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C O P Y

WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division
WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
1231 Market Street
San Francisco, Cal.

Salt Lake City, April 7/42

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C1,03

Dear Milt: (*Eisenhower*)

The meeting was a huge success for you - It gives you the background necessary to support your position of "No infiltration or form settlement" - You can now devote your time to the resettlement centers.

This will save you many headaches and incidentally the dangers incident to the movement and re-settlement of small groups - I think it was fortunate that MAW popped off - You know about the old saying regarding "empty kettles" making loud noises - It was true today.

If there is anything I can do for you in Washington let me know at the Raleigh - I shall see the AG on (1) prevention of Japs securing title to land (2) pledge of return to present residence before admittance to resettlement centers. Personally I am against both - If they are citizens they have the right to buy and you should not force on them other alternatives - also to force evacuation and then return is not the American way.

Highest regards -

Tom Clark

P. S. Incidentally don't ever let the states handle it - or any part of it.

Regional Files, 002, Wash. D. C.
Miyamoto

1.03

Letter from Gov. Herbert B. Maw (Utah) to Eisenhower
April 8, 1942

At our meeting yesterday, I became so disturbed when you and Colonel Bendetsen stated that you intended to do nothing with the Japanese who have come into our state during the past month that I was perhaps too severe in my criticism of your policies when I spoke. If I said anything on that occasion which offended either you or Colonel Bendetsen, I sincerely apologise.

About a month ago Mr. Tom C. Clark came to my office and advised me that the federal government would assume the full responsibility of resettling the Japanese in Utah to adopt a hands-off policy. I informed Mr. Clark that just two days before then I had held a meeting with the county commissioners of each of the counties of the state and they had expressed a definite and unanimous feeling that Japanese should not be permitted to come into this state except under strict state or federal supervision. I furthermore told him that I was then in the process of setting up an organization to take charge of the Japanese resettlement problem in Utah. On receiving definite assurance from Mr. Clark that the federal government would take charge and that they would not only supervise the migration and settlement of Japanese in Utah, but that they would provide housing, maintenance, educational facilities and other benefits for those who came in, I expressed my willingness to cooperate fully with the government and to do nothing in the matter. In other words, I took you people at your word that you would supervise the resettlement of those people in this state. Placing full confidence in the integrity of Mr. Clark, I immediately wrote a letter to each of the county commissioners of the state and assured them that no Japanese would settle within their counties except under strict federal supervision and protection. Yesterday I learned that you had done nothing in the matter and that you intended to do nothing with the twelve or fifteen hundred Japanese who have come into Utah during the past month. Because I cannot make myself believe that you people who represent the United States government will not keep a solemn covenant that you made with me as Governor of the State of Utah, I am writing you this letter to ask if you will not furnish housing, supervision, education and maintenance for these Japanese as promised.

At the meeting in Salt Lake, I proposed that the states be permitted to supervise the distribution of Japanese from the government reception centers. I am quite sure that if federal officials can become converted to the thought that the administrators in the various states are better acquainted with the needs of their people and are better informed on where Japanese can render the best service than our federal employees, you will readily see that the state groups can take care of the matter faster and cheaper than you. Why don't you establish the policies and furnish the money for such a program and let us work out our own problems with respect to the Japanese resettlement within our borders?

I should appreciate hearing from you on this matter at your earliest convenience.

C O P Y

AIR MAIL

SPECIAL DELIVERY

April 9, 1942

Mr. Tom Clark
Raleigh Hotel
Washington, D. C.

Dear Tom:

Thanks a lot for the personal note you sent me from Denver. I shall be in Washington myself either on Sunday or Monday. I hope you and I can get together there.

In addition to the two questions you intend to take up with the Attorney General, I hope you will also discuss with him Senator Johnson's demand that those who have already voluntarily evacuated be taken back into the protective custody of the Federal Government. I sent Senator Johnson's letter with a covering note to the Attorney General.

