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University of California Japanese Evacuation and
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THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA JAPANESE EVACUATION AND RESETTLEMENT STUDY: A PROLEGOMENON

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One's opinions regarding the effort and efficacy of the congressionally-sponsored Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC) and of its report aside [1] there is no gainsaying that the hearings the Commission held in 1981 and 1982 throughout the United States, including Alaska, have compelled many to examine or reexamine the significant scientific literature on the wartime camps for Japanese Americans. Certainly a corpus of such studies on these camps [2] will include *The Spoilage* by Dorothy Swaine Thomas and Robert S. Nishimoto (with contributions by Rosalie A. Hankey, James M. Sakoda, Morton Grodzins, and Frank Miyamoto) [3]. This 1946 publication was the first volume published of the University of California Evacuation and Resettlement Study.

The purpose of this paper is to examine certain aspects of *The Spoilage* and of the Evacuation and Resettlement Study (ERS) based upon published and unpublished materials (the latter in the National Archives, Washington, D.C.). Additionally, some materials recently submitted to CWRIC will be used to aid in the analysis that follows; and a basic and fundamental concept in anthropology will be used to help elucidate certain figures who were associated with ERS.

ERS was a major social science research project which was financed by the following

institutions: The University of California, the Giannini Foundation, the Columbia Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation [4]. The magnitude of the funding can be imagined by the contributions which were made to support the Study: University of California, \$29,554; Rockefeller Foundation, \$38,750; and Columbia Foundation, \$30,000 [5]. Thus, almost \$100,000 went into the project [6], which was begun in February 1942 and concluded in July 1948 [7]. Given the cost of living and the purchasing power of the dollar in this period, Carey McWilliams' characterization of ERS as "...a lavishly financed research project" [8], remains indisputable.

The project was headquartered in Room 207 of Giannini Hall on the campus of the University of California at Berkeley and was headed by the sociologist Dorothy Swaine Thomas, who was also Lecturer in Sociology for the Giannini Foundation and a professor of rural sociology.

In addition to *The Spoilage*, a companion volume, *The Salvage*, published in 1952, dealing with those who had moved from the camps to the Chicago area, was a product of ERS [9]. It was hoped that a third volume, on the "residue," i.e., those who had returned to the West Coast from the camps, would be written. The two volumes published were the only ones on the social aspects which were definitely projected and realized [10]. However, 1954 saw the publication of

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Prejudice, War and the Constitution, a work that concerned itself with the political characteristics and legal consequences of the evacuation [11]. All three books were published by the University of California Press.

ERS had an ambitious goal even for the large-scale interdisciplinary research project that it was. Each of the major social sciences — sociology, social anthropology (sic), political science, social psychology, and economics — was intended to intermesh and converge upon the “evacuation, detention, and resettlement of the Japanese minority in the United States” [12].

One can readily agree with the statement by the authors of *The Spoilage* that, “The ambitious conceptualization was never realized to the full” [13]. This was especially true of the economic aspect of the project, a point which did not escape its critics [14].

It is not only in ERS’s failure to deal with one of the aspects of the stated goal of the project that *The Spoilage* falls short of its goal, however. There are other significant omissions which have the cumulative effect of raising serious questions regarding the study’s effectiveness.

As an example, consider the statement that follows regarding the camps where research was done.

Our three major “laboratories” were at Tule Lake project [camp] in northern California, the Poston project in Arizona, and the Minidoka project in Idaho. We were able, also, to make spot observations in five of the other seven War Relocation Authority [the government agency which ran the camps] projects [15].

Despite the last statement of the citation above, the reader will look in vain within the covers of *The Spoilage* for the names of the five camps (projects) where “spot observations” were made. Moreover, extremely confusing is the use of the collective pronouns. As applied in the first statement of the passage cited, the plural form obviously refers to the entire ERS, a fact which can be

deduced from the paragraph which precedes the cited passage. However, the use of “we” in the second statement could be interpreted to mean the co-authors, Thomas and Nishimoto. To further confound the clarity of the first statement is the issue of the criteria which were used to determine the selection of Minidoka, Poston, and Tule Lake as the “major laboratories.”

As regards ERS fieldworkers in the camps, Gila, also in Arizona, at one time or another (depending upon the sources) had upwards of seven, the largest contingent of ERS fieldworkers. On the other hand, Minidoka, one of the “major laboratories,” had only one (and that person moved from Tule Lake to Minidoka in mid-1943 [Minidoka had been in existence since the summer of 1942]); Poston, another “major laboratory,” had but two (perhaps only one, after mid-1944); and Tule Lake had upwards of six.

Furthermore, inasmuch as Minidoka, Poston, ^{and Tule Lake were the “major laboratories,”} ~~Poston, another “major laboratory,” had but~~ laboratories,” one wonders why an inordinate portion of *The Spoilage* was given over to Tule Lake. Correspondingly, considering that they were viewed as “major laboratories,” Poston and Minidoka receive scant attention. Specifically, coverage of these two camps in *The Spoilage* is, in the case of Poston, limited to approximately five pages (pages 45–49; 67–68), while in the case of Minidoka, not quite three pages are devoted to this Idaho camp (pages 65–68) in a 388-page volume. Of those where, presumably, “spot observations” were made and which may be considered the “minor laboratories,” and where there were ERS fieldworkers, we have the following page figures: Manzanar, California: some five pages (pages 49–52; 70–71); Topaz, Utah: one and a half pages (pages 64–65); Gila, Arizona: one and three-fourths pages (pages 68–69); and Jerome, Arkansas: three-fourths of a page (pages 71–72). (Assuming that these are where “spot observations” were made — by Thomas and Nishimoto (?) — there is no

indication which camp might have been the fifth where "spot observations" were made.) It should be noted that the print-type on the four camps in the pages cited is half the size of the regular print-type of the book; but even taking this into account the fact of the paucity of information on all but Tule Lake remains an issue.

Moving to the topic of ERS personnel, Thomas and Nishimoto have this to say: "Most of the staff observers were evacuees; at one time as many as twelve Japanese Americans were employed as technical or research assistants in the camps" [16]. Yet, there is no systematic listing of the names of these individuals. The normal protocol observed by a scientific research project — of recognizing in its published results those who had participated — is ignored in this book [17]. By examining closely the index of names and the pages in which the persons listed for their studies are referenced one might be able to compile a list of such Japanese-American researchers. Nevertheless, even by using this cumbersome method an accurate listing cannot be compiled.

In point of fact, only by studying assiduously a not-readily-accessible mimeographed catalog of the General Library of the University of California listing ERS materials which appeared twelve years after *The Spoilage* [18], or by doing research at the National Archives in Washington, D.C. [19], can one learn the names of the Japanese-American personnel. But these are largely hit or miss processes because inference and deduction must be used.

Just as negligent as omitting the Study's Japanese-American researchers in the WRA camps is the omission in *The Spoilage*, and subsequent ERS volumes, of the names of Japanese-American ERS fieldworkers who did studies in the so-called assembly centers. There were 16 in all, including Manzanar, a camp which later became a WRA camp. In general, these 16 detention camps were in or

near large urban areas (but included one in Arizona) along the West Coast and were the temporary camps where internees were incarcerated before being transferred to the more permanent WRA camps.

The authors acknowledge that there were such researchers, but not until the footnote at the bottom of page 23 can the observant reader, one fully conversant with the types, names, and history of the camps, for the first time infer from the citation, "Field Notes, August, 1942," that material from Japanese-American researchers in the detention camps was used. Again, either by combing Barnhart's General Library Catalog or by doing research in Washington, D.C. [20], the persistent student might succeed in compiling a list of such researchers and where they worked. There is, of course, the direct method, which is to say, journeying to the Bancroft Library of the University of California at Berkeley where the ERS materials are deposited.

Parenthetically, with regard to the ERS collection and accessibility to its archival materials at Berkeley, the following odd circumstance must be noted.

Although Alexander H. Leighton was a Lt. Commander in the U.S. Navy while he was head of the Poston camp's Bureau of Sociological Research, the entire Bureau file was moved to Bancroft after the war. Consequently for the student who wishes to do archival research on the WRA camps, in addition to doing it at the National Archives in Washington, D.C., he/she must also travel to Berkeley for the Leighton file. Yet, because Leighton was a government employee, his materials should have been deposited in the National Archives in the first instance, as was the case of WRA materials (copies of which were deposited at Berkeley, among other places) [21].

Japanese-American ERS personnel in the detention camps ("assembly centers"):

Manzanar (Owens Valley, California):

Mari Okazaki

Togo Tanaka
 Santa Anita (Santa Anita Racetrack, Arcadia, Los Angeles County):
 Tamie Tsuchiyama
 Tanforan (Tanforan Park Racetrack, San Bruno, San Mateo County, California):
 Doris Hayashi
 Fred Hoshiyama
 Ben Ijima
 Charles Kikuchi
 Michio Kimutani
 Tamotsu Shibutani
 Haruo Najima
 Henry Tani
 Kay Ushida
 Fujii Ushida
 Earle T. Yusa
 Tulare (Tulare County Fairgrounds, Tulare, California):
 James Sakoda
 Japanese-American ERS personnel in the WRA camps:
 Gila, Arizona:
 Shotaro Hikida
 Inoue (first name unknown) [22]
 Charles Kikuchi [23]
 Y. Okuno
 Joe Omachi
 Tamie Tsuchiyama [24] (see also under Poston, below)
 Earle T. Yusa [25]
 Manzanar, California:
 Mari Okazaki
 Togo Tanaka
 Minidoka, Idaho:
 James Sakoda [26] (see also under Tule Lake, below)
 Poston, Arizona:
 Richard N. Nishimoto
 Tamie Tsuchiyama (see also under Gila, above)
 Tule Lake, Newell, California:
 Frank S. Miyamoto [27]
 James Sakoda (see also under Minidoka, above)
 Tamotsu Shibutani [28]

Tetsuo Najima (worked for the Giannini Foundation)
 Chet Yamauchi
 Topaz, Utah:
 Doris Hayashi
 Frederick Hoshiyama
 Japanese-American ERS personnel in the Midwest:
 Chicago:
 M. Ishida
 Charles Kikuchi
 Frank Miyamoto
 R.S. Nishimoto
 Tamotsu Shibutani
 Togo Tanaka
 St. Louis:
 Setsuko Matsunaga
 No city identified:
 M. Ikeda

For some individuals listed above the complete names could not be found. Aside from the silence regarding the Japanese-American ERS personnel in the detention camps in *The Spoilage*, it would appear from the above that there may have been at least four more than the "twelve" in the WRA camps mentioned by Thomas and Nishimoto [29].

Still on the topic of ERS personnel, if the focus is now shifted to the non-Japanese staff, an equally-ambiguous accounting is found in *The Spoilage*.

In addition to the Japanese-American staff observers, three "Caucasian" members of our staff resided for long periods in the [WRA] camps we were studying. Two of these were graduate students in anthropology; one was a sociologist, with graduate training in political science [30].

These "Caucasians" remain equally nameless; likewise where they were assigned is not revealed except by references in footnotes. Of the anthropologists, one was Robert Francis Spencer, a Berkeley graduate student who spent from July 1942 to June 1943 at Gila [31]. One comes across his name in a reference note at the bottom of page 68 as

the author of a report. This is the only reference to Spencer, despite numerous reports he had filed during his tenure with ERS [32]. The second anthropologist was Rosalie A. Hankey (later Rosalie Hankey Wax) [33], who is listed on the title page as one of contributors to the book. This is the only instance in which her name appears in the book. The third was Robert H. Billigmeier [34]. One learns, also only indirectly, that he was the third "Caucasian." His name appears three times in three separate footnotes.

