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CONFIDENTIAL

Jan. 5, 1943

Captain Ellis M. Zacharias
Office of Naval Intelligence
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Captain Zacharias:

Confirming our recent conversations I want to express in writing my appreciation of your visit and your offer of help in discovering disloyal individuals in our relocation centers and safeguarding the public interest in segregating or otherwise dealing with them. The list of suspected individuals in your own files, which you offered to furnish, will be of great assistance to us.

We would appreciate also receiving from you any analyses or studies which your office has made of various Japanese group activities or organizations. The importance of such organizations both as focal points of disturbance or as nuclei for educational program is of course apparent.

From time to time we will be submitting to you additional names of individuals whose activities at the centers raise doubts as to their pro-American sympathies. Your check of these people in your files will be very much appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ D. S. Myer

Director

AIR MAIL
CONFIDENTIAL

January 7, 1943

Mr. D. S. Myer
Director, War Relocation Authority
Barr Building
17th and Eye Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Myer:

I am not positive that you wanted me to answer your confidential letter to all Project Directors of December 24. Nevertheless, I will attempt to give you some of my ideas and answers concerning your questions.

1. a. If the term "disloyal elements" can be expanded to include troublemakers and agitators, the answer is definitely yes.

b. The segregation of this type of individuals is absolutely necessary for the orderly operation of any project.

2. There are, in my belief, certain individuals in each Center who are continually agitating for disloyalty and, through such agitation, obstructing the program not only of the Authority but are obstructing the willingness of loyal individuals in each Center and causing either work stoppages, slowdowns, or wasteful practices on the Projects. A complete list of these individuals is practically impossible to secure as only a small number of individuals who are working in this manner are out in the open where the administration has an opportunity to know who they may be. Further, loyal persons on the Project hesitate to release names of individuals under present conditions in the fear that they may become known and that action by the disloyal group would be taken against them. Such lists could be prepared from time to time if it were possible to take rather rapid action on segregating such people after the lists were prepared.

3. If a policy of segregating disloyal and obstructive individuals were adopted, it is my belief that the reaction on the Center would be all for the good provided that the persons who were to be segregated were only given sufficient notice to permit them to pack their belongings and be immediately removed from the Center. My feeling is that they should not be given 24 hours notice but that they should be moved the day they are notified so that no time should be given them to stir up more agitation in the community. It is my feeling that if these elements were removed in small groups from time to time the leaders of the community would immediately see what WRA had in mind and sufficient support would be given to the Internal Security force so that care could be taken of practically any problem.

4. If segregation were decided upon, I would definitely recommend the following groups or categories for segregation:

a. All those who have applied for repatriation.

b. All issei bachelors, with the exception of those whom the Project Director may recommend to remain on the Project. I believe the Project Director should be given this authority as there are some bachelors who are very valuable to the administration.

c. All issei married couples without children, extending the same exception as provided in item b.

d. All troublemakers in the issei and kibel group, or we might place it as all issei or kibel except those whom the Project Director may recommend to remain on the Project. I believe it would be better to remove other issei or kibel troublemakers recommended by the Project Director as that group will be much smaller than the number that will remain. If such a procedure were established, I believe we would find a relatively small number in the latter category and would immediately leave within a Project those persons who were willing to work with the administration for the Project and those who have been willing to promote harmonious relations among all concerned.

5. In answer to this question, as already stated, it is difficult to secure good evidence against persons as long as those who give evidence feel there is a possibility of their remaining in the Center. Proper witnesses may talk with WRA employees, but if they were called to testify would conveniently forget that they had ever discussed such a subject with us for fear that they would be severely beaten by the minority group on the Project.

6. The segregation committee on each Project would, I believe, vary; but, in general, my recommendation would be that the Chief of Internal Security, Chief of Community Services, and one other staff member working the largest number of evacuees be assigned as members of the segregation committee.

7. The leaders of the community will, in an undercover manner through the staff, be very helpful in carrying out a segregation program. If they were named to a committee and openly branded as members of such a segregation committee, I doubt if they would serve; and I think they would suffer serious consequences by being in such a position. More help can be gained by the Project Director and his staff through confidence men on the Project rather than through openly established committees while such a program is in progress.

8. There is at present from 10 to 25 or 30 very disloyal people on practically every Project. These persons, I believe, should be removed immediately. With reference to the larger segregation program, it is my thought that families should

probably be removed with those who are to be segregated. If the program, as recommended, is considered, one Center could be selected. First, all repatriats could be kept in that one center. Second, a hundred or more repatriats from a Center could be sent to this selected Center and this selected Center could send back to the other Center all loyal persons. This procedure could continue until all repatriats were segregated. Then exactly the same procedure could be followed for bachelors and others until all disloyal people were in one Center and other Centers supplied with loyal people. In this way families could be moved at the same time that segregation takes place.

9. It is my belief that once a Center was established as a segregation Center that all persons moved to this area should be denied indefinite leave until their cases could be thoroughly checked; and, if it were found that they had been moved unjustly, then I would think they should be sent to a Relocation Center before being given the benefits of indefinite leave. I believe all mail in such a Center should be censored, that all packages should be checked carefully for contraband, and that the administration should definitely run the Project with a firm but fair hand.

These few comments are furnished for your information, and I hope they will be of some help. They are based upon my experience and discussions with large numbers of people of Japanese ancestry at Gila ~~and~~ and other Projects, and further on my knowledge of Japanese people in general through my long years of association with them. The entire 100,000 evacuees now in WRA Relocation Centers will, I believe, if this or some similar segregation procedure is put in operation, give WRA administration their loyal support. Work on each Project will be increased and WRA will be respected by all the loyal evacuees and will certainly gain, in my estimation, enormous support from the American public as a whole.

Very truly yours,

R. B. Cozzens
Field Assistant Director

CONFIDENTIAL

E 2.06

Feb. 2, 1943

Mr. John J. McCloy
Assistant Secretary of War
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCloy:

The War Relocation Authority concurs in Paragraph 1 of the directive under which the War Department is to conduct loyalty investigations of Japanese-American citizens in relocation center. This paragraph reads as follows:

"A plan has been formulated whereby the War Department will, upon request of the War Relocation Authority, assist in determining the loyalty of American citizens of Japanese ancestry under its jurisdiction. The purpose of the plan is to determine (a) loyalty of American citizens of Japanese ancestry to permit of their release by War Relocation Authority from war relocation centers, and (b) whether those so released may be inducted into the military service or may be available for employment in plants and facilities important to the war effort."

The War Relocation Authority is very glad to have this assistance from the War Department and will do everything possible to facilitate the work of the War Department representatives while they are on the project.

Sincerely,

/s/ E. M. Rowalt

Acting Director

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February 10, 1943

AIR MAIL

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. D. S. Myer
Director, War Relocation Authority
Barr Building
17th and Eye Sts., N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Myer:

This will confirm our telephone conversation concerning action on the Fredericks' case and discuss other matters about Gila.

1. Fredericks is Assistant Chief of Internal Security and is a good officer. However, he and Williamson form a combination that won't "jell". In my judgment, Fredericks is a better officer than Williamson. Graves, the second Assistant Chief, is better trained and has more experience than either of them. He would be my choice for the position of Chief. Fredericks should be transferred to another project. Future action of some action is indicated on Williamson. This is a problem that rests between the Director and Mr. Bennett.
2. Martin Gaba, Assistant Chief of Community Services at Canal Community. He is able, intensely interested in his work, and aggressive. It is the latter quality, no doubt, that is being exploited by evacuees in the Canal Community to demand his removal. Gaba has requested a transfer to another project but Mr. Bennett, wisely, wishes to time ~~his transfer~~ his transfer so that it will not be considered a victory for anti-administration evacuees. As a suggestion; Ray Best desperately needs help at Moab. Why not detail Mr. Gaba there to assist him and depend upon Best's judgment as to whether or not Gaba should remain at Moab in charge when he, Best, is relieved?
3. Position of Chief of Community Services: Mr. Hoffman is doing an admirable job. Mr. Bennett depends upon him for nearly all things in the field of human relations. He now proposes to add Internal Security to Mr. Hoffman's responsibilities. This is in line with national thinking but Mr. Bennett believes, as I do, that some trouble may be experienced unless the position of Chief

of Community Services is dignified by a change in title. I propose that we favor the recommendation made at the Salt Lake conference in December and the title of this position be changed to that of Assistant Project Director.

4. Project Relations: It is obvious to even a casual visitor that the Project Director has not made his leadership felt, either by the staff or the evacuees. I discussed this fact with Mr. Bennett. He is aware of the deficiency and told me that the same observation had been made by Mr. Cozzens. It is his intention to become better acquainted with the evacuees. This week offers him a good opportunity since he will be required to introduce the Army recruiting group to the evacuee leadership.

5. Conference with Governor Osborne: This was arranged by Tom Sawyer as a "get-acquainted" meeting for Mr. Bennett. The Governor appeared only mildly interested in urging Japanese to help in picking cotton. He said negotiations were proceeding for the importation of Mexican labor; and in response to my question as to whether or not the use of Japanese cotton pickers at this time might not muddy the waters, he said "Yes, that is a possibility." It was my intention, if the Governor were aggressively intent upon the Japanese to help pick cotton, to contact farm bureau groups and learn what plans they had for providing housing and protection. But in view of the Governor's luke-warm interest, we deemed it wise strategy to let the whole matter rest in status quo. We left the next move up to the farm bureau group to take whatever steps are necessary with the military, with WRA ready and willing to help out, subject to the provisions of your letter to Senator Hayden.

6. The Shook Problem: Shippers are trying to prevent WRA from buying any of the shook produced by the Navajo Tribal Sawmill. They are putting pressure on Senator Hayden in an attempt to keep us from doing this. I discussed this with Senator Hayden before I left Washington. I recited the story we told at the Westward Ho. He seemed unimpressed and thought we might use sacks or bulk shipments and thus release box shook for private shippers.

I found that Gila has thus far not purchased any shook from the Navajo Tribal Sawmill. They are shipping everything in sacks including lettuce which is, of course, heavily damaged by this method, but since lettuce has been declared a non-essential crop, WRA would hardly be justified in using shook for this purpose. The Project is working out an arrangement for the acquisition of used shook from the Florence Camp for prisoners of war. If they succeed in completing this arrangement the shook problem will be only partly solved. We are, therefore, negotiating for additional shook from the sawmill at Ft. Apache.

I recommend that the agricultural division determine as a matter of policy those products that, in the interest of food conservation, require box packing and that we aid and support Project Directors in securing shock for this purpose. We should notify the Arizona Congressional Delegation of our shock requirements and to ship products which we determine must be boxed. I would like at this point also to recommend a second statement of policy concerning sales of vegetable products.

In spite of national shortages, Arizona shippers are afraid that WRA will sell in the open Market. I assume this includes sales to the Quartermaster Corps. Senator Hayden has already reminded us of the policy we announced earlier; (a) to produce for consumption by evacuees, and (b) to produce for lease-lend.

Admittedly, the emphasis has moved away from heavy agriculture production; but nevertheless there will be from time to time, surplus that cannot be disposed of entirely in WRA. I recommend that Project Directors be authorized to dispose of such crops in excess of the consumptive requirements of WRA to the Quartermaster and that they be given authority to pack such vegetable products in accordance with the specifications of the Quartermaster irrespective of the policy decided upon for packaging for WRA uses.

