

See Part I, Chap. IV, "Emergence of the ⁹Unrest"
pp. 63-94 (Disorganization in the Work Corps)

See also Part I, Chap. IX, "Stability Within
Instability" pp. 48-55. (Coop Movement)

Also additional information in "Strikes" and
in "Theater Project".

Miyamoto

*Whiyamoto
Tule Lake Report*

CHAPTER V. ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION

General Features of Relocation Center Economy

Due to a considerable public agitation against wage payments to evacuee workers higher than the minimum wage paid American soldiers, which was then \$21 per month, the W.R.A. very early established wage scales of \$12, \$16, and \$19 per month, as the range of pay for all evacuee employees from apprentices to the most highly trained personnel. Milton Eisenhower, then W.R.A. Director, foresaw that these "miserably low cash advances" provided inadequate work incentives and would create problems of re-assimilating the population into American life after the war, but despite a letter to President Roosevelt urging that the scale be raised, it was never altered. To offset the difficulties resulting from the low wage scale, a plan, wcalled the W.R.A. Work Corps program, was devised through which it was hoped the evacuees might receive profits in addition to their basic cash compensation.

The principle of the W.R.A. Work Corps was similar to that of the Civilian Conservation Corps, a work group into which evacuees would enlist, thereby assume certain work responsibilities, but in return would receive subsistence for himself and his dependents, plus cash compensations. A unique feature of the plan was that ~~profits~~ ~~from the~~ farms and industries on the projects should be operated as cooperative enterprises and the profits from them be divided equitably among the enlistees, thus providing a supplemental income, beyond the "cash advances" from the W.R.A. Accounts were to be kept of the ~~balance~~ balance between operative costs, and the income produced plus

the increase in capital values. "At the end of each financial year, if the balance sheet shows a profit, this profit will be paid to members of the Work Corps in the form of increased cash advances."^{1/} The aims of this program were to make the projects self-sufficient, mobilize the employable evacuees for constructive work, provide work incentives through the share-the-profit plan, and afford a source of income to the evacuees by which their post-war rehabilitation might be facilitated.

These plans never materialized, for even as the Work Corps program was being developed, it was found unworkable. Preparation of W.R.A. budget estimates revealed that "Relocation Centers were expensive war babies" from which profits could not be realized even under optimum conditions; a complex accounting problem appeared of determining what to charge against operative costs which would be deductible from the income; because of wide variations in the agricultural and industrial possibilities of different centers, there was no equitable way of dividing profits among all evacuees; and there were serious doubts that the use of federal lands for producer's cooperatives of evacuees would receive legal sanction or the approval of Congress. The evacuees themselves balked at certain clauses of the Work Corps agreement, and employment procedures were continued without an enforcement of the Work Corps agreement. Consequently, the Work Corps program was vaguely discussed for several weeks, and then was shelved.^{2/}

Although the Work Corps plan met an early death, in the W.R.A. employment and compensation policy, its skeleton was retained though not its flesh. Especially was this the case at Tule Lake which was

^{2/} Grodzins, Chap. XV, pp. 46-58, and Chap. XVI, pp. 1-6. Gives a full account of the development and decline of the W.R.A. Work Corps plan.

^{1/} W.R.A. Tentative Policy Statement, May 29, 1942. See employment and compensation section for outline of Work Corps plan.

in operation from June 1942, at least two months before the Work Corps program was finally discarded in August. The part retained included the guarantee of basic subsistence, the scale of cash compensations from \$12 to \$19 per month, certain other basic terms of employment, and the emphasis on creating productive communities. The part discarded included the features which Director Eisenhower envisioned as giving force to the Work Corps program, that is, the producer's cooperatives the profits from which would form supplemental earnings and a work incentive to the evacuees, and the Work Corps agreement which would bind enlistees to certain work responsibilities in return for which they would share in the profits.

Several consequences followed. At the Tule Lake Project the administration continued to think vaguely in terms of the Work Corps policy without full realization for some time of the changes in the employment and compensation policy which its discard implied.^{1/} The idea of creating a productive community was heavily promoted, while the evacuee workers rebelled against these demands unless better incentives were offered. With the shelving of the War Relocation Work Corp program, Director Dillon Myer decided that emphasis upon a relocation program, of re-assimilating evacuees into outside communities, was the only remaining alternative;^{2/} but this shift of emphasis

^{1/} The tenacity with which remnants of the Work Corps idea clung to the minds of both administrators and evacuees is indicated in the continued use of such terms as "cash advances" and "the work corps", which referred to cash compensations and the work group in the original plan. The continued use of the terms signifies that people failed to fully analyze and understand the changes of policy which were taking place.

^{2/} The relocation program met unusual resistance. Eisenhower, it should be noted, anticipated this difficulty when he argued in a letter to the President, "The chief disadvantage of this low scale of income is that it rather severely limits many of the evacuees in planning for their reassimilation in American life..." Myer's program of reassimilation was imposed upon this severe limitation of the low scale of income.

produced a conflict between certain features of the Work Corps program, a plan based on the assumption of war-duration communities, which were retained and installed at the Tule Lake Project, and the features of the relocation program which assumed the temporal character of centers. For instance, just at the time that the farm project and the construction of tent factories called for increased numbers and efficiency of evacuee workers, the seasonal leaves program, considered the first step in the relocation program, was activated withdrawing almost a thousand men of the most employable age groups from the labor force. Finally, some publicity of the Work Corps plan was given evacuees at assembly centers in a W.R.A. pamphlet called the War Relocation Work Corps, and raised hopes that evacuees might share in the profits of the center or at least germinated the notion that they should be allowed to share. Throughout the summer and fall of 1942, questions were occasionally addressed to the administration concerning the possibility of organizing the farm into a producer's cooperative.

The inability to establish profit-making enterprises at the centers determined in large part the characteristics of the economy, and also the social life, at the projects. The Tule Lake center was a community parasitic, as perhaps any place of internment is likely to be, for withdrawal of W.R.A. financial support would have caused the residents to starve, or necessitated complete reconstruction of the economy. The bulk of employees worked at the self maintenance of the community and very little was produced which had an exchange value in the outside communities, yet the project was far from self sustaining. Tule Lake was a community of low economic opportunities, and there-

fore of inadequate work incentives. Because the W.R.A. held the purse-strings and all private enterprise was excluded on the project, the economy operated on a highly centralized system of controls in which the W.R.A. performed all the hiring, supervising, and discharging of evacuee employees, except for a small number working for the evacuee owned and operated consumer cooperative, and set standard regulations applying to all evacuee employees.

The regulations determining the conditions of employment and compensation for evacuee employees were set forth in a series of administrative instructions from the national office, thus standardizing these policies for all the projects. While these policies underwent constant change, their main features remained fairly uniform and involved the following underlying conditions. (1) Employment was voluntary, but any person 16 years of age or more was eligible for work. Since the project administration provided work for almost every applicant, there was virtually no unemployment at the project during the first year, except in the case of those who were unemployable. (2) The occupational skills of evacuees were classified, and insofar as possible each employable evacuee was to be given work consistent with his vocational qualifications. (3) Compensation was paid at the rate of \$12, \$16, and \$19, per month, according to the following schedule: Group I, \$12 per month, ~~to all evacuee~~ an "entrance rate" for new workers, trainees, partially qualified workers, and apprentices; Group II, \$16 per month, to all evacuees not included under Group I or III; and Group III, \$19 per month, for jobs requiring exceptional skill, ~~or otherwise making~~ considerable formal training, responsible supervision of others, or otherwise making an

exceptional contribution to the community welfare. The bulk of evacuees fell under the Group II Classification. (4) The work week was set at 44 hours, eight hours daily from Monday through Friday plus half a day on Saturday.

(5) Unemployment compensation was paid an evacuee who had registered for work but had not received employment within 15 days, unless he had refused to accept suitable work offered him, had been discharged for cause, or was unqualified for employment. Upon application to, and certification by, the Employment Division, unemployment compensation was to be paid at the rate of 60 percent of the primary classification for which the applicant was registered for work, i.e., \$7.20, \$9.60, or \$11.40 per month. ⁽⁶⁾ In addition to cash compensations, each person employed or eligible for unemployment compensation was to receive supplementary allowance for clothing for himself and his dependents. Clothing allowances were paid at Tule Lake according to the following schedule:

	<u>Annually</u>	<u>Monthly</u>
Persons 16 yrs. of age or over	\$45.00	\$3.75
Persons 8 to 16 yrs. of age	39.00	3.25
Persons under 8 yrs. of age	27.00	2.25

(7) Finally, W.R.A. guaranteed basic subsistence to all evacuees at the project, including, food, medical services, housing, and education, regardless of their state of employment.^{1/}

Because of the great number of workers on the Tule Lake W.R.A. pay roll, the variety of work in which they were engaged, and the lack of time clocks where workers would punch their time cards daily, a staff of time-keepers was necessary to record the hours of work of every employee. During the initial months, the routine of computing time for the individual worker was poorly organized, there

^{1/} The following Administrative Instructions determined the policy of employment and compensation:

- a. Administrative Instruction No. 10, June 17, 1942.
 - b. Administrative Instruction No. 27, September 1, 1942.
- Also, all revisions of the above.

were several changes in procedure which caused much confusion and delay, and complaints against the timekeeping section frequently arose from the workers. The procedure finally adopted was that of requiring the workers within each section to post their time twice daily /on a sheet prepared for the purpose, the timekeepers to copy this information on individual cards for each worker, and the bookkeeping section to transfer the data from the cards in computing individual paychecks at the end of the month. The procedure was laborious. Furthermore, there was much delay in wage payments during the early months because of the inadequate facilities for getting the payroll from the U. S. Treasury to the individual worker. At Tule Lake, there was one cashier bonded for \$15,000 who could handle only this amount at any one time, and had to account for his payments to the Regional Office in San Francisco before receiving a further sum. Since the payroll at Tule Lake amounted to a total of about \$105,000, there were considerable delays before the entire group of workers could be paid.

