Kunitani and Tada.7

The whole thing lacks authenticity. These people existed, but as to the build up about them, it varies according to the authors.

George remarked that the stories were not unlike the way stories grew around such people as Daniel Boone.

Shimizu Jirocho, the most notorious example of this group, died only about 40 or 50 years ago - around 1895, added Yoneda, who became quite interested in the discussion and promised to look up the subject in a Japanese encyclopedia and bring it to George for him to translate for me. George continued,

They formed a code among themselves. It's hard for outsiders to understand them.

Even I can't understand some of their ideas, said Yoneda.

George told me that the code of the yakuza was different from that of bushido. On the whole, the gamblers organized in small groups, scattered about the country. On occasions, however, they would form alliances, if they thought it necessary. The head of one clan would meet the head of another clan and exchange cups of sake, something like the American Indians smoking a peace pipe. George also corroborated a statement made by Reverend Aramaki, that there were a considerable number of ryonin, samurai who had lost their lords, in the group.

Santa Fe Matter:

George now showed me two letters, one from Mr. French to Mr. Best, stating that the Department of Justice would be quite willing to return the internees to Tule Lake, if Best approved, and another from the Department of Justice stating that the return of the internees was up to the WRA. George said that he could assure me that most of the families of the internees in this camp were determined not to go to Crystal City under any pressure.

Honestly speaking, I don't want to cause any ill tension, but going back to Japanese psychology, whenever you can find no other alternative, you may have to take strong measures. It will be pretty hard to do anything else than to take action embarrassing to the WRA here.

I think Mr. Best knows that the return of the men would bring about better feeling in the center. But if he feels like playing foxy with us, I can play foxy with him.

I think he was told by Myer to stay out of the Santa Fe trouble. I think he has strict orders from Myer that the future Santa Fe business will be handled by Myer himself.

The Matter of Meeting with Myer on November 1 1943:

Mr. Zimmer was in control. The farm group went to see him. Kato, Nomura and others went to see him. Zimmer made out the reply - a type-written statement that Mr. Myer would see us on November 2, at 2:00 p.m., that is, he would see the farm committee.

Kato said he wasn't a representative of the farm group and that the Negotiating Committee wanted to see Mr. Myer. So he just refused. So we had to make the other arrangement to see Mr. Myer. This could have been the work of Zimmer and Best and not Myer.

Previous Interview of Best and Farm Group:

Best told the farm group to go back to work - or else. So they called upon the people to form an organization to deal with the situation. I have a resolution drawn up by the farm group and the block managers - to give whole-hearted support to the newly elected body. There is also a statement from the farm group.

Post November 1 Sentiments:

We were very much satisfied with Best's and Myer's statements. In accordance with their statements we were going ahead to form this permanent body. The November 4th incident and the Daihyo Sha have no connecting link.

The Administration, being given the wrong impression at the start, wanted to stick to this wrong conviction.

Food Taken from Warehouse on November 4, 1943:

The boys in the warehouse brought in an itemized list of the things taken from the warehouse to Kato. The immediate reaction of the people was, "Our food is bad enough, if they take more away (to feed the harvesters) it's going to get worse."

Yoneda suggested that I check with the railroad and bus companies to settle the matter as to whether a group of harvesters was really coming into Tule Lake on the night of November 4.

Sokoku Kenkyu:

At another point in the conversation, George remarked that now "Best didn't know what to do with this new bunch who were forming the Sokoku Kenkyu. He didn't know whether to let them go ahead or whether to pick up the leaders.

OCTOBER 26, 1944

TALK WITH GEORGE KUNITANI

Took over the minutes [Daihyo Sha Kai] which I want checked,¹ planning to stay just a short while. But George was very communicative, so I remained for the greater part of the afternoon.

George says that the Internal Security has the copies of the Japanese minutes so he can help me only by memory. He looked over my copy of the minutes briefly and remarked that several things needed changing.

He also informed me that he had heard that Murakami, the #1 inu, is in Heart Mountain. He also remarked that when he had straightened out the Santa Fe problem which is keeping him very busy, he will have time to hunt out and prepare a good many documents for me. He pulled out some things hidden in his house and went over them, giving me the following documents to copy:

Petition for Release of the Hunger Strikers:

(This is the petition which was circulated in July which, Mr. Kurihara told me, caused him to contact Mr. Best and get the promise of release in a month. This petition was never handed in. Kunitani said that it had been signed by about 8,000 people. This may well be the truth, because at the time this was done, sentiment was strongly behind release of the hunger strikers.)

PETITION

BY THE RESIDENTS OF THE TULE LAKE CENTER
TO THE PROJECT DIRECTOR, R. BEST REGARDING
THE RELEASE OF THE FOURTEEN RESIDENTS
CONFINED IN THE STOCKADE WHO ARE ON A
HUNGER STRIKE FOR THEIR RELEASE

[1]. I had been given a copy of the minutes by Mr. Sasaki, Chairman of the Coordinating Committee.]

We were shocked to learn that fourteen residents confined in the stockade are on a Hunger Strike for their release and return to this center. The Hunger Strike is on the 10th day on Friday, July 28, 1944.

Naturally we, as members of the Japanese race, are very worried and anxious about the lives of our racial brothers. Already several persons have collapsed from hunger. If any or several of our racial brothers should die on account of the Hunger Strike, we all would feel deeply grieved. Reverse the case; suppose Americans in an internment camp in Japan should die on a Hunger Strike, how would you feel? Would not the American people be deeply grieved? So will we if our racial brothers die of a Hunger Strike.

Therefore, we, the residents of Tule Lake Center, request you, Mr. Raymond Best, to be merciful to our racial brothers and release the fourteen persons on a Hunger Strike from the stockade. Your mercy will never be forgotten.

- - - - -

Mr. Kunitani now showed me the original of a letter signed by Mr. Best, remarking that if the authorities had gotten hold of it they would certainly have confiscated it. The letter, said Mr. Kunitani, was given to Mr. Nomura who is now in Santa Fe.

(Heading)

War Relocation Authority
Tule Lake Center
Newell, California

November 4, 1943

To whom it may concern:

Immediately following the incident at the hospital wherein Dr. Pedicord was beaten by some unknown group of men, Director Myer and Dr. Pedicord agreed that doctors on the appointive staff and the appointive staff of nurses were to be removed from further duty at the hospital. Federal regulations require that a hospital administrator must be responsible for government property and narcotics. In accordance therewith Nurse Shipps has been detailed as hospital administrator. There are no facts to the rumor that Dr. Pedicord will return to the Tule Lake hospital.

s/ R.R. Best
Project Director

Food:

"You can ask any person here whether they ever got pork or chicken prior to November 4."

Garbage and Coal Crews Return to Work:

George made quite a point of the fact that the Daihyo Sha had gotten the garbage and coal crews to go back to work, showing me the announcement in the Tulean Dispatch of November 9. They had, however, not succeeded with the warehouse workers.

The Army, however, wished only about 25 of the warehouse men to go back to work. 98 men had been working originally. The Army thought that 25 men could do all the work. But in their estimate the Army did not consider (the men needed) for unloading and maintenance.

From Japanese psychology, their point of view would be impossible for us to come back and tell the group that only 25 of the 98 could be picked out and approved by the FBI, WRA and the Army. That would have left a queer impression on those picked. The remaining people would be thinking they were inu or informers. We stressed that point."

I asked George if the Army had gotten any of the warehouse workers to go back to work and he said he didn't think so. (However, as I recall, the demands of certain warehouse boys to go back to work was one of the reasons given by the Divisional Responsible Men in late December and January for initiating the procedure which broke the status quo.)

Resolution Made by the Block Managers:

It appears that there are no English copies of the resolutions passed by the Block Managers and the Farm group. These are important documents with regard to the legitimacy of the Daihyo Sha's position. Kunitani had copies in Japanese and translated them for me which, I reckon, is the best thing I can get now. I am planning an interview with Mr. Fujimoto who was a big man in Civic Organizations and (I am told) an anti-Daihyo Sha man to get his version.¹

Block Managers:

Dated - October 16, 1943 (day after the farm accident)

(oral translation by George Kunitani)

We, the Block Managers, in a body, regarding the accident of October 15, express our unqualified support of the resolution drawn up as a result of the Farm Workers' General Meeting and furthermore regarding the solution of this problem, we are requesting that the WRA director (Myer) and the Spanish Consul visit here.

Taking this grand opportunity, we the people of this center, concerning the improvement of living conditions in this center and all the problems pertaining to the people of this center, and for these reasons, we are asking the people's whole-hearted cooperation in this request.

Resolution of the Farm Group:

Dated - October 15, 1943

As a result of the automobile mishap on October 15, there were many persons injured. The reason of this happening of this incident might be directly traced to the fact that the Administration has been using many minors. This employment of minors should be affected by the child labor amendment of the Constitution.

Here George left off a literal translation and said: "They give as a direct cause of the auto accident because of laxity on the part of the Administration to take some definite step preventing the previous accident (the fire truck accident).

He then returned to a literal translation:

However, the circumstances might have been, we feel that absolute responsibility rests with the WRA Administration here. In order to compensate in the best possible way to the persons who were the victims of this mishap, we should request and demand for legitimate action from the Administration and also to prevent any such happenings in the future we wish to bring about the solution of various other problems in the center. This problem should be the concern of all the residents of this center. We resolve to make this a center-wide affair and we, the Farm Workers, will not return to our places of employment until our request for such is granted fully.

[1. I was able to have a long interview with Mr. Fujimoto on January 8, 1945 (See Fieldnotes).]

Dai Nippon Seinen-dan:

Since George seemed to be in an excellent mood, I thought I'd risk a remark on the rumors about Reverend Abe's organization of the Dai Nippon Seinen-dan. George denied that Abe was doing any such thing, saying that he was on excellent terms with Abe and that if Abe were forming such an organization, he, George, would certainly know about it. He remarked that Abe had had a young men's organization in San Francisco, called the Dai Nippon Seinen-dan and that this may have started this present rumor.

Role Played by Hawaiian-born Japanese in November Incident:

George was most insistent that the Daihyo Sha Kai had not been composed of or supported by Hawaiian-born Japanese. He also took umbrage because of my remark that many Hawaiian-born Japanese stood up for their rights. "After all," said he, "I was born here!"

OCTOBER 27, 1944

[On the next day, October 27, Mr. Kato, an ex-stockade detainee and ardent young Resegregationist who, like Kunitani, was interested in having the Issei who had been interned in Santa Fe returned to their families at Tule Lake, criticized Reverend Abe and Mr. Kunitani at length.]

Abe and Kunitani should realize that the people who really supported us were the people for the status quo. The status quo people feel that they cannot get along with the people who do not want to go to Japan.

Of course, when George Kunitani met Mr. Myer he stated the necessity of a Resegregation Program. This group, the Resegregation Program, were the ones who really supported us. They gave money to hire the lawyer for us. The immediate families had a lot to do with it too.

Reverend Abe ignored all that. He never expressed thanks of any nature. Naturally, the people who supported him, got pretty mad about it. They (Abe and Kunitani) still think the whole colony is supporting them.

In a time of crisis like this we must stick together. We are not supposed to co-operate with the Administration. That's going against the will of the Japanese government, if you understand me.

Note: It is very interesting that both Kato and Mrs. Tsuchikawa criticize Kunitani for attempting to "bring the whole camp into one." It appears that this powerful demand for cleavage springs from the Resegregationist leaders. That they criticize Kunitani for his desire for unity doesn't necessarily mean that he is advocating unity now though. It may just be one of the things they feel they can slam him on politically, i.e., a weak point in his past platform.

NOVEMBER, 1944

[On November 20, Mr. Kato again criticized Abe and Kunitani, of whom he said, "They do not want to bow their heads and come under us. . . They forgot how much we had done for them." Kato also told me that his group knew that many of their plans were being reported to the Administration and he knew who was doing it. I assumed he meant that Abe, Kunitani, and their friends were being inu (informers). But none of my respondents, in October or November, told me that the Resegregation Group had begun formally to expel certain of their members, who, they claimed, were not behaving like "true Japanese". (They probably began the expulsions sometime in mid-November.) Among those expelled were Kunitani, Abe, and a number of their friends.

I did not visit Mr. Kunitani in November. I was preoccupied with attending and reporting on the various Resegregationist ceremonies, with visiting my assaulted friend, Mr. Itabashi, and with getting information about the knifing of October 30, in which Mr. Kira's right hand man attacked the son of a man who had criticized Kira's tactics. I was also working very hard, preparing a lecture for a conference of the members of the Evacuation and Resettlement Study which was to held in Salt Lake City from November 21 to December 7.

On the evening of November 20, fifty-six relatives of Issei members of the Daihyo Sha Kai, who had been interned, left Tule Lake for Crystal City where they were to join their interned relatives. An elaborate farewell ceremony was held, in which the Resegregation Group, the Abe-Kunitani group, and the Ward VI language school participated. On my return in December, I was told that when the farewells were over, Tetsuo Kodama, a judo champion and a friend of Kunitani, had approached Mr. Yamada, the danchoo or leader of the Hōkoku Seinen dan, and accused him of having called him an inu. Yamada, who also had the black belt, ignored this challenge to fight.]

DECEMBER 1944

[When I returned to the center in December, my anti-Resegregationist friends were delighted to tell me about the encounter. I did not visit Kunitani until December 11, but on December 8, Mrs. Deschin, a very competent social worker on the WRA staff, told me that she had had several interviews with Kunitani regarding his clothing allowance grants. She pointed out to him that in making this request he was asking for special priveleges. He said that he would be willing to take a job (which would make the clothing allowance unnecessary) which would help the people in the colony. Mrs. Deschin is seriously thinking of giving him a job in Social Welfare, which she considers would be very good for him, psychologically, providing that the other evacuee employees in Social Welfare would not be too afraid of him and providing that he had sufficient respect and prestige with the people.

[On December 9, I discussed the Kodama-Yamada interchange with the Tsuchikawas. They denounced Mr. Tada and the gamblers and also hinted that Kunitani and Tada were inu. Mrs. Tsuchikawa said, "Tada, Kunitani, and the stockade roughnecks are going to see Mr. Best so often." On the same day I asked Mr. Wakida, a good friend of mine, whether he thought Reverend Abe and Kunitani were connected with gamblers. He replied: "Abe, Kunitani, and Tada and the rest were together at that funeral." But when I asked Mr. Wakida about the Kodama-Yamada encounter, he smiled happily and said: "Yamada couldn't fight. The other gang was too big."

[On December 11, I called on Mrs. Yamashita, the wife of one of the most important leaders of the Resegregationists. She told me: "The boys are not going to stand for this much longer" [by which she meant that some of the Hōkoku youths were ready and eager to use force against the 'gamblers'].

It all started with the Jomei, the withdrawal. They were told [by Resegregationist leaders] that they were not Japanese and were asked to withdraw (from the organization). They got sore. Three or four of them came to Mr. Tsuchikawa, demanding why they were withdrawn from the organization. I think this is the cause of it all.

My husband says he can't understand why they take Mr. Tada's or Kodama's word for it. He says their words don't mean nothing to them.

DECEMBER 11, 1944

TALK WITH MR. KUNITANI

[I was, of course, very interested in obtaining Mr. Kunitani's view about the inter-change between Kodama and Yamada. I also wanted to learn more about members being asked to withdraw from the Resegregationist Groups "because they were not Japanese". But I thought it might be crude and "not Japanese" to ask specific questions, so I listened and hoped Mr. Kunitani would reveal his sentiments indirectly.]

Mr. Kunitani was in a very affable mood. He had gone over all the Daihyo Sha minutes for me and pointed out errors in the margin. That is, he'd gone over all those held before he had to hide. He is going to have the others checked by men present at the later meetings. I asked him to clear up some of the questions Mr. Nishimoto had raised [at the conference] about the October 27 meeting with Best. He complied willingly.

Firing the Farm Workers

If Mr. Best hadn't fired the farm workers --- We realized that if the farm acreage was to be curtailed, some workers had to be terminated. We asked Mr. Best not to terminate them right away but he just went ahead and did it.

Mr. Kashima's Funeral

The Japanese people feel very honored to have people take such a direct interest in a birth or death. However, they have a tendency to refuse out of modesty. (Kunitani is speaking of the widow's statement to Mr. Best that she didn't wish a public funeral.) So if Mr. Best had known Japanese psychology a little more thoroughly, there wouldn't have been that bad feeling.

Mr. Yokota was closely attached to the Kashima family. He brought up the suggestion that the funeral should be on a centerwide scale. It was voted on and so decided in a Daihyo Sha meeting.

Yokota was head of the Jikkoo-inn [Executive Committee], and took an active part in executing the funeral. My name was put in as head of the Sogi in [Burial Service Committee]. Anybody who was head of the Daihyo Sha - I being the head, naturally my position would be at the head. But actually the work was done by Mr. Yokota and his friends.

"Mr. Best was afraid of another outbreak at that time. We explained that the funeral was considered a sacred thing and that there would be no trouble.

Those boys who lined up and attended the funeral - we didn't know they would attend the funeral in that manner. The conspicuous point was they lined up and marched toward the funeral ground in military fashion.

I asked Mr. Best later why didn't he let the people know he was going to have a picture taken. He took the pictures without letting anyone know what he was doing. The boys thought he was taking the picture for propaganda purposes.

The Block Manager Question on October 27, 1943

The people knew and the Administration knew that the block managers are more or less figureheads. They are just go-betweens between the Administration and the people. And when the time comes for any major grievance to be presented, whether it be to the Administration or the Spanish Consul, the block managers should act only as go-betweens.

Even now that feeling exists. The people feel if there should be a central committee here, the block managers should take no part in it.

The reason this point came up - if they were put under the Central Committee, supposing the block manager should step outside of his capacity? The Central Committee would be able to quell such an attempt on the part of the block managers.

Right now the Civic Organizations has been taking steps curtailing the expenses of marriages. Such things are not their jobs.

We intended to keep them (block managers) as figureheads. The only result of that would be if something came up that the Central Committee felt was not their duty, the Central Committee could tell them that the problem should be under the Central Committee.

The American Flag Matter

The American flag in the center was brought down by one of the Boy Scouts. He felt that the flag of any nation should command that much respect. He feared that some rude boys would get hold of it and trample on it. He took it down.

There was a rumor however, that somebody might tear it down.

There is a small group of young kids in camp - 17 or 18 years old - radicals from Jerome. They came with the later group and I think they were sent here just to get rid of them. This camp is becoming a regular dumping ground.

Renunciation of Citizenship

I asked Mr. Kunitani what he thought about the renunciation of citizenship.

I'm not going to renounce mine. If a man doesn't have Japanese citizenship, if he renounces it, he'll be without a country. (Mary Okita said the same thing this morning.) I'll tell you this much. When I did declare my intention to go back to Japan I wouldn't want to fool this country or evade any obligations in this country by saying that I wanted to go back to Japan and then stay here.

Whatever the outcome, I shall go back to Japan. The only thing is, I want to be honest with myself.

Resegregation Group and Hōkoku

[I then ventured to ask what he thought Resegregationists were trying to accomplish.]

What they're trying to do is very ungentlemanly and very cowardly. I think I can just about tell what they're up to.

There are some people being expelled (from the Sokuji Kikoku) for no concrete reason. One man was expelled because he worked under Mr. Ishida trying to get people out of the stockade. Now he's been termed informer and expelled from membership. Worse still, one of the responsible men said this in a written statement and gave it to this man. He's really angry.

[Kunitani would say no more, but after this statement, I no longer had any doubt that he was not on good terms with the leaders of the Resegregation Group.]

DECEMBER 12, 1944

[On December 12 I visited Mr. Kato, who, like Mr. Kunitani had been a very active member of the Daihyo Sha Kai and, like Kunitani, confined in the stockade. But Mr. Kato was now an enthusiastic member of the Resegregation Group. He talked about many subjects, but at the end of our visit he said:]

Out of the 14 who came out of the stockade, only 4 of us are in the Hokoku. The rest are more or less against us. I don't care to hear about what they are doing.

(Kato again told me about the Resegregation Group's plan to make Abe a Shiji (Advisor) and Kunitani a Dancho (group leader). He also said that all during the incident he had often not agreed with Kunitani but had supported him for the "sake of the incident.")

In the stockade I almost got into a fight with four fellows. But I said, 'I'm not supporting George or Reverend Abe. I'm supporting the incident.' I said, 'Once we are out of the stockade, if Reverend Abe and George continue, I'm going my way.' Because George was the chairman I always wanted to see him my way. George really wanted the re-segregation program as you can see from the meeting with Mr. Best.¹

When he brought out the statement thanking the people (statement has been sent along some time ago in notes) he didn't even show it to me. He used my name without showing it to me.

I asked Kato about the July hunger strike in the stockade.

Hunger Strike - July 1944

There was something fishy about after the hunger strike. Best was always glad to see Abe and Kunitani and he wouldn't see me. On September 4 he saw Kunitani and Abe and Kagawa and on the 5th he saw me. For goodness sake, why doesn't he see us together!

Not only that, when Wayne Collins came I told Reverend Abe and George, 'Say, I think it would be a good idea if I asked a written apology from Mr. Best since he just said he made a blunder in putting us in the stockade.' But Reverend Abe said bluntly, 'This is no time.'

[1. It is worthy of note that when the Negotiating Committee met with Mr. Best on October 26, 1943, their agenda included a request for clarification of the status of Tule Lake residents: 'the question was raised of the desirability of re-segregation, involving the separation of 'loyals' or 'fence-sitters' from the genuinely 'disloyal' and sincere repatriates for whom Tule Lake had been designed as a segregation center. (See Thomas and Nishimoto, p. 125)]

DECEMBER 15, 1944

[On December 15, Mr. Hamaguchi, one of those who had been expelled from the Resegregationist group, went to the Resegregationist Headquarters in Block 54, accosted Tokuichi Matsubara, the nominal head to the Resegregation Group, and demanded the reason for his expulsion. Matsubara, according to report, gave him a rude reply. Hamaguchi thereupon seized a piece of wood from a nearby woodpile, Matsubara grabbed a mop, and the two men had at it in what must have been a strange parody of a samurai sword duel. Although the fight lasted only a few minutes, strong-arm boys from both factions and a crowd of several hundred spectators assembled. Called on for an explanation, Hamaguchi made a speech, denouncing the Hōkoku for gangster tactics and for the degregation of the true spirit of Japan.

The leaders of the Resegregation Group at once approached the high ranking members of the Administration and told them that if proper steps were not taken immediately, they would take matters into their own hands. The Project Attorney told me that they had said; "We have 1,000 young men to call on, and had even hinted at the possibility of assassinations. They also plastered the latrines and laundry rooms with mimeographed statements to the effect that their "peaceful organization" had been attacked by "gangsters".

