GICA

THE EVOLUTION OF EVACUEE RESPONSIBILITY IN COMMUNITY LIFE

(A paper delivered before the Community Management Conference at Denver, Colorado, 2:00 p.m., ~~May 14, 1944.~~)

The topic listed on the agenda and the title of this presentation differ. The viewpoint I favor is the "Evolution of Evacuee Responsibility in the Community" rather than "Community Organization from the Project Level."

When we speak of community organization or community responsibility, we are faced immediately with two opposing points of view; first, that community organization can do nothing that is efficient; and secondly, that community organization can do everything. Neither of these viewpoints are correct. There is a middle road.

The development of community responsibility is based upon several definite convictions. The first is that people in general are vitally interested in all things which affect their lives; and secondly, that people are willing and able to accept responsibility in matters which affect their lives. These convictions are definitely democratic. They make allowances for group weaknesses and for individual training. They mean that people are able to govern themselves and that one person is just as good as the next, whether he be evacuee or a member of the appointed staff. The acceptance of responsibility and the willingness to act intelligently (including seeking advice from technical experts) are the criteria upon which democratic life is based.

But why should we have a community organization in a relocation center? The necessity for the development of community responsibility lies in the fact that American life depends upon the desire of people to govern themselves. Direction is too close to dictatorship. If the evacuees are ever to take their place in American life, they must learn to understand majority government including also the majority government which brought about evacuation and an understanding of its process of reasoning. They must also learn to again believe in Americans as people who believe in the principles expressed in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and they must also experience a definite satisfaction in participating in the democratic way of life.

Before such a general understanding could be developed and the purpose for community organization be stated in such terms, it was necessary to analyze the total situation. We

took for granted that the objective were correct, although some were obscure in the minds of the people. We had to know the attitude and willingness of the evacuees, however, to consider those points, the attitude of the staff toward community organization and shifting responsibilities to community government, the attitude of the Director, and the willingness of the residents to cooperate as well as a willingness to make mistakes in the learning process.

It was most evident that a number of the staff did not believe in community government because they felt that community government was letting the people run everything--that once responsibility was given to the people, they would continue to "ball up" the works and try "to run the place". Another member of the staff characterized community government as a "play toy" with no authority and very little excuse for existence. The evacuees themselves looked upon community government as almost useless. They couldn't do anything, so why try? The temporary community council had failed from their viewpoint. If the administration wanted a community council, it was wanted only to carry out administration policies and ideas. Such was, in general, the situation a year ago.

Certain key men saw that community government could do a great deal for the good of the people if it could be organized. They, however, distrusted both the local and the National WRA. In general, they distrusted the staff as people. They also knew that no matter what they suggested, whether that part be small or great, the administration could over-rule and was still responsible for the operation of the Center.

In the evolution of community organization, several steps were now taken. More or less accidentally, a few key men were invited to discuss relocation. They were taken into confidence on all matters pertaining to the relocation program as it then existed and offered excellent suggestions. Boys and Girls Week was promoted--It just happened that the theme of 1943 was "Learning the Ways of Democracy". These two developments gave a great deal of information about the administration to the people. The boys and girls, following out the national pattern, took over the project operations for a day. There was an interchange of ideas between the staff and the evacuees. All administrative matters were open for investigation to the boys and girls, and for the first time the evacuees learned what went on behind the scenes in the running of the Center.

Influence and Advice

From that time on information was channeled to the people on almost everything. The employment cut of last July was largely overcome by consultation and information. The committee worked with Mess Operations and succeeded in doing what the administration could not do by fiat order. Thus the staff and the Director came to feel that there might be some good in community government. There still persisted a feeling, however, "You can't give them too much or they will run the Center".

Then came segregation and the hectic problems connected with it. Information was channeled to the people by means of charts and notices. Constant meetings were held. Reports were given to the community councils on every new suggestion. Criticizm shifted from the local staff to the Washington staff for the change in policies. This was unavoidable and all to the good as far as the Center was concerned. In October a permanent council was organized. The representatives were elected within each block. Interest ran high. Some were convinced that it would work and some that it would not. The block managers looked with questioning brows at the councils. A chairman was chosen who was dynamic and who had been a previous central block manager in the Butte camp. The councils in both communities (When we speak of councils in Rivers, we speak of two bodies distinct and separate, coordinated through the joint meetings of the Executive Boards.) appointed 19 committees. There was no knowledge of parliamentary procedure or committee reporting. Everyone was anxious to do something but there was apparently nothing to do. The channeling of information was all right and things were carried on, but the council had no prestige.

Training

It was suggested at one of the council meetings that there be an investigation of Internal Security. This, coupled together with the development of the Judicial Commission, created tremendous amount of interest. The committee appointed to investigate Internal Security went wild and found itself in a very difficult situation. It could go no further since the premise upon which its action was based had turned out to be a rumor. How could they get out of it? How could they have avoided getting into such a jam? How should a committee work? This process of training by doing, although exceedingly agravating at times, had a very desirable effect. They pointed out(1) that committee members should not be members of the administrative staff of the activity which they are investigating; (2) that committees should base their actions on definitely written and proved statements, and in fact that no committee

should begin any action unless it is backed by a verified report. It also highlighted the fact that the community council was not a "play-toy" since it could get itself into an extremely difficult position and that its members were not free from possible suits for libel.

There now followed the report of the atrocities to American prisoners of war. A petition was drawn up denouncing these atrocities. A petition was also drawn up on Selective Service. The method was cumbersome. The block managers criticized the council for not being able to get things done. There now developed a small group composed of the executive committee and several members of the block managers who believed that a new organization combining block managers and the council was necessary.