Very sincerely,

E. R. Fryer
Deputy Director

Dictated by Mr. Fryer,
but not read.

CONFIDENTIAL

Feb. 26, 1943

Mr. Harvey M. Coverley
Project Director
Tule Lake Relocation Center
Newell, California

Dear Mr. Coverley:

I have just sent you the following teletype:

"Reurteletype and telephone conversation with Glick. Filling in questionnaires is required of all male citizen evacuees of military age by Supplement 3 to Administrative Instruction No. 22 Revised, issued January 30. Refusal of any such evacuee to register is a violation of WRA regulation, punishable by administrative proceeding by Project Director. You therefore had clear authority to make the arrests you refer to. Your advice to sheriff of Modoc County that prisoners are being held on WRA responsibility is proper. More complete discussion of your questions being airmailed today."

The situation with reference to your authority to make these arrests is rather confused, because of the fact that I have learned since my return to Washington that the War Department and the Selective Service System did not come to a complete agreement along the lines that were earlier discussed between my office and the office of Assistant Secretary of War McCloy. I shall outline in this letter briefly only those points that relate directly to your questions.

The War Relocation Authority was given to understand that the War Department would request the Selective Service System to issue a regulation making the filling in of the questionnaires involved in the current registration compulsory for all male citizens of military age. In turn, WRA announced its intention of providing for the filling in of the questionnaires by all evacuees in relocation centers 17 years of age or over. This was the understanding when Mr. Provinse, Mr. Glick, and I left Washington for the recent field conferences. This was also the understanding communicated to you. While we were in the field, Mr. Rowalt, as Acting Director, issued Supplement 3 to Administrative Instruction No. 22, Revised. You will notice that Section I of that Supplement adds a new section II to Administrative Instruction No. 22. Paragraph B of the new section Section IX, you will notice, begins with the statement "Beginning with a day in February 1943 to be announced by the Director, each Project Director shall arrange for each male United States citizen of Japanese ancestry in the relocation center who has reached his 17th birthday to execute DSS Form 304A and Form WRA-126a."

I have learned, however, that the Selective Service System subsequently was informed by certain officers in the War Department that the filling in of the questionnaires by male citizens of military age was not to be made compulsory under the Selective Service Act. The Selective Service System therefore did not ~~not~~ issue a regulation requiring the filling in of the questionnaires.

At the time, therefore, that you and Major Marshall sought to require certain male citizen evacuees of military age to complete the questionnaires and they refused to do so, they became guilty of violating a regulation of WRA, but their mere refusal to complete the questionnaires did not make them guilty of violating the Selective Service Act.

You have, of course, authority under our Administrative Instructions to arrest evacuees for disobeying orders or instructions issued by your office, to hold a disciplinary hearing, and to impose suitable punishment. Under the revised Administrative Instruction on this subject, an advance copy of which I mailed you yesterday, the maximum punishment you can impose in such a disciplinary proceeding is 90 days confinement in jail or suspension of certain compensation privileges, or both.

The FBI officers referred to in your teletype are right, therefore, in saying that the mere refusal to fill in the questionnaires is not a violation of the Selective Service Act, but they are quite wrong in denying that you have authority to make arrests under the circumstances. Your statement to the sheriff of Modoc County that the prisoners are being held on WRA responsibility is correct.

The fact that the FBI is responsible for making investigations concerning offenses against the Selective Service Act and related acts in no way modifies or qualifies your authority to institute disciplinary proceedings for violation of your instructions.

So far I have discussed only the mere refusal of the evacuees to fill in their questionnaires. I sent to all Project Directors a few days ago a teletype calling attention to the fact that an act of Congress makes it a crime to interfere with the enlistment or recruitment service of the United States for its armed forces. If any of the people whom you have arrested were guilty, in addition to refusing to fill out the questionnaires, of conduct that tended to interfere with the filling out of these questionnaires by other male citizens of military age, you should turn that evidence over to the FBI agents for transmittal to the United States Attorney. It will be the responsibility of the United States Attorney to determine whether the evidence warrants prosecution for interference with the enlistment and recruitment service. It is still possible, therefore, that some of the evacuees who have been arrested may need to be turned over to the Federal courts for prosecution for this offense.

D. S. Myer, Feb. 26, 1943

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Your last weekly report discusses your arrest of Junich Nimura. It does not, however, discuss the arrests of the other 35 or 36 evacuees, nor does it give any summary of the evidence on which those others were arrested. I believe your weekly report was mailed before those additional arrests were made. I am unable, therefore, at this time to advise you whether the persons arrested should merely be given a disciplinary hearing before you and then permitted to return to Tule Lake after serving any term in jail that you may impose, or whether it would be better for the evacuees to be transferred to another relocation center or to Moab. I believe it would be best for you to reexamine the entire situation in the light of the further information supplied in this letter, and then to proceed as you think best. If you want any advice before taking action in the case of the 35 or 36 evacuees, submit to me a summary of the evidence as to what they did, together with indications of whether the persons arrested are married or single, whether they are kibel, which of them have children, and similar factors, with a statement of your recommendations. We shall be glad to consider your report and recommendations and advise you further.

You are authorized to give a copy of this letter to the FBI agents referred to in your teletype. I wish also that you would show this letter to Bob Cozzens.

Sincerely,

Director

CONFIDENTIAL

February 27, 1943

AIRMAIL SPECIAL DELIVERY

Mr. Harvey M. Coverley
Project Director
Tule Lake Relocation Center
Newell, California

Dear Harvey:

Attached is a copy of a teletype just sent to you. You may want to check it with the original which may have been garbled.

We get all kinds of reports and rumors here and, of course, there is much information we don't get. I had a report this morning that Major Marshall had stated there were fifteen teachers at Tule Lake who had been teaching anti-militarism. You may know about this. If you do I would like to have the facts. If not, I would suggest that you quiz Major Marshall on any information he may have. It is also reported that four Kibei entered the registration quarters on Friday, a week ago yesterday, and tried to stop the registration by stating there would be no more registration. They gave a fifteen minute harangue on the subject and seemingly tried to entice Major Marshall into taking some physical action against them. The Army office here is wondering why they were not arrested on the spot. I am wondering what the facts are regarding this particular incident. We have been informed that they are among those arrested on Saturday or Sunday but there is still some question in the mind of Colonel Scobey whether action has been taken in the cases of those who tried to interfere with registration.

We also have reports that death notices have been posted in washrooms threatening death to all those who register, and that mimeographed memoranda have been put out urging people not to register.

All of the above reports have come to us through Colonel Scobey's office as reported by Major Marshall. I am not being critical because we do not have all these details and I am presuming that you are fully informed about these reports, but I am sending them to you for confirmation.

I have just read Mr. Cook's report of February 22 to Mr. Baker, and I note on page 4 of this report a statement regarding the beating of Teiho Hashida on the night of Feb. 22. This definitely states that the beating was done by two Kibei. I am wondering if the perpetrators were apprehended and if not, why not, in view of the fact there seems to be definite information that they were Kibei.

I fully appreciate the problems you are having to face as the new Project Director and we want to give you every assistance we can from this end. Communication is not easy but we will do our best to render services from here if we can be of assistance.

D. S. Myer, Feb. 27, 1943

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I am sorry we got you out on a limb regarding the arrests but I had been definitely informed that this was compulsory under selective service and was greatly surprised and disappointed when I was informed otherwise. However, you are still within bounds and I hope the cases can be cleared up rapidly and that you can proceed to get your registration completed by March 10 as outlined in my wire, or in accordance with any plans you and Mr. Cozzens feel are sound. It is now definite that the problem is ours to get the job done but I am sure we will have full collaboration of the Army in accomplishing it. We should check with them step by step but there is no question about where the responsibility lies under present conditions. It lies with the War Relocation Authority.

For your information we are attaching copy of a memorandum dated February 26, from Colonel Scobey to the Adjutant General concerning military guard for the Biological Survey Camp at Tule Lake.

Yours very truly,

/s/ D. S. Myer
Director

March 6, 1943

Mr. Dillon S. Myer
Director
War Relocation Authority
Barr Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Myer:

I have just received two confidential communications from you, both dated February 27. One was addressed to me personally and the other was apparently sent to all project directors. I will comment on both in this letter.

There are, as you have heard, a number of teachers at this project who are opposed to war as a means of settling international disputes and who would probably refuse to perform war service if they were required to do so. There are both men and women in this group. So far as we have been able to ascertain, however, they have not been teaching anti-militarism. Furthermore, all but two of them have cooperated loyally in the registration program. The two who refused were requested to resign and did so. There have been rumors that some of those who were participating in the registration were using the opportunity as an avenue for pacificistic propaganda. I have investigated these reports and find little basis for them.

With reference to the report that four kibeï entered the registration hall on February 19 and attempted to stop the proceedings, may I say that no such report has even been made to me. I believe it is true that four young men (nisei) did talk to Major Marshall in the registration hall on that date. One of them was quite vehement in his arguments against registration but Major Marshall did not recommend that any action be taken and did not seem to think that an arrest was necessary. All four of these young men later turned out to be among the residents of Block 42 who were arrested at 5:00 P.M. on Sunday, February 21. It is also true that a few threatening posters were found. Two of these appeared in Block 42 just before the arrests above mentioned. None have appeared since. Only one other such poster has been reported. None have appeared recently. It is also true that a mimeographed circular was scattered around the center, urging people not to register. You have been fully informed in Mr. Cook's reports regarding both of these developments. We now have in confinement a person believed to have been implicated in the distribution of the mimeographed circular. We have not obtained a confession, however, or any admittance that he participated in any aspect of the preparation, reproduction or distribution of this circular.

I gather from your letter that you feel you are not kept fully informed about these reports. I endeavor to keep you informed through my weekly reports, those sent in every day or two by Mr. Cook and by frequent telephone calls.

With reference to Mr. Cook's report of February 22 in which it was stated that the beating of Teiho Hashida was done by two kibeï, this was probably somewhat premature. At the time his report was prepared no one knew what or how many persons attacked Mr. Hashida. You will recall, however, that on Friday, February 26 and Saturday, February 27, thirteen persons were arrested on suspicion of being implicated in several beatings or attempted beatings. Twelve of these persons have pleaded guilty to the charge and have been sentenced to terms in the Modoc Tounty Jail. Among them are three persons we are fairly certain were involved in the Hashida beating. One of these three is believed to be the leader. None of the three, however, have confessed specifically to being involved in this case. We have reason to believe that there are two other persons still at large who participated in that affair.

It is realized we have made many errors ourselves but I cannot help feeling that in the case of the Tule Lake Project the plans furnished us for the registration program were too indefinite. Mr. Hayes returned from Washington with a clear impression that the registration of male citizens was to be performed under the Selective Service regulations. The forms used were issued by the Selective Service Systdm. A number of inferential statements in the instructions alsb led to that conclusion and as you stated, you yourself also believed this to be a fact. As a result, we placed ourselves in a position which might have been very precarious had we not proceeded somewhat cautiously and sceptically.