The project police immediately arrested eleven men (evidently accused by the Resegregationist leaders) and confined them in the Klamath Falls jail. Among these arrested was Mr. Kodama, the black belt judo man and friend of Kunitani's, who had challenged Mr. Yamada, the leader of the Hōkoku on the evening of October 30.

On December 18 I had a long talk with Mr. Yamashita, who was perhaps the most influential of the Resegregationist leaders, and with his wife. He made no reference to Kunitani although he did tell me that if the Administration did not take proper action and "if once our organization has to stand up, they will give up their lives. If these gangsters get only a 90 day jail sentence, the boys (Hōkoku) will do it . . . They'll say, 'Let's make big trouble'."

Mrs. Yamashita interjected here: "I'm afraid bombs won't be able to stop them or tanks either."

Later in the day, however, I talked again with Mr. Goodman, the Project Attorney, who told me:

I talked to George Kunitani and Tada today. I heard that they wanted to see me, so I sent the word along that they could if they wanted to. So they came up. I told them to get their witnesses together. I told them I was interested only in this case, not in fighting among factions. I told them I'm very sorry it's taking so long but that I've dropped all other work to handle only this case. I told them the information received warranted the issuance of warrants. No man is guilty until he's proven so. So they've gone out to get their witnesses. They say they could bring in 50 but I told them a few good ones - actual eye-witnesses would be better than many poor confusing ones. I also told them that they could hire a lawyer if they chose, but that would drag out the case.

They told me their group says: "Unless those guys are let out and let out quickly, we won't be responsible for what happens."

I said: "You can tell those guys for me that this will be a trial on the facts. We don't want any witnesses who are not eye-witnesses."

The Abe and Kunitani group keep tearing them (the Sokuji) down, saying, "This is a violation of law."

The guy whose most worried is Wilson (Head of Internal Security) because his evacuee police department is made up of a lot of the Abe and Kunitani bunch.¹

Abe and Kunitani said indirectly, so that the word got to me, that if both principles, Hamaguchi and Matsubara get 10 days suspended, everybody will be happy.

From testimony it seems that Hamaguchi went to the block and started to quarrel with Matsubara in front of the mess hall. Both of the men grabbed for a mop and got it. The mop broke and Hamaguchi got the business end and banged Matsubara over the head and the hand with it. Then a group which had come with Hamaguchi made a ring around the fighting men so there would be no interruptions from the Sokoku bunch. Sort of referees. Hamaguchi's son and wife got hit too, trying to stop the fight. We've got all the weapons including the broken mop and the sticks.

I'm going to swear in every witness and warn them about perjury.

The formal hearing began on December 19, but I was not permitted to attend this session. I did however talk to Mr. Baker, a member of the WRA Internal Security and, after the session, with Mr. Goodman, the Project Attorney.

TALK WITH MR. BAKER OF INTERNAL SECURITY

Had a chat with Mrs. Baker today and it lasted until Mr. Baker came in. He had been at the beginning of the Matsubara-Hamaguchi trial. First of all, he said he did not approve of the fact that the trial was being speeded up so much. He thought it would have been just as well to postpone it 30 days. The boys wouldn't make any more trouble either way. He seemed happy over the fact that Best was scared to death about the whole business. Baker feels that both groups would give their eye-teeth to get this matter into the newspapers and hope to do Best great harm thereby. Baker also told me that it was Kira who came up and laid the Sokuji ultimatum of "instant justice or else" before Best. Then Abe asked to see Best but was refused and told to go to Internal Security. This Abe would not do but sent his "disciples" [Baker's term] to Internal Security in his stead. Evidently it was Goodman who finally invited them up to see him. Baker believes that either group is capable of starting deliberate trouble to get the matter into the newspapers.

TALK WITH MR. GOODMAN

The defendants have been accused of assault and battery, aggravated assault and battery, disorderly conduct, and disturbance of the peace. They were to be accused of riot but Goodman scratched this out, lest the newspapers get hold of it and start more fuss about more "riots in Tule Lake". The defendants are all being housed in the Internal Security office tonight. Goodman believes he has both groups up a tree because they have both threatened that they will not be responsible if their side does not win. Goodman feels that since they have admitted they could hold their boys down if they got justice, they have taken the responsibility for any trouble. (These statements, I think, were made in writing.) According to Mr. Goodman Yamashita came to the trial of his own accord today. The business conducted was the testimony of Yamada and the questioning of the plaintiff, Matsubara by Goodman. Tada and Kunitani started in on Yamada and he broke down on the stand and couldn't say a thing. Yamada had signed the complaint naming the attackers. But Tada (who used to be head of evacuee Internal Security) made him admit that he had seen nothing. Yamada was so scared he trembled. He

¹/1. I was not aware that many of Abe and Kunitani's friends were on the evacuee police force, but after some reflection, I think this may have been so.

wouldn't look at Tada or Kunitani. "If you didn't see them," said Tada, "How come you knew all their names?" Yamada tried to get out of it by saying that he had only acted as interpreter for Matsubara. But it turned out that Matsubara had only recognized a couple of his assailants, among them however, being Kodama. Yamashita did his best to tell Goodman the case should be tried in Alturas, but Goodman said it was a government case and besides, the Alturas court didn't want it. Yamashita also wanted to bring in more witnesses. (All in all, it did not sound like a very good day for the Hōshi-dan, Goodman told me that I could attend tomorrow and see Tada and Kunitani question Matsubara.)

Goodman also told me that Wilson, head of evacuee Internal Security, keeps saying to him, "Turn them all loose and I'll guarantee there won't be any trouble."

DECEMBER 20, 1944

HEARING OF 11 YOUNG MEN - ACCUSED BY HŌSHI-DAN

[Having now been given permission to attend the hearings, I did so and took very careful notes.]

On entering the room where the hearing was to be held I saw only the defendants present. They were eating breakfast in a happy-go-lucky manner, and put on a good show of bravado and self-confidence. After a while, Kunitani, Tada, Kagawa and some witnesses from block 54 entered. . . among whom was Bill Higashi, my old friend from Gila.

Next - in stalked the Hōshi-dan witnesses with Yamashita, their advisor, Tsuchikawa, Yamada (who looked pretty sick) and Kato, who looked calm as usual. The contrast between the normal haired defendants and the shayed head Hōshi men was terrific.

Matsubara had given his testimony yesterday and today's proceedings opened with his cross examination by Kunitani and Tada:

[Mr. Matsubara gave all of his testimony in Japanese and his responses and the questions put to him were translated by an interpreter.]

Thompson: (hearing officer) "Yesterday afternoon, Mr. Matsubara stated that when he me Mr. Hamaguchi he also saw Kodama, and that when Hamaguchi yelled, Mr. Kodama came running. What did Mr. Hamaguchi say?"

Matsubara: He said, "I must apologize for what I said."

Thompson: How did he know Mr. Kodama came running?

Matsubara: It was while Mr. Hamaguchi was talking I noticed.

Thompson: It looked as if he (Matsubara) had his back to him (Kodama).

Matsubara: As I was coming out of the mess hall I was facing in that direction.

CROSS EXAMINATION

Kunitani: What is your present capacity in the Sokoku Kenkyu Hōshi-dan?

Thompson: Has your question anything to do with the fight?

Matsubara: I am president of the Jochi-in.

Goodman: (Project Attorney) You may cross examine him only on matters on which he testified.

Kunitani: How many of the defendants did you see at the scene of the crime?


Matsubara: I saw many but I recognize only four faces.

Kunitani: Tell me their names.

Matsubara: Kodama, Imizu, Mizuno, Yamatani.

Kunitani: How did you know Mr. Yamatani?

Matsubara: Mr. Yamatani was introduced to me once before.



Scene of first fight between Matsubara and Hamaguchi

Kunitani: *What is his first name?*
 Matsubara: *Person who introduced him did not tell me his first name.*

(Plaintiff points to Yamatani.)

Kunitani: *Where did you get the mop?*
 Matsubara: *It was at the scene of the fight.*

Kunitani: *Did you take the mop with the intention of hitting Mr. Hamaguchi?*
 Matsubara: *No*

Kunitani: *Isn't it true that you can move a bunch of boys at your fingertips?*

Goodman: *Objects - no business in testimony.*

Tada: (This is the Tada of stockade fame, supposed to be head of the gamblers, leader of rival pressure group, ex-head of Japanese police.) *On the morning of the 14th what time did you meet Mr. Hamaguchi at Block 54?*
 Matsubara: *At the latrine.*

Tada: *Inside or outside?*

Matsubara: *As I was washing my face Mr. Hamaguchi approached me and said, "I have something to say to you."*

Tada: *About how long a conversation did you have at that time?*

Matsubara: *I don't think the time was very long.*

Tada: *During the conversation you have stated you didn't use any threatening words against Mr. Hamaguchi, is that true?*

Matsubara: *Yes*

Tada: *On December 15, as you came out of the messhall and saw Mr. Hamaguchi, did you notice or didn't you whether Mr. Hamaguchi had any stick or club in his hand?*

Matsubara: *At that time I don't think he had anything in his hand.*

Tada: *In your statement yesterday you stated from the time you saw Mr. Hamaguchi and the time you were first struck was about five minutes. After Mr. Hamaguchi approached you, you said you had one minutes talk with him. Do you remember whether Mr. Hamaguchi struck you with his fist or with a club?*

Matsubara: *The time was about five minutes as it was something that happened so momentarily.*

Tada: Do you think or have you actually seen whether Mr. Hamaguchi reached for any club or any stick that you might have struck first? Do you think Mr. Hamaguchi had that chance of grabbing a weapon in such a short moment?

Goodman: Objects - his opinion wouldn't matter.

Kunitani: In yesterday's testimony you stated you did not strike Mr. Hamaguchi?

Matsubara: I did not.

Kunitani: In yesterday's testimony you testified you did not threaten to strike Mr. Hamaguchi?

Matsubara: Yes

Kunitani: On the morning of December 14, when you had a conversation with Mr. Hamaguchi, isn't it true that 16 or 17 young boys surrounded Mr. Hamaguchi?

Goodman: I object - the trial here is not for any assault that took place on the 14th.

Kunitani: On the morning of the 14th, was anyone present but yourself?

Matsubara: At the beginning only two. Later people began to gather, so with my good intentions of avoiding a fight I advised Mr. Hamaguchi very earnestly to go away.

Kunitani: On the morning of the 14th, during the conversation you made no threatening gesture or words. Is that true?

Matsubara: I did not.

Thompson: When you sent Mr. Hamaguchi away [on the 14th] did you make any statement, "Go and never come back"?

Matsubara: I said for him to come to the central committee.

Kunitani: Pardon me - he also stated, "Come back at anytime at all" (Kunitani was correcting the interpreter here.)

Thompson: Please repeat the statements.

Matsubara: He asked me what time he should come back and he . . .

Yamashita: (interrupts) When Mr. Hamaguchi came to see you at the latrine on the 14th in the morning, that time you told Mr. Hamaguchi that you can come back anytime to see me or to the central committee of the Sokuji Kikoku Hoshi dan.

Matsubara: It's no use to come over to see me because I don't know. I said, come to the Central Committee of the Organization.

Ross: (an interpreter, corrects Kunitani's translation) He said, it's no use asking me at all.

(I should explain here that Kunitani first put the question to Matsubara in English and then in Japanese. Then Matsubara answered in Japanese and Kunitani translated in English, checked by Mr. Ross and Miss Newberry, interpreters.)

Tada: I wish the court would remember the statement Mr. Matsubara has just stated now.

Goodman: It's in the record.

Mr. Goodman then proceeded to question Mr. Hamaguchi for the prosecution, but Hamaguchi was unable to identify any of the weapons exhibited. These were a 2 by 2 about 30 inches long, with a nail 1 1/2 inches long protruding from one end, a 2 by 4 about two feet long, and a large flat board about 6 1/2 inches by 1/2 inch about a yard long. Goodman then questioned Mr. Matsubara's son Mori, who testified that he had seen a number of men who had tried to keep other people from approaching his father and Mr. Hamaguchi. "They were keeping other people from going in." He also identified the piece of wood with the protruding nail as the one carried by Mr. Kodama.

CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. KUNITANI

Kunitani: When did you see Mr. Yamada, [the young Hōkoku leader who had signed the complaint naming the assailants of Matsubara/?

Mori Matsubara: I didn't see him.

Kunitani: In other words, you did not see him on the 15th?

Mori Matsubara: I saw him later in the office.

Kunitani: What time?

Mori Matsubara: I can't say.

Kunitani: Can you give the approximate time?

Mori Matsubara: I couldn't tell exactly.

Kunitani: Was it after the fight?

Mori Matsubara: Yes

Goodman: Was it immediately or some time after?

Mori Matsubara: (Nods to some time after.)

Kunitani: You testified you did not know which piece of wood Mr. Imachi and Mr. Matsubara were struggling with?

Mori Matsubara: I couldn't tell what it was.

Kunitani: You testified you saw Mr. Yamada in the block 54 office. What did you do?

Goodman: Objects -

Kunitani: When you came out of the mess on December 15, and first saw the circle, you said you saw about ten persons?

Mori Matsubara: About ten. At that scene - I wasn't there too long.

* * * * *

Mr. Goodman then questioned Mrs. Matsubara, a very small, middle-aged woman. She testified that she had heard a great noise, had run to the scene, and that "I thought my husband was being killed". She also testified that she had seen two men carrying sticks. She pointed to Mr. Hamaguchi and then said: "I saw Mr. Kodama swinging a big stick." Her husband, she said, "was injured on his head and hand."

Goodman: Did Mr. Hamaguchi or Mr. Kodama make any attempt to strike you?

Mrs. Matsubara: They were standing there and Mr. Hamaguchi had a stick and I asked him if he was going to strike me.

[1. Known to be friends of Abe, Tada, and Kunitani.]

Goodman: *What did he say?*

[Mrs. Matsubara answered in Japanese with a statement which caused the defendants and many of the spectators to burst into loud and prolonged laughter. The members of the Resegregation Group, however, remained silent and expressionless. Mrs. Newberry, one of the interpreters, explained that the phrase was very profane.]

Kunitani requested permission to speak:

In the Japanese language, men being considered superior to women, so a man can say about anything which would not be considered profane. Those words are mild when they are spoken by a man.

Goodman: *I am inclined to disagree under the circumstances described in the case.*

Mr. Yamashita then requested permission to speak:

As the defendants' advisor just spoke of such language used in Japan more or less familiarly. Please do not misunderstand. Profane language cannot be spoken in public. It can be considered just as bad as in any language. Please do not be misinformed.

Kunitani: *I'm sorry to disagree. I happen to be a common fellow. Nevertheless I have certain ground to contest that statement.*

Thompson: *If the statement has any bearing we can take it to a place where we can get it interpreted.*

Goodman: *Did you try to assist your husband?*

Mrs. Matsubara: *Yes, I did, because I thought he was going to be killed. I tried to take the stick away from Mr. Hamaguchi.*

Goodman: *What did Mr. Hamaguchi do to you?*

Mrs. Matsubara: *After he said dirty words, he shoved me aside.*

Goodman: *Did you fall down?*

Mrs. Matsubara: *Yes, I fell. My back was hurt and is still painful.*

[Mr. Goodman continued to question Mrs. Matsubara who was unable to identify any of the defendants except Mr. Kodama. Mr. Kunitani said that he did not wish to cross examine. Then Mrs. Matsubara said: "Since their father was beaten up my children don't want to eat," and she began to cry. Mr. Goodman asked her how old her children were, and she said 6 and 8. He advised her to see a doctor about the children. Several other witnesses were called, but Mr. Kunitani did not cross examine them.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

I arrived early in the afternoon before the hearing began. Kunitani began to josh his friend Kagawa, telling one of the Internal Security men that Kagawa had offered to serve all the sentences which might be meted out to the defendants. Kunitani explained that Kagawa had gained so much weight since leaving the stockade that he'd decided to go to jail to lose weight. These sallies caused loud laughter on the part of the defendants and the friendly witnesses. (None of the Resegregationists had as yet arrived.) Kunitani said to Kagawa, "You don't need to worry, we'll take care of your wife for you." This got the loudest yells of laughter. Kagawa replied lamely, "All he's interested in is my wife." "You shouldn't let the last joke out of your pocket," said Kunitani. When the Hookoku men came in, however, everything became solemn again.

Four additional witnesses for the prosecution now gave their testimony. All were young men. Since they all said much the same thing and were not cross-examined I have omitted five pages here.

A young woman was then called and testified:

I got lunch for my mother-in-law and sister-in-law. I saw Mr. Matsubara and Mr. Hamaguchi fighting. Mr. Hamaguchi struck Mr. Matsubara with his fist three times. I did not see either with a weapon. I noticed other men around whom I had never seen before.

Kunitani did not cross-examine her, stating that "he would spare the young lady."

A man called Miyamoto was then called to testify: He said:

Miyamoto: I heard someone running across my block saying, "There's a fight in block 54. So I went over. I didn't see anyone hit anyone else. I saw Mr. Hamaguchi shouting loudly with another group. I didn't hear what he was saying."

At this point I wrote in my notes that it was amazing that so many witnesses had testified that they had heard Mr. Hamaguchi shouting loudly, but not one would repeat anything he said. Later, I learned from uninvolved respondents, that in his speech Mr. Hamaguchi had denounced the Hookoku for gangster tactics and for degregation of "the true spirit of Japan".

Miyamoto: I heard Mr. Shitanishi threatened. Hamaguchi said something to me. I don't remember what it was. He had no club. The older Shiroyama too said something to me. I don't remember what it was. It was something threatening and dirty words. The younger Shiroyama brother held my jacket and threatened to hit me. Another boy held my jacket too.

Thompson: Did anyone hit you?

Miyamoto: No. But Mr. Kono, Sawada and Kodama with a stick, they attempted to hit me. He didn't raise his stick but pulled it behind. I said something to them but I don't remember what it was.

Goodman: Were you there when the police arrived?

Miyamoto: Some of them throw their sticks on the ground and started to run away.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

Kunitani: What center are you from?

Miyamoto: Jerome.

Kunitani: These boys (defendants and Miyamoto) all come from the same center. That's just a reminder.

Tada: Did you go from block 52 to 54 alone?

Miyamoto: Two boys came with me.

Two additional witnesses were called, but neither would say much and there was no cross-examination. Mr. Thompson remarked:

It seems to me that there are a lot of witnesses coming here who know little or nothing about the case.

* * * * *

Mr. Hamaguchi now took the stand in his defense. He is 30 years old and lives in block 57.

Kunitani: On December 14th did you have any conversation with Mr. Matsubara?
Hamaguchi: Yes.

Kunitani: Where?

Hamaguchi: Mr. Matsubara was in the latrine. I went in and said, "Good Morning," I waited until he had brushed his teeth. We were outside by the coal pile. Well, I said, "Mr. Matsubara, I came to straighten out a matter of expelling me from the Hōshi-dan. I've seen you twice before. You told me you didn't know anything about it. But the night before I had received the minutes of the Hōshi-dan meeting of October 11. According to these minutes you are the one who stated in the meeting of the committee that I'm to be expelled." Mr. Matsubara said, "I don't know nothing about it. It's a frameup."

When he said that I noticed about 16 boys behind me.¹ Mr. Matsubara said: "You haven't any business in 54. Get the hell out." One boy said, "Are you looking for trouble in this block? and he shoved me.

I said: "Mr. Matsubara, why don't you stop these boys?"

He said: "If you don't get the hell out I'll sock you."

I said I'll come back with the minutes and show you definitely what you said at the committee meeting. If I'd gotten into a further argument with Mr. Matsubara, I'd been mopped up.

Thompson: When you were pushed on December 14th, did you make no complaint to the Colonial Police Force?

Hamaguchi: No

Kunitani: Can you recognize any of the boys who were there?

Thompson: ~~That was~~ That has no bearing on this case.

Kunitani: Yesterday Mr. Matsubara testified that he did not strike you on the 14th?

Goodman: Objects.

Kunitani: On December 15, why did you go to block 54?

Hamaguchi: I went there to straighten out a personal matter. I brought over the minutes.

Kunitani: Tell the conversation that took place.

Hamaguchi: I went in 54. I went up to him. He wouldn't look at me. I said, "We can't get any place. Why don't you stop?" He did stop. With his right hand he swung out at me. Defending myself, I gave him a left jab on the jaw.

Thompson: You just struck him once?

Hamaguchi: As I did that he swung round. I noticed his glasses were hanging over his right ear. He turned around to the wood-pile. His glasses dropped into the woodpile. He picked up the mop, holding the side with the rag. I ducked. He hit me and the mop flew off. I tried to get the mop away. I stumbled and fell down. He hit me on the knee with the jagged end and tore my pants. (shows torn pants). I sprang away and grabbed the mop end. I hit him on the head.

1. Evidently these were Hookoku boys, many of whom lived in Block 54.

Kunitani: Was it Mr. Matsubara who struck you first?
Hamaguchi: Yes.

Thompson: Do you have any scars?
Hamaguchi: No. But my back hurt me all the next night. After I struck Mr. Matsubara on the head, I saw him facing toward me. It was the only thing I could do. I picked up a lathe in self-defense. He backed away and I followed him. He stopped (around barrack 10). I saw him gesturing to somebody, saying, "Come and get him," Mrs. Matsubara came out and grabbed my stick. She said, "Why don't you strike me?" I said, "I have nothing against you, Mrs. Matsubara." I said, "I'm man enough not to strike a woman." She wouldn't let go of the stick. I pulled and she fell to her knees. Then she got up and walked away.

Mr. Matsubara went back to pick up his glasses. Then I walked around this way (north of Barrack 10) I wanted to know why a certain boy pushed me yesterday. I wanted to get his explanation. I spotted him. It was Mr. Matsubara's son. I said, "Weren't you the boy who pushed me yesterday? At that time a fellow (Mr. Miyamoto) came out and said, "Explain." Then I explained.

Thompson: Was it Mr. Miyamoto?
Hamaguchi: Yes. Mr. Miyamoto looked as if he understood my side of it. He said, "What's going on here?" He said, "Let me handle this matter." He said, "I'll call Mr. Yamada. He would fix it up." At this time 150 fellows (of Hookoku) were there. Somebody said about three times, "Slap that fellow down - get him."

Tada: Was there a pretty big crowd?
Hamaguchi: There was approximately 450 to 500 people.

Tada: How long did you make a speech?
Hamaguchi: It wasn't exactly a speech. I thought I'd explain to everybody. I spoke about twenty-five minutes to a half hour.

Tada: What kind of response did you get from the crowd?
Hamaguchi: I heard three different times, "That's right - Sure he's right."

Thompson: (Asks for description of beginning of fight.)
Hamaguchi: When he came out of the mess hall I told him to stop. I saw about a half dozen boys rushing toward me. Mr. Matsubara said, "I told you to get the hell out of my block before." That's when he swung on me.

Thompson: Did you go alone?
Hamaguchi: Yes. - Well, because of the day before incident I went to Kodama and I told him what happened.