Criterion of Efficiency

This move was excellent since now results and a speedy way of getting results became a common purpose and in this way influenced the community. There was a discussion of government--what it could do, what it could not do, how it could be revised, how it would operate, how to draw out the best leadership, how to define the jobs of councilmen and block managers, how to create a greater interest among the more able parolees, and what could be done to develop a thoroughly American outlook. After a number of weeks of concentrated discussion, several decisions were reached; first, that under no circumstances could the community afford to give up the elective form of representation and substitute according to the old Japanese custom and that streamlining procedures were essential; second, that an outline of jobs for both the councilmen and the block managers must be carried out; th , that the excutive committee should have an office and give full time to its work. All these were taken care of. An executive committee was set up and all committee jobs cleared through it. It was particularly stressed that no member of the community should take up any matter with the members of the staff except through the community council, through the Project Director, and to the particular section involved and vice versa, that no member of the staff should contact any evacuee directly, but should channel through the Director, through the executive committee and the council, and to the people. The executive committee has full authority to act between sessions, should be available at all times, and should receive all communications from the Washington office.

Identification

Of course, there were many stumbling blocks in the development of this process. It was not and is not easy. However, the smooth operation of the Center testifies to

the cooperation which has gradually been developing. This is further highlighted by a discussion which took place with the executive committee in insisting that this Center is an American community. The executive committee placed in its outline of duties for the councilmen a definite statement to that effect. The Servicemen's Relatives Association erected a monument in honor of the men who had gone into the Armed Forces. There is developing a definite working partnership on an American basis between the staff and the council. I am looking forward to the time when there can be a much greater community as identifying itself fairly closely with the purposes of the WRA and with the American picture in general.

Not all diffculties have been overcome, but these difficulties center more around the attitude of the staff than around the attitude of the people in general. In the development at Gila, we have reversed the order of those factors usually considered as necessary for the smooth running of business, particularly problem situations and the influencing of subordinates in reaching decisions. Our business is really one of influencing people just as a business concern tries to influence its employees to carry out the policies of the concern. When we deal with people and the ancient practice of business and the modern practice of authoritarian and dictatorship governments, we reverse the use of authoriy. They told people what they wanted them to do and expected them to do it. We know from experience in modern business, industry, and government that authority can go only as far as the people concerned acquiesce in the demand. The magnitude of that acquiescence depends upon the sanctions which are available to enforce the demand. Authority created the evacuation, and authority created the relocation centers. Authority, too, could operate these Centers, but there authority reaches the limit of its sanction. No amount of authority can force the development of confidence. Now amount of authority and no sanction can force people to believe in a democratic government because that very authority and use of sanctions violated the principles upon which democracy was based. We have therefore reversed the ordinary procedure of influencing people.

The process of identification was also reversed in as far as we were able to do so. Rather than identify the group as Japanese, we have and are attempting to use the term American and to avoid labeling anything as Japanese. There is no common purpose in the Center with the activities of the Japanese Government. There is an old statement which describes the experience of calling a child a bad boy and by that statement forcing him to live up to it. We are trying to avoid that in our operation, realizing that some of the things and ideas may be different from ours but that people are not necessarily bad because they have it. It is our job to give them sufficient information to overcome any false ideas or notions. It is a matter in which

we are to lead and one which cannot be directed. We can have pride in culture, but our thinking must function in an American way.

What we are really trying to do in community organization is to influence people to accept responsibility for themselves. In everything we do, we must therefore so construct our approach that the desired reaction is attained. Our own method of approach is not the criteria upon which to judge the work of a center. The effect of the approach is the criteria. It is not what we do that counts but what we get the other fellow to do in line with the general purposes and objectives under which we operate that counts.

One of the most harmful reactions to the acceptance of responsibility at the project level had been brought about by administrative instructions, manual releases, etc. We grant that standardization is desirable. We grant also that the higher officials may have a wider viewpoint; but when it comes to securing the proper responses from the individuals involved in a relocation center, administrative instructions have left very little leeway for individual thought. Life in a center has too often been looked upon through an organizational chart which designates "lines of authority". But "lines of authority" do not show that there are other and more democratic forms of influencing people. Information, training, and identification are such forms. They many be far more important in securing the coordination and cooperation of people than an instruction. Instructions, manual releases, etc. simply limit the leeway in which responsible people are suppose to act. The behavior of a rational person can be controlled and directed if the premises upon which he is to make a decision are known to him. The tendency of government bureaus to standardize, definitely limits the sphere of responsibility and detracts from democratic ideals and individual responsibility in government.

A functioning community organization depends upon its own ability to make decisions. When a very narrow range of discretion for its operation is permitted, the purpose of the organization is proportionately diminished. Successful community organization demands as wide a range of discretion as possible. This means as few directives as possible. Lest I be misinterpreted, I wish to repeat that directives may be perfectly sound but unless they bring forth constructive responses, they have failed in their purpose. Information, training, and guidance are all helpful but authority may defeat itself.

Community government as it is now established is not an end in itself but is a means of developing a greater acceptance of responsibility. Successful relocation depends.

upon developing confidence. We are not interested in developing a model form of community government. We are not now interested in establishing particular techniques or procedures. We are nterested in carrying out the adjustment of a group of people who have been torn from their homes and in creating from that group individuals who are self-respecting citizens of a democracy and of a democratic world. As stated previously, community organization is not an end in itself but one means in the general solution of evacuation and relocation.