Since the administrative organization was divided into departments on a functional plan covering all the ~~occupational~~ activities on the project, the division of labor on the project was organized on the same line; that is, for each of the administrative divisions ---administrative management, community services, transportation and supplies, agriculture and industry, internal security, employment and housing, public works and construction, and the legal aid and reports offices---there was a staff of evacuee workers supervised by the head of the division. The following table indicates the distribution of evacuee workers at Tule Lake in the various divisions

and sections by wage classifications and sex.

TABLE I.
Evacuee Workers in Major Occupational Groups by Wage Classes & Sex
Tule Lake Relocation Center, February 28, 1943

Section or Division	\$12		\$16		\$19		Total
	Male	Fem.	Male	Fem.	Male	Fem.	
Project Administration.....			255	66	40	23	384
Mess Operations.....			796	1,002	444	13	2,255
Warehousing.....			98	30	16	8	152
Transportation & Operations.....	2		221	2	33	6	264
Health & Sanitation.....			235	398	88	36	757
Education.....			53	168	32	42	295
Internal Security.....			124	3	21	3	151
Housing & Employment.....			16	39	2	8	65
Other Community Services.....			82	130	100	13	325
Building Construction.....			424	14	52		490
Building & Ground Maintenance.....			701	65	26	1	793
Fire Protection.....			111	1	15	1	128
Agriculture.....			117	21	51	4	193
Industry.....			10	1		4	15
Community Enterprises.....	6		44	43	119	48	260
Total.....	8		3,287	1,983	1,039	210	6,527

Data from: "Japanese War Relocation Centers," Report of the Subcommittee on Japanese War Relocation Centers, Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, 78th Congress, 1st Session May 7, 1943.

(34.5%)

One-third of the population of workers was engaged in mess operations, the task of feeding themselves. On the average, each of the 63 mess halls had about 32 mess workers to feed a population of about 250 residents. Those in the \$19 classification were generally cooks stewards, or ~~dixitians~~, while the \$16 group was largely made up of waiters and waitresses plus a smaller group of kitchen helpers. 12% are listed as engaged in buildings and ground maintenance, that is, as janitors, boiler firemen, carpenters, and the like. Another 12% were engaged in the maintenance of health and sanitation within the community, in-

cluding the entire range from doctors, dentists, nurses, pharmacists and other professionals to chamber-maids and garbage collectors. Except in the cases of agriculture and industry to a minor degree, the functions at Tule Lake had no productive relationship with the larger economy; in other words, the overwhelming proportion of employed persons at Tule Lake were engaged in maintaining the population at the project and produced very little wealth. It must be remembered that relocation centers were economically isolated, that its warehousing, transportation, construction, and other similar activities, served only the people in the center.

Thus, the income of the residents came entirely from the W.R.A., and since there was little employment on the project that was wealth producing for the W.R.A., the wages to the evacuees took essentially the form of "doles". The evacuees felt fully justified in accepting such compensation in view of their enforced evacuation, but they were also keenly conscious of the limitations of opportunities within such an economy. The incentive to work, consequently, was very low, not merely because the wage compensation was inadequate, but also because there was no possibility of increasing the wage scale.

Several lines of endeavor were tried by the W.R.A. to increase the productivity of the community, and also increase the income of the residents, though with relatively poor success. Very early in its program, the W.R.A. envisioned four main employment opportunities for the evacuees, within project boundaries: agricultural production, public works, manufacturing, and community services. Except for the last item mentioned, the emphasis of the W.R.A. was upon productive endeavors which would yield incomes for the evacuees and the agency,

and add to the wealth of the nation.

The site of the Tule Lake Project had been rented from the U. S. Bureau of Reclamation under a contract holding for the duration of the war plus a certain number of additional days, containing clauses by which the W.R.A. guaranteed to continue reclamation programs already started by the Bureau. These contracted properties included large sections of already reclaimed lands of the highest fertility--- of such quality as to make Tule Lake the outstanding agricultural project of all the ten relocation centers, and cause considerable irritation among the local farmers who had expected to occupy shortly this hitherto uncultivated territory. The aim of the W.R.A. was to use the large number of agricultural workers sent to Tule Lake, reputedly excellent farmers, in cultivating the fertile soil for a large scale farm enterprise that was intended gradually to encompass several thousand acres.

During the summer of 1942, 2,500 acres were placed under cultivation, 1,157 acres of which were planted with barley as feed for livestock on the project, and the remainder in potatoes, cabbages, turnips, rutabagas, peas, onions, and other similar crops. Apart from the fertility of the soil, the W.R.A. saw several reasons why the farm should prove a great success. (1) Under the aegis of the W.R.A., the farm received large and ready capitalization; (2) because of the ample capitalization and the centralized control over all the equipment and services at the project, the Tule Lake farm had the advantage of vehicles, machinery, storage space, and the services of feeding, medical aid, accounting, construction, and technical assistance, such as few privately owned farms could have; (3) due to the preparations made by the Reclamation Service, irrigation was

abundant and readily accessible; and (4) there was an abundance of cheap but experienced farm labor. But these advantages were also the sources of disadvantages, the chief difficulties being traceable to the lack of incentive for the workers and the disorganization within the centralized control. (1) Because the project farm was capitalized by the W.R.A., authorization from the national or regional offices had to be received for all major decisions, and there were certain limiting regulations upon expenditures; (2) evacuee labor, while abundant, cheap and experienced, proved an erratic labor force because of their dissatisfaction with center conditions and created considerable difficulties to the management; (3) while centralized control permitted an exceptional availability of facilities and services, the difficulties of coordinating the various departments, the "red tape" involved, and the conflicts among them, frequently caused delays that would not have been experienced in an independent farm; and (4) because the evacuees arrived at Tule Lake in the summer of 1942, rather late for planting, the farm program was undertaken in a great hurry and the best use of the land was not made. Moreover, although the agency had funds with which to acquire machinery, equipment was often difficult to get because of wartime shortages. There were also disagreements over the types of machinery necessary or desirable, and of putting the equipment to optimum use. In addition, a hog and a chicken farm were coordinated with the farm and the community such that garbage from the latter was utilized for hog feed and feed crops were grown on the farm.

The farm crew was a focal point of labor disturbances throughout the period of community unrest from August through October 1942, but

in a lesser degree the same troubles existed in other departments as well. Among the chief complaints were those regarding inadequate and poor food, the lack of work clothing and the consequent personal expenditures for replacement, and slow wage payments. These were general conditions affecting all the workers, but because the farm crew performed hard manual labor on the outside, their needs were greater than in the case of most crews. The feeling that the Caucasian farm supervisor was incompetent was especially strong among the farmers who prided themselves on their record as "good farmers", and led to poor discipline within the work crew. The discontents of an evacuated/^{and confined}group, the series of conflicts in the community which were among the main topics of conversation at the farm, the quarrels of their Caucasian supervisors, all served to demoralize and cause inefficiency in most of the farm work groups.

But the condition which perhaps most affected these workers was their low wages, and the resulting feeling that they should not expend more energy than their compensation required. Farmers who had formerly worked from dawn to dusk on their own farms without complaint, demanded to have their time of travel to and from the project center to the project farm accounted in their work time. Their actual work time each day frequently did not exceed $6\frac{1}{2}$ hours. And when it was learned that a small amount of the project farm products were being marketed on the open market, but with no returns to the evacuees, the reaction was that the farmers were willing to grow crops for themselves, but not for people who had evacuated them especially in view of the absence of returns to them for their work.

In the early stages, ambitious plans were also laid for manufacturing enterprises on the project, but only the furniture factory

was ever actually established. Its purpose was mainly to make school furnishings for the Tule Lake and other center schools, but much the same troubles as on the farm were encountered here, and the enterprise was never enlarged beyond the employment of a handful of workers. Of several other industries discussed, one which was attempted was the tent factory for which two large factory buildings were constructed. In August 1942, the W.R.A. received from the Army Quartermaster Corps a contract to make 7,500 tents of the Army pyramidal type, with operations to begin no later than November 1. Although the authorization to start construction of the factory buildings was received in late August, the buildings were still incomplete in December and work on the tents had not been started. However, in December the Community Council and the Planning Board started negotiations with the Sun-Tent Leubbert Company, which held the sub-contract, on the conditions of employment. The gross income of the project was expected to be \$75,000, with about two-thirds (or \$50,000) calculated as labor cost which would be the income to the evacuees. It was expected that about 300 evacuees would be employed, with 150 employees on two shifts per day. Piece work was expected to prevail, but during the initial training period it was expected that time work would constitute the large percentage of workers, with the following wage stipulations:

These workers will begin at the rate of 40¢ per hour and with intervals of 4 weeks 5¢ increase in the rate will be given until such workers reach the maximum of 60¢ per hour.^{1/}

But it was in the question of compensation that the most serious obstacles arose. Since only a small percentage of the total evacuee work force could be employed at the tent factory, and all

^{1/} Fact Finding Committee on Tent Factory, "Report to the Tule Lake Community Council, Dec. 9, 1942.

aliens were excluded from employment on an army contract, it was felt that some percentage of the earnings had to be deposited with the community trust fund, a pool that was to be equitably divided among all the evacuee workers. After deducting \$27.00 for subsistence cost to the W.R.A., Social Security, and California Unemployment Insurance, the factory worker was to receive \$16 as the regular W.R.A. monthly wage, \$3.75 for clothing allowance, and 12 $\frac{1}{2}$ % of his own gross earnings as his bonus. The remainder was to be deposited with the trust fund. That is, on an assumed \$100 gross earning per month, the individual worker would receive \$32.25 as his wage, while \$40.75 would be deposited with the trust fund.