That, however, is probably not the most serious difficulty into which we have been led. In Mr. Rowalt's letter of February 1, he stated categorically at the end of the third paragraph that "the registration will be compulsory except in the case of those who have requested repatriation." Acting on this statement and the instructions which accompanied it, we proceeded to answer a flood of questions on this point accordingly. Later on ^{we} were somewhat embarrassed to be informed that for male and female citizens at least, an application for repatriation did not excuse them from registration. Announcement of this only increased our problem as it convinced many dubious evacuees that the government was not acting in good faith. Now, however, we are confronted with an even more perplexing difficulty. We have at all times stated that the registration was compulsory. Both Mr. Cozzens and I repeated this statement several times last evening at an issei meeting where we faced a critical audience. We were repeatedly asked what penalty would be imposed for failure to comply with this compulsory ruling and dodged this question by stating that the penalties had not yet been announced. Now our position is further weakened by the fact that the registration for other than male citizens is not compulsory.

Harvey M. Coverley, Mar. 6, 1943

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Frankly, I do not know how we are going to get out of this predicament without so great a loss of face that we would have no further control over the project. This morning before breakfast Mr. Cozzens and I were discussing desirable penalties to be imposed upon the issei who refused to register, such as suspension from work and pay privileges for periods up to ninety days. Since we have committed ourselves so definitely on this point, I am at a loss to know how we can gracefully retreat without disaster. 2

I am certain that a large proportion of our issei are not going to register. They are stubborn, obstinate and still profoundly distrustful of the War Relocation Authority. They have little faith in our good intentions and are convinced that there is some trick behind the entire registration program. How this feeling was nurtured I cannot say for sure but I believe you have a good idea. I am anxious for you to realize the serious effect on WRA of a failure to stick by our commitment on the compulsory nature of the registration and impose some type of penalty. When I am sure that you realize this effect, I will do my best to carry out loyally any directive you give me. I feel sure Mr. Cozzens concurs in what I have said in this paragraph.

Please let us hear from you as soon as possible as we will be in a most difficult situation as to our relations with the evacuees until a decision is reached.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Harvey M. Coverley
Project Director

CONFIDENTIAL
AIR MAIL

March 10, 1943

Mr. D. S. Myer
Director, War Relocation Authority
Barr Building
17th and Eye Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Myer:

During the past month it was my privilege to visit Manzanar during the beginning of registration, Gila the following weeks, and to spend the next two weeks at Tule Lake. Problems were naturally encountered at Manzanar and at Gila. None appeared to be very serious.

The Tule Lake problem is one which has really baffled everyone. The condition there and the refusal to register, in my opinion, can only be laid to a number of incidents which preceded the registration period. From observation, it is my belief that there are a number of groups of disloyal people within the Center proper. These groups, through the management prior to January 1, had an opportunity to grow and prosper. The Planning Board of Issei, which augmented the Council, placed the full operation of the Project in the hands of the Issei. It was a very clever means used by them to circumvent the type of internal government proposed by WRA.

In the past the evacuees at Tule Lake have won every argument which they had with the administration. When registration came along, the leaders of the subversive group were opposed to it and, therefore, have used every means possible to again drive the administration back and show the administration that the evacuees were running the Center.

Mr. Coverley has done everything within his power to carry on the registration in an orderly manner. One demonstration after the other was put on by the evacuees who opposed it. Action was necessary if any law and order were to be maintained.

My personal observation on the Project was that Mr. Jacobo, who was head of Internal Security, is a grand individual. However, I personally do not believe he is an internal security officer. He is too soft-hearted and, in many cases, yields under pressure. In my opinion, he is not the leader type of individual necessary for that type of position. He has however, worked night and day and practically made himself ill. Yet, in the number of months he has been there, real lists of individuals who were opposed to administrative policies and opposed to the administration in general were not available.

Another problem which seemed to exist at Tule Lake prior to Mr. Coverley's arrival on the Project, from all appearances, is that everyone trusted the evacuees, granted all kinds of freedom, and as nearly as I could see things were handled in a very loose manner.

R. B. Cozzens, Mar. 10, 1943

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I realize that Major Marshall mentioned in one of his communications to Colonel Scobey that he believed there were school teachers on the Project who were conscientious objectors and who were interfering with the recruitment program. Mr. Coverley worked diligently while he was there attempting to run down such rumors and was unable to get any real proof that these objectors had actively participated in obstructing recruitment. Yet at three different times during interviews with Kibei we were told that school teachers or women on the staff stated that they did not have to register and that the Government would not make them register. When we attempted to find out who, the person being interviewed conveniently forgot and could not even recognize the person. I talked with one or two school teachers on the Project, and they told me that there were a number of people on the Project who were very definitely opposed to registration. Yet I was unable to obtain any names. There are, ~~yet~~ however, a number on the Project who are known to be conscientious objectors; and while we were unable to get any real facts, it is my belief that a number of these persons are taking sides with certain evacuees against the administration. Due to the shortage of teachers, I realize that this again is difficult problem and is one which has been handed to Mr. Coverley or one which he inherited. I am positive that he is doing everything possible to iron this out and remove people as fast as he is able to clear information.

I only point these things out as I believe you should realize the serious handicaps and difficulties which Mr. Coverley encountered when he entered Tule Lake.

Very truly yours,

/s/ A. S. Olsen
R. B. Cozzens
Field Assistant Director

Dictated by Mr. Cozzens
but not read by him.

CONFIDENTIAL

February 27, 1943

TELETYPE (307)

Harvey M. Coverley
Tule Lake Relocation Center
Newell, California

Confirming our telephone conversation February 26 and your wire same date, FBI investigation should be completed and I hope they will be able to file charges against a number of those arrested. In the meantime have your plans definitely laid for disciplinary procedure by Project Director to dispose of any or all cases not covered by FBI Justice charges. This may take the form of a sentence not to exceed ninety days for breaking of WRA regulations or you may determine that they should go to isolation center at Moab. Check recent administrative instruction sent you airmail letter this week concerning actions which are essential. These procedures have been signed since they were mailed to you. These actions should be announced in the center so there is no question regarding actions taken and the reasons therefor. You should proceed with the arrest and removal of any individuals who are interfering with the program or who refuse to comply with regulations. Suggest aliens mentioned your wire be processed for internment by Justice Department immediately if feasible. Steps must be taken to complete registration of male citizens by March 10. Please outline for me in wire your proposal for completing registration by March 10 including detailed procedures as to how you would require registration in case of refusal. I will either approve your suggestions or advise you immediately of counter suggestions. Suggest no other ultimatums be issued until cases of those now under arrest have been disposed of and results announced. It is my recommendation that after above steps have been taken that an orderly procedure be laid out block by block or group by group and arrest and removal of those who refuse to comply with orders as has been done with those now in jail. I would make this a small enough group to begin with so that cases can be handled expeditiously. This, I believe, is what you had in mind when we talked on the phone yesterday. I am assuming that questionnaires from draft boards regarding reclassification are simply belated questionnaires in relation to classification in the 4-C category. This is the only explanation that Selective Service has to offer. Have just talked with Mr. Ladd of FBI giving him complete story of problem at Tule and requested that this be clarified with FBI agents working on the problem. Mr. Ladd has assured me that this will be done immediately.

/s/ D. S. Myer

CONFIDENTIAL
AIR MAIL

March 10, 1943

Mr. D. S. Myer
Director, War Relocation Authority
Barr Building
17th and Eye Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Myer:

Sometimes I wonder how you really stand up under the pressure of the numerous ideas which you receive from Project Directors and all of us in the field, together with those from outsiders who know little of the actual problems involved.

Upon my return to the office I found two letters addressed to you from Director Merritt, one dated February 23 and the other dated February 27. In commenting on the letter of February 23, I realize that Mr. Merritt's comments on page 2 are very thoughtful. I further realize that it may be possible for people to be disloyal under pressure in Relocation Centers, and then again be loyal when they are released from such Centers. I have had the personal privilege during the past month to interview in excess of 100 people of Japanese ancestry, including a number of Issei, some Nisei, but the largest portion were Kibei. It is my conclusion that where a spark of loyalty for the United States originally existed that, in practically every case, it still continues; and that where a person has stated that he is disloyal to this country, the use of loyalty in his case prior to evacuation was only as a screen or a shield in order to secure the benefits, may mean to him that even though he is a citizen loyalty never existed. It is my firm belief that the statement made by Mr. Merritt is correct--that many people who have stated they are disloyal would state that they are loyal if they felt it was an opportunity for them to be relocated and to be turned free where they could do as they saw fit. To me, this type of an individual, particularly in the Kibei group, is one of the most dangerous persons we have in this country. I believe that WRA should be very careful to see that no such person is released as many of these people would gladly sacrifice their lives if they thought it was for the benefit of Japan or for the Emperor.

Drafting evacuees for agricultural labor, as referred to on page 3, to me, would be setting up another discriminatory act against evacuees and I would consider this to be a mistake. It is my further belief that many who have answered "No" to the loyalty question, if drafted, would take the oath without hesitation as they would be under more pressure at that particular time than they have been in the Center. I do not believe we should again open the question of loyalty or disloyalty. It appears to me that, with the exception of very rare cases, everyone has been given a month in which to think and that while some choices may not have been made wisely they were made

according to teachings which these young people had received and which could not be broken down for at least probably a generation. We know of aliens who have instructed their sons how to register, and I have personally overheard other aliens tell their sons that if they did not comply with the laws of the United States that they, their fathers, would disown them. The latter type of individual is the one who deserves protection. The allegiance of the other is certainly not with this country and never was.

In commenting briefly on Mr. Merritt's letter of February 27, I am still of the opinion that if those who were definitely loyal will continue to be loyal, even though they were deprived of certain rights during the past year. Mr. Merritt points out on page 2 of his letter the problem of the Terminal Island group and in the almost complete negative answer to the loyalty question. In my opinion, this problem was not brought about by their loss of property and their being removed from Terminal Island in 24 hours. A large portion of the people from Terminal Island were sent to detention camps, which proves that a large portion were aliens and loyal to Japan. Therefore, the teachings of the younger generation were those of their fathers. ~~Therefore, the~~ The question seems to be whether we should attempt to set up a community in which we can change the thinking of the individuals, such as those from Terminal Island, or whether those who are of age and who have been indoctrinated through their entire lives with the teachings that are practically wholly Japanese should have the advantage of citizenship in this country or be returned, according to their choice, to Japan. After numerous interviews, I am convinced that the older persons would rather die for Japan than be loyal to the United States.

I believe that in Mr. Bennett's report of February 27, on page 2, item 2 head "ProJapanese Sentiment," most of the Kibei group or those who have lived under the same type of influence are willing without any hesitation to state that they are disloyal to this country. I realize that the registration has placed before you a serious problem and that the word "segregation" has been loosely used without giving serious thought as to how such a problem could be coped with. In many of the Centers it is my belief that you will find that registration has brought about a type of segregation within the Center that is going to cause a great deal more difficulty for Project Directors than existed prior to the registration period. The disloyal Kibei are fairly well marked and rather easily located through registration records. The older Issei bachelors are still a factor in disrupting project activities; and while the repatriates have not in the past caused any trouble openly, it is my firm belief that they have been well organized and have worked behind the scenes and used every method possible to hinder a large portion of the WRA

Segregation, R. B. Cozzens

-3-

program. Such a physical separation of all groups mentioned would be practically impossible as many families would naturally be involved. On the other hand, you may find it feasible to make some shifts as soon as figures are available in one of the divided Centers and use one of the 5,000 units for disloyal Kibei, old bachelors, and other disloyal persons. This would be the most simple procedure on segregation that I can think of if we were forced to do it and would certainly eliminate a large portion of the disagreeable element from Center operation.