Hugo W. Wolter

Hugo W. Wolter
Gila Relocation Center
Rivers, Arizona

215

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

GILA RIVER PROJECT
RIVERS, ARIZONA

REFER TO
Dwayne
Date ans.
No reply nec.
To file
(NAME)

November 18, 1944

Mr. Robert B. Cozzens
Assistant Director
War Relocation Authority
461 Market Street
San Francisco 5, California

Dear Mr. Cozzens:

We invited Mr. William P. Mathews, editor of the Arizona Daily Star, to be the principal speaker at the Armistice Day celebration and to address a Youth Group Movement meeting in the evening. His speeches at Butte and Canal were preceded by a parade. The evening meeting was attended, I believe, by about 120 outside guests from various parts of Arizona.

To my way of thinking, Mr. Mathews made an exceptional presentation. I am sure you will agree when you read the attached copy of his speech.

Sincerely,

L. H. Bennett

L. H. Bennett
Project Director

BETTER DAYS AHEAD

WILLIAM P. MATHEWS--EDITOR

THE ARIZONA DAILY STAR

When your officials asked me to speak to you on this twenty-sixth anniversary of the first armistice day, I felt I could not dodge their request. The least I could do, it seemed to me, would be to help out and in a small way express appreciation of the record that you have made here, and the deeds your sons have done in the Pacific as well as in Italy. I think that now I can bring to you a message of hope and encouragement, both as to the future of our country and yourselves.

It was my happy privilege to take part in the celebration of the first armistice day in Paris. I had been wounded a month previously and by good luck was hospitalized in Paris. There on that memorable day soldiers in the uniforms of more than a score of different nations could be seen swarming in gay and happy mobs along the wide boulevards. Most of them were happier than the civilians. To the soldiers it meant an end to the hard, exhausting struggle amidst the mud, snow and rain; it meant a chance to eat and to sleep undisturbed and in comparative comfort.

To all of us that was a great day of hope. Under inspiring leadership we had fought and won a great war. We hoped that we had fought to bring an end to war, and to bequeath to

the people of Europe some of those blessings of freedom that we here in America so unconsciously enjoy. Little did we dream that twenty-six years later we would be fighting again over some of the very same ground and against the very same enemy in Europe.

Our soldiers in France and Italy will celebrate today while fighting the same enemy we thought we had subdued twenty-six years ago. They are fighting in that same mud and rain and sleet, in that same piercing, wet cold that we felt in the marrow of our bones during all of those long months. Twenty-six years ago we were celebrating the end of the war. Today our soldiers will keep on fighting. They cannot pause for celebration.

Although good fortune has favored our arms to a much greater extent than we have any right to expect, we still face a hard task in defeating both the Nazis and the Japanese militarists. Although collapse of Germany can come at any time, the chances are that Germany will be able to last through the winter and into next spring.

We are now marking time on the European front while we bring up supplies for the final great offensive. We are temporarily handicapped by lack of ports to unload our ships. Before many weeks pass, however, we can rest assured that the stage will be set for our final effort.

That we do apparently mark time instead of engaging in futile attacks is an encouraging omen. Our army leaders are determined to give our men who are fighting every advantage that

machines and munitions can provide. They will not send armies into battle unless they have an overwhelming advantage in munitions and machines, as well as in manpower. Our leaders are not going to waste the lives of our men in indecisive combat. To that extent we must be patient, and not through unreasonable criticism stampede our leaders into an unprepared and indecisive attack. Rather than build our hopes too high and then suffer disappointment, let us prepare for the worst and then be overjoyed with unexpected success.

In the Pacific our campaign also goes well beyond what should be our expectations. That we are now back in the Philippines and have the Japanese fleet licking its wounds from recent defeat, represents a tremendous accomplishment both at home in our factories and ship yards, and in the conduct of our battle forces.

I cannot be as pessimistic about the Pacific war as many are. I believe that within six months after the war ends in Europe we shall be able to amass such power in the Pacific that we can land anywhere we choose, including the main island of Japan. In the meantime, we shall soon see our super-fortresses giving Japan a taste of the war that her unreasoning militarists brought upon her.

We have answered and shall continue to answer those Japanese militarists who thought that the American nation was soft and decadent and unwilling to fight. We shall answer their scorn of our asserted weaknesses with more power than

they could conceive of being mobilized anywhere.

These militarists saw us as a mixture of many minorities incapable of making sacrifices, unwilling to suffer the sacrifices that we have so gladly made. They confidently said that we were too hopelessly divided to mobilize the power and the unity that we now see winning victories in both Europe and the Pacific.

A record of deed rather than of opinions now tells what we have done as a nation. This record tells also of what you have done as one of those minorities. Your record since that tragic day when you were torn from your homes and dumped our here on the desert presents to the nation a timely lesson, a living example of that greatest question that America must constantly face--the problem of racial minorities.

Your patience, your good conduct, your cooperation in most difficult circumstances, your patriotism and that of your sons on the battle fields of Europe and the Pacific, your willingness to lend a helping hand and temporarily forego those rights that others exercise as a matter of course, have made an overlasting contribution towards a solution of that great problem of minorities.

You will have taught to others the wisdom of recognizing how passions as well as legal rights and duties must be recognized when the furies of war make men unreasonable. And I am optimistic enough to believe that in years not far off, just as you now see the ugly war-excited passions of the American people, you will see those generous, noble impulses that the fathers of

our nation inspired in mankind and which still beat in the hearts of the American people.

When the American people see how you have unjustly suffered as a war measure and, above all, how you have patriotically cooperated, with not one single example of sabotage, I am confident they will show their appreciation to you generously.

My opinion is based to an important extent upon some personal experiences. When people, here in Arizona, were incited by the fears of war into speaking violently and uncompromisingly of everything and everyone bearing any relation to Japan, I enjoyed the personal experience of seeing how words of caution brought a generous response. Not one word of criticism was spoken openly of what I said. Just to the contrary, it brought me letters and telephone calls of commendation. That was in the spring and summer of 1942.

