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~~UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE~~
Bureau of Agricultural Economics

FARMERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE USE OF JAPANESE EVACUEES
AS FARM LABOR

Part I: Sugar Beet and
Long Staple Cotton Regions

RESTRICTED

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FARMERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD THE USE OF
JAPANESE EVACUEES AS FARM LABOR

Summary

Farmers' willingness to accept the Japanese evacuees as farm labor showed marked variation from one locality to another. In Yellowstone County, Montana, for example, only one out of fifteen sugar beet growers contacted completely rejected the use of evacuee labor for the coming year, whereas in Big Horn County, Wyoming, in the same crop region, two-thirds of the respondents rejected the Japanese.* In the long staple cotton counties sampled, uniformly high proportions of growers expressed hostility toward the use of evacuee labor.

In general, farmers in counties where the Japanese were actually used as farm labor during the past year showed a greater tendency to accept them for next season than did those in counties where they were not used. Areas where evacuees were used happened to correspond with crop regions, Japanese having been employed in the sugar beet region but not in the cotton producing counties sampled.

No direct relationship between farmers' sense of concern about a prospective labor shortage and their willingness to accept the use of evacuee labor was found.

In the beet areas, farmers' opinions of the evacuees were expressed primarily in terms of their efficiency or inefficiency as farm labor. In the cotton areas, racial and national antagonisms aroused by the war were the predominating reasons given for the rejection of evacuee help. Perhaps the tendency for beet growers to think in pragmatic terms is associated with the fact that they have had many

* "Japanese" as used throughout this study refers to both Nisei and Issei members of the relocation centers. There was rarely any distinction made by farmers between citizens and aliens in their discussions of the suitability of the evacuees as farm labor. For this reason, and for convenience, "Japanese" will be used as a shorthand term to refer to all members of the group, although it is recognized that the greater portion of the persons referred to are citizens and therefore properly called "Americans".

years of experience with several kinds of so-called foreign labor (Mexicans, Indians, Filipinos, Russian-Germans, and Japanese) and may have come to realize that their value to the farmer must be reckoned on the basis of individual efficiency rather than race.

Special local factors had a great effect on attitudes from county to county, wherever the evacuees were used. In Broadwater County, Montana, for example, beet growers' attitudes toward the evacuees were strongly affected by the fact that several construction workers from this locality had been captured by Japanese military forces at Wake Island.

The manner in which evacuees adjusted to rigorous conditions of work and life as seasonal farm workers had important influences on their reception by employers. This was revealed in a catalog of characteristics which farmers found objectionable in the Japanese, apart from characteristics conventionally assigned to them as a racial group. Respondents objected to their exceptional demands for housing facilities, refusal to work longer than eight hours a day or to work in stormy weather, and lack of interest in getting crops harvested early. These were sources of conflict which might normally be expected to arise when a predominantly urban group is suddenly placed under conditions of life much more severe than those to which it has been accustomed. On the other hand, farmers supplied with evacuees of previous farm background commented on their diligence and cooperation.

Fear of economic competition from the evacuees if they were permitted to enter the community was hardly mentioned as a reason for rejecting them. Fear of retaliatory action in connection with the war, such as sabotage or violence, likewise was mentioned only rarely. It is possible that these were rationalized in the form of other, more "respectable" reasons, but they were probably not immediate concerns of the respondents.

Few farmers among those willing to accept the evacuees as seasonal labor favored their permanent residence in the community. The fact that seasonal labor areas were studied rendered the question of permanent residence less applicable than it would have been in regions where year-round employment of farm help is customary.

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Introduction

The objective of this study is to discover what administrative steps may be taken: (1) to further the utilization of the agricultural manpower contained within the relocation centers of the War Relocation Authority, and (2) at the same time to assist the permanent integration into American community life of the people of Japanese extraction who have been displaced from their homes.

The study was conducted among farmers of the western sugar beet and long staple cotton producing areas, where demands for seasonal farm labor were exceptionally heavy this past year. Japanese and Japanese-American evacuees from the relocation centers were employed in several of these areas, and farmers had an opportunity to observe their work at close hand. This report describes how farmers in these areas feel about using the evacuees again next year, and, by way of comparison, how other farmers who have had no direct experience with the evacuees feel about their possible use. Barriers to the full acceptance of the Japanese are discussed, together with influences which seem to facilitate their acceptance. These factors have implications for an effective placement policy which are suggested in a final section of the report.

Source of the Data

The study is drawn from a general survey of the farm labor situation conducted during the months of November and December, 1942, in several important national crop regions. The purpose of the general survey was to investigate various problems arising in connection with a decreasing farm labor supply at a time when expanded crop production is being undertaken. In the course of this survey, an attempt was made to learn how farmers feel about using Japanese evacuee workers as a possible way of offsetting the farm labor shortage. This portion of the survey provides the material for the present study. The report is based upon 109 interviews representing cross-sections of sugar beet growers in Weld County, Colorado; Big Horn County, Wyoming; Broadwater and Yellowstone Counties, Montana; and long staple cotton growers in Maricopa County, Arizona; Dona Ana County, New Mexico; and El Paso County, Texas. Supplementary information was obtained in special interviews with agricultural officials and representatives of sugar beet companies in the sampled counties.

It was originally planned to tabulate the responses by crop regions, but local variations by counties are so significant that it seemed desirable to analyze the material in such a way as to give meaning to

these variations. Although the frequencies cited may therefore appear small, it should be borne in mind that the populations they represent are also relatively small. In one county the sampled respondents represent as much as 38 percent of the relevant population (sugar beet growers). Moreover, the counties studied have each a high degree of cultural homogeneity within themselves, and this circumstance lends additional assurance that the responses recorded are representative. These factors render the data highly suggestive, if not conclusive, and appear to justify a careful consideration of the local influences which are described.

FARMERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD THE USE OF JAPANESE EVACUEES AS FARM LABOR

I. HOW FARMERS FEEL TOWARD THE USE OF EVACUEE LABOR

Striking differences from one locality to another in the willingness of farmers to accept the Japanese and Japanese-American evacuees as seasonal farm labor were uncovered by the survey. The range of differences by counties is illustrated in the chart on page 2 (figures are taken from Table 1*).

The differences could not be explained in terms of the relative concern felt by farmers regarding their prospective labor supply for next year, as will be demonstrated below. A consideration of local and regional factors is therefore necessary to show why farmers in one area predominantly accepted the proposed use of evacuee labor and in others rejected it.

Regional Differences in Acceptance


The three counties showing uniformly low acceptance of the evacuees fall into a single crop region - southwestern long staple cotton. No evacuees were actually employed as farm labor in these counties in 1942 as far as farmers contacted knew, but several Maricopa County cotton growers had heard about their use in adjoining Pinal County, which contains the Gila River Relocation Center.

The four sugar beet counties in the sample show a wide variation in the willingness of farmers to accept evacuee labor, but all of them show higher proportions of respondents willing to accept the evacuees than any of the cotton counties. Some evacuees were used as beet labor last fall in each of the four beet-growing counties sampled.

In general, then, farmers in counties having actual experience with evacuee labor expressed a greater tendency to accept them for the next crop year than did those in counties where they were not used. However, since the division of the seven counties into two groups happens to coincide with difference in crop regions, it would not be entirely safe to conclude that actual experience with evacuees promotes their acceptance by farmers. Differences in farming practices or other variables between the two regions may enter as unpredictable factors. It would have been valuable to have access to the results of a similar survey conducted before the evacuees were introduced into the beet areas, in order to determine with certainty to what extent employers' attitudes were changed as a result of having used the Japanese. Additional reference will be made to the possibility of such a change having taken place, in connection with the discussion of reasons given by farmers for their attitudes.

* All tables are in the Appendix

Chart 1. Percentage of Respondents in Each County Indicating Acceptance of Evacuees as Farm Labor



This study will try to account for the marked differences in extent of acceptance of the Japanese noted among the four counties in the sugar beet region. This is a rather homogeneous crop region, characterized by intensive cultivation of the irrigated valley areas lying along the upper reaches of the Missouri, Yellowstone, Big Horn, and South Platte rivers. Complementary feeding of livestock is carried on, principally in the winter months. Hand labor is chiefly required in the cultivation and especially the harvesting of beets. The transient Mexican population which has in recent years been the main source of this labor proved inadequate during the past year. During the critical harvest period evacuee labor from the relocation centers was introduced into all of the beet counties sampled, with resultant reactions of considerable diversity. Expressed alternatively, the proportion of farmers who rejected the use of evacuee help for next year ranges from 6 percent in Yellowstone County, Montana, to 68 percent in Big Horn County, Wyoming. Broadwater County, Montana, shows almost as high a proportion of farmers rejecting the evacuees as Big Horn County. Weld County, Colorado, is intermediate, with 41 percent rejecting evacuee labor.

Relation of Anxiety About Labor to Acceptance of Evacuees

It might have been expected that farmers who seemed most anxious about labor scarcities next year would be most ready to receive help from the nearby evacuee camps. This relationship did not appear. Chart 2 on the following page compares the proportion of respondents who appeared seriously concerned about a prospective labor shortage with the proportion who would accept evacuee workers (figures are taken from Tables 1 and 2).


Broadwater County, with almost all farmers seriously concerned about a shortage of labor, shows low acceptance of the Japanese. Yellowstone and Big Horn Counties, with equal degrees of concern, differ widely in acceptance. Weld County, with relatively little concern, shows moderately high acceptance.

From this comparison it appears that other factors will have to be considered in order to explain the marked differences in the extent of willingness to accept the evacuees. These are brought out in the reasons farmers gave for their opinions, which will be discussed in the second section of this report.

Acceptance as Permanent Residents

Few respondents among those who had expressed acceptance of the evacuees as seasonal labor favored their permanent residence in the

Chart 2. Relation of Serious Concern about Labor Supply to
Acceptance of Japanese



Percentage of farmers rated as seriously concerned about prospective labor shortage.



Percentage of farmers indicating willingness (qualified or unqualified) to accept Japanese as farm labor.

community. A variety of reasons was given, but the total number of cases is too small to reveal a significantly recurrent one, since attitudes were sought on the question of permanent residence only in cases where acceptance as seasonal labor had already been indicated. A few farmers feared economic competition after the war if the Japanese remained in the community, and others simply saw no reason for the evacuees to stay, since farm labor requirements in these areas are largely seasonal. Farmers tend to prefer transient labor which makes an appearance during the hoeing and harvesting seasons and goes elsewhere during the off seasons. This saves rural communities responsibility for the employment and support of seasonal workers except during the times when they are urgently needed.

The county which showed most acceptance of the evacuees as permanent residents (Weld County, Colorado) has had a number of resident Japanese truck growers operating in one section of the county for a period of years. The agricultural agent for this county reported that several of the evacuees who worked in the beet fields this past fall remained with local farmers to take share crops in beets for the coming year. He felt this would work out all right, since the earlier Japanese settlers had, in his opinion, made good, substantial farmers.

II. FACTORS AFFECTING ATTITUDES TOWARD THE EVACUEES


In discussing the evacuees, farmers generally spoke in one of two important frames of reference, and the preponderance of either of them varied considerably from one area to another. In two of the beet counties (Yellowstone and Big Horn) opinions of the evacuees were expressed almost exclusively in terms of their efficiency or inefficiency as farm labor. National and racial antipathies were mentioned so rarely that they seemed to play little part in determining attitudes. In the remaining two beet counties, national and racial considerations were referred to more frequently and no doubt occupied an important place in the farmers' feelings, but the labor-efficiency frame of reference was still the predominant one.