With every good wish, I am

Sincerely yours,

M. S. Eisenhower
Director
War Relocation Authority

MSEisenhower:HC

Gov. of Utah
Letter from ~~Maw~~ to Eisenhower
April 13, 1942

103

Following the recent Salt Lake City meeting on the subject of the relocation of Japanese evacuees from the Pacific Coast Defense Zones, I have worked out the following suggestions bearing on this problem which seem to meet all the military necessities of the situation and at the same time give ample protection to the citizens of the several states involved. In submitting these recommendations I recognize that varying conditions exist in the several states, so have tried to eliminate all considerations of purely local nature. However, any general plan which may be adopted for the handling of this problem should include the following safeguards and provisions:

1. Either The Federal Government should assume the responsibility for handling the problem recently created by the voluntary movement of several thousand evacuees, whether aliens or citizens, under Public Proclamation No. 4, issued March 27, 1942, by General J. L. DeWitt, or turn the problem over to the various states with full authority to act and Federal funds with which to solve it. As the matter now stands, the States are keeping a "hands off" policy at the request of Mr. Tom Clark, Representing General DeWitt, after his assurance that the matter would be handled by the Federal Government.
2. If it becomes necessary to permit a future mass movement of other alien evacuees into Utah under military necessity, I request that the state government be fully notified of the event and be permitted to set up a proper system of public safeguards before, and not after, great damage has been done. If, in the event of a military crisis, such a course is not practicable, then the Federal Government should assumed all responsibility for the safekeeping and conduct of any or all such evacuees until they can be returned to their former places of residence.
3. I recognize the principle that all evacuees should not only be self-supporting, but, so far as possible, should also contribute to the production of agricultural or manufactured goods that are most needed to help win the war. I particularly recognize the services which many of these evacuees can perform in the handling of crops, including, especially, sugar beets, which are so badly needed under the Government's more "food for freedom" program.
4. I believe the State Governments are in a better position than the Federal Government to know what useful services these evacuees can best be put to. I also believe that any surveys to this end can be made more quickly and cheaply by the several states than by the Federal Government, and that recommendations to this effect should be left to the states, acting singly, or collectively, or in connection with the Federal Government.
5. I believe that the local supervision of the work and the conduct of evacuees should be handled by the several state governments but that all costs of special guards, supervisors, housing facilities or other expenses which must be incurred should be furnished to the states by the Federal Government.

Letter from Maw to Eisenhower, cont'd.

6. I recognize fully the pressing local needs for immediate assurance that adequate numbers of these evacuees will be available for agricultural work, especially in sugar beet areas, within the next few weeks, or even sooner, for beet blocking and thinning, and other ~~off~~ spring farm work, and I urge that every possible effort be made to meet these needs. If we fail to get assurance of needed labor now, there will surely result a reduced production of sugar beets this year either through failure of farmers to plant their maximum acreages or their subsequent failure to handle the crops properly.
7. I believe that CCC camps, where available in agricultural districts, or in areas which are not too close to forests or military objectives or vital war industries, should be provided wherever possible, along the lines suggested by Oregon's representative, Mr. George Aiken, at the recent conference, to permit the growers to do needed agricultural work in the planting, growing and harvesting season, and to perform off season work, such as soil conservation, that has heretofore been carried on by the Civilian Conservation Corps enrollees.
8. I believe the Federal Government and the War Department should, if possible, work out a legal and effective plan for the return of evacuees to their former states at the conclusion of the present emergency. Meantime, I pledge to our local citizens, my fullest possible assistance in creating in each locality involved, an educational program which should very largely minimize, if not completely eliminate, the sale or long-term leasing of any lands or property to Japanese evacuees. Locally appointed committees, receiving the full force of the influence of all agencies, Federal, state, county, municipal, and the local citizenry, can accomplish much to prevent, or minimize, the danger to local social and economic institutions which may otherwise be created by this mass evacuation program. As the governor of Utah, and reflecting the unmistakable sentiment of my constituents, I solemnly pledge my cooperation to prevent by these or any other legal means, the acquiring of any of the real property within this state by these alien or Japanese-American newcomers.
9. While recognizing the fact that many of our Japanese, whether recent evacuees or old residents of our communities, are, and will continue to be law-abiding, loyal American citizens, I believe that the several states and the Federal Government acting together, should devise a thorough-going program of supervision and registration of all alien Japanese or Japanese-Americans "for the duration", to supplement the work already being done by the Federal ~~off~~/Bureau of Investigation and the War Department. Funds for this work should also be furnished to the states by the Federal Government.
10. I recommend the carrying through of the program tentatively announced by Mr. Tom Clark, some weeks ago, that the War Relocation Authority provide funds for the erection of temporary structures to be located on privately-owned lands which may be leased by their owners to the Federal Government for the seasonal housing of one-family or multiple-family group evacuees, where local conditions and local sentiment justify such a procedure.
11. In addition to CCC camps which may be made available for the temporary housing of evacuees I suggest that other suitable State, County or Federal buildings which are not now being utilized,

