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SUMMARY

By Glenn B. Pinsky  
Fire Protection Section

The War Relocation Projects were erected by the Army Engineers according to the standards for Field Operation Centers. The general structural plans of the Centers, the provisions for fire brakes, the distribution of fire hydrants, and the installation of fire alarm systems were good. Due to the temporary type construction and the geographical location of the centers as well as the lack of critical materials, several conditions, which hindered fire protection, were prevalent. Since the inception of the Centers, the following conditions, which should be corrected if there is need for future Project construction for a similar type of occupancy, were the causes of fires or hindered fire suppression.

FIRE ALARM SYSTEMS

Delayed fire alarms result in many instances in loss of life and property. Although, no loss of life has been suffered at the Centers due to this cause, this type of difficulty was encountered on some War Relocation Projects, due to the fact that fire reporting telephones terminated at the Project P.B.I. board rather than at the Fire Station. The termination of such telephones (Fire Alarm Boxes) at the Fire Station saves time and insures a quicker response to an alarm. At one Center, the fire reporting telephones were installed in buildings and were used for office purposes. These telephones were not accessible at all times. Experience during the life of the Centers revealed the necessity of 24 hour service for reporting alarms and a rapid system of transmitting all alarms.

WATER SYSTEMS

The Water Systems on the Centers were installed for domestic and fire fighting purposes. At first these systems were adequate until the residents began gardening and using the water for irrigation purposes. The overtaxing



of the water supply created a serious hazard, due to the fact that at times the reserve supply of water was not adequate for fire fighting purposes.

Due to the emergency period and the immediate need of facilities for housing, the water mains gave considerable trouble during the first year. Because of the lack of critical material and adequate expansion joints in the mains, much replacement and constant repair was necessary, thus causing accumulated expense. This fact was revealed at some centers. The above mentioned condition made it necessary to install used water mains and required the complete replacement of mains in one Center. If the Centers had remained in operation for a longer period of time, replacement would have been necessary elsewhere. From a health and safety viewpoint the installation of a water system in this type of Project should be given foremost consideration.

Double Roofs At the Centers located in arid areas, the original Standard type of construction was prescribed. During construction a need for ventilation was discovered. Due to the intense heat of such localities, some type of air conditioning was necessary. Air Conditioning units were not available and as a substitute, double roofs were erected. The upper roof was constructed approximately 18 inches above and completely covered the original roof. These roofs were so erected as to provide ventilation both vertically and horizontally over the entire surface. During the occupancy of these buildings, two distinct characteristics of these roofs were noted. First; they served the purpose of making the buildings more comfortable by deflecting the heat rays, second: they acted in the capacity of a flue and presented a serious obstruction in fire suppression. In case of a small fire breaking through the inner roof, the entire building is soon enveloped in fire due to this type of roof ventilation. This fact necessitates the first fire line to be concentrated on the roof rather than the original area of fire. Experience



gained in fighting fires in buildings which have this type of roof has proven the necessity of the construction of some type of fire stop between such roofs. This has proven a conflagration breeder and should be given serious consideration.

#### CHIMNEY AND FLUES

Generally, brick flues which were constructed at some of the Centers gave little trouble with the exception of those at one Center. Liners were installed in all brick flues except those at this Center. In the construction of these flues there was no provision for clean-out doors for removal of soot. At this center, the brick flues were constructed to extend to the ground and rest upon a concrete base. Due to the type of installation and climactic conditions, the flues and bases settled causing the flues to crack. Some of the cracks appeared at points where the flues passed through the floor members. After considerable firing there was an accumulation of soot in the base of the flue, which at times became ignited. Due to the cracks in the flues and the ignition of the soot, several fires which involved floor members occurred. Fire losses from this cause were negligible because of the early discovery. From exterior appearances these flues were apparently safe but created a serious fire hazard. To eliminate this hazard, sand was placed in the chimneys to a level about the floor members, thus incurring a great deal of expense. If these flues had been properly constructed and lined this hazard would not have existed and would not have incurred this unnecessary expense.

At some Centers, terra cotta flues were constructed. Due to the expansion and contraction of heat, these flues cracked creating a serious fire hazard. Terra cotta flues required constant inspection and repair which at times required complete replacement. This constant upkeep incurred consider-



able expense. At one Center, to eliminate this fire hazard, metal liners were inserted in the flues. After the installation of the liners there were no recorded fires due to the flues. Considering the serious fire hazard created and the expense incurred by the use of terra cotta for flues, this type of material should not be used in the construction of flues which involve the use of solid fuel.