I hope some of my comments may be of value to you.

Very truly yours,

/s/ R. B. Cozzens

R. B. Cozzens
Field Assistant Director

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WASHINGTON

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March 31, 1943

AIRMAIL

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Harvey M. Coverley
Project Director
Tule Lake Relocation Center
Newell, California

Dear Mr. Coverley:

From fairly reliable sources we are currently receiving disturbing reports about the activities at Tule Lake of pacifists and conscientious objectors employed by WRA. Most such reports indicate active interference with the recent registration and army recruitment and indicate that the activities are a matter of common knowledge to other members of the appointed staff and to the evacuees. The reports vary as to the persons concerned, numbers ranging from two to a dozen, but yesterday the following individuals were named as engaged in this unacceptable activity:

Raymond Cheek - 4e
Bess Kirven
Maryette Lum
Jean McKay
Dorothy Phillips
Edgar Ritter - 4e
Harriett Yarrow
Arthur Ramey
Lillie Roudabush

Elizabeth Janes
Goldie Nicholson
Garnet Van Buskirk
Emily Light
Pearl Watson
Charles Palmerlee - 4e
Portia Billings
Nellie Carter

Three of the individuals are classified as 4-e under Selective Service, and two of the women mentioned (Miss Nicholson and Miss Light) are described as dangerous to administration and as leaders in the anti-war propaganda organizations which is reported as active at Tule Lake. Why the Tule Lake schools are so disproportionately staffed with pacifists of such belligerent type is not understood here, but if such is the case early corrective measures must be taken. Provinse and Dr. Ade had expected to discuss the matter with Supt. Harkness at the Denver meeting next week, but earlier action seems desirable.

Please discuss the matter immediately with Supt. Harkness and recommend what should be done. Since most of the appointees concerned have been on WRA rolls less than a year, no formal charges need precede their dismissal. Records should be developed, however, and specific reasons for dismissal should be assigned, if resignations are not secured. Since the action of dismissal will be a disciplinary one, it should probably come from this office, and, if, after full investigation, you think dismissal is proper, please submit the record with your recommendation to me and I will issue the necessary termination.

The people concerned are probably well-meaning and sincere, though it would not be surprising to find on closer analysis a heavy trace of frustration and martyrdom. In any event, their presence on the project in such numbers and with such zeal for their beliefs is extremely undesirable at the present time.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) D. S. Myer
Director

JHProvinse HP

cc: E. B. McMenamin
Philip M. Glick
Lester K. Ade

April 3, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

FROM: B. R. Stauber, Relocation Planning Officer

SUBJECT: Registration Statistics

As all of us in WRA are keenly aware, the recent Selective Service Registration has developed a number of new issues, and has brought more sharply to the fore many problems with which we have heretofore been wrestling, particularly those connected with the determination of loyalty.

I have, as you will recall, prepared instructions which you sent to the projects in a teletype of February 27 and March 3, for the patial analysis of the answers to Questions 27 and 28, including a comparison of certain background characteristics of persons who answered "Yes" to the loyalty question, in contrast to those who answered "No". This analysis was necessarily rather simple and included only factors which were considered a priori to be of outstanding importance.

As I have indicated to you from time to time, the pattern of characteristics of persons answering "Yes" compared to those answering "No" has fallen into fairly well defined lines. For example, among the "No's", the proportion of persons having relatives in Japan, those registered with the Japanese Consul and not removing their names, those who have requested repatriation, and those who have traveled three years and studied two years in Japan since 1934, is much higher, generally speaking, among persons answering "No" to Question 28 than among those answering "Yes."

I discussed this analysis with Major Lansdale of the War Department a few days ago. He expressed keen interest and welcomed it as affording the first substantive confirmation of some of the factors heretofore deemed important respecting the loyalty to the United States of persons of Japanese ancestry.

During the past week, as you know, I have sat with Elmer Rowalt's committee which is developing plans and procedures for Plan C, and is collaborating on the matter of criteria for determining which evacuees shall be considered for Groups I, II, and III.

It is inevitable, as we proceed with any classification of this character, that we shall want more and more to know how significant may be the various criteria that we use. Already it is clear not only that different individuals attach different weights to different criteria, but that they interpret the significance of the criteria in different ways.

So far, our judgments have been largely on a priori or empirical basis. The initial analysis carried out on the basis of your teletypes of February 27 and March 3 is providing highly useful evidence as far as it goes, but it is my belief that the WRA will be at a very definite disadvantage before long unless we can very soon have the benefit of a far more comprehensive analysis of the information pertaining to individual evacuees than is provided by our investigations so far.

MEMO from Stauber to Director

It is my recommendation that we undertake at once a comprehensive analysis of an adequate sample of the "804-A's" and of the "126 revised" forms, supported by the from 26's, and perhaps additional information. This should be done by use of punch cards, coding and punching answers on the schedules in such a manner that significant differences in virtually all questions can be analyzed, and the various inter-relationships of all factors thrown into bold relief.

I would believe that a sample of between 5,000 and 10,000, chosen so as to represent all centers, and suitably controlled as to other significant characteristics, should be adequate.

I recommend that such an analysis be started immediately and pressed forward to early completion.

B R Stauber

P.S. Attached is a very interesting table based upon a special tally of the Manzanar 304-A schedules. Note for example the increasing percentage of "No" answers with increased length of stay in Japan, and with increased schooling.

BRS

OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

War Relocation Authority
226 West Jackson Boulevard
Chicago, Illinois

April 14, 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Elmer Rowalt
Acting Director
War Relocation Authority
Barr Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Rowalt:

I am sending you herewith, for Mr. Myer's attention, a letter which I have received from Mr. J. E. Otis, Jr., President, Dodge Manufacturing Corporation, Mishawaka, Indiana.

I met Mr. Otis one evening at a conference held with some of the leading citizens of Mishawaka and South Bend and he is most interested in our program. He has been very helpful.

He has made a very decided point and I think the resolution of the War Manpower Commission should be given very careful consideration by Mr. Myer. We are running into the same situation every day. Until this matter of the draft is cleared up by the Army, it will continue to haunt us.

I felt Mr. Myer himself would want to see this letter and am therefore sending it to you as confidential.

Sincerely yours,

/Signed/ Elmer L. Shirrell
Elmer L. Shirrell
Relocation Supervisor

Encls.

DODGE MANUFACTURING CORPORATION
Mishawaka, Indiana

April 13, 1943

Mr. Elmer L. Shirrell
War Relocation Authority
226 West Jackson Blvd.
Chicago, Illinois

Dear Mr. Shirrell:

Since my last discussion with you and since your representative was in this territory, I have had a good many discussions regarding the Japanese-American situation and I find there is very little antagonism anywhere regarding the rights which American-born Japanese should be entitled to. However, there is a very distinct objection to having them come into a community of this kind not subject to the draft.

At the last meeting of the War Manpower Commission held on Friday of last week a resolution was passed in which they said in short that they would not be willing to accept young Japanese-Americans in this community unless they were subject to the draft as all other boys in this community are.

This is for your confidential information. No publicity has been given to the subject and there probably won't be.

Yours very truly,

/Signed/ J. E. Otis, Jr.
President

JE Otis, jr.
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WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Tule Lake Project
Newell, California

April 21, 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Dillon S. Myer
Director
War Relocation Authority
Barr Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Myer:

In further reply to your confidential airmail letter of March 31 regarding the alleged activities of conscientious objectors on our appointed staff, I am pleased to submit a final report. All the persons listed in your letter have been interviewed either by a representative of the Internal Security Division or by myself. In addition, the activities of these persons have been checked and investigated independently by the Internal Security Division. With the exceptions of Miss Goldie Nicholson and Miss Nellie Carter, all of the persons listed were conscientious objectors or have pacifist leanings. Neither Miss Nicholson nor Miss Carter consider themselves as conscientious objectors or pacifists and there is nothing in their past records to contradict this. No evidence could be obtained either direct or collateral which would support the seriousness of the charges made in your letter. In other words, we have nothing on which to base any disciplinary action.

Since you pointed out in your letter that Miss Goldie Nicholson and Miss Emily Light were particularly dangerous to the administration and were leaders in an alleged "anti-war propaganda organization", I interviewed them personally. In the case of Miss Nicholson, as indicated above, she is not a pacifist or a conscientious objector. She formerly worked with Baptist Church groups, including Japanese-Americans, in the city of Sacramento, California and has been active here in church work. From all the information we can obtain, she urged her nisei friends to register. Otherwise she promoted the registration program. She has encouraged the young men to volunteer for the Army and has given one or two entertainments

in the nature of farwell parties for the volunteers who will soon be leaving. There is nothing to support the charges made against her.

In the case of Miss Light, the evidence is somewhat less favorable. On the first day of registration she was detailed to a post in Block 27. During that day the block manager apparently told her that the issei would be slow to register due to the wording of Question 28 on Form 126, revised (the substitute question had not yet been received). She apparently replied, "I don't blame them for waiting." Later on in telling of this incident to one of her colleague's she made a remark which could easily be interpreted to mean that she had instructed the Block 27 residents not to register. A check up in that block, however, seems to indicate quite clearly that she did not give such advice. After the substitute question was received she felt there was no further reason for anyone refusing to register and there is no evidence of any further activity which might be considered obstructive. At no time have we reason to believe that she made any remarks applicable to the registration of citizens.

At the time registration began, Miss Light asked a number of questions regarding why the registration was necessary. Later on she asked Sergeant Vincent Sullivan, one of the members of the military team, a number of additional questions about registration for her information. These questions were interpreted by some to mean that she was opposed to registration. It seems clear that she was very much opposed to the idea of an all Japanese combat team but as far as that goes, so were many others including Major Marshall and myself. There is no evidence that she ever told anyone not to register or that she ever agitated against registration. Miss Light claims to be a conscientious objector but I personally doubt if she could prove it. She is a Congregationalist, a denomination which has no strong stand on peace. She has never belonged to a pacifist organization and has never participated in a pacifist propaganda drive.

Mr. Charles Parmerlee, who entered on duty one day before registration began, also raised a question regarding the propriety of requiring issei to sign the original Question 28. He offered no further criticism after the substitute question was provided.

The strongest evidence, however, in favor of the persons named by you, is that the groups with which they were most closely identified were those which had the highest percentage of registration of any on the project. In other words, the people

with whom they were working are those who had the best registration record. The groups with which they had the least contact were those which had the poorest records, namely Buddhist and kibel groups.

For your information, I am enclosing copies of two interviews between persons accused and a member of our Internal Security staff. These are samples to show you what type of questions were asked.

I wish to lodge a strong protest against the activities of Mr. Hoffman when he recently visited this center. You have advised me that he is the person who submitted the list of names contained in your letter. He is also presumed to have reported that the list was given to him by Mr. Floyd Wilder, former principal of our high school. For your information, there is enclosed a copy of a confidential memorandum addressed to our Assistant Project Director by Mr. Wilder, in which he points out that Mr. Hoffman solicited the list and represented himself as a member of the Washington staff, delegated to obtain such information and hinted that he was serving in a secret service capacity. Mr. Hoffman did not mention this to me and I strongly resnet his snooping around the project in this maner. In the future I suggest that if it is necessary to send anyone here to inspect our Fire Control service, that you delegate someone other than Mr. Hoffman. I regret that I canot make him welcome here again.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Harvey M. Coverley
Harvey M. Coverley

Enclosures #33779

CONFIDENTIAL

May 7, 1943

Memorandum

To: Mr. Glick

From: E. Barker

Mr. Myer suggests substitution of the following sentence for the one crossed out on the second page:

"We will be glad to call to the attention of the Federal Bureau of Investigation those cases involving violations of Federal law which are to be referred to the United States Attorney for prosecution, or any other cases you may indicate would be of interest to your Bureau."