The tent factory never materialized, for the net earnings of the workers (\$32.25) was considered too small to be an incentive wage for them. But it was also felt that the allotment for the trust fund (\$40.75) had to be maintained in fairness to all other workers who would have the task of operating the community in which the tent factory workers would continue to dwell. The effort of the Council was therefore turned towards getting a reduction on the amount scheduled for return to the W.R.A. which included amortization on the Buildings, subsistence cost of workers, and other expenses, but the W.R.A. was adamant. Negotiations were carried on into January 1943, but the W.R.A. contract with the Army was finally cancelled in February.

This was the one industry at Tule Lake which might have yielded an income beyond their wages, but the offer was rejected and it is of interest to consider why the evacuees rejected it. After deducting all costs, the net savings to the community would have amounted to about \$36,500. The chief problem was of dividing this amount to provide an incentive to the tent factory workers, yet retain some of it

for the total labor force which was working for the welfare of the community. Since there were over 6,000 evacuee workers in the labor force, any division of \$36,500 among them would have yielded only a few dollars of savings/at best, while the tent factory workers could not have saved more than a couple of hundred dollars at most. In relation to their low monthly wage from the W.R.A., the wages from the tent factory work might have been considered substantial, but the evacuees desired prevailing wages of outside communities for work of this type. While they were willing to accept under protest the low wages of the W.R.A., adjusting themselves by expending only as much energy as they felt the wages justified, the evacuees had a quite different attitude towards doing productive work for outside companies. The work at the project was considered for the welfare of the community; work for the Sun-Tent Leubbert Company was for an outside group, and an element of calculation of the relative advantages and disadvantages entered in that was not evidenced in the former.

Other projects were discussed, but failed to materialize. There was a vague discussion of establishing a Quartermaster Corps Property Rehabilitation Station at this center employing 700 or 800 evacuee workers at regular Civil Service rates of pay,^{1/} but nothing came of it. ~~Had~~ Public works programs were likewise discussed, and there were possibilities of continuing with the reclamation service on the Klamath Project started by the Bureau of Reclamation, but only a minimum activity in this direction was carried on. Industrial programs at Tule Lake were therefore at a minimum, and the bulk of work at the project was for the purpose of enabling minimum subsistence for

^{1/} Letter from Coverley to Dillon Myer, January 14, 1943.

the community.

Work Opportunities and Incentives

It has been previously remarked that in all the labor strife occurring at the Tule Lake Project, there was none in which the main issue was a demand for an increased wage scale. Where complaints arose, they generally were in reaction to the administration's demand that the evacuees display more industry than they were wont to show, for the latter would then retaliate that if they were expected to work harder, they should be better paid. The relative absence of complaints about the wage scale was not a reflection of their satisfaction with the rate of compensation, but rather indicated their economic ennui while at the center. A great many evacuees, especially the older generation, looked upon their stay at the center as an enforced vacation during which it was hopeless to expect economic opportunities; they were more concerned to have an uninterrupted flow of a decent level of subsistence, for it seemed hopeless to demand an increase of the wage scale. For the duration of the war, then, they were more concerned to gain security than economic opportunities, though the latter would by no means have been neglected were there any assurance of opportunities. The point at which insecurity feelings about income became noticeable was not when the wage scale was first announced, but when the W.R.A. increasingly stressed the relocation program and thus aroused concern among the evacuees as to how to finance themselves on the outside.

If articulation of demands to the administration for better compensation were seldom heard, resentment of the restricted economic

opportunities was ever present and perhaps may be considered the chief source of all evacuee discontent about their economic situation. Considering their dissatisfaction with the rate of compensation, it is somewhat surprising that no serious effort was made to demand higher rates of pay. The occasional, half-hearted efforts expended in this direction give emphasis to the point that the evacuees saw little hope of improved compensation rates from the W.R.A.

In the summer of 1942, the Committee on Better Living Conditions of the Community Council presented a resolution to the administration requesting among other things a minimum scale of cash advances of \$30, \$35, and \$40, and a family allowance of \$5 to each non-working member of the family.^{1/} At the Farm Strike of August 1942, which occurred just after the passage of the resolution, one of the main arguments used by the foreman of the construction crew who urged the farmers to return to work was that the resolution had been sent to Mr. Shirrell in San Francisco and was then being considered by the Regional Office. The strikers should return to their jobs, the foreman argued, until these negotiations were completed and the decision of the W.R.A. on this and other requests be ascertained. The resolution received no response from the W.R.A., but the failure to receive increased compensations caused no reactions in the community such as might have been felt if a basic issue had been rejected.

A more persistent effort of the evacuees to have their income increased was their frequent inquiry into the possibility of having the project farm converted into a producer's cooperative yielding profits to the evacuees. At an Issei Meeting of November 5, 1942, the following discussion occurred as one Issei questioned the project

^{1/} Minutes of Community Council Meeting, August 17, 1942.

director regarding the possibility of a producer's co-op.

Mr. Aoki (Block 5): At the last meeting you said that the policy of the W.R.A. is to relocate the Nisei as fast as you can get them out. Those remarks set me thinking: why would it not be possible not to relocate the young people far from the center, but rather for the W.R.A. to lease the farm land to them for private enterprises. If the Nisei were permitted to do this, they would find far greater incentive in working on the farm, they would be able to save something for their post-war resettlement, and they would be in a position to offer work opportunities to other Japanese. My idea is, why can't the W.R.A. allow the farm to be operated as the canteen is, by Japanese?

Shirrell: I don't know about that. There are many problems involved in trying to establish something like that. But one thing we talked about at San Francisco was regarding next year's plan for the farm project. I've been worried about the farm all year, but we did pretty well, I think, considering the handicaps under which we operated. Our idea for next year is to plant seeds on our farm for distribution to other farmers. As you know, there is a very great shortage of seeds in the United States today, seeds for crops such as sugar beets, cabbage lettuce, etc. We are planning to split up the farms in small lots, say of thirty or forty acres each, and let small groups farm them in the way they want. We hope that this may offer more incentive than under the present system. We shall keep separate accounts for each plot, and we shall be able to show how each group of workers is progressing. I'm afraid it's impossible to change the present wage rate of \$12, \$16 and \$19, but I think this system may increase personal interest in the farm. I had thought, when I left, that this idea was entirely original with us here, but when I arrived in San Francisco, I was pleasantly surprised to learn that Mr. Zimmer and Mr. Cozzens of the Regional Office had been thinking along very similar lines. I was extremely happy to know that our ideas coincided. As for leasing the farms, there are many obstacles in the way of such a program, and I fear it may be difficult to get.

Mr. Aoki: My idea was, why can't we run the farm as we run the canteens?

Shirrell: When Mr. Myer was here, he declared that he was trying to push such an idea through, and it still remains a definite possibility, but there are numerous legal and other difficulties standing in the way, and I can't say whether the thing will succeed.

Issei: I'd like to ask a similar question. Why can't we run the farm on a cooperative basis?

Shirrell: That's exactly what I've been talking about. The W.R.A. has been trying to clarify the possibility of getting its production program under some form of a producer's cooperative, but as I've said, there are numerous difficulties that stand in the

way. In the first place, we're not sure that a government agency can legally permit a producer's cooperative on land within its jurisdiction. Furthermore, Congress would have to pass upon the idea. The whole thing is still a possibility, but I can't promise you that we'll get it.^{1/}

The first suggestion from Mr. Shirrell, that a method be devised for increasing the personal interest of farm workers in the project, of course utterly failed to touch the problem in which the evacuees were interested. The evacuees were interested in some kind of economic program that would enable a larger income and future security; the W.R.A. denied the two most evident ways in which these ends might be achieved, by either increasing the wages or by permitting private or cooperative enterprises; and having these two channels closed, sought artificial means of stimulating work incentives. Shirrell himself was quite convinced that the low rate of compensation was at the basis of the labor difficulties of the project, and in a letter to the Regional Office, pointed out the need for a revision of the wage scale if the discontent were to be removed.^{1/}

It was evident that the W.R.A., for whatever reason, had no intention of altering the wage scale and gave little hope for the establishment of producer's cooperatives. As some evacuees occasionally put it, "The ~~g~~overnment evidently doesn't want us to make any money." The wage scale was reluctantly accepted by the evacuees as an invariable factor, and their adjustments to their work were made on the other factors such as work hours, level of efficiency, and acceptance of supervisory control, which were variable. No strikes occurred in demand of increased wages, but there were persistent demands for prompt wage payments, better food, issuance of work clothings, better working conditions, better hours, and the

^{1/} Miyamoto Notes, "Issei Meeting," November 5, 1942.