At some Centers, some difficulties were encountered due to the installation of metal flues and roof jacks. The quality of these flues and roof jacks was of approved standards. Due to improper installation of the flues, a serious fire hazard was encountered and considerable expense was incurred as close inspection was necessary. Because of the type of buildings upon which these flues and roof jacks were installed and the location of such centers, the constant vibration of these flues caused either their being broken off at the roof or becoming disjointed within the attic space. The seriousness of this condition was that it occurred either during adverse weather conditions or during the time the building was not occupied. This condition demanded close inspection and created unnecessary expense in the replacement of flues. Had the metal flues and roof jacks been installed in the standard manner, little difficulty would have been encountered.

Experience gained during the operation of the Centers revealed the importance of having scuttle holes for the purpose of checking flues, constructed in the buildings of this type of project. Should this type project be necessary at a future date, the construction of such scuttle holes will conserve time; as a great deal of time is required in removing the cross ventilators for flue inspection. From the fire suppression viewpoint, scuttle holes are not necessary but they are a necessity for fire inspection purposes.



#### INSTALLATION OF HEATING APPLIANCES

In most cases the quality of the heating appliances installed at the Centers was of an approved type and the equipment was good. Trouble was encountered due to the placement of these appliances. The original <sup>in</sup>stallations of such equipment in some apartments, mess halls, and boiler rooms did not permit sufficient clearance from combustibles. Due to the necessity of changing the placement of heating appliances to reduce fire hazards, unnecessary expense was incurred. Realizing that this type of construction and the necessity of compact housing brought about these factors; from a safety and conservative viewpoint, the placement of heating appliances should be given careful consideration in the future.

#### FUEL SUPPLY STORAGE

At Centers where oil was used as fuel very little difficulty was encountered due to the storage of fuel. At Centers where solid fuel, especially coal, was used a serious fire hazard was created by the storage of the fuel. At some Centers coal was stored in combustible bunkers which were attached to the buildings; thus, creating a serious fire hazard due to the possibility of spontaneous ignition. From experience of fire losses suffered from this source, the necessity of constructing coal storage bins not attached to buildings was revealed. Due to the fact that these were unauthorized bunkers little thought was given to the safety factor as they were built for convenience. In the future, some means of safe storage of coal should be provided. Such storage would not only provide safety but also conserve coal.

#### ASH DISPOSAL

At Centers using coal for fuel, serious difficulties were encountered due to the lack of proper facilities for the disposal of ashes. Especially during periods of high winds; many runs, which were caused by fires due to the disposal of hot ashes, were made by the Fire Department. During the time of



these runs, the Center was left with impaired Fire protection. Many times the extinguishing of hot ashes required several members of the Fire Department to be out of the Fire Station for several hours. Residents were encouraged to extinguish ashes before disposal but due to the lack of water in the barracks this was not always accomplished. Past experience has revealed the importance of having some type of conveniently located noncombustible ashpit or receptacle for the disposal of ashes. These receptacles should have an ash door that is easily accessible and that will work easily. Experience has revealed that if the ash door does not work easily, women and children are prone to dump hot ashes on the ground or in gutters creating a serious fire hazard.

#### ELECTRIC SERVICE

The lighting service as installed was adequate and efficiently served its original purpose. After some time of occupancy, the residents continually hooked up more electrical appliances; thus overloading the circuit. This condition constituted a serious fire hazard. Although not too many fires were caused from this source, much inspection and constant checking of circuits was required. Dangers of the excessive use of electrical appliances was constantly stressed in a program of fire prevention or more fires might have originated from this cause.

#### SPRINKLER SYSTEM INSTALLATIONS

Sprinkler systems of approved wet and dry pipe types were installed in the Hospitals at the Centers. Generally, the sprinkler head distribution was good with a few exceptions. In some instances, due to the cold climate and lack of heating facilities, insulation of certain portions of buildings became necessary. This insulation requirement impaired the use of the sprinklers to a certain degree. At most centers the water pressure supplying the systems was too low to adequately supply a large number of sprinkler heads in case of a large fire. Fire Department connections were not installed on most of the systems, thus the department could not aid in boosting the pressure in case of a large fire.