Letter from Maw to Eisenhower, cont'd.

such as State Armories and transient labor camps, be made available for such temporary or seasonal use wherever local conditions and military approval permit. In all such cases, Federal funds should be provided to guard or supervise these structures and surrounding public or private property.

12. While recognizing the fact that all employable aliens living in the United States, as well as Americans ~~of~~ of foreign extraction, whether Japanese, Italian or German, should be made to work for their own support and for the production of needed civilian or defense goods, I recommend that work preference be given in every instance to American-white workers, so long as a single one of them remains unemployed in our communities, and is willing and able to perform the required service.

13. Wherever the already-proposed plans of the War Relocation Authority, as outlined April 8 by Colonel Bendetsen, Mr. Eisenhower, and Mr. Tom Clark, do not conflict with the local application of the basic principles of good self-government as contained in the foregoing suggestions, I can give approval and encouragement to their provisions, and will be glad to give my full support and cooperation to their administration, so far as our state funds and local responsibilities make it possible. Moreover, I realize that we are engaged in "total war" and we will be "good soldiers" and go along with any program that military necessity dictates, whether it meets with our local needs or not, though I believe best results will be accomplished when the military and civil authorities work together, with consideration being given to the place the states should hold in any plans which directly concern the present or future internal wellbeing of their citizens. Any other approach to these problems will tend to promote disunity and misunderstanding, which must not arise in these critical days when the very lives, both of our nation and our civilization, is at stake.

Recapitulation of letter from Maw to Eisenhower

1. Federal government should either assume full responsibility for handling Jap problem or give full authority to states, with funds to do the job.
2. In case of future mass movement of evacuees states should be notified in advance or else Federal Government should agree to take full charge and return evacuees to former place of residence.
3. Evacuees should not only be self-supporting but should contribute to defense production.
4. States in best position to determine what services evacuees should be put to.
5. Local supervision of work and conduct of Japs should be handled by states with funds provided by Federal government.
6. Evacuees needed immediately for agricultural work, if production is not to suffer.
7. CCC camps, under guard, should be made available for housing.
8. Evacuees should be returned to former residence after emergency; meantime legal and educational program should be worked out to prevent sale or long-leasing of lands.
9. State registration and supervision, with aid of Federal funds, should supplement that of Army and ~~Marine~~ FBI.
10. Federal-financed labor houses, as proposed by Tom Clark, should be built.
11. Suitable State and Federal buildings, including armories and transient labor camps should be provided, under federally-financed and state-directed guards.
12. Work preference should be given to American-white workers.
13. States will be good soldiers on any Federal plan needed to win the war, but best results will be obtained with full cooperation of Federal ~~and~~ and State governments.

Regional Files, 103, Wash. D. C.
Grodzins

C1.03

Letter from Olson to Eisenhower
April 13, 1942

This is my first opportunity to acknowledge receipt of your letter of April 3.