I mention this because it indicates to me that deep in the hearts of the American people there is a sense of justice, and that this deep-seated sense of justice will express itself when the passions of war have cooled.

This same experience has been confirmed by our army. That our army has been your best friend is a matter of official record. It defended your conduct when others were afraid to speak. It uses your sons and fathers in highly confidential positions in the war zones of both the Pacific and the Atlantic.

I have talked with soldiers, some of them generals, who have used your men in battle. They not only speak highly of their work, but compliment their trustworthiness. You have

thus written into the traditions, as well as the official history of our army, a record of faithfulness to duty that will make that great force of American life an eternal supporter and protector of you and your children.

The example you have set as a minority can help all of us. Big things lie ahead for our nation. As the most powerful nation the world has ever known, we are going to take a responsible part in the affairs of the world. Our racial minorities must be a source of strength in the great work that lies ahead, rather than one of weakness.

They can be a source of strength if all of us merely adhere to those fundamental principles of government enunciated by the founders of our nation and written into our constitution. America can succeed in the gigantic task that confronts her, if she will only be true to those principles and champion that spirit of fair play everywhere. To do that, to carry influence by means of ideas and ideals rather than by arms, she must set an example of fairness with her many racial minorities by welding them together into one great happy and enthusiastic nation in which all people of every race will enjoy equal legal rights.

This is not an easy task that can be accomplished overnight. It will take more than laws to do it. Laws, to be effective, must have a moral force of willing acceptance behind them. This moral force can grow only as we of the majority teach our children the need and the justice of such laws, instill in them the lessons of tolerance and forbearance.

You have made a great contribution to the growth of such an ideal. You have taught patience to other minorities that have both moral and legal justification to be impatient. You have taught that progress will require time and that you will have to restrain your passions at the various injustices you will undoubtedly suffer, as we of that fortunate majority learn to calm our fears and have faith in fair dealing.

You have done your part nobly. As long as the war lasts, you will continue to suffer unjust discrimination, even illegal discrimination.

In spite of all such discrimination, I sincerely hope that you will continue to maintain the perfect record you have made. If you do maintain such a record, when the war ends you will be in a position to make all of us who count ourselves a part of that lucky majority ashamed of ourselves. You will have aroused some sense of remorse and anxiety that will almost unconsciously seek to redeem those American traditions of justice and generosity and fairplay.

All of this will have a direct bearing on the celebrations of future anniversaries of armistice day. If all of us learn to live and let live, if here in America we can, by our tolerance and sense of fairplay, bring together all of our racial minorities into one great nation, we can have reason to believe that we can succeed in the work that we shall have to do abroad. We can make the American nation known throughout the world for those ideals of justice and fair play. Without those there can be no long or reasonable period of peace.

Consequently it is with a sense of gratitude, as well as a sense of duty, that I come here on this twenty-sixth armistice day. As an old soldier, as well as an American citizen, a member of the fortunate majority, I want to thank you, one of our many minorities, for the positive contribution you have made to the future political morality of our country. You have, by your patient endurance of sacrifices and hardships, helped the cause of all minorities. You have helped to make them a source of strength rather than weakness. You have helped to promote a brilliant future for America, your home and mine, as well as those principles of decency and fair treatment that must be the foundation of any great and happy civilization.

GILA

THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF A RELOCATION CENTER

Talk to the Community Council of Phoenix

March 19, 1945

I. Introductory

The purpose of this talk is to give a general account of the social organization and cultural activities of the community of Japanese and Japanese-Americans who were evacuated from the West Coast to the Gila River Relocation Center at Rivers, Arizona. While your interests are primarily in the operation of soical agencies, this general study may form a useful background to the examination of such operations. My colleague, Mr. Griswold will deal more specifically with the professional aspect of the problem.

Within the limitations of allotted time, I can give no more than a brief impression, and must omit much of interest and even of significance. It is impossible to convey, in a short time, the intensity and complexity of the social and cultural activities which have grown up. One of the lessons to be learned from the life of these centers is the degree to which, in a short span of time, the most profound of human relationships can be developed, and how a mass of cultural and ritual values can emerge. I can only tell you this; to demonstrate it fully would need hours of talk or hundreds of pages writing. In this short talk I can only give the briefest indications.

The Gila River Relocation Center is situated in Pinal County. The nearest rail point is Chandler, 16 miles due north of the nearest gate. Within the Center, there are two communities, Butte and Canal, separated from each other by a distance of four miles. There are 7000 acres of farm land, of which a maximum 1700 acres was once cultivated, though the acreage is now being reduced. The present population is just over 9000. Of these about 60% lives in Butte, 40% in Canal. The population has fluctuated. In late 1942 it was 13,400. In addition, 2000 people came from Jerome, Arkansas in June 1944. Of the 6400 who have left the camp about 2000 went to Tule Lake, the other 4400 have resettled elsewhere or been inducted into the armed services; the number of boys from the camp serving in the Army is 923, of whom 12 have been killed and 44 wounded.

The population structure is not what one would find in a normal peacetime community. This population pyramid may give you a quick impression of its present characteristics by age, sex and citizenship. The first striking thing

is the very large number of males 55 years and over, and the smaller, but still appreciable number of males 40 to 54 years. Of men in the most vigorous years of their life, 20 to 39, there are very few. Also, if the age group 15-19 had been subdivided into single years, it would have shown only a small number of 18 and 19 year olds. (66 and 38). This scarcity of younger men is partly explained by army induction and relocation; but it is also partly a result of immigration restrictions. Japanese immigration ceased from 1924 onward. Consequently the U.S. census of 1940 shows a relative scarcity of men of the same age. Only as families of the immigrants grew up did this position begin to alter. The census of 1940 shows the 15-19 year group the largest, both for males and females.