At centers in which the connections were not installed, this condition created great concern among those who were in charge of fire protection as fire department connections are an absolute necessity to insure an adequate water supply for sprinkler systems under the existing conditions. In the case of one installation control valves were located in pits beneath the buildings and during a cloudburst were completely submerged in water. Should it have been necessary to shut off the sprinkler system during the time that the valves were submerged, considerable water damage could have occurred. This condition proved the necessity of having control valves accessible at all times.

The original organization of the Fire Department as prescribed by the Administrative Manual was adequate to provide the necessary fire protection for the centers. In all Centers with the exception of two, the administration of the Fire Protection Section was limited to a Fire Protection Officer and one Assistant. During the first year of operation of the Centers or until the beginning of a program of permitting Evacuees to enter the armed services and obtaining terminal and short term leaves, little difficulty in securing a fully manned department was encountered. During the time of the segregation movement great difficulty in fully manning the fire department was encountered at all centers with the exception of one, which was designated as a segregation center. This condition at these centers was alleviated. The evacuee firemen who were very limited in fire fighting experience and training did a good job in fire fighting as they took great pride in being a member of the Fire Department.

The Evacuee Firemen, not having previous experience in fire fighting did an exceptional job of fire suppression on the Centers. Great ability in fire fighting and the desire to serve the Centers was displayed by some members of the department. During some unfortunate disturbances, the Evacuees, through experience having learned the necessity of fire protection, remained on duty to respond to an alarm of fire if such should occur. This service was rendered to the Center through



loyalty and without compensation. The act of these men proves the importance of using the occupants of such projects as personnel in emergency units. The importance of using the occupants of Centers of this type has proven its worth in keeping fire losses to a minimum. After the lifting of the West Coast restrictions for Japanese and the final announcement of the closing of the Centers, difficulty was encountered in keeping the fire Department fully manned due to the rapidity of relocation. The Fire Protection Section was affected as well as other sections. As a result, administrative authority was granted to permit Evacuee firemen to receive overtime pay. This provision sufficed until the Evacuee population within the Centers became so depleted that it was impossible to secure Evacuee fire fighters. Many Evacuee fire fighters, realizing the importance of fire protection and the important role they had taken in the protection of the Centers, requested of the Fire Protection Adviser his influence in retaining them on the Centers in their official capacity until the last occupants had departed. This request was conflicting to the policy of the War Relocation Authority, which aided and encouraged relocation, and was emphatically denounced by the Fire Protection Adviser who assured that adequate fire protection would be provided. This was accomplished by employing one fully manned company of appointed personnel giving 24 hour protection and the training of a volunteer fire department consisting of the available personnel on the Centers. This program has proven very satisfactory in the suppression of fire.

After the Evacuees had left the Center and inspections were completed by competent inspectors, some conditions were found which should have been reported to the fire department headquarters. This inspection should not cast reflections on the Evacuee Fire Inspectors, who were chosen for their personalities and ability to meet people, although with their lack of experiences rendered a valuable service to the Centers. Should this type of project be necessary at a future date, the services of a fully trained fire prevention inspector would prove an asset.



WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY 6

Periodical Government Fire Losses from Inception of the Centers to December 31, 1945

CENTER	Date Inception		July 1, 1943		July 1, 1944		July 1, 1945		TOTAL		Average loss per Fire	Per Capita Loss
	to		to		to		to		No. Loss			
	No. June 30, 1943 Fires		No. June 30, 1944 Fires		No. June 30, 1945 Fires		No. Dec. 31, 1945 Fires		Fires Loss			
	No. Fires	Loss	No. Fires	Loss	No. Fires	Loss	No. Fires	Loss	No. Fires	Loss		
Central Utah	37	9 278.30	67	3,984.00	12	145.31	2	7.36	118	4,414.97	37.41	.558
Colorado River	114	8,000.00	44	20,520.40	48	2,371.84	29	14,937.00	233	45,829.24	197.07	2.566
Gila River	6	15.00	17	18,860.00	9	477.78	1	126.80	33	19,479.58	590.27	1.460
Granada	103	442.00	55	3,797.00	10	549.63	3	1,500.78	181	68,289.41	34.77	.921
Heart Mountain	37	635.00	57	881.01	9	477.78	3	326.84	105	2,320.63	22.10	.209
Fort Ontario					10	90.00	6	11.50	16	101.50	6.34	.103
Manzanar	73	100.00	25	908.00	13	19,224.22	4	6.00	115	20,238.22	184.55	2.043
Minidoka	9	250.00	35	3,040.00	43	909.55	9	100.00	96	4,299.55	44.78	.473
Rohwer	1	72.00	34	17.00	28	1,090.19	0	00	63	1,179.19	18.71	.139
Tule Lake	4	0	39	8,009.00	21	153.93	14	55,645.92	77	63,808.85	815.69	4.120
Jerome	4	0	20	605.00	0	0(closed)			24	605.00	25.21	.077
TOTALS	388	9,792.30	393	60,628.41	203	25,490.23	71	72,662.20	1051	15,819.67	110.19	1.074



WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

FIRE PROTECTION SECTION

Fire Loss - All Centers

May 1942 - December 31, 1945

Reporting Period	No. Fires	FIRE LOSSES			Per Capita Loss	
		Gov. Loss	Private Loss	Total		
Date Inception to June 30, 1943	388	98,792.00	25,065.70	34,858.00	(1)	.25
July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1944	393	60,628.14	32,422.00	93,050.41	(2)	0.998
July 1, 1944 to June 30, 1945	203	25,490.23	12,145.95	37,636.18	(3)	0.6602
July 1, 1945 to Dec. 31, 1945	71	72,662.20	4,213.50	76,875.70	(4)	
Grand Total	1,055	168,572.57	73,847.15	242,420.29		



SUGGESTED PRACTICES FOR FIRE PROTECTION  
AND SAFETY DURING CLOSING OF CENTERS

*All Centers*

Contemplating the closing of all War Relocation Centers, with the exception of Tule Lake, by January 1, 1946, the following suggested practices should apply to all Centers:

GENERAL

1. A n active Fire Department of appointed personnel should be maintained and a well defined program set up for the training of a Volunteer Fire Department among the Administrative Staff.
2. The present water supply should be available at all times for fire protection. This will necessitate the operation of the pump stations until final disposition of the Project. As the relocation trend increases, the use of the water supply should be restricted to only domestic and fire-fighting purposes.
3. The Fire Alarm System should be maintained as of present and a rigid daily inspection provided to insure a means of rapid transmission of an alarm. Authorized persons should be instructed as to the locations of fire alarms in vacated areas.
4. In order to insure an early discovery in case of fire and to aid in preventing unlawful entry into vacated buildings, a system of watchman service should be established in all vacated areas.
5. A standard system of placing "KEEP OUT" signs around vacated areas should be adopted to aid in lessening the possibility of unlawful entrance into these areas.



6. All Government property such as furniture, stoves, etc. in vacated buildings should be removed to a central warehouse. The mess Hall of the vacated block would be a good building to use as this would provide a standardized location for storage of Surplus property in each block.

7. The electric service and refrigeration units in all vacated buildings should be disconnected and the buildings securely locked.

8. A thorough Clean-up program should be promoted around all buildings in vacated areas. The weeds should be cut <sup>and</sup> proper disposal should be made of all debris.

9. No open fires should be permitted unless under the supervision of the Fire Protection Section. Experience gained during the closing of the Jerome Center disclosed the need of close fire supervision and fire prevention.

During the recent inspection trip of the Fire Protection Adviser to all the Projects, several conditions were noted which presented fire hazards and which might result in loss of life and property should fires occur. The conditions as of present and which may arise are listed according to the Center as follows:

CENTRAL UTAH

1. Coal piles which are banked against the washrooms should be removed. Piles of coal create a serious fire hazard due to the possibility of spontaneous ignition.



2..Vacated Mess Halls should be cleaned up and all combustibles, such as coal, stored in these buildings should be removed and the electric service disconnected. The use of the refrigerators should be discontinued.

3. Numerous fire hazards and poor housekeeping were noted in the Auditorium. Closer supervision should be provided for the auditorium to aid in decreasing the danger of fire.

#### COLORADO RIVER

1. Contemplating the closing of Camps #2 and #3, a strict watchman service should be maintained to insure against unlawful entry into these camps and to lessen the possibility of fire.

2. A skeleton crew of firemen should be stationed at each of these camps to insure a more prompt response in case of fire; thus, decreasing the possibility of property loss.

3. Entry into these camps should be prohibited unless by authorized permission.

4. The present water supply should be provided at all times in these camps to provide water to give adequate fire protection.