Racial-national Antagonism

In contrast, greater percentages of farmers in the southwestern cotton counties gave their opinions of the evacuees in terms of racial and national antagonisms aroused by the war. In two of the counties this frame of reference seemed to be the predominant one. In the remaining one it was at least as important in frequency of mention as was the consideration of the evacuees as efficient or inefficient labor. This is illustrated in the chart (from Table 3) on the following page.

It is interesting to consider these findings in connection with the previous suggestion that there may be a relationship between acceptance of the evacuee workers and actual experience with them. The areas where the evacuees received least acceptance correspond generally with those where racial and nationalistic considerations were most often mentioned by farmers in rejecting them. These are also the areas where farmers had had no direct experience with evacuee help. It is possible that similar anti-Japanese attitudes were prevalent in the beet areas before the evacuees were introduced, and that these attitudes were modified by actual experience with them as workers. However, a factor of possible importance in accounting for the greater tendency of farmers in the beet areas to think of the evacuees in pragmatic terms is the fact that they have had many years of experience with a variety of types of so-called foreign labor. The transient workers whom they have used in the beet fields have at various times been Russian-Germans (from the Dakotas), Indians, Filipinos, Mexicans, and Japanese (earlier migrants). It is probable that agricultural employers

Chart 3. Percentages of Farmers Regarding Evacuees in Terms of Labor-Efficiency or of Racial-National Background



Frames of reference



Labor-Efficiency



Racial-National Background



Other

have grown accustomed to the utilization of whatever labor is at hand during the busy harvest time and do not raise too many questions about race or nationality so long as the work is done. On the other hand, the cotton areas of the Southwest customarily depend for their seasonal labor on native whites, Spanish-Americans, and Mexicans from their own states, Oklahoma, Texas, and Mexico. The study revealed that these farmers had their attention focused on Mexico as a potential source of cheap labor and were not greatly interested in the possibility of using the Japanese.

Respondents were often extreme in their expressions of dislike of the evacuees because of their nationality. One El Paso County farmer put his opinion this way:

"I wouldn't have a God damn Jap on my place. I might kill him."

A Maricopa County grower said with less vehemence:

"I don't want any Jap because I just plain don't like them. They have tried using some of them down in Pinal County where they have a colony, and I heard they could not get any work out of them. I would not want to see them brought in here to work because there might be trouble. They had trouble in one of the camps down there in Pinal County just the other day. They are truck farmers and I don't believe they would be much good just working on cotton farms."

Undoubtedly one of the factors which contributed to this type of attitude was the unusual arrangement under which evacuees worked in the Pinal County cotton fields. Several growers had heard that the evacuees were heavily guarded as they worked and mentioned the need for guards as a prohibitive reason against using evacuee labor. A Maricopa County farmer who was rather favorably inclined toward their use made this comment:

"If I had the right bunch (of evacuees), it would be all right. They tried to use those at Sacaton, but they weren't farm laborers and it didn't work. The ones they put out had never done farm work. Another thing that made it bad was the guards. They had five soldiers for every Japanese."

Another grower in this county said he had heard that the guards could have picked more cotton than the evacuees! Objection to the guards was echoed in El Paso County, where a smaller grower said:

"They would be all right on the large farms where they could keep a bunch and watch them easy. I don't think it would work on the small farms."

Similar feelings were expressed in Dona Ana County, New Mexico. A rather liberal-minded bank president at Hatch who operates a 154-acre farm summed up the community attitude in this way:

"Some farmers through here would resent using Japanese during the war; I do not feel badly toward the Japs and I dislike the way some of them were treated in California. By God, they are damn good farmers -- a hell of a lot better at it than we Americans -- and they might be good at farm work here, but I do not think it would be wise to bring them in because some farmers feel badly toward them and I feel sure we would eventually have trouble if they were brought here."

There were occasional expressions of sympathy. A Czech woman who manages a 75-acre farm with the aid of two sons still in high school said:

"I don't see what is wrong with them. They might be good people. They have done nothing wrong. Understand, I speak for me and not for others. They are as innocent as anyone; they are not responsible that their old country is at war. This is their home, too. I can sympathize with them because I come from the old country. I can put myself in their place."

Certain misconceptions of the evacuees based on lack of actual acquaintance with them were occasionally disclosed. They were sometimes referred to as "prisoners", and one El Paso man evidently thought that they were unable to speak English.

"The Mexico Mexicans appeal to me more. They are close, just across the river, and trained in our type of work. There is irrigated farming over below Juarez, and they know how it is done. And we can speak their language. I can jabber it enough to let them know what I mean, but we can't speak the language of the Japanese."

The Labor-Efficiency Frame of Reference

The types of responses which have been cited as representative of the southwest cotton areas may be contrasted with the following ones taken from beet county interviews.

A young Yellowstone County farmer:

"It looked might bad this fall, until the Japs helped us out. They worked pretty nice. They do nicer work than the Mexicans and Filipinos. They wasn't experts at it, but after they got started they done nice work. Some stayed on permanent, feeding cattle. The Mexicans and Filipinos wouldn't do that. Soon as the beets are out, they pick up and go."

A Big Horn farmer with a large beet acreage:

"The (evacuee) labor was very unsatisfactory, and if we have to employ them for another year we will simply have to reduce our beet acreage by at least 50 percent or more. It takes about four Japanese to take the place of one Mexican. The evacuees we obtained in this valley had no previous farm experience. They were clerks and professional people from coast cities, most of them young single men."

Another Yellowstone man:

"There were Mexicans and Japanese people sent in here to help in the beet work. We did not grow any beets, so didn't employ any. I understand the Japanese were generally satisfactory. We would just as soon employ Japanese labor. The Japanese laborers are not to blame for the war. That was started by the ruling class."

From these quotations it is possible to see that the terms in which these farmers thought of the evacuees were quite different from those represented by the quotations from interviews taken in the Southwest. This was true even in cases where employers were very dissatisfied with the help they had received, as the Big Horn farmer's statement indicates. Two-thirds of the respondents in Big Horn County rejected the Japanese for next year, but only one-fifth of them mentioned nationalistic or racial antipathy toward them. Usually they were concerned primarily about the inefficiency and excessive cost of the evacuees as a labor force.

While farmers in the sugar beet area tended to explain their acceptance or rejection of the evacuees in labor-efficiency terms, in one of the beet counties an appreciable number of respondents were influenced by racial-national considerations. This was Broadwater County, Montana, where antipathy engendered by the war was traceable to local circumstances which will be discussed in another section of the report dealing with local factors affecting attitudes.

In general it appeared that in the southwest cotton areas the most important consideration in farmers' minds was the racial or nationality background of the evacuees; in the mountain beet areas, their labor efficiency. The implications of this finding for public policy are discussed in the final section of the report.

The Specific Reasons for Acceptance or Rejection

The frequencies of various considerations which entered into farmers' explanations of their attitudes are shown in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 lists considerations favorable to the use of the evacuees, and Table 5 those unfavorable. It is possible for a respondent to be represented on both tables, and even within seemingly contradictory categories, if he gave a qualified opinion of the evacuees. For example, several farmers objected to the inefficiency of some of the evacuees whom they had observed, but declared they would be glad to have the help of some of the more experienced ones. It seemed important to note both considerations, since the dominant reason for acceptance and a significant qualification are at once revealed.

The predominating reasons given by respondents for their opinions have already been suggested by the discussion of the frames of reference in which they tended to speak. Most important to the farmers were the relative efficiency or inefficiency of the evacuees and their own racial-national prejudices. Secondary considerations played an important role in some instances, however. Some farmers thought that evacuee labor was unduly expensive because of special treatment which had to be accorded them in the form of unusual housing and transportation facilities. Many objected to the attitude of the evacuees themselves, which grew mainly out of differences in cultural backgrounds. In listing objections to the evacuees within the category of "undesirable characteristics", a careful attempt was made to exclude attributes which are frequently assigned to the Japanese merely as a result of racial or national antipathy. "Sneakiness", treacherousness, and similar traits when mentioned were included under "national-racial dislike". The result was to confine complaints listed under "undesirable characteristics" mainly to objections to the unwillingness of some of the evacuees to work more than eight hours a day or in bad weather, their unusual demands for housing and sanitary facilities, and their lack of interest in getting the crops harvested early. It will be seen that these objections in common express a conflict

between rural and urban attitudes held respectively by the farm operators and some of their evacuee employees. An examination of the reasons for unfavorable attitudes toward the evacuees listed in this category thus will focus attention on some of the adjustments necessary for satisfactory relations between agricultural employers and evacuees with urban backgrounds.

Fear of economic competition was also tabulated but was not noted a significant number of times. Fear of retaliatory action in connection with the war, such as sabotage or personal violence, was mentioned, but not often enough to justify listing for frequencies.

A negative reason given by some for willingness to accept the evacuees was that there was no other labor available. Respondents giving this reason usually were seriously concerned about a labor shortage but declared they would take the evacuees only as a last resort.

Offsetting to some extent the undesirable characteristics ascribed to some of the evacuees were favorable ones, such as diligence, appreciativeness, and cooperativeness. The greater education and versatility of some of the younger evacuees were also mentioned occasionally as enabling them to be trained quickly to operate power equipment. A few respondents recognized the evacuees as a benefit to the local business community, since many of them spent a good part of their earnings locally.

It is possibly of great significance that a few of the respondents spoke of the evacuees in very sympathetic terms. Although small in number, these people seemed willing to assign to the evacuees social status comparable with their own. They described the evacuees as "nice, clean, hard-working people", and one fairly successful farmer went so far as to say that he would be glad to have one of the evacuees stay in his home while working as a hired hand on his farm. It seems likely that such sympathies developed in the course of primary contacts will help to dissolve racial and cultural antipathies. Consequently their early appearance, even in only a few cases, may be highly noteworthy.

The Effect of Special Local Situations

A comparison of the percentage distributions shown in Tables 4 and 5 emphasizes community differences in the reception of the

evacuees during the past fall, as well as the importance of local situations in shaping public attitudes. It will be valuable to consider these differences specifically by localities.

Yellowstone and Big Horn Counties

Two of the sugar beet producing areas of Montana and Wyoming located near the Heart Mountain Relocation Center in northwestern Wyoming apparently had very different experiences with harvest labor from the camp. In Yellowstone County, only 6 percent of the respondents rejected the use of evacuees for next year, but in Big Horn, 68 percent indicated rejection. This difference seems attributable to the unusual difficulty which Big Horn farmers had in making arrangements to obtain satisfactory evacuee labor. A field agent for the local sugar factory described the situation in this way:

"The Japs didn't work out so well. We got about 120 of them from Heart Mountain, and we were two weeks late getting the Governor's approval. There was only one good family in the bunch. The rest were boys who acted like a bunch of kids. They wouldn't think of staying on the farms. Said they didn't like the living accommodations there. They wanted baths and to eat in restaurants. So we had to fix them up with places in town. We rented the second-best hotel for about 50 of them and put the others in tourist camps and private homes. They insisted on a tub or shower. They wouldn't work but an eight-hour day, with Saturday afternoon and Sunday off. The farmers had to haul them back and forth from town to the fields every day, and they made them haul them back to camp on week-ends so they could see their friends. They wanted to go to the movies and be in town where they could buy things. They didn't care about money - they just wanted to be out of the camp. After a farmer had gotten up at six in the morning to drive in after them, they would hang around the hotel lobby until nine before they would go out. They wouldn't work at all in wet weather, and they laughed at the Mexicans for working so hard. They couldn't see any sense in that. The Mexicans would harvest eight or ten tons of beets in a day, and the Japs two or three. (Of course they were soft. They had been in camp for four months, doing nothing.) But then they would complain because they didn't make as much money as the Mexicans did. Most of them quit early, before the beets were all in, because they weren't making more than their board and on account of a storm that came up about that time.