^{2/} Letter from Shirrell to Fryer, October 7, 1942.

removal of certain Caucasian supervisors. The characteristic thinking of the evacuees in this respect was that of a farmer who declared, "Since the W.R.A. is paying us only \$16 a month for working in the fields under the hot sun, they ought at least to feed us properly."1/

The attitude toward the lack of work incentives was noticeable in a complete catalogue of petty acts by which they ~~displayed~~ betrayed their feelings about the low rate of compensation. On the farm, the foremen complained that in smoothing irrigation ditches, the workers would smooth only their own side and "didn't give a damn about other people's ditches." This behavior was interpreted as a characteristic lack of cooperation among the Japanese. Men who signed in at the dispatching station would jump off the trucks en route to the farm to spend their day at home, and trucks returning at night when checking in with the guards at the gate would be found ~~to be~~ missing several men from their full complement. Others who went to the farm would sometimes spend their whole day working on their private patches. When asked to work, these men would argue that the individual asking them was not their boss, but when the foremen tried to ascertain which workers belonged to whom, some of the foremen were skeptical that this would serve any purpose since, "It's no use talking to men who want to plant their own seeds." One of a group of farmers who were complaining about the lazy ones among their co-workers remarked:

The irrigation people are lazy. When irrigating barley, they need only one man there, but they get a whole gang out on the field. They work only half an hour in the morning and half an hour in the afternoon. The rest of the time, they sleep out in the barley field. No one gives a damn, and no one wants the responsibility of telling them to work harder. The attitude is that for the small amount of wages, there's no use getting

1/ Miyamoto Notes, August 11, 1942.

people mad. The best thing about this farm is that you can learn; if anyone wants to try anything, he can try it.^{1/}

A similar situation existed in a number of other work crews where the evacuees were under pressure to produce at a rate comparable to workers on the outside. A major complaint at the time of the construction crew strike was against the use of Caucasian carpenters and their retention at a time when the evacuee construction workers were being transferred to other jobs. The Caucasian carpenters, it was argued, should be discharged and their pay be divided among the evacuee workers. It irked the evacuee workers that they had to do the same work with Caucasians who in a day received almost as much as evacuees received in a month. Furthermore, the Caucasians, it was felt, were being used to set the pace for the evacuees, a comparison that was resented because the latter had no incentive to work as the outsiders did. The furniture factory strike was likewise based, in large part, upon the effort of the Caucasian supervisor to get a higher rate of production out of his workers. After a long period of conflict between the Caucasian supervisor and the evacuee foreman, the latter resigned. Unfortunately for the furniture factory, the workers walked out with him. In later relating his difficulties with the supervisor, the evacuee ex-foreman declared: "Rouner has no understanding of the people he works with nor any desire to acquire such an understanding. He isn't interested in them as people. His chief interest lies in greater production."^{2/}

From the standpoint of the evacuees, they had no incentive to work and it seemed to them that they should not be expected to work more than their compensation required of them. They saw a wide gap between themselves, and those who were being paid prevailing wages

^{1/}Najima Notes, July 11, 1942.

^{2/} Billigmeier Report, "The Furniture Factory Strike."

on the outside. A group of Nisei were discussing the difficulties Mr. Shirrell must be having in directing the project, and sympathizing with him, when a young Nisei girl remarked, "I don't feel sorry for him. After all, he gets \$700 a month to do his job."^{1/} The figure was slightly exaggerated, but the exaggeration itself reflected a rather characteristic line of thinking among the evacuees, that wartime workers on the outside were accumulating generous earnings from which the evacuees were being excluded. On the other hand, the evacuees felt that the administrators should see the situation as the evacuees saw it, and make allowances for low productivity on the basis of the wages they were receiving. In fact, most evacuee workers were ^{of} the opinion that they were doing more than their wages called for. At the basis of most of the labor conflicts between the evacuees and the administration was the difference in conception of how much the evacuees should be expected to do.

If the rate of compensation could not be adjusted, the workers themselves adjusted the working hours to correlate with their compensation. The irregularities in the working hours of the farmers have already been noted. Following the farm strike the W.R.A. attempted to enforce stricter hours regulations, first because of an incident involving the arrest of one of the farm foremen for being out of bounds during working hours, and also in line with a general administrative policy of stricter hours. Convoys ~~from and to~~ ^{between} the camp and the farm were to leave the camp at 8:00 a.m. and the farm at 5:00 p.m. The farmers threatened to strike if these hours were strictly enforced, and the result was that trucks returned to the center area without their required escorts at the usual hour. One of the major points of

^{1/} Miyamoto Notes, October 13, 1942.

dispute in the construction crew strike and virtually throughout the operation of this crew involved the question of working hours and work efficiency. An immediate cause of the construction crew strike was the lay-off of sixty workers who were caught resting after the demolition of a building. Christenson, the Caucasian construction foreman, considered by the evacuees a "slave-driver", gave these workers a ten days leave of absence without pay, and on the following day a general ruling was issued to the construction workers requiring that they work a full eight hours making up for any lost time during the noon lunch hour by working after 5:00 p.m. These rulings coupled with other grievances which had been accumulating over a period of weeks aroused a great deal of resentment and led to a strike which lasted three days. Despite frequent efforts of the administration to enforce the eight-hour work day regulation, such efforts only resulted in the rebellion of the workers and were found impracticable as a method of getting more work out of the crews. In actual working time, it may be doubted that the construction crew averaged more than six hours per day, and it was a cardinal principle with them that they should be allowed to set their own pace and receive a liberal amount of "smoke time".

Perhaps no work crew was more sensitive to the question of the adjustment of working hours than the coal crew. No work group was more under the pressure of production, for during the late summer, fall, and winter, ~~xxxxxx~~ when coal was regularly shipped to the project, ten cars a day would arrive which the administration, concerned about demurrage charges on standing cars, would desire to have unloaded as fast as possible. The coal crew which generally numbered no more than a hundred workers, largely because of the difficulty of getting coal

workers, on the average unloaded about three cars daily of the ten arriving, which of course led to difficulties for the administration and insistence on their part that the crew improve their efficiency. The latter argued from reports of outside workers, two of whom were said to be capable of unloading one car a day, that there were more than enough workers to unload the ten cars daily. In the eyes of the workers, however, coal work was the most disagreeable job on the project---it was dirty, required constant laundering, held little prestige and rather caused disparaging remarks about their dirtiness, was strenuous, poorly equipped, and otherwise had decided disadvantages in comparison to other \$18 jobs. In rebuttal of the administration's comparison with outside workers, a comparison which the workers deeply resented, the evacuees pointed out the lack of automatic conveying devices, the lack of trucks particularly of the dump type, the smallness of Japanese workers, and the poor rate of compensation at the project.

The crucial issue between the coal workers and the administration, however, was the insistence of the latter that the coal crew put in eight hours a day, whereas the workers refused to work more than four hours. The remaining four hours was considered just compensation for doing undesirable work, since no other compensation beyond that of other workers was offered. On the occasion of the first strike, a compromise agreement was reached that the coal crew work six hours a day; two hours to be compensation for washing up and laundering. The net effect in adjustments of this type, in which the workers yielded in part to the administrative demand for longer working hours, seldom resulted in greater output, for the workers then adjusted their rate of production to gain compensation in

the
other ways than by/shorter working days.

In the case of the coal crew and other groups which performed undesirable work, the administration would have been justified in yielding to shorter working hours and giving other forms of compensation for the performance of this work, but their reluctance to depart from the eight-hours a day ruling suggests a fear that yielding in one case would lead to the necessity of yielding in others. There was reason ~~for~~ to fear such a development, for the relaxation of controls over one group tended to have a circulatory influence upon other groups. It was not uncommon for work groups to compare their hours with those of others, and adjust to the common practices prevalent among their class. A farm worker remarks of the maintenance crew, one of the hardest working groups at the farm, "The maintenance crew and grease wagon boys are having disagreements because the grease crew goes home early, at 3:00 p.m."^{1/} Mr. Rouner of the furniture factory, in describing the events leading to the factory strike, says, "The first disagreement was caused by the order to work them a full eight hours, or pay for actual time worked. Other departments working less and still turning in eight hours made them angry at me."^{2/}

Unfortunately, the administration rather insisted on the eight hour day, and made persistent efforts to have the rule enforced. The Tulean Dispatch of September 8, 1942 carried a front-page item announcing new work hours, which stated:

Definite work hours was officially announced by Director Elmer L. Shirrell last Saturday following a report from all division chiefs. The consensus of all workers indicated that following schedule of hours will be most convenient. These hours will become effective starting today, Sept. 8, and will be in force until further orders.

Week Days

8:00 a.m. to 12 noon

1:15 p.m. to 5:15 p.m.

Saturdays

8:00 a.m. to 12 noon. ^{2/}

^{1/} Letter, Rouner to Shirrell, Sept. 26, 1942.
^{2/} T.D. 2-8-42

In the background of this announcement was the concern of the administration with the irregular work hours maintained by many work groups, and the desire to get greater productive efficiency out of them. The newspaper announcement was supported by instructions to Caucasian supervisors that the eight-hour day should be enforced, but it was seen that in the farm crew this ruling led to a threatened strike, and in the furniture factory constituted one of the grievances leading to their strike. Even among the office workers, the new work hours ruling happened to coincide in time with the loss of motor transportation to them to and from their homes to the place of work, and aroused murmurings of a strike although no action was taken. Announcements of this kind were not long effective in gaining greater efficiency and longer hours out of evacuee workers, but they did arouse the antagonism. One of the characterizations often given to Caucasian foremen who were disliked by evacuees was the label "slave-driver", a term indicative of their feeling that the foremen demanded more of evacuees than was justified. Invariably, the better liked supervisors were those who made no special point of increased productivity, but gained worker support through indirect means. The Japanese foremen were generally more acutely aware of this attitude of the workers than were the Caucasians, and where his personal authority permitted, made allowances of easier rates of production or of shorter working days to maintain the support of his men. In fact, the foremen frequently spearheaded the workers' conflicts with the administration by demanding for them the conditions of work which they desired.

To be sure, not all workers were agreed about the desirability

of the slow-down, and there was a substantial minority who disapproved of "loafing" or of taking too much time off from the eight hour day. But individuals who set too fast a pace were generally reproved or ostracized by their co-workers; a rather common laboring group phenomenon that was atypical of the prevacuation Japanese American workers. Rouner mentions a case, "Ogura, by the way, is the good cabinet saw man who the others threatened if he did not slow up. He told them that was his natural gait and rather than join in with them, he left."^{1/} The reasons for Ogura's departure were other than the one given by Rouner, but the antagonism of the workers for a fast worker may well be believed.