With regard to Billigmeier, the unknowing reader could readily assume that it was Morton Grodzins rather than Billigmeier who was the third "Caucasian." Grodzins is listed as one of the contributors on the title page of *The Spoilage* (just as is Hankey). Furthermore the description of the third person, as one who had training in political science, could apply to Grodzins equally. Truth to tell, in 1945 he received his Ph.D. in political science at Berkeley [35]. A secondary source, namely, the book review by Marvin Opler, the WRA Community Analyst who did in-depth studies of all aspects of the Tule Lake camp, confirms that it was Billigmeier (rather than Grodzins) who did some field research at the camp of Tule Lake [36].

Beyond those issues raised thus far, which might be excused as lapses, very serious ones emerge relating to the quality of *The Spoilage*. As Marvin Opler has pointed out, the first 83 pages contain rather straightforward material pertaining to the internees before the war and materials up to, and including, the loyalty oath ("registration") period in Tule Lake. These first 83 pages he considers "excellent" [37]. The remainder of the volume is devoted to Tule Lake exclusively. This was the WRA camp in northern California, which, from the middle of 1943, became the "segregation center" for those who had been removed from the nine other camps because they had not passed the loyalty-oath test or had wanted to return to Japan for one reason or

another. It also housed those who had been placed there originally and had not wanted to make another move to still another camp when Tule Lake was being converted to the segregation camp.

Marvin Opler's review of *The Spoilage* reveals that there is much to be desired in its section on Tule Lake, based upon Wax's observations. One major shortcoming, according to Opler, is Wax's lack of objectivity.

In order to understand the lengthy passages from *The Spoilage* which follow, the following must be stated. Wax initially became deeply involved with a group of internees — the segregants, that is, those who had selected to go to Tule Lake rather than those who had been there before the camp became a segregation camp — who were "pro-Japan." Then, after a murder of a "pro-America" member, she turned against the members of the former group. The following, therefore, reveals her subjective approach to some of the Tule Lake segregants, many of whom she came to despise. The passages are excerpts from pages 370 through 379 in *The Spoilage*.

Abe, Shozo (pseudonym). Of medium height and slender; physically unattractive. Manner forbidding in general and arrogant toward WRA officials and other Caucasians.

Kuratomi, George Toshio. Of medium height and slender. Quick intelligence; somewhat high-strung; dignified manner; an effective speaker....

Kato, Bill (pseudonym). Of medium height, heavy set; affected *bozu* haircut. Boastful of leadership qualities....

Seki, Johnny (pseudonym). Short and plump; gentlemanly; genial and courteous....

Tada, Mitsugu (pseudonym). Slender and extremely tall for a Japanese; often addressed by nickname, "Slim." High-bridged nose; moustache; in appearance more like a person of Mexican extraction than a Japanese.

Sasaki, Milton (pseudonym). Short and slender; distinguished appearance; dressy and dandified.

Watanabe, Taro (pseudonym). Heavy set; of medium height; impressive manner.

Noma, Takeo (pseudonym). Taller than average and well built. Considered arrogant and blunt in manner....

Yamashita, Koshiro (pseudonym). Of medium height and stout; large "handle-bar" moustache. Pompous and condescending manner....

Kira, Stanley Masanobu (pseudonym). Short and stout; effeminate appearance; small features; beard.

Ishikawa, Torakichi (pseudonym). Tall and well built. Argumentative and self-assertive.

Yamada, Nobuo (pseudonym). Of medium height and slender. Arrogant and self-assertive.

Tsuchikawa, Mrs. Hanako (pseudonym). Very short and slender; physically attractive; often called "Madame Chiang Kai-shek" by fellow evacuees. Proud and stubborn; argumentative.

Wakida, George (pseudonym). Short and well built.

Niiyama, Sam (pseudonym). Short and somewhat stout. Practical and cynical.

Tsuruda, Bob (pseudonym). Medium height and slender; attractive in appearance. Conceited, but good sense of humor; talkative.

Kurusu, Isamu (pseudonym). Tall and slender. Gentle in manner and courteous.

Higashi, Thomas (pseudonym). Short, medium build.

Itabashi, Kazuhiko (pseudonym). Short and slender. Neat in appearance; spry and alert. Straightforward; kind manner.

The descriptions in themselves — some of which can be found word for word in Wax's *Doing Fieldwork* — not only are gratuitous, they also amply support Marvin Opler's criticism of Wax in his review of *The Spoilage* regarding lack of objectivity.

What is striking about the descriptions is that for none are standard measurements applied. Yet, Wax, an anthropologist, who, having studied in one of the world's foremost departments of anthropology, surely must have had at least one course in physical anthropology, which, if it was a standard course, taught use of simple objective measurements of body height in feet and inches and of body weight in pounds.

Withal, the most serious infelicity by Wax had to do with Stanley Masanobu Kira (pseudonym), an alleged Tule Lake terrorist. After she had turned against the "pro-Japan" group, the faction with which she had great empathy and sympathy prior to the murder of a Tulean of the opposing view (a "pro-America" member), and a faction with which she had ingratiated herself in order to get information, she began to abhor the "pro-Japan" group and its leaders, especially Kira. In her new "anti-fanatic" role she accepted as true what the leaders of the group to which

she had switched her allegiance had to say about Kira. She asserted that Kira was a "selfish and dangerous man who wished only to become a big shot," and that Kira was nothing more than a gangster [38]. It came to a point where she felt so enraged about Kira, owing to the allegations of terrorism she had heard charged against him, that she pictured herself running to the section of the camp where Kira lived "like a berserk and beating up Mr. Kira" [39]. She then plotted to get vengeance on Kira [40].

Wax ultimately wreaked her vengeance on Kira in another, more effective, way. She informed on Kira to the Federal Bureau of Investigation at Tule Lake.

Not surprisingly, her hatred of Kira can be seen in the most denigrating and pejorative description with which one can label a man, a description she reserved for Kira: "effeminate."

What is most disquieting about the entire episode revolving around the Kira incident, aside from the ethics of an anthropologist turning informer, is this: in *The Spoilage*, perhaps one of the most astounding facts of the entire evacuation is buried in an appendix and laconically stated — in an incomplete sentence, no less — because it had to do with Stanley Masanobu Kira: "Filed suit against General DeWitt [Commander of the Western Defense Command, and the general who was ordered to implement the evacuation], contesting legality of evacuation" [41].

The precious few Japanese Americans who contested in the courts one aspect or another of the martial law, evacuation, and incarceration have become landmark cases in legal history, irrespective of the outcomes of the cases, and the plaintiffs have become folk heroes in contemporary Japanese-American culture.

What student of the Japanese-American experience or of constitutional law has not heard of the Yasui, Hirabayashi, Endo, and Korematsu cases [42]? However, one

wonders how many have heard of Kinzo Ernest Wakayama (Wax's "Kira")? Yet, had "Kira" not been turned in by Wax there is a good possibility that Wakayama would be as well known and as highly respected as the other four, a thesis which will be explored in greater detail shortly.

Before proceeding further, however, consider Wax's words on Kira's fate after she had informed the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) about him. She

suggested that they [the FBI] call in Mr. Kira and question him about his loyalties in the presence of some of the young *Hokoku* [a group of Tuleans who had renounced their American citizenship] officers [because Kira himself had not renounced his citizenship]. Mr. Kira applied for denationalization. Subsequently, he was sent to Japan with the other expatriates... [43].

Wax's matter-of-fact observation hardly reveals what then happened to "Kira." Thanks to the remarkable research and study by Michi Weglyn, one learns firsthand what actually took place during the FBI's "questioning." (Information on the source of Weglyn's section dealing with Wakayama precedes that portion in her book specifically dealing with him.)

Tex Nakamura, a Nisei attorney...recently recalled that in a Gestapo-style predawn raid, government officers forced themselves into the apartment of Kinzo Wakayama — a World War I veteran and embittered extremist leader — and compelled him to sign away his citizenship at gunpoint. Nakamura explains in a letter of June 25, 1973: "I interviewed him [Wakayama] during the summer of 1957 in Hakata, Japan. At which time he stated to me that he was rudely awakened about 3 or 4 in the morning. The FBI came to his quarter with a pistol brandishing, and the officer that accompanied the FBI compelled him to renounce.

Mr. Wakayama told the Justice Department official that he will only sign the renunciation document under protest. The officer stated to him that he may do so. Consequently, Kinzo Wakayama signed the renunciation document under protest. This means that the document so obtained would not be valid, and was obtained by duress" [44].

In neither *The Spoilage* nor in any of Wax's other writings are the central facts about

Wakayama's life mentioned, facts which would have raised serious doubts in the readers' minds that he was a "fascist," as he was painted to be. It remained for his son, Junro Edgar Wakayama, presently assistant professor in a school of medicine of a Western state university, to carry on the fight to clear his father's name [45]. Dr. Wakayama (born in the camp of Manzanar) and his younger brother were successful in making it possible for Kinzo Ernest Wakayama, at age 86, to fly from a home for senior citizens near Fukuoka, Japan, to San Francisco in order to testify before CWRIC on August 11, 1981 [46].

The outstanding fact about Wakayama, and relegated to an incomplete statement in the Appendix of *The Spoilage*, and never again raised in any of Wax's writings or in any ERS publication, is that Kinzo Ernest and his wife Toki Wakayama challenged the constitutionality of the internment in "An Application of Wakayama, Ernest and Toki for a Writ of Habeas corpus, No. 2376-H and 2380-O'C (Civil), The District Court of the United States Southern District of California, September 23, 1942" [47]. Both were supported in their efforts by the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California.

It would be only fair to have Kinzo Ernest Wakayama present his story, as outlined in autobiographical form and submitted to CWRIC prior to his actual appearance before the Commission in 1981.

Brief Personal history, Incidents and Opinion (sic)

1. American citizen of Japanese ancestry — Born at Kohala, Hawaii, on June 16, 1895.
2. Enlisted in the United States Army — First World War.
3. Secretary — Republican Party, 2nd Precinct, 2nd Representative District — Island of Hawaii.
4. Clerk — United States Post Office — Kohala, Hawaii.
5. Bookkeeper — People's Bank, Kohala Branch — Hawaii.
6. Interpreter — Kohala District Court — Hawaii.
7. Candidate for the West Hawaii Board of Supervisor primary election from Republican Party.
8. Secretary-Treasurer of Fishermen's Union of Los Angeles Harbor Area, Los Angeles, California — affiliated with the American Federation of Labor.

9. Statement of loyalty, an article published in the San Pedro Pilot – newspaper, California – written by me and was introduced in Congress – recorded in Congressional Record of June or July issue 1940 or 1941 (exact date, month and year not clear).
10. Submitted request to General DeWitt, West Coast Defense Commander, to make a separate camp for First World War Veterans (American Legionnaires) of Japanese ancestry if removal of every person of Japanese blood is necessary for defense purpose, to avoid criticism later if dumped together with others, which will be taken up as racial issue and abridge (sic) of Constitutional Rights. The reply was as we all know, "Jap is Jap," which greatly hurt my heart because I believed that I was a loyal American regardless of race, creed or color.
11. The above request was sent by me, acting adjutant of Commodore Perry Post, American Legion of Southern California and in behalf of Townsend Harris Post of San Francisco, California but the reply as mentioned above to my disappointment.
12. I rejected evacuation at Terminal Island, California, because I am an American citizen, but was ordered to obey the removal under the point of a machine gun by armed sailors.
13. Filed writ of *Habeas Corpus* through the [American] Civil Liberties Union of Southern California in the United States District Court to challenge our (wife included) Constitutional Rights. Attorneys Edgar Camp, [A.L.] Wirin and O'Rand and others handled this case.
14. I was illegally imprisoned without due process of law twice – approximately 72 days in the Los Angeles County Jail and 2 weeks at Lone Pine Jail near Manzanar Relocation Center, California.
15. Arraignment at Los Angeles Jail read as follows: "Knowingly and willingly attempt to over-throw the United States Government" which was very ridiculous when heard.
16. I was handcuffed from Santa Anita Segregation Center to Los Angeles County Jail and this photo appeared in the next morning which was read by thousands of people.
17. I was blended (sic) [branded] as a traitor, my reputation injured greatly beyond words expressed because of my loyalty to the country of my birth, which was demonstrated by serving as a good soldier with the United States Army became regrettable after a number of years passed by and my above written personal record was not given any consideration at all.
18. Nothing has been done during my imprisonment except once taken to court for 10 minutes and was released without explanation or decision given after 2 months of confinement.
19. I was taken to Pomona Camp [Pomona Assembly Center, Pomona, California], Manzanar, Tule Lake, Santa Fe [Internment Camp], and Crystal City [Texas] Camps thereafter.
20. I was kicked and pushed around and taken to the stockade for questioning countless number of times, told to drop the case of *Habeas Corpus* otherwise there will be

other method to curtail my movement hereafter which was a vengeance cleverly planned by the authorities of the Justice Department, also based on racial prejudice.