Thompson: Did you tell Mr. Kodama that you were going to block 54 at noon the next day?
Hamaguchi: Yes.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

Goodman: How much do you weigh?
Hamaguchi: 132 pounds.

Goodman: Do you engage in any exercise or athletics?
Hamaguchi: I did when I went to high school.

Goodman: Do you work here?
 Hamaguchi: Yes, in housing. I'm a water adjuster.

Goodman: Do you do any wrestling?
 Hamaguchi: No.

Goodman: When did you last see Mr. Matsubara before the 15th?
 Hamaguchi: On the afternoon of the day before.

Goodman: When you had the tussle with Mr. Matsubara where were your friends?
 Hamaguchi: I didn't see them. I first saw them when Mr. Matsubara picked up the mop and struck me.

Goodman: How long was it after Mr. Matsubara struck you that you delivered the speech?
 Hamaguchi: Eight or nine minutes.

Goodman: Who else left with you?
 Hamaguchi: I left by myself.

Goodman: What happened to Mr. Kodama? Did you see him?
 Hamaguchi: He disappeared some place.

Goodman: When did Nozama leave?
 Hamaguchi: I don't know.

Goodman: When did Yamatani leave?
 Hamaguchi: I don't recall.

Goodman: Do you remember seeing any of the boys leave before you left?
 Hamaguchi: I don't know.

Goodman: All of these boys were with you at the time?
 Hamaguchi: Yes.

Goodman: Is this the mop?
 Hamaguchi: Yes.

Goodman: When you grabbed hold of it was it broken?
 Hamaguchi: It was busted.

Goodman: Did you talk to any of the other boys about going to block 54 but Kodama?
 Hamaguchi: No.

HAMAGUCHI DISMISSED, MR. KODAMA CALLED,

(Hamaguchi is a medium sized Japanese of slender build. He made a colorful witness and gave an impression of frankness. Mr. Kodama is quite tall and enormously strong. Both of the men speak good, if ungrammatical English. Kodama lives in block 66 and is 28 years old. He is a former prize-fighter and was Judo instructor at Jerome Center and here. He has the black belt.)

Kodama: Sometime on the afternoon of the 14th Mr. Hamaguchi had saw me about the incident of the morning. He told me he was going back and settle the argument the next afternoon. And according to his story I felt bodily harm would be done so I proceeded to block 54 on the 15th and at that time I didn't know if Hamaguchi was in the block. I waited around.

- Goodman: How long would you have waited around if you hadn't seen him.
 Kodama: Oh, all afternoon, I guess. (laughter from those attending) Then I spotted Hamaguchi. I saw a bunch of fellows come out of the mess hall. I just stood there. I stood there until Mr. Hamaguchi was swung at. Then they had a scramble as Mr. Hamaguchi described. It looked as if the boys standing there were going to rush in. Some of them said something about getting a knife or a stick. So I went to the woodpile and picked one up.
- Tada: What made you pick up the wood?
 Kodama: One fellow said something about a knife and ran toward the kitchen. Seeing that this was a personal matter I just let Hamaguchi and Matsubara have their argument. All this time I could see fellows gathering around. They were all bald headed (shouts of laughter from all defendants and friends)¹ and we were very much outnumbered.
- Kunitani: How many were there?
 Kodama: About 50. After we moved to this section (lower part of block) there were about 100 to 150 fellows - all bald headed.
- Thompson: What is the significance of these clipped heads?
 Kunitani: I don't know. I belong to the organization, that is, I pay my dues. Of the 11 boys here only one belongs to the Sokujū. I don't know who it is.
- Kodama: After the argument, they both got up and Hamaguchi had picked up another piece of lathe. Mr. Matsubara was backing up. He kept signalling for some of the fellows to jump in. They didn't care to fight. Mrs. Matsubara came in. We let her past. I thought she was just one of the people living in the block. She went for Mr. Hamaguchi's stick. She grabbed the stick. Mr. Matsubara was making every effort to hit - strike Mike (Hamaguchi). He pulled on the stick and she stumbled. Seeing it was a man to man affair -- Mr. Matsubara threw down his mop and Mike threw his stick away. Mr. Miyamoto came along. He had no business there. I missed one part - when Mrs. Matsubara went down she called for the emergency bugle call. It might have been a bluff.
- Thompson: Did you see Mr. Hamaguchi strike Mr. Matsubara?
 Kodama: After Mr. Matsubara had flung his arm.
- Tada: Then you merely went over there to see that Mr. Hamaguchi wouldn't get hurt?
 Kodama: Yes
- Thompson: Did you take anyone with you?
 Kodama: No sir.

¹. Sometime in late November or early December male members of the Resegregationist Groups shaved their heads, in imitation, some said, of the Japanese Army. People who were not members began to refer to them as "shavedheads" or, more derogatorily, as "baldheads". The followers of Abe, Kunitani, and Tada came to be called "longhairs".

CROSS-EXAMINATION

Goodman: *When did you first see Mori Matsubara?*
 Kodama: *I don't remember - but I did see him later.*

Goodman: *Did you see anybody trying to help Mr. Matsubara?*
 Kodama: *No*

Goodman: *Was there a group of friends there trying to help you or were you alone?*
 Kodama: *I presume there were some friends.*

(Goodman got Kodama to admit Kono and Mits Sawada were there. - Also that the boys formed a circle to keep people from interrupting.)

There was really no circle until we thought there would be trouble.

(Goodman here went into detail on how Kodama and the boys were not worrying about the safety of Mr. Matsubara, that they didn't go there to protect Mr. Matsubara. He then asked Kodama if the two by two were the one he was holding. Kodama admitted that it looked like the stick he held.)

Goodman: *(Asked him if he held the stick by the end with the nail in it or the other end.)*
 Kodama: *At first I held it by the nail end, but afterward I held it by the other end because it was more protection. (laughter from sympathizers)*

Goodman: *Did you say anything to anybody?*
 Kodama: *No sir.*

Goodman: *Did you tell the people to keep away?*
 Kodama: *No sir.*

Goodman: *Then there were other fellows standing around as part of a circle?*
 Kodama: *I don't know.*

Goodman: *You didn't keep running around the circle protecting Hamaguchi all by yourself?*
 Kodama: *(Smiled sweetly in answer as if to imply that he was capable of this.)*

Goodman: *When Hamaguchi went to the other end of the block did you follow him?*
 Kodama: *Yes.*

Goodman: *Did any of the other boys follow him?*
 Kodama: *I don't know. With me were Mr. Tsuha and Mr. Kono. I noticed no others while the speech was going on.*

Goodman: *Did you keep the crowd away while he was delivering the speech?*
 Kodama: *Yes*

Goodman: *How did the people react to the speech?*
 Kodama: *It seems as if the older people were with Mike, but the younger people didn't look friendly.*

Goodman: How many were there in the group whom you thought would gang up on Hamaguchi?
Kodama: About 150.

Goodman: How many of you were there?
Kodama: The whole bunch here - They hadn't shown up till we came to the end of the block.

Mr. Kodama was dismissed and another witness called. Kunitani introduced him by saying "Mr. Yamatani has been going to English school ever since he came out of the stockade. He was watching the fight."

Mr. Yamatani was questioned briefly and court was adjourned until the next day.

Encounter with Wilson

On my way home I met Wilson, head of Internal Security. He expressed himself as most displeased that this matter had been made so much of and that there was so much fuss. Everybody knew what the Hoshi-dan was, said he. He felt that the Administration should tell the Kira gang to go to hell. He told me 160 families had resigned from the Hoshi-dan. Later inquiries in the colony corroborate this. In fact, even more may have resigned since the fracas in block 54.

DECEMBER 21, 1944

Yamatani again took the stand, but neither Goodman nor Thompson questioned him. Kunitani, however asked: "Did you strike More Matsubara?" Yamatani responded: "No." Another defendant, Mr. Nozama was then called and subjected to an extended interrogation by Mr. Goodman. Here are the final questions.

Goodman: Do you study every morning making Japanese characters?

Nozama: Last semester I studied English - Now I'm...?

Goodman: Do you work?

Nozama: No.

Goodman: Do you study every morning?

Nozama: Yes.

Goodman: Every morning from the time you leave the messhall until noon?

Nozama: In general, yes.

Goodman: Do the other boys in your room study every morning?

Nozama: Yes, we all study.

Goodman: Do you study in the afternoon and do the others study in the afternoon?

Nozama: Yes, they study as a rule.

Kunitani: If you want to know how studious these boys are you ought to go to their room. In the stockade they studied five to six hours a day - every day.

Goodman: If they studied English a little bit I would be able to question them better.

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Mr. Kai, 21 years old was then called and the following interchange took place.

Kunitani: What do you do?

Kai: I go to school. As stated by the previous boys I went to block 54 after we heard the noise and watched the commotion. In 54 I went to the latrine. When I came out I saw Mr. Hamaguchi and Mr. Shitanishi asking him for the reason. Mr. Hamaguchi said, "If you want to ask the reason." There were many boys behind Mr. Shitanishi coming toward Mr. Hamaguchi. Then Mr. Hamaguchi started in with his speech. "I came to see Mr. Matsubara and talk as man to man and this is a personal affair."

Thompson: Did you hold a club at any time?

Kai: No.

Thompson: Did you hit anyone?

Kai: No.

Thompson: Did you take any part in keeping back the crowd?

Kai: There were lots of children listening to Mr. Hamaguchi's speech as if they were listening to a principal's speech.

Four more witnesses for the defense were called, but Mr. Kunitani did not participate in the questioning except on one occasion when Mr. Yamashita interrupted with a suggestion and Kunitani objected. Mr. Goodman quieted them and said that only questions pertinent to this case might be asked. When the younger Shiroyama brother (age 26), a defendant, was called, Kunitani began by asking him; "Were you at block 54 on December 15th?" The defendant replied: "I was ill and in bed. I went to the latrine in 49. Then I heard a noise and saw a big crowd around 54. So I went to 54. Mr. Goodman then asked a few questions. When the older Shiroyama defendant was called (age 37), Kunitani again began the questioning by asking: /

How many children do you have?

Shiroyama: Oh, about five.

Kunitani: When was the youngest born?

Shiroyama: November 26. I was bringing food for my family from the messhall and then I went to get some hot water. I heard a bunch of boys coming from the Manzanar section. I took the water home and then I went to 54. There were about 200 people there - shaved heads.

Thompson and Goodman then asked a few questions. Other witnesses for the defense were called, but none were present. /

Kunitani: Many witnesses refused to come for fear of retaliation.

Thompson: What do you mean by retaliation? Is a person afraid to get up in the witness stand for fear of what might happen?

Kunitani: It's difficult to explain.

Thompson: Are you people coming down here in fear?

Kunitani: Concerning this problem, your honor, since the people had to testify for Mr. Matsubara, they are afraid they may offend some of them. Some are rather hesitant.

Goodman: (suggests subpoena).

Thompson: Of what are they afraid?

Kunitani: That point is rather difficult for me to testify to because some of them may have personal reasons or reasons we don't know. Since there is some sort of friction - there is a little trouble in 54.

Goodman: Are they afraid of getting between two groups?

Kunitani: You could say that.

Goodman: Can you tell me whether they are afraid of a group or of individuals?

Thompson: Are they afraid of any group of people?

Kunitani: I couldn't say so.

Mrs. Higashi of block 54 called - witness for defense. Mrs. Higashi is my Gilan friend, Bill Higashi's, mother or aunt.

Mrs. Higashi: On December 14th I did not go to breakfast. I went to wash my face and hands. I heard a noisy commotion outside the latrine. I don't belong to either side.

Tada: *At the time when you saw Mr. Hamaguchi and Mr. Matsubara, was there any threatening words given by Mr. Matsubara to Mr. Hamaguchi?*

Mrs. Higashi: *Yes, I heard it.*

Kunitani: *What did Mr. Matsubara say?*

Mrs. Higashi: *When I came out of the latrine I saw a man in a black coat standing quite a distance away. He said, "I didn't come here to fight. All I want is a reasonable answer." I saw Mr. Matsubara and three young fellows following him. Mr. Matsubara stated, "Should I give it to you (hit you)?" Some seven or eight boys made threatening gestures toward the man with the black coat.*

Mr. Matsubara said, "Shall I let you have it?" again. "If you have any evidence, bring it over." Mr. Hamaguchi said, "I have evidence. I'll bring it over." Mr. Matsubara said, "Get the hell out of here." Mr. Hamaguchi said, "I may bring a man with me." Mr. Matsubara said, "You can bring anybody over."

/Another witness for the defense was called and then the session adjourned for lunch./ As I was leaving the courtroom, Mr. Yamashita, the Resegregationist leader remarked that the notes I was taking ought to be of great use to me after the war.

AFTERNOON SESSION

As I came in and waited Goodman came up and asked me jokingly if I thought anyone would object if the hearing were finished off today. I replied in a mock sententious tone that his object was to see that justice was carried out. I heckled him a little bit on not having an opposing attorney to object to some of his questions, and said that if I didn't hear what was said in Hamaguchi's speech I'd raise a riot. He took this seriously, and later told me he had approached Kunitani who promised to get Hamaguchi to write out the speech whereupon Kunitani will translate it for Goodman who will pass it on to me. The atmosphere of the room became gloomy and tensed as the Sokuji faction stalked in. All sat down and waited silently for the proceedings to begin.

/The secretary and the vice-president of the Hōkoku Seinen dan were called to the stand and questioned at length by Mr. Tada. Mr. Matsubara was then re-called by Mr. Thompson./

* * * * *

Thompson: *You said (in first statement) that you did not see the mop. Is that right?*
Matsubara: *Because my glasses had fallen off I couldn't identify the mop.*

Thompson: *Do you remember striking Mr. Hamaguchi and hearing something break?*
Matsubara: *My glasses had fallen off, I didn't know whether Mr. Hamaguchi was standing there.*

Thompson: *Did you hear anything break?*
Matsubara: *No.*

Thompson: *Do you know of any reason why there shouldn't be a warden in block 54?*
Matsubara: *I asked the committee about that.*

Thompson: *Who is the committee?*
Matsubara: *I don't know all of the members of the committee. Mr. Murashige is one.*

Goodman: *Did you see Mr. Hamaguchi fall to the ground?*
Matsubara: *No.*

Goodman: *Did you strike Mr. Hamaguchi at all?*

Matsubara: *No.*

Goodman: *How could you see Mr. Hamaguchi strike you if you didn't know he was there?*

Matsubara: *I knew it because of the hurt on my head.*

Goodman: *Earlier you positively stated it was Mr. Hamaguchi who struck you.*

Matsubara: *I'm sure it was Mr. Hamaguchi. There wasn't anyone between us.*

During this interchange, two Issei men sitting next to me (who must have been very anti-Hōkoku) kept smiling at me, as if to make sure I understood that Matsubara was contradicting himself. They looked delighted.

Thompson: *You are to have me understand that you could walk back and find your glasses and yet couldn't see a man the size of Mr. Hamaguchi or an object the size of a mop?*

(Loud laughter from defense and sympathizers)

Matsubara: *It was not so much that. At the moment when my glasses were knocked off my nerves were upset and I couldn't see.*

Goodman: *Mr. Hamaguchi says you struck him on the knee with the jagged end of the mop. Did you do that?*

Matsubara: *No I didn't.*

Goodman: *Do you know if Mr. Hamaguchi was in anyway hurt?*

Matsubara: *No, I didn't hurt him.*

Goodman: *Did you see anything happen that might have caused hurt to his knee?*

Matsubara: *No.*

Yamashita: *Mr. Matsubara wishes to present his personal opinion before the honor and you.*

Goodman: *If he has any additional facts - - -*

Thompson: *Go ahead.*

Matsubara: (as interpreted by Tachibana) *Because of the fact testified of the witness did not come to his satisfactory understanding. Therefore I wish to state my opinion. I saw Mr. Hamaguchi standing by the coal pile as I came out of the door. Mr. Hamaguchi stated as in testimony, "There is something I wish to talk with you." Yet I went forward.*

Mr. Hamaguchi also stated "I told Mr. Matsubara to stop." When I stopped I saw Mr. Hamaguchi and I also saw Mr. Kodama and Mr. Yamatani right in front of mess-hall 18 - the other side of the coal pile. I know particularly Mr. Kodama was behind that coal pile. (Kodama had denied this.) Mr. Nozama and Mr. Sawada and two others were standing with him.

They stated that they are to be enrolled in school on the following Monday, but I feel there is some doubt.

Tada: *I object - I think this is irrelevant.*

Thompson: *Why does he doubt it?*

Matsubara: (via Yamashita) *That Mr. Fukushima who lived in ward II and the others living far away from 54, when at such a time they should be eating lunch - - -*

Kunitani: *I don't think this has any bearing on this case. Plenty of the plaintiffs' witnesses come from other blocks.*

Goodman: (To Yamashita) *You are trying to interpret the evidence for Mr. Thompson.*

/Mr. Yamada, the leader of the Hōkoku was recalled, but testified almost incoherently./

/Ten days later the verdict was announced: Hamaguchi was given a light sentence; two other defendants were given suspended sentences; the rest were acquitted./

TALK WITH GOODMAN

/I knew Goodman would be very communicative after the trial so visited him the same evening./

"We had a long conference with Yamashita, Kunitani, Yamada and Tada after the hearing, at which time it was again explained why the men were being paroled to Wilson. Wilson asked Yamada whether he could control his boys. He asked Yamashita whether he could control the situation. He also asked Kunitani and Tada - and Abe and Kira were mentioned too. It was explained to the leaders of both sides that if any incident occurred, they would all be responsible."

Each one (Japanese) delivered a little speech which was taken down in shorthand. Yamashita said that he was only a member of the Hooshi dan, "You gentlemen probably don't understand, I'm not the head." he said.

Kunitani and Tada made very eloquent speeches about the point that ever since the stockade incident they had been campaigning and practicing peaceful methods. 18,000 people ought to be able to live together with peace and harmony.

Yamada explained that he called the police, which is indicative of his intention to follow peaceful methods.

Thompson gave them a very very effective speech, better than he gave in the courtroom. Wilson suggested that they could have a good colonial police department, if all were cooperative.

Slim Tada wanted to talk to me. And he said, "Is there any legal recourse here if someone calls anyone else an inu?" I said, "That's just an insult, isn't it?"

"Oh, no," said he, "It makes a man lose his social standing." I said that slander depends on the case. If a man calls another man a criminal, then we can punish him for criminal libel. I would prefer that each case be handled as a separate case.

Goodman also told me that it had been Yamada who swore out the complaints. Swearing that the eleven men were responsible. Kodama, Tada, Hamaguchi and Kunitani had all asked Goodman who had made this complaint. Yamada, Goodman tells me, was not going to sign the statement, but Yamashita, who was present when the complaint was made, said, "Sign it, sign it." So poor Yamada signed. . . Goodman also told me that Matsubara is one of the men whose names always appear on the Hooshi dan petitions along with Iwo, Tsuchikawa and Ishikawa.

Goodman also said that before the hearing Abe and Kunitani, through go-betweens, had tried to make a deal with him for a suspended sentence of ten days for Hamaguchi and Matsubara. He refused to listen. I asked for his guess on the possible sentence which might eventually be meted out. He said his guess was that Hamaguchi and Kodama would not get more than 90 days at the most.

DECEMBER 23, 1944

TALK WITH MRS. TSUCHIKAWA

Mrs. Tsuchikawa was really worried and when she's worried she's always very communicative. The release of the eleven boys /accused by Hooshi dan/ was a great blow.

"Wilson rode around the block 54 office with some of those boys in his car and they were all giggling and laughing."

"Morris¹ told me that Tada, Kunitani and Wilson were now taking charge of the boys. Why should they do such a thing? I told Morris, either you bought them or they bought you."

"Lot's of men (of the Hooshi dan) have been threatened personally. Mr. Kone grabbed Mr. Higashi's neck. Now they're spreading rumors that Mr. Tsuchikawa and Ichi (her brother) informed on the eleven names.

"Those three clubs came from Reverend Abe's house. They have been seen there.² They told the boys (defendants) over and over again what to say. And they also asked the bread man to take them chicken and things to the Klamath Falls jail. You can just imagine what kinds of notes they smuggled.

The boys (Hokoku) are really mad. We had a hard time stopping them. We say, "They aren't worth picking fights with."

When we heard Thompson was the judge, we said it was plain that they (gamblers and Administration) were together.

Mr. Kira said right away, "This trial is a flop."

I'm sure we're going to send a letter to all the different departments, telling them how unfair this thing was.

The second day, when some of the boys came from the hearing, they said, "Oh what a shibai, (performance) what an act they put on.

And then Kagawa came over and said he wanted to hold hands with us. I said, "We're happy as we are and we don't want to have gangsters in our social life. And he laughed at Mr. Matsubara because he made that statement. He said he (Matsubara) had tied himself into a knot. He said he was going to see Reverend Abe and see if then we could get together. We should hold hands. He said, "We're not going to apologize and we are going to have our own way too." But nobody listens to them.

Reverend Ohira and Ishikawa, who are Hooshi-dan leaders, wrote to Reverend Abe and told him never to call on them or speak to them again. His father and mother renounced him on the day of the trial.

We want Abe and Kunitani to feel that the WRA is purposefully using these boys to disorganize the center. WRA wants to make use of this in propaganda against the Japanese. If these people don't realize that they just must be stupid Japanese. If they want to fight personally, we don't care, but to see them who think they're so intellectual, playing into WRA's hand - - -

/1. Also a member of the police force./

/2. The clubs exhibited at the trial were very inefficient looking. I doubt that Reverend Abe would keep such objects in his barracks./

Mrs. Tsuchikawa's Cause for Anxiety

Mrs. Tsuchikawa then told me what was really torturing her, the possibility that her brother might be arrested for perjury because he signed the complaint against the eleven boys.

Mr. Johnson just forced them to sign the statement. Kagawa told us, "why did you sign it?"

What do you think he will do?

They [the Hōkoku boys] said they didn't know anything about it. They (Internal Security) said it was nothing, just to sign it. Johnson took him (Ichi) to another room and made him sign it.

Kagawa threatened us with perjury about the statement.

(Mrs. Tsuchikawa told me that Yamada, her brother Ichiro Uchida, and her husband had signed the complaint.)

The other side is talking about a perjury charge. This boy (indicating a young man who had been present in the apartment when I arrived) just came and told me. It said on the statement that Ichiro and Yamada and Mr. Tsuchikawa presented the eleven names to have arrested.

Ichiro and Yamada and my husband didn't go to the Internal Security. Yamada went to the colonial police. Neither was there. How could they present eleven names? Now they say that Ichiro was an informer and that he informed on the eleven names.

I said to him, "Why did you sign?" He said, "Mr. Yamashita knows I said I didn't want to sign." There were lots of other boys there.

The gamblers are going from house to house making people leave the Seinen dan.