One other form of compensation over which there was much controversy was the ^{work}/clothing allowance. The initial W.R.A. instructions on employment and compensation (Administrative Instruction No. 10) made no provisions for the distribution of work clothing, although the issuance of a general clothing allowance was announced. The instructions of September 1, 1942 (Administrative Instruction No. 27) mentions the issuance of uniforms.~~xx~~

F. In addition to the clothing allowances, special uniforms shall be issued free of charge to the following persons: Cooks, mess personnel, doctors, nurses, and police and fire department personnel, in those cases where the wearing of uniforms is required by the Authority. Also, special work clothing, such as rubber boots, welding gloves and masks, etc., shall be issued free of charge, where their use is so required.^{1/}

Nothing is ever said about work clothing other than in the instances mentioned. However, apart from the case of mess workers, the main complaints about the lack of work clothing came from the industrial workers: the farmers, construction workers, coal workers, and furniture factory workers. In the strike of every one of these latter

^{1/} Letter, Rouner to Shirrell, Sept. 26, 1942.

^{2/} W.R.A. Administrative Instruction No. 27, Sept. 1, 1942.

groups, the clothing issue figured very prominently. At the Tule Lake Project, announcements were made in ^{July} ~~August~~ 1942 of the issue of work clothing to all outside workers, and to those requiring uniforms. An announcement in the Tulean Dispatch of July 29, 1942 read:

Free clothing will be available soon to workers whose duties demand excess wear on their clothes, Director Elmer L. Shirrell stated today.

Qualified for the free clothing will be the farmers, maintenance crew, and dining hall workers.^{1/}

< It was in the late summer of 1942 that the demand for the distribution of work clothing was greatest. By this time, workers had been at the project for two months, and those engaged in hard manual labor found their clothing and shoes wearing out. The farm workers, for instance, contended that they were required to wash their clothes frequently because of the dustiness of their work, had to use their own laundry soap, and that both clothes and shoes wore out rapidly because of the alkaline character of the soil. Their main contention was that on a wage of \$16 a month, they could not afford to pay for their work clothing out of their own pockets. > In addition to the demands for work clothing, there were demands for boots by irrigators, gloves, aprons, and other clothing equipment necessary for various types of farm and packing shed work. Similar demands were made by the construction crew. On August 11, the issue was raised directly to Project Director Shirrell in the effort to emphasize the seriousness of the discontent regarding work clothing, to which the latter replied that, "The matter has been taken up with the Regional Office, but ^{I'll make} further inquiries about it when I'm in San

^{1/} Tulean Dispatch, July 29, 1942.

Francisco."1/ Five days later, when the farm crew was still discussing the pros and cons of continuing their strike which had started on the day before, Shirrell wired an announcement that "shoes have been purchased for issue to enlistees engaged in hard outdoor labor."2/

The clothing issue was closely tied in with the very acute question of evacuee expenditures at the project, for it was the relatively high living costs at the project while receiving a minimum compensation to defray the costs which caused evacuees to ^{make} their work clothing demands one of the persistent issues in a series of strikes. The wear on shoes was thought to be exceptionally great for those living at the center, which was possible in the light of the lack of motor transportation and the amount of walking people did on gravel roads. The complaint was that full soles on shoes cost \$1225 and up---"That's as much as we were paying on the outside."3/ In addition to shoes, dungarees and work shirts were among the necessity of the workers, and also heavier clothing for the anticipated cold winter for which the majority of the California people were unprepared. The limitation on the amount of baggage which evacuees were able to bring to camp also restricted the amount of old clothing on hand and necessitated unexpected purchases. Cumulative expenses for work clothing thus was likely to cut deeply into the small monthly wages of the evacuees, and it was this which made the clothing issue an important demand to the evacuees. On a \$16 monthly wage, the range of freedom in expenditures was extremely limited; that is, a few major items of expense would completely consume the entire amount very quickly. Therefore, from the evacuee

1/ Miyamoto Notes, August 11, 1942.

2/ Tulean Dispatch, August 16, 1942.

3/ Miyamoto Notes, August 18, 1942.

point of view
/it was urgently necessary to get the W.R.A. to assume the cost of work clothing; in fact, they saw it as their right to demand that the W.R.A. do so.

The first needs for work clothing appeared as soon as the evacuees arrived and became employed at the project. In many cases, men who had hitherto not been engaged in manual labor prior to evacuation and therefore did not have clothes suitable for this purpose found themselves in this type of work and under the necessity of having to purchase clothing for their new functions. By the last of July 1942, work clothing demands in both the construction and farm crews were prominent, and it was also at this time that the administration first announced ~~the~~ the issuance of work clothing to outdoor workers. By the middle of August when the Farm Strike occurred, the work clothing issue was a crucial matter to the evacuees, and the workers were making vigorous demands upon the administration to fulfill their promises of work clothing. At a Council meeting about this time, Hayes, in replying to the demands from Councilmen on this issue, declared:

Shoes are coming next week, we ordered about 1,000 pairs of them, and jumpers for workers are coming soon. We placed a requisition for them several weeks ago, and we went out to find every pair of shoes that could be spared for our use. But these things take time; you can't ask the Government to rush out and buy things for you people because a need ~~has~~ suddenly arisen. You have to remember, too, that there are serious shortages of shoes, clothing, and other essential goods, and that you can't get these things as you could before the war. Etc. 1/

To the evacuees, however, the issue was one of immediacy. They were unsympathetic to the plea, "These things take time...", for the idea was already well imbedded, ~~that~~, "You'll never get anything from the W.R.A. unless you keep asking for it." Where the W.R.A. consider-

1/ Miyamoto Notes, August 11, 1942.

ed a month's delay between the announcement of a policy and its institution a normal expectation under government procedure, the evacuees saw the developments in ^{their} ~~the~~ day-by-day progression as they daily experienced the handicaps of their shortages. Strikes based on the work clothing issue among other reasons threatened throughout the month of August, and was stemmed in the farm and construction crews by the issuance of shoes, dungarees and mackinaws in the first week of September.

Since clothing was not issued to all work crews at the same time, and certain crews received only a minimum of clothing issuance, a question of equality appeared in the other crews. In the furniture factory crew, for instance, a major grievance appeared because they were not given work clothing comparable to that given out-door workers. Rouser reports:

About two weeks or so ago, the men, through their foreman Asazawa, requested more clothing. Said they did not have enough to keep warm, especially if a night shift was put on as intended. I put in a request for it but was informed that they could get only work clothes and their regular allowance.

A day or so later, even though the night shift was called off by addition of another warehouse for assembling, they made a demand for clothing which was again turned down, and Mr. Eastman gave them a talk. After grumbling, stalling on the job and pestering the foreman for several more days, they stopped work and issued an ultimatum that if clothing was not furnished as it was to other departments, they would no longer work. I again relayed their request again was advised that they could not have it as they were not engaged in hard outdoor labor. However, before I reported back to them, Mr. Hayes gave them reasons why they were not entitled to the out-door clothing but ended up by giving them a pep talk, saying that if they really got in and worked and put in a full 8 hours day, he would get it for them even though he might have to pay for it himself. This apparently satisfied them and I returned to office with Mr. Hayes.

It was about an hour later when I returned and they were in another huddle and insulted because Mr. Hayes intimated that they were not already doing a good day's work. Even though I

agreed with the idea that they had not been doing enough (at least as far as half the crew was concerned), I spent half an hour getting them satisfied and back to work.1/

The troubles of the furniture factory were essentially based upon the bad relationships between the supervisor, Mr. Rouner, and the evacuee workers, but this situation gave impetus to all the workers' grievances including their demands for more clothing. There were other reasons basic to their interest in additional work clothing. The workers in the furniture factory were closely identified with the construction crew which received outdoor work clothing, and the former therefore demanded the same treatment. Moreover, they were virtually the only group of industrial workers occupied at an in-door job, because of which they were excluded from receiving the more adequate clothing issues provided outside workers.

Among the mess workers, too, while the major controversy revolved about their demands for the discharge of Mr. Pilcher, Assistant Mess Steward, an important contributory factor in the mess hall strike of October 1942 rested on the demands of the workers for work clothing. Uniforms had been promised the mess workers, other departments had received their allowances while the mess workers had not, and it was contended that the wear on/~~the~~ ^{their} clothing was as great as in the case of out-door workers. The strike was settled with an agreement, among other settlements, that their work clothing should be issued as soon as possible, and by the end of the month, mess workers were provided with the promised uniforms.

All these limitations of opportunity were bound ~~be~~ to be blamed by the evacuees upon the evacuation, the Caucasian majority, the Government, the W.R.A., and the project appointed personnel. The presence of Caucasian personnel receiving the comparatively muni-

ficent Civil Service rates of compensation emphasized the contrast between the meagre pay of the evacuees and those of non-evacuees. Considering the differences in their economic situation, nothing was more aggravating to the evacuees than to have the Caucasian personnel make demands of greater efficiency upon them. The common criticism of those administrators particularly disliked by the evacuee workers was that, "They don't have any understanding of our position, and have no desire to understand." The desire of the evacuees, clearly, was to have the appointed personnel understand ~~and~~ their lack of work motivation, their economic problems and subsistence needs, and ~~try~~ try to improve these conditions rather than make further demands upon them. However, there was reason for the evacuees to resent some of their supervisors, for there were not a few who held attitudes similar to that of Joe Hayes, who remarked, "I'll tell you about evacuee psychology. A third of the evacuees here are a lot better off than they were before evacuation; there's another third who are as well off here as they were before; and there's another third that lost out because of the evacuation." 1/

Beyond maintaining themselves at the level of subsistence, the evacuees had very little interest vested in the economy of the project. A greater show of industry would not have contributed anything to their future security or power, and their main interest was only of working sufficiently to ensure their monthly wage, and maintain the operation of the project. On the other hand, the Caucasian personnel were cynically viewed as having a definite interest in the performance of the project since the efficiency of project operation would yield a better record and increased compensations for the Civil Service workers. Fundamentally, the main barrier to work in-

centives for evacuees at the project was their lack of personal control over economic opportunities. Whether a man worked hard or little, he received the same rate of compensation. In fact, the non-workers were almost as well off as the workers since the W.R.A. gave the same subsistence rates to all evacuees regardless of their condition of employment, and the workers had only the advantage of small wage compensations. The effort to charge the non-workers for their subsistence costs, however, led to rebellion on the grounds that since the evaucees were involuntarily evacuated, it was the Government's responsibility to support them regardless of whether they worked or not. The performance of the worker at the project had but the vaguest relationship to future opportunities, for there was little possibility of saving, ~~and~~ there was no chance of economic advancement, and most work at the project could not be considered steps toward security in the post-war years.