As far as Mr. Myer is concerned, the letter will be ready to go then. However, I think the last sentence needs to be revised accordingly.

April 2, 1943

Mr. Dillon S. Myer
Director
War Relocation Authority
Barr Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Myer:

As you predicted, I was very much interested in your correspondence with Mr. John Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as transmitted with your letter of March 24. This is the first occasion we have had to learn of the FBI's analysis of the events which have transpired during the past two months in the center.

A number of the statements made by Mr. Hoover help us to understand, at this late date, the reasons from some of the actions taken by the FBI. In certain respects, however, I am compelled to differ with Mr. Hoover, much as I regret to do so. In the second paragraph on Page 1, Mr. Hoover says "I understand a representative of this bureau is alleged to have informed the WRA representatives at Alturas, California and Klamath Falls, Oregon that they had no authority to hold the Japanese who were removed". No such allegation has been made by me. If you will refer to my telegram of February 24, you will note that I stated the "FBI informed the District Attorney of Modoc County they doubted whether the sheriff had any right to hold the evacuees incarcerated there by me on Sunday". In other words, we did not state that the WRA representatives at the points in question had been contacted by the FBI, nor did we make statements regarding Klamath Falls, Oregon in this connection.

We were advised by the District Attorney of Modoc County,

Mr. Dillon S. Myer
Page 2.

Mr. Charles Lederer, that he had been informed by the FBI in the manner reported to you. Following receipt of your letter of March 24, I talked to him again over the telephone. He states the facts are as follows:

On Tuesday, February 23, he called Mr. Nap Pieper, Agent in Charge of the FBI office in San Francisco, asking him whether or not the FBI proposed to prosecute the prisoners we had lodged in the Modoc County Jail on February 21, or whether he was to prosecute them locally. Mr. Pieper advised that he would inquire into the matter and communicate with him further. On the following day, an FBI agent at Sacramento, California telephoned to Mr. Lederer and stated that he had been requested by Mr. Pieper to inform him that the prisoners were not being held at the request of the FBI and that he questioned whether they were properly held upon the request of any government agency, and that it was assumed they were being detained on the responsibility of Modoc County. This was the first time we were aware Mr. Lederer had first communicated with the FBI. He tells me he was under the bonafide mistaken assumption that the FBI was somehow involved. He also assures me that the information given him by the FBI agent at Sacramento was of such nature as to alarm him and make him believe that he was holding the prisoners without any right to do so. He also gained the impression from this conversation that the FBI felt WRA did not have authority to commit these prisoners.

In the same paragraph of Mr. Hoover's letter he says "This Bureau was originally informed of the situation being encountered in Camp Newell, in connection with the registration of Japanese for military service, on February 17, 1943". Our records reveal this is not quite true. I first reported that we were encountering difficulty in connection with the registration on Monday, February 15, via long distance telephone to Mr. McConnell of the FBI office in San Francisco. This report was made to Mr. McConnell because I was advised that he was in charge of all FBI activities in Northern California. After advising Mr. McConnell of the kind of resistance and the interference we were encountering, he told me he would see what could be done and would phone me back. In the course of his conversation, however, he more or less led me to believe he did not consider the matter very serious and wasn't sure that there was anything they could do, unless we would ascertain specifically what acts were being performed, who was doing them and gather all necessary evidence in connection therewith. I told him that if we were in position to do these things, we would not need the FBI. Later the same evening (around 7 or 8 o'clock, I would estimate) I received a call from Mr. Hart, the FBI agent stationed at Red Bluff, California, who stated he had been informed by Mr. McConnell of my call and wondered if I could give him a little more specific information about what was happening, in order that he might ascertain the best way that he could serve us. I gave him all the information we had available about the kind of hidden and subversive opposition arrayed against us. His conversation

Mr. Dillon S. Myer
Page 3.

then conveyed to me the attitude that it did not seem very serious and that he thought we were over-emphasizing its importance. He also inferred that he had previously visited the Project once or twice on what he felt were "wild goose chases" and hardly considered it would be worthwhile for him to come here on a similar mission. I then made it quite plain, in my exasperation, that I felt we were not getting very good cooperation from his agency. He thereupon advised me that if we would get all the details about specific acts being committed, with the names of the persons connected, he would be very glad to come up and conduct an investigation. I therefore told him, as I had told Mr. McConnell, that if we were in possession of this information, we would not need any help. On the following morning, I received another telephone call from Mr. McConnell, who again asked me just what was happening and what kinds of acts were being committed, which we wished investigated. In the meantime, I had analyzed somewhat more carefully the experiences through which we were passing and was able to state more concisely just what it was we wanted. Mr. McConnell then told me he would get in touch with appropriate officials and see what could be done. This conversation was much more agreeable and indicated a more cooperative attitude. There were one or two other telephone conversations with FBI representatives between Tuesday and Friday.

On Friday evening, February 19, I reported to the San Francisco office, over the telephone, the fact that 34 residents of Block 42 had come to the Administrative Building that afternoon and presented us with a written statement advising that they refused to register. I was told by the FBI office that the matter was being considered in Washington and there was nothing they could do for the time being. I then complained, as I had before, that the FBI in Phoenix had assisted the Gila River Project immediately, and without any delay, upon request. I also advised that the FBI offices in Los Angeles, Salt Lake City and other places had given similar assistance to Manzanar, Central Utah and other relocation centers. San Francisco then advised me that it made no difference how other offices acted, they were proceeding in accordance with instructions and would take no action until their Washington office had issued orders.

At this point, may I call attention to the first paragraph on Page 3 of Mr. Hoover's letter, in which he stated that special agents were conducting investigations into this matter on February 20 and 21, 1943. As you know, we did not make the arrests in Block 42 until 5:00 P.M. on the afternoon of February 21. Prior to that time we had only made one arrest, that of Mr. Junichi Nimura on Tuesday, February 16. So far as I know, no FBI men were making any investigations on the dates mentioned.

On the evening of Tuesday, February 23, I received a telephone call from Mr. Gleysteen and Mr. Jacoby, (no relation to our Internal Security Chief) who advised they were FBI agents who had just arrived at Klamath Falls, Oregon to assist us with our investigation. I made an appointment with them for 8:30 the following morning in my office. They arrived therefore, on Wednesday, February 24. So far as I am aware, between my first telephone call on February 15 and February 24, these were the first agents to visit the project.

With reference to the third paragraph of Mr. Hoover's letter, may I state that I, like you, was under the impression at the time the arrests were made on February 21, that a violation of the regulations of the Selective Service Act was involved. Furthermore, I wasn't aware that all violations of this act, were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the FBI. Your letter to Mr. Hoover indicates that you thought similarly.

When the two agents, above mentioned, arrived here on the morning of February 24, they asked us why we had proceeded to make arrests on suspicion of violation of Selective Service regulations when such matters were under their jurisdiction. They also questioned why the project attorney had proceeded to interview the prisoners after their arrest. It may be stated therefore, they did not question my general authority to arrest evacuees and remove them from the project, but in effect, they did question my authority to arrest these particular evacuees. In this respect, therefore, I would say that Mr. Hoover is in error. I explained to the agents that such a statement came from them with poor grace, in view of the fact that we had been trying for approximately ten days to obtain their assistance and then when it became absolutely necessary for us to proceed without them, they criticized us for taking action. Nevertheless, I did request Mr. O'Brien to discontinue his investigation, in view of the fact that the FBI claimed exclusive jurisdiction. Subsequently, as Mr. Hoover states, it was determined there was no violation of the Selective Service Act involved. Nevertheless, after this fact became known, the FBI men continued their investigation. They departed from the project on the evening of March 1, advising us they would let us know as soon as possible whether or not they intended to prosecute. We did not receive any further communication from them. After waiting for more than a week, Mr. O'Brien made a trip to San Francisco and telephoned to Mr. Gleysteen at the FBI office on March 9, in order to get an answer. Mr. Gleysteen told him the FBI had not reached a final decision but if he were in O'Brien's shoes, he would proceed on the assumption the FBI was not interested in the matter. He also hinted to Mr. O'Brien that it would be useless for him to take the problem up with the United States Attorney.

Mr. Dillon S. Myer
Page 5.

In all respects concerning the visit of the FBI, we cooperated with them in every possible way. We made available special quarters outside our Administrative office where they could interview privately, persons whom they wished to investigate. We placed a driver and a car at their disposal for bringing persons to be questioned. When necessary, our Internal Security officers were available to assist them. Upon their departure, both Mr. Gleysteen and Mr. Jacoby expressed full satisfaction with all aspects of their stay here.

With reference to the last paragraph of Mr. Hoover's letter, may I state that we are most desirous of establishing a relationship with the FBI which will result in us obtaining their assistance promptly when it is needed. We realize their investigative facilities and resources are incomparably better than our own. We would be most happy to make full use of them. It is not only discouraging, but somewhat humiliating, however, to beseech them for help over a period of time and then to be criticized later for having taken such action as we thought necessary and proper.

Please let me make it clear too that we are perfectly willing to furnish the FBI with all the information we have available as to why we need their services in any particular instance. We do consider it embarrassing on the other hand, to have our requests treated as though they were less serious than we consider them, with the inference that we had become unduly excited about a trivial matter. In this connection, it may be significant to point out that we did not obtain any assistance from the FBI until after considerable newspaper publicity had been given to all our troubles, making it obvious to them that the situation was, if anything, more serious than we had described it.

Sincerely yours,

Harvey M. Coverley
Project Director

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
Washington

May 19, 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Dillon S. Myer,
Director,
War Relocation Authority
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Myer:

Attached is copy of a letter I have sent to the head of our Hollywood office today. You will note that I omitted references to Naval Intelligence and the FBI. This is because in the case of ONI we were asked on an earlier occasion not to spread word of its use of nisei.

Best regards,

(Signed) Lowell Mellett
Lowell Mellett,
Chief,
Bureau of Motion Pictures

Encl.

May 19, 1943.

Mr. Nelson Poynter
Bureau of Motion Pictures,
Office of War Information,
Hollywood, California

Dear Nels:

I have a memorandum from Dillon S. Myer, Director,
War Relocation Authority, in which he says:

"We propose that positive suggestions be made to the motion picture industry concerning the representation of Americans of Japanese ancestry, commonly known as nisei, in feature movies. It is our thought that the following ideas be presented in appropriate form by your representatives who have contact with motion picture producers, writers, and directors:

- "a. That it be made evident that agents and officials of the Japanese government do not trust the nisei.
- "b. That nisei be represented as aiding authorities of the United States government in apprehending enemy agents.
- "c. That there are approximately 7,000 Americans of Japanese ancestry in the United States Army at the present time.
- "d. That Americans of Japanese ancestry are incensed by atrocities of the Japanese government and army. As an example, soldiers of Japanese ancestry at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, bought over \$100,000 worth of war bonds in two days immediately following the announcement that the Japanese government had executed American fliers captured after the bombing of Tokyo."