DECEMBER 24, 1944

TALK WITH MRS. DESCHIN

Mrs. Deschin, the very capable social worker, told me of an interview she had had with Kunitani in which he had brought up the subject of community government in camp and his desire to take an active part in bringing this about. He was quite frank about his wish to be in on it. She made what I consider a pretty astute guess of why he wants to go back to Japan even though he is so American. She guesses he will feel that with his American education and his obvious ability he feels he can become a really big shot in Japan, while in this country, with only a high school education, he'll always have to buck better educated Americans.

DECEMBER 25, 1944

News From Goodman

Goodman gave me two interesting pieces of information this evening. First - Reverend Abe has filed a complaint that he has been threatened by the Hooshi-dan. Second - on Wednesday, the 27th, the leaders and officers of the Hooshi-dan are going to be picked up and taken out of camp. I could get no other details because the information was whispered at a Christmas party.

DECEMBER 26, 1944TALK WITH KUNITANI

Kunitani was in excellent spirits and we had a better talk than ever before. /Before we began our talk, he gave me a copy of a letter which Mr. Best had prepared for the residents of Tule Lake immediately after the farm accident of October 1943. I was very happy because this letter was valuable data for the Evacuation and Resettlement Study./

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Tule Lake Center
Newell, California

October 20, 1943

To be read at dinner, Oct. 20 and at breakfast, Oct. 21 by Block Managers and posted in each Block Manager's office and in all mess halls.

On the afternoon of Oct. 15, an accident occurred in transporting workers to the farm area. Many workers were injured. Later one worker died from injuries received. Immediately all reports and notices necessary were made to the U. S. Employment Compensation Commission for all the workers injured. The next day no farm workers appeared and none have reported since. To date no official spokesman of the farm workers have come to discuss the matter with the Administration although the administration is ready and invites such discussion.

It is the administration's intentions to work with the residents in adjusting problems and making Tule Lake as comfortable a place to live as possible.

In the immediate situation, the entire farm crop needs to be harvested. These are the vegetables that the residents of Tule Lake will be eating this winter. The crop will not be lost. If evacuees do not harvest it; the Army will be asked to. This means that the W.R.A. will have to ask the Army Quartermaster for vegetables for the evacuee's tables this winter. These requisitions must be prepared for 50 days in advance of the period to be used. We would not be in a very good position to expect our demands to be filled if we fail to harvest the splendid farm crop now available.

The situation is the responsibility pure and simple, of the residents of Tule Lake Center. The administration is ready and willing to discuss and work out on a fair basis any and all difficulties that may arise. If the farm workers are not interested enough in the settlement of this problem to send official spokesmen to the administration by 8:30 A.M. October 21st, it will be necessary for the W.R.A. to request harvesting by the Army and consequent loss of the crops to the evacuees.

/s/ R. R. Best.

I then asked Kunitani about the rumor I had heard that a group of Hōkoku boys had come rushing to the scene when the trouble started. He said it was true;

"About 30 fellows came. Ueno came from block 15 and about 30 fellows came from Manzanar. I was told that Yamashita and Kira were there too."

"This whole incident (trouble with Hōkoku) would have been ten times easier if Best had realized the background of the November 1 incident and if he had released us /from the stockade/ in April. I don't think if he'd done that these men /Resegregationists/ would have gotten control like they did."

The only thing I feel sorry for is the young fellows who knew nothing of the intentions of the leaders and also for the old couples who had no knowledge of the conditions, who are following the leaders as if they were their sole saviors. Among the group there are about ten or twelve people from the Poston gang - among them are Iwo, Yamada, and Yamashita.

I've told Yamada repeatedly to refrain from such activities. But he's stubborn and he doesn't use his stubbornness in the right place.

I then asked Kunitani some questions about the events of October and November. I had minutes of many of the meetings, but many items needed clarification.

Best's Interest in Internal Security at October 27 /1943/ Meeting

His fear was because of segregation, so many [evacuee police] went out. The force was supposed to be 140 people (Japanese) but at that time there were only 78. That was just a fraction over half.

Farm Meeting Minutes

Kunitani had some sloppy looking minutes in Japanese from the farm workers meetings of late October. He translated some for me to clarify the farm problem.

27 or 28 of Oct. - Farm Meeting decision - "Without any reason we don't see any necessity of returning our badges."

The following minutes were written after Kunitani had reported on the "successful" conference of the 27th:

"Since the Administration has the intention of a cooperative spirit, I think the colonists should support the Administration as far as the farm group is concerned. The negotiations have been completed very favorably. As far as guarantee of life is concerned, there should be no worry in the future.

"Mr. Kallum [Callum?] the supervisor, has the interpretation that the stoppage of work was not considered a strike. It's possible that all of us should return to work. I don't believe any of us (farm group) would have any objection to returning to work.

"However, on the 28th, it was announced that the farm group had been terminated. The farm group has been requested to turn in their badges. But there has been so much contrast between what the Negotiating Committee had reported and this action that we are very much disappointed about this action. Since we did not stage a strike, we see no reason why we should be terminated. Mr. Zimmer should know very well what transpired during the conference.

"With the foregoing reasons, we request that by tomorrow, Saturday noon, (Oct. 30), we want the Administration to retract the announcement of the previous day and at the same time nullify our termination from work. If this problem cannot be settled, concerning the graveness of the situation, we will again have to turn the matter to the peoples' hand."

Badges

The badges if not returned, took .50 from the pay check. There was a sincere effort on our part to try to minimize the grievance toward the Administration and we had to have some ground to appeal to the farm group to be more patient. If Mr. Best made some concessions we could defend the practice at this time.

Referral to Poston Strike

During the night of November 4, when the committee was in session, the suggestion was made from the Poston segregees that the condition which took place in Poston in and around the strike - the matter was more or less set in that manner.

Nov. 4th Riot

If I had known anything like Nov. 4th would have happened I would have sent Mr. Tada down. I didn't think it was such a bad condition. Mr. Tada felt about the same as I did.

5th of Nov.

On the 5th the M.P.'s lined up about five feet apart. The majority of the people knew nothing of what had happened and wanted to go to work. Some were just standing and trying to find out the reason. The girls working in the hospital were kept in the hospital. Their families and the families of the boys arrested wanted to know what had happened.

Best's Promise to Let People Know What Means He Took to Harvest Crop

Kunitani could think of no reason why the people got the notion that Best had promised this. He had never had that idea, he said. The only possible source of the common notion that he could think of was that Best might at some time have made this statement to the farm group. Through Kunitani I may be able to get in contact with some of the men on the farm group and ask them about this.

Kunitani and Abe's Speeches on Nov. 1

This is a matter on which I have very little information. Kunitani was very glad to tell me:

"I made a very short speech. I said we had an opportunity to negotiate not only with Mr. Best but with Mr. Myer also. I just briefly summed up the points in the majority of cases. Mr. Myer promised he'd conduct a thorough investigation and said we'd be notified. In general, the requests brought up were received in a harmonious manner. In due time, I was positive, everything would be ironed out.

The recognition of a centralized committee was important to the people. I mentioned that and also about the food and the hospital.

Mr. Myer spoke then. Then Reverend Abe spoke last. He refrained the people from going into any unreasonable acts and to always maintain their true virtue as real Japanese. The negotiations were well conducted. At the last he said, "This is the end for the time being," and told the people to disperse.

Uchida told the people to take a bow. The people took a bow not only in gratitude to Reverend Abe, but also as a gesture of gratitude to Mr. Myer.

Kunitani then told me that Kagawa has been going around telling the big shots in the Hoshi dan to resign. He's suggested the idea to Yamashita and Ishikawa, but it doesn't seem as if he's having much success. Kunitani also stated that he still believed the camp people could get along, if the Hoshi-dan hadn't made so much trouble; he, he felt, could get along with the "loyal" people.

Present Hearings for Relocation

I did notice people are receiving different papers. Many are receiving excludee notices from the Pacific Coast, Gulf and Atlantic defense areas. Then there's a small group of people whose status in the eyes of the Army is not clear. (These are probably on the stop list.) I've heard of no one who has been given a segregation notice yet, except those people in block 99.

Representative Government

Kunitani also brought up the need of representative government here. He feels that the people are ready for this now and that all they need is the right leader. He added, jokingly, that he was probably going to be sent (forcibly relocated) to the Middle West, which he hated. His wife Joyce said: "I don't want to go there. I want to go home." Kunitani is the first person, except Niyama¹ who has looked at the situation realistically and doesn't try to fool himself about the possibility of being sent out of Tule Lake.

JANUARY 2, 1945

/Early on the morning of December 27, the Department of Justice arrested and interned seventy of the leaders of the Sokuji Kikoku Hoshi dan and the Hokoku Seinen dan./

TALK WITH GEORGE KUNITANI

Rumors Which Hoshi-dan is Spreading About Kunitani and His Group

"I'm not afraid. That organization is a monkey wrench. We will have to win the membership into a much broader field so they, in the shortest possible time, will realize the significance of living in harmony together here in camp.

If they keep on making more pickups it's going to excite the people and we'll never have harmony.

Over the past two days the feeling has been very good in camp. It's the spirit of the holiday and I'm more or less pleased to see it. Of course the families of the people picked up didn't feel too good. They happen to be the leaders for a segment of the sentiment in the colony."

Kunitani then gave me copies of the two propaganda statements put out by the Hoshi dan since the pickups. The first was put out on December 27, the very day of the pickups, the second came out a few days ago. Kunitani translated parts of the second paper, but we were interrupted by the arrival of an elderly Issei friend. (I'll see if I can't get someone else to do it.)

On the 27th of December the leaders and cabinet members were picked up for reasons unknown. A meeting was held. It mentions the fact that the succeeding cabinet members had already been selected by the old officers.

Here Issei friend came in.

Today a member came over here telling me that during the morning exercises Yamada had said that he'd be picked up sooner or later. 'If they do get picked up,' he said, 'they

/1. See my talk with Frank Niyama on December 23, 1944./

had new cabinet already selected and they wanted the members to support the new cabinet unconditionally.'

This boy was laughing, he said, 'That's ridiculous. How can I support somebody I haven't voted for.'

Kunitani said this boy was very American in thought and would not understand the ways of the Hōshi-dan. He then digressed:

"In the political set-up in Japan the parliament is patterned after the United States, the French and the English parliaments. The people in Japan only know one way. When an organization is formed, you'll find almost the identical familiarity between these organizations of this country and the organizations of Japan.

(Just what Kunitani implied here - I don't know.)

He talked for some time with his visitor while I talked with his wife Joyce, and admired the baby daughter. When the elderly gentlemen left, Kunitani told me he was the block representative of the Hōshi-dan and had come to tell him that he was resigning.

Hōshi-dan (Resegregation Group)

"They are going to continue their past policy. I don't know what they are expecting to do, since the new cabinet members really know nothing. Everything was done in a small inner clique.

Tell Mr. Goodman for me (here Kunitani translated from the latest pamphlet of the Hōshi-dan) There's a part which says that Mr. Okada went to see Mr. Goodman and it says Rev. Matsumura (and two other men) went to see him and they asked him for his explanation as to a conference which took place between Mr. Best and Okada with Goodman present.

Then they say these four men, after receiving full explanation from the WRA head, came back. It says, the conference must be transcribed, which transcription will be given to these men.

(When I took this message to Goodman he told me he had refused to give them this transcription.)

This thing must be carefully controlled. They say: "Our former leaders who were arrested would signify to the fact that we, the members, have put a step forward towards becoming real Japanese nationals."

* * * * *

Kunitani commented: "I think this needs some justification here. They keep on saying, anybody sent to Santa Fe is taking a step forward to becoming a real Japanese. If this propaganda takes effect it will cause great trouble. A lot of people will look for trouble trying to be sent to Santa Fe.

Tell Mr. Norden for me - There are people who are very sensible and reasonable and that their only desire is to go back to Japan. These people would like to renounce their citizenship so that they will be looked on as Japanese nationals. If Mr. Norden should under some misinterpretation pick up these people, just because they renounced their citizenship, I think the repercussions would be very unfavorable on these people. These people have not belonged at all to the Hōshi-dan.

"I think the Hōshi dan undoubtedly has started the rumor that by renouncing citizenship, the people will be allowed to stay here at Tule.

Reactions to Another Pick-up

Widespread pickups would not be a good thing. If another bunch is picked up it will lay foundation to the rumor that my group are instrumental in initiating such a thing. You can't tell how many real fanatics there are in camp. Suppose they attack one of us. Our young boys would consider that an insult. They will never have harmony in the colony then.

Goodman and Best, if they want to avoid embarrassing moments, would be wise to announce the true and real honest reason for the pick-ups. That has to be published and would pump some logic and sense into the people who have been misled blindly. It would curtail the rumors, and it would take the prestige from the Hōshi-dan. The more elaborate this announcement would be the better it would be.

A mass pickup would be very injurious. The very people who are attacking me may not know the significance of the true facts.

The old Daihyo Sha men (Issei) who were sent to Santa Fe.¹ Iwo, Yamashita, and Kato started to write to Santa Fe, [telling them:] 'If you go to Crystal City you're nothing but a coward. The only way you can be real Japanese is to take a stand to come back to this camp.' The people in Santa Fe didn't like this high-handedness. They wrote to Nakashima and Iwo. Then they received a letter of excommunication [from the Hōshi dan.]

Five or six of these men are still in Santa Fe. When this new bunch comes in, I'd hate to be in those five men's position. They're not going to get along with that bunch there. Their names are Itami, Kone, Nakaji, Ichiba, who has an old mother here 71 years old. They ought to come here. If these men were returned here it would be a great relief.

I asked Kunitani for his opinion on Okimura, who is supposed to have left instructions for the murder of Abe.

Okimura did say many radical things. He is very stupid. He and Yamashita were very closely connected.

CLARIFICATION OF NOVEMBER DAIHYO SHA KAI MEETINGS AND SOME OF NISHIMOTO'S QUESTIONS

1. Mr. Murakami, after consulting with the nine ward representatives found out that in ward I (only I believe it really was ward IV), anyway, there was one ward in which the nine Daihyo Sha representatives got together and where that ward didn't have any people in the ward suitable to be named on any committee.

2. He's from this center.

Each block recommended so many people - there was a stack of papers about that high (8 inches). They were very brief case histories. There was a special form, marked out in columns. In the first column was the name of the committee, in the second the names of the men recommended, in the third, their history and the 4th their block.

In these committees, each sheet had five, three or maybe ten names. We had to go through a pile of papers that high and select one person for each sheet - for each position there were 150 to 200 names to go through.

1. These were Issei who, on being released from the stockade were sent to the Santa Fe Internment Camp in New Mexico.

It was all understood by the Daihyo Sha that after this recommendation was made that the names would be brought up before a mass meeting of the people and that the people would have the final say. If any man of the committee was unfitted, that position could be re-elected by the people. The Daihyo Sha had to disband after this approval by the people. We had left the making of by-laws and anything like that to the new permanent representatives.

We wanted to be released of the responsibility as fast as possible. I wanted myself to get the center church organized. That was my primary thought at this time. If I went into this kind of a thing I couldn't take my hands off. I wanted to be done with it, and let time take care of itself.

(We then went off on another discussion of the administration's contention that the November uprising [1943] had been plotted by leaders. I said that I knew that small groups of dopey boys had come into camp with the intent to cause trouble, but that was about as far as the contention was true. Kunitani agreed absolutely and added, "The worst bunch of boys came from Topaz. They really had a tough group. Ask Tada. They broke up the chairs.

Page 85 - question by Nishimoto - "That was the Negotiating Committee. Okubo was on it too. Volunteers were added to bring things to a favorable solution. Anyone who had an empty hand was asked to help it. These men were able volunteers who held some important position in the coming permanent body.

TALK WITH GOODMAN

Found out from Goodman that Hamaguchi had been sentenced to 90 days in jail. Of this 60 days was suspended and the remaining 30 had the alternative of a 20 dollar fine. Six days or 4 dollars was cut from the sentence because of previous detention. Hamaguchi paid the fine. He got 60 days for assault and battery and 30 days for disturbing the peace.

Matsubara got a severe reprimand because he was a leader of an organization and conducted himself in an ungentlemanly manner, unbecoming to an officer of a group of people. Had he been courteous, and informed Mr. Hamaguchi that he could meet with the committee, the whole incident probably would not have occurred.

Kodama got 60 days suspended and Yamatani and Mizuno 30 days suspended.

Goodman said that all of the boys had come in their best clothes. Kodama, especially was resplendent. He was evidently prepared to go to jail in style. (There is very little chance that Hamaguchi will have to pay his own fine. A lot of people will be glad to contribute.)

Goodman also told me that Masao Nakadate is the new head of the Hōshi-dan. (I'll have to check up on this.) Goodman also believed that Abe, Kunitani and Tada are circulating the rumors that the members of the Hōshi-dan had been picked up because they were hoodlums and gangsters.

The new Hōshi-dan did send a telegram to the Spanish Consul, although they could have done this Saturday.

Only 34 of the 70 men sent were members of the cabinet of the "Association of Applicants for Repatriation" which is how the group translates Sokuji Kikoku Hōshi dan. Six men taken were Hōshi dan members, but not of the cabinet. Eighteen of the seventy were Issei.

JANUARY 5, 1945

On January 5 I talked with my Issei friend, Mr. Itabashi. At the end of our talk he made a few remarks about the Hōshi dan and about Reverend Abe.

TALK WITH MR. ITABASHIHōshi dan

Generally, what I've heard is that the trouble started among themselves. It started because Matsubara and some others were too radical in their principles. The moderate people in that party were against them and in number they were much more than the radicals.

After that trouble in (block 54) so many withdrew from the Hōshi dan. Before the trouble only nine families in block 54 were not members. Afterward there were only three families remaining as members.

I think even the members of the Hōshi dan are glad the radicals were picked up. I don't think there will be any trouble about it.

Reverend Abe

I understand Reverend Abe was a red (Communist) in Japan. He called himself a priest but he really isn't. He was a red in Japan and was always followed by a detective. He really isn't a priest.

(This is not the first time I have heard these accusations made against Abe. I don't know whether there's any truth to them or not. I am frequently made aware of the fact of the almost universal hatred which the Japanese here bear toward the Communists. It's really worse to be called a Communist than a dog, in a way.)

On the same day I talked with Mr. Kurihara who told me that very few people were believing the rumors spread about Abe and Kunitani by the Hōshi dan.

JANUARY 7, 1945TALK WITH GOODMAN

On January 6, Mr. Goodman had given me a typed English translation of the announcement distributed by the Resegregationist Groups. He also gave me a typed copy of a hearing he had held with four Resegregationist leaders. (It covered twelve pages - see Fieldnotes for January 6.)

When I returned the documents to Goodman he told me that he is determined to encourage Norden to get Abe and Kunitani to renounce their citizenship, so that they may be sent out of camp to Santa Fe. He feels that they are such a potential menace to the peace of the camp that the end justifies the means in this case. Norden, incidentally, is due to arrive at Tule Lake with a staff of twelve males and three female assistants.

JANUARY 10, 1945

TALK WITH GEORGE KUNITANI

In discussing the present temper of the people, Kunitani agreed that the people are daily becoming more stubborn about the idea of being forced out of the camp.

The possibility of legal action has already been discussed with the ACLU. (I wonder who initiated this?) The contention of one of the lawyers was that as far as material compensation was concerned, it would be harder to obtain today than at the time of the Civil War. And he said there were cases still unsettled today which were started at the Civil War.

(We concluded that waiting eighty years for a case to be settled wouldn't help the present relocation problem.)

Kunitani's Feelings

I did state this previously too. To be frank with anybody, my determination is such that I can't picture myself sacrificing my life for this country. I feel therefore, I am of less value or no value at all as far as my place in this country is concerned. I'm of practically no use to this country's cause as a citizen. I feel I should try my stake in Japan. In my interpretation, loyal is such that it must be met with supreme sacrifice when a citizen is called upon to do so. I wouldn't want to live as a second or third rate citizen in any country.

November 11, 1943 - Reason for Split Between Army and Daihyo Sha

My guess is that a group of people [Japanese Americans] must have met with the Army in secret session around the 10th or 11th of November, and implanted them with the idea that we, the Negotiating Committee, weren't the actual representatives. That's the impression I received from talking with them.

Colonel Austin said, 'I don't think you're the representatives of the people. I think you're nothing but a pressure group.' He also asked why out of so many people (on the Negotiating Committee) there were so few old Tuleans. He also asked why out of the people on the Negotiating Committee there were only three, four or five faces showing up at the conferences (with him). He evidently felt we weren't in contact with the Negotiating Committee.

The only reason why we didn't have so many people (go to see him) was because we only sent the people who were taking an actual part and were immediately concerned with the return to work.

(I then asked Kunitani if he thought this group which had gone to see Austin, in secret, had comprised Daihyo Sha members or opponents of the Daihyo Sha. His guess was that it was Daihyo Sha members - especially Yokota and Nakano. This would be my guess too.)

December 13 Meetings with the Spanish Consul

We spoke with the Spanish Consul on December 13 or 14, in the Administration building because the people in the colony requested that he see us. Colonel Austin and Lt. Forbes were present at this meeting. I believe there were nine (members of the Negotiating Committee) present. The conversation was very interesting in that we asked Colonel Austin for the reason of our detention. His contention was that he thought we were trouble-makers and that was the reason he was keeping us locked up. We asked, 'Can the Army, just because the commandant thinks a portion of the people are trouble-makers, can he

detain us?' He didn't make a clear reply and had to think a long time. We also asked what was the evidence. He thought a long moment and said 'We'll get the evidence while we keep you boys in the stockade.'

(I then asked about the extreme discrepancy in the December 13 minutes of the Spanish Consul's meeting with the people which had been commented upon by Mr. Nishimoto. Here Mrs. Kunitani took over the story with considerable verve:)

The people didn't listen to their speeches. As soon as the speech was over they'd yell, 'That's not what we want. We want the Negotiating Committee.' All through the meeting the Consul would get up and say something and the people would say, 'Oh to hell with you, we want the Negotiating Committee.'

(Kunitani suggested that I might get additional helpful information about the Daihyo Sha Kai and the Coordinating Committee from Mr. Kawahara, 2901 BDC.)

Compulsory Relocation

Mr. Kunitani:

I think it's a silly idea on the part of the WRA or the Army to try to get us out of here. People came here with full knowledge of being segregated and they knew the inevitable consequences which would result as a direct by-product of segregation. I still think it's crazy. Even the Army can try - but the result will not be complimentary.

Mrs. Kunitani: I think they'll have trouble at all the camps. They're more stubborn at the other camps.

Mr. Kunitani: Violence is very possible. Even in this camp the people are saying, 'I'll commit sabotage or blow up a bridge if they make me go out, just so I'll be sent back to camp.' That should be avoided.

Anything that will be forced on the Japanese people - they won't take it.