5. The weeds around all buildings should be cut and all debris disposed of properly.

#### GILA RIVER

1. Contemplating the closing of the Canal Camp, all fire hydrants in the camp should be kept charged to insure adequate fire protection.

2. The suggested practices for the Colorado River Center will also apply to Gila River.



#### GRANADA

1. In vacated apartments which were formerly occupied by members of the appointed staff, the refrigeration units should be disconnected.

2. The water supply should be used for domestic purposes and fire protection only. The use of the water supply for irrigation purposes should be prohibited. In recent months the Fire Protection Section has been without an adequate water supply due to power and mechanical failures.

3. Coal stored in vacated Mess Halls and vacated washrooms should be removed immediately.

4. All weeds should be cut and properly disposed of and no outside fires should be permitted in the area during the closing period, as is now the practice.

5. Due to the leasing of property surrounding the Koen Ranch buildings, the hazards of fire are greatly increased. The group of buildings in this area present a serious fire protection problem and the Fire Protection Officer should place special emphasis on the protection of them. Some program of fire prevention training should be provided for the surrounding leasees stressing the danger of the burning of pasture land and ditches. No fires for the purpose of cleaning the land in the immediate area should be permitted except under the supervision of responsible parties.

#### HEART MOUNTAIN

1. The general condition of this Center are satisfactory and under control. Due to the isolation of the livestock area, a program of watchman service should be maintained in this area which would increase the early discovery of fire and decrease the possible danger of fire.



MANZANAR

1. Vacated buildings such as apartments, were noted to lack window panes and were open. Vacated mess halls were not locked except those used for the storage of Evacuee property. All vacated buildings should be securely locked and the windows boarded or covered to prevent unlawful entrance.

2. It was noted that the flooring in a few of the warehouses was in poor condition. Spaces were noted between the boards of the floor allowing an accumulation of debris under these floors; thus producing a serious fire hazard. Rigid "No Smoking" regulations should be enforced and discretion should be shown in the type of goods stored in these buildings.

3. It was noted that a wooden grease rack, which presents a serious fire hazard, was in direct exposure to the Motor Pool Building. Due to the fact that a hydraulic lift is installed to replace the use of this rack, the wooden grease rack should be removed.

MINIDOKA

1. It was noted that weeds were quite prevalent throughout the Center. The weeds within the Center should be cut and disposed of properly. Due to the fact that the Center is surrounded by weeds and grass, a fire break should be cut enclosing the entire Center.

2. The housekeeping in the Auditorium was poor and presented a fire hazard. Closer supervision should be maintained over the Auditorium to alleviate this condition.

ROHWER

1. The general conditions were found to be satisfactory. Due to the problems of labor shortage as the relocation trend increase, the Fire Protection Officer should promote an efficient clean-up program during which all



fences and improvised sun shades on Evacuee apartments should be removed.



WARRELOCATION AUTHORITY

Washington, D.C.

July 13, 1945

MEMORANDUM: ALL CENTERS ✓  
ATTENTION: FIRE PROTECTION OFFICER

,We are enclosing a copy of the minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Federal Fire Council held December 14, 1944, which we believe will be of interest to you.

If you have not already done so, will you kindly send, as soon as possible, your Monthly Fire Report for June, 1945 and also, the Semi-Annual Report from January 1, 1945 to July 1, 1945.

E.J. Utz,  
Chief of Operations



*all Centers* 2/23/85

INSTRUCTIONS FOR LISTING FIRE LOSSES - FORM WRA-158- Revised

Service Buildings

This includes: Latrines, showers and laundry rooms

Other Buildings

This includes: Recreation, office, regular school, garage and all other buildings not specifically listed. Use this column also for fires in property that cannot be otherwise classified; mark such items with a reference, ie. 1/, and explain the item in the narrative on the reverse side.

Grass-Brush

This item includes: Grass, brush, rubbish, ash fires, etc.. Should any fires under this classification result in spread-fires to buildings, vehicles, etc., resulting in loss to Government or private property, mark with reference to the narrative, where the item should be explained.

Vehicles

All types of rolling equipment should be included under this classification, except where a fire occurs in a building in which the vehicles are stored; in the latter case the vehicles become contents of the building. If the fire started in a live vehicle parked in a service garage it would be a vehicle fire; if the building became involved the building would be a spread fire. Such items should be explained in the narrative, with a reference mark in the vehicle column. Losses to the vehicle should be placed on the line opposite "Damage to Building"; the contents loss refers to content of the vehicle.