I think it would be well for you to have everybody on the staff absorb this information and be prepared to present it to any studio engaged in making or contemplating any picture dealing with Japanese in America, either primarily or incidentally.

Best regards,

cc: Mr. Dillon S. Myer

Lowell Mellett, Chief
Bureau of Motion Pictures

CONFIDENTIAL

June 8, 1943

C1.02

The Honorable
The Secretary of War
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I wish to thank you for the support which the War Department has given the program of the War Relocation Authority generally. I value the advice and assistance I have received from Assistant Secretary McCloy and other members of your staff. Without the assistance of the War Department our task would be immensely more difficult, if not impossible, to perform. More and More I come to realize that the work of the War Relocation Authority, not merely as it touches the restricted military areas, but in many of its larger aspects, necessarily must lean heavily upon the War Department for assistance and guidance if it is to be successful.

For these reasons, particularly, I am disturbed to learn from your letter of May 10 the view held by the War Department on the related questions of evacuee morale, segregation of evacuees, and the treatment of evacuees believed to be disloyal. I have known for some time that the Western Defense Command held a point of view on these questions somewhat at variance with ours, but I had not realized until I read your letter and was informed of Mr. McCloy's recommendations to the Senate Military Affairs Committee that the point of view of the Western Defense Command on these questions appears to be settled War Department opinion.

To say that "the Wra Relocation Authority should take immediate steps to screen out from the centers and segregate in close confinement all individuals appearing to have pro-Japanese sympathies" in my judgement is to state the problem in over-simplified terms. To say that "it has been and remains the opinion of the War Department already frequently expressed to you that much trouble could have been avoided if these troublemakers had been removed from the relocation centers and placed in rigorous confinement" implies that the War Department has presented to this Authority a consistent approach to the problem of segregation, and that the War Relocation Authority has consistently ignored or opposed such suggestions.

I feel it is only fair to point out that if segregation could have been accomplished by the War Relocation Authority during 1942 and the early part of this year as easily as your letter implies, it could also have been accomplished by the War Department during the evacuation period. Substantially all the information about individual evacuees actually available to the War Relocation Authority prior to registration was available to the Army at the time of evacuation and later. If mass segregation on a fair and individual basis is so simple that the War Relocation Authority is to be criticized for not accomplishing it, it is difficult to see why a wholesale evacuation of all persons of Japanese descent was ever necessary. If the dangerous and potentially dangerous individuals may be so readily determined as your letter implies, it should have been possible to evacuate only the dangerous from the Pacific Coast area.

D. S. Myer, June 8, 1943

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If military considerations other than the danger from disloyal individuals, such as danger of civil disorder, for example, prompted wholesale evacuation, then I suggest the Army had a second opportunity to effectuate segregation, that is, during the assembly center period when plans for removal to relocation centers were in preparation.

The earliest segregation proposals presented to the War Relocation Authority advocated removing certain broad classes from the evacuee population. The first specific suggestion was made by Lt. Commander K. D. Ringle, a Naval Intelligence officer who served for several weeks with the War Relocation Authority in the early summer of 1942. He suggested segregating Kibei who had resided for a certain number of years in Japan. Their parents and children would also, under Commander Ringle's suggested plan, be segregated. On August 23, 1942, we received the first formal suggestion from the War Department when General DeWitt made a similar recommendation. On September 9, 1942, he proposed that not only the Kibei but also the Issei be segregated and that repatriation be asked for both groups.

The War Relocation Authority, after full consideration, rejected the idea of segregating entire categories of the population. We felt, and still feel, that while we should probably look with particular care at the individuals who fall into certain specific categories, the arbitrary removal of an entire class would be unjust, unwise, and seriously damaging to evacuee morale. The evacuation process itself was such a categorical segregation involving, as has been acknowledged, many injustices to individuals. The evacuation was justified by military urgency, but military necessity could not justify segregation on a categorical basis as proposed to the Authority. The disloyal of the group were now in safe custody under military guard.

Moreover, there were practical considerations. Removal of the Issei en masse would have disrupted the majority of the families. There are in the centers some 40,000 American citizens under 20 years of age, most of whom are sons and daughters of aliens. At the time of evacuation General DeWitt had repeatedly reassured the evacuees that family composition would not be disturbed; in fact, the Western Defense Command put itself to great trouble to unite families during and immediately following evacuation to assembly centers. Removal of the Kibei, likewise, would have penalized many loyal citizens. In this connection it is relevant that a large proportion of the evacuees recruited for the special Army school at Camp Savage, Minnesota, and for the Navy language school at the University of Colorado are Kibei.

On October 5 General DeWitt presented to the Chief of Staff another recommendation, proposing both segregation and the retention of all evacuees in the centers for the purpose of a study to develop data for psychological warfare. This would have meant holding all evacuees in centers. Other recommendations were presented on October 9 and October 30. On December 30,

D. S. Myer, June 8, 1943

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in response to my personal request to Assistant Secretary McCloy, the War Department outlined the following comprehensive plan for segregation:

- "(a) All evacuees who did indicate their desire to accept repatriation or were loyal to Japan.
- "(b) All parolees from detention and internment camps now living in relocation centers.
- "(c) All evacuees having an evaluated internal security police record during assembly or relocation center residence.
- "(d) All evacuees who are listed and evaluated by the intelligence service as potentially dangerous and who are not included in the above mentioned categories.
- "(e) Members of the immediate families of listed segregatees and groups (b) and (c) above where the segregatee is listed as a family head."

In items (c) and (d) of this proposal, the idea of "screening out" individuals, in addition to segregating entire categories, was proposed for the first time.

The War Relocation Authority believes that a plan of segregation based upon the examination of individuals through the customary processes utilized by intelligence agencies, or by hearings or other more or less formal process, represents a sound approach to the problem. Segregation is not, however, a simple procedure. It requires a great deal of background study and work among the population to be dealt with. It requires the building up of police and intelligence records and analysis such as has been proceeding since the registration program was carried out on the centers in February 1943.

Until the registration was effectuated the War Relocation Authority had no adequate basis for conducting a large scale segregation program based upon the examination of individual cases. The Japanese-American population was turned over to the War Relocation Authority progressively from May to November, 1942. No basic records were supplied the Authority by the Army. We were denied the privilege of securing questionnaires from evacuees while they remained in assembly centers. We had no access to the intelligence records of the period prior to evacuation. We had no information about the individuals in our custody except that which was developed during the course of managing the centers. Since we did not have half the population until August 25, 1942 and did not secure all of the remainder until November 1, 1942, we naturally were compelled to move slowly in approaching the problem of screening out the agitators. As a practical matter, we had to wait until the individuals made trouble on the centers. We had to locate them. It was essential that we make certain we had the right people before we moved, and then we did remove them from the centers.

~~In light of those facts I think the Authority can be accused of nothing more than exercising r~~

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In light of those facts I think the Authority can be accused of nothing more than exercising reasonable caution in dealing with this problem. In December, 1942, following the incident at Manzanar, we established an isolation center for the purpose of segregating troublemakers. We also developed procedures in collaboration with the Justice Department for sending trouble-making aliens to internment camps operated by that Department. Under the procedures thus developed and through the collaboration of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, about 100 aliens and 55 citizens have been removed from the centers and placed in detention camps or the isolation center.

Now, on the basis of the information developed during registration, I feel that for the first time the War Relocation Authority has a reasonably adequate background of information on which to proceed with the process of screening out disloyal or potentially disloyal individuals.

While segregation of evacuees might have been accomplished during the process of evacuation and movement from assembly centers to relocation centers without adding materially to the frustration and insecurity the evacuees were obliged to experience, once they were settled in relocation centers it became evident that the only positive form of segregation is that involved in relocation of loyal individuals outside the centers. It is unfortunate that the outside relocation program has never been widely regarded as a process of segregation, as, of course, it is. In fact, if one looks primarily at the welfare of the Japanese-American population, it is the only process of wholesale segregation which has very much to recommend it.

At this point I should like to consider briefly the general subject of evacuee morale in relocation centers. Again, I regret to say, your comments regarding the situation appear to me to be an over-simplification of the problem. I do not minimize the influence of what you have called the "pro-Japanese minority group" in the centers. When this group has acted in such a way as to provide a basis for removal of individuals to the isolation center, or has justified other such action, we have taken it. But the fact is that many of the ostensibly pro-Japanese, the repatriates, for example, have generally not been a source of trouble in the centers, either by overt act or by agitation among the rest of the community. Agitation by the disloyal element plays a part in the problem but by no means the leading role. We would be making a serious mistake to assume that by taking out the disloyal we will solve the problem of morale among the remainder.

So far as we have been able to determine, morale in the centers generally develops through a series of stages and fluctuates. First, there is the period of initiating work, receiving evacuees, and getting the centers organized. Generally, this period has been characterized by a high degree of cooperation and hopefulness on the part of the evacuees. This period has ordinarily been followed by a period of increasing dissatisfaction and bitterness as the people settled down in their new location and began to contemplate

their situation. In three or four centers the second period culminated in some kind of incident, but this was by no means universally the case. Generally, in the centers which started later, we were able, on the basis of the experience gained in the centers which started earlier, to anticipate such incidents. The cycle of development, however, was substantially the same in all centers. To be entirely objective, one must say that morale now and at all times in the past has varied from center to center, depending upon local conditions, in part the ability of the project management and in part on accidents of time and local circumstances. Speaking generally, however, morale in the centers is at the moment better than it has been at any time since the centers were established. This may in part be due to recovery of balance following the emotional strain of the registration. B

Because of the importance you have attached to the activities of the disloyal element, I should like to return to that subject. I think it is elementary that the influence of agitators in any group of people depends more upon the receptivity of the group than upon the skill and energy of the agitators. The disloyal group, in my judgment, would have relatively little influence upon the majority of Japanese-American population if they were not already badly demoralized as a result of the treatment they have received. We have definite evidence, for example, that the disloyal people have taunted the loyal and cooperative citizens about their citizenship and about how little it actually means when they can be forcibly removed from their homes and confined in what in physical respects are concentration camps, and in most cases forced to sacrifice property and chance to earn a livelihood. Now, segregation may remove the subversive ones who do the taunting, but it cannot remove that realization from the loyal population. The real cause of bad evacuee morale is evacuation and all the losses, insecurity, and frustration it entailed, plus the continual "drum drum" of certain harbingers of hate and fear whose expressions appear in the public press or are broadcast over the radio. A segregation program which imposes additional restrictions on the disloyal, without removing the restrictions and reestablishing the rights of the loyal, will not accomplish very much in improvement of morale.

In saying this I do not wish to convey the impression we are unwilling to pursue a program of segregation based upon an appraisal of individual cases. We are willing to do so and are undertaking the necessary planning to launch such an undertaking, but I should not like anyone to overestimate the benefits to the evacuee population which will result from segregation. I agree that, in view of the importance which has been attached to segregation by the War Department and by other agencies and individuals who are guided by the War Department position in this matter, public acceptance of the loyal evacuees will no doubt be facilitated by a program of segregation. For this reason primarily we believe it will be worth the effort and demoralization it will entail.