Mrs. Kunitani remarked that the food was getting much worse again, which however, was to be expected since the WRA wanted the people to leave camp.

JANUARY 11, 1945

[January 11, I was able to have a talk with the notorious Mr. Tada, who was reputed to run the gambling joints in the center. He proved to be a very intelligent and agreeable man and gave me a great deal of helpful information. He gave me the following information about George Kunitani and his role on the Negotiating Committee of the Daihyo Sha Kai.]

As you know, the Negotiating Committee, there were a few who could not speak fluent English. These persons evidently do not brave themselves to go out in front. Naturally, it goes to George Kunitani.

Up to the night of the 4th we had the Koshi-ian. But that night the meeting was held to elect the permanent committees. Of course, the permanent committees were in different divisions according to the type of work. At the top of these committees we set up an Executive Board. On that Board, I believe five men were selected. Reverend Abe and Kunitani - they wanted to retire from the political organization.

Regardless that George wasn't an Executive Board member, since this plan wasn't yet

accepted by the center people, therefore, George could not very well get away from responsibility.

JANUARY 19, 1945

TALK WITH SALLY WAKIDA

[On January 19, I asked my friend, Sally Wakida, how people were now regarding Abe and Kunitani.]

It seems to be public opinion that Abe and Kunitani will start some action in the future. Pretty soon they will be leaders again. From what I hear they're popular enough to get camp support again. They certainly have enough support from people who are willing to give their lives for them. But I think that they're wise enough and will wait until the right moment comes.

[On January 19, Mrs. Deschin, my social worker friend, told me that Dr. Osler, at an administrative staff meeting had said that he did not believe that Abe, Kunitani and Tada, were participating in pro-Japanese activities.]

TALK WITH GEORGE KUNITANI

Hoshi-dan Rumors about Renunciation

Kunitani informed me of a widespread rumor that all those persons who have not renounced their citizenship by January 20 will summarily be kicked out of camp. He implied that this rumor was being spread by members of the Hoshi-dan. He added:

Some people are also being told to answer in a radical way so that their citizenship will be taken away.

He then read me part of a letter which he had received from a friend in the Army. The friend is in Camp Blanding and expects to go overseas very soon. The friend said:

The lifting of the exclusion order has sure changed a lot of plans for my mother. They'll be closing all the camps pretty soon and I don't know what I'll be doing about Mom. At any rate, I'll hope for the best.

Kunitani also said that the Hoshi-dan people are spreading the rumor that in less than fifty days the families of the interned men expect to be reunited.

Explanation on Daihyo Sha Kai minutes of November 12

A. The secretary had not taken it down - since it was a minor point.

When he (Yokota) began to pound the table that there was not enough time allowed, he began to accuse the people who had negotiated that day of accepting such (unfavorable) terms from the Army.

(I asked who had done the negotiating.)

Myself, Tada, Kagawa, Miyamoto and Kodama.

Another thing I said was that since the negotiations had come to a rupture since the Army does not recognize us as being true representatives of the colonists, we who were negotiating didn't feel we could carry on the task. I bluntly stated I wanted to resign.

B. The words he (Colonel Austin) said, were 'Take it or leave it.'

C. No, the reason why we left was that they were going to prepare the statement and after that resolution was properly signed, the representatives were going to bring it to us. They wanted to go into further detail.

The atmosphere wasn't too good. There were hecklers - Dyo, Hashimoto, Yokota, Sawada, Oshima.

Yokota wanted to get into the Central Executive Committee, but he was put into the committee on personnel. Immediately he began to voice his dissatisfaction and the next day he brought me a letter saying that he wished to resign, although the committee was not yet recognized by the people. I said I couldn't do anything about it. I was just the Chairman.

I then asked Kunitani something I've been aching to know for a long time; whether he disguised himself in women's clothes at the time of the Army search. He implied he had not done so, but explained why the rumor had started:

When Mr. Hughes of the FBI asked how I got away I told him, 'Weren't all the soldiers men?' He couldn't catch on. I added, 'I just used psychology. The searchers, being males, only naturally would be tender to the opposite sex.' I told him that."

D. There was more to the meeting. After the thing was decided, they came back and told us to return to messhall 18. It was pretty late, about 4:30 in the afternoon. When we returned, they told us what had transpired. They reaffirmed full confidence and support in the Negotiating Committee and asked us to continue negotiations with the Army.

Japanese Present at November 1 Conference with Myer

The following men were members of the Negotiating Committee: Okada, Hosokawa, Abe, Sawada, Yamada, Akashi Noguchi, and Miyamoto. Kato was the English Secretary; Katayama and Morimitsu, representatives of the farm group; Namashita represented the Agricultural Division and Okubo the hospital committee. Tajiri and Kodama - here Kunitani became very nervous and ill at ease - They just came in - they were both judo men.

(The minutes had mentioned a Kaijo Seiri iin which had been translated as Committee to Preserve Peace and Order. Other people told me that these men served as bodyguards. Why this subject should make Kunitani so nervous, I don't know.)¹ I pretended not to notice his perturbed state and began to play with the seven months old Yuriko. She is a beautiful child. After a few minutes her father continued:

Taro (Kodama) went to the hospital to stop the beating of Dr. Pedicord. There was fear on the part of some men. We'd heard from other sources - from people present that some young men may get out of hand - so they recommended that we have some young men to be prepared in case of a disturbance.

¹. On re-reading my notes, I note that Mr. Kato had told me on December 12 that the function of this committee was to "see that no Army, or Internal Security or any Caucasian would come to disturb" the funeral. The members of this committee may also have been responsible for ordering people not to leave the demonstration of November 1, 1943.⁷

JANUARY 28, 1945

/On January 24, Mr. Norden of the Department of Justice notified 171 male members of the Resegregation Groups that they were to be interned in two days. On the same day he had mimeographed copies of a letter to the chairmen of the Hōkoku and the Hōshi dan posted in all the messhalls. In this letter he condemned the activities of the Hōkoku members and the Hōshi dan elders who "encourage the activities of the young men." He concluded with the warning that "since these activities are intolerable, they will not be tolerated, but on the contrary, will cease."/

/I did not know that Norden had scheduled an internment and so, on January 25, I went to see my friends, the Wakidas intending to ask them how people felt about Norden's posted statement./

On my way to the Wakidas' I noticed people standing about in groups and talking. When I knocked on the Wakidas' door, Sally's mother opened it, took my arm and quietly pulled me inside. /George and Sally made signs of silence and both looked very anxious./ They told me the notice of another internment had just come out and that the people in their block had accused them of being inu because I came to visit them. I offered to leave but they asked me to stay. That afternoon I wrote letters to my respondents, asking them to tell me when I might visit them.

/On February 1 George Wakida sent me a note asking me to call on him. But it is interesting that I did not hear from Mr. Kunitani until February 13./

On January 28, Mr. Goodman the Project Attorney, told me that Mr. Norden had had a long talk with George Kunitani. According to Goodman, Norden told George that there was to be no parading or demonstrating in camp. He said, "You can have the rising sun in your heart, but you can't have it on your chest or on your forehead." George said, "We understand. We've been for the idea all the time."

Goodman said that he himself had also had a long talk with Kunitani. They discussed community government in camp which Goodman is very anxious to initiate and, in which, I am sure, Kunitani would like to play a leading part.

/On February 11, the Department of Justice arrested and interned about 650 Hōkoku and Hōshi dan members. Answering bugle calls, the young men of the organization assembled immediately and each of those listed for removal accepted personal notice of internment./

On February 13 I received the following letter from Mr. Kunitani:

FEBRUARY 13, 1945

Received the following letter from Kunitani today.

February 12, 1945

Dear Miss Hankey:

Sorry I have delayed in answering your letter of Jan. 25. The condition in the center has been most unsettled because of recent mass pick-ups.

The current rumor which in my opinion is the most vicious has it that unless people (young-men of course) sign up with the organization, they will be subject to draft by March of this year. There seems to be a great increase in the membership of said body. The people are under the impression that if you are a member, then your chance of renunciation is guaranteed; whereas, if you are not, you just don't know when you will be able to renounce your citizenship. Of course there is a connection with the recent announcement about the exchange-ship.

In fairness to everyone concerned, I am of the opinion that some kind of statement should be forthcoming from the Justice Department in this instance. The result if left unabated, will not only be tragic, but dreadful. I don't know what you are able to do, but for justice's sake please take some action.

Hope to see you soon.

Sincerely,

George.

Though it was pouring cats and dogs and puddles rose almost to the knees, I put on my field boots and hiked out to see Kunitani.

TALK WITH GEORGE KUNITANI

Rumors

Kunitani said that he was so alarmed at the proportion to which rumors had grown that he was willing to start a petition to the Administration to ask for a clarification on the points which are upsetting the people. In Manzanar, he told me, just about everybody had joined the Hōkoku. The first bunch of rumors started Saturday, just before the internees left.

It's been known that the men picked up have committed some crime - violated the law - However, their destination has been to Santa Fe which is a really favorable place to be. In the minds of the people of the center it has been the general impression that by going to Santa Fe for one thing, they'll be recognized as aliens and they feel that their renunciation of citizenship is granted. Whereas if you are a gentleman enough to be peaceful and quiet, renunciation will not materialize. That should come out. The people feel the only way renunciation will be accepted would be to raise a row and be sent to Santa Fe.

Something that would put a stop to the whole thing on that point should be stressed.

They figure that the number of persons held by Japan (Americans) is so great, in comparison with the people on this side, what little prejudice the American government has against the Hōkoku, they will be forced to send them back to (Japan to) get Americans back.

I heard that one man tried to commit suicide on the way to Santa Fe.

I asked Kunitani why he and his friends had taken no action against the Hōkoku. /But after one sentence he changed the subject. I am not sure what he was referring to when he said, "Before registration it was voluntary."/

One of the main reasons we have been more or less bound is that WRA may have a great prejudice against any action we may take. Whether it be voluntary or involuntary, it is under the same act and then the people should be informed of the policy under such an act. Before registration it was voluntary. As long as it was voluntary, I just sat. Finally the Project Director told me it was compulsory. Being a compulsory matter, I had to choose one or the other road.

There is a question in my mind: suppose you did renounce your citizenship and the Japanese government was not informed, how would you become a Japanese national? Suppose one doesn't have Japanese citizenship? Where would he be? If he wanted to go back to Japan, the Japanese government might not accept him.

On the Fence-sitters

I've always believed that there were at least 6,000 people here whose real intention was to remain in America. Now I'm beginning to think the other way round. I think there are only about two or three thousand who are willing to stay here after what they've gone through in this camp under Mr. Best's administration. Whatever Mr. Best has done during his administration here, hasn't been favorable to the American government. If the Project Director were changed here, there might be a swing of 180 degrees in the people's feelings.

People Resigned from the Hōkoku

I was very much worried. There is one aspect of the whole thing. The thousands of people who withdrew from the organization whose names had been accepted by the committee-men as members. I doubt if the names of these men have been crossed off the list. If justice should pull them in then there'll be a lot of injustice. If they are taken in a lot more will fall in with them. It will be all over camp that even if you don't belong to the Hōkoku you will be taken anyway, so you might as well join. Some who were out are rejoining and some who never belonged are joining now.

A lot of simple minded people think that being sent to Santa Fe is a glory for them. There should be some way you could disqualify such a statement.

I wish Justice would keep in mind that there will be a lot of people who haven't renounced it as yet because of uncertainty and doubts. As soon as a clearcut policy is presented before the people I would consider seriously about my own renunciation. Don't think for a moment that I won't go back to Japan. But even there I will run into a lot of difficulties. I am radical in my thoughts. I was a most ardent New Dealer until 1933.

Manzanar Joining Hōkoku

In the Manzanar section most of the school teachers quit (the school) and joined the Hōkoku. They are making a house to house canvass there. It's because of this latest rumor about the draft going into effect in March and if you don't join the Hōkoku and go to Santa Fe your renunciation of citizenship will not be accepted. If you do go to Santa Fe your chances of having your renunciation accepted will be ten times as great. If you

stay here you will eventually be thrown out of camp. If you stay here you aren't safe.

Because certain actions of the Hōkoku in the past have been vague and not becoming a Japanese, the Hōkoku is now trying to conceal this past and glorify the present position and make a flowery picture of their actions. They (the people) feel the Hōkoku is the only thing they should do. I know a lot of boys who were in the Hōkoku when it first organized who had been nothing but fence-sitters before. They were just segregated to this center because the authorities considered them ineligible for leave.

Sociologically speaking, I wonder if the people have not been tortured in their minds for so long - all they can think of is what's happening right in front of their eyes and they aren't looking forward to the future at all. None of them think that the war might end and then what position would they be in?

Another rumor I've heard seems to come from Mr. Best. He made a statement in which he said that all of the pro-Japanese elements were to be sent to an internment camp - then all that are left over will be shoved out of the center. After that is completed, all those men sent out will be returned here in six months.

Another good thing to announce would be that the men who have been interned will not be permitted to come back here and join their families. That should be published. All of them honestly believe they will not be out of here more than six months.

Public Alarm Very Serious

There are many serious people saying that if there is any monkey business pulled they are willing to take a jail sentence to fight it out.

Many boys went to Santa Fe simply because they didn't have the determination to get out of it and just tagged along.

George also told me that if the next pick-up took a lot of people who were not Hōkoku there would be an avalanche to join the organization.

TALK WITH MR. GOODMAN

Following Kunitani's request I went to see Goodman, told him about the rumors and passed on the advice given by Kunitani. Goodman was in a receptive mood and told me that a proper statement would come out in the next Newell Star which will be released Thursday. The Department of Justice has also prepared a statement. Goodman also informed me that he had met with the officers of the Hōshi-dan and the Hōkoku dan this morning (these are new officers.) The men appeared to be utterly stunned by the raid of Monday night /Feb. 11/. He was also impressed with the information that people were still worried about what would happen to them after January 1 of 1946. He told me that the Administration here had asked for a clear statement from Myer stating that the people in Tule Lake were not to be pushed out at all. But Myer had come back with the compromise statement of January 29, which appears to have done little if any good.

The Hōshi-dan men wished to know why their office had been raided. "Because your activities are unlawful." said Goodman. "Why are they unlawful?" they asked, saying that they had received no warning. Goodman asked them if they had not read Norden's statement. They said they had not read it because it had been torn down from the messhall board. "yes," said Goodman, "By members of your organization." Goodman told me several times that they appeared stunned and dumbfounded. They had immediately sent telegrams to the Spanish Consul about the raid, which was how Goodman got the names of their newest officers. Goodman told the group of officers that if they would go back to the colony, dissolve their organization,

Kunitani, February 13, 1945
and February 16, 1945

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and live as peaceful citizens, everything would be all right. "If you are true Japanese," he said, you are going to help your people live in peace and security."

* * * * *

(At any rate I got Kunitani's message across and a statement is coming out Tuesday.)

FEBRUARY 16, 1945

TALK WITH GEORGE KUNITANI

"Lots of people were concerned when they heard the boys were sent to Bismarck instead of Santa Fe.¹ But it's still hot in camp.

One good statement that could be made is that the families will not be reunited.

The Japanese section of the information that appeared in the Newell Star was much stronger. It stated there that 99% of the renunciations in Tule Lake will be accepted, and that there is no worry about the draft.

What's taking place now is that some of the kids going to the Japanese language school would drop out any time they feel like it and go out for the Hōkoku exercises. They just can't discipline the kids that way.

It would have been possible to stop this after the first pick-up if some arrests had been made and the leaders prosecuted.

I certainly hope that in the near future, supposing the WRA should change hands and Justice take over, that we do have a strong centralized committee here. I was talking to a recent transferee from Hawaii. He said he was amazed to find the unlawfulness in the colony where there was no representative group dealing with the Administration. It was a big surprise to him to find that situation.

Concerning Mr. Sasaki and Shimano and Reverend Ohira. I think something ought to be done about them. (These men were ward VI school teachers sent to Santa Fe.) I've written to Mr. Norden and I wonder what became of them.

When the Hōkoku fellows left the stockade for Santa Fe, they plastered the wall with 20 names - with insults. They were the names of the 11 men who fought the Hōshi-dan (the noted block 54 fight) with Tada, Abe, Kunitani, Higashi and Noguchi.

Kunitani voiced his suspicion that instructions for the Resegregationists might be coming to Tule Lake via the underground. (I happen to know that this is true.)

Kunitani's reason was that Yamada, his successor Ishino, and the newest president of the Hōkoku were all close friends and the old plans seem to be being carried on so well.

If it could only be announced that the men going to Santa Fe are not going to have priority in going to Japan, it would be a big help.

At the same time this psychology works behind the Japanese. They are very loyal to their good friends. The ones who never did belong to the Hōshi-dan will still tag along or join after their friends are picked up. Three young men I know came back from Leupp. They have

1. The Bismarck internment Camp in North Dakota was not considered a particularly pleasant place to be.

Kunitani, February 16, 1945
and February 21, 1945

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been against the Hōshi-dan. I met them in the stockade. In the Manzanar section the pressure is spreading and it's hard to stay out of the Hōshi-dan. If those men are sent to Santa Fe I know they will come on to a head on clash with Yamada. They are Kodama and Tsukamoto.

Unhappy Fate of Yamada

Yamada is from Kumamoto Ken. A letter came to camp from a Hawaiian fisherman who has been interned in Santa Fe from the beginning of the war. He said that Yamada had boasted in Santa Fe of all that he could do. And his attitude was so annoying that the fellows around just took direct action and stuck his head down the toilet bowl.

FEBRUARY 21, 1945

TALK WITH GEORGE KUNITANI

I met Kunitani today in the administrative area and invited him to come over to my place when he had finished his business. This he did and stayed the entire afternoon discussing the camp, his possible future in Japan, his pre-war experiences, his plans for the remainder of his stay in camp, etc. etc. He talked to me more freely than ever before.

Reaction to Statement in Newell Star

Some die hards are saying that it's nothing but propaganda to put them off the track.

If some of the men who had no connection with the Hōkoku-dan should be returned here, I think it would do more good than harm.

On February 19, after I had talked to Mr. Kunitani, Mr. Goodman informed me that two leaders of the Hokoku had been arrested by the WRA police and had been placed in the project jail. I asked Mr. Kunitani about this.

Arrests of Monday

No one seems to regret that they were picked up.

Telegram to Spanish Consul

The best way to do it would be to get a committee to do it. If they put a statement in the Newell Star some people will say that we (Abe and Kunitani group) were responsible for the statement coming through at that time.

It would be best for the block managers to announce it in the messhalls.

Kunitani said that he knew an Issei who would send the telegram for him but he thought best results would be obtained if Wagatsuma and Yasui, the head block managers who are on the committee which meets with the Spanish Consul would do it. Moreover, they came to Tule Lake from Santa Fe, they definitely wish to avoid being sent back there. In consequence, they are prone to do as they are told. (I'll take this up with Goodman and see if he's willing to contact them.)

The main thing is to get them (Hōkoku) to feel they're going against the law. Up to now they feel it's an honor to be sent to Bismarck.

The Hōkoku still has the cockeyed idea that if something should go wrong, the Japanese government will help them. If a statement from the Spanish Embassy should come out - it would really affect them.

After all, most of these people are harmless.

Results of American Victory over Japan

If Japan should be defeated many of the people in Tule Lake would stay here. But I'm going back, win or lose.

Renunciation of Citizenship

The main motive behind that was mistrusting the future. You remember when the Army Individual Exclusion orders came out. At their hearings, almost to a man they were asked whether they had renounced their citizenship or not. Even the ones who had not applied, said, 'Yes,' to be safe from being shoved out of the center. It was also announced at that time that WRA was going to close the camps.

The individual reaction was - renounce or be shoved out.

Of course, the people who were called outside for their hearing said, 'Yes, I will apply.' When they came back from their hearings, they started writing (to apply for renunciation).

About that time the Hōkoku-dan activities really appealed to the young men because they (Hōkoku) went in for resegregation.

A lot of my friends came to me especially after they had received their exclusion orders, asking me for advice on what to do about renunciation.

Kira and Yamashita

Kira and Yamashita gained a great following by making strong clearcut statements. They said, 'If you're not a follower of this group, you can't go back to Japan. Kira also said that the Hōshi-dan was going to have subdivisions in the various prefectures in Japan to handle the Japanese who were coming back from abroad for their future colonization.

It was not the hearings of the Hōkoku boys or the pickup that made people renounce their citizenship.

Some of the Issei speakers stated that they have connections with the Japanese foreign office or the Japanese Navy or Military.

July Hunger Strike

For many months I have wanted to learn more about the July hunger strike. Since Kunitani was in an extremely open mood, I ventured to ask him.

As for the hunger strike, I wasn't in favor of it. I haven't ever told even my best friends that. However, the majority feeling in the stockade at that time, detained for so long, and our length of detention was so uncertain. At some time, in a vague, round about way, we knew that certain people were trying to get us a lawyer, and that another group was trying to negotiate with Mr. Best for us.

There was a sentiment in the stockade that was more or less conducive to some action to let the Administration realize of this indecision - that it was about time something was done and the more forceful way we demonstrated it, the better it would be. I had to stay with it.

Kunitani, February 21, 1945
and March 6, 1945

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When we went to the hospital we were advised by the doctors to stay in the hospital and take care of ourselves or we would wreck our health. I hoped in the meantime to effect some kind of agreement so it wouldn't be necessary to continue.

All the time we were hospitalized none of the Internal Security would come and see us or if they did come they wouldn't make any statement to us. Sachs, I think, picked out four of the weakest and sent them back to the stockade first. These four boys talked to the Internal Security men and got no answer so they started in to strike again. Those of us who followed had to do the same thing.

Another Hōkoku Rumor

Another rumor put out by the Hōkoku members is that unless you renounce your citizenship by January 20 you will be put on the clearance list.¹ This rumor came out before any of the pickups.

During our talk Kunitani made it clear that he intends to take a very active part in camp politics in the future. He stated that if "his" group had been leading the Hōkoku people instead of Yamashita and Kira, the Administration and Department of Justice would have had a real job on their hands. He also indicated that he may attempt to start an organization of a definite Japanization character. I was very frank with him and pointed out that as long as the fence-sitters and the large group of vacillating people live in the camp, any such action would bring down the wrath of the authorities on his head. He said he believed one could get around that if one were careful. (I must admit the trend in camp to act as Japanese as possible is very very strong.) I asked Kunitani how he would clear the fence-sitters out of camp. He suggested that the WRA come out with a clear statement of policy and tell the people to make up their minds once and for all, stay in camp and go to Japan or get out by a certain date. Of course, he admitted, it would really be necessary to have an understanding with the Japanese government before this could be done.

MARCH 6, 1945

On March 6, I asked Mr. Kurihara what he thought about Abe, Kunitani and Tada. About Abe and Kunitani, he said:

They have started an organization called the Yamato Seinen-dan. Their aims are good. They want to organize an organization that will co-operate with the Administration and work for the benefit of the Japanese as a whole in camp. Which way they will flop, I don't know. It is an organization for young men. They may take older people in it too.