Estimated Damage to Buildings

The word "Estimated" should be eliminated from the title. The amounts listed under the different headings should be in accordance with Section 40.4.25C and .25C-3-Item 4-0, should be the total for all fires occurring during the reporting period. The totals for all items should be carried to the total column at the right.

Estimated Damage to Contents

The word "Estimated" should be eliminated from the title. The total Government loss, should be in accordance with the statement above plus any private loss incurred. Private losses should be determined in accordance with Section 40.4.25C-3-Item 4-0 and p. (In order to protect the Government, and provide information regarding the exact number of items lost and their value, it is suggested that signed statements be taken from the persons



Estimated Damage to Contents

lost and that the value stated is correct; should the losses appear to be excessive an investigation should be made for evidence of carelessness, negligence, arson or incendiarism, and statements from the Fire Protection Officer and others should be included in the center file. Should a claim be made that currency was lost, a careful search should be made for the ashes and assistance given in recovery of the destroyed currency. If no evidence can be found of the destroyed currency a complete statement of the investigation should be in the files.). A statement should be made in the narrative, should any item need explanation. The totals for all fires in the reporting period should be listed, with the total for all columns in the total column at the right.

Private Loss

The totals for all fires occurring during the reporting period should be placed in the proper column and the totals of all columns should be carried in the total column.

Government Loss

The total Government loss should be stated for each classification for the reporting period and the total should be carried in the right hand column. A line should be drawn under the Total Government loss.

TOTALS:

The word "TOTALS": should be typed in the left margin and just below the last line of the block and the total losses of each column should be entered under each column, including the total column at the right of the block. If proper entries have been made, the total of the building and of the contents loss will equal the total of the Government and the private loss in each case.

E. J. Utz, Chief  
Operations Division

WEHoffman:ml



FIRE DEPARTMENT

For Month Ending Midnight  
\_\_\_\_\_ 194\_\_

Center Any

FIRE REPORT SUMMARY:-

SAMPLE REPORT

	Mess Halls	Ware-houses	Living Quarters	Service Bldgs.	Other Bldgs.	Grass, Brush	Vehicles	TOTAL
Number of Fires			1		2/ 4	3/ 10	2	15
<del>Estimated</del> Damage to Buildings			250.85		73.45	9.47	22.35	356.12
<del>Estimated</del> Damage to Contents			2/ 57.43		8.00		4.00	69.43
Private Loss			50.00		8.00		4.00	62.00
Govt. Loss			250.85		73.45	9.47	22.35	363.55
			308.28		81.45	9.47	26.35	425.55

FIRE PREVENTION

Inspection \_\_\_\_\_ Reinspection \_\_\_\_\_ Total \_\_\_\_\_ Per Man-day \_\_\_\_\_

No. of Inspectors \_\_\_\_\_ Additions \_\_\_\_\_ Terminations \_\_\_\_\_

Fire Hazards: Originating: Over 60  
This Month \_\_\_\_\_ Last Month \_\_\_\_\_ Days ago \_\_\_\_\_ Total \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ of these Hazards Originated During Construction Period.

Violation Notices Served:

Verbal \_\_\_\_\_ Firsts \_\_\_\_\_ Seconds \_\_\_\_\_ Finals \_\_\_\_\_ Total \_\_\_\_\_

Violations Corrected: Of those Notified:

This Month \_\_\_\_\_ Previously \_\_\_\_\_ Total \_\_\_\_\_ of these  
were Hazards Existing 60 Days or More; \_\_\_\_\_ Originated During Construction.

Technical Advice: Written Recommendations:

Supplementing Notices of Violations \_\_\_\_\_ On New Construction \_\_\_\_\_ On Alter-  
ations \_\_\_\_\_ On Activities or Procedures \_\_\_\_\_ On Equipment \_\_\_\_\_

Number Fire Drills Held: In High School \_\_\_\_\_ Elementary Schools \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

Hours Devoted to Class or Drill: For Regular Firemen \_\_\_\_\_ For Volunteer Firemen \_\_\_\_\_

Fire Prevention Talks: (Indicate number, to whom given, where, number in attendance)  
(Use back of this form)

Number of Hydrants Tested \_\_\_\_\_ Number of Water Mains Tested \_\_\_\_\_

PERMITS ISSUED:

For Burning \_\_\_\_\_ Construction \_\_\_\_\_ Motion Pictures \_\_\_\_\_ Public Assembly \_\_\_\_\_

(OVER)



# FIRE EXTINGUISHERS:

Type	Total Number Installed	Number Inspected	Number Serviced
2½ Gal. Pump Type	_____	_____	_____
2½ Gal. Soda & Acid	_____	_____	_____
2½ Gal. Foam Type	_____	_____	_____
1 Gal. C.T.C.	_____	_____	_____
1 Qt. C.T.C.	_____	_____	_____
Throw Type CTC	_____	_____	_____
_____ -lb. CO <sup>2</sup>	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
Totals:	_____	_____	_____

## DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL:

Number Firemen on Regular Duty\_\_\_\_\_ Additions This Month\_\_\_\_\_ Terminations\_\_\_\_\_

Number Volunteer Fire Fighters\_\_\_\_\_ Additions This Month\_\_\_\_\_ Terminations\_\_\_\_\_

NARRATIVE REPORT: Use space below or additional sheet if necessary to discuss or explain any unusual or significant development effecting Fire Department this month; changes in policy or procedures; explanations of items in statistical report; problems of personnel; comments on compliance with fire prevention regulations; equipment received; equipment needed; progress in eliminating fire hazards; plans for future; any other developments.

1/ \$7.43 of this was Government loss as determined by Board of Survey; \$50.00 was evacuee private loss; these losses have been checked and the value appears reasonable;

2/ All of the loss was in a recreation building in one fire; the losses are in accordance with statements in 1/.

3/ This loss occurred in one fire in a combustible rubbish container that was too close to the building. The loss is as determined by the Board of Survey.



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*Kimberly*

ADDITIONAL APPOINTIVE POSITIONS RECOMMENDED IN OPERATIONS TO  
CLOSE CENTERS

Central Utah

Hospital Boiler Fireman	4
Domestic Water Pumping and Treatment	2
Electrician	1
Electrician's Helper	1
Plumber's Helper	1
Clerk Stenographer, CAF-4	1
Clerk Typist, CAF-3	1
Truck Driver	8
Fireman	6

Colorado River

ADDITIONAL POSITIONS BASED ON USE OF ONE CAMP ONLY

Hospital Boiler Fireman	4
(In lieu of Stationary Engineer)	
Domestic Water Pumping and Treatment (In lieu of W & S Repair Mechanic	6
Electrician's Helper	1
Sewage Plant Pump Men	3
Truck Driver	15
Fireman	6

Gila River

Hospital Boiler Fireman	3
Domestic Water Pumping and Treatment	2
Electrician	1
Electrician's Helper	1
Plumber's Helper	2
Clerk Stenographer, CAF-4	1
Clerk Typist, CAF-3	1
Clerk Stenographer, CAF-3 (ET & M)	1
Truck Driver	10
Fireman	6 (Per Camp)



GRANADA

Hospital Boiler Fireman	2
Domestic Water Pumping and Treatment	4
Electrician's Helper	1
Plumber's Helper	2
Clerk Stenographer, CAF-4	1
Clerk Typist, CAF-3	1
Truck Driver	8
Fireman	6

Heart Mountain

Hospital Boiler Fireman	3
Domestic Water Pumping and Treatment	4
Electrician	1
Electrician's Helper	1
Plumber's Helper	2
Truck Driver	10
Fireman	6

Manzanar

Hospital Boiler Fireman	1
Domestic Water Pumping and Treatment	1
Electrician	1
Electrician's Helper	1
Plumber's Helper	2
Truck Driver	10
Fireman	6

Minidoka

Hospital Boiler Fireman	4
Domestic Water Pumping and Treatment	1
Electrician	1
Electrician's Helper	1
Sewage Plant Pump Man	4
Clerk Stenographer, CAF-4	1
Clerk Typist, CAF-3	1
Truck Driver	12
Fireman	6



Rohwer

Hospital Boiler Fireman	4
Domestic Water Pumping and Treatment	4
Electrician	1
Electrician's Helper	1
Plumber's Helper	1
Sewage Plant Pump Man	1
Clerk Stenographer, CAF-4	1
Clerk Stenographer, CAF-3	1
Truck Driver	8
Fireman	6



WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Washington

February 16, 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO: Central Utah, Colorado River, Gila River, Heart Mountain, Manzanar, Minidoka, and Tule Lake

Fire Protection Adviser, William E. Hoffman will be in the field visiting all centers from February 21, 1945 to April 25, 1945. A copy of his itinerary is enclosed.