"We treated them just as nice as we could, because we had to have them. But along toward the end they took advantage of their nice treatment. After they got back to camp they would

call in here by long distance every day to ask about their checks. Some of them got pretty nasty about it, and it got so we wouldn't accept a call from the camp. I know for a fact that most of them have got their money. But they won't surrender their passes to get out of the camp, and they are using the story that they haven't been paid as an excuse to hold onto those passes. We had a field agent up there at the camp, but they came in and out so much that he lost track, and now lots of them have passes that aren't supposed to have them. I believe they are being babied too much in that camp. We had a letter from the camp chastising the company for not paying off the Japs, but I know there are just a few that haven't been paid. They just don't want to surrender those passes. The other day a couple of us were down town and we ran into a bunch of the boys from camp. They hollered at us like old friends and said they wanted to talk to us. They wouldn't talk to us except in private, so we had to go up to their hotel room with them. Then they tried to make a deal so that we would haul them back and forth from camp on week-ends. They tried to get us to come up and get them, saying we needed them to work. They don't like to stay in the camp -- that's clear. They are getting to be like a bunch of WPA'ers. Expect everything and do nothing.

"The farmers won't use the Japs for labor next year, unless they have some better arrangement. It costs too much for them to haul them from town, especially for a short day."

This is the sort of criticism which also came out fairly consistently in the farm interviews. The manager of the sugar beet factory was not quite so critical. He said he realized that most of the evacuees had probably never done that sort of work before, and expressed the hope that by next year they would make better labor because of their experience this year. But he, too, asserted that more satisfactory housing and transportation arrangements would have to be made next year, or farmers would refuse to employ the evacuees.

In Yellowstone County the story was almost totally different. Since farmers in this area were able to obtain evacuees about two weeks earlier than the Big Horn growers, they probably secured a greater number of workers with previous farm experience, who were therefore more willing to accept the requirements of long hours of arduous work and primitive living conditions imposed by the customary arrangements for seasonal farm labor. Many of the farmers contacted were quite enthusiastic about their success with the use of evacuee labor. One Yellowstone man said:

"The Japanese is the best. With gas rationing there won't be no Mexicans or Filipinos coming in the spring. They all got their own cars. The sugar company can bring the Japs in (in a group). Some of them was farmers before, and I don't see why they shouldn't be encouraged to stay around and do anything they can. My neighbor has two of them staying on, and he says they are the handiest men he ever had. They never made no trouble. They went to town, spent their money, went to the movies, and everything. I was a little worried at first, but they didn't bother anything. I don't think they let the mean ones out of the camps, and the rest is all right."

Those who criticized the evacuees in this county, although not nearly so proportionately numerous as the respondents in Big Horn County, voiced the same sorts of complaints. They objected that some of the evacuees expected better living accommodations than Mexicans would be satisfied with. They demanded shower baths and other conveniences that farmers themselves did not have. Moreover, they would not work in fields which were very muddy or which had a low yield, apparently feeling that they were in a position of choice as to where and under what conditions they would work. Sometimes they did not complete their work on one farm before moving on to another where the yield was better. The county agent himself made this complaint about one group, although he said that in general the Japanese workers were very satisfactory and a real help in getting the crop out. A few of the critics were resentful of the fact that some of the Japanese boys had college educations and seemed disappointed if they did not make \$6 or \$7 a day, even though they would not get to the fields until eight or nine o'clock in the morning and would quit at five. They compared the evacuees to the WPA'ers, saying that they took the attitude, "Why should I do hard work when the Government will feed me at 'Little Tokyo' (locally popular name for Heart Mountain Relocation Center) and allow me to loaf." These farmers felt that they could not depend on the Japanese to return in the spring, since their work was entirely voluntary. A few expressed the fear of economic competition with the Japanese after the war if they were allowed to settle permanently in the Yellowstone Valley. An AAA committeeman remarked, "If we permit them to settle here we'll have the situation where I'll be trying to raise beets and eat beefsteak on one side of the fence, and they'll be eating rice on the other. You know we can't compete with that. I have a brother who had experience with them growing potatoes in California. He says they never want them back there again." His statement was not typical, but may have exceptional importance because of his influence among farmers in the county.

The great number of farmers who accepted the evacuees said that they were inexperienced in beet work but became good workers as soon as they acquired a little skill. They were described as careful, conscientious, and more dependable than the Mexicans. Respondents who took this point of view generally went on to say that the Japanese were well behaved, caused no trouble in the community, spent their money locally, and didn't try to run away or evade minor restrictions placed upon them. These farmers seemed to appreciate greatly the coming of the evacuees at a time when labor was scarce and much needed.

In Big Horn County the general disapproval of the evacuees was undoubtedly colored by events connected with the construction of the Heart Mountain Relocation Center in the adjoining county. (The center was invariably designated simply as "Tokyo" by the farmers in Big Horn County, to whom the term apparently had much more unfavorable connotations than the corresponding expression, "Little Tokyo", used humorously by the farmers of Yellowstone County.) One-half the respondents in Big Horn County spontaneously charged the Heart Mountain project with having taken away the greater portion of the regular Mexican beet help to do manual labor and construction work during the erection of the camp. This resulted in wage competition which farmers could not meet. Mexican workers failed to return to the beets in the fall, and growers considered themselves forced to take unskilled, unduly expensive Japanese help instead. A larger operator expressed his complaint this way:

"I'm not going to have no more Japs on my place. They are too expensive and they are not dependable. They've got to have a steam-heated room and a modern house. We had to put them up at a hotel in town and haul them back and forth. It cost 39 cents a ton for housing them alone. It wouldn't have been so bad if they had worked. Then we could have spread the cost over more tonnage. But there are too many loafers among them. They just wanted to get out of the camp. They acted like kids. I had a Mexican family, but they didn't come back. The sugar company thought they would do a nice thing and let them work at Tokyo, but they just made enough money so they could go back to Texas, and then we didn't see them any more."

The complaint that the evacuees had no interest in making sure that beets were out of the ground by the time the ground became frozen and that "they just wanted to get out of the camp", was reiterated by one-fifth of the respondents in this county.

A basic conflict between the farmers and evacuees which these comments reveal is a clash of habit patterns formed respectively in rural and urban environments. Since a good many of the evacuees came from urban or urbanized areas where an eight-hour day and modern sanitary and heating facilities are more customary than they are in seasonal farm work, their attitudes might have been expected to conflict with those of the rural community. It is important to realize that such a clash would be likely to occur when any predominantly urban* group is suddenly transplanted to the rigorous conditions of life and work as seasonal farm labor. The fact that the evacuees felt under constraint while confined to the relocation centers merely contributed to their difficulty in making adjustments to their new environment.

Broadwater County

Broadwater County, Montana, situated at the source of the Missouri River, is part of the mountain sugar beet region but has a few characteristics which distinguish it from the other beet producing counties studied. It was developed rather early as an irrigation district but did not begin to produce sugar beets until 1930. Average beet acreages per farm run much higher than in other beet counties. There were only 39 growers in the county last year, so that the number of farmers contacted by the survey represents nearly two-fifths of the beet growers in the county.

Two-thirds of the respondents rejected the use of the evacuees in Broadwater County. There seem to have been two strongly influencing factors of a local nature. Several farmers complained that the evacuees had struck for higher wages, and others based their objections on the fact that six construction workers from this locality had been captured by the Japanese military forces at Wake Island. They resented having the evacuees set at liberty while Broadwater County men were confined to Japanese prison camps.

Discussing his labor situation this past year, one Broadwater County beet grower said:

"Italian internees from the camp at Missoula did pretty well. Some said the Japanese did good work. I don't want them. Too

* Approximately 40 percent of the evacuees in the relocation centers are classified by the War Relocation Authority as of rural background and 60 percent as of urban background. Figures are not immediately available on the number of evacuees of urban background who actually performed farm work this past year.

many boys from here have been killed or taken prisoners in the South Pacific ... There simply are no young men left. Six young men from here were recruited for civilian work on Wake Island last fall. They are now Japanese prisoners. No wonder we are prejudiced against the Japanese!"

One-third of the respondents mentioned the capture of the construction workers at Wake Island in discussing the evacuees as farm labor, and several in the county expressed preference for the Italian internees from Fort Missoula.

With regard to the strike for higher wages of which some of the farmers complained, one grower had this to say:

"I had to plow under 15 acres because of labor shortage. I finally obtained a crew of Japanese evacuees to do some thinning. They helped to put up the second crop of hay and did all of the beet harvesting. I was well pleased with their work. Due to racial prejudice on the part of livestock ranchers and townspeople, who objected to having any Japanese come into the valley for any purpose, we were delayed in getting help from relocation centers until too late to save some of the crop. Some say that the Japanese struck for higher wages. I maintain that it was partly due to the beet growers themselves, who bid more to get the help."

The fact that Broadwater County farmers were rated as most concerned about the prospective labor shortage made their rejection of the evacuees the more remarkable. Broadwater County is near the upper end of the Mexican migratory beet labor route, and it is likely that most of the migrants were absorbed by farm areas in Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, Wyoming, and eastern Montana before they reached the end of their usual route. The fact that farmers who had good reason to be anxious about their labor supply for next year expressed unwillingness to accept evacuee labor indicates that their feeling against the Japanese must have been intense.

Weld County

Weld County, Colorado, one of the heaviest sugar beet producing counties in the country, probably did not have as severe a labor shortage last fall as did the other sugar beet counties discussed. This was due to several factors: (1) A short crop, both in yield and sugar content; (2) the presence of a number of small towns in the county, from among the permanent residents of which it was possible to draw some seasonal labor; and (3) the fact that Weld

County is in the southeastern section of the beet region and therefore one of the first areas which transient Mexican workers strike in their annual migratory trek. Since there were probably fewer migratory workers making the trip to the beet fields last fall (because of the draft and opportunities for defense work), and since those who sought beet work would be likely to stop where they first found an opportunity, it is probable that Weld County had access to more regular Mexican beet workers than the counties farther north. Farmers in this county characteristically complained of the cost of labor, rather than any dearth of it. An early freeze, however, caused many of the Mexicans to return south prematurely, and it was in the succeeding period that evacuees were most in demand.

Reactions to the evacuees were mixed, about equal numbers of farmers indicating acceptance and rejection. This was virtually the only area surveyed where the question of their acceptability was met with some indifference, several farmers apparently not being troubled about the labor problem for next year. Moreover, it was in Weld County that most receptivity to the idea of permanent settlement of evacuees was encountered, as was mentioned earlier. It seems probable that a limited number of evacuees could be settled permanently in this county, since there are already other resident Japanese farmers who have been accommodated within the community. One farmer expressed his feelings in these terms:

"They (the evacuees) might be all right. I have several Jap neighbors, and they are good farmers. They are hard-working, industrious, and they mind their own business. I get along fine with them. We even swap machinery from time to time ... Why not let them farm for themselves?"