Mr. Kurihara also told me that Mr. Tada was head of the gambling interests in camp. On the same day I went to visit Mr. Kunitani and found Mr. Tada there.

TALK WITH MR. KUNITANI AND MR. TADA

Rumor That Tule Lake was to Become the Center for All Resegregationists

Kunitani: Mr. Best made that statement about the removals being the beginning of resegregation to a lady who went to see him because her boy was going to be pulled in and she wanted to ask about family reunion.

Best said something to the woman about what they were doing at the moment was to get all the people not permitted for relocation out of the camp and then when those people who could relocate were out, they interned persons could come back.

[1. That is, be reclassified as a person free to relocate.]

Norden's Posted Letter

Mr. Norden's letter was very sarcastic. Many points he stated could be considered contradictory. However, since the letter was directed to the Hōshi-dan, many people didn't say anything. Many points were not very clear, especially about family reunion.

If the original leaders could have been convicted, it would have stopped them from the first.

Daihyo Sha Minutes

Kunitani told me that my Daihyo Sha Kai minutes extended only to December 19, and he is certain the body had meetings after that.

Resegregation Group

We then began a general discussion of the policy of the Resegregation Group. I outlined my analysis of the group's post-September activities and also outlined Osler's because I wanted Kunitani's reaction to them. He, like Kurihara, agreed with me, only Kunitani agreed more thoroughly, that after September they followed their preconceived plan and did not change their policy as Osler insists.

They just followed their preconceived plan. It was after the September petition that they started having dues.

Hōshi-dan Ready to Quit After February 1

The Hōshi-dan really had the intention of quitting their activities after February 1 of this year. But the people in the Manzanar section coaxed so many boys to join the Hōkoku-dan, and since the people in Manzanar got so many new members, the members in the rest of the camp just tagged along.

The Fight With the Resegregation Group About the Indictment and Tada

I had had only the other side of this story. To get Kunitani's story I read him what they /the Resegregationist leaders/ had said about him. By this time Tada himself had come to visit Kunitani, and as I read the statement aloud they both fell into gales of laughter. Tada is made out to be such a villain. After Kunitani pulled himself together, he gave me his story and also gave all of his correspondence with Besig on the matter.

After we came out of the stockade they had this what do you call committee for the law suit - the Saiban-iin and furthermore, the responsibility rested not with them but with the detainees in the stockade. If things went OK, they'd get the credit but if they didn't go OK they'd get no blame. Then as a result of the threat of a law suit from the ACLU, WR A turned us loose.

After we were released all of us detainees had a meeting with the Saiban-iin and thanked them honestly. It was quite an amicable meeting. Regarding the 500 dollars collected for the law suit it was not as much a part of the Resegregation Group, it came more from the earliest effort of the Saiban-iin. /Most of whom were relatives of men confined in the stockade./

As to the reason why we did not join the Hōshi-dan was because of our position in dealing with the WR A. We didn't only represent one group in camp, because the Daihyo Sha represented the whole camp and we had not disbanded officially. As a result we had to publish a paper thanking the people. I think, if my observation isn't wrong, they did have a feeling we should give the Resegregation Group some kind of official thanks and make some kind of statement that everybody in camp should support that organization. People in that organiza-

tion came to my place and begged me to go to see Mr. Yamashita and Mr. Kira, saying that my acquaintanceship with them will be a great advantage for me.

The Indictment Threat /Noma Murder/

We asked no one for material aid in hiring a lawyer. Our feeling was that since six or seven people were to be indicted for the same charge against the same man, and all were Japanese, in my eyes and lived within the compound, I felt it was only natural and just to ask everybody to write and hire a lawyer if necessary.

I wrote this letter September 11, and took it around and got the signatures of everyone but Mr. Endo, whose name I couldn't recall. Then they came the next day and asked me to tear the letter up.

Here Mr. Tada interrupted:

I don't have to ask anybody to give me aid or lawyer's fees. I'll do it myself.

Kunitani said, And if I remember correctly, most of the 500 dollars came from Mr. Tada anyway.

When I got the signatures, I went to Mr. Iwo's place last. Mr. Iwo was surprised to see that I had Mrs. Tsuchikawa's signature and very hesitatingly, he signed the letter. On the way home I stopped at Mr. Yamada's place. There I was told that Iwo had boasted to Mr. Yamada that under no circumstance would he sign any statement if it caused him to be linked with Mr. Tada. So right then I felt that tomorrow morning somebody was going to come to my place.

The next morning at 7:00 A.M. the Saiban-iin came. They were rather peaved because I didn't consult them before I went around and got the signatures. To get rid of them I threatened them, saying, 'This is an indictment for murder and you may be involved as the backers of murderers and you gentlemen may be put on the spot.' Then they wanted to retract everything and scrambled out of here as fast as possible. They told me to tear up the letter of September 11 with the signatures on it, so I wouldn't have their signatures alongside of Mr. Tada's.

Fifteen minutes later they came back and asked me to give them a copy of the letter so they could hire a lawyer. I gave them a copy of the September 11 letter. They did this to leave Tada's name out of it. Then they came back with my letter and asked me to sign it too. They had recopied it on another sheet of paper. I said, 'I may be a fool, but I'm not going to sign that letter I just typed out.'

So I typed out another letter and sent it to Mr. Besig, with my name, Abe, and Tada.

(Now Mr. Tada took over the conversation and began to tell why he had never joined the Resegregation Group. By this time George had gotten out a large vinegar bottle which proved to contain distilled sake. From this moment forth the conversation got more and more confidential.)

Mr. Tada: I didn't join the Resegregation Group because I figured the group didn't represent the whole center as the Negotiating Committee did. Moreover, I didn't like the idea of not letting all the people in. The first couple of months things were perfectly satisfactory between us. With myself, I was working with Mr. Best trying to get the boys released from the stockade. But since there was no result, they must have gotten tired. They must have suspected my way of doing things and thought I was supporting Mr. Best's idea instead of holding out for the internees.

Poston Clique Behind Resegregation Group

Most of the important policies were actually adopted by the people from the Poston cliques. Iwo, Yamashita, and Yamada. They were all tied up with Mr. Yamashita in Poston. That's what gave them so much power.

(Since the party was now getting pretty gay, I asked Kunitani if he was going to tell me about the Yamato-seinen-dan he was supposed to be starting or if I had to be satisfied with the rumors. Here he and Tada guffawed again. Kunitani denied he was starting anything and added, "If I start any monkey business you'll be the first one to be in on it.")

He then translated for me a curt notice he had received from the Hoshi-dan on November 20th. (1944)

They said that on my first signature on their petition (Resegregation), my wife signed it. They want to know if I had any intention of joining the organization. The Jochi-iin would like you to put your own signature to the organization's petition and accordingly will you come to 5408-D and express your intent about it.

Kunitani said that the mere act of sending him such a letter was an insult. I asked if many letters similar to his had been sent out and he said they had. His was the second or third batch. Many people had been unofficially expelled before that. Hamaguchi and Shiroyama were expelled the latter part of October. (I was glad to get this information about dates since it will help to clarify the chronological growth of policy in the Resegregation Group.)

If they had been really working for release and if the organization was our true backers, I don't see how they could dare to write me a letter like that.

The sake was now taking effect and Tada told me what was worrying him, i.e., that the Administration is trying to get him, which is to some extent true. He felt that Goodman's questioning of Tayama was not legal or right and that where Tayama worked and who paid him had nothing to do with the case.¹ (I must confess that this sounds like good sense to me.) Tada continued:

The other day at the trial Goodman interrogated the witness (Tayama). The witness refused to answer. Goodman made a motion to Black then that the person should be arrested for concealing the facts. If it was related to the assault and battery case I wouldn't think so much of it. But it seems it's out of principle. Since this witness was a gambler and the rest of the witnesses were all gamblers, we refused to put them on the stand.

Tada then told me that the reason Goodman must have thought that he had intimidated Tayama was that he had gone over to see Tayama to tell him to tell the truth "and say only what he saw, no more." Turnbull, of Internal Security, called at Tayama's and found Tada there. Later, when Tayama was called in, "he was darn fool enough" to say that Tada had told him not to say anything.

Then I sent a man to Wilson to tell him to take the trial to Alturas. I told them to get a first class lawyer and we'd blast it all over the front page that WRA was allowing gambling at Tule Lake.

(No wonder Goodman was so anxious to keep it a project trial.)

¹ Mr. Tada was referring to a case in which a young man assaulted an older man in a "gambling house" on the afternoon of February 22. See Fieldnotes for February 22, 23 and March 1 for details.

Tada and Yamashita

On the day you saw me at Yamashita's house, [see Fieldnotes, May 21, 1944], he asked me why I didn't join the Resegregation Group. He said, 'We have 9,000 people here now and great power. If you should belong to a power like that you can do yourself very nice.'

If I hadn't had a son who was a Sansei, I'd have joined the Hōshi-dan. But my son is all for the American way. My mother is Issei, 72 years old, and I'm Nisei or rather Kibei. My father is the typical Issei, the stubborn type. My family is just like the camp, Issei, Nisei, and Kibei. I can see the picture of the whole camp in my family.

The way of this Resegregation Group, the Hōshi-dan and their principal, I like it. But their way of doing, excluding the people, is the thing I'm opposed to. If I should belong to the Hōshi-dan my son does not feel the same way I do about it. I couldn't have my son in my house. That's why I can't do it.

The Resegregation Group kicks about the descrimination and exclusion they had in America but they're doing it right here in this camp.

Tada and Stockade Matter

After I got out of the stockade, I went to see Mr. Best many times, trying to liquidate the stockade. When the idea of hiring a lawyer came up, I went to see Mr. Kira. He said it was no use. He said, you know how big the United States government is. If they want to put 100 boys in the stockade, they will do it anyway. The stockade is just a insignificant thing. It would be foolish to bring in a lawyer. I went to see Mr. Yamashita and he said the same thing.

As the sole responsible person for bringing in a lawyer, I didn't want to cause any further trouble. Right after that, this here Saiban-iin got in touch with Mr. Yoshino and Mr. Okimura and through him they hired Mr. Besig. The results were good? I don't know.

Segregation

(This is a very important statement which I have not stressed sufficiently in my report on pre-incident attitudes.)

All the people who came here from different centers had a different idea of what segregation meant. Every center had been told different things.

Kira's Statement

Kunitani translated Kira's threatening statement for me as, "For the survival of the larger cause, we may have to sacrifice the smaller cause."

He also translated the first name of the Resegregation Group - Saikakuri Seigan - "The people who have requested for resegregation."

He gave as his opinion that the organization of the group which took place formally after the September petition was to give the group a policy.

CORRESPONDENCE OF KUNITANI AND BESIG

This is the noteworthy letter about which there was so much controversy:

Sept. 11, 1944

Dear Mr. Besig:

At this time please accept our belated gratitude for your most humane and understanding interest in our behalf concerning the stockade problem.

It has been two weeks since our release, and we are already confronted with another grave problem. This time it is that of murder which occurred July 2, 1944 while the stockade was still in existence. We were informed that sometime next week the Grand Jury of Modoc County will indict about half a dozen evacuees on charges of murder and conspiracy to murder.

You are familiar with the conditions of the camp. After some of us have spent a few nights each in the Modoc County Jail, we feel that there may be a deliberate attempt on the part of some individuals to conspire against us. Of course, we are positive that any so called "evidence" compiled about us is based upon rumors. Consequently, we are very anxious to clear ourselves of any and all such disgraceful charges directed toward us. There are entirely too many idle talks floating about the center, and such talks may greatly injure many perfectly innocent bystanders. We are suspicious that there is a link between Mr. Best's stockade complex and the murder investigation, which eventually brought us into the murder picture. For this reason, we urgently request your visit.

Also, would it be possible, therefore, for you through your association to acquire us the best available criminal lawyer to fight this case in our behalf? We are at a loss as to our preparation for this case. Will you suggest our attorney to visit us so that he may be better supplied with the facts?

Again we wish to thank you deeply for your sincere efforts. We are waiting for your favorable reply.

Very truly yours,

P.S. Reverend Abe was taken in also to the Modoc County Jail on Saturday afternoon, the 9th of August, and has not yet been returned to the colony, as yet.

* * * * *

Sept. 18, 1944

Dear Mr. Besig:

We are in receipt of your very heart rendering letters and thankful for your thoughtful information. Please accept our apologies that we had to interfere your noble task with our personal problem. However, since this was our only means of receiving a satisfactory legal aid, we were compelled to employ this method.

For your information we wish to state the following:

1. We don't know how many but some will most likely be indicted on charges of murder and conspiracy to murder Mr. Noma.

2. Some of us have been taken to the Modoc County Jail and were questioned by the

District Attorney, the State and Government investigators.

3. Some of us have been shown the forms mentioning our names in connection with
aforementioned charges to be presented to the Grand Jury of Modoc County for indictment
proceedings.

Of course, we realize the fact that we haven't been indicted as yet and can't predict
the ultimate result. But the evidences shown during our investigations must be counter-
acted should the suit becomes a reality. This is especially so when those so-called
"evidences" are known to us to be false. For this reason we wish to be prepared in the
event of our adversities.

We, the undersigned, do hereby delegate you an authorization to act as our agent to
secure us a counsel so that he may visit us here at Tule Lake as soon as possible.

Please advise us as to the guarantee necessary for his visit. We will dispatch it
immediately.

Very sincerely yours,

* * * * *

September 20, 1944

Dear Mr. Kunitani:

I want to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated September 18 in which Messrs. Abe
and Tada and yourself authorize me to act as your agent in hiring an attorney for you.
I'll be glad to undertake the mission and to have him visit you at Tule Lake.

I do not know how large a retainer will be required. It may be a retainer to represent
all three of you on a charge of conspiracy to commit murder, or it may simply amount to
a trip to Tule Lake to advise you about your rights, and to discuss your general knowledge
about the case and your past relations with Mr. Noma. Personally, I think it would be
wise to see whether indictments are returned by the Grand Jury before you engage an attorney,
but the decision is yours and not mine. I would suggest, however, that you send me \$500,
and you'll have to trust me to handle it wisely.

It is quite possible that the District Attorney was engaged merely in a "fishing expedi-
tion" when he took certain people to Alturas, or it may be that this is a method of inti-
midation your group so that you'll be good boys in the future. On the other hand, it is
not impossible that this is the genuine thing and that they mean to take action. Have you
heard of any Tule Lake segees actually testifying before the Grand Jury. I've also
heard rumors about some fellow who transferred to Manzanar and then asked for expatriation.

Please advise me more fully of the manner in which you were taken to Alturas. Were you
given any choice about going? Were you informed you were being placed under arrest? Who
picked you up? Did they want you to sign statements, and, if so, did you sign them?

The police have no right to pick up people and to detain them for questioning. If they
have duly executed warrants of arrest and then bring the person before a magistrate, there
can be no complaint. Please let me know with particularity exactly how you were picked up.
Of course, if you were asked to go and you agreed to it, there would be basis for complaint.

Sincerely yours,

Ernest Besig.

Kunitani, March 6, 1945

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P.S. Would you like Collins to come, if he is available? I haven't talked to him about this business. He has to be in Washington D.C. on October 10 and has a criminal trial coming up in the federal court the latter part of October. I also have John Taafe in mind.

* * * * *

Sept. 22, 1944

Dear Mr. Besig,

Thank you for your letter of Sept. 20, 1944, also your kindness in acting in our behalf to secure an attorney. We are dispatching \$500 as you advise us.

We feel that the District Attorney is engaging in a "fishing expedition". To my knowledge there has not been a person testifying before the Grand Jury. As I mentioned in my last letter, we were merely questioned by the District Attorney, the State and Government Investigators. None of us signed any statement. When the WRA, Internal Security Officers came to pick us up, they informed us that we were being taken to Alturas at the request of the District Attorney's office. For some unknown reason, these Internal Security officers were very cautious and hesitant about our destination. Why they were afraid of us is beyond our imagination. They never mentioned the word "arrest" and in all sincerity, I believe they weren't given that order. It is, however, very annoying to see them come in almost any time and pick us up. The families are certainly against such treatments. The only reason we let ourselves be picked up, is simply to cooperate with the Authorities.

The Grand Jury is not returned indictments and it appears that the authorities are in dire need of more concrete evidence to convince the Grand Jury. The investigation conducted by the WRA was headed by Fenton Morris. Remember the name? Mr. Sachs is no longer in the Project, I am informed.

By weighing the aforementioned, I am in complete agreement with your sentiment about hiring an attorney. However, the retainer is to give you an assurance that we are prepared to fight this case if necessary. So, if we are not asking you too much, please be ready to send us an attorney when the time comes.

Further suggestions or information will be appreciated. Thanking you and trusting you for a wise counsel, I am,

Very truly yours,

George Kunitani .

Encl: Money Order for \$500

P.S. In the event we become incommunicado and unable to communicate with you regarding hiring of the lawyer and the financial end concerned, please contact Mrs. Abe, 503-3. We will delegate our interest in her hands.

* * * * *

September 25, 1944

Dear Mr. Kunitani

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of September 22 enclosing \$500 in money order payable to me. I will hold this money and use it if necessary for employment of counsel in your behalf.

Today I talked to Mr. Bernhard, attorney for the W. R. A. here in San Francisco, and he verified the fact that Mr. Ishida had been detained for five days on one occasion and all day on the second occasion. He admitted that a couple of Internal Security men were involved in the detention, but claimed that they acted merely as deputy sheriffs and not as members of the Internal Security. I pointed out to him that these arrests had been made without warrants and that the W.R.A. should not cooperate in the lawless enforcement of the law. It seems to me that before a District Attorney or any other person is allowed to pick up a person at Tule Lake there must be some appropriate warrant for such action. Certainly, if I wanted to quiz certain persons at Tule Lake, they would not be brought here to San Francisco at my request. The W.R.A. would certainly demand that I show some legal order to bring them here.

It seems to me that the segregates at Tule Lake should resist such unlawful conduct. The next time the Internal Security or others seek to pick up a person that person should demand to see the warrant of arrest, and if no warrant can be produced then an objection should be made to accompanying the officers. Of course, since the officers have superior forces, no physical resistance should be made if they insist on taking the person without the benefit of a warrant.

I have been very busy today and have not been able to do some writing with reference to this problem. I hope to get at it tomorrow and to send protests to Mr. Dillon Myer and to the project director at Tule Lake, demanding that the present procedure be changed. I also intend to write to District Attorney

I should also inform you and other interested persons that there is no duty upon you to answer the questions of any police officer or other person. Likewise, there is no duty upon you to sign any statement.

I have noted what you say about communicating with Mrs. Abe in the event that you are picked up and held incommunicado. There is a duty on the part of police officers to bring any arrested person before a magistrate within 48 hours, or within 72 hours if arrest is made over the week end. Every prisoner has the right to get in touch with counsel, and if a prisoner is brought before a magistrate he should request the court for an opportunity to secure counsel to represent him.

It might be a good idea for you to advise me with some particularity as to how the questioning was conducted when you and Mr. Abe and Mr. Tada were taken to Alturas. Were there any threats? Was any violence used? Were you asked to sign any statements?

Please let me know whether there have been any further arrests and exactly when the last one was made.

Sincerely yours,

Ernest Besig.

* * * * *

Sept. 29, 1944

Dear Mr. Kunitani,

I want to acknowledge receipt of your letter of September 26 and to advise you that I have written to Director Raymond Best and to Mr. Dillon S. Myer, complaining about the W.R.A.'s participation in the recent unlawful arrests and imprisonment. I have requested assurances that in the future the W.R.A. will not surrender any person to the District Attorney unless a duly executed warrant of arrest is first presented. I have also requested assurances

Kunitani, March 6, and 8, 1945
and March 13, 1945

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that where persons at the Center are questioned by members of Internal Security similar warrants of arrest will be presented.

Finally, I have complained to Mr. Charles Fellow, District Attorney of Modoc County, against the practices he employed in the recent investigation of the Noma murder. This is what we call lawless enforcement of the law, and it is rather typical of police practices throughout the country. It is our practice to crack down on it whenever it occurs.

Residents of the Center who are picked up by Internal Security men should demand to see the warrant of arrest. If no such warrant can be presented, then immediate protest should be made against accompanying the officer. Since the officer has superior force, however, I would suggest that no further objection be made. Then get in touch with me at once and give me all the circumstances of the case, and I will take appropriate action.

Sincerely yours,

Ernest Besig.

P.S. Sign no statements unless you first confer with your attorney, and submit to interrogation only in the presence of your attorney.

MARCH 8, 1945

TALK WITH MR. WAKIDA

[Mr. Wakida and I] discussed the rumor of Abe and Kunitani forming a new organization. George said he doubted very much if they were doing this. "*Kunitani is too smart to start something now when so many people are being picked up.*" (I inclined to agree.) George also agreed with me that Kunitani intended to get political power in camp eventually.

MARCH 13, 1945

LETTER FROM KUNITANI

Received the following letter from Kunitani. It relates to Dillon Myer's reply to Besig, concerning the unlawful detention practiced by the District Attorney of Modoc County at the time of the threatened indictments.

October 23, 1944

Mr. Ernest Besig, Director
American Civil Liberties Union
216 Pine Street
San Francisco, 4, Calif.

Dear Mr. Besig:

This is in reply to your letter of October 9, which was held for my personal attention. We are glad to inform you of our views with respect to the complaints you received about the questioning of certain Tule Lake residents by the District Attorney at Alturas.

The incident you speak of came to my attention shortly before my departure from Washing-

ton on an extended field trip, which has just ended. We were very concerned about the civil liberties aspects of any involuntary detention for questioning in Alturas without observance of due process requirements, and the matter was discussed with Mr. Best in Denver during a conference held there late in September. Mr. Best, who was absent from the center at the time of the removal of the evacuees and their stay in Alturas, was also concerned about it, and it was agreed that the matter should be discussed with Mr. Fellow upon Mr. Best's return to Tule Lake. Just before my return to Washington, I visited the Tule Lake Center, and Mr. Best and I discussed the matter fully. It is true that these people were taken to Alturas upon Mr. Fellow's request without proper warrants. As a result of our discussion, I am quite confident that there will be no further involuntary detention of persons at Alturas without observance of due process requirements.

I am sorry that our letter of October 3 was not more explicit. However, at the time it was written, the Washington office was not fully informed of the action that was being taken.

Sincerely,

D. D. Myer
Director

MARCH 14, 1945

TALK WITH GEORGE KUNITANI

✓ Kunitani opened the conversation by asking about the sit-down strike at Minidoka, which has gotten into the Minidoka newspapers and must be pretty serious. It appears to have originated over the closing of some mess halls and cuts in the mess crew. Before we had gotten well under way, Mrs. Murata dropped in to see him to ask whether the rumor that Reverend Ohira had attempted to kill himself on the way to Santa Fe was true. When she left we got around to a discussion of rumors. He had heard the one about Aramaki re-locating from Santa Fe, but had not heard the one on Kira. ✓

On Announcement that Families will not be Re-united

If it's the truth, it might just as well come out. It depends on what the WRA says. It will have more prestige to begin with if it's said by the Department of Justice and not by the WRA. Everybody knows that the WRA is a temporary set-up.