21. There were few Japanese in Lone Pine Jail and the Mexican (sic) [Spanish] Government Consul (neutral country represented Japan) came to see them but I was refused when asked to interview my case because he had nothing to do with American citizen. Mr. Gaffrey (spelling might be wrong) came to Manzanar at that time so my wife requested why should my husband be taken in prison and no protection given to a person of American citizen while the aliens are taken care of by the Mexican (sic) Consul. Reply was, "If your husband needs protecting tell him to become an alien," which was very astonishing and disappointing – forced me to become an alien and give up my American citizenship which I have valued greatly for many, many years and was a great shock to me.

22. Over 110,000 Americans of Japanese blood were sent to segregation (sic) centers by forceful evacuation. However, none of the enemy aliens of Italy and Germany were taken in – this biased act clearly demonstrated racial discrimination; abridge (sic) of Constitutional Rights of the Nisei, American citizens of Japanese ancestry; and unfair treatment to veterans of the First World War of American Legion which stated above.

23. I was glad to hear the good news of the heroism of Nisei soldiers of 442nd Infantry from Hawaii – my nephew was injured but returned, who fought gallantly to preserve American democracy but on the other hand I felt sorry for those who died and to those who came back not knowing that some day in the future these boys will experience what I am now going through and be too late to regret.

24. I denounced my citizenship under threat and duress of war plus in fear of unlawful imprisonment again and illegal questioning thereafter in consideration of my declining health if refused to do so.

25. I still believe that I am a good American citizen compared with those who waved patriotic flag and did not care to fight for their rights in time of peace or at war. As an example, I have preached my 3 sons to render their service with the Armed Forces of the United States to show their loyalty to which they have done so regardless of what have (sic) happened to their father, because some day, the government will realize the black page in the brilliant American history and correct it by someone, though it may take many years hereafter.

26. My first son was discharged from the United States Army in 1970 was a Captain and my third son served overseas at Vietnam.

27. I would like to see this great mistake of injustice done to me and other 110,000 Americans of Japanese ancestry by the United States Government authorities be corrected if the true spirit of democracy is to be preserved and if the United States of America is still claimed to be the land of the free and justice for all the people. For this reason I sent a claim and letter to my sons who are presently attending University of Oregon Medical School and San Francisco State College.

I had gall bladder extracted at the age of 77 and I am now recuperating at an Old Age People's Home in Japan. I desire settlement before I pass away, may be not to (sic) far in the future, to rest my soul in peace.

signed/ Ernest Kinzo Wakayama
October 16, 1972 [48]

The especially harsh treatment which had been meted out to Wakayama at various stages and places of his incarcerations lend credence to his Point 20 of the statement above. That an anthropologist, perhaps unwittingly, may have occupied a key position by playing into the hands of those who had a larger plan — to be rid of Ernest and Toki Wakayama and their children by banishment to Japan — is quite disconcerting to contemplate. What is established is that Wax knew exactly what the consequences of her informing on Wakayama would mean.

In the circumstances that make up *The Spoilage* chronicle, an interesting but revealing aside is presented by the pseudonym selected by Wax for Wakayama. The rich allegorical imagery is revealed when the plot of one of Japan's classic and most-beloved tales, *Chushingura* (*Tale of the Forty-Seven Ronin*), is recounted.

In brief, it is a tale of feudal Japan revolving around the villainous Lord Kira and the hero Retainer Oishi. Lord Kira, a corrupt and greedy figure, fails to instruct Lord Asano properly on court etiquette and dress because the latter had not plied Lord Kira with lavish gifts. Ultimately, Lord Asano is forced to commit *seppuku* (ritual suicide). To avenge his death the Lord Asano's retainer Oishi develops a plot which culminates in avenging his lord's death. *Chushingura* is a tale of greed, power, perfidy, face, honor, and revenge [49].

By the use of the particular pseudonym and the descriptions of Kira and of his alleged activities, Wax leaves no room for doubt that, in Wax's eyes, the morality play unfolded in Tule Lake while she was there, and the choice

of "Kira" for Wakayama was more than fortuitous [50].

Although seemingly quite unrelated, there is still another significant aspect of ERS, which is to say, a book by one of its principal researchers, Morton Grodzins.

Grodzins was a young graduate student in political science who joined ERS in early 1942 and who was, in many respects, Dorothy Thomas' right hand man [51]. Based upon his research while with ERS, as has been reported already, he wrote his Ph.D. dissertation in political science in 1945 for the University of California, "The Effects of the Japanese Evacuation."

Four years later, while teaching in the political science department of the University of Chicago, he had a book published by the University of Chicago which stemmed from his research with ERS, *Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation*.

Although this book is now remembered more for its analysis of the Japanese evacuation, *Americans Betrayed* was a brilliant *tour de force* for the field of political science, breaking barriers in theory, methodology, and policy analysis. Nonetheless, the basic thesis of this comprehensive tome is that pressure groups and politicians were behind the unjust evacuation.

An important consequence of the publishing of *Americans Betrayed*, and neglected to date by students of the evacuation, was the alteration of ERS's publication plans.

As will be recalled, had there been a third volume, it was to have been entitled *The Residue*, a book on the returnees from the camps to the West Coast. That *The Residue* was to be the third volume was also clear to the most knowledgeable person about ERS not connected with it, Marvin Opler. "The third [ERS volume, after *The Salvage*], already titled *The Residue*, will concern that population segment which ultimately returned to coastal areas" [52].

In the words of the authors of the third volume of ERS which did come off the press, *Prejudice, War and The Constitution: Causes and Consequences of the Evacuation of the Japanese Americans in World War II*, published in 1954:

Before leaving the University of California and the directorship of the Evacuation and Resettlement Study in 1948, Professor Thomas, together with Professor [Charles] Aiken, prevailed upon Professor [Jacobus] tenBroek to undertake the preparation of the present volume. The latter invited Professor [Edward N.] Barnhart to participate in the enterprise, and subsequently Floyd Matson was asked to join as collaborator.

The present work is concerned with the evacuation in terms of its historical origins, its political characteristics, the responsibility for it, and the legal implications arising from it. Thus it is less a study of the Japanese in particular than of Americans in general [53].

However, it is clear that one of the major goals of this book had to do with Grodzins' *Americans Betrayed* in a very direct way. Thus,

Some of the original file material bearing on the political aspects of the evacuation had been collected by Morton Grodzins in his position as research assistant for the study. Utilizing this as well as other study materials, he prepared and published a book on the subject.... Although Dr. Grodzins and the authors of the present work have all drawn upon the file material of the study, the present authors differ substantially from him in their assessment of the reliability, relevance, and significance of much of the data, and have supplemented these resources with much additional material. Accordingly, their ultimate conclusions are different from his, and sometimes flatly contradict them [54].

The authors then reveal their position very early in the book. This paragraph is found on page four.

A number of students of liberal persuasion have attributed the principal responsibility for the evacuation to pressure groups and politicians. Thus Bradford Smith declares that "the preponderantly loyal Japanese minority were rounded up in an illegal fashion, chiefly in response to pressure from a bluntly intolerant, grasping element on the Pacific Coast." Smith also observes that "this was an election year" and "anti-Orientalism was a staple product on the Pacific Coast." According to Carey McWilliams "the Federal Government was pressured or perhaps more

accurately, 'stampeded'" into undertaking the evacuation "by the noisy clamor of certain individuals, groups, and organizations in the three western states," by "groups that had an obvious and readily acknowledged economic interest in evacuation," by "politicians and political units" exerting pressure directly on General DeWitt as well as indirectly "through the technique of an organized campaign." Morton Grodzins — though his conclusions as to responsibility for evacuation vary from chapter to chapter of *Americans Betrayed* — adheres, in the main, to the pressure group and political theory.

Veritably an entire chapter (Chapter IV) is set aside in the book by tenBroek, Barnhart, and Matson to criticize Grodzins' *Americans Betrayed* [55].

Notwithstanding the then-startling thesis posited by the three authors, and increasingly substantiated by heretofore classified documents as they are declassified (especially those pertaining to Roosevelt) [56] — that Roosevelt, his civilian aides, Henry Stimson, the Congress, and the Supreme Court were to bear the heaviest burden of responsibility [57] — a major question remains. Why did an unplanned book, or one which, at the most, was to be a "monograph" to "deal with political and administrative aspects of evacuation and resettlement" [58] come to be a cornerstone of ERS?

A clue to the answer — providing yet another twist to the history of ERS — may be found in reactions by specific institutions of higher education to *Americans Betrayed*.

On page 27 of the December 15, 1950 issue of the *New York Times* can be found this news item, cited here in its entirety.

William Terry Couch charged today that he lost his job as director of the University of Chicago Press last month because he had published a book that Chancellor Robert M. Hutchins, at the request of the University of California, had sought to suppress.

Mr. Couch quoted Chicago's president, Ernest C. Colwell, as telling him in effect two years ago, during the controversy over the book, that "inter-university comity" was more important than freedom of the press.

He asserted he had decided to disclose the background of his dismissal after waiting three weeks in vain for the university to do so. When the vice president, James A. Cunningham, announced Mr. Couch's discharge on Nov.

21, he said the reason was "private." To Mr. Couch personally, he said it was "inability to get along with your subordinates or superiors."

The book involved in the dispute was "*Americans Betrayed*," by Morton M. Grodzins, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. It was published early last year, and is critical of California's and the Federal Government's handling of the Japanese relocation problem [sic] during the war. The book was written as a thesis by Mr. Grodzins while he was studying at the University of California.

Mr. Couch denied the assertion by the University of California that it had allowed Mr. Grodzins access to material in the book only on his written agreement not to publish it [59].

There is no denying the sharp criticisms of Californians and of leading California officials contained in the book. Very few Californians and California organizations (or, for that matter, West Coast groups) receive accolades from Grodzins for having tried to prevent the evacuation or for having tried to help Japanese Americans (this follows logically from the fact that there were so few such groups or people). The forthrightness of the author in pointing the finger of blame to Californians and others on the West Coast for culpability in the evacuation obviously did not escape the attention of Grodzins' alma mater.

It appears that the decision to work on a study assigning blame for the evacuation, as was done in *Prejudice, War and the Constitution*, instead of pursuing a study about the lives of former inmates through *The Residue* (for which background research already had been established) [60], was directly connected with the unhappiness of the University of California over the then-forthcoming *Americans Betrayed*. Quite clearly the next best policy by those who have been unsuccessful in proscribing a book is to have a team of "experts" write a book to discredit the first. One must bear in mind the following words by a disinterested historian written almost 20 years after the appearance of *Prejudice, War and the Constitution* in order to appreciate better the cogency of the previous statement.

The highly argumentative tone of the volume [*Prejudice, War and the Constitution*], one suspects, can be explained by the fact that its authors, Edward N. Barnhart, Jacobus Ten Broek (sic), and Floyd W. Matson were quite concerned with refuting the argument of Morton Grodzins in *Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation* (Chicago, 1949) [61].