A member of an AAA community committee said:

"Well, you take a good Jap - he ought to be allowed to settle. But I don't know how to pick the good ones from among the pro-Axis ones. That's a hard problem. But I think they'd be safe, all right. Nobody would bother them around here, if they was good Japs, and if he was a bad one, I'd turn him in myself. I think it would be a good idea to bring some up to settle, because labor is awfully hard to get."

A few expressed fear of economic competition if the evacuees were brought in, as did this respondent:

"Well, I heard the Japs was all pretty good. They did fine as hand labor. But if they come here they are going to like

it and buy the farm next door. I don't think that's the best thing for the country. I heard of a Japanese who wanted to buy 1,000 acres in Weld County, if the Government would release his machinery in California. A lot of them have money, you know. If he's not a citizen I don't see why he should have a citizen's rights. You take those German-Russians that came in here several years ago - most of them weren't citizens and never made no effort to be. But they bought up lots of land. That don't seem right to me."

It should be pointed out that this statement was not typical. Most frequent objections to the evacuees were on the basis of their nationality background and their "demanding" attitudes. A young farmer who was not greatly worried about a labor shortage gave the comment:

"I don't know a thing about the Japs. I never had any of them, or talked with anybody about them. I wouldn't want them, I don't think. Not after what they done over there."

But there was also a good deal of favorable sentiment, represented by statements such as this one:

"From what I've heard about them, I'd be willing to take on a good Jap family. They are more desirable than the Mexican labor. They are more willing."

Maricopa, Dona Ana, and El Paso Counties

Attitudes in these three southwestern counties, which are contained within a fairly homogeneous crop region and in which responses tended to be similar, were described in general terms in an earlier section on "Racial-National Antagonism". No marked community differences within the region were observed. Farmers in these areas tended to think of the evacuees as American war prisoners who could only be worked under strong guard. They regarded them as former truck farmers who would not make good cotton pickers, either because of lack of experience in cotton production or because they had been used to operating their own farms and therefore would not be amenable to supervision. Racial and nationality considerations were often mentioned, but it is possible that these were a mask for less "respectable" reasons, such as fear of economic competition or lack of willingness to pay prescribed wages. One of the reasons cotton growers in this section were focusing their attention upon securing labor from Mexico was that it seemed a source of the cheapest available workers. There was a good deal of

objection to minimum wage provisions set up by the Government as a condition of importing labor, and perhaps similar considerations played a part in the rejection of the evacuees. One or two growers suggested that the Government ought to permit the exploitation of the evacuees at low wages, since they were war prisoners and a burden upon the taxpayers. Such suggestions were invariably couched in the language of patriotism.

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR PLACEMENT POLICY

The foregoing findings show the significance of local factors in the community acceptance or rejection of the evacuees. This has a direct implication for future placement policy: That a public employment program for members of the relocation centers will have increased chances of success if specific local situations are carefully investigated and prepared for in advance.

There are several ways to carry this suggestion out. Wherever possible, evacuees should be selected for placement according to individual suitability, including both job experience and general background for the positions to be filled. This means, in general, urban employment for people with urban experience, and farm employment for those with farm experience. Contrasting observations in Big Horn and Yellowstone Counties reveal that the employment program in a community which might ordinarily have proved receptive was impeded through failure to supply evacuees with previous farm experience. Although agriculture as an industry has until recently had last call upon the nation's labor supply, skill is not a negligible factor in the suitability of farm labor. When both farming skills and rural cultural background are lacking it is especially difficult for newcomers to become satisfactory farm labor.

Eliminating Rural-Urban Conflict

The "undesirable characteristics" of which farmers complained in the course of the survey represent a major conflict between rural and urban living and working standards. The importance of this conflict should be weighed carefully in determining whether evacuees coming from urban environments continue to be placed in agricultural employment. On the one hand, if city-bred evacuees are given seasonal farm work under customary conditions, it will be necessary for them to make difficult personal adjustments. It would certainly be unjust to force evacuees with strongly developed urban culture patterns to adapt themselves to the most arduous forms of rural life simply in order to obtain employment. Moreover, difficulties of this sort would have possible propaganda value for the Japanese government if construed as exploitation of its nationals. On the other hand, if a strong effort were made in farming communities to approximate conditions of urban life for the evacuees, in order to meet their previous living standards, there might be equally severe consequences.

The exploitive features of seasonal farm employment are well known. They become increasingly apparent in wartime, when the contrast between agricultural and industrial wage levels and working conditions becomes marked and there is actual competition for the available labor supply. There may be a temptation to employ the circumstances of the emergency to effect a reform of the conditions of farm employment while at the same time improving the welfare of the evacuees. Yet it would be unfair to the evacuees to make them seem the driving wedge of such a reform movement, as might appear if large numbers of them were suddenly given agricultural employment at advanced wartime wages. The attention thus fixated upon them as a racial or nationality group reaping unusual advantages would only intensify the problem of community accommodation which these people already face.

Selective Placement

Individual classification of evacuees according to their experience and environmental background, and placement within the limits of such classifications, will help avoid conflicts between employer and employee such as occurred in Big Horn and to some extent in other counties. A policy of voluntary employment is certainly desirable, because it maintains an important form of democratic freedom. Nevertheless, an unrestricted volunteer recruitment policy might jeopardize future good relations with communities which may for a time provide the chief opportunities for mass employment.

This is not to suggest that only experienced farm workers be permitted to leave the relocation centers for work in the beet fields and other farming areas, but that the placement program be organized in such a way as to put to maximum effect the reservoir of agricultural skill which is contained in the group. For example, inexperienced youths who would like to try their hands at farm work could be placed under the direction of more experienced evacuees serving as "lead men" and foremen. Such leaders, democratically elected, would probably prove useful in representing the evacuees in their relations with employers and other members of the local community. (The traditional office of the "go-between" would thereby find a functional counterpart in a modern industrial situation, filling the joint needs of work supervision and employer-employee relations.) Within the group, the leaders would help educate the evacuees regarding the delicate problem of public relations which they face in each new community they enter. They could properly point out the importance to the evacuees as a group of helping to make the necessary adjustments.

Training programs conducted within the relocation centers would also help to develop skills, such as the operation of power machinery, which would render evacuee labor more desirable to employers.

Permanent Employment Policy

Especially with regard to permanent placement of evacuees it would be unwise to introduce a large group into a single community at once. Many communities which might object to the introduction of a large group of Japanese residents could probably each absorb a few of them, especially where particular needs exist or untended farms are available.

No doubt it would be a long, tedious task to match individual skills with corresponding local needs, but such a method would have long-term value in achieving permanent integration of the evacuees into normal American life. Fortunately it is a method which developing shortages of manpower will render particularly feasible in wartime, when the variety of job openings is large.

Pre-Surveys of Local Situations

Since it is likely to require a relatively long time to place evacuees individually in permanent jobs, it will probably be necessary for some time to continue taking advantage of mass-employment opportunities afforded by seasonal agricultural labor demands. In such cases it is imperative to make some preparations in each community to encourage local receptivity and at the same time make the lot of the evacuees an easier one. A community pre-survey should be made to uncover existing biases and misconceptions regarding the evacuees. It should also locate sources of assistance toward local receptivity, such as sympathetic individuals willing to sponsor the introduction of the evacuees, or particularly pressing employment needs which they might fill.

The possibility that such a pre-survey might have practical consequences for administrative policy is illustrated by the findings of this study. It was found that in some communities the evacuees were characteristically evaluated in terms of their pragmatic worth as efficient labor. In other places they were judged on the basis of their ancestry. The respective administrative problems posed in placing evacuees in these two types of communities are consequently different. In some situations efforts to secure local cooperation would have to deal with prejudices which might reasonably be neglected in others. The study suggests a further possibility: That anti-Japanese feeling is not so deep-seated as sometimes supposed and that under circumstances of economic necessity and face-to-face contact employers may come to accept the evacuees at their actual worth. (This hypothesis would, of course, be severely modified in areas where fear of economic competition underlies anti-Japanese feeling.) As a consequence of knowing what kind of

prejudice exists and how deeply it is grounded, administrators may place appropriate emphases on their educational policies. The suggested hypothesis could be tested in communities where the evacuees are employed this year, and the result used to guide future placement policy.

Community Relations Policy

On the basis of information acquired in a study of the local situation, a community relations program could be set up which would prepare the community for the coming of the evacuees and deal with points of friction after their arrival. Preparations might consist of enlisting the local support of interested groups, such as prospective employers in need of labor, farm officials, sugar factory representatives, and merchants who could be shown the economic advantages in the presence of the evacuees. These contacts should be made as close to the level of directly affected groups as possible. In many cases, the contacts would represent merely matters of etiquette, such as personal assurances of cooperation given by a governmental representative; but they would be none the less effective, in view of the importance attaching to such courtesies in rural areas.

On the other hand, local representatives of the Government should deal concretely with such arrangements as housing and transportation. The latter will be increasingly important during the coming crop year, when the usual migrant groups will no doubt be heavily affected by lack of tires and gasoline. Transportation subsidies will probably be part of the Government's responsibility in securing the production of important crops, and the availability of large groups of potential farm workers in the relocation centers should make the problem easier to deal with than if farm workers had to be recruited individually over a wide area. Moreover, the possibilities of using mobile group-housing facilities such as developed by the Farm Security Administration should be considered in areas which have until now had rather primitive arrangements for migratory workers. If it does not prove feasible to use such facilities and it becomes necessary to make arrangements such as were tried in Big Horn County during the past year (leasing a hotel and renting other accommodations in town), governmental subsidies to provide adequate housing may become necessary. These could be justified by the need to get crops harvested without having to break through price ceilings. Housing and transportation costs to farmers in the Big Horn valley were unusually high last year, and this objection will probably work toward the complete rejection of evacuee labor next year unless more favorable arrangements can be made.

It is hardly necessary to point out in addition that the use of heavy guards and other obvious restrictions which convey the impression that the evacuees are war prisoners are extremely unfortunate from a public relations point of view. In general, every effort should be made to establish the public feeling that the evacuees who are released from relocation centers have a right to assume normal conditions of life and work in American communities. The less a disruption of customary relations occurs in connection with their introduction, and the less they are set apart by restrictions and unconventional arrangements, the more likely they are to be accepted as persons having a legitimate right to become part of the community.

APPENDIX

THE INTERVIEWING PROCEDURE OF THE DIVISION OF PROGRAM SURVEYS

The Division of Program Surveys conducts studies of social and administrative problems in which public attitudes play an important part. Generalizations about larger populations from relatively small numbers of interviews are made possible by the use of a carefully developed method of selecting respondents.

Interviewing is done by a full-time professional field staff who follow a narrative procedure in which the interview schedule becomes the stimulation for a controlled, respondent-centered discussion, rather than a series of questions for specific reply. A professionally trained analysis staff summarizes and interprets the interview write-ups submitted by the field staff.

The present report is based upon the intensive interviewing of 109 individuals in sugar beet and long staple cotton producing areas. Counties represented are Yellowstone and Broadwater, Montana; Big Horn, Wyoming; Weld, Colorado; Maricopa, Arizona; Dona Ana, New Mexico; and El Paso, Texas.