On the female side, two things are noteworthy. First, the number of alien females is much smaller than that of the males. Secondly, they are, on the average, younger. The nature and limits of the Japanese immigration explain both phenomena. The general practice was for the man to come over and establish himself. When he could afford it, he either went over to Japan to return with a wife, or got a wife by the well-known "picture-bride" procedure. As a consequence, wives are much younger than husbands, the median age difference being 9 years. Further, the prohibition of immigration in 1924 found many men without wives. Some of these would never have established themselves sufficiently well to be married; but others had simply not had forever debarred from marriage if they wished to remain in this country. Thus, of the 2556 alien males in the camp on December 31, 1944, 718 or 28% were unmarried.

This population structure poses certain problems, both of internal administration and of relocation policies. Internally public opinion is dominated by old men, products of another culture; beyond their best working years and hostile to things which they do not understand. In terms of relocation, there is a large block of people who feel too old to build up their lives again, who may be parents of large families. Included in this group are 718 bachelors, mostly old, with no family ties, who have seen the destruction of the social group to which they belong and who have great fears of going out individually to settle singly among people who regard them as aliens, and with whom they would feel little social solidarity.

II. The Cultural Background

In the years immediately preceding the war, the Japanese, and Japanese-American population on the U.S. mainland

was mostly concentrated in the three coast states and Arizona; in 1940, the total number of this group in the U.S. was 126, 947 of whom 112,985 were in the four mentioned states. Of these, nearly two-thirds were native-born. But this statement must be balanced against the fact that nearly two-thirds of adults were foreign-born. The median age of non-citizens was 49.7 years, that of native-born 17.2 years. At the time of evacuation the median age of the native-born was under 20. Thus, the aliens, the immigrants dominated the group up to the time of evacuation; the majority of the native-born citizens consisted of dependent children. A brief estimate of the cultural characteristics of the first-generation Japanese is thus relevant.

The Japanese immigrant usually came here in his late teens or early twenties. His formal education was generally confined to the elementary school, though a proportion of well -educated also migrated. A large proportion came of an agricultural background. Certain basic attitudes and interests were thus well established before emigration. First, there was attachment to the Japanese culture. Politically, this must not be constrived to mean then what it means now. All immigrants arrived before the days of strident nationalism and before schools and other institutions became the organs of malitarist propaganda. Thus, to them, Japanese culture meant the Japanese family organization, with its emphasis upon the group rather than upon the individual and the consequent family solidarity; the assiduous and intense cultivation of the soil; respect for ritual and social form; and a belief that Japanese culture was superior to all others; to mention only a few ingredients.

The cultural complex was modified for many individual in the course of 20, 30 or 40 years of residence in this country; and the modification was increased as children grew up in the family. The children were primarily American, spoke colloquial English, and participated in American educational and recreational activities. But the modification of the cultural background was not as marked as that which sometimes occurs in other immigrant groups.

Three factors tended to keep the Japanese within their own cultural intersts. First, they kept together by choice. Even more than the peasant from Eastern Europe they found themselves in a strange cultural environment. Ways of making economic and social adjustments were foreign and incomprehensible. Thus they maintained a social solidarity as necessary to social participation and to mutual assistance. This might have broken down, as it did in other groups, but for the second factor, discrimination by the majority group. Discrimination took economic forms: certain occupations were practically barred to them; even in employment in which

they could participate, the native American was preferred if there was a choice; and many of their business enterprises had to depend upon Japanese custom. Discrimination took legislative forms; the alien land laws are the best example of that. And it took social forms; Japanese were excluded from many cultural activities.

The third factor accentuating the isolation was occupational; of employed Japanese, 50% were engaged in agriculture. While this contributed to the basic security of the people, it kept them apart from others. There was an increasing urbanization, but it had not advanced sufficiently to Americanize the older generation. Thus the Issei (explain) remained a culturally distinct group, occupying a place in the economic life of the nation but marked off from it by legal and social discrimination, and held together by a community of economic and social interests, and by common cultural traditions.

In this social setting the Nisei, the native-born citizens occupied a difficult position. Like all children of immigrants they were faced with a conflict situation. At home, they were members of an alien cultural group; in their external relationships they were members of an American cultural group. Members of this audience are well acquainted with the consequences of such situations. I ask you only to consider how that of the Japanese was accentuated by discrimination, isolation, and the possession of physical characteristics always identifying them.

In spite of these deterrent factors the majority of Nisei grew up fundamentally as members of the American culture. As noted before, they speak colloquial English, usually as their preferred language; they prefer American forms of recreation and American rituals of social relationships. Most of them are attached to American forms of government. They constitute a small segment of the American cultural group, different in some ways from other segments, but with more similarities than differences. They have made remarkable records in educational achievement; not because of superior intelligence (anthropolgists are nowadays convinced that these are no biological racial differences in intelligence to any degree that matters) but because of superior diligence and application, products of the Japanese respect for formal education and the immigrants urge to achieve.

One other group remains to be mentioned, the Kibei. The Kibei are children of Japanese, born in America, citizens, who were taken to Japan for education and returned here when education was completed. Some spent most of their early years in Japan and are more Japanese than their parents; others spent smaller periods of time there varying from one year up. In

time of war, this group was naturally suspect many of them had received their Japanese education when Japanese nationalist propaganda was at its height. As a matter of fact, many of them did become rabid nationalists. But others reacted against the militaristic system and while influenced by the non-national aspects of Japanese culture, became convinced adherents of democracy. It is estimated that there were 8000 to 9000 of them at the time of Pearl Harbor. Most of those who preferred Japan are now at Tule Lake. In the days before the war, they constituted an anomalous ingredient in the Japanese-American group.