The final twist to this particular episode regarding *Americans Betrayed* is that — in order to mute further criticisms of the University of California and the University of Chicago — Grodzins was appointed the Director of the University of Chicago Press in 1951, a position he held until 1953 [62].

DISCUSSION

Up to this point the basic facts concerning some shortcomings and odd developments of ERS have been indicated. Some interpretation of the facts has been made as well. It now remains to try to understand in greater depth some of the facts. This will be done by looking more closely at several of the principals who were associated with ERS by applying a standard and basic anthropological concept as a basis for interpretation. This concept is enculturation [63].

The first of these principals is Morton M. Grodzins. With reference to a passage by ten-Broek, Barnhart, and Matson cited earlier, the reader will recall that Grodzins, because of his "liberal persuasion" (along with Smith and Carey McWilliams), as averred by the three authors, offered the thesis that he did in *Americans Betrayed*. This kind of approach is facile and obfuscates what this observer considers to be a more important reason. However, before proceeding to Grodzins, a few observations on Carey McWilliams are in order.

According to William Petersen, Carey McWilliams, strongly influenced by Communists, had, after all, backed the evacuation, had even tried to organize a group that would endorse the evacuation, and then had praised

the efficiency with which the evacuation had been undertaken [64]. After he had switched positions and had come out against the evacuation and incarceration, it would hardly have been seemly to have criticized those (i.e., government officials) whom he had praised earlier. Moreover, for McWilliams, blaming agribusinesses, chambers of commerce, and "rightwing groups" (such as the army, the American Legion, nativists, etc.) provided a good stratagem; it helped deflect blame from his idol, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Thus, lumping Grodzins with McWilliams and Smith (about whose political ideology there is little information) provides little elucidation.

Regarding *Americans Betrayed* and Roosevelt, however, it is interesting what one astute reviewer, writing in *Columbia Law Review*, had to say as a major criticism of the book: "...the major omission in the work [*Americans Betrayed*] is the almost complete failure to mention the part, if any, played by the president... [65].

It was not that Morton Grodzins was a "liberal" (he may well have been) which is the key to understanding his attack on West Coast organizations and officials. Rather, the underpinning clue is found in the following statement on page ix of his book. "As a relative newcomer to California, I was unfamiliar with the Japanese problem when I began my work in the early spring of 1942."

Here was a young doctoral student (he was 25 when he arrived in California) who had not been raised on the West Coast and therefore had not been enculturated to and sullied by hatred of and prejudice against Japanese Americans so endemic on the West Coast, even infecting academia [66].

Grodzins was born in Chicago in 1917, and had studied for his undergraduate and M.A. degrees at the University of Louisville [67]. In neither Chicago nor even the South — Kentucky — had he been enculturated to dislike Japanese because there had been no set

anti-Japanese ideology rampant in these places in contrast to the West Coast. (Therefore it was no accident that Chicago welcomed Japanese Americans from the camps when many moved out of them. Eventually the Japanese-American community grew from next to nothing to some 20,000 in a few short years.) His stay in California was brief, from 1942-1945 and some of this time was spent in Washington, D.C. for ERS [68].

It may have been Grodzins' anger and indignation over the evacuation and over the long history of the mistreatment of the Japanese on the West Coast, culminating in the evacuation, rather than liberalism, which steered him to seek the blame on those whom he felt were most immediately responsible for the injustice — ranging from the Magnolia Study Club of Anaheim and the University of Oregon Mothers to Earl Warren [69].

The validity of the enculturation thesis in understanding Grodzins' *Americans Betrayed* can be apprehended more successfully by looking at another white-male researcher who had been with ERS.

Like Grodzins, Robert F. Spender was a graduate student at Berkeley (his field was anthropology). He had spent from July 1942 to June 1943 at the camp of Gila, in Arizona, as a field worker for ERS. Like Grodzins, Spender was born in 1917 [70]. Like Grodzins, Spender received his Ph.D. from Berkeley (in 1946, in anthropology), and also based his dissertation on some of the work he had done as field researcher for ERS much like Grodzins.

However, the similarities end there. Spender was born in San Francisco and received his B.A. degree from Berkeley in 1937. For his M.A. degree he went to Albuquerque, New Mexico, where he received the degree in 1940. He taught at Reed College, Portland, Oregon, from 1946 to 1947 and then from 1947 to 1948 he taught at the University of Oregon. It is clear that he was a

product of the West Coast (Arizona certainly could be considered a West Coast state, and New Mexico, a western state) [71].

It is apparent that the enculturation of typical West Coast prejudicial and pejorative attitudes toward that region's Japanese population had taken place for Spencer along the lines of the classic model [72]. Despite the training he had received in one of the world's finest departments of anthropology and under the tutelage of world-renowned anthropologists Robert H. Lowie and Alfred L. Kroeber [73], his training in anthropology was of little aid in helping him transcend the values and attitudes with which he had been enculturated. The good Pacific Coast citizen that he was first and foremost, he wrote two articles in the immediate postwar years which showed how effective the enculturation process had been for him and how ineffectual his Berkeley training in anthropology had been in competing against it.

Nineteen forty-eight saw the appearance in print of his article "Social Structure of a Contemporary Japanese-American Buddhist Church" [74]. The languid state of the Berkeley Buddhist Church in the immediate postwar period is analyzed without proper reference to the devastating effects of the evacuation, incarceration, and resettlement or to the pervasive anti-Japanese attitudes and discriminatory acts before, during, and after the war. Additionally, Spencer leaves the reader with the distinct impression that the priest and the Japanese congregation (Issei, Nisei, Kibei) were somewhat deficient and therefore were to blame for the pathetic state of affairs of the church. In his 1948 article is embodied a textbook case of the critic blaming the victim [75].

Two years later, and one year after the publication of Grodzins' *Americans Betrayed*, he made known his position even more forthrightly. In a journal publication on the speech of Japanese Americans — based upon those whom he had studied in the camp of Gila and

those in Berkeley — he observed, "Not only is this American-born segment [Nisei and Kibei] of considerable interest as bilingual, *but, more significantly, the development of English follows a somewhat distinct aberrant path.*" A few pages later is found this statement: "One cannot but agree with Swadesh when he implies that a bilingualism which prevents mastery of either language reflects not psychic confusion, as a behavioristic psychologist might claim, *but rather feeble-mindedness*" [76].

A good case for enculturation can be made as a basis for understanding Rosalie H. Wax as well.

The chief writer of *The Spoilage* was born in Des Plaines, Illinois, in 1911 [77]. During the depression years, from about 1930–1938, her fatherless family, composed of her mother, two brothers, two sisters, and Rosalie, lived in a Mexican slum (*barrio*) of Los Angeles. During this period she did housework, was on relief, and worked on several Works Project Administration (WPA) jobs.

Despite her working-class background, she had enculturated the following value, as expressed in her own words.

During this period I had come to accept hard work as one of the essential elements of life and I had also developed an imperviousness to obstacles, disappointments, and discouragements. If I thought a task worth doing and finishing, I would stick with it [78].

This is borne out by her subsequent upwardly-mobile, success-oriented achievements. She completed junior college at age 27 in an era when adult college students that old were a rare phenomenon. She then received a modest scholarship for study at the University of California, from which she received her Bachelor's degree in 1942.

While at Berkeley she had heard that Professor Alfred L. Kroeber, the great anthropologist, was hostile to the idea of women becoming anthropologists. Fearful that he would tell Wax to leave the Department of

Anthropology, she avoided him for a year. When she did take a course with him, she "worked like a demon and he seemed to find [her]...phenomenal energy baffling and amusing." He never made an attempt to discourage her interest in anthropology; she did work very hard as a graduate student [79]. Indeed, it was Kroeber who notified Wax of a position with ERS when another Berkeley anthropology student, Spencer, had resigned [80].

She notes that ERS originally had a number of social scientists, "But the war gradually drew all of the male planners out of the study, and its directorship fell upon Dorothy Swaine Thomas..." [81]. For her part, the latter was very pleased to have Wax as Spencer's replacement [82].

Fieldwork at Gila, Arizona, was difficult for Wax and discouraging from the very start [83].

Obviously, Thomas was a demanding taskmistress, requiring of Wax "voluminous data about attitudes and events that she desired." She kept asking Wax for these data on a regular basis [84].

At the same time, Thomas told Wax "...on no account to give any information or 'data' to the WRA" [85], but Wax did have contact with G. Gordon Brown, the Community-Analyst anthropologist at Gila.

Even after a month at Gila, Wax had obtained "almost no data of the type that Dr. Thomas considered valuable" [86].

During her early months at Gila, quite understandably, Wax felt discouraged because she could not conform to Thomas' expectations [87] in terms of field data, and because Thomas became dissatisfied with Wax [88]. However, Wax was not the only ERS fieldworker who felt this way. Tamie Tsuchiyama ("Miss K" in Wax's *Doing Fieldwork*), a Japanese-American anthropologist, "...worried Dr. Thomas because she [Tsuchiyama] sent in so few field notes" [89].

Thomas gave Wax the charge of getting at

the attitudes of the internees in Gila who had passed the loyalty test, but Wax felt that it was not possible to get this kind of information using the participant-observation method.

In order to gain the confidence of these people (the "loyals"), Wax began a series of survey and interview studies. These studies, which Wax terms "red-herring studies," were useful in gaining entree into the lives of the inmates, also presented her "...in the role of a conscientious scholar collecting data on relatively harmless matters. They also provided the opportunity for a return visit to discuss specific problems..." and "...gave respondents a reasonable story to tell curious neighbors" [90].

The red-herring studies also provided her with an opportunity to learn to be a competent friend and fieldworker and taught her respondents to be useful and competent respondents [91].

I doggedly submitted my red-herring studies to Berkeley and described the attempts I was making to reach the point where I could get the kind of information needed. As the return letters [from Thomas] grew increasingly critical, I grew increasingly stubborn. I knew I was not doing a good job, and this distressed me very much. But in my more optimistic moments I hoped I was making progress [92].

Then Thomas told Wax quite clearly, "...sternly and... even harshly" ordering Wax to abandon her "time-wasting" red-herring studies, and "to report what was going on" [93]. (She learned sometime later, though not after this particular letter, that Thomas had considered firing Wax [94].) In the meantime, Wax had submitted a report on the shooting of a young internee by an Army guard, an event which had taken place just before having received the warning letter from Thomas. In this incident and events surrounding it, Wax

...found it possible for the first time to prepare a detailed, reasonably accurate, and well-balanced report, which presented a comprehensive picture of the dynamics of an event and the attitudes it produced.

This report was enclosed in a letter replying to Thomas' warning letter. "Dr. Thomas praised the report and did not again complain about my field techniques" [95].

The shooting incident also had the effect of structuring the relationship of the inmates to Wax as respondents and fieldworker, and the knowledge that Wax had prepared a good report helped her self-confidence and morale. "From this point forward it was relatively easy to keep informed on the salient political and social developments" [96].

The salience of what has been brought to the fore on Wax, based almost exclusively upon information in her book *Doing Fieldwork*, toward understanding her is clear. To recapitulate, Wax was a highly-motivated, success-oriented person who, through enculturation, firmly believed in hard work and had developed an imperviousness to obstacles and disappointments. By practicing what she believed she had received her Bachelor's degree from an elite university at an age when most Americans of that period, especially women, were resigned to a lesser status. Having encountered another obstacle, Kroeber, a purported sexist, she waited until she felt she was ready to tackle him, and when she did, she so impressed him through hard work that he even notified her of a position (as researcher for ERS), and took a solicitous interest in her health while undergoing preparations for Gila [97].

Despite extremely adverse physical, cultural, psychological, and social conditions at Gila, and under manifestly inordinate pressure from the director of ERS to produce results, Wax persevered. To compound her difficulties, ERS was directed by a woman (with whom she had very little in common because Thomas was a demographer, rural sociologist, and statistician [98]), who, implied by Wax, became director through default rather than through hard work and merit because all the original male planners (including the anthropologist Robert H.