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE*

1. Did you have any difficulty in operating your farm in 1942? (If yes) What was it due to?
2. What crops or livestock enterprises were affected?
3. (If difficulties were caused in whole or part by labor shortage) What sort of labor shortages caused these difficulties?
4. Will your 1942 experience or the farm help situation for next year cause you to make changes in acreages, in crops or methods of care, harvesting and marketing next year? If so, what?
5. Do you expect to change the 1943 livestock operations on your farm? Why?
6. What could be done that would help you to maintain your present production in (the livestock and critical crops he is planning to decrease)?

Rating: Interviewee's frame of reference in answering this question:

1. Personal or individual
2. Group plans or identification
3. Government action
4. Other

7. If you had had more labor available what changes would you have made in crops or livestock this year?
8. What difference is there in your family labor this year (1942) compared with last year (1941)?
9. What labor will you have available for 1943?
10. (If applicable) Is the draft or defense work having the greater effect in taking labor off your farm?
11. Which is having the greater effect on the farms in your immediate neighborhood? (draft or defense)

* The interview schedule is that known as Study A-3. Material for the present report was drawn mainly from the responses to questions 1, 3, 4, 20, 21, and 22.

12. What are some of the changes your neighbors are making to meet the labor situation?
13. Do you know of any office where you can go to get farm labor?
14. To what extent can farm girls and women replace usual farm labor?
15. To what extent can city girls and women replace usual farm labor?
16. How do you feel about using non-farm boys 14-17 years old that have had short training?
17. Who do you think should train inexperienced farm workers?
18. How do you feel about using older men with previous farm experience - but past the age of greatest usefulness - on your farm?
19. How do you feel about using men from nearby cities or towns?
20. How do you feel about using labor from other farming areas, for example, (whatever labor has been recently imported into his community, as Kentuckians, Mexicans, Japanese evacuees, cut-over area people, or other)?
21. (If favorable) Should they be used as migrant labor or be encouraged to become permanent residents?
22. How do you feel about using special groups, such as Spanish-Americans or Japanese-Americans? (Use "Mexicans" instead of Spanish-Americans if that seems best.)
23. Did farmers exchange labor more in 1942 than in recent years? What operations?
24. Could they go further in exchanging work? How far will this go in solving the problem?
25. Could you and your neighbors make better utilization of the most efficient machinery available in the community?
26. Would you be willing to loan or rent your machinery to neighbors?
27. Would you be willing to do more custom work?
28. Have you and your neighbors had more difficulty hiring custom work done in 1942 than in previous years? (If yes) Why? What operations?
29. To what extent would greater use of increased custom work and borrowing and loaning of machinery solve the problems of the labor shortage?

30. What do you think of the suggestion that older children be taken from schools for the emergency or that the school year be shortened?
31. How much further can you or your neighbors, their wives, and other family help go in doing the work of the farm themselves?
32. Do you know of any labor plan worked out for the community for supplying necessary labor, especially of short-period type? What do you think of it?
33. How do you feel about "freezing" farm labor on farms?
 - a. hired
 - b. family
 - c. operators
34. What do you think of the suggestion that the Government subsidize farm labor so farmers can more nearly compete with war industry for labor?
35. What do you think of the suggestion that the Government give incentive payments to encourage farmers to keep up production of critical food products, such as milk?
36. What do you think the Government should do (that it is not already working at) to make it possible for farmers to maintain production?
37. Are there many farm auctions in your community? More than usual? Why are these farm operators selling out?

Table 1. Extent of Acceptance of Evacuees as Farm Labor*

Degree of Acceptance	Yellowstone, Montana	Weld, Colorado	Broadwater, Montana	Big Horn, Wyoming	El Paso, Texas	Maricopa, Arizona	Dona Ana, New Mexico
Acceptance, unqualified	47%	12%	6%	0%	8%	0%	0%
Acceptance, qualified	47	35	27	32	15	17	17
Rejection	6	41	67	63	77	83	83
Not necessary - labor not a problem	$\frac{0}{100\%}$	$\frac{12}{100\%}$	$\frac{0}{100\%}$	$\frac{0}{100\%}$	$\frac{0}{100\%}$	$\frac{0}{100\%}$	$\frac{0}{100\%}$
N=	15	17	15	25	13	12	12

* Questions 1, 3, 4, 20, 21, and 22

Table 2. Extent of Farmers' Concern about Prospective Labor Shortage*

Degree of Concern	Yellowstone, Montana	Weld Colorado	Broadwater, Montana	Big Horn, Wyoming	El Paso, Texas	Maricopa, Arizona	Dona Ana, New Mexico
Serious concern	40%	18%	93%	40%	58%	67%	33%
Some concern	53	47	7	56	47	33	58
No concern	$\frac{7}{100\%}$	$\frac{35}{100\%}$	$\frac{0}{100\%}$	$\frac{4}{100\%}$	$\frac{15}{100\%}$	$\frac{0}{100\%}$	$\frac{9}{100\%}$
N=	15	17	15	25	13	12	12

* Based on ratings made by interviewers on each interview as a whole

Table 3. Predominant Frames of Reference in Which Farmers Think of Evacuees*

Frame of Reference	Yellowstone, Montana	Weld, Colorado	Broadwater, Montana	Big Horn, Wyoming	El Paso, Texas	Maricopa, Arizona	Dona Ana New Mexico
Labor efficiency	93%	53%	80%	96%	46%	42%	50%
Racial-National background	7	35	20	4	54	58	50
Other	$\frac{0}{100\%}$	$\frac{12}{100\%}$	$\frac{0}{100\%}$	$\frac{0}{100\%}$	$\frac{0}{100\%}$	$\frac{0}{100\%}$	$\frac{0}{100\%}$
N =	15	17	15	25	13	12	12

* Analysis staff ratings on responses given to questions 20, 21, and 22.

Table 4. Percentages of Respondents Mentioning Considerations
Favorable to the Use of Evacuee Labor*

Favorable Considerations	Yellowstone, Montana	Weld, Colorado	Broadwater, Montana	Big Horn, Wyoming	El Paso, Texas	Maricopa, Arizona	Dona Ana, New Mexico
Efficiency of evacuee labor	93%	41%	47%	24%	31%	8%	17%
Desirable characteristics of evacuees	27	6	7	8	0	0	0
Community benefit of presence of evacuees	7	6	0	0	0	0	0
Inability to get other help	0	6	7	16	8	8	17
N=	15	17	15	25	13	12	12

* Questions 1, 3, 4, 20, 21, and 22

Percentage totals are more than 100 since more than one answer per person was possible.

(Respondents represented in this table may also be represented in Table 5. Some respondents who rejected the evacuees nevertheless credited them with favorable attributes. Still others accepted the evacuees as efficient on the whole, but pointed out that some were inefficient and therefore would not be satisfactory.)

Table 5. Percentages of Respondents Mentioning Considerations
Unfavorable to the Use of Evacuee Labor*

Unfavorable Considerations	Yellowstone, Montana	Weld Colorado	Broadwater, Montana	Big Horn, Wyoming	El Paso, Texas	Maricopa, Arizona	Dona Ana, New Mexico
Inefficiency of evacuee labor	40%	24%	67%	88%	15%	67%	33%
Excessive cost of evacuee labor	0	12	27	44	0	0	0
National-racial dislike	7	35	33	16	62	58	50
Fear of economic competition	7	12	0	0	15	0	0
Undesirable characteristics, other than racial	20	35	67	64	0	33	25
Not ascertainable	0	0	0	0	0	8	8
N =	15	17	15	25	13	12	12

* Questions 1, 3, 4, 20, 21, and 22

More than one answer per person was possible

P.O.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Bureau of Agricultural Economics

FARMERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE USE OF JAPANESE EVACUEES
AS FARM LABOR

Part II: Five Major Crop Regions

For Administrative Use Only

Study A-3
Report No. C-16

Program Surveys Division
February 27, 1943

SUMMARY

1. Unfamiliarity with the Japanese and other unusual types of labor is a major factor in farmers' rejection of the evacuees as agricultural labor. The greatest degree of acceptance of the evacuees was found in the sugar beet areas of the western mountain states, where evacuee labor was used during the past year. The greatest degree of rejection appeared in truck crop areas of the eastern seaboard, where farmers showed almost complete unfamiliarity with the evacuees as a potential labor supply.
2. In the areas where there had been no experience with the evacuees, they were commonly described in terms of racial and nationalistic stereotypes. This was in sharp contrast with attitudes expressed within the sugar beet region, where farmers had had sufficient experience with the evacuees to evaluate them for their work efficiency.
3. Although there is a somewhat greater tendency to consider the use of evacuees in areas where the pinch of labor-scarcity has been most severely felt, this tendency is by no means uniform (as was shown in Part I of the report). Prejudice and local considerations often override farmers' anxieties about their prospective labor supply.
4. Some farmers on the Pacific Coast feel that an economic loss was sustained when the Japanese were removed from that region, and they therefore desire to see the evacuees returned to the restricted areas. A majority, however, still apply racial stereotypes in opposing the return of the Japanese. The factor of economic competition often seems to underlie this attitude.

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INTRODUCTION

This report is an expansion of Part I of a study of "Farmers' Attitudes toward the Use of Japanese Evacuees as Farm Labor", issued by the Division of Program Surveys on January 30, 1943. The objective of the study, as set out in the first part of the report, is to discover what administrative steps may be taken: (1) to further the utilization of the agricultural manpower contained within the relocation centers of the War Relocation Authority; and (2) at the same time to assist the permanent integration into American community life of the people of Japanese extraction who have been displaced from their homes.

Part I of the report compared farmers' attitudes toward the use of evacuee labor in two crop regions, in one of which evacuee labor was employed last year, and in the other of which it was not. The effect of local influences on attitudes was considered in some detail. The conclusion was drawn that variations in receptivity toward the evacuees within the region where they had been used were largely explained by peculiar circumstances within local communities. Some implications of this finding for an effective placement policy were suggested.

This part of the report combines data presented in Part I with additional data obtained from several other major crop regions. It presents regional comparisons of receptivity toward the use of evacuee farm labor, and attempts to account for differences on the basis of a general theory regarding farmers' willingness to accept unusual types of labor. It also presents suggestive data regarding recent attitudes toward the evacuees on the Pacific Coast - at present closed to their re-entry, but comprising an area to which many evacuees will no doubt seek to return at the close of the war. The broader coverage of the material incorporated in this part of the report enables greater generalization of the conclusions drawn in Part I.

Source of the Data

Both parts of the report are based on data derived in a general survey of the farm labor situation in several major crop regions, which was conducted during the months of November and December, 1942.

The purpose of the general survey was to investigate a number of problems arising in connection with a decreasing farm labor supply at a time when expanded crop production was being undertaken. In the course of the survey an attempt was made to learn how farmers feel about using Japanese evacuee workers to offset part of the farm labor shortage. It is from this portion of the survey that the material for the present report is drawn.

For purposes of analysis, the 27 counties represented in the sample have been grouped into five geographical crop regions: Pacific Coast fruit and dairy; mountain sugar beet; southwestern long staple cotton; middle western dairy and livestock; and eastern truck crops. The counties surveyed were selected to represent these regions, but it should not be assumed that percentages cited are actually representative of regions as a whole, since no attempt was made to weight frequencies on the basis of relevant populations.