I think I should point out in this connection that the WRA has never had the surplus center facilities with which to establish a segregation center of any size. Our desire to put relocation ahead of segregation rather than the other way around, as proposed by General DeWitt, arose in part from the desire to vacate living space so that segregation could be accomplished without moving all or nearly all the loyal evacuees in order to make room for the disloyal. In August, 1942, for example, we surveyed the country to find a center for repatriation. We found no facilities available and were given

D. S. Myer, June 8, 1943

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no hope that priorities to construct new facilities could be secured.

of Now that relocation has reduced the population of the centers from a maximum of 107,000 to somewhat less than 100,000, with other evacuees leaving regularly on both seasonal and indefinite leave, we can look forward to making shifts which will release one or more centers for segregation purposes. The process will be a disrupting one, nevertheless. It will be virtually impossible, for example to effect wholesale segregation and at the same time meet the agricultural production quotas of the centers this year. Since our budget for food purchase contemplates \$5,000,000 worth/food production, it is vital to the administration of the centers that the agricultural program be interfered with as little as possible. Similarly, our efforts to secure a maximum utilization of evacuees in seasonal agricultural labor outside the centers will undoubtedly be delayed, as will the indefinite leave program, and the school program, by the process of segregation. And finally, the constitutional problems inherent in the confinement of American citizens will be sharpened and brought more definitely into question when citizens are confined without leave privileges in segregation centers. I mention these points merely to make clear the fact that segregation has disadvantages. From the point of view purely of the Japanese-American population, the disadvantages appear to outweigh the advantages.

However, if it will help to secure acceptance of the relocation program, we are willing to accept the consequences of segregation in the centers. Our real problem both in maintaining morale in the centers and in securing the relocation of evacuees arises not from the problems which segregation will solve, but from the public attitude often expressed that no Japanese can be trusted, from the point of view which engenders restrictive and discriminatory legislation, which seeks to deprive Japanese-Americans of their citizenship, and to class all of them as enemies no matter what their individual records may be. Perhaps segregation will help us to deal with that point of view more effectively.

We have almost decided to use Tule Lake as the segregation center for a number of reasons -- there are a rather large number of non-registrants and repatriates there now. It has good facilities for subsistence food production, and it lies within the evacuated area where movement in and out of the center requires special permits and escorts which makes it undesirable as a center from which to relocate. Before we make public announcements we would be glad to have your opinion as to the use of this center for this purpose.

Sincerely,

/s/ D. S. Myer
Director

COPY OF ENVELOPE

Post Marked U. S. Navy
June 8, 1943, 10 A. M.

Mr. Dillion S. Myer
War Relocation Director
Washington, D. C.

Stamped on back "Received June 14, 1943, War Relocation Authority"

Mr. Myer

Baker

Public Attitudes

Mr. Myer

In regards to the Japanese question I believe like many a Californian that you are a damned Jew, one of the greasy money loving kikes. If so, money (Jap Money) must be at the bottom of your releasing the yellow vermin. If you are not a Kike then you must be a bribe taking (Jap bribe) son-of-a-bitch. If we Californians ever catch a Jap around here we will pat the yellow bastard in the face with a shovel. It is too bad the average citizen cannot get a crack at a son-of-a-bitch like Mr. Dillon S. Myer. May all your children be half Japs and you die of the Syph. The Wheelers, Myer & Lindbergh's almost wrecked us and now you and your kind in Washington are carrying on the sneaky cause.

CONFIDENTIAL

June 12, 1943

VIA AIR MAIL

Mr. Dillon S. Myer
Director
War Relocation Authority
Barr Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Myer:

Miss Florence Walne, Technical Director of the Navy Japanese Language School at the University of Colorado at Boulder, contacted this office this week and asked for permission to go to Heart Mountain, Minidoka and Central Utah for the purpose of recruiting twelve or fifteen more instructors for the school at Boulder.

She was advised that I contemplated making the same trip between now and the end of June and invited her to go with me.

Mr. Girardo, Miss Walne and I will leave here the 17th and expect to return to Denver the 27th or 28th.

Miss Walne, of course, was somewhat concerned over the continued publicity regarding the relocation centers and the Japanese people in general. She advised that she found it quite hard to maintain good morale among her instructors on the one hand, and that public sentiment at Boulder seemed to rise and fall in accordance with the amount of publicity which the Japanese people in the relocation centers received in The Denver Post. Right now, of course, they are getting a rather large amount, due to the hearings of the Dies Committee in Los Angeles.

Miss Walne made one interesting observation while she was here. It seems that at the time of the burst of articles written by Carberry of The Post about Heart Mountain, Robert Stearns, President of the University of Colorado, at Miss Walne's request, and Captain Roberts, of the Navy and the faculty in general, personally contacted the City Editor of The Denver Post (I presume this to be Mr. Martin. Miss Walne was not certain of the name) and advised the City Editor that their articles were having an effect on public sentiment to the extent that quite possibly hindering the war effort by the quality of the teaching that was going on up there. The City Editor informed Mr. Stearns, according to Miss Walne, that he was very sorry about that and that The Post had no intent of inciting the public against the loyal Japanese, but that their campaign was directed against the Government in general and the inefficiency of the War Relocation Authority in particular.

This, of course, is exactly the opposite from that reported from three other sources, namely: Mr. John Baker's talk with Shepherd, Barron Beshoar's talk with Shepherd and Gene Cervi's talk with Shepherd, in that they were sorry that any individuals or Government agencies had to be dragged along with the general program but that their program was a program of arousing public sentiment against Japanese, whether American born or foreign born, wherever they might find them and in whatever situations they might find them.

Malcolm E. Pitts, June 12, 1943

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Miss Wlane advised that Captain Roberts, who is the Commandant of the Navy Language School, made a very forceful memorial address regarding the relationships of America and resident alien and American born Japanese. She advised that it did a great deal to help clear the troubled waters of public opinion in Boulder. Captain Roberts has gone before the Boulder Post of the American Legion and made similar talks. Since Captain Roberts has been so helpful in general, I requested that she send, if she could get them, copies of his talks and they will be sent back to you.

It is wondered if any follow up has been made on the subject which I left when I was in Washington, i. e., attempting through the National Press Association, to bring some pressure to bear on The Denver Post and the Hearst Syndicate to not look for every possible chance they can to do destruction, to pass over little incidents, and to temper what articles they do publish, to the fact-finding and not a nerve-rousing report.

It was thought that you would be interested in this report of the absolutely opposite stand taken by a member of The Denver Post staff when approached from another angle which includes the strength of the Navy.

Sincerely,

/s/ Malcolm E. Pitts
Malcolm E. Pitts
Acting Field Assistant Director

Wash. Files 65.430
Segregation

TT. from Stafford to Myer
Aug. 13, 1943

PAGE 11 OF SEGREGATION MANUAL STATES PROJECT DIRECTOR SHALL DETERMINE WHETHER PERSONS IN CATEGORY 2 ARE LOYAL TO JAPAN AND APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE THEM FOR SEGREGATION ACCORDINGLY. PAGE 6 OF PRINTED PAMPHLET ON SEGREGATION DISTRIBUTED TO EVACUEES STATES THAT THOSE WHO SIGN STATEMENT OF LOYALTY WILL BE RECLASSIFIED IN GROUP 3. WE HAVE six individuals who signed LOYALTY STATEMENT BUT WHOSE INTERVIEWS INDICATE THEIR LOYALTY WILL IS WITH JAPAN. THEY STATE THEY CHANGED ANSWER SO THAT THEY WOULD NOT HAVE TO GO TO TULE LAKE AND THAT THEY PLAN TO RETURN TO JAPAN AND WERE EVASIVE ON QUESTIONS THAT WOULD INDICATE LOYALTY TO THE UNITED STATES. WHAT DISPOSITION SHOULD BE MADE OF THESE CASES QUESTION. SHOULD LOYALTY STATEMENT BE ~~ACCEPTED~~ ACCEPTED IF INTERVIEW INDICATES GOOD FAITH OF STATEMENT IS QUESTIONABLE QUESTION.

TT. from Rowalt to Stafford
August 14, 1943

REUTEL AUGUST 13. IF PROJECT DIRECTOR BELIEVE THAT PERSONS IN GROUP 2 ARE LOYAL TO JAPAN AND DISLOYAL TO THE UNITED STATES THEY SHOULD BE SEGREGATED. PROJECT DIRECTOR MUST MAKE THE FINAL DECISION. IF A PERSON IS IN GROUP 2 BECAUSE HE GAVE A NEGATIVE ANSWER TO QUESTION 28 AND DID NOT CHANGE HIS ANSWER PRIOR TO JULY 25 AND IF THAT PERSON NOW EXPRESSES A DESIRE TO CHANGE HIS ANSWER AND SIGN A LOYALTY STATEMENT, PROJECT DIRECTOR MUST EVALUATE THE FACTS AND DETERMINE WHETHER THE PERSON'S LOYALTIES STILL LIE WITH JAPAN. IF THEY DO, HE SHOULD BE SEGREGATED NOT* WITHSTANDING HIS DESIRE TO SIGN THE LOYALTY STATEMENT. A CHANGE OF ANSWER TO QUESTION 28 AFTER JULY 15 SHOULD NOT PREVENT SEGREGATION IF PROJECT DIRECTOR BELIEVES THE CHANGE IS NOT MADE IN GOOD FAITH. PLEASE NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT A PERSON WHO CHANGED HIS ANSWER TO QUESTION 28 PRIOR TO JULY 15 IS IN GROUP 3 AND MUST BE GIVEN A LEAVE CLEARANCE HEARING RATHER THAN A SEGREGATION HEARING. THESE PERSONS WILL NOT BE SEG* REGATED UNLESS THEY ARE DENIED LEAVE CLEARANCE BY THE DIRECTOR.

Confidential

8/24/43

Robert Frase

Frank Sweetser

Subject: Memorandum from Philip Webster, dated 26 April.

The attached document describing the investigational activities of Victor Nielson of the Civil Affairs Division, WDC is transmitted for your information. Apparently the project is an elaborate one, and is being conducted with considerable attention to detail.

However, the reported estimates of Mr. Nielson as to the number of subversive Japanese and Japanese Americans he expects to identify are very high:--so high as to raise serious doubts as to the validity of the criteria he is applying. Inasmuch as transmissions of funds to Japan seem to figure prominently in his estimates, it is worth remembering that the Japanese group in the United States in the years between China "incident" and Pearl Harbor had all manner of legitimate reasons for sending money to their country of origin, and the gross sums involved probably signify little.

Contributions to Japanese organizations, too, may have much less significance than seems to be attached to them by Mr. Nielson. Many such organizations are entirely innocent, and even those which are clearly subversive have members (and solicit funds from people) who are not subversive. Contributions for Japan's war use in China were, for many Japanese--especially those whose business depended on relations with Japanese firms--as necessary as are contributions to, say, the Community Chest, for American business men.

Mr. Nielson is to be complimented for recognizing that chapters of the same organizations in different localities varied widely, so that what may have been a subversive organization in one area was quite different in another (p.4, P.2). His perspicacity in this regard is a pleasant contrast to the uncritical thinking in some quarters which would damn any Japanese or Japanese American who ever belonged to to any organization, any branch of which is known to have been subversive.