Lowie) were called upon to do other things owing to wartime exigencies.

She persevered through doggedness and recourse to red-herring studies. Also, she worked "furiously" to get data [99] and was aided by a fortuitous circumstance. An extraordinary event — the shooting of an inmate — took place. It was an event "...of the type on which the study particularly desired data" [100]. The report on it not only enhanced her rapport with the internees; it also shut off all criticisms of her field research methods from Thomas from then on.

It appears Wax interpreted the significance of the report in the following way. The way to satisfy Thomas was to keep her apprised of events beyond the prosaic and mundane, beyond reports on "Japanese language and Japanese customs."

Seen from Thomas' perspective the demand for data on extraordinary events also made sense. As a female who had been given the vast responsibility, albeit by "default" (although she was a professor in a major university), of heading what up to that time had been one of the largest social science research projects affiliated with a stellar university, she had to prove herself in a sexist world and prove to others her uniqueness and individuality (that she was not "just" the wife of W.I. Thomas, the world-famous sociologist). One way to make ERS a landmark project was to immortalize it with field data even Japanese-American researchers could not attain. Quite possibly Wax would be the one capable of obtaining such data. This was vindicated as can be seen in the statement that follows, from *The Spoilage*: "One of the Caucasian observers — a contributor to this volume — obtained confidential reports from a group of determined 'disloyals' with whom no Japanese-American staff member could possibly have established contact" [101].

It was in keeping with this, therefore, that Thomas in January 1944, asked Wax to make an exploratory visit to Tule Lake, where there

had been a major disturbance in the previous fall [102]. After Wax's visit to Tule Lake, Gila seemed "quiet and dull" and boring. Consequently she was pleased when requested by Thomas to make a 10-day return visit to Tule Lake [103]. A third visit, lasting six days, like the previous two visits, centered on the political activities of various factions [104].

By her third visit she had good working relationships with "more than a dozen of the segregated residents [vs. those who had been at Tule Lake from the start]..." [105].

She moved permanently to Tule Lake in May 1944 and remained there a year.

At Tule Lake, Wax became more and more involved with the people she was to be detachedly observing [106]. Her assignment at Tule Lake was "...to gather information in two areas, past history and current events..." [107], whereas at Gila, the stress had been more upon what the internees "were doing and detailed — if possible, verbatim — accounts of what they were saying..." [108].

Through a white administrator Wax was put in touch with an "underground group," one of the many factions within the camp [109], and one which was "pro-Japan." The close identification with this group [110] precipitated a state whereby she became "once again a little crazy," and became a "fanatic" [111] (i.e., a "pro-Japan," "anti-America"). However, after one of the "pro-America" group members was murdered, and she had taken satisfaction in his death, she changed her mind and became an "anti-fanatic" [112]. She "...came to believe that observing and recording what went on at Tule Lake was [her]...transcendental task, and ...went about this task with an unflagging energy and relish that today seems rather frightening" [113]. However, she did not confine herself to observing and reporting data. In her "anti-fanatic" stage, she came to loathe Kira (Wakayama), as noted before.

As for myself, I had privately decided to do all that I could to stop Kira's (and Kato's) policy of terrorism and violence. And I also decided that, if I ever got the opportunity, I would pay Kira back. If anyone had told me that I was about to "interfere" in a field situation and that I was thereby breaking a primary rule of scientific procedure, I think I would have laughed, or, perhaps, told the admonisher to go to hell [114].

She consulted with some of her anti-Kira informants on how best to see that Kira could be denounced to the proper authorities, and suggested to one of them to denounce him before any more violence would take place. This suggestion was rejected. The person to whom she had made this suggestion was able to get at Kira in another manner, the end result of which was the resignation of Kira from the leadership position he had held [115].

Quite obviously, having shorn power from Kira was not enough for Wax because she followed the action up by informing the FBI about Kira, a fact to which reference already has been made.

The values Wax had enculturated help explain her singleminded devotion to doing good fieldwork, gathering data, and satisfying Thomas, or, in other words, overcoming whatever obstacles were in her path and succeeding in the assigned tasks and proving to herself and to others that she was a competent anthropologist [116]. Regrettably, this devotion to her enculturated values overrode her role as objective scientist. Participant-observation could have been achieved by studying the other aspects of the Tuleans' lives [117] which would have given her a better and healthier perspective on those issues which were of such consuming interest to her.

The particular tragedy of the Wax case is not just her having attempted to alter the course of events; her having lost all objectivity; her having sided with one faction and then another; her having turned against a group from whom she had won trust; or her

having informed the FBI on Wakayama. The major tragedy is that, because she was expelled from Tule Lake by WRA (among other reasons, for having contacted the FBI), she could not report on the major events in Tule Lake subsequent to her expulsion.

Ending with renunciation [the topic of the final chapter of *The Spoilage*] rather than with Center [Tule Lake] closure, the entire final chapter of Center history is missing, including the complete transformation of Tule Lake to the most relocation-minded Center of all [118].

Consequently, not only was a certain family (the Wakayamas) victimized by Wax's enulturated values, infelicitously actuated at Tule Lake, but the entire Tule Lake population and the scientific community as well. Even today there is a definite stigma in the Japanese-American community surrounding former Tuleans. And even today, what precisely took place at Tule Lake, not only in connection with factionalism but also with regard to the total culture of the community, remains open to research [119].

In the framework of contemporary events, the Wax case has an all too familiar ring. From the laboratories of the most prestigious universities (e.g., Boston, Cornell, Harvard, Sloan-Kettering, and Yale, to name a few) has come the following kind of case (presented in composite form): young scientist recruited for his promising research talents; under great pressure to produce spectacular results; manipulates data to meet the high expectations.

That Wax's report on Tule Lake (a "major laboratory" for ERS) in *The Spoilage* distressingly fits into the same pattern can be concluded from the observations of the greatest authority on all aspects of Tule Lake, Marvin Opler, as seen in some of the excerpts from his book review.

Dependence upon one person [Wax] for major contributions, led, in turn, to undue credence afforded about two dozen factional leaders who happened to impress the fieldworker [Wax], during the year period, as knowing

the Center [Tule Lake]. ...[T]he penchant for quoting "an Issei," "Kibei," or "Nisei" stands out since context is generally lacking; on pages 101-102, for example, "Kibei" are stereotyped and oversimplified on the basis of two short quotations from two of their members.

The reliance of one fieldworker [Wax] upon testimony of a few dozen persons among thousands available is, of course a highly vulnerable method; and, since the technique of description is governed by quotations from these individuals rather than by analytical procedures, there is a certain amount of careless interpretation specifically resulting from overstress on one set of factional leaders...and the boundless credence afforded them which reifies their rationalization. On page 103, the authors remark "a tendency among large numbers of Tuleans toward narrowly opportunistic decisions to hold to status of 'disloyalty'" - the term "Tuleans" here referring to a rival faction apparently. ...[W]e pointed out carefully that pontifications about "opportunism," based on the "loyalty-disloyalty" labels were actually misleading since these labels had long since lost any objectively significant meaning in the maelstrom of emotionalized reactions to consistently discriminatory treatment. ...[W]e argued against it [segregation], predicted its immediate and long-range results, and finally indicated that the only valid distinctions which could be sought within this population would be cultural identifications and socio-economic status, not political determinations; family typologies, not loyalties; emotionalized reactions, not consistent international programs. It is surprising to find the old labels applied, amid pontifications, years later.

With social, cultural, economic and psychological analysis lacking at points in the record, a factional interpretation threads through the final three hundred pages. On page 110, the same Tuleans of the rival faction are castigated for an alleged control of the Co-operative Enterprises of the Center: "There were no major positions left unfilled" when people arrived from other centers [during the segregation process]. On page 168, this inaccuracy is swallowed with the rumor, "residents had noted that fruits...on purchase by (the government) were conspicuously absent from the messhalls but were on sale in the (Co-operative's) canteens." This last refers to a million-and-a-half-dollar enterprise undergoing regular, periodic audit by both a governmental agency and reputable private firms. In the event the reader remains unconvinced by these allegations of opportunism, job monopoly and the supposed dishonesty rampant among six thousand Tuleans, their factional leader receives the sociological description of "dressy and dandified" and his chief cohort is implied to have been "opportunistic" in decisions to safeguard a son "of draft age." A Mr. Tada (pseudonym) of a more-favored rival faction likewise had a son of draft age, but this fact is not adduced in accounts of his heroics. On pages 117-119, this favored faction is described as having duly elected a representative body "in about the proper proportions, but some blocs of transference [those who had moved to Tule Lake from the other

camps] were markedly over-represented and were soon able to obtain and hold positions of control in the organization"; on page 142, this curious contradiction is doubly confounded when we learn that the elections of October 16th, "in proper proportions" yet "markedly over-represented" by some blocs of transferees, were completed on November 4th by "arrangements for selecting the permanent representative body." Staff members and Center contacts who were selected into this representative body give no indication of a *bona fide* elective process.

The contradictions of *The Spoilage* arise from credence given to accounts written up and mimeographed by the favored faction months later. On page 131, the favored faction is credited with community support of the now-famous November 1st Incident, contrary to all evidence in print. On page 140, Mr. Myer, Director of the [War Relocation] Authority is alleged to have unwillingly attended a staff meeting in the nearby town of Tule Lake; there was no such meeting outside Center confines. At another point, the favored faction is credited with having eluded administrative notice while "organizing their protest movement" (p. 120) whereas, in truth, there was practically daily contact. On pages 153, 157, and 158, the Center mimeographed newspaper is quoted first as calling, later as cancelling, a meeting between Daihyo Sha Kai (Negotiating Committee) and the Army and WRA; again the Daihyo Sha Kai position is presented approvingly, unmindful of the fact that for several issues, following Army control of the center, the paper was published under direct and exclusive control of the Negotiating Committee alone and that no meeting with the Committee had been sanctioned by the Colonel in command and certainly none cancelled. The point of these corrections, and of scores of others for which there is neither time nor space, is that well-heated attempts to play sides in factional disputes which rend any aggrieved and disaffected community are only possible where the proper interpretation of factionalism in general is lacking.

...Tule Lake is given too much the cast of a "disloyal" center where "disloyals" were treated badly. *The Spoilage* becomes an excellent source-book on government documents, but the treatment of daily rumors and the ebb and flow of opinion are subordinated to the presentation of factional claims; and there is practically nothing on Center art and religion, recreation, welfare and economic status. Obviously, the 19,000 men, women and children cramped in a square mile of tar-papered "theater of operations" barracks do not emerge as people. The effects of discriminatory and racist treatment are only in part reflected. And the need in social science apparently is to know the possible limitations of a few dozen informants or where the document ends and broad social analysis begins [120].

CONCLUSION

I have here attempted to identify, clarify, and explain certain aspects of ERS which,

to date, have not been examined by others.

For various reasons ERS remains a puzzle.

1. Four of the five camps where "spot observations" were made have been identified, but published data do not reveal enough to help in identifying the fifth.

2. On what bases Minidoka, Poston, and Tule Lake were identified as the "major laboratories" cannot be determined. Why Tule Lake came to be the focus of *The Spoilage*, it now seems certain, was because of expediency. This is where, to one field observer, the extraordinary events were taking place, and the accounts in that researcher's reports were accepted at face value [121]. By the same token, in Thomas' desire for reports on such events all other camps came to be of secondary importance.

Even one of the stated aspects of the goal of ERS, a study of the economic impact, diminished in significance to the sensationalistic reports on the political events which were taking place at Tule Lake [122].

3. ERS staff (Japanese Americans and whites) have been identified, a listing of whom cannot be found in ERS publications. Japanese-American staff in the detention camps ("assembly centers") — an issue hardly dealt with in ERS publications — have been identified as best could be, through inference and deduction. Both lists of Japanese-American staff require further confirmation.