The limitations of time have forced certain broad statements. To these statements there are probably hundreds of exceptions. Some of the Issei entered into relationships with non Japanese and profoundly modified their attitudes. Others were strongly influenced by their children. As for the Nisei, although most of them were young, there was an increasing group of adults. Some of them were consciously, perhaps self-consciously, American. A few of them belonged to clubs and societies American in nature. And there was founded the Japanese American Citizens League, the purposes of which included the furtherance of Americanism as among themselves, and the promoting of their recognition as Americans.

Further modifying factors were the growth of Japanese urbanization; the acceptance of some on equal terms by non-Japanese; the leavening influence of education in non-segregated schools; and other aspects of social participation.

The Japanese in America thus occupied a particular position in Western U.S. when the bombs of Pearl Harbor began the series of events which shook their whole social structure. Some were completely Americanized, others almost completely Japanese with the majority fitting somewhere in between these extremes. The course of years would have promoted assimilation. The American-born would have assumed gradual control, and the social solidarity of the group would probably have diminished as increasing numbers would have identified themselves as Americans not Japanese-Americans, to the extent permitted by the majority group. But this development was retarded by evacuation; the Japanese and Japanese-Americans were thrown together far more intensely than they had been before; and distinctive Japanese-American communities were artificially created by the advent of war.

III. Evacuation.

Evacuation began on March 2, 1942. We are not concerned with the process, but one fact should be noted. Most evacuees were first collected at assembly centers. They stayed

there for periods of months, while awaiting the preparation of the relocation centers. During this period of life in the assembly centers several significant social developments began. First, the resentments of evacuation had time to crystallize and to be accentuated by the hardships and inconveniences of life in an assembly center. Second, patterns of apposition to administrative measures began to form. Third, social groupings were formed, and even to this day there are social resultants of assembly center groupings; people still distinguish the people from Santa Anita from Tulare and from other centers.

The movement to Gila River Center began on July 20, 1942, and was practically completed by October. Again certain hardships associated with shortages and absence of certain facilities intensified resentments and turned them towards the WRA. At the same time the process of social grouping the creation of new forms of social life and the recreation of certain old forms began.

It would be instructive to trace the history of the Center, dwelling particularly upon crisis situations and the social consequences. Time does not permit this. Instead I shall just try to indicate briefly some of the attitudes which have developed as a result of evacuation and subsequent life in assembly center and relocation center, for those attitudes are the basis of many of the soical problems which now exist.

Resentment has been mentioned. This resentment is towards the Army, to the WCCA, and is now focussed upon the WRA. The WRA gets the brunt of it, because it is convenient, it is the agency which has to enforce certain restraints, and is associated with many of the inevitable frustrations of center life. The resentment arises first from the fact of evacuation itself, from the fact that this one group of all groups was singled out for discriminatary action. Resentments also arise from physical hardships, from property loss, from educational deprivation (this refers particularly to college students) from loss of livelihood. It is continually reinforced by the limitations placed upon individuals by the nature of the life they lead.

Far deeper than resentment is insecurity. Evacuation destroyed a community, or, rather, a whole pattern of communities. The Japanese formed a cohesive social group in a very real sense. They provided social life for each other, they mutually assistted one another, they were, to themselves, a basic social group . While this continues within the centers, it is not the same. All know that the centers are temporary. The old social grouping on the outside is gone, many think never to return. Some of the Nisei are willing to face this fact. The bulk of the Issei, that is, the bulk of the adults are not willing. They feel that when they leave the center they are

severing all social bonds other than those of the family.

This insecurity is the most significant cause of their fear of relocation. It also explains, partly, their resistance to changes of policy within the center. When a policy is established, it involves the establishment of certain employment groupings. This becomes systematized and the employment groups become social groups, and groups, at that, which tend to provide a substitute security. If a policy changes, certain employment policies are also changed, and the substitute security also disappears.

Insecurity is also at the root of the people's sensitivity to slights and to any appearance of discrimination. Any appearance of inferiority threatens the self-esteem which is developed as a compensation for insecurity. Prestige systems have grown up within the Center; any attempt to alter or belittle these is met with resentment and apposition; the basic insecurity will permit no disturbance to compensatory mechanisms without a struggle.

For the moment I shall mention only one more result upon attitudes; the intensification of Japanese cultural interests and activities. Before evacuation the isolation was only relative. Japanese entered into social and economic relationships with other social groups, spoke English to some extent, and even developed interest in American activities. Moreover, as an industrious group, they had little time for any great amount of non-economic activities. Isolation in a relocation center has thrown them back upon themselves, has reduced the necessity to speak English, has provided both the leisure and the concentration of people with common interests to make possible a complex of Japanese groupings and programs. Mr. Griswold will probably go into this in more detail; I merely wish to point out its existence. Evacuation has halted the process of Americanization for many, and has permitted the resumption of Japanese cultural values.

These remarks, of course, apply principally to the Issei, but again I remind you that the Issei constitute the bulk of the adults. The education system provides apportunities of Americanization for the children, and there do exist American type activities for the older Nisei. But the group as a whole, though not the whole group, has become increasingly Japanese.

This few remarks must suffice to indicate what might be turned evacuation attitudes and values. I shall now attempt to indicate the type of organization which the WRA created to deal with this displaced, insecure, resentful, shocked and partly alien group.