Rumors on next Pick-up

I've been hearing anywhere from 400 to 1000 for a pick-up. Right now they're saying 600.

Situation in Camp

One bad thing about it is there is no constructive movement going on. It's about time this center will get back on constructive activity.

✓ *People will be blaming the Hoshi-dan leaders if they find out the families will not be re-united.*

Why Evacuees will not Leave Camp Until After War

It's not worrying about repercussions on their relatives in camp. If I'm not mistaken, if they should relocate now, then the Japanese nationals wouldn't have any reason for ask-

ing for indemnity from the U. S. government. In the relocation center, I've attended two or three meetings when the Spanish Consul spoke with Japanese representatives, and at almost every meeting the problem of indemnity from the U.S. government was brought up. They'd bring up 100 million or a billion dollars to settle the damage incurred upon us. It's very primitive, I admit, but I believe it's true.

We thereupon embarked on a long and involved discussion about the relative idealism of Japan and the United States. Kunitani enjoys this sort of thing and while it has little relation to the camp situation, it shows the kind of thing the "noted riot leader" likes to talk about.

Sometimes I think that the Americans possess something greater than Japan can cope with. This war has brought up many things. Many people - Americans captured in the far east - in concentration camps - something similar to us - - Although I wasn't there, I think that even the Chinese would have lived better than the Japanese have done in camps. About the only time the Japanese would ever get together is in time of war or emergency. Other than that, they are far more individualistic than the Americans. It interests and grieves me because Japan is supposed to be highly developed spiritually.

(Here Kunitani remarked as an aside that at times he thought that America was more spiritual in nature than was Japan.)

America is fundamentally materialistic and in my opinion they are doing pretty good. The only disparity between the two groups is that America stepped into the idea of material wealth and really determined resolutely about following that path, whereas the Japanese, as a spiritualistic race haven't gone deep into the spriritual studies. If Japan were really steeped in the spirit, she would have an equal chance with the other nations. I don't think the Japanese as a whole are any too interested in their own belief.

The actual spiritual movement in Japan started about seven to ten years ago. But in spite of the feeling of the people, there are the big shots, Mitsuyo and Mitsubishi, whose idea isn't any different than the ideas of this country (U.S.).

I have no use for the Buddhistic movement unless they change the whole picture. They'd have to knock off about 500 of the big shots in the Buddhist headquarters in Japan.

I pointed out that Kunitani's criticism of Japan might well be made of any country today. He agreed. We then went into an anthropological discussion of the urge in humanity which appears to be responsible for the selfishness and oppression which is so manifest today and has been manifest for some thousands of years. We compared primitive societies, but Kunitani still held to the view that there is an urge to accomplish, to put across a new idea which leads inevitably to taking advantage of other peoples.

After this discussion we got back to the 1943 troubles in Tule Lake. Kunitani said he was sure he could have stopped the trouble if Mr. Best had cooperated to some degree.

After November 1 I was more than confident that we could work out everything in a very peaceful manner. Even after the Army came in I think we could have settled it, have the Army removed, and continue negotiations with the WRA.

If Mr. Best had assured us that the food would be improved, the roads fixed, and stated that he would build uniform porches. On the 29th, he said he'd put out an article in the Tulean Dispatch asking the people not to cut up porches because he intended to put up uniform porches.

In any case, Kunitani is of the opinion that the whole thing could have been settled amicably if a few genuine concessions had been made to the poeple at that time. He also told me that the girls of the Joshi-dan are practicing on their bugles very hard, evidently so

Kunitani, March 14, 1945
and April 9, 1945

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that the bugling can continue after the next expected pick-up.

On March 20 I left Tule Lake to consult with Dr. Thomas and Mr. Nishimoto in Berkeley. By this time I had prepared several reports on the complex history of Tule Lake during the "incident". Thomas and Nishimoto had a number of additional questions which they wished me to put to Mr. Kunitani.

On April 2 Mr. Goodman made an involved and complex attempt to get the Hōkoku to stop their early morning bugling. I, of course, did not hear about this until I returned to Tule Lake on April 9 and visited Mr. Kunitani.

APRIL 9, 1945

TALK WITH GEORGE KUNITANI

Kunitani gave me a good deal of the information on the early activities at Tule Lake. Nozama, Noguchi, and Morimitsu have been called chairmen of the farm group in various minutes. Kunitani explained that Morimitsu was elected chairman of the group at their first meeting on October 15. Nozama was the secretary. The group had two or three secretaries. They had no organization before the accident. Noguchi and Kato played a peculiar part in trying to organize the farm workers soon after segregation and before the accident. Because of this activity Noguchi was sometimes called the farm chairman.

Noguchi and Kato were holding meetings with the idea of organizing the farm group. This was before the accident, right after segregation.

Noguchi was head of an informal group talking about politics and other matters. I don't think he had anything to do with forming the farm group (after the incident). (Nevertheless, he was made vice-chairman of the Daihyo Sha.)

Morimitsu was the legitimate chairman of the farm group. He was elected after the accident.

There were a great many minors working on the farm at that time.

(Here Joyce Kunitani spoke up, 'My brother was one of them. He was thirteen.)

That was one of the reasons the employment of minors developed into an issue.

Personnel of the Civic Organization

The Civic Organization was composed of the Ward Chairmen of the Block Managers. They had a chairman, a vice-chairman and a secretary. The greater majority of the body would be old Tulean. Most of the block managers after segregation were old Tuleans.

Accident Committee

I believe I was there myself. That was the very first thing the Daihyo Sha did. We got statements to the extent of the injuries and took down their names and ages.

(This was done on October 17th, before Kunitani was made chairman of the Daihyo Sha.)

Best arrived on the project August 1, 1943.

The Planning Board

The new member of the Planning Board in my block was appointed by the block manager.

I don't know what was done in the other blocks. They were supposed to be Issei, but a lot of Nisei were appointed. The positions were just appointed by the chair.

On October 26th we phoned Mr. Best and asked for an appointment.

Why Kunitani Did Not Discuss Pedicord on October 26

The biggest cause of the people was to straighten out the farm accident. Although that was just an excuse, because there were so many things in camp that needed to be improved. The report of the hospital committee wasn't complete. Besides we wanted to get the farm group back to work as soon as possible. This talk with Mr. Best was to be the first of a series of reports and we intended to bring up the matter of Dr. Pedicord later.

Mr. Kunitani then brought up the matter of Mr. Goodman's proposed compromise with the Hōkoku and the Hōshi dan.

Kunitani's Opinion on a Compromise with Hōkoku Buglers

Kunitani definitely disapproved of Goodman's policy of making a compromise with the Hōkoku. He also disapproves of another internment because of the possible effect on the people. He said that there is a large faction in the Hōkoku which is pulling for discontinuing their activities entirely, and given a little more time they might put a stop to it of themselves.

A Hōkoku man told me that some leaders were called to Mr. Best's office. Evidently they were told that if they would stop the bugle playing within a month, most of them who ask internment will be sent. They said there was a written statement.

If they do that it will be worse in camp. The Caucasians must remember that the relations between relatives among the Japanese are nothing like relatives among the Caucasians. Even people who now have no connection with the Hōkoku may be pulled in if there is another pick-up.

If Department of Justice Takes Over Camp

I think if Justice takes over the camp that we should start a new life here. I think we can do it, providing there is no monkey-business. The center has been settling down steadily for several weeks now. I can tell that by the fact that visitors here (to Kunitani's apartment) have dropped off.

The authorities must keep the relatives of the Hōkoku in hand. Otherwise they will be a continuous aggravation. Next they will be pushing for reuniting the families.

The boys were arrested, sentenced and put in the stockade for 15 days. Then they were sent to Santa Fe. Naturally, the others are going to keep it up if that's what happens.

TALK WITH MR. GOODMAN, PROJECT ATTORNEY

I went to see Mr. Goodman the same evening to find out what this compromise was all about. Goodman told me that he had begun the negotiations on April 2. He had offered the Hōshi-dan, the Hōkoku, and the Joshi dan their choice of three propositions. The Hōkoku accepted the third choice: that they stop all their activities - marching and bugling - if all male members over 18 years of age who desired it were interned. Thereupon, the members of the Hōshi-dan, the adult Resegregation Group, came back with five counter propositions. When these were not met, a part of the Hōkoku seceded from the main Resegregation Group. Mr. Goodman told me:

Men have come to me saying that they had been threatened because they are against the proposition. The majority of the Hōshi dan voted No. It's the old fellows who don't want

to sign their names to anything that are so stubborn.

Here I brought up some objections to Goodman's plan, the chief one being that it would not stop the fundamental trouble - the old issue of resegregation. Making another internment would stir up the people again and it would not stop the adult resegregationists from pressuring for reunity with their interned relatives. To them, this signifies a successful consummation of their old aim, resegregation. Goodman disagreed. He said that the only alternative was to use force, tear gas and guns. With some more of the group gone, he figures they won't be quite so annoying, having been whittled down a bit in numbers. I then asked why things couldn't go along as they were. Goodman said that the Department of Justice was pressuring him for action. . . He said that the real reason he was taking action was that he feared that if he didn't, the Department of Justice would crucify the WRA again by getting this marching and bugling into the newspapers, ruining relocation, etc. The idea is -- stop the noise in any way possible, lest the Department of Justice use the activities at Tule Lake to harm the WRA.¹

APRIL 13, 1945

TALK WITH MR. KUNITANI

On Hōkoku

From what I've heard the Hōkoku gang is breaking into segments. Some of them though will go to any extent to be reunited with their families. They will resort to any action to realize that prospect. Making a compromise will cause more trouble to the WRA and Justice will have to step in and take over.

[I had been told that Dillon Myer, National Director of the WRA was going to visit Tule Lake on April 16. I remarked on this to Mr. Kunitani.]

On Myer

I used to have quite a lot of respect for Mr. Myer. But lately I'm beginning to lose faith with him. Above all I'm disappointed. Keeping Mr. Best here is the biggest boner he ever pulled.

Riot In Santa Fe Internment Camp

(Kunitani heard that there had been some trouble in Santa Fe.)

I heard that the Hōkoku bunch was under strict surveillance and that the former occupants are against them [the Hōkoku]. Those men even organized themselves so that the new arrivals will have nothing to do with the Internal Organization of the camp, and be on no committees.

Back to Tule Lake Hōkoku

The Hōkoku has had seven or eight meetings in the last ten days. I heard quite a few seceded.

The power of the group who want to stop it altogether is gaining momentum. Though at the beginning it was probably only 15% it has grown to about 30% of the group now. If you intern them it will be additional trouble for nothing. It won't gain anything.

[I. For more details see fieldnotes for April 9, 11, 17.]

DISCUSSION OF NOVEMBER 1943 INCIDENT AND MR. KATO

[In my numerous talks with him, Mr. Kato had implied that he had played a very important role in the November 1943 uprising. Indeed, on one occasion he had told me that he himself was responsible for the brawl on the night of November 4 which resulted in military control over the camp. So I asked Mr. Kunitani if Mr. Kato had played an important role in the "incident".]

Kato was not a big shot. He had very little following.

When I first came here an old Issei from Topaz asked me to meet a fine young man who might do me some good. I went to this old man's house and was introduced to Mr. Kato. He started to tell me about organizing the center. I didn't answer. I could tell by looking at him what kind of trouble he might cause.

Three or four days later I went to his house and there were six or seven men there, mostly the Topaz group. I believe sincerely that the trouble with him is that he lets too many people utilize him.

(I took a chance here and asked Kunitani if it was this bunch in Kato's house that was behind the coal strike. He said it was. They came to me and I told them nothing doing.

At that time there were various different groups interested in different problems. I took most interest to form a committee to study and decide on the Japanese language school problem. I was called to meetings like this twice.

Here Mrs. Kunitani entered. She began to read the paper and commented on the President's death. Kunitani said, "It's too bad about Roosevelt, isn't it?" in a sympathetic tone of voice much different from that used by some of my other respondents.

Kunitani told me that when his block had voted for Daihyo Sha members on October 16 (Block 6) the people turned out 100%. (I think it is no exaggeration to state in my report that at least 60% of the people took part in selecting the representatives.)

Kunitani commented on the members of the Motor Pool present at the first Daihyo Sha meeting.

I felt sorry for them. The atmosphere was strong against them because the people felt they were responsible.

At one of the educative meetings I attended (before the incident) an old Tulean said, 'They have started a coal strike but I don't believe they'll succeed. We tried (to strike) and we didn't succeed.'

I remarked that I was applying for a fellowship at the University of Chicago.¹ Kunitani mentioned that he had a friend teaching Japanese there. "A person doesn't need a Ph.D. these days to teach in a University if he knows Japanese", he said rather enviously. Then he added, "But I guess the United States thinks I'm a bad boy now."²

[1. Professor A. L. Kroeber had suggested that I do so.]

[2. This was not the first indication in our conversations that Kunitani was having second thoughts about going to Japan.]

APRIL 23, 1945TALK WITH GEORGE KUNITANI

Though young members of the Hōkoku continued to bugle spasmodically, no internments took place. On April 23 I visited Kunitani to get his views on the speech Dillon Myer had made to the block managers and also to get his reaction to the news that some of the original leaders of the Resegregationist Group who had been sent to Santa Fe had now been sent to the Crystal City Internment Camp with their families.

Yesterday they held a party for a fellow who's going to Crystal City. The common people there said that they didn't think that Justice was going to have another internment. They say WR A may be thinking that, but they don't believe it. I was rather amused by that.

Myer's Speech to Block Managers and Spanish Consul Representatives

As you know the people have no respect for the block managers to start with. Myer also saw the representative body which used to see the Spanish Consul, on the following day. But the people have no feeling whatever that these men are their representatives. 'Why pay any attention?' is their attitude.

As you know the majority of the block managers are old men. I feel that at least one-third of them don't understand English. In my block the block managers made no announcement whatever. I think the people should have been notified of Mr. Myer's object. I dare say that over half of the people in camp don't know what he said. The Newell Star description was very obscure.

There are no serious rumors about Myer, relocation, or resegregation.

Mr. Kira

Mr. Kira's being taken to Crystal City will have a very queer reaction. The Hōshi-dan people felt that he was one of the leaders. Now they are suddenly confronted with the fact that he and his brother-in-law are the only ones being sent from Santa Fe to Crystal City. Some mothers and wives have recently received letters from the Justice Department after they asked for family reunion, telling them there is to be no family reunion.

New Political Movement Starting in Camp

Right now a new movement is starting. The Representative Body to deal with the Spanish Consul is one group, the Warden's Organization is another Group and the Civic Organization is another group.

Mr. Yashui, Mr. Wagatsuma, Shimizu and Iwo - they seem to be getting together and making a bid for prestige. I hope they won't do it for their personal glory.

The Daihyo Sha Coordinating Committee was called Renraku-iin which means Communications Committee. The so-called Coordinating Committee that broke the status quo was called the Kakubumon Sekinin Sha which means Coordinating Committee.

Somebody must have given them (Coordinating Committee) a very strong guarantee that we (Negotiating Committee) would never be let out of the stockade or they would never have dared organize.

November 12 Meeting of Daihyo Sha

The motion to cancel the mass meeting was made by Yokota. It was immediately seconded

by six or seven men of his clique. When it was put to a vote the results were overwhelmingly in his favor.

I was really angry that day. I didn't give a damn for the way they acted. I wanted to put some of the responsibility on them.

Kibei yogore - this means literally dirty Kibei - but actually the meaning is closer to hoodlum or bum.

Army Entrance

When the Army came in they yelled and shot. The people were all confused. They didn't know what was taking place. If anybody stuck their heads out of a window or a door the soldiers shot into the air and said, 'Get back in'.

On November 5th all the soldiers would say to the people was, 'Get back - get back'. The people didn't know anything. They just stood around. Then the soldiers threw tear gas. Tear gas was even thrown into some of the barracks in blocks 5 and 6 by mistake.

When work was cut out entirely, soldiers had to take over the responsibility of delivering food.

Here Mrs. Kunitani interrupted: 'They threw the food all over the place. They were so scared they set the food in the middle of the road. Sometimes a sack of rice was a block away from the messhall.'

On April 27 Mr. Goodman told me that the Internal Security had made a raid on a small Hōkoku headquarters and confiscated all bugles. They also arrested the leader of the bugle corps and took his bugle away from him.

APRIL 30, 1945

TALK WITH KUNITANI

Kunitani told me that Mr. Morimitsu, the Farm Representative of the "incident" time, had come to see him and explained that his father had disapproved strongly of his talking to me. So Mr. Morimitsu sat down and told Kunitani all he could, and Kunitani took notes for me. As I have remarked before, even though the camp is quieter than it has been since a year ago last May, many people are still very reluctant to be seen with Caucasians.

Morimitsu's Story as told to Mr. Kunitani

He told me most of the farmers were transferees from other centers.

He said it had been raining quite frequently at that time and the farmers went to work in open cars and got drenched. Another of their complaints was that the transportation cars were in bad shape.

(These complaints preceded the accident.)

They had requested cargo trucks (covered) repeatedly, but Mr. Lummer, though not disagreeing, never did anything about it.

On the particular morning of the accident, when the farmers were going out of the gate, they and the MP watching the gate had a little argument over passes. So the farmers came back without going to work.

He heard the workers grumbling - 'Why should we go out of the project to work. If we have to go to all this trouble, why should we work?'

Another grudge the farmers had against Mr. Lummer, the Farm Supervisor, was that they were accustomed to bring in radishes and vegetables from the farm and Mr. Lummer would stop them at the gate and make them unload the sacks and take them away from them. Once this happened during a heavy rain and they all got wet while they stood there. This griped them.

On the afternoon of the day the accident occurred, the farmers were told to report back to work. It was announced in the mess halls by the block managers.

Then the accident happened, as they were going out to work. So when the accident happened, the men, instead of jumping on the Caucasians, jumped on Mr. Sumi, the foreman and Mr. Ohira, saying, 'If you fellows weren't so anxious to work, we wouldn't have gone out and had the accident.'

Before the accident the farmers had elected a representative from each crew. There seems to have been quite a lot of complaints they wanted presented to the administration and the personnel in charge. These men (the crew representatives) and the foreman met first and discussed the accident (as Tada also told me). All the other farmers and other people gathered around the block 7 mess hall.

Almost everyone in camp had heard of the accident and the farmers felt they should not return to work unless they were safe-guarded against a repetition of a like accident.

The driver was thought to be under age, and his previous record of reckless driving had reached the ears of the farmers.

(I've heard this before. - that in Ht. Mountain the driver was supposed to have a reputation for reckless driving.)

A large crowd gathered around the mess hall. They were farmers and outsiders.

After some discussion of Saturday morning, October 16, the farm division, the crew representatives and the foremen met. As a result of the discussion they decided to consult the Planning Board. The Planning Board was the only organization which had the least inkling of a representative body at that time.

Morimitsu explained that he was appointed temporary chairman because Sumi the head foreman, who would be the natural person, was so afraid, he wouldn't assume the responsibility. He tried to push it to Mr. Ohira, the Assistant foreman. But Ohira couldn't speak Japanese well, so Morimitsu took it.

Ohira and Sumi feared that since so many persons had been hurt they were afraid to take the responsibility for the consequences which might develop later.

(I asked Kunitani to explain this a little better. He said that since the truckload of boys had been such young fellows, Sumi and Ohira were possibly afraid that the people would throw the whole blame on them in the event that they stepped forward now.)

Besides, the farmers were blaming Sumi for telling them to go to work on that very afternoon, since they had been against it in the morning.

So the farmers took it up to Civic Organizations, and it was presented to Bill Tayama. He said he would take it up with the Planning Board. But the Planning Board explained that they were unable to handle it, so they went back to Civic and asked Tayama to call the block delegations, which they did.

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I then asked Kunitani a number of questions which had come up while working over my manuscripts and reports.

Why were some of the men who had been arrested and confined in the stockade released in January and, subsequently, in April?

Early Releases From Stockade

Kunitani said that some of the detainees may have intended to cooperate with the Coordinating Committee when they promised to do so.¹ Others just wanted to get out gap of five words here in notes.

Kodama got out so that they could work for the release of Abe, Kunitani and the others.

Kunitani also told me that the letter "R" had no significance to Japanese and put the worries of the Coordinating Committee down to their extraordinary fear and tension "because they were working against the Japanese."

I brought up the subject of the call for a general hunger strike which the anonymous "Second Negotiating Committee" put out on November 14. Kunitani said that "it might have been a bluff on the part of the authors, who didn't understand Caucasian psychology very well." The Ward VII proclamation which denounced it was chiefly instigated by Mr. Yokota. He also told me that when they were hiding from the Army/ he and Abe had never stated that they would give themselves up if the other men were released. (Osler told me that they had done this.)

The following men who took an active part in breaking the status quo were Old Tuleans: Furuye, Yoshino, Tayama and Sasaki. Takahira came from Ht. Mountain. Mizuno from Rohwer. (I'll get the three other names from Tada, who seems to know everything on these matters.)

Present Situation in Camp

As a result of the stockade and the Hōshi-internments a lot of the hot heads in camp have been cooled off to a great extent. None of these people will take any forceful steps now, because they don't have a big group backing them up. It will be much easier to keep them in hand than it was a year ago.

If Justice takes over I'd hate to see them make the same mistakes that WRA made.

Stockade Meetings and Coordinating Committee

Hikida did not call any meetings in the stockade. Those internees who talked to the Coordinating Committee didn't talk much in the stockade when they came back.

1. The Coordinating Committee had announced "justifiable" release of detainees as one of its major planks and had negotiated for such release with the Army and with WRA throughout its tenure. (Thomas and Nishimoto, pp. 288-9).

MAY 7, 1945

TALK WITH KUNITANI

Poston Strike Patterns Appearing in November 1943

Kunitani told me that it was Kagawa who was responsible for the similarities between the "Poston Plan" and Tule's "Negotiating Committee Plan". (Dick Nishimoto has commented upon these similarities.) Kagawa was vice-chairman during the Poston strike, says Kunitani.

Kunitani also told me that our old friend Yokota has been elected chairman of the Red Cross Committee (which is also tied up with the ex-Coordinating Committee people.)

If a man is to be a real representative of the people, he must have enough force to control the Hōkoku bunch.

We have a Spanish Consul representative in this block. He never makes a report at all. It's very interesting, the Issei and Nisei in camp never get along.

Renunciation of Citizenship

The boys holding out without renouncing were on the defensive at that time. The general idea was, 'If you're going back to Japan, what's the use to hold on to your citizenship?' That was the common argument.