He will notify you should there be any change. *see his itinerary*

*E. J. Utz*  
E. J. Utz, Chief  
Operations Division

Enclosure

WEHoffman:lbr

CC: R. B. Cozzens

*Indicated*  
*1/21/45*



WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Washington

January 18, 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Colorado River, Manzanar, Minidoka, Central  
Utah, Heart Mountain, Granada, Rohwer, Tule  
Lake, Fort Ontario Emergency Refugee Shelter.

Attention: Engineering & Fire Protection Sections

Recently on one of the Centers an overheated U. S. Army  
No. 1 stove set the ceiling on fire, adjacent to the stove-  
pipe. This stove was installed by W.R.A. and the installa-  
tion approved by the Fire Protection Officer. The fire was  
discovered very soon after it started and the loss was only  
\$2.70.

While the loss in this case was not important, it does  
indicate the need for vigilance and care on the part of both  
the Engineering and Fire Protection Sections to be sure that  
heating equipment is installed in a safe manner. It appears  
that if the above stove had been installed according to WRA  
regulations that the fire would not have occurred, even though  
it was over-fired.

I suggest that a careful check be made on your Center to  
discover whether or not you have any faulty installations and  
that corrections be made promptly if any defects are discovered.

Sincerely,

Jan 18 1945  
William E. Hoffman

E. J. Utz, Chief  
Operations Division

✓ WEHoffman:ml



WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Washington

January 18, 1945


MEMORANDUM TO: Colorado River, Manzanar, Minidoka, Central  
Utah, Heart Mountain, Granada, Rohwer, Tule  
Lake, Fort Ontario Emergency Refugee Shelter.

Attention: Fire Protection Officers

Section 49.4.23C-(1)-(a), revised, Fire Protection Handbook requires red dye for the liquid in carbon tetrachloride fire extinguishers. The Washington office Procurement Section has purchased dye for this purpose, to be sent to each Center by the manufacturer.

This purchase was made because of the difficulty in obtaining the Sudan IV as required in the regulations. While the material purchased is not Sudan IV, a sample was sent to the National Bureau of Standards, for testing, before the purchase was made and they have certified that the dye meets the requirements of the Federal Specifications. The Procurement Section will send full information to each center very soon.

Sincerely,



E. J. Utz, Chief  
Operations Division

✓ WEHoffman:ml



November 28, 1944


MEMORANDUM TO: Colorado River, Manzanar, Gila River, Minidoka  
Central Utah, Heart Mountain, Granada, Rohwer,  
Tule Lake, Fort Ontario Emergency Refugee Shelter.

We have recently had fires in some Relocation Centers that are of interest to all Centers. These fires were where:

1. Stoves or heating appliances were installed too close to walls or combustible materials. The locations in which the fires started were protected by ventilated shields of asbestos-board, but the shields were nailed directly to the studs at a point very near the heating appliance. Air space had been provided at other points. Fires started at the point where the ventilated-shields were nailed to the studding.
2. Wood, kindling and other combustible materials were stored under buildings in considerable quantity. This contributed to the spread of fire and hindered fire-fighting operations. In some cases materials were stored near defective chimneys that extended to the ground. Defective chimneys and accumulated sut resulted in fire under the buildings. Other fires of unknown origin have started in combustibles stored under buildings.

The hazards incident to these conditions are all pointed out in the WRA regulations. It is suggested that each Center make a survey to determine the number and location of such hazards, if any, and that effective measures be taken to correct the conditions found before a fire occurs.

Sincerely yours,



E. J. Utz, Chief  
Operations Division

WEHoffman:ml ✓



*E. H. Reed*  
October 7, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: All Centers

Sometime ago we sent you an allotment of Federal Fire Council Forms (FFC-3R'S) which seem to have gone astray. We are, therefore, sending you another allotment to-day.

On Tuesday, October 3rd, 1944, 300 copies of the revised WRA-98's and 100 copies of the revised WRA-158's were sent each Center.

Will you please advise us when you received these Forms.

Sincerely yours,

*E. H. Reed*  
E. H. Reed, Acting Chief  
Operations Division

cc: Mr. Cozzens  
cc: Mr. William Hoffman

EHR:mlv✓