4. Why the complete Leighton file relating to the Bureau of Sociological Research at Poston was sent to Berkeley instead of the National Archives, Washington, D.C., has yet to be fathomed. As the situation now stands the researcher interested in the Leighton file pertaining to the Bureau of Sociological Research must rely upon the Bancroft collection at Berkeley. Whereas for all other WRA materials the National Archives have been the repository, the kind of easy usufruct offered by the National Archives is denied the researcher interested in the Leighton file. In this case, federal property has been appropri-

ated by the State of California, and the University of California in particular [123].

5. In a prefatory section of *The Salvage*, the second volume of ERS, Thomas has this to say in the first paragraph.

In 1946, the University of California Press published *The Spoilage*.... Publication of *The Salvage* completes the plan, announced at that time, for a two-volume work on social aspects of the wartime evacuation, detention, segregation, and resettlement of the Japanese American minority [124]. Nonetheless, had the third volume been published as had been anticipated, it was to have been a book on the return of the internees to the West Coast. Two minor "monographs" also were to have been published "concurrently with the two main volumes. One... [on] political and administrative aspects of evacuation and resettlement; the other ...[on] the ecology of 'disloyalty'" [125].

Prejudice, War and the Constitution, the third volume of ERS which actually came off the press was commissioned by the University of California to discredit Grodzin's *Americans Betrayed* and to assuage the devastating criticisms, accurate or inaccurate, of Californians in his book [126].

6. An anthropological concept, enculturation, has been useful to help explain the thrust of the writings of three former ERS members: Grodzins, Spencer, and Wax [127].

Given the powerful, but not subtle, influence used to exert pressure in suppressing the publication of *Americans Betrayed*, and the *raison d'être* of *Prejudice, War and the Constitution*, the particular documents and sources cited by tenBroek, Barnhart, and Matson in criticizing Grodzins must be reexamined for their validity by an objective, disinterested researcher.

Because of the politics which gave rise to *Prejudice, War and the Constitution*, the three ERS publications must be reexamined in their entirety for the same reason. That is to say, what roles, if any, the backers of ERS, other than the University of California, played in determining the results of ERS must be examined. Attention of the reader is called again to two foundations in particular which supported ERS. Both the Giannini Foundation (presently known as the Bank of

America-Giannini Foundation) and the Columbia Foundation have been San Francisco-based organizations [128].

The section in *The Spoilage* on Tule Lake (pages 84-380) cannot be relied upon for accurate information regarding factionalism and the personalities involved during the period covered.

A complete and objective history of Tule Lake, including its operation in the postwar period and the social and cultural life of the people after it became a segregation camp has yet to be written and therefore must be undertaken. Such an enterprise will require not only use of ERS file materials [129] and unpublished data by Marvin Opler and his staff [130], but interviews of survivors who experienced Tule Lake life [131].

Because I have not utilized archival materials at Berkeley, this paper must be viewed as a prolegomenon to the larger undertaking of analyzing ERS and its publications (including *Americans Betrayed*) and of writing a dispassionate history of Tule Lake.

Withal, such an undertaking can never adequately help restore those like Wakayama and his family who have been irreparably damaged by ERS.

A final, and ineluctable conclusion flows from the previous statements in this section. ERS was a failure. This fiasco is quite unique in the annals of American social-science research projects. Granted, there is a small portion in *The Spoilage* which is reliable, *The Salvage* contains useful information [132], and *Prejudice, War and The Constitution* is hardhitting. Nevertheless, ERS clearly represents a disturbing misappropriation of lavish funds, rich talent, precious time, and boundless energy.

NOTES

1. Joan Z. Bernstein et al., *Personal Justice Denied: Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982).

2. See, for example, Howard H. Sugimoto, "A Bibliographic Essay on the Wartime Evacuation of Japanese on the West Coast Areas," in Hilary Conroy and T. Scott Miyakawa (eds.), *East Across the Pacific* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO Press, 1972), pp. 140–150.
3. D.S. Thomas and R.S. Nishimoto, *The Spoilage* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1946.) CRWIC's *Personal Justice Denied* cites *The Spoilage* in several of its sections.
4. Thomas and Nishimoto, op. cit., 1946, p. xiv.
5. Jacobus tenBroek, Edward N. Barnhart, and Floyd W. Matson, *Prejudice, War and the Constitution: Causes and Consequences of the Evacuation of the Japanese Americans in World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968 [1954]), p. ix.
6. No figures are cited for the contributions by the Gianinni Foundation.
7. tenBroek, Barnhart, and Matson, op. cit., 1954, p. ix; Thomas and Nishimoto, op. cit., 1946, p. v, merely state "Early in 1942." However, in a letter to the acting president of the University of California, Dorothy S. Thomas, Letter to Morton Deutsch, July 9, 1945, p. 1, states she had been with ERS "since Pearl Harbor." Unless otherwise noted, all documents in this paper are in the National Archives, Washington, D.C., Record Group 210, 61.300 Folder No. 24.
8. Carey McWilliams, "Review of *The Spoilage*," *New York Times Book Review Section*, February 2, 1947, p. 22. For example, professional anthropologists who worked for the War Relocation Authority (WRA) in one of the camps received an annual salary of \$3,800 at the rank of P[rofessional]-4 Class plus overtime during the Wartime 48-hour workweek, according to John F. Embree, "Community Analysis – An Example of Anthropology in Government," *American Anthropologist*, vol. 46 (1944), p. 284 and p. 284 fn8.
9. By Dorothy S. Thomas, prepared with the assistance of Charles Kikuchi and James Sakoda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952).
10. Thomas and Nishimoto, op. cit., 1946, p. xiii; see, also, Marvin K. Opler, "Review of *The Spoilage*," *American Anthropologist*, vol. 50 (1948), p. 307.
11. tenBroek, Barnhart, and Matson, op. cit., 1954.
12. Thomas and Nishimoto, op. cit., 1946, p. v. According to one source, Foster Goss, "Dr. [Dorothy] Thomas' Survey," Memorandum to E.L. Shirrell, June 26, 1942, pp. 1–2, social psychology was not included as one of the disciplines to be investigated.
13. Thomas and Nishimoto, op. cit., 1946, p. v.
14. Opler, op. cit., 1948, p. 308; Constantine Panunzio, "Review of *The Spoilage*," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 251 (1947), p. 203. The book was also faulted for its lack of breadth in sociological interpretation; see Solon T. Kimball, "Review of *The Spoilage*," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 53 (1947), p. 229; Kimball Young, "Review of *The Spoilage*," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 12 (1947), p. 363; Otis D. Duncan, "Review of *The Spoilage*," *Social Forces*, vol. 25 (1947), p. 457. Marvin Opler, op. cit., 1948, is highly critical of the book as an anthropological study. Of the major reviews, only Carey McWilliams, op. cit., 1947, praised it highly.
15. Thomas and Nishimoto, op. cit., 1946, p. vii.
16. Ibid., p. viii.
17. Contrast this with another large-scale interdisciplinary research project on another American minority funded by another foundation and completed the same year that ERS started; Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York: Pantheon, 1972 [1944]), vol. I, p. 1i, lists each staff member who was on the project.
18. Edward N. Barnhart, *Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement: Catalog of Material in the General Library* (Berkeley: General Library, University of California, 1958) (mimeographed).
19. See, for example, Goss, "Dr. Thomas' Survey," op. cit., 1942, pp. 2–3 and Appendix (which lists the addresses of some of the researchers as well).
20. In addition to ibid., see Harvey M. Coverley. Letter to Dillon S. Myer, December 14, 1942, p. 1; Thomas and Nishimoto, op. cit., 1946, p. vii fn2, "We have, in addition, observational records from four of the temporary assembly centers to which evacuees were moved...."
21. At the meeting which decided the disposition of the Leighton file, Thomas, Letter to Deutsch, op. cit., 1945, p. 2, of the other two making the decision one was Edward H. Spicer, Head, Community Analysis Section, WRA, whose supervisor while he was Community Analyst at Poston was Leighton. See, also, Thomas and Nishimoto, op. cit., 1946, p. xii, fn13; Barnhart, op. cit., 1958, pp. 90–91, on the Leighton file.
22. Listed in Coverley, Letter to Dillon Myer, op. cit., 1942, p. 1, but Inoue's name does not appear in Barnhart, op. cit., 1958.
23. Charles Kikuchi, *The Kikuchi Diary: Chronicle From an American Concentration Camp. The Tanforan Journals of Charles Kikuchi*, John Modell (ed.), (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973). Kikuchi dedicated this book to Dorothy Thomas.
24. An anthropologist, Tsuchiyama originally was at Poston, Arizona and spent some time at Gila, Arizona. See John F. Embree, "Second Report on Poston, February 4–6, 1943," Washington, D.C.: Community Analysis Section, p. 9; 61.300 Folder No. 2. She is the "Miss K" in Rosalie H. Wax, *Doing Fieldwork: Warnings and Advice* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971; paperback ed.), p. 74. See, also, Peter T. Suzuki, "Anthropologists in the Wartime Camps for Japanese Americans: A Documentary Study," *Dialectical Anthropology*, vol. 6 (1981), p. 55, n145. Tsuchiyama's Ph.D. dissertation at Berkeley was "A Comparison of the Folklore of the Northern, Southern, and Pacific Athabaskan: A Study in Stabilizing Folklore With a Linguistic Stock," Department of Anthropology, 1947.
25. Yusa, who did author some materials as a researcher for ERS while in Tanforan, had none to his name from Gila, according to Barnhart, op. cit., 1958. However, Goss,