A lot of other people thought, 'If we have to live in camp with them and it looks like everybody's doing it, we have to do it.'

Kunitani told me that Abe got most of his prestige with the Jeromites for the stand he had taken at Military Registration.

Attitude Toward Justice

Kunitani would like to see the Department of Justice take over "and kick out Mr. Best."

I've heard people say that if Justice takes over there won't be any monkey business as there is under WR A.

I've heard that people asking about relocation are told that if they don't get out, Justice will take over and then it'll be too bad for them.

LONGITUDINAL ORAL HISTORY OF GEORGE AND JOYCE KUNITANI ~~91914~~

~~62944=79454z~~
1944-1945

TULE LAKE SEGREGATION CENTER

Evans-Fritchard discussing E. E. C. 1944
Max discussing K. 1944
Evans-Fritchard discussing E. E. C. 1944
Evans-Fritchard discussing E. E. C. 1944

The questions that follow are based on the story by B. Hargrove, "Camp Student
Practices and the New Consciousness".

35. During the 1940s some students ministered:

a. offered sanctuary to young men seeking to evade military duty
b. supported race groups
c. came into direct contact with political organizations
d. all of the above are correct
e. only answer a is correct

36. A large percentage of camp churches were (by 1945) to have lost contact with
young people:

a. before they reached school age
b. before they reached college age
c. because these young people do not go to college
d. none of the above is correct

37. Which of the following churches is not listed as having its membership
in 1945 of 125 young people or increasing rapidly growing for the 1940s?
a. an accepted theological school system

b. the Church of Latter-day Saints - in Hermiston
c. the Episcopalians
d. the Lutherans
e. none of the above is correct for all churches have lost the grasp of large
young people

38. According to Kunitani, the most important Protestant church history of 1945
was as a result of the following:

a. they had no constituency
b. they had no history
c. they were being overtaken by an increasing number of students
d. they had been questioned by an increasing number of students

Kunitani, September, 1984 1.

GEORGE AND JOYCE KUNITANI

Mr. [Mr. Kunitani is deceased. If any part of this longitudinal case history should be considered for publication, I think that Mrs. Kunitani would probably permit the use of their real names. Interested persons should get in touch with Professor Arthur A. Hansen, Director of the Japanese American Oral History Project at California State University, Fullerton, California.

Mr. Kunitani was born in San Diego, California in 1915. He was taken to Japan at the age of 7 and returned to the United States at age 15. He graduated from high school in San Diego with honors. He spoke English and Japanese fluently.

✓ He worked as sales clerk in a fruit and vegetable store and in 1937 he made another short trip to Japan. On his return to Amercia^{ICA} he worked successively as manager of a retail fruit and vegetable store, as salesman and truck driver of a wholestore produce store, and as operator of his own produce store. In his spare time he served as Sunday school teacher and group leader in the Buddhist Church.

In April of 1942 he was evacuated to the Santa Anita Assembly Center, where he met Joyce, the young woman who was to become his wife. He and Joyce managed to get themselves transferred together to the Jerome Relocation Project by taking employment with the WRA as key personnel. As Joyce told me in 1981, "We were just going together. I had a crush on him."¹ But, since they were not yet married, George arranged for Joyce to live with a Buddhist minister's wife. "He was very religious, George was." At Jerome, George worked as foreman of a lumberjack crew. He also became associated with Reverend Shozo Abe with whom he vehemently opposed the military registration.]

[1. See interview with Joyce Kunitani, p. .]

Kunitani, September, 1944

[George and Joyce were segregated to the Tule Lake Center in September of 1943 and in October, when the farm accident occurred, George accepted the chairmanship of the Negotiating Committee of the Daihyo Sha Kai (Representative Body). After November 4, when the Army took control of the Center, George, Reverend Abe, and Mitsugu Tada, the head of the evacuee police force, tried to maintain a political relationship with the Army, presenting a plan for getting the essential workers back on their jobs. But negotiations proved very difficult and after the debacle of November 13, when the Army and WRA called a mass meeting at which no Japanese Americans appeared, the Army ordered the arrest of the members of the Negotiating Committee and other leaders. Kunitani and a number of other leaders went into hiding. Despite a camp-wide search on November 26, the Army was unable to find them.

✓ On December 1 Kunitani and three other unapprehended leaders voluntarily gave themselves up, but they surrendered to the FBI and not the Army. George Kunitani was confined in the stockade without trial until August 24, 1944.]

* * * * *

[After the release of the leaders of the November uprising, I, of course, was eager to talk to them. I approached the Tsuchikawas, who were ardent Resegregationists, and who, I knew, had been among those involved in trying to obtain the release of the men in the stockade. They said they would make inquiries. (I did not, at this time, know that a schism had already developed among the Resegregationists, nor was I aware that Mr. Kunitani was not on the best of terms with Mr. Yamashita and the Tsuchikawas (See Thomas and Nishimoto, pp. 298-300.). Nevertheless, on September 7, Mr. Tsuchikawa told me that George Kunitani "had been contacted and that he had said that he would be glad to see me at any time." I thereupon arranged for a meeting on the following morning and sat up far into the night, composing a list of questions. (Field Notes, September 7, 1944, p.9).]

[2]. Almost a year later George hinted to me that they had escaped the search by dressing as women.]

Kunitani, Sept 18, 1944

3.

[But when I arrived at Kunitani's apartment, his wife told me that he had been picked up by the Internal Security the day before and not yet been released. I subsequently learned that investigators from the District Attorney's office in Modoc County, had embarked on a re-investigation of the Noma murder and that they were questioning not only Kunitani, Abe, and Tada, but also such Resegregationist leaders as Mr. Tsuchikawa, and Kira.

On September 12 I visited the Tsuchikawas, who were deeply concerned over the threatened indictments. Mrs. Tsuchikawa told me that the District Attorney had told George Kunitani that if he came back to camp and gathered as much information as possible about the murder, he would be shown leniency. According to her, George said: "Of course, I'll do anything I can to help you sir." The re-investigation, however, was abandoned after a few days, and I was able to make another appointment with Kunitani for September 18.

✓ *all sp. sent. + copy →* SEPTEMBER 18, 1944.
INTERVIEW WITH GEORGE KUNITANI, CHAIRMAN OF NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE OF THE DAIHYO SHA KAI

✓ Mr. Kunitani was asleep when I arrived at his apartment, but his wife woke him. Like Mr. ^A_{Kogawa}, he was cautious and careful at the beginning of the interview, but at the end he spoke more freely. He appeared very nervous and highstrung. He smoked more of my cigarettes than I did, which is really going some. His hands tremble, his voice is strained, his attitude somewhat arrogant. He had evidently prepared to tell me the story of the beginning of the trouble in his own way. I listened and wrote and later asked a few questions. He appears to have an inordinate contempt for Mr. Best.

First Impressions of Tule Lake

"First of all, it must seem peculiar to you because it would be more expected to see such an upheaval right after evacuation. To have a thing like this happen so long after evacuation would give the impression that something was wrong. But

[13]. It would be more accurate to say that he was reserved and diffident. He was also very handsome.]

George and Joyce were segregated to the Tule Lake Center in September of 1943 and in October, ~~xxxxx~~ when the farm accident occurred, ^{George} he accepted the chairmanship of the Negotiating Committee of the Daihyo Sha Kai (Representative Body). After November 4, when the Army took control of the Center, George, Reverend Abe, and Mitsugu Tada, the head the the evacuee police force, ~~attempted to~~ tried to maintain a ~~xxxx~~ political relationship with the Army, presenting a plan for getting the essential workers back on their jobs. But negotiations proved very difficult and after the debacle of November 13, when the Army and WRA called a mass meeting ~~which~~ at which no ~~the~~ Japanese Americans appeared, the Army ordered the arrest of the members of the Negotiating Committee and other leaders. Kunitani and a number of other leaders went into hiding, and despite a camp-wide search on November 26 the Army was unable to find them.

① On December 1, ^{Kunitani} ~~George~~ and three other unapprehended leaders voluntarily gave themselves up, but they surrendered to the FBI and not the Army. ^{(Many months later (almost a year)} George hinted to me that they had escaped the search by dressing as women.)

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INTERVIEW WITH MR. KUNITANI, CHAIRMAN OF NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE OF THE DAIHYO SHA KAI

Kagawa ^{Kunitani} Mr. Kuratomi was asleep when I arrived at his apartment, but his wife woke him. Like Mr. ~~Sugimoto~~, he was cautious and careful at the beginning of the interview, but at the end he spoke more freely. He appeared very nervous and highstrung. He smoked more of my cigarettes than I did, which is really going some. His hands tremble, his voice is strained, his attitude somewhat arrogant.¹ He had evidently prepared to tell me the story of the beginning of the trouble in his own way. I listened and wrote and later asked a few questions. He ^{appears to have} has an inordinate contempt for Mr. Best.

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First Impressions of Tule Lake
The Maxmax November Uprising

First of all, it must seem peculiar to you because it would be more expected to see such an upheaval right after evacuation. To have a thing like this happen so long after evacuation would give the impression that something was wrong. But there were reasons.

I have lived only seven years in Japan and twenty-two in the U.S.

I strongly believe that my way of thinking might be different from other people's. I appreciate the idea of democracy and have a clear picture of what democracy stands for.

Mr. McVoy, the Community Analyst at Jerome, knew quite clearly why I took my step to come to this center.

The immediate impression I received after coming here was the unpreparedness on the part of the Administration, especially in the field of housing and reception. I arrived here at 5:00 p.m. on the 30th of September. That day the Army was good enough to give us a lunch. After we were through with the processing, it was well towards evening.

Eventually, we were thrown into an unpartitioned Recreation Hall. No mattresses were available. I got the block manager to find me a mattress. Even the stove wasn't ready for operation. The block manager had to get wood for us. I don't believe the block manager was even notified we were to be there. There were ten boys and they told us that between 20 and 30 would come, but they didn't know. They had no plan at all.

Before we left Jerome we had a talk with the Project Director and also with various high officials of the WRA. I can say that they were sympathetic and at least understanding.

We talked to Mr. Taylor and I believe Mr. Taylor realized that we cooperated with him in order to make the movement a smooth affair.

At that time, the people leaving the (Relocation) projects had the feeling they would like to be housed closely together, but realizing the conditions at Tule Lake, they didn't expect too much. But it was Mr. Taylor's feeling that the families should be close together. Not that we felt our treatment would be the same.

When I arrived here I heard so many complaints about the separation in housing. Even families were sometimes separated from one end of the camp to the other.

The train on which I came had Dr. Melton, the Assistant Project Director, as escort. He was kind enough to arrange an introductory meeting for us with Mr. Best. He called upon four or five persons whom he thought would be interested in being introduced to Mr. Best at that time. That was on the 1st of October.

We had an interview with Mr. Best. I clearly remember what he said at that meeting. The impression he gave us then certainly betrayed his ability as a Project Director. Putting up his feet on the desk and talking was all right. I suppose many executives do that. But his attitude toward us was high pressure. He gave us the impression, "I'm Project Director here, and I'm running this center. Nobody's going to tell me what to do."

The very thing he said was, "I don't recognize any representative body." (I asked here how this had come to Mr. Best's mind, whether Dr. Melton had introduced this group from Jerome as representatives.)

Said Mr. Kunitani.

"We weren't introduced as a representative body," Dr. Melton would corroborate this.

"I'm not going to be high pressured by anybody." (said Best). "I'm not going to meet any demands from anybody at any time."

Dr. Melton was surprised and I think he was sorry that he had ever suggested our meeting with Mr. Best. One of the boys was so angry he walked out in the middle of the interview.

(I remarked that this attitude of Mr. Best appeared strange indeed, and wondered what could have caused him to adopt it.)

It is possible that some other group had gone in to demand something of him. But certainly we wouldn't do that, especially with Dr. Melton there.

I got rather sarcastic. I said, "I'm still listening," after he started up. After that he was more reasonable.

Contrast ^{with} Facilities ^{at} Jerome

As far as Jerome was concerned, the facilities were very good. Each latrine and urinal basin was individual and the interiors of the shower are very much better.

Food too was much better. This was especially strange, since Jerome raised so little. However, food there in comparison to this center was twice as good.

About six months before segregation took place, I was pretty well informed about the activity in centers through the Center papers. I thought I knew pretty clearly what this center was raising in the way of agriculture. It was only natural for me to take it for granted that there would be an ample supply of vegetables, chickens, and hogs.

I also knew the regulation of the WRA in providing 45¢ per day for food for the people. Of this, 14¢ was provided by project undertaking. When that problem came up in Jerome (It used to be 50¢ to 55¢ and was cut to 45¢), 35¢ was bought through government channels and 14¢ was raised on the project.

The question was put to Mr. Taylor at that time: how he expected to raise 14¢ at a place at Jerome. He said he'd do his best to raise 14¢ and in the event that he could not do it he would secure it through other channels.

When ~~Suginoto~~ ^{Kagawa} investigated the mess here, his figures checked with the FBI accountants.

There was a great suspicion on the part of the evacuees as to what became of the goods being produced in the centers. There were 3,800 to 3,900 acres in cultivation at that time.

I went to the farm myself (in Tule Lake). I found that the hens were laying 6,000 to 7,000 eggs a day. There were 290,000 pounds of meat in preservation. We asked the former Tuleans and they said that they never received any portion of it. When we met Mr. Best, he said, "I've been here only since the first of August. What transpired prior to my arrival does not concern me."

The attitude of the Administrative officials toward our group was very cool. They had the conviction that the less they had to do with the Japanese, the better it would be for them. I often heard the remark, "I know how to handle the Japanese. Just leave it up to me."

Motives for Action of November 1:

We had met Mr. Best on October 27. We went in there as a committee. There was no mass demonstration. I still had a vain hope at that time that he would listen to reason.

Ever since the farm accident the farm group was not working. The hogs, chicken and packing, being a different section, kept on working. Some representatives demanded that they all quit, but I myself didn't think that wise. I quashed that and the motion did not carry. I'm glad of it.

Going back to the October 27 meeting - realizing that so many people were on the verge of termination because of the strike, we stressed (to Mr. Best) that termination would not be good.

The farm incident had become so entangled that it had become a center-wide topic. The farm group realized that their task would be too great for them to handle and they felt it should be the concern of the center residents. The cry was coming from various other sections too, that unless they were safeguarded they would not go out of the center.

These feelings precipitated the election of the Daihyo Sha Kai. It may be that Mr. Best did not want to make such a big issue out of it. That's why he wasn't enthusiastic about the election of the block representatives.

As far as the election of representatives is concerned, I don't think I did wrong and I think I've been fair with the people. The request for the elections was put through the block managers by the farm group. It went through ~~Miyada~~ ^{Tayama}.

Then, the Administration was very anxious to terminate the farm workers. We spoke against that. We thought we had been able to convince Mr. Best and that if the termination was to take place, it would be gradual. However, the next day /on October 28/ he left for San Francisco. During his absence, with his signature, came a statement: "All farm workers are terminated as of October 19." I don't think this is in the minutes of the October 26 meeting.

It has

Naturally, after we had had the meeting with Mr. Best we made reports to the representatives and to the farm group in particular. That such a statement came out the following day threw suspicion on Administrative sincerity. Our immediate feeling was distrust of Mr. Best.

So when Mr. Myer came we felt we had to show that we had support so that Mr. Myer could see with his own eyes the support we had. That was our paramount intention.

(I asked why the Negotiating Committee had asked Dillon Myer to dismiss Mr. Best.)

We felt that if a request were made to get rid of Mr. Best, Mr. Myer would investigate the matter. If he were investigated and remained, we could tell the people that an investigation had been made and that his position is vindicated. We asked for the resignations of Best, Zimmer (head of Operations), Schmidt, Callum and Kirkman (Mess Operations), and Pedicord. *Sachs Jones*

Kirkman was thrown out of Santa Anita. He was caught in some kind of scandal there. *Jones*

The request to remove the Caucasian staff from the hospital came from the hospital employees. I don't think they'd like to say that, but it's the truth.

One point I want to make clear was their feeling was that if the Caucasian doctors and nurses are human enough to realize the problem before them and are willing to work for the benefit of the people, it would have been all right.

Negotiating Committee
Recognition: ~~of Daihyo Sha Kai~~ by Administration

(I then asked *Kunitani* ~~Kuratomi~~ what actual assurance Best had given the Negotiating Committee of recognition - that is, what prompted his statement to the Daihyo Sha that the committee had been recognized.)

Best said, "I would recognize any committee or group of committees. I don't care how good the organization is." He made the same statement when Mr. Myer was there.

Murder Indictment:

I have seen the statement myself, accusing me of murder and conspiracy of murder and asking the county grand jury to indict me. One thing, I am more or less on the lookout for a frame-up. I'm playing safe and am going to have a lawyer come in and go over the situation. If they try to connect me with this I'm going to have a real disillusionment in American democracy.

Visit of Spanish Consul on November 3:

(I have no data at all on this visit and the consul's talk with the Negotiating Committee, so I asked *Kunitani* ~~Kuratomi~~ about it.)

I think he came mainly to check up on the November 1 demonstration. He also asked about the auto accident - and the rest was of a personal nature. We did explain the situation to him. I also explained the proceedings of the conference with Mr. Myer.

That was one of the most amicable meetings we ever had. The atmosphere in camp (immediately after November 1) was very amicable. We had just had the celebration of Meiji Setsu too.

He asked, "Is it all right for me to leave?" I told him frankly that everything was under control. Then when he came back again [after the November 4 "incident"] he was rather peeved with us.

FOOTNOTE p. 7.

1. These men may have been sent to Santa Fe in August, for which month my notes have been lost. They may be the men referred to by Michi Weglyn, "Years of Infamy" p. 213.

Possibility of Returning Stockade Detainees from Santa Fe:

Kuratomi
(Kuratomi then asked me if I would do something for him. I asked what it was. He said that the "people in camp" were very anxious to have those persons who were sent to Santa Fe recently returned to camp. He wondered if I could find out what chance they had. I said it was not likely that I could find out anything, but I would try.)

"Our release is unconditional (the citizens' released after the hunger strike). They were sent to Santa Fe just because they were aliens. How could their return to Tule Lake be expedited?"

We (Negotiating Committee) haven't been disbanded officially. We want to disband. Until the Santa Fe question is cleared up I don't dare take a forward step.

Mr. Best promised us in front of Wayne Collins that he's willing to make any recommendations pertaining to these Issei returning to the camp.

The people have a very firm idea that the Issei sent to Santa Fe are just as innocent as the Nisei released outright. I know one or two families have received letters that the Justice Department is willing to return them.

Resegregation:

Kuratomi
(Kuratomi remarked that if the above matter were cleared up there would be peace in camp. Knowing that this is not the view of the resegregation pressure group, I now remarked that in my opinion, real order could not come without a separation of those who truly desired repatriation and the fence-sitters. I wanted to get his reaction, particularly since he had made no mention of resegregation and "status" so far. The minutes of meetings in my possession are full of impassioned speeches by him on these topics.)

When resegregation started out - all right. We had to have a clear status. Being that there were so many fence-sitters, the people who came in were forced into a position that looked queer to them at the time.

However, some of the people who are running the resegregation group (now) are more or less doing it for their own general benefit.

I predict that if you stay here six months longer you will see the resegregationists split up into at least three different groups. (I said I did not understand, but Kuratomi refused to elaborate.)

Kuratomi
November 4 Meeting of Daihyo Sha Kai:

(I asked Kuratomi to give me an account of what really happened at this meeting and what his intentions were at that time.)

Our main object was to elect our permanent committeemen. Previous to that we had had a meeting and it was suggested that capable persons from their respective blocks should be nominated from the block people for the seven or eight committees we were to have. This was still to be approved by the Administration and by the people.

At the same time, if any persons who were chosen were not capable, it would be entirely up to the liberty of the people to refuse them. If the people wanted some other committeemen, or wished to subtract a committee, this was also up to them.

At the same time, it was our sincere desire to resign because we were only a temporary group. After our resignation, what would take place after the body was recognized was up to them. The Administration and the people might have many suggestions. The entire body of the Daihyo Sha Kai intended to resign and be replaced.

That night, we were choosing the names of the permanent committee members from nominations that had been submitted by the residents of the blocks. We selected the names of people whom we thought would be capable.

Murakami, ~~XX~~ ^{Ma} ~~Ma~~ ~~oru~~ and Uno

Shigemitsu

That night we had a so-called committee to choose from the nomination lists. After the committee members had filled in the names, they asked the block representatives for their approval. The only thing left to do was to bring this up to the Administration for their approval. We also intended to have the mass meeting /scheduled for November 13/ and explain this to the people.

Yamatani continued his negotiations

The people signed two resolutions expressing their whole-hearted support of the block representatives and of the Negotiating Body.

After the Negotiating Committee was put on the spot and was hunted down by the Army, the remaining block representatives didn't feel they should elect any other body until the incident was satisfactorily closed. So they felt they shouldn't elect any committee to negotiate with the WRA and the Army and that was the greatest difficulty. So as a substitute they had the so-called, I believe it is translated Coordinating Committee, but that really isn't a proper name, on which were Yamatani, Yanakawa, and Kawamura. They made themselves clear that they would not negotiate except through the Negotiating Committee.

We could have kept on hiding. But we felt it was for the interest of the people to give ourselves up. The main reason we gave ourselves up, was that our first resolution (the petition of November 13) was vague and just stated that the people were supporting the Negotiating Committee. The second resolution (November 30) stated our position more clearly.

It was in that resolution that we stated that we wanted all the staff to resign.

(I asked respectfully, what the reason for this demand was.)

Reason for Asking Resignation of all WRA Personnel:

The reason we wanted all the staff here before November 1 to resign: the point is that the people were fed up with the Administration. They were more or less under the impression that WRA officials were under the influence of Mr. Best and had taken over Mr. Best's unfavorableness. If there were some clear thinking and decent minded persons, we thought that by this time some step would have been taken whereby the situation would have been cleared and the Negotiating Committee vindicated.

We were in hiding and these things were brought to us.

[I asked what role the Planning Board had played.]

The Planning Board:

That was a leftover of the pre-segregation days. It was like a city council. Instead of the block managers the planning board functioned in that capacity. The planning board was all Issei, since the council could only be Nisei. This body was in a sad state when we got here.¹

[I asked how they ACLU had been approached.]

Appeal to ACLU:

That was instituted by the people in the colony, especially by Mr. *Yokata* Okamoto. He suggested it.

All along we knew what the Administration was doing toward us was an invasion of our Constitutional rights. All our mail was censored. We could not initiate anything like that.

From the very beginning, I've maintained that anything we have done wasn't any too radical or against our constitutional rights. As Chairman of the Committee I conducted the job in a correct manner. And the job was difficult because the people didn't understand.

1. The Planning Board had served pre-segregation Tule Lake as a kind of Issei community council.