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FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL NATIONAL DEFENSE APPROPRIATION  
BILL FOR 1943

HEARINGS  
Before  
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Seventy-Seventh Congress  
Second Session

on the

FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL NATIONAL DEFENSE  
APPROPRIATION BILL FOR 1943

PART 1

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations

June 15, 1942

MR. EISENHOWER. If I may, I should like to make this observation: I doubt that it is desirable, by Executive order, to authorize now a program which would not be effectuated until the war is over. But certainly I do believe that this Government, after assuming what seems to me to be a moral responsibility to aid the evacuees, many of whom are perfectly loyal American citizens, will not fail to aid them at the appropriate time to return to their normal stations in life. I have every confidence that this is going to be done.

LOYALTY OF EVACUEES TO THE UNITED STATES

THE CHAIRMAN. There is no suggestion that any of these should be returned to Japan?

MR. EISENHOWER. Yes, sir; the question comes up from time to time. I can only give a personal opinion. I have studied this problem for about 3 months, Mr. Chair-



man. I have visited with many people, some of whom are technical experts in whom I have confidence. I would say that from 80 to 85 percent of the Nisei, who are American-born citizens of Japanese descent and who have never been out of the United States, are loyal to the United States. They have attended only American schools with other American children. They have learned the democratic way. They know no other way. Many of them are in the American Army and Navy. Most of them can speak no other language but ours. They are thoroughly Americanized.

I would say, from all the technical evidence I have, that 50 percent of the Issei, that is, the first generation or aliens, are passively loyal to the United States.

There is another group, however, called the Kibei- American-born citizens who returned for a considerable period to Japan and who were educated in Japan. My judgment is that a youngster, born in this country but educated in Japan for from 3 to 5 years during his impressionable years, that is, between the ages of 12 and 19, is likely to have when he returns here a stronger cultural attachment to Japan than he has to the United States.

I do not have any idea what percentage of the Kibei would be deemed to be loyal to the United States under varying circumstances.

MR. WIGGLEWORTH. Does he represent 20 percent of the total, the Kibei, as you call them?

MR. EISENHOWER. If we define a Kibei as an American-born Japanese who has spent 3 years or more in Japan, a portion of which was subsequent to 1930 and after he was 12 years old, there are about 8,000 such Kibei in the United States. If we add the parents, wives, and children, the number would increase to between 20,000 and 25,000.



I am merely making the generalization, Mr. Chairman, that the American-born citizens who have never left the United States, have their cultural attachments here, have known only our democratic methods, have never known anything else, are on the whole loyal to this country and to our form of government. In the same generalization, I should say it is the Kibei who are pointed in the other direction. There are exceptions, of course. Some Kibei apparently dislike Japan intensely.



December 8, 1943. Budget Director Smith invited Director

Myer to come to his office for a conference.

Informed him that Attorney General Biddle had called on him, expressing anxiety over developments in the WRA program, especially publicity following incidents at Tule Lake. Smith requested background information on developments at Tule Lake and other phases of the WRA program. Stated that he expected people to be raising questions with him concerning WRA and he wanted to have the answers.



Dec. 17, 1943. At meeting of Cabinet, Attorney General Biddle mentions "the Japanese question" as a matter of concern to his Department and to the Administration.

Dec. 30. Attorney General Biddle writes memorandum to President, giving his analysis of the problem of Japanese evacuees and the manner in which WRA has done its job. Concedes that WRA has ~~handled~~ handled a thankless task rather well, and that its policies, especially the one of relocation, is fundamentally sound; however, there has been much public criticism of WRA; there is "unanimous" feeling in the California delegation in Congress that WRA should be abolished; cites L.A. Times poll as indicative of public ~~in~~ mistrust ~~of~~ of WRA. Suggests that WRA should not be required to bear brunt of this public and political pressure alone, as a small, independent agency; but that is should be made part of an established Department. Mentions either Justice or Interior, and favors Interior as having resources and personnel, particularly Indian Service, suited to the job.

INTERIM: Biddle memorandum evidently referred by the President to Mr. Byrnes, Director of War Mobilization, for consideration; Byrnes concurred in Biddle's recommendation and returned memorandum to President, who then referred the matter to Judge Rosenman with the request that he see that an appropriate executive order be



Drafted, attaching WRA to Department of the Interior. Judge Rosenman apparently communicated with Harold Smith, Director of the Budget, through whose hands all Executive Orders are to pass.

January 11, 1944. Budget Director Smith communicates by telephone with Director Myer, who is in New York to address the Home Missions Council, and is planning to go from there to Phoenix, Boston, San Francisco and Los Angeles for a period of about three weeks. Upon learning of the proposed change in status of WRA he delays his plans for a trip to the coast and returns to Washington.

January 12. Myer confers with Smith. Learns that Biddle apparently had something to do with the proposed move.

January 13. Myer confers with Biddle, who gives him a copy of his memorandum of December 30. Myer cites unfairness of carrying on maneuvers without informing him, and Biddle admits the charge. Myer points out importance of proper timing in making the transfer in order that the relocation drive completion of segregation, and other important WRA moves may not be thrown off stride. Biddle expresses the opinion that Myer should be given opportunity to indicate when the proposed transfer is announced and made.

January 14. Myer sees Byrnes. Suggests that if transfer is to be made, he would prefer to be transferred to



Justice Department, rather than to Interior. The expressed reasons were that WRA might gain in a public relations sense by being in the same Department which includes the FBI, and in an administrative sense by association with the Immigration and naturalization service with which WRA already has cooperated. Feels that the institutional policies of the Indian Service and the developmental interests of the Bureau of Reclamation would be antithetical to WRA's relocation program.

These arguments apparently were brushed aside by Byrnes, who felt that the WRA program would have a stronger, more vigorous defender and proponent in the Secretary of the Interior than in the Attorney General.

The impression was given that Director Myer will be retained as head of the agency, whatever it may be called, after the transfer. Presumably there will be no major change in personnel or in major policies.

January 15. Further conference with Smith gives assurance that any change can be delayed until Myer has met his obligations on West Coast.

January 16. Director Myer leaves for West Coast.