I regret that I was unable to attend the Salt Lake conference on the program of relocating evacuated Japanese-Americans. I have full confidence, however, in the program adopted, and my continued cooperation and assistance in any and all procedures in accordance with it may be depended upon.

I shall be glad to meet and confer with you personally at any time that may suit your convenience and mine, so as to go over the entire matter and have the benefit of your report as to the progress of the program.

(Prepared by John Bird and Ed Bates
(for MSE/ (Not actually delivered.))

Not for publication - Confidential

(Library at Salt Lake City)

Statement by M. S. Eisenhower, Director of the War Relocation Authority,
April 7, 1942

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The task that we are here to discuss today has no precedent in American history. Never before has the security of the Nation demanded that a large segment of the population of an area be uprooted overnight and be moved to new localities. Certainly, wartime migrations have happened elsewhere in the world - indeed, all over the world today such things are taking place, or have taken place. We in America have escaped such grim things in the past, but now we are face to face with this new problem. We have, it seems to me, little to gain from the experience of dislocations in other lands, under different conditions. We have to handle this problem, as best we can, in an American way.

I want to emphasize that point - THE AMERICAN WAY. The eyes of the world are watching us to see how we - as Americans - handle this problem the war has forced on us.

Our friends are watching us, and hoping that we will not make any slips that will weaken the cause of the United Nations.

Our enemies are watching us even more closely than our friends - they are watching and waiting for any opportunity to turn our mistakes to their profit. They would like nothing better than for us to supply the grist of hate to feed their propagandist mills, to start insidious tales on their way among the neutrals and the discontented peoples that are designed to weaken their faith in the United States as an outstanding symbol of Democracy. They would like nothing better than to whet their dangerous weapons of race hatred and intolerance at our expense. And, they are watching for pretexts - even the

slightest will serve their purpose - to take terrible, unspeakable revenge upon the unfortunate people, the men, women and children - among them many Americans - who have fallen into their hands.

In short, this whole migration imposes on all of us - on all Americans - a tremendously grave responsibility which calls for carefully considered plans and delicately weighed judgments. Hasty, ill-considered action could well cover our hands with the blood of unfortunates and bring down on us the censure of history.

Now before I talk of the general program we have in mind for relocating more than 100,000 Japanese-Americans and aliens from the West Coast combat zone, I want to emphasize two cardinal points:

1. The evacuation is a military operation in war time. It is not within the province of any of us to question the need for this action; that was determined in the light of military necessity by the commanding officer. The first essential is to carry out the evacuation orders as rapidly as possible, with safety, decency, and orderliness.

2. If people are to be evacuated, they must have some place to go and they must have work to do. The evacuees possess a wide range of professions, technical skills and abilities that are greatly needed in the war effort. Their productive capacity should not be allowed to go to waste at a time when the output of every worker counts for so much, when the man on the assembly line and the man with the hoe in the fields is just as important to our national security as the man in uniform. We cannot allow petty politics, racial prejudice and "business as usual" considerations to confuse or distort the problem and block the way. This is a military necessity.

If we are to find an adequate answer to the problem which here confronts us, we must first be aware of its size. The Bureau of the Census recorded 113,000 Japanese in 1940 in the states of California,

Oregon and Washington. That figure includes the alien Japanese and also American-born Japanese who are American citizens, but are also subject to evacuation orders if they live in military zones.

Our relocation problem may, therefore, be said to cover the whole range of human relationships of 113,000 people for whom new adaptations have to be made. That figure represents three-fourths as many people as lived in Salt Lake City when the 1940 census was taken. That figure -- 113,000 -- represents about half as many people as lived in the State of Wyoming at that time and somewhat more people than lived in Nevada. It represents the combined population of four important cities of this Intermountain region: Colorado Springs, Pocatello, Cheyenne and Tucson.