A point of final interest is the rarity of any kind of pro-Japanese record for Japanese Americans under 28 or 29 years of age (p.3, P.2). A check with the Relocation Planning Division showed that 89.7% of all Nisei were under 29 years, and 86.3% were under 28 years in 1942.

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

Washington

AUG 24 1943

My dear Mr. Myer:

For some months I have watched with a growing sense of disappointment the efforts of officials of this Department to administer the Colorado River Relocation Center within the framework of policies and procedures laid down by the Authority.

In committing the Department to the Memorandum of Understanding of April 14, 1942, it was not in my mind that I was thereby accepting a situation in which we would have no voice in the formulation of a relocation policy as it affected our project. It is clear that Mr. Milton Eisenhower, your predecessor, did not intend such a development either, since he wrote on May 18, 1942, "Naturally, I do not wish to issue regulations, administrative memoranda, and fundamental policy documents affecting the Colorado River Relocation Project without first consulting with the appropriate people in your Department."

If we did not insist on a strict fulfillment of this understanding, it was because we believed that by accepting your decisions and promulgations we were contributing to administrative unity. The objectives which we had in mind, in behalf of which was contributed equipment and personnel sorely needed elsewhere we allowed to be subordinated; and as the months passed we found ourselves operating in a narrowing sphere of judgment and action.

I am troubled particularly by the direction which resettlement has taken at Poston. I had wanted to see the Center developed to its full capacity of food production. I wanted to see the evacuated population rehabilitated in mind and spirit, if not in fortune. Land and water facilities were available and the Indian Service gladly lent heavily of equipment and personnel much needed by its own agencies in order to push a food production program. We also called upon the broadest experience and skills that we had, robbing other activities, in order to develop a community atmosphere within which evacuee morale might be restored. Your approach to the problem has been different and the solution that you have offered cuts squarely across the objectives with which we set out.

I now feel that we erred in not requiring of the Authority full compliance with the terms of our Agreement. If by exercising our managerial responsibility we had achieved a program which differed from that developed by your agency, the comparative experience would have been of value to all of us.

It is with this thought in mind, and believing that it is not yet too late to bring the point to issue, that I now insist on a strict and faithful observation of the terms of our Agreement. In practice this will mean: (1) The formulation of policy, so far as it affects the Colorado River Relocation Project, should be in consultation with members of this Department; (2) administrative responsibility for the project will hereafter be exercised by this Department rather than by officials of the War Relocation Authority; (3) no instructions, memoranda, or policy statements should hereafter be addressed by War Relocation Authority officials to the Colorado River Relocation Project, but all statements or recommendations as to policy or procedure should be addressed to this Department.

If for any reason you prefer not to proceed under terms previously agreed to, you are of course at liberty to withdraw, as provided in section 16 of the Memorandum of Understanding. In the event that you choose to withdraw, this Department will expect an immediate restoration of all lands not actually used for relocation purposes, and a prompt settlement with the Colorado River Indian Tribes in the matter of compensation for the use of their lands.

Sincerely yours,

(SGD.) HAROLD L. ICKES
Secretary of the Interior

Hon. Dillon S. Myer,
Director, War Relocation Authority

Wash. Files 65.430
Segregation

Letter from Dillon Myer
Sept. 2, 1943

Mr. Ralph P. Merritt
Manzanar, California

Dear Mr. Merritt:

In his letter of August 19 to the Solicitor, Mr. Saks asked whether authority would be granted to project directors to refuse transfer of segregants to Tule Lake in two types of cases - one involving aged parents whose children do not want to go to Tule Lake but who will do so if the parents must go; and the other involving families in which one young and immature member is a segregant, and the remaining members of the family group similarly do not wish to go to Tule Lake but will do so if the segregant goes. In his answering teletype of August 25, which was prepared after a consultation with my office, the Solicitor stated that exceptions to segregation in hardship cases were to be considered in Washington on an individual basis rather than on the basis of hypothetical cases or general types of cases.

The reason for close control of this policy on the Washington level is this: we have set up certain standards governing the segregation of evacuees; presumptions of disloyalty attach to persons in certain categories. Leaving segregants such as Mr. Saks described - segregants who are presumably disloyal - behind in the relocation centers involves a delicate balance of individual and family welfare on the one hand against the considerations which motivated the whole segregation program on the other. We feel that we must move cautiously and surely in granting exceptions.

I trust that you will feel free to submit some individual cases of the types Mr. Saks describes if you feel in your own mind that the hardship involved warrants the granting of exceptions. At the same time you might indicate the number of similar cases involved and the variance in the factual situations presented by them. Your recommendations will receive careful consideration.

Sincerely yours,

D. S. Myer

SEP 16 1943

42-03

Hon. Harold L. Ickes
Secretary of the Interior
Department of the Interior
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Your letter of August 24, while not altogether unexpected, presents a point of view which I regret very much. I cannot feel that the War Relocation Authority has failed in any significant way to live up to the terms of the memorandum of understanding between the Department of the Interior and this Authority, or of Mr. Eisenhower's letter of May 18, 1942, from which you quote. Until I received your letter, I did not know that representatives of the Department of the Interior felt that the Colorado River center should not be administered in accordance with the same basic policies which govern the relocation program as a whole. The purpose of Mr. Eisenhower's letter of May 18, 1942 was to "set forth in writing the general policies governing all relocation projects, including the Colorado River Relocation Center which is administered for the War Relocation Authority by the Office of Indian Affairs."

Once the framework of national policy was established, the War Relocation Authority participated only to a limited extent in the administration of the Colorado River Center. Our participation in the management of the center has been limited largely to the review of the annual budget and the quarterly requests for allotment of funds, and in carrying to Poston the results of our experience and observations in the management of the nine other centers.

I am convinced now, as Mr. Eisenhower was convinced, that all centers must operate under the same body of basic policies. Too many of the policies for handling the evacuation and relocation program must be worked out in collaboration with other agencies of the government--notably the War, Justice, and State Departments--to make feasible the administration of one center under a set of policies different from ~~xx~~ those employed for the nine others. In addition, commitments to the Congress and the Bureau of the Budget must always be considered in determining the course a Federal program must take, only the agency that ~~xxx~~ negotiates with these agencies of government on the problems, involved in properly in position to guide its policies accordingly. Therefore, faced with the alternatives presented in your letter, I am obliged to elect the ~~xx~~ second and to request that, in accordance with Section 16 of the Memorandum of Agreement, the agreement be terminated.

I make this choice with ~~xx~~ mixed feelings,. We have benefited materially from the assistance and counsel of Mr. Collier and members of his staff. We gained certain advantages, particularly

in the early days, from the experience, personnel, and material resources of the Department of the Interior. The many personnel associations involved in this cooperative undertaking, furthermore have been very pleasant. But the ~~xxxxx~~ arrangement has also involved disadvantages to the Authority, particularly in the field of administrative management. Without comparable procedures and standards in accounting, personnel administration, and in other managerial fields, we have not always had from Colorado River information and reports suitable to our needs, nor in some instances have administrative practices been comparable with those in the other relocation centers.

I want to say a word about the working relations between the Colorado River Center, the Washington representatives of the Indian Service, and the Authority. These have been so close and harmonious that I believe it is hardly accurate to state that the Department has had "no voice in the formulation of a relocation policy as it affected our project."

At all stages we have attempted to bring representatives of your Department into the development of WRA policies and regulations. During the life of the Authority we have had a ~~xxxxxxx~~ number of national meetings to discuss and formulate policy, and in all cases Interior Department representatives were invited to be present and to participate fully. The Colorado River Center has been represented at all meetings of Project Directors and other project representatives. Representatives of the Office of Indian Affairs have regularly attended the Washington office staff meetings and have also participated in general meetings in the field and in Washington. In these contacts we have gained the impression that the Interior Department was fundamentally in agreement with most of the aspects of the basic program. I can think of only one or two basic questions upon which there has been a notable difference of opinion. One concerned the rate at which land development should proceed, a point upon which you touch in your letter; another had to do with the development of industry and crafts on the ~~xxx~~ projects--a policy which it became necessary to modify drastically after short experience with plans for large scale activities of these kinds.

It has been the position of the Authority from the beginning that land development and other construction programs on relocation centers must not be regarded as ends in themselves, but must be planned and evaluated in terms of their usefulness in providing useful work for evacuees. While in the beginning of the program we estimated the labor potential of the centers to be much greater than it has turned out to be, we have, nevertheless, always understood that land development must be justified in terms of its utilization of evacuee labor. Our position in this matter was confirmed by the attitude of the War Production Board when the general construction program of the Authority was presented to that agency for review about a year ago.

During the first year of operation, the Colorado River Center expended \$2,914,000 for public works. While it employed many evacuees in center maintenance, the bulk of the development work was actually performed by non-Japanese day labor paid prevailing wages. For a number of reasons we supported the Colorado River construction program during the first year, even though we felt that it was **not** being conducted in accordance with the purposes for which we were justified in doing land development, and even though the presence of large numbers of non-Japanese labor complicated other aspects of center administration.

When the public works budget for 1944 was presented by the project the amount of money for the employment of Japanese was reduced in comparison with expenditures for 1943, and that for the employment of non-Japanese labor was increased to \$1,148,000. We were unable to concur in such a plan of operations, and felt obliged to take the position that the Poston development program, like that on all other centers, must be limited to that which evacuees with adequate supervision and with a minimum of supplementary skilled labor were able to carry on themselves. After extensive negotiations between our staff and representatives of your office, a new figure ~~of~~ for public works was arrived at. Even this figure, which allows \$50,000 to the center for non-evacuee labor, provides five times as much money for such labor as is available to any other relocation center.

Since it has become necessary for the War Relocation Authority to assume full administrative responsibility for the Colorado River Center, I should like the transfer of responsibility to be effected with a minimum of interruption to the normal routines of the center and in such a manner as to insure as much continuity of administration as possible. With these purposes in mind, I wish to make the following proposals:

1. That no announcement be made and no steps taken which would give general circulation to the idea that there is to be a change of administration until after all evacuees who are to be removed from Poston under the segregation program have left.

2. That all personnel of the Colorado River Center who wish to remain with the center be given an opportunity to transfer to the War Relocation Authority without prejudicing their employment rights in the Department of the Interior.

3. That Mr. Wade Head be brought to Washington in the immediate future to assist in developing detailed plans for the transfer of administrative responsibility, and that he and his principal assistants be allowed to remain at Poston until at least January 1, 1944, regardless of whether they elect to transfer to the Authority for the duration, and regardless of the effective date of the termination of our agreement.

Sincerely,

D.S. Myer
Director

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Memorandum

Date: Sept. 21, 1943

To: Thomas W. Holland

From: Dillon S. Myer

I have read with great interest your memorandum outlining the history of relocation up until about January 1. I think it is excellent and have no criticisms or suggestions to make except that it stopped too soon. It would be tremendously helpful if you, perhaps in collaboration with Bob Frase, would write a second chapter starting with the combat team idea, following through the Joint Board, and bringing the history up-to-date as of the middle of September. If you could do this I would appreciate it very much.

(Signed) D. S. Myer

Hon. Harold L. Ickes
Secretary of the Interior
Department of the Interior
Washington, D. C.

OCT 7 1943

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Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have received your letter of September 28, 1943, in reply to my letter of September 16, 1943, on the subject of the transfer of the Colorado River Relocation Center from the administrative jurisdiction of the Bureau of Indian Affairs to this Authority.

It is my