- "Dr. Thomas' Survey," op. cit., 1942, Appendix, lists him as a researcher for ERS at Gila.
26. James Minoru Sakoda, "Minidoka: An Analysis of Changing Patterns of Social Interaction," Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, 1949, pp. 6-7, moved from Tule Lake in 1943 to Minidoka. He remained there until March 1945 and then returned to this camp in June 1945 and again in October, to witness the closure of the camp.
 27. Frank Shotaro Miyamoto, "The Career of Intergroup Tensions: A Study of the Collective Adjustments of Evacuees to Crises at Tule Lake Relocation Center," Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, 1951; "The Forced Evacuation of the Japanese Minority During World War II," *Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 29 (1973), originally had a Social Science Research Council pre-doctoral fellowship and did some research at the Puyallup Assembly Center, Puyallup, Washington, according to Goss, "Dr. Thomas' Survey," op. cit., 1942, p. 2. According to what Thomas had told Goss, idem., he received the fellowship "provided he works under sponsorship of our University [ERS] group." He then resigned from the fellowship to work for ERS (he was at Tule Lake) to head up its Chicago "office," for which, see, Dorothy S. Thomas, Letter to John F. Embree, June 4, 1943.
 28. Tamotsu Shibutani, "Rumors in a Crisis Situation," M.A. Thesis, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, 1944; "The Circulation of Rumors as a Form of Collective Behavior," Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, 1949; *Improvised News: A Sociology of Rumor* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), esp. pp. 64-68; *The Derelicts of Company K: A Sociological Study of Demoralization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), especially p. xiii, with reference to ERS and his praise of Dorothy Thomas.
 29. Thomas and Nishimoto, op. cit., 1946, p. viii.
 30. Idem.
 31. Robert F. Spencer, "Japanese Buddhism in the United States 1940-1946: A Study in Acculturation," Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley, 1946, p. ii.
 32. Thomas and Nishimoto, op. cit., 1946, pp. 68-69. For a list of Spencer's reports, see Barnhart, op. cit., 1958, pp. 101-102, 167.
 33. Rosalie Hankey [Wax], "The Development of Authoritarianism: A Comparison of the Japanese-American Relocation Centers and Germany," Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago, 1950; "Reciprocity as a Field Technique," *Human Organization*, vol. 11 (1952), pp. 34-37; "The Destruction of a Democratic Impulse," *Human Organization*, vol. 12 (1953), pp. 11-21; "Twelve Years Later: An Analysis of Field Experience," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 63 (1957), pp. 133-142; *Doing Fieldwork*, op. cit., 1971.
 34. Robert H. Billigmeier, "Aspects of the Culture History of the Romansh People of Switzerland, 1850-1956," Stanford University, 1951. Billigmeier was offered a position of Community Analyst at Tule Lake by John F. Embree, a position which he turned down; see John F. Embree, Letter to Dorothy S. Thomas, March 31, 1943.
 35. Morton M. Grodzins, "The Effects of the Japanese Evacuation," Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, 1945.
 36. Marvin Opler, "Review of *The Spoilage*," op. cit., 1948, p. 308. It should be borne in mind that the Barnhart catalog was not compiled until 1958.
 37. Ibid., p. 308.
 38. Wax, *Doing Fieldwork*, op. cit., 1971, p. 155.
 39. Ibid., p. 157.
 40. Ibid., pp. 158-162.
 41. Thomas and Nishimoto, op. cit., 1946, p. 376.
 42. tenBroek, Barnhart, and Matson, op. cit., 1954, cite these four cases quite extensively.
 43. Wax, *Doing Fieldwork*, op. cit., 1971, pp. 168-169. See, also, Thomas and Nishimoto, op. cit., 1946, p. 339 and 339 fn27. For statements by Japanese Americans Koji Ariyoshi, Karl Yoneda, and James Oda (the second, according to the source, a Communist) to the Naval Intelligence Service informing on internees - one of them, Joe Kurihara, a major figure in *The Spoilage* and *Doing Fieldwork* - see District Intelligence Office, Twelfth Naval District, "Manzanar Relocation Project, conditions at," Memorandum to The Director of Naval Intelligence, February 16, 1943 ("Confidential"; declassified December 14, 1979), pp. 1-2, 4-5. Numerous other internees are denounced by these three informers in this 7-page document. This document is in Record group 210, Box No. 2, entitled, "Washington Central File Confidential Files, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence, Office of Censorship, Department of Justice, Executive Office of the President, Department of State, Selective Service, Office of Strategic Service, United States Coast Guard, Office of War Information," Folder: Office of Naval Intelligence. On Joe Kurihara, see, also, Togo Tanaka and Joe Masaoka, "Straws in the Wind: An Inquiry into the course of the recent flare-ups [at Manzanar]," Project Report No. 47, Manzanar Historical Documentation, August 12, 1943 ("Restricted"; declassified February 3, 1975), p. 2.
 44. Michi Weglyn, *Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America's Concentration Camps* (New York: William Morrow, 1976), p. 243.
 45. Junro Edgar Wakayama, Letter to CWRIC, July 13, 1981. I thank Michi Weglyn for her generosity in making this letter, the article from the *San Francisco Chronicle* (see Note 46, below), the autobiographical statement by Kinzo Wakayama (see Note 48, below), and the Nielson document (see Note 47, below) available to me.

46. Evelyn Hsu, "War Heroes Testify on the Internment Camps," *San Francisco Chronicle*, August 12, 1981. The article includes a picture of Wakayama.
47. Junro Edgar Wakayama, Letter to CWRIC, July 13, 1981, p. 2. According to a government report, Western Defense Command, "History of Litigation Involving Western Defense Command," (no date; 1945?), p. 1, Record Group 338, in a binder with the title, "Chronology of the Western Defense Command Exclusion Program, June 26, 1944 to October 10, 1945," the petitions (sic) were filed on August 20, 1942. I thank Edwin R. Coffee, Assistant Chief, Modern Military Headquarters Branch, Military Archives Division, The National Archives, for having located this document upon my request. See Victor Nielson (Director of Information?), Western Defense Command, "The Legal Phases of the Exclusion Program and Other Controls Imposed Pursuant to Executive Order No. 9066," (no date; 1945?), p. 7 (italics added): "One of the first challenges to the validity of group exclusion of Japanese was made by Ernest Wakayama when he applied in the United States District Court of the Southern District of California for a Writ of Habeas Corpus to obtain his release from an assembly center [Santa Anita]."

In Western Defense Command, "History of Litigation...", op. cit., no data, p. 1, are found these sentences. Petitioners (Ernest and Toki Wakayama) moved for dismissal without prejudice. The motion was granted 8 March 1943. It is understood that attorneys for petitioners became uninterested in the case when they discovered that Mr. Wakayama had indicated his desire for expatriation."

The above interpretation does not square with the facts alluded to in connection with what Wax had done. In Audrie Girdner and Anne Loftis, *The Great Betrayal: The Evacuation of the Japanese-Americans During World War II* (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 183, a more detailed description is provided (see, also, p. 544). "The Southern California branch of the Civil Liberties Union decided to defend several of those charged [in Santa Anita who had been arrested because they had met to discuss camp conditions, including its camouflage factory]. After many months, A.L. Wirin, attorney for the ACLU, succeeded in reducing individual bail from \$10,000 to \$2,000 each and in securing a writ of *habeas corpus*, the first since the evacuation began, for one of its defendants, Ernest Wakayama, a Nisei Republican, American Legion leader, and former AF of L official, and his wife, Toki. These two were chosen for the purpose of developing a federal test case to challenge the constitutionality of certain aspects of the evacuation. The defense contended that the Army action constituted imprisonment without hearing or trial and that the petitioners were being held solely because of their ancestry and thus were illegally discriminated against. The national ACLU and Walter Tsukamoto of the JACL [Japanese American Citizens League] joined in this particular action which did not challenge the constitutionality of Executive Order 9066 [which enabled the evacuation and incarceration] nor the congressional legislation making disobedience to the military proclamations a crime. The Wakayama case was eventually dropped by the ACLU as other cases which more directly challenged the evacuation came into prominence."

48. Ernest Kinzo Wakayama, "Brief Personal History, Incidents and Opinion (sic)," Certified October 16, 1972, pp. 1-3, attachment to "Redress Questionnaire." The second part of his Point 23 seems particularly haunting today.
49. See Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (New York: New American Library, 1946, Paperback ed.), pp. 199-205, for a cultural analysis of this tale.
50. Correlatively, it is obvious whom Wax had in mind as Oishi. Although there is no mention of this tale in *Doing Fieldwork*, it is apparent that she knew about it, inasmuch as she was exposed to even more arcane Japanese folk tales than *Chushingura* while with ERS; see Wax, *Doing Fieldwork*, op. cit., 1971, p. 153, for a summary of one such tale. Also, in the same book, she makes quite a few references to the traditional role of the samurai. On the use of "Kira" for a person at Gila, see Wax, "Shooting of Satoshi Kira" (pseudonym?) as listed in Barnhart, op. cit., 1958, p. 100. (Apparently this was the report which, for the first time, pleased Thomas.)
51. See, for example, John F. Embree, Letter to Dorothy S. Thomas, October 6, 1942, p. 1; Dorothy S. Thomas, Letter to John F. Embree, October 13, 1942, p. 1; Coverley, Letter to Dillon S. Myer, op. cit., 1942, p. 1; Dorothy S. Thomas, Letter to John F. Embree, April 28, 1943, p. 2, in which the various assignments given to Grodzins are mentioned.
52. Marvin Opler, "Review of *The Spoilage*," op. cit., 1948, p. 307.
53. tenBroek, Barnhart, and Matson, op. cit., 1954, p. x.
54. Ibid., p. xii.
55. In addition to the contents of Chapter IV, the endnotes to the chapter contain pointed criticisms of Grodzins. See, for example, tenBroek, Barnhart, and Matson, op. cit., 1954, pp. 374 n229; 376 n50; 377 n61, n62; 378 n73, n88; 381 n111. It is probably for their attacks on Grodzins that one historian, whose major interest is the Japanese-American experience, has termed *Prejudice, War and the Constitution* "somewhat tendentious...." John Modell, "Suggestions for Further Reading," in Charles Kikuchi, op. cit., 1973, p. 256.
56. See, for example, R.J.C. Butow et al., "The FDR Tapes: Secret Recordings Made in the Oval Office of the President in the Autumn of 1940," *American Heritage*, vol. 33, No. 2 (1982), pp. 9-24; "FDR ordered internment of Hawaii Nikkei [persons of Japanese descent] in 1936," *Pacific Citizen*, February 11, 1983, p. 1; New York Times News Service, "Official Says Japanese Internment Possibly Not Justified by Cables," *Omaha World-Herald*, May 22, 1983, p. 11.
57. tenBroek, Barnhart, and Matson, op. cit., 1954, pp. 331-334.

58. Thomas and Nishimoto, op. cit., 1946, p. xii fn10. The other monograph was planned to deal with the "ecology of 'disloyalty'." Idem.
59. "Ousted Chicago Man Says Book Cost Job," *New York Times*, December 15, 1950, p. 27, col. 4; see, also, "Couch Dismissal Scored," *New York Times*, November 30, 1950, p. 41, col. 3.
60. This is in sharp contrast to what tenBroek, Barnhart, and Matson had to undertake. For some aspects of their study which came to be *Prejudice, War and the Constitution*, they literally had to start anew because the ERS files were incomplete with reference to certain issues they wanted to pursue; see tenBroek, Barnhart, and Matson, op. cit., 1954, pp. xi-xii.
61. John Modell, in Charles Kikuchi, *The Kikuchi Diary*, op. cit., 1973, p. 256 (italics added). The roles of Dorothy Thomas and Charles Aiken in all this remain areas open to research. Charles Aiken of Berkeley's Department of Political Science was one of the original planners of ERS; see Thomas and Nishimoto, op. cit., 1946, p. vi fn1. See, also, Grodzins, op. cit., 1949, p. ix.
62. C. Herman Pritchett, "In Memoriam: Morton Grodzins," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 58 (1964), p. 504.
63. See Melville J. Herskovits, *The Study of Man* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1951), especially pp. 39-42, 491, 625-627, for a basic discussion of this concept.
64. William Petersen, *Japanese Americans: Oppression and Success* (New York: Random House, 1971; Paperback ed.), p. 76.
65. "Review of Americans Betrayed," *Columbia Law Review*, vol. 50 (1950), p. 130.
66. As an example, Frank Miyamoto encountered some difficulties in being hired by the Department of Sociology of the University of Washington because one of its members held Miyamoto's Japanese background against him. See, John H. Provinse, Letter to Harold S. Fistere, June 7, 1945, pp. 1-2.
67. C. Herman Pritchett, "In Memoriam," op. cit., 1964, p. 504.
68. Dorothy Thomas, Letter to John F. Embree, April 28, 1943, p. 2.
69. For a list of some of the West Coast organizations which were for the evacuation, see Grodzins, op. cit., 1949, p. 21. Under what circumstances Grodzins accepted the position of Director of the University of Chicago Press can only be speculated. A most revealing case similar to Grodzins', concerning enculturation, is that of William Petersen, the eminent sociologist, who had been professor of sociology at the University of California at Berkeley. "When the editor of *The New York Times Magazine* proposed that I write an article on Japanese Americans, I supposed that he must have asked other more likely candidates and that they had refused. For at that time, in 1965, I knew less about that subnation than the average long-time resident of the West Coast. Until 1953, when I accepted a position at the Berkeley campus of the University of California, I had never been west of Chicago; and my acquaintances in and around New York included precisely two Nisei. In retrospect, I believe this psychological distance from Japanese Americans...was not altogether a disadvantage."
- The upshot was a splendid article on Japanese Americans and, ultimately, his brilliant book on the same group, from which the above quotation is taken: *Japanese Americans*, op. cit., 1971, p. ix.
- Petersen, a political conservative, illustrates in good measure the folly of labeling - as tenBroek, Barnhart, and Matson have done - students of the evacuation as either liberals or conservatives. In the case of Evacuation (the evacuation, incarceration, segregation, and resettlement), those who one would think would have fought against it backed it, and vice versa. The critical element appears to be enculturation, with a measure of human decency. In the case of Carey McWilliams, the enculturation thesis can also prove useful, but he represents opportunism *par excellence* (as do Earl Warren and a host of other politicians who originally came out for the evacuation).
70. Jacques Cattell Press (ed.), "Spencer, Robert Francis," *American Men and Women of Science: The Social Sciences*, (New York: Bowker, 1976, 13th ed.), vol. 5, p. 4235.
71. One notion that has to be disabused is that San Francisco and the Bay Area always had been tolerant and liberal places toward Japanese. On October 11, 1906, San Francisco's Board of Education issued a resolution removing its 93 Japanese-American students from its regular public schools and ordered them to attend special "Oriental" schools. This idea caught on elsewhere in California. As a result, in 1909 the State Legislature sought to establish segregated schools for Japanese and special ghettos to confine California's Asian population.
- As for Oregon, it has an image of being a liberal, tolerant, and humanistic state, with special attention being paid to the environment. And in the postwar era, John Gunther, *Inside American* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1951; Revised ed.), pp. 89-100, tried to project the image of this state as one which was liberal and tolerant; but the facts show otherwise, so far as Japanese Americans were concerned. See Audrie Girdner and Anne Loftis, *The Great Betrayal: The Evacuation of the Japanese-Americans During World War II* (London: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 396-399, concerning Hood River, Oregon. Also, note again the University of Oregon Mothers, a group which was for the evacuation. See, also, Peter T. Suzuki, "The Ethnolinguistics of Japanese Americans in the Wartime Camps," *Anthropological Linguistics*, vol. 19 (1976), p. 427 n11, on Hood River, Oregon. For a contemporary study of Hood River, Oregon, see Wallace Turner, "Hatred of 40's Still Vivid to Japanese [of Hood River, Oregon]," *New York Times*, July 20, 1981, p. 6, columns 1-6.
72. For the "classic model," see Melville Herskovits, op. cit., 1951, pp. 40-41.
73. Robert F. Spencer, *Japanese Buddhism in the United*