The one evacuee group which maintained a fair level of work efficiency and least objected to the eight hour day was the staff of clerks, secretaries, professionals and others in the administrative ~~staff~~ offices. Here, there were better opportunities of learning skills which could be used to advantage on outside jobs. The work itself was intrinsically more absorbing and often held greater responsibilities than for those in manual occupations. The work was relatively clean, held the prestige of "white collar" jobs, and production was less concretely measurable than in the cases of contraction, farming or coal unloading, such that demands for higher rates of production were less likely to be heard.

The Canteens and Other Consumer Functions

General merchandise stores called "canteens" were in operation at the Tule Lake Project from the second day after the opening of the center to evacuees. The first of these, Canteen No. 1, was opened by Mr. Kendall Smith, Chief of the Community Enterprises Division, on ~~the~~ May 29, 1942, and in the following weeks as the project was gradually filled to capacity, other stores--No. 2 in Ward II, No. ~~3~~ in Ward ~~IV~~, No. 4 in the Administration Area, and No. 5 in Ward III--were established to meet the expanding consumer needs and the inconvenience of distances. As originally defined, Community Enterprises held a rather indefinite status within the administrative structure, for while it was a division of the W.R.A. administration and its Division Chief was therefore responsible to the Project Director, it had the rather transient function of temporarily supervising community stores until the evacuees themselves, through some form ^{to} of consumer cooperative organization, could assume control of canteen operations. This plan was necessitated by the policy of the W.R.A. that it would not itself operate enterprises selling goods to evacuees; no doubt a measure to avoid legal entanglements as well as accusations of profiteering from the evacuees.

The stores were ^{initially} stocked on the personal credit of Mr. Smith and the mistaken belief of creditors, deliberately left uncorrected by Mr. Smith, that the W.R.A. was subsidizing the stores. Profits of the canteens were held in trusteeship by Mr. Smith until such time as the consumer cooperative was organized and control could be transferred to the evacuees. Talk of organizing the Co-op was started by the administration shortly after the opening of the project although

the movement was not started until somewhat later, and its actual establishment did not occur until December 1942.

The canteens were always objects of much criticism and suspicion from the evacuees, at least from that section of the population which was concerned with problems of economic security after the war. The problem of consumer enterprises was thus directly correlated with the economic losses suffered by the evacuation and the low rate of compensation received by evacuee employees. Because of the restricted income of the people, there was a vocal minority in the community which felt that the sale of consumer goods at the stores should likewise be restricted, to the sale of only those goods basically necessary to the people. It was not merely economic considerations which led them to this conclusion, but there was the attitude that because the Government had been responsible for the disrupting of Japanese American economy as a result of evacuation, and had promised adequate maintenance of the people as a reward for cooperation with the evacuation, that the WRA should therefore provide all that was necessary to the people. Hence the outcry against the sale of staple foods such as rice, ^{and} /canned goods, ~~and~~ which it was felt the W.R.A. should provide in adequate quantities, and as well the sale of any "luxury" goods which only tempted people to unwise expenditures. Suspicion of the Community Enterprises was made doubly great by its initial control under the W.R.A., which while only a temporary condition was thought by the evacuees contradictory to the announced policy that the evacuees would themselves have control of canteen operations. Because of this contradiction, and for other reasons of distrust of the Community Enterprises, accusations

even of graft was made against the W.R.A. trustees. The fact that the center economy was completely controlled and standardized for all residents, that the canteens were the only consumer enterprises on the project and held a monopoly over all sales, readily led to the opinion that the latter too should be controlled and standardized to the purchasing power of a people living under center conditions.

The controversies about consumer enterprises at the center thus centered about the questions of what limitations to place upon the canteens and how to control them. Various opinions appeared from time to time, pro and con, on such issues as: Should the canteens sell at cost? Should "luxury" goods be sold at the canteens, and what might be considered "luxury" items? Should the W.R.A. operate the canteens on a non-profit basis, or should the evacuees organize a Co-op for the purpose of control? These questions in turn had their ramifications in a series of other issues. But the central objective in all these discussions was clearly to effect as great a savings as possible for the evacuees while not too rigidly restricting the varied consumption needs of the residents. If the controversy sometimes became heated, it was the result of the acute economic limitations felt by a great many families and their interest therefore in curbing temptations to expenditure.

The issue of the high prices at the canteens was one of the first controversies to appear at the project. There were several reasons for special interest in the canteens at the time. As recent arrivals, the evacuees had need of a great many commodities to furnish their homes, and make them comfortable and attractive. It will be remem-

bered that the W.R.A. made no housing provisions other than shelter, beds and stoves, and that the W.C.A.A. had restricted the amount of their baggage, so that household expenses tended to run high where any effort was made to achieve even a minimum comfort and attractiveness of the home. Those who had spent time at the assembly centers ~~had invariably~~ where the canteens were very limited facilities often were disposed towards a spending spree after the period of self-denial. (Compared to those of some projects, Tule Lake canteens were well stocked and attractive to customers.) New canteens were being established with the arrival of each new major group, and questions arose concerning their control. And, as Kendall Smith later revealed, there was initially a 20% mark-up of prices in the effort to reduce the debts of Community Enterprises incurred in establishing the stores.

The immediate reaction was demands that canteen prices be lowered to a cost-plus level. Certain evacuees who had been in merchandise business before the war were quoted authoritatively as stating that the prices on certain goods in the store were marked up thirty or thirty-five percent, an unnecessary and exorbitant profit to the Community Enterprises in the eyes of the evacuees. At the same time, there were those who argued that canteens were unnecessary since the W.R.A. was supposed to provide all the necessities of the evacuees and the existence of the canteens, in fact, was likely to cause the W.R.A. to neglect the provision of those items which were sold at the canteens. The element that argued in favor of the abolishment of the canteens, however, were in the minority and the bulk of opinion was agreed that canteens were a necessity.

K: I think that the canteen is necessary. There are many necessary things we have to buy there.

M: I think it's necessary, too. Even though it requires money, it's necessary if you have children.^{1/}

But this was not an unqualified admission that the canteens should be permitted to operate on a laissez faire basis. Among those who were agreed as to the necessity of the canteen, there was a substantial number who felt that definite restrictions should be placed upon the nature of the goods sold at the stores. ^{Some of} /The councilmen, for example, who reflected fairly closely the attitudes of the community were of the opinion that the canteens should be curbed in the sale of items which the W.R.A. might be expected to provide automatically. Because of the lumber shortage and requests from certain customers for the stocking of 2 x 4 and other lumber, the canteen put them on sale, but brought immediate repercussion from the community that it was the W.R.A. responsibility to purchase lumber for the people and that ~~the~~ its sale at the canteens was providing the agency with an outlet for evasion of its duty to the people. Referring to the sale of foods, for instance, Councilman Oshima stated:

I think the Council ought to take steps to stop the sale of certain food items. According to my information, the canteen is selling Blue Rose rice by the sacks, and they are selling other items like takenoko and other canned goods over the counter, but I think these items ought to be kept off the shelves. Many Issei are buying up a great deal of these foods in anticipation of the food shortage, and they are spending money that they really can't afford to spend.^{2/}

The same questions were raised even after the establishment of the cooperative controlled and operated by the residents. In the following case the reference is to the distinction between "luxury" goods and "necessary" items, rather than of goods for which

^{1/} Sakoda Journal, Sept. 8, 1942.

^{2/} Miyamoto Notes, August 11, 1942.

W.R.A. should be responsible, but the purpose was essentially the same in both cases. The intent was to limit the sales at the canteens to necessities which the W.R.A. would not under any circumstance provide. At a discussion taking place at a Co-op General Assembly,

Katagiri: Until now there were some items which were difficult to stock in full. I tried to buy a pair of pants. I finally found it in #1 canteen after some search. On the other hand there are things which I consider luxury and unnecessary goods. Can't something be done about those?

Miyamoto: It may seem that Mr. Smith and I tried to sell unnecessary goods to the Japanese. This camp is very funny. You can't sell anything cheap. They advise us to stock with expensive goods.

Katagiri: I was thinking of such things as the floor lamp. I think there are other necessities that should be stocked.

Miyamoto: There are people who come in individually and ask for some of those goods. We feel that it's best to buy things for these people as cheaply as possible. That's why we have stocked with radios, for instance. We bought in lots because it's more economical. The same thing goes for the floor lamp. People want them for weddings. It's only the way you look at it. We try to get what the people want as cheaply as possible. But if the Board of Directors feel that such goods should not be stocked, then I shall follow that.1/

The contrasting philosophy by which Kendall Smith and Miyamoto, the managers of the Consumer Enterprises, operated the stores is further elaborated by Miyamoto in another place where he states:

We start with the assumption that where there is consumer demand for certain goods, that we should provide the people with those goods, for if they can't get what they want in their own stores, they will go to the mail-order houses to buy them. In the long run, this is much more expensive for the people than if we were to provide people with them. However, if the Council feels that certain goods should be kept off the shelves, I'm sure that Mr. Smith would have no objections to removing them. I hope you will understand that Mr. Smith's conception of the canteens is that they are, in fact, a community enterprise, and that the people should decide for themselves how it should be run.2/

The conflict arose because of the variation among the residents

1/ Sakoda Journal, December 3, 1942.