It was felt that such weighting would represent an artificial refinement of the data, which are offered as suggestive, rather than conclusive. Within each region there are significant local variations, and any regional combination of frequencies must therefore represent somewhat of a distortion of the respective situations in particular localities. For convenience in presenting the data, however, percentages are used which represent crude regional totals. Whenever these appear to be unrepresentative of particular counties within a given region, the exceptions will be pointed out in the text. On the whole, the percentages for individual counties within regions showed remarkable uniformity, with the significant exception of those for the sugar beet region. The reasons for differences within this region were discussed at length in Part I of the report.

FARMERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD THE USE OF
JAPANESE EVACUEES AS FARM LABOR
(Part II)

I. REGIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE USE OF EVACUEE LABOR

Farmers' readiness to accept Japanese and Japanese-Americans from the West Coast as farm workers showed a severe decline with geographical distance from the areas where the evacuees had previously lived and worked.

As the chart* on the following page illustrates, respondents in the Rocky Mountain sugar beet region accepted the use of evacuee farm labor most frequently; those in the truck growing areas of the eastern seaboard, least. With the exception of the Pacific Coast region, from which the evacuees are excluded at present, the regions which were most familiar with the Japanese or other ethnic types of labor showed the most acceptance of the evacuees. Evacuees were employed last fall in the mountain areas surveyed, and were used to a limited extent in areas near the southwestern counties, but were not employed at all in the middle western and eastern seaboard areas. (Mexicans, the most nearly comparable ethnic group, have been used extensively in the southwestern and mountain regions, and in limited portions of the Middle West.)


Several factors appear to be responsible for the decline in acceptance of the evacuees from western to eastern areas of the country: a general distrust of unusual types of labor and unwillingness to change customary employment habits; patriotic nationalism and racial prejudice; relatively low anxiety about the coming year's labor supply; and particular local experiences of rural-urban conflict.

General Distrust of Strange Labor

The attitudes of eastern and middle western respondents, when contrasted with those expressed in other areas, reveal clearly a

* Taken from Table 1. All tables are in the Appendix.

Chart 1. Percentages of Respondents in Each Crop Region
Indicating Acceptance of Evacuees as Farm Labor



Unqualified acceptance of evacuee labor



Qualified acceptance (e.g., if trained farm workers, or if housing demands not too great)

lack of actual experience with Japanese labor. In addition to the lack of specific experience with the evacuees, however, farmers show a general reluctance to change their customary employment practices, particularly when the change involves the use of "outsiders" or "foreigners" of any sort. The ability of strange ethnic groups is uncertain. Farmers assume that they are lacking in desirable specialized skills, and that they are not likely to know or be willing to follow the customary ways of doing things which are peculiar to each farming community. Objections to the evacuees were often expressed in occupational stereotypes, such as, "They might work out all right in truck farming (or beet harvesting), but they wouldn't know how to do dairying (or general farming, or livestock raising.)" Such expressions were less frequent in localities where the evacuees had actually been tried out, even in types of farming previously unfamiliar to them, or where other ethnic groups, such as Mexicans, had formerly been used.


Racial and National Antipathy

Distrust of the evacuees because of their nationality background was frequently expressed, particularly in the East, Middle West, and Far West. The considerations underlying such expressions did not necessarily have a common basis. Wartime feeling unquestionably was responsible for the application of some of the racial labels, but it is probable that in some areas they frequently represented less "respectable" reasons, such as fear of economic competition, or a desire for cheaply exploited labor. Sometimes they no doubt grew out of simple unfamiliarity with the evacuees as individuals. In the mountain sugar beet region, where farmers had recently had experience with evacuee workers, the prevailing tendency was to think of them as efficient or inefficient workers, rather than as members of a racial or national group.

Anxiety about the Labor Supply

Considering the data region by region, there is some correlation between farmers' concern about the available labor supply for the coming year and their willingness to accept the evacuees. (Chart 2, taken from Tables 1 and 2.) In communities where there is

Chart 2. Relation of Serious Concern about Labor Supply to Acceptance of Evacuees



general concern about a prospective labor shortage, farmers are probably conditioned to feel a stronger interest in the use of unusual types of labor. In the present case it is difficult to estimate the influence of this factor, since the regions showing relatively high acceptance of the evacuees happen to be those having most experience with them - and acceptance and experience are correlated.

Anxiety about a labor scarcity, moreover, is only one of the factors tending to shape attitudes toward the evacuees, and is often overridden by other, sometimes irrational considerations. Thus Part I of the report demonstrated that special local situations have in several instances outweighed farmers' desire for an assured labor supply.

The Influence of Local Situations

Since the effect of local circumstances upon attitudes in any given community was discussed at some length in Part I, it will be given little emphasis here. It is nevertheless an important aspect of any comprehensive consideration of the factors shaping attitudes. That community differences appeared to any striking degree only in the mountain sugar beet area is largely attributable to the fact that this was the region in which respondents had direct experience with the evacuees during the past year. Local factors doubtless would come into play with the introduction of evacuees into other areas.

Although an early return of the evacuees to the West Coast is unlikely, a knowledge of present attitudes in this region is useful in projecting trends in public feeling toward Japanese Americans. It is highly significant that one-third of the respondents on the Pacific Coast were willing to accept the use of Japanese labor, in view of the earlier public antipathy which was partly responsible for the evacuation.

II. HOW FARMERS EXPRESSED THEIR ATTITUDES

There was considerable variation not only in the reasons which farmers gave for their opinions of the evacuees, but in the frames of reference in which they spoke. These two aspects of the responses form regional patterns which will be described.


The Frames of Reference

Most respondents considered the evacuees in either of two frames of reference, as shown in Chart 3 (from Table 3) on the following page. The evacuees frequently were thought of as a racial or nationality group, and the most violently emotional responses occurred within this context. Many of the respondents who made their evaluations on racial or nationalistic grounds had never seen a person of Japanese extraction, and knew very little about the evacuees except that they could be identified as members of the "yellow race" and associated with the enemy. There were others, of course - primarily on the Pacific Coast - who had had more opportunity to come into contact with the Japanese and Japanese-Americans. The bases of their antipathy were no doubt more complex, often involving a fear of economic competition or other threat to their own status.


A remarkably large number of respondents, on the other hand, evaluated the evacuees according to their work efficiency. These farmers did not seem perturbed about employing workers linked by ancestry with an enemy nation. They rarely even distinguished between aliens and citizens in expressing their opinions, although most assumed that governmental or military authorities would not permit actually dangerous members of the group to leave custody. Respondents sharing this frame of reference figuratively asked themselves the single question, "Can they do the work?" Acceptance or rejection hinged on whether the answer was affirmative or negative.


Most of the respondents who thought of the evacuees in terms of labor-efficiency had had experience with Japanese or other ethnic groups, and often were greatly concerned about the supply of farm labor for the coming year. This was particularly true in heavy seasonal hand labor areas. Such areas have customarily depended upon various migratory ethnic groups, such as Mexicans, Filipinos,


Chart 3. Percentages of Respondents Regarding Evacuees in Terms of Labor-Efficiency or of Racial-National Background*




Frames of Reference

 Labor-efficiency

 Racial-national background

 Other (sympathy for evacuees as mistreated citizens, or complete indifference)

 Not ascertainable

* Each bar represents 100 percent of the respondents in the respective region

Indians, and Russians. Possibly the reason that farmers in these areas are ready to accept the evacuees on their merits as workers rather than as undesirable outsiders is that they have become accustomed to the idea of hiring what other farmers would regard as "strange" groups. Such acceptance does not necessarily involve the granting of advanced status to the evacuees. On the contrary, perhaps they are accepted because their status is clearly defined as below that of the employer, while on a middle western dairy farm a hired man is often admitted to the same social group as his employer.

A few farmers thought of the evacuees in other terms than those which have been described. Some were completely indifferent, since they had no labor problem themselves. Others had a rather broad outlook and expressed sympathy for evacuees who had been unfairly deprived of their freedom as citizens. Both groups were relatively small with reference to the total number of respondents.

The Specific Reasons for Acceptance or Rejection

The principal considerations which respondents mentioned in accepting or rejecting the use of evacuee labor are listed in Tables 4 and 5. As the discussion of frames of reference has suggested, the most important considerations to farmers were the nationality and racial background of the evacuees, and their relative efficiency as farm labor.

In one region unusual costs in connection with employment of the evacuees became a strong reason for rejecting them. Other factors which seemed to carry weight were certain undesirable personal characteristics of the evacuees described by respondents. In Part I it was shown that these represented a basic rural-urban culture conflict between farm employers and some of the evacuees, and figured only in areas where farmers had already had experience with evacuee labor.

Several other reasons were mentioned in accepting or rejecting the evacuees, but none with great frequency. Fear of economic competition, which was rarely expressed, was no doubt at times rationalized beneath the mask of racial dislike.

Regional Patterns

Common attitudinal patterns within each of the regions surveyed help to explain the regional differences in acceptance of the evacuees. These patterns will be described briefly by regions.

THE MIDDLE WEST

Dairy and livestock farmers in counties scattered throughout the Middle West expressed an almost uniformly high degree of hostility to the idea of using evacuee farm labor. The frame of reference in which farmers thought of the evacuees was predominantly nationalistic, and expressions of strong antagonism like the following ones were frequent.

A Carroll County, Missouri, livestock feeder:

"If you want some Japs killed, send them here. I would let my farm lie idle before I will take any Jap labor. I don't care if they are born in this country. I am just as patriotic as anybody, and I am doing anything I can to help, but I am not going to give a Jap a home and my boys over there fighting them."

A Cedar County, Iowa, feeder:

"What would I think of using a Jap? What for - a corpse? It would be all right if we were running a bombing school. I think those Japs should be kept just where they are. If they want to do something with them and don't want to feed them, why not take them any place handy and put them in the Pacific and let them swim back?"

Opposition to the use of the evacuees was part of a general pattern of resistance to "outsiders" and "foreigners", as the following quotations indicate.

A young Medina County, Ohio, livestock raiser:

"Nothing doing! I wouldn't want no part of anything like that. Personally I have nothing against people like that. But in a section like this it is made up of fellows who own their own places. They are honest, hard-working people who don't lock their doors when they go out. They don't want a bunch of foreigners running around that they can't trust."

A Carroll County, Missouri, livestock and dairy farmer:

"I don't want them. I would quit before I would use them. I wouldn't consider it in no way. I would a lot rather have nigger help than Japs. Mexicans ain't much better. They are all the same to me."

A Johnson County, Kansas, dairy farmer:

"I never saw a Jap in my life, but I am afraid of them and the Mexicans."

Unfamiliarity with strange ethnic groups and particularly with the Japanese led farmers to repeat all the traditional racial stereotypes which they had heard. The evacuees were charged with treachery, brutality, and sedition, and the most common single criticism was, "You can't trust them". The widely circulated "true" story about the Japanese servant who told his American employer, "After this war, the white man will be working for the Jap", was repeated by a Dodge County, Wisconsin, dairy farmer. (This story had been picked up by interviewers in Dallas and Los Angeles on previous surveys shortly after the outbreak of the war, and the incident was later reported in the newspapers as having actually occurred to a friend of a California congressman.)