IV. The Administrative Structure of a Relocation Center

It is not proposed to describe the whole structure of the WRA, merely the organization of the center. For the Washington staff, it is sufficient here to say that it is headed by the National Director, who is assisted and advised by a group of officials, and that the line of authority goes from National Director to Project Director (that is, the Director of the Center). The Project Director is responsible for the general welfare of the people and for the carrying out of the national policies. Within the framework of the regulations he is given a considerable amount of authority.

Under him, the administrative is divided into three principal divisions; there or other divisions, the Relocation Division, the Project Attorneys office and the Reports Office; but the three main administrative divisions are Administrative Management, Operations and Community Management. Of these, the first two do not greatly concern us tonight. Administrative management is concerned with finance property purchasing, auditing employment and so on. Operations includes engineering, industry, agriculture and transportation and similar activities. The Division of Community Management includes those spheres of action in which we are most concerned; it deals with government, and social services in the broadest sense of that term.

The Division is headed by one of the three Assistant Project Directors; it is his duty to coordinate all those activities which have to do with the social organization of the Center. The list of sections within the division will give a better understanding of the nature of the work. They are:

1. Health; including medical and hospital services.

2. Internal Security: that is internal police (ag contracted with the M.P's guarding the camp externally)

3. Community Enterprises: that is the body operating cooperative services and stores.

4. Community Government: this I shall discuss later.

5. Community Analysis: that is my job, the analysis of the social life of the people.

6. Education.

7. Community Activities: this will be the principal topic of Mr. Griswold's paper.

8. Welfare.

This group will be particularly interested in the welfare organization and I shall attempt a brief account. The

welfare section is headed by a Counsellor. There are two assistant Counsellors, one for each of the two communities, and there are several junior counsellors. There is also an evacuee staff, and there were some competent case workers among them, but most of these have relocated, leaving only two or three case workers, some interpreters and a clerical staff.

The section is responsible for the administration of relief grants, for those unable to work; for the allocation of clothing allowances which are granted to all family members of employed people; for the allocation of housing; for transfers to and from other centers; for visits sanctioned on a welfare basis, and for the administration of certain special relief to indigents requiring special assistance. Just now it is faced with the hardest job it has ever had; the relocation of families and individuals requiring public assistance and the essential negotiations with relief agencies in the place to which relocation is planned. This is all I shall say about welfare just now; if anyone is interested I shall be glad to try to answer any questions later.

To this sketch I shall only add that the heads of all Divisions and most sections are appointed Caucasions, on a Civil Serviee salary scale. The services of professional, skilled and unskilled evacuees are utilized to the greatest possible extent, but they are on the evacuee scale of pay, of which I shall say more when touching on employment policies.

V. The Social Organization of the people.

Mention has already been made of the Japanese family. A few more words may emphasize some of its distinctive characteristics.

First, to repeat, in the pure Japanese culture the group is more important than the individual; the individual justifies himself by conforming to the conduct prescribed by his status.

The father is the head; to him is owed obedience and a degree of ritual respect. The wife is, theoretically at least, subordinate to her husband. She obeys him and serves him. In fact, this subordination is much modified. In Japanese peasant society, the wife occupies an important economic position and is accordingly respected. The same holds true of the Japanese in America. Thus, while in public the wife gives deference to her husband, in private she can wield a great deal of influence; a strong-minded woman can dominate her husband, as may sometimes conceivaly occur in our own culture.

The children owe deference and obedience to the parents, particularly the father. Even marriage, which American society considers the affair of the two individuals, is much controlled

by the father. Other matters, of personal responsibility in America, are considered the business of the father.

The eldest son has a particular position. He is responsible for the family property, for the care of the parents when they are old, and he will in time succeed to the authority of the father. Consequently be has more responsibility and at the same time less freedom of action than the younger brothers.

In the U.S. the family organization was somewhat modified. Children were, in some families, given more freedom. But this was true only in some families. In others the authoritarian pattern persisted. As the Nisei grow to marriageable age, this pattern changes still more, many Nisei marriages follow the American pattern to some degree or other. As for the eldest son, be retains his special position, particularly when there is family property.

Evacuation further modified the family. In the first places it brought the family closer together. This is true physically, because a whole family lives in one small apartment. It is also close socially; as other relationships were weakened or shattered, family relationships became even more important.

At the same time certain changes occurred. The child is no longer dependent upon the father for support, the child is fed by the Government in a communal mess-hall. Parents tell us that adolescent children are well aware of this and the parental authority is thereby weakened. Authority also is diminished by the absence of many family enterprises which would exist in normal family life.

Relocation has separated families. The bulk of those who have left are Nisei, leaving the Issei parents behind. It is said, and I can only cite other people's evidence, that some Nisei enjoy their freedom and do little to help their parents. But this is certainly not true of all Nisei, possibly not even the majority.

To sum up, the Japanese family retains some Japanese features. Some families show marked signs of American influence. Evacuation may have diminished its authoritarian characteristic but without seriously disturbing family unity. It will probably remain a strong social group through whatever changes the larger group many experience.

The next social grouping to be noted is the block. This is a unique social entity, created by life in a relocation center. It combines certain characteristics of a close-knit village, a city neighborhood togehter with some features entirely its own.

Physically, a block is a collection of barracks created by the engineers who built the camp. It consists of 16 barracks arranged in two parallel rows of eight barracks. each. The barrack at the end of one row is the recreation hall, seldom available for block recreation, as most of them are assigned to activities of project-wide importance at the same end of the other row is the mess-hall. The other fourteen barracks are residential. Each is 100 feet long, 20 feet wide. The residential barrack is divided normally into four apartments, varying in size. Each apartment is inhabited by one family. If the family is unusually large it may have two apartments. Between the two rows within the block are the block familities; lavatories, laundry-room and storeroom. There are 33 such residential blocks in Butte, 17 in Canal.