The War Relocation Authority was established by Executive Order of March 18, in which President Roosevelt gave this agency the specific responsibility for formulating and effectuating a program for the removal of certain persons or classes of people from military areas designated by the Secretary of War or an appropriate military commander, and for the relocation, maintenance and supervision of such persons.

The Authority was empowered to provide for the employment of evacuees at useful work on public projects, in industry, commerce or agriculture. It has the authority to prescribe the terms and conditions of public employment of evacuees and to safeguard the public interest in their private employment.

The order established within the Authority a War Relocation Corps, in which evacuees may enlist for the duration of the war. The Authority is to prescribe the terms and conditions of work to be performed by such Corps and the wages to be paid enlistees. In effect, evacuees who enlist accept a semi-military status and

are under the protection of the Federal government.

The Departments and agencies of the United States are generally directed to cooperate with and aid the Authority in carrying out its program. The Departments of War and Justice are specifically directed to provide such protective, police and investigational services as the Authority needs.

At the time the Authority was being established, evacuation of the West Coast areas had already started, and the Wartime Civil Control Administration, operating under the supervision of the Western Defense Command, already had started on the colossal task of establishing prohibited zones, and making arrangements for the removal of persons of Japanese ancestry from them. Government agencies were being called in to help in a coordinated way on the evacuation, which involves all of the complicated problems of suddenly cutting off and transplanting the normal business, economic, and social relationships of more than 100,000 persons. The Department of Justice, the Federal Security Agency, the Department of Agriculture, the Treasury, the Alien Property Custodian, and others all chipped in to help, and are still helping.

The Authority has been in existence for a matter of but three weeks and naturally our policies have not all come into sharp focus. However, we have formulated some general principles, and we do not know the general direction in which we are heading.

Our most important guiding principle is to do first things first. We cannot bog down a military operation.

And, the No. 1 priority is to handle the evacuation of military areas on a planned, orderly, protected basis. This is a national security measure and its place on the priority list is obvious.

Number 2 on the list is the protection and supervision of the relocation whole group of more than 100,000 that is being evacuated.

This means that we must devote our immediate time and our energies to the largest outlines of the problem. It is certain that a program of this scope cannot be handled satisfactorily on the basis of hundreds of individual requests for small relocation projects. We must put into operation, first, the large projects that will temporarily provide adequate protection for the whole group of evacuees.

No. 3 priority is the matter of useful work that contributes the most to the war effort. Priorities 1 and 2 - evacuation and large projects - dictate to a degree the type of work that the evacuees will be doing in the next several months at least. At the present time it appears that much of the labor of the evacuees should be devoted in easily supervised communities on large projects to direct production of articles or providing services needed by the military establishment. There are a number of needed manufactures utilizing simple equipment to which the experience and skills of the evacuees are particularly adapted. A few examples are cartridge belts, leather goods, camouflage nets, gloves, some boat and airplane parts. Reception centers could undertake several large contracts for such manufactures right now, if they were organized to do so, and they soon will be.

Also because of priorities 1 and 2 and 3, it appears that development of new lands on public projects for needed agricultural production will play an important part in employment opportunities. Here we can relocate large groups most quickly, and here, too, their protection and supervision will require the least drain on manpower of the military establishment. On such projects evacuees can first develop the production of crops needed for their subsistence and then may bring new land into production of crops for sale. For examples - although all factors must be carefully investigated, it is possible

that opportunities for the production of two greatly needed products - silk and guayule - may exist on some of these projects.

Frankly and sincerely, I say that private employment follows these priorities. It is No. 4 on our list. Voluntary evacuation has shown us the grave dangers that arise from infiltration of small groups into a country-side that is not prepared for them. We simply cannot move into private employment until we are absolutely sure it can be so handled without jeopardy to the national security.