2/ Miyamoto Notes, August 11, 1942.

in their purchasing power. Families with two or three adults working, and without small children, could support themselves reasonably well on their combined income, and generally had fewer anxieties about future economic insecurity than those with children or with a number of dependents. Some families had substantial savings and some continued to receive rents from property which they had rented to others. But there were an indeterminate number of families which were seriously concerned about their future economic security, had large numbers of dependents upon whom money had to be spent at the center, and whose savings and income at the center were insufficient to allow mental ease. Moreover, parents and heads of families who had to consider the means of rehabilitation after relocation were concerned to place curbs upon the expenditures of less responsible members of whom it was thought that they did not give adequate consideration to the problems of the future. The theory of business propounded by Kendall Smith and Miyamoto, that demand should determine the character of goods sold at the canteens, was satisfactory to those who could afford to spend, but was entirely unsatisfactory to a substantial number who were concerned about savings for the future.

In line with their originally announced policy and to overcome the disagreement among the evacuees as to the measures of control necessary in the Community Enterprises, the W.R.A. urged evacuees to assume supervision of the stores themselves through the organization of ~~the~~ a consumer cooperative. There were, however, a number of reasons why the evacuees were initially reluctant to accept the Co-op. To a bulk of the people the consumer cooperative was not only a new and unfamiliar idea, but it also smacked of an idealistic plan of

economy not well grounded in practice. Tom Yego who was perhaps the spearhead of the anti-Co-op group was particularly skeptical of theorists who wished to impose a complicated cooperative institution upon the people when a simpler form of business relationship between the evacuees and the administration in the operation of the canteens held possibilities of functioning better. At a meeting to discuss the Co-op movement, Yego argued:

My main objective is to ask questions, and not give a set speech. What type of store should we have? I have been told we can have only one type (the Co-op). I think there was one more alternative--a WRA store. Is a WRA store more economical. I understand that if the Coop is to take over the percentage will have to be raised, so we'll have to pay more. I don't see why the WRA doesn't continue to pay the wages of the employees. At mass meetings we were told that we would have a consumer's cooperative and a producer's Coop. The policy is changing and we are not going to have a producer's coop. I don't see why the distinction should be made between these two types of coops, and they can't continue to operate the store as they have done until now.^{1/}

The movement to have the W.R.A. retain supervision of the Community Enterprises rather than transfer it to the control of^{an} evacuee operated cooperative was, at first, very often expressed in the view, "Why should we take over the canteen~~s~~ from the WRA if they are running well now?"^{2/} The only adjustment which many evacuees desired was that the prices be lowered making the profits of the stores a minimum, but otherwise having the W.R.A. continue operation of them. The solution was simple. Most people were agreed that canteens were necessary, but the evacuees were also intent on savings and therefore an interest in purchasing goods at a minimum price. Since profits were not wanted, all that was wanted was for the W.R.A. to function as distributors of goods purchased at wholesale rates.

There were additional reasons why this form of organization was considered superior to a consumer cooperative. Under the Co-op

^{1/} Sakoda Journal, Sept. 21, 1942.

^{2/} Sakoda Journal, Sept. 16, 1942.

plan, the evacuee~~s~~ members were to be responsible for the payment of a \$50 per barrack store rent, payment of workers, and all overhead charges, but the evacuees felt that the W.R.A. should pay these expenses. Operation of the stores by the administration which assumed the burden of these expenses and sold goods at cost plus, it was thought, would relieve the evacuees of the unnecessary operational costs of the stores. Moreover, there was some concern that Caucasian wholesalers would in some instances refuse to deal with an evacuee operated cooperative, whereas the W.R.A. would not suffer any such stigma and could have more goods available to the evacuee purchasers. Furthermore, since the stay at the centers was to be of temporary duration, there were questions as to how the net profits would be divided at the closing of the stores and of who would take the responsibility for liquidating the stores. Finally, there was the danger that the canteens may not prove a successful business venture, resulting in possible losses to evacuees, or to some members of the ^{cooperative.} ~~the/XXXXXXXX~~

By August 25, 1942, the W.R.A. issued an administrative instruction which determined that consumer enterprises had to be organized under the form of consumer cooperatives, or that there would be no canteens for the evacuees. The alternative suggested by Yego, that the W.R.A. should operate the stores, was never seriously considered, and the administration in fact refused to countenance[~] this possibility. But the ~~people of the~~ community was quite unaware of this instruction and for at least a month thereafter there was still some doubt as to whether or not the people wanted a cooperative. The efforts of the administration to encourage the Co-op served sometimes to arouse the suspicion that the W.R.A. was seeking to avoid the re-

sponsibility of operating a store for the people. From the standpoint of the latter, the agency was responsible for minimizing the expenses of the evacuees, and the administrative operation of the stores was one of these responsibilities.

I had an argument with Councilman Suzuki over cooperatives. He felt that all the coop did was take people's money away from them and that the prices should be lowered. When I said that if people got dividends it wouldn't make much difference financially, he said, "But how do we know we are going to get dividends?" The keto might decide to keep it himself."1/

Why doesn't the Government run it (the canteen) and sell at cost? We don't know whether the War Relocation Authority wants to unload it's burden on us. Are they going to unload their mistakes on us? If a cooperative is operated, then it's less likely that the W.R.A. will foot some of the overhead. They shouldn't do that.2/

First, the W.R.A. owes the evacuees a living, since we were forced by the evacuation to give up our means of livelihood, and the cooperative program sidetracks this more basic issue; and, second, the Japanese people would be held responsible under a cooperative plan should the stores fail, as seems likely in view of the extremely low wages paid us in contradiction to the prevailing high prices.3/

The controversy over the question of what constituted "unnecessary expenditure" and the responsibilities of the W.R.A. in supplying the wants of the evacuees reached its peak in the theater project issue. A demand existed among some sections of the community, particularly the youthful Nisei, for the showing of movies, but there were no facilities available at the project convertible into a theater. Kendall Smith, at the advice of Mr. Shirrell, purchased in September 1942 just prior to the freezing order on lumber, a sufficient quantity of lumber for the building of a theater, and also a projection equipment. These were purchased on Community Enterprises funds, but unfortunately without consulting the people about the use of canteen profits, which had ~~xx~~ been agreed to by the W.R.A. as a primary condition in the administration's relations to the con-

1/ Shibutani Diary, July 22, 1942.

2/ Sakoda Report, "The Cooperative Movement in T. L." p. 9.

3/ Ebid., p. 10.

sumer enterprises. When the fact of the purchases became known to the people, therefore, much resentment was aroused for several reasons. The evacuees pointed to the agreement of the W.R.A. to consult the people on all disbursement of canteen profits and the failure of the administration in this instance to heed its own promise; and it was also recalled that the W.R.A. had promised in earlier days to build an auditorium for the evacuees. These were the immediate issues in the controversy.

In the later discussion of the theater project, however, when the Nisei Council supported the plan of building a theater at the people's expense, and thus brought themselves in conflict with the majority of the Issei who were opposed to the plan, the issue became one of arguing the economic and social desirability of a movie theater. Smith argued that the theater would not cost more than ^{which} \$8,400/would amount to a per capita outlay of only fifty-six cents, and admission charges were to be 5% for children and 15% for adults. Aside from social and moral objections to the theater raised by the oppositionists, the basic arguments of this group were that/^{construction of} the theater building was the responsibility of the W.R.A., that movies were unnecessary in any case, and that such expenses would seriously deplete the savings of the evacuees. A 15% admission, it was pointed out, was one-third of an evacuee's daily earnings. Because of the relocation policy, the number of theater patrons might be rapidly curtailed, nor would the building have any value at the time of liquidation. It was calculated that an average 10% admission before a capacity attendance of 800, three times a day, would amount in a year to the astonishing total of \$84,400; too great an economic bur -

den for evacuees. The theater proposal was finally defeated in a referendum by a two to one majority. It is difficult to determine accurately the weight to the various arguments against the theater given by the oppositionists, but there is no doubt that the economic question played an extremely important role in the defeat of the proposition.

The conflict over the theater proposal contributed toward the acceptance of the consumer cooperative by the people. Evacuees had from the beginning suspected Kendall Smith of possible graft, but his part in purchasing lumber and equipment for the theater with the people's funds, but without first consulting them, crystallized suspicion against him and led to the conclusion that evacuee control over the community enterprises was essential.

Transfer of Consumer Enterprises control to the Co-op in December 1942, however, did not completely settle the difficulties of the canteens. The people agreed to the Co-op because, first, it was the only course left open by the W.R.A. for the maintenance of canteens on the project; second, the people wanted control of the consumer enterprises; and, third, the Co-op had been widely promoted as the best means for the people to control the business, share equitably in the profits and maintain favorable relations with outside business houses. Nevertheless, the primary interest of a majority of the residents was still to purchase goods at the minimum ~~price~~ cost, that is, to have the canteens operated at a minimum expense to the evacuees and a maximum savings for them.

However, it was not always evident to the residents that the Board of Directors of the Co-op, which was responsible for setting

the policies of consumer enterprises, always kept in mind what the people considered their own welfare. In the nature of the Co-op movement, its leaders who were those largely selected to the Board were a selected class somewhat unrepresentative of the masses, especially of that group most antagonistic to the Co-op. To become interested in Co-op principles they had to be individuals with a social point of view as over against those who in business matters held a strictly self-interest view. As policy makers of a business enterprise, they had to follow rules of "sound business practice" which the populace did not always understand. Since it was those who were thought to have some knowledge of business matters who were chosen to leadership, the leadership tended to be composed of the relatively more successful businessmen and farmers who held a different point of view from those of a less economically successful background most interested in having the sales of the canteens curbed. Finally, because the Board of Directors had to deal with Caucasians, familiarity with Americans and the English language constituted one of many criteria by which the Board was selected, and thus tended to compose a group more sympathetic to the administration than the masses. If Kendall Smith and the W.R.A. was suspected during their ^{management} ~~control~~ of Community Enterprises, the Board of Directors of the Coop encountered the same difficulties in only a lesser degree.