Respondents frequently expressed fear of personal harm, either through violence or sabotage, if the evacuees were brought into their respective communities. The examples below are characteristic.

A Saginaw County, Michigan, dairyman:

"I wouldn't feel safe (with the Japanese around). Not as long as we are at war."

A Johnson County, Kansas, dairy and livestock farmer:

"I wouldn't want Japs around a dairy. They might poison the milk, and then where would you be?"

A Medina County, Ohio, hog feeder:

"I'd be afraid of a Jap. They are the ones that are awful brutal in this war."

A Macon County, Missouri, dairyman:

"I wouldn't want to be around them. I'm kinda afraid of those people. I'd rather do it myself than trust those fellows. I've never seen any, but I don't want to."

Occasionally there were expressions of sympathy and tolerance, but even these were usually smothered in a desire to conform to the prevailing opinion in the community. One farmer in Carroll County, Missouri, ventured,

"That wouldn't bother me as long as the community wouldn't care. I don't think I would want the foreign-born Japs, but their children born in this country would be all right. They should have a chance to work, too. I am a little leary about bringing in any foreigners to take the place of our boys. If they would boost them out when the emergency is over, it would be all right. But if you had a good man you might get attached to him and wouldn't want to give him up, or he might not want to go, either."

Some of the opposition to employment of the evacuees probably stemmed from resentment against the conscription of local farm workers, and fear that returning sons at the close of the war would find themselves displaced by imported help. As one Faribault County, Minnesota, dairyman said,

"Why not send them (the evacuees) to the Army, and leave us have our own who know how?"

Such expressions were directed in opposition not only to the evacuees, but to all outside labor in general. Respondents in a number of instances frankly declared that they would rather not have their own sons go to war if there were others who might serve in their places. Moreover, they regarded the importation of additional workers to replace those conscripted as merely an exchange of good labor for bad, since the new help would have to be trained.

Farmers in the Middle West appeared on the whole less anxious about the prospective labor supply than those in any other region except the eastern seaboard. This circumstance probably contributed to the lack of genuine interest in considering new sources of labor, although labor scarcity was often mentioned as a source of difficulty in maintaining farm production.

Farmers disclosed both their lack of real concern about a labor shortage and their unwillingness to consider using unusual types of labor by the frequency with which they suggested that evacuees

workers would probably be better suited to other types of farming than their own. Occupational stereotypes were applied which relegated the usefulness of the evacuees to crops requiring heavy hand labor, such as sugar beets and garden truck. It was assumed that they would not be sufficiently skilled in the operation of farm machinery and the care of livestock to make satisfactory help on middle western general and livestock farms. Few suggested that the evacuees be given a trial to demonstrate their abilities, and none seemed sufficiently pressed to be willing to train his own help. Some of the objections were without doubt genuine, but many appeared to be more excuses for not seriously considering the use of the evacuees.

There were two counties in this region, however, where farmers showed exceptional interest in the possibility of using evacuee workers to replace former help. The counties were Faribault and Steel, both in Minnesota. This is one of the few areas in the Middle West where farmers (largely Scandinavians) have had extended experience with the employment of various ethnic groups. This circumstance has probably rendered them more receptive (at least temporarily) to the use of evacuee labor than farmers in other areas within the same region. Several comments similar to this one by a Faribault County farmer were recorded:

"If they must take the farm boys for the Army, I would be willing to have some Jap-Americans come here to work. I am doubtful about them as permanent residents though."

THE EASTERN SEABOARD

Truck and dairy farmers in two counties on the eastern seaboard exhibited much the same pattern of thought with regard to the use of evacuee labor as farmers in the Middle West. If anything, they were more hostile and more extreme in their expressions of anti-Japanese feeling. They revealed the same general resistance to the employment of strangers and foreigners that was found in the Middle West. Some of the respondents were themselves immigrants from southern European countries. The Italians in particular may have been afraid that they would be identified as pro-Axis if they consented to use evacuee labor.

The following comments are indicative of the depth of feeling

against the Japanese, and by association, against the evacuees, in these areas.

A Hartford County, Connecticut, dairy farmer:

"Don't bring any Japs here! They wouldn't get out of here alive!"

A Cumberland County, New Jersey, truck farmer:

"Take the sons of bitches out and shoot 'em! The yellow bastards! They got the right color - yellow clear through!"

A Negro truck farmer in Cumberland County:

"We got too many of them kind. That is the big trouble with the U. S. today. They are real enemies. It was a big mistake to ever let them in."

Fear of harm through sabotage or violence on the part of the evacuees was also asserted as a reason for rejection. A Hartford County dairyman, who had just sold his farm to go into retirement, "because of the labor shortage", said,

"Japs! I don't believe we need them! For myself, I wouldn't want them. You wouldn't know what they might do. They might poison your milk or something. Like them eggs the other day. A hell of a lot of people died from frozen eggs!"

Farmers in this region were rated by interviewers as least concerned, on the whole, about a labor shortage. Unquestionably some individual operators have been hurt by lack of labor, but the situation has not become general enough to lead farmers as a group to begin casting about for unusual sources of help. Seasonal labor (both white and Negro) has customarily migrated to these areas from the South, and this source has probably not been so severely affected by wartime drains as have other migrant groups.

THE MOUNTAIN AND SOUTHWESTERN REGIONS

Patterns in the Rocky Mountain sugar beet and southwestern long staple cotton regions were discussed in detail in Part I of the report.

Farmers in these areas showed most concern about the prospective labor shortage, and displayed a much higher degree of acceptance of the evacuees than was found in the East or Middle West. The tendency to consider the evacuees according to their potentialities as farm workers, rather than to think of them as an undesirable ethnic group, was more common here than in other areas. This was most strikingly shown in the sugar beet region, where farmers had had experience with various ethnic types of labor, including the evacuees themselves. Acceptance of the evacuees was relatively high in these areas, with the exception of those where particular local circumstances had had an unfavorable influence. (See Part I.)

Acceptance of the evacuees was considerably lower in the Southwest, where farmers felt that their best - and cheapest - available source of seasonal labor was nearby Mexico.

THE PACIFIC COAST

Public feeling on the West Coast ran high against persons of Japanese descent shortly after the outbreak of the war, and no doubt partly influenced the Government's decision to remove them from the area.* It is therefore especially significant that 32 percent of the respondents on Pacific Coast farms were willing to accept the use of evacuee workers. These farmers were thinking in a labor-efficiency frame of reference, and most of them desired the return of the evacuees because they had suffered some economic loss through their removal.

A larger dairy and vineyard operator in Kings County, California, said,

"The Japs are the best. Of course we are fighting them now, but they are the best of all. My Japs took care of my grapes and so on for me and they are good workers and they really know how. I wish we could get them back. The Mexicans and the Oklahoma people, they just work for the money. After they get so much money they don't care to work any more. Like today, there - you see they all quit picking cotton at one o'clock. After they make five or six dollars in a day they will quit, even if it is noon."

* A report prepared by the Division of Program Surveys for the Office of Facts and Figures on March 6, 1942, indicated that 77 percent of the West Coast respondents in an urban survey disliked and distrusted residents of Japanese ancestry. Fifty-two percent advocated evacuation or more extreme measures to remove the menace of the domestic Japanese.

In Yakima County, Washington, a prune grower commented,

"I can tell you this frankly: I'd be all for bringing the Japs back here to take up where they left off, but I don't think the valley would stand for it. Lots of people still have a bad taste in their mouths where the Japs are concerned. It's too bad, too, because the Japs are good, hard workers. They mostly mind their own business, and I personally believe that most of them are just as loyal to this Government as a lot of the other people in the valley."

When asked, "Did removing the Japs have much effect on the labor situation?" this respondent continued,

"Only indirectly. You see, the Japs never were much for working the orchards. They worked truck gardens - vegetables and things. But here's how it worked: when they moved the Japs out, then somebody else had to work their truck gardens, and it takes at least three white men to do the work of one Jap in that kind of work -- and then it isn't done half as good. The way I figure it is that every one that worked in the place of the Japs this year was just so many less available for work in the orchards. In that way it had plenty of effect."

Others objected to the economic waste resulting from confinement of the evacuees to relocation centers.

A Ventura County, California, orange grower:

"The Japanese have never worked here. I think by now they have had time to ferret out the bad ones from the good ones and they could bring the good ones back under supervision to work. That way they could pay their own way, rather than just be an expense to the Government. I had a Jap come three times a week and do garden work in my place in Hollywood. I know he was all right, and I would hire him here in a minute and be glad to get him, except that the people around here would probably think I was a fifth columnist or something."

A Yakima County apple grower:

"Everybody should work during wartime - even the Japs and Mexicans. It does seem a waste to keep the Japs locked up. They used to have such nice kept-up vegetable farms around here, and now everything has gone to seed. And it's very expensive to buy vegetables in town."

The heavy labor drain to defense centers caused an acute labor shortage in the harvest season for larger growers. One Yakima County apple grower said,

"I sure don't think it's right to keep 100,000 Japs idle in these concentration camps while the crops rot on the ground. It just doesn't make sense - especially when they keep yelling about how important it is to raise food."

Two-thirds of the West Coast respondents, however, rejected the use of the evacuees, and nearly all of these spoke in racial or nationalistic terms. Within this group were several farmers who had taken over land formerly operated by the evacuees and who consequently had an economic interest in opposing their return. Some of them complained that the Japanese were clannish and would not divulge "trade secrets" about their successful truck-farming methods, even to those who had formerly worked for them. One such farmer, a Los Angeles County Mexican, declared,

"The Japanese knew how to truck-farm pretty good, but I don't want them back here, oh no! I used to work for them. They would never tell you what kind of medicine they used to spray with or anything like that. I know, though, and I can farm as well or better than they can."

Comments like this one by a Yakima County hops raiser were common:

"As for the Japs - if I can't get my work done without the help of those slant-eyes, I just won't get it done."

Several mentioned fear of riots and sabotage. A Tulare County, California, fruit grower said,

"I don't think the people would stand for bringing the Japanese back. No, sir, I would be dead against that. I think we are too close to the coast here. There would be too much sabotage. Anyway, they would have to have more men watching them than there was working. No, sir, that wouldn't work. I think they are going to have to bring the Mexicans in, but how they are going to get rid of them after that is what I am worrying about."

A peach grower in Yakima County:

"I don't think I'd want any Japs, myself. Apt to be too much trouble. Don't want any riots on my hands."

Most of the dairymen in Kings and Los Angeles Counties rejected the use of the evacuees on the ground that they had had no experience in dairying. Some of the replies carried the implication, however, that the real concern was to prevent the Japanese from gaining a competitive position in a new farming enterprise. This undertone was likewise present in interviews with other types of farmers. Thus, while fear of economic competition was never specifically mentioned as a reason for rejection of the evacuees, it was without doubt operative in the minds of many West Coast respondents.

III. CONCLUSIONS

In order to secure satisfactory agricultural employment for the evacuees, and at the same time utilize fully their manpower, it is necessary to observe the primary considerations influencing farmers to accept or reject their services.

The Conditions of Acceptance

Acceptance was facilitated when farmers had had former contact with the evacuees or similar ethnic groups. Interest in the use of the evacuees was also stimulated (but to a smaller degree) when farmers were so pressed for help that they were forced to consider unusual sources of labor.