When it first became necessary to evacuate military areas there was a prevailing notion that voluntary evacuation should be given a chance. The aliens among the group had been registered, and those whose previous connections and activities brought them under suspicion had been detained. All evidence gathered by competent investigators, indicated that most of the citizen-Japanese were loyal. True, there was evidence of a small borderline group - 2 or 3 percent - about whom there was some suspicion. However, these were known, and were being watched. Furthermore, all those leaving the military area were required to record their change of address. In view of these facts, it appeared that the best solution to the evacuation problem was to encourage the Japanese to wind up their affairs and for each individual or family to voluntarily leave the military area and relocate elsewhere.

However, voluntary evacuation did not work. It might have been successful, had there been time to inform the public thoroughly of the necessities involved, or to inform the evacuees of where best economic opportunities existed. But there was not time, and we all know what happened when a thin trickle of Japanese began moving out of the military zone into the outlying states. It was a thin trickle; only about 3,200 left the zone, according to our information.

Voluntary migration did not work for several reasons:

For one thing, it was impossible in the short time involved, to prepare people in outside areas for the appearance of evacuees among them. Consequently, when small groups of evacuees began to look for opportunities to settle in outlying states, they were met in many cases with suspicion and violent opposition. People did not understand that Japanese-Americans had been encouraged by the Army to leave the military zone; in numerous instances it was supposed by local officials and people that evacuees were escaping military zones.

Then, there was a wide-spread impression that all persons of Japanese ancestry were regarded by the Federal government as dangerous. I assure you that such is not the case as I have indicated. In fact, the F.B.I., the Army and Navy Intelligence are maintaining close surveillance of the dangerous persons among the Japanese just the same as they are watching all persons who might seek to imperil the national security, regardless of antecedents. There was, and still is a prevalent notion that most of the evacuees are aliens. Again this is far from the truth. Two thirds of them are American-born citizens. All but a small group of these have been educated in the United States and have every reason to be loyal to this Nation.

Although I have no desire to dwell on the more unpleasant phases of this situation, we have to be realistic if we are going to get this job done. And it is a plain fact that many unscrupulous promotions and grafts were being aimed against the evacuees - some of them perpetrated by their own people. As a Nisei leader said: "We have our quota of skunks among our own people." That is, I believe, a fair name for anyone who seeks to victimize a group of people who are caught in an unfortunate situation, and who are unable to pro-

tect themselves. Some of the oldest land promotions and other "deals" in the confidence man's portfolio were brought out, polished up, and attempts were made to foist them on evacuees.

And in this connection, I may add parenthetically that these deals will be looked into, and some of the unscrupulous promoters who took the last few dollars and possessions of desperate families may find themselves involuntarily evacuated to places less pleasant than reception centers.

Also, of course, some poor but honest deals were being made, largely because of lack of time and information. Some of the evacuees, used to very favorable land and water conditions were buying lands and seeking to set up new communities under totally different and basically unsuitable conditions, simply because they did not have good information. Such communities, with too many people on too little or unproductive land, would not contribute to the welfare of the nation nor of the communities themselves, but would simply become liabilities. Such relocation has long been against public policy.

Then there was the private employment problem. Many fair and sound opportunities for useful employment of the evacuees were offered. At the same time, some employers saw in the situation a chance to import a new labor supply to break the local labor market and to depress the wage scale of the whole community. Because of the very real danger that the labor or evacuees might be mis-used instead of constructively used, it has become necessary for us to hold the whole scope of private employment at arm's length until we can separate out the really constructive opportunities and can make careful overall policies on wages and conditions of employment.

And finally, there was the problem of protection of the evacuees themselves. In a situation in which one or two untoward incidents could jeopardize the interests of the whole group of evacuees, we cannot afford to take the slightest chance. The Federal Government, having evacuated these people, has a very direct concern with their safety, and incidents which occurred made it absolutely clear that their safety could not be assured so long as they were on their own, at least not until the real facts regarding the evacuation could be impressed on people generally, and certain baseless fears could be explained away. We had actual instances in which responsible employers made offers of work for several hundred evacuees. Such offers were made in good faith, but there was no certainty that such arrangements would be accepted by the whole community.