- States..., op. cit., 1946, p. ii.
74. *Social Forces*, vol. 26 (1948).
 75. Correspondingly, by ignoring what was going on in California and what had taken place on the West Coast before the war, Spencer was exonerating the people and institutions of California and the West Coast. For a more detailed discussion of his paper, see Peter T. Suzuki, "Anthropologists in the Wartime Camps..." op. cit., 1981, pp. 37-38.
 76. "Japanese Language Behavior," *American Speech*, vol. 25 (1950), pp. 242, 244. (Italics added.) See Peter T. Suzuki, "The Ethnolinguistics of Japanese Americans..." op. cit., 1976, on the influence of camp life on Japanese-American speech.
 77. Jacques Cattell Press (ed.), "Wax, Rosalie Hankey," *American Men and Women of Science: The Social Sciences* (New York: Bowker, 1976, 13th ed.), vol. 6, p. 4736.
 78. Wax, *Doing Fieldwork*, op. cit., 1971, p. 64. See, also, *ibid.*, p. 53, on her family background. Although of German descent, and this factor was perceived as important by some internees in Tule Lake, this ethnic factor is not significant in other respects.
 79. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
 80. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
 81. *Idem.*
 82. "Luckily, we were able to replace him [Spencer] with a young but highly intelligent graduate student in anthropology, Miss Rosalie Hankey," Dorothy S. Thomas, Letter to John F. Embree, July 9, 1943.
 83. Wax, *Doing Fieldwork*, op. cit., 1971, pp. 66-67. However, according to a letter Thomas received from Wax, Dorothy S. Thomas, Letter to John F. Embree, July 14, 1943, p. 2: "Hanky has arrived at Gila, and her first reports are enthusiastic."
 84. Wax, *Doing Fieldwork*, op. cit., 1971, p. 69.
 85. *Ibid.*, p. 65. See Peter T. Suzuki, "Anthropologists in the Wartime Camps..." op. cit., 1981, p. 39, on Thomas' attitude toward the WRA researchers.
 86. Wax, *Doing Fieldwork*, op. cit., p. 70.
 87. *Idem.*
 88. *Ibid.*, p. 71.
 89. *Ibid.*, pp. 74.
 90. *Ibid.*, pp. 75-76.
 91. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
 92. *Ibid.*, p. 81.
 93. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
 94. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
 95. *Ibid.*, p. 82. The passage quoted is also on this page.
 96. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
 97. *Ibid.*, p. 66.
 98. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
 99. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
 100. *Ibid.*, p. 81; italics added.
 101. Thomas and Nishimoto, op. cit., 1946, p. viii fn5. "(Some of the Japanese fieldworkers employed by the study had been accused by their fellow evacuees of being informers or 'spies for the administration.' Some were made so uncomfortable that they left the centers [camps] soon after the registration [loyalty oath] crisis.)" Wax, *Doing Fieldwork*, op. cit., 1971, pp. 94-95.
 102. *Ibid.*, pp. 94-95.
 103. *Ibid.*, p. 105.
 104. *Ibid.*, pp. 118-119.
 105. *Ibid.*, p. 123.
 106. *Ibid.*, p. 105.
 107. *Ibid.*, p. 108.
 108. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
 109. *Ibid.*, p. 112.
 110. On Wax's warnings to the fieldworker, of identifying oneself too closely with his/her informants, see *ibid.*, pp. 47-49.
 111. *Ibid.*, p. 139. In her "pro-Japan" stage, she "...found the news of these beatings [of alleged "pro-America, pro-administration" internees] exciting and somehow gratifying," *ibid.*, p. 136.
 112. *Ibid.*, pp. 152-162. Some of these points have been covered in Peter Suzuki, "Anthropologists in the Wartime Camps..." op. cit., 1981, p. 31.
 113. Wax, *Doing Fieldwork*, op. cit., 1971, p. 139.
 114. *Ibid.*, p. 158. "One [of the first four] safeguard[s] [of the participant-observation method used by ERS field researchers] was, of course, the competence, intellectual honesty, self-control and self-correction of the observers themselves," Thomas and Nishimoto, op. cit., 1946, p. x.
- Marvin Opler, "Narrative Report on Work of the [Community Analysis] Section by the [Tule Lake] Community Analyst," Tule Lake Community Analysis Section, August 31, 1945, p. 14 (61.319 Folder No. 18), has this observation about Wax. "...Miss Hankey, post-incident, again revived the one-way style of pumping appearing regularly with pencils and notebook.... The one-way operation proved to be burdensome, week after week, that when it settled in a pattern out of office hours in evening sessions, we bore it for a time, then terminated our contractual, it would seem, obligation to serve as chief "informant" for the Thomas study."
- He then continues on the same page, still in connection with Wax: "Some essential material, though not essential to the understanding of the Washington office [of WRA], had thus willfully been secreted in our files, on the assumption that reports labeled "confidential" were not so treated as regards the Thomas study."
115. Wax, op. cit., 1971, pp. 160-161.
 116. See, for example, Wax, op. cit., 1971, pp. 71 ff., 79, 133, 139, 147; op. cit., 1952, pp. 36-37; op. cit., 1957, pp. 140-142, regarding her concern about competent field research and gathering data. It goes without saying that some of the values associated with being a good researcher had been enculturated while a graduate student in one of the world's most research-oriented anthropology departments (sociologists prefer to use the term "socialization," for which, see Harriet Zuckerman, *Scientific Elite* (New York: The Free Press, 1977), pp.

- 122-132). On enculturating values as an adult, see Melville Herskovits, op. cit., 1951, p. 41.
117. See Peter Suzuki, "Anthropologists in the Wartime Camps...", op. cit., 1981, p. 39.
118. Marvin Opler, "Review of *The Spoilage*," op. cit., 1948, p. 310. (Italics added.)
119. Notwithstanding the heroic efforts of Michi Weglyn, *Years of Infamy*, op. cit., 1976, which have helped so much to expose the issues.
120. Marvin Opler, "Review of *The Spoilage*," op. cit., 1948, pp. 309-310.
121. Of the "safeguards" which were developed for ERS field workers (see Note 114 above), three of the four "were established and reinforced by frequent conferences of observers and other staff members with the director of the study [Thomas] and its advisors." See Thomas and Nishimoto, op. cit., 1946, p. xi. The other safeguards were as follows. The interdisciplinary approach "which resulted in a situation analogous to 'differential diagnosis'." A third safeguard was the bicultural composition of the evacuee staff (i.e., Japanese-American). "A fourth was the utilization, wherever possible, of administrative and particularly quantitative materials collected independently of the study for checking or revising the generalizations growing out of the materials of the study itself." Idem.
122. On "sensationalistic," see Marvin Opler, "Review of *The Spoilage*, op. cit., 1948, p. 308, as noting the "marked tendency toward incomplete coverage and sensationalistic opinion..." of the book's section dealing with Tule Lake after it had become a segregation camp.
123. I have written to my congressman and to the director of the National Archives to see what can be done to have the Leighton file returned to its rightful place.
124. Dorothy S. Thomas, op. cit., 1952, p. v.
125. Thomas and Nishimoto, op. cit., 1946, p. xii fn10. The monograph on the "ecology of 'disloyalty'" was never written.
126. The article from the *New York Times* quoted in this paper mentions the controversy over *Americans Betrayed* as having taken place "two years ago" (i.e., 1948). According to tenBroek, Barnhart, and Matson, 1948 was the year that tenBroek was given the assignment to write what eventually came to be *Prejudice, War and the Constitution*. In other words, the University of California made the assignment through Thomas and Aiken in 1948, the year of the height of the controversy.
127. The gender factor also has been taken into consideration in the case of Wax (and Thomas).
128. Foundation Center, *Foundation Directory* (New York: The Foundation Center, 1981, 8th ed.), pp. 11, 15. An intriguing aspect in this connection has to do with the fact that in the three ERS publications, but especially in *Prejudice, War and the Constitution*, no attention is paid to the favored treatment of other aliens, especially Italian aliens and Italian Americans, by California and by the Roosevelt administration, over and against Japanese aliens and Japanese Americans. Grodzins, op. cit., 1949, pp. 39, 47, 72-73, 96, 108, 110, 120, 144, 193, 263, 282-283, 318, 322, 362, pursued the invidious treatment relentlessly. On this same issue, see, also, Weglyn, op. cit., 1976, pp. 29, 68-69, 73-74, 96, 103, 134, 139-140, 200, 291 n10. The political influence of Italian Americans was marked, especially in the Bay Area; the mayor of San Francisco in 1942 was Angelo Rossi. On his statements regarding Japanese vs. Italians and Germans, see Grodzins, op. cit., 1949, p. 110. For detailed studies showing the decided influence of American foundations on research projects they have financed, see the excellent studies in Robert F. Arnove (ed.), *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism* (Boston: G.K. Hall, 1980).
129. Curiously, according to Barnhart, op. cit., 1958, p. 158, the only ERS materials at Berkeley by Wax while at Tule Lake are classified as correspondence "with evacuees." Yet, according to *ibid.*, p. 100, the same Berkeley collection has seven titled reports (totaling 170 pages) plus some untitled reports by Wax while she was at Gila. And Wax herself refers to "Field Notes" throughout *The Spoilage*, or her Tule Lake period. See, also, Wax, op. cit., 1971, p. 386, "Wax, Rosali H. 1943-1945, Field notes, Japanese-American relocation center [Tule Lake]."
130. For statements about Marvin Opler's and the Tule Lake Community Analysis Section's reports, see Peter Suzuki, "Anthropologists in the Wartime Camps...", op. cit., 1981, p. 39. Needless to say, all WRA materials on Tule Lake should be consulted as well.
131. The playwright Frank Chin has been interviewing some of these people for his research project on camp dissidents.
132. It is no mere coincidence that, of the ERS trilogy, the only book which was not born of expediency, *The Salvage*, also happens to be the most solid and the least spectacular.