There continued to be much talk of the large profits of the canteens and an interest in seeing that these profits were returned to the people as rapidly as possible. The Co-op Board, however, was concerned not to deplete the cash reserves which were necessary to

credit
maintain good/standing with the Caucasian wholesalers. In fact, Caucasian wholesalers and accountants/ the Board had been repeatedly warned/to maintain a cash reserve of \$100,000 or more which was considerably beyond the reserves at the time of the transfer to the Co-op. By mistake, during the membership drive of November 1942, an announcement was made that a \$2.00 certificate of interest would be paid to members of the Co-op which was taken to mean an immediate refund. Because of the pressure of outside groups to sustain a large reserve for credit purposes, and also the possibility that the Co-op might be required to pay income taxes, the Board ruled that refund payments should be postponed for a period of three months. The Board, however, was afraid to announce this postponement because of possible repercussions on its membership drive, which suggests what the sentiment in the community was regarding the canteen profits. At one of the General Assemblies shortly after the Co-op took control of the stores, the following discussion occurred concerning the disposition of profits.

Issei: I heard that there was a profit of \$30,000 and that the members would receive \$2 each. But that seems to have been changed in the present By-Laws. We are not supposed to make any profit in here. The canteen was run for the benefit of the Japanese people, and should not be any profit. The profit should be refunded to the people. If people buy scrip, there should be sufficient cash fund. If the profit were returned to the people, then income tax would not be paid. Has the Board of Directors considered this?

Kuramoto: Mr. Miyamoto thinks that the income tax doesn't have to be paid; it is going to be set aside. The announcement of \$2 was a mistake, but certificates of interest will be issued.

Issei: How about the Board passing that the patronage dividend will be refunded?

Kuramoto: The credit structure has to be maintained.

Issei: There should be no reason to worry about credit if you buy most of the things for cash.

Kuramoto: (He explains)

Issei: This I heard from Mr. Jacoby at a wardens meeting, although I am not a warden. The warden discussed a matter of three months ahead. Mr. Jacoby said that it was useless to figure ahead so far because we can't stay here forever. Do we have to stock up so much? Why can't we do cash business?

Kuramoto: For the amount of business that we do, credit is necessary.
(Everybody is snickering at the persistent questioner)

Issei: I mean that we should do cash business. Why can't we borrow the \$200,000. (A reference to an agreement of the W.R.A. to assist the Co-ops with financial backing to the extent of \$200,000.)
(The chair is taken by Miyamoto)

Miyamoto: The \$200,000 applied to all centers. (He goes into detail and explains Mr. O'Connor's stand. The creditors put out \$120,000 and the Japanese put out only \$5,000.) Let's pay our \$1 and run the store in the way we want to, shall we? (He receives a good applause.)

Assembly

Despite the tendency of the ~~Board~~ to ridicule the Issei's point of view, his doubts probably reflected questions in the mind of a substantial minority of people in the community. The number of people in the community who had an understanding of the business operations of the Co-op operated canteens ^{were} ~~was~~ small, and the ideas expressed by this individual were in line with the original views of the anti-Coop people.

There were other similar instances of differences between the Board of Directors and the Assemblies, ~~and~~ or the people whom the Assemblies ~~Board~~ represented, which suggested the continued dissatisfaction of the people with some features of the canteen operations. For instance, the arrangements for ~~cashing~~ checks had always been a

source of irritation to the evacuees. Initially, the Bank of America branch at Tule Lake had cashed all checks at the project, but for a charge of ten cents. Workers who received government checks represented having to pay/a fee to cash their/monthly pay checks of \$16, having to stand in long lines to get their checks cashed, and frequently finding themselves inconvenienced by the irregular hours of the bank (the Bank of America usually appeared twice a week at the project). The initial decision of the Board was that a five cents charge should be made for all checks cashed, except those members using 50% or more of government checks to buy scrips at the canteens, whose checks would be cashed free of charge. In Ward II, the announcement of this policy led to opposition, partly for political reasons as ward committeemen tried to assert their independence of the Board, but also as a result of popular opposition. At a Ward II meeting, the following discussion occurred.

Ikeda: If you don't bring important matters back to the block the Board is going to be looked upon like Mr. Smith was. (There ~~is~~ a lot of opposition to charging 5¢ for cashing checks. They believe the people are going to think the Co-op is trying to make money. (The ward is for not charging anything at all. There is general assent on this matter. No formal motion is made.

Nishida: The directory (of project residents) should be distributed free of charge.

Matsumoto: Regarding the branch office (a proposed central warehouse and distributing point for all center Co-op, located outside the centers) which was approved by the Board, I am opposed to the Co-op expanding its business activities in this way.

Ikeda: I think the important matters should be brought back to the wards.

Chairman: I have always tried to consult the ward whenever it was possible to do so.

Sakamoto: The people are not in favor of profit-making. The canteen is for profit alone.

Nishida: Everybody has very little money. We don't want them to be spending a lot of money.

(The chairman answers that the Board cannot do anything if it doesn't have the support of the wards. He is angry and about ready to resign.)1/

The opposition was, of course, to a number of policies approved by the Board which the Ward II committee-men disliked. As between satisfying the people and maintaining the charge for check cashing services, the majority of Directors reversed their original opinion in favor of doing away with the fee, but there were those who felt that some advantage should be given the Co-op members, and also strongly opposed the cashing of personal checks.

The Board approved of the purchase of a panel truck and a passenger car, but some people questioned whether the latter were necessary ~~if~~ since a panel truck would serve all purposes. It was explained that the passenger car was necessary to take Caucasian dealers visiting the project around. The Board approved withdrawal of funds from the Co-op/^{to}~~for the~~ purchase ~~of~~ gifts ~~from~~ for Kendall Smith, Miyamoto, and Mr. Shirrell, all of whom were leaving the project in December 1942, but there was later criticism because some people felt that Smith and Miyamoto did not deserve gifts. There was even the hint that these people had already received their "cut" from the Community Enterprises profit. As disbursers of public funds, the Board of Directors was in a precarious position for the evacuees viewed the profits of the canteens as their own money and solicitously watched the acts of the Board in dispensing the fund.

The canteens and the Co-op were subject to criticism from another direction. Even during the operation of the stores as Commu-

1/ Sakoda Journal, December 7, 1942.

nity Enterprises, there had been much public feeling about some of the clerks in the stores who were thought to give poor service to the customers, favored their friends, and even stole from the cash register. Once the Co-op gained control, the antagonism of some customers increased with the feeling that they had a right, as members of the managing group, to criticize clerks for poor service.

Donao: There's a canteen employee in our block who refused to become a member.

Hashimoto: There's a very tough (namaikina) girl who refused to hand out pennies in return for scrip. The manager said that he knew about her, but he didn't want to fire her because she might call him bad names, or it were a boy might even do him harm. He didn't think that it was worth the trouble to fire anyone. He would fire a person if a word came out from the Management Committee.1/

.....

Ikeda: There is a girl in the #1 canteen who takes money. I heard it three times. A man bought two packages of cigarettes free of charge, and another man came along and bought a pack of cigarettes and said that he would not pay anything because she had given cigarettes away free. The boy handling fruits gives poor services. How about getting clerks numbers.

Ikegami: Everybody is against numbers.2/

Most of the clerks in the stores were Nisei who often spoke Japanese poorly and did not understand the proper way to deal with Issei customers. A few were affected by the social life surrounding the canteens--young fellows and girls used the stores as one of the social centers of the camp--and lost efficiency as a result. However, evacuees who in their own jobs complained of the demands made upon them by the administration for a mere \$16 a month compensation, often made demands for high efficiency from the canteen workers who were paid the same rate of compensation. In many in-

1/ Sakoda Journal, Dec. 17, 1942.

2/ Sakoda Journal, Jan. 4, 1942.

stances, it seems that some of the public resentment against the canteen as an institution which deprived the people of their money was vented upon the clerks who were taken as representatives of the canteens. The feeling of having some right to speak to clerks for inefficiency, as well as a certain degree of penuriousness which developed among some people as a result of their need to conserve their pennies, undoubtedly served to strain the relationships of customers and clerks.

Apart from the canteens, no private consumer enterprises were permitted on the project. The ruling was established by W.R.A. Administrative Instructions 1/ and was re-enforced ~~by~~ the By-Laws of the Co-op whereby the right to determine what consumer enterprises would be permitted on the project was relegated to the Co-op. A few enterprises, however, were surreptitiously organized within the community. For the benefit of families who occasionally cooked their own meals at home, ^{at least one} ~~a~~/fish dealer opened a private shop in Block 6 and was alleged to have done a very good business. No known effort was made to curb this practice although the people knew of the enterprise, and it hardly seems credible that the W.R.A. did not know considering that the fish had to be shipped in through the W.R.A. warehouse. At least one watchmaker continued his trade at his home. In other instances, persons with ~~a~~ trades or professions who were not given employment in their field practiced their business in private. An Issei couple, for instance, who had taught Japanese music in Sacramento before the war were denied a position in the recreation music department and therefore opened their own studio in their home and took private pupils. A chiropractor, whose right to be employed by the project hospital, was denied by the medical

staff gave his service under private arrangements. On the whole, however, there were very few efforts to establish private enterprises and when the Co-op was established, some steps were taken to curb individual businesses further.

Apart from the Co-op, therefore, the only other major consumer industry invading the project were the mail-order houses. Chief of these were Montgomery Wards and Sears Roebuck and Company between the two of which a substantial trade was carried on with the Tule Lake Project. No estimates can be offered as to the amount of money which left the project through the channel of the mail-order houses, but it is certain that the figure amounted to several thousand dollars monthly. No effort was ever made to curb the purchase of goods through these houses, except insofar as neighbors and friends would speak critically of families which spent much money on "luxury" goods.