Acceptance was impeded when there were other labor sources more readily available, or when customary sources had not yet been fully exploited. It was often blocked by anti-Japanese prejudice, particularly if this was reinforced by feelings of threat to the economic and social status of prospective employers. Also hindering acceptance of the evacuees were the rural-urban conflicts which sometimes arose with their introduction; in certain areas where evacuees had been used, farmers opposed their return for this reason.

The Implications for Placement Policy

In Part I of the report some specific recommendations for evacuee placement policy were made on the basis of data from two of the five crop regions surveyed. It is now possible, through the inclusion of additional data, to make general application of the earlier recommendations.

These suggestions were made in Part I:

1. The selection of evacuees to be placed in agricultural employment should take into account both their farming skills and their rural cultural background, in order to minimize frictions with the rural community.

2. Voluntary employment should be encouraged, but so directed as to make maximum application of the agricultural skills contained in the group.
3. In placing evacuees in permanent situations, they should be introduced as individuals or in small groups, rather than in large numbers.
4. Before evacuees are sent into seasonal labor areas for mass employment, advance surveys should be conducted to discover particular local attitudes which might affect the success of the program.
5. The findings of such surveys should be used in planning local public relations policies and in making concrete arrangements for housing, transportation, and similar requirements.

It appears that these suggestions need not be modified in light of the general findings. On the contrary, succeeding evidence seems to establish the desirability of a placement policy which will take into account the individual capacities of the evacuees and the receptiveness of the communities into which they are to be placed.

Additional Recommendations

A further technique to facilitate a more general acceptance of the evacuees can be suggested. It is an adaptation of the "demonstration" technique which has been successful in introducing other innovations in farming practice into rural communities.

As has been pointed out, farmers in many areas have not yet reached the stage at which they need help badly enough to reconsider their established preconceptions about the suitability of strange labor. It may be expected, however, that as the war continues and food production demands increase, farmers will be impelled to consider unusual labor sources. This situation should create new opportunities for the employment of the evacuees, and possibly at the same time afford them a chance to become accommodated within numerous American communities.

It is, therefore, suggested that arrangements might be made to place a few experienced evacuee farm workers into each of

several communities most likely to be subject to continuing labor shortages. They would serve as demonstration groups, and farmers would have a chance to observe their work at close hand and under local conditions. Under such circumstances farm employers may tend to lose their habitual distrust of strange labor and begin to welcome the help of the evacuees.

In inaugurating such a plan in the Middle West, for example, it would probably be best to begin with communities which have had previous contact with unusual ethnic groups, and those which have had the greatest labor drain. Intensive farming areas surrounding defense centers would seem to offer the most feasible possibilities.

Evacuees for the demonstration units should be selected for their experience in the kind of work into which they will be placed, and for their capacity for accommodation into the community. Minimum requirements would probably include an agricultural background, a knowledge of English, and a personal ability to make necessary social adjustments. The vanguard groups will certainly be more likely to succeed if they are themselves conscious of their important office as demonstrators that Japanese-Americans can become useful, recognized participants in American community life.

A P P E N D I X

THE INTERVIEWING PROCEDURE OF THE DIVISION OF PROGRAM SURVEYS

The Division of Program Surveys conducts studies of social and administrative problems in which public attitudes play an important part. Generalizations about larger populations from relatively small numbers of interviews are made possible by the use of a carefully developed method of selecting respondents.

Interviewing is done by a full-time professional field staff who follow a narrative procedure in which the interview schedule becomes the stimulation for a controlled, respondent-centered discussion, rather than a series of questions for specific reply. A professionally trained analysis staff summarizes and interprets the interview write-ups submitted by the field staff.

The present report is based upon 333 intensive interviews representing

dairy and livestock farmers in Jersey County, Illinois; Macon and Carroll Counties, Missouri; Cedar and Butler Counties, Iowa; Washington County, Nebraska; Faribault and Steele Counties, Minnesota; Traill County, North Dakota; Dodge County, Wisconsin; Medina County, Ohio; Saginaw County, Michigan; Johnson County, Kansas; and Kings and Los Angeles Counties, California;

sugar beet growers in Weld County, Colorado; Big Horn County, Wyoming; Broadwater and Yellowstone Counties, Montana;

long staple cotton growers in Maricopa County, Arizona; Dona Ana County, New Mexico; and El Paso County, Texas;

fruit growers in Yakima County, Washington; and Tulare and Ventura Counties, California;

truck growers in Cumberland County, New Jersey; and Hartford County, Connecticut.

Supplementary information was obtained in interviews with agricultural officials and other special informants in the sampled counties.

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE*

1. Did you have any difficulty in operating your farm in 1942? (If yes) What was it due to?
 2. What crops or livestock enterprises were affected?
 3. (If difficulties were caused in whole or part by labor shortage) What sort of labor shortages caused these difficulties?
 4. Will your 1942 experience or the farm help situation for next year cause you to make changes in acreages, in crops or methods of care, harvesting and marketing next year? If so, what?
 5. Do you expect to change the 1943 livestock operations on your farm? Why?
 6. What could be done that would help you to maintain your present production in (the livestock and critical crops he is planning to decrease)?
- Rating: Interviewee's frame of reference in answering this question:
1. Personal or individual
 2. Group plans or identification
 3. Government action
 4. Other
7. If you had had more labor available what changes would you have made in crops or livestock this year?
 8. What difference is there in your family labor this year (1942) compared with last year (1941)?
 9. What labor will you have available for 1943?
 10. (If applicable) Is the draft or defense work having the greater effect in taking labor off your farm?
 11. Which is having the greater effect on the farms in your immediate neighborhood? (draft or defense)

* The interview schedule is that known as Study A-3. Material for the present report was drawn mainly from the responses to questions 1, 3, 4, 20, 21, and 22.

12. What are some of the changes your neighbors are making to meet the labor situation?
13. Do you know of any office where you can go to get farm labor?
14. To what extent can farm girls and women replace usual farm labor?
15. To what extent can city girls and women replace usual farm labor?
16. How do you feel about using non-farm boys 14-17 years old that have had short training?
17. Who do you think should train inexperienced farm workers?
18. How do you feel about using older men with previous farm experience - but past the age of greatest usefulness - on your farm?
19. How do you feel about using men from nearby cities or towns?
20. How do you feel about using labor from other farming areas, for example, (whatever labor has been recently imported into his community, as Kentuckians, Mexicans, Japanese evacuees, cut-over area people, or other)?
21. (If favorable) Should they be used as migrant labor or be encouraged to become permanent residents?
22. How do you feel about using special groups, such as Spanish-Americans or Japanese-Americans? (Use "Mexicans" instead of Spanish-Americans if that seems best.)
23. Did farmers exchange labor more in 1942 than in recent years? What operations?
24. Could they go further in exchanging work? How far will this go in solving the problem?
25. Could you and your neighbors make better utilization of the most efficient machinery available in the community?
26. Would you be willing to loan or rent your machinery to neighbors?
27. Would you be willing to do more custom work?
28. Have you and your neighbors had more difficulty hiring custom work done in 1942 than in previous years? (If yes) Why? What operations?

29. To what extent would greater use of increased custom work and borrowing and loaning of machinery solve the problems of the labor shortage?
30. What do you think of the suggestion that older children be taken from schools for the emergency or that the school year be shortened?
31. How much further can you or your neighbors, their wives, and other family help go in doing the work of the farm themselves?
32. Do you know of any labor plan worked out for the community for supplying necessary labor, especially of short-period type? What do you think of it?
33. How do you feel about "freezing" farm labor on farms?
- a. hired
 - b. family
 - c. operators
34. What do you think of the suggestion that the Government subsidize farm labor so farmers can more nearly compete with war industry for labor?
35. What do you think of the suggestion that the Government give incentive payments to encourage farmers to keep up production of critical food products, such as milk?
36. What do you think the Government should do (that it is not already working at) to make it possible for farmers to maintain production?
37. Are there many farm auctions in your community? More than usual? Why are these farm operators selling out?

Table 1. Extent of Acceptance of Evacuees as Farm Labor*

Degree of Acceptance	Pacific Coast dairy and fruit	Mountain sugar beet	Southwestern long staple cotton	Mid-western dairy and livestock	Eastern truck
Acceptance, unqualified	13%	14%	3%	2%	6%
Acceptance, qualified	19	35	16	7	0
Rejection	68	48	81	83	88
Not necessary - labor not a problem	0	3	0	0	0
Not ascertainable	0	0	0	8	6
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
N=	32	72	37	174	18

* Questions 1, 3, 4, 20, 21, 22

Table 2. Extent of Farmers' Concern about Prospective Labor Shortage*

Degree of Concern	Pacific Coast dairy and fruit	Mountain sugar beet	Southwestern long staple cotton	Mid-western dairy and livestock	Eastern truck
Serious concern	37%	46%	46%	23%	17%
Some concern	47	43	46	46	61
No concern	16 <u>100%</u>	11 <u>100%</u>	8 <u>100%</u>	31 <u>100%</u>	22 <u>100%</u>
N=	32	72	37	174	18

*Based on ratings made by interviewers on each interview as a whole.

Table 3. Predominant Frames of Reference in Which Farmers Think of Evacuees*

Frame of Reference	Pacific Coast dairy and fruit	Mountain sugar beet	Southwestern long staple cotton	Mid-western dairy and livestock	Eastern truck
Labor efficiency	34%	82%	46%	19%	6%
Racial - National background	60	15	54	72	82
Other (complete in- difference, or sympathy for evacuees as mistreated citizens)	3	3	0	1	6
Not ascertainable	$\frac{3}{100\%}$	$\frac{0}{100\%}$	$\frac{0}{100\%}$	$\frac{8}{100\%}$	$\frac{6}{100\%}$
N=	32	72	37	174	18

*Analysis staff ratings on responses given to questions 20, 21, 22.

Table 4. Percentage of Respondents Mentioning Considerations Favorable to the Use of Evacuee Labor*

Favorable Considerations	Pacific Coast dairy and fruit	Mountain sugar beet	Southwestern long staple cotton	Mid-western dairy and livestock	Eastern truck
Efficiency of evacuee labor	19%	47%	22%	4%	0%
Community benefit from presence of evacuees	9	3	0	0	6
Desirable characteristics of evacuees	3	11	0	0	0
Inability to get other help	3	8	14	2	0
N=	32	72	37	174	18

*Questions 1, 3, 4, 20, 21, and 22

Percentage totals are more than 100, since more than one answer per person was possible.

(Respondents represented in this table may also be represented in Table 5. Some respondents who rejected the evacuees nevertheless credited them with favorable attributes. Still others accepted the evacuees as efficient on the whole, but pointed out that some were inefficient and therefore would not be satisfactory.)

Table 5: Percentage of Respondents Mentioning Considerations Unfavorable to the Use of Evacuee Labor*

Unfavorable Considerations	Pacific Coast dairy and fruit	Mountain sugar beet	Southwestern long staple cotton	Mid-western dairy and livestock	Eastern truck
Inefficiency of evacuee labor	13%	58%	38%	15%	0%
Excessive cost of evacuee labor	0	24	0	0	0
National - racial dislike	56	26	57	70	66
Fear of economic competition	0	4	5	1	0
Undesirable characteristics, other than racial	0	39	19	0	0
	N= 32	72	37	174	18

*Questions 1, 3, 4, 20, 21, 22

More than one answer per person was possible. See footnote to Table 4.