Though physically created in accordance with Army camp specifications, the block from the beginning became an intense, close-knit social group. The 200 to 250 who inhabit it have became a village in the midst of other nearly similar villages. The fact of eating together and sharing common facilities induces close social union. In addition older social groupings were perpetuated. Relatives sought to live in the same block. So also did friends, and people from the same localities in California.

Block life became rapidly organized. Children now play together in natural groups within the block. There are block young people's clubs, block clubs, and block parties. Cliques are strongly developed within the block; people who gossip, drink tea, and enjoy common recreation.

The block has an official as well as a social character. Each block has an evacuee appointed to the post of block manager. He was orginally, and is still officially concerned with the material care of the block. He looks after vacant apartments is custodian and distributor of the necessary supplies (other than mess supplies) and is responsible for the block property. In addition he has, in most blocks, become the representative of the people, composes quarrels, and carries complaints from the people to the Administration. He is at once Mayor, judge and external representative.

The block manager of each community meet together weekly, to receive instructions and information, and to discuss matters of common interests They thus become a council. While they have no legislative authority, their resolutions are held with respect, and are thus important indications of community wishes and attitudes. They are probably the most influential of officially recognized evacuee groups.

In most blocks there is a block council. This consists of the block manager, the member of the community council, and

one representative from each of the 14 barracks. They discuss matters of interest within the block, usually have a fund to buy recreation equipment for their children and plan block parties. They also voice complaints to be taken to the Administration and receive important communications on policy. They at once organize block life and are a link in the administrative chain.

Each of the two communities has an elected council. As originally planned, it was to be the official voice of the people. Various factors delayed the formation of permanent councils, and it was not until September 1943, one year after the Center had been in existence, that the first councils were sworn in. Each block has one representative; the electors are all adults within the block. The councilmen elect their chairman, secretary, executive board and other officials. The Butte Council meets twice a month, the Canal Council once a week.

The pass ordinances, bring up grievances, make requests and are given a considerable share in the internal organization of the Center, but of course within the WRA regulations. They also hear official communications and discuss community affairs with the appropriate officials. Their most important functions are to voice community wishes to coordinate community needs with administrative policies, and to act as organs of communications. Legislation has been passed, but it is much less important than other functions.

The community councils have had many ups and downs. When they came into existence, they found themselves rivals of the block manager assemblies. These had been in existence for a year, had acquired prestige and authority, and were already trained men of affairs. Moreover, they were permanent appointees, not subject to reelection every six months. The details of their history can not be given here. There was competition for authority; the community councils lost favor with the people for certain acts; the councilmen became discouraged; and there was serious talk of amalgamating managers and councils. Eventually a few changes were made. The councils regained some prestige. The Block Managers still retain their active concern in camp welfare, but now route official requests and complaints through the councils. At the present time, the Councils are useful to people and to administration; they are given as much authority as regulations permit; the Administration listens to their requests grants them if possible, and explains carefully when they cannot be granted. Whenever possible, methods of implementing Government policy are left to them. The councilmen still have not the prestige within the blocks that the managers have but the council as a whole occupies a much better position of respect than it did before.

I shall touch on only one more aspect of social organization, that of employment. Congress set the limits an evacuee can be paid. The majority get $16 a month. 15% of them may receive $19 a month; this wage is received for professionals, the highly skilled and people doing supervisory work. The wage

is supplemented by clothing allowances for members of the workers families. Thus a professional man with a wife and two children would receive $33 a month.

The bulk of the work is done by the evacuees. In the hospital there are evacuee doctors and nurses, a pharmacist and the whole sub-staff. The farm now employs 400, with their own supervisions and foremen. The largest group are those concerned with mess operations; the highly skilled in the central office, the warehousemen and butchers, as well as 50 mess-hall staffs for preparing and serving the people in the blocks. The total number employed is now 3589, plus 223 employed by the Co-op, which is run entirely by the evacuees.

Those with responsible positions have responded well and ably. The bulk of the workers do not work so hard as they would outside. There is very little economic motivation; everyone is fed and housed, and the extra $16 or $19 is not a sufficient inducement to arduous toil. From time to time there have been labor problems. Any reduction of staff is resisted. Apart from that most troubles are caused by tactless handling. In general, the essential work gets done; the evacuees realize that the maintenance of essential services is their responsibility and, while standards of performance are not what they would otherwise be, they meet the requrements of the situations.

Other organizatiohs will be discussed by Mr. Griswold: I shall simply mention their existence and list: religious organizations, clubs and societies;recreation groups, and various other cultural activities.

VI. Problems.

Problems have been indicated as they arose. Only two more will be mentioned.

The all-absorbing problem now facing the WRA is the relocation of allevacuees within this calender year. The two great deterrents are the welfare cases and the fear of "outside".

Of the welfare problem, it can only be said is that there are many hundreds of cases and that the problem involves the administrative difficulty of coordinating the work of the WRA with that of other Federal and State agencies.

The other deterrent is the result of the type of life the people have been living. They have become dependent and institutionalized; those facts, added to their insecurity caused by evacuation makes many of them psychologically unable to re-establish themselves. The problem of the WRA is thus, among other things, to give such material help as is possible, to re-

build their confidence in themsel ves, and by advice and information to help them make the readjustment. Upon the ability of the WRA staff to accomplish these ends depends the success of the policy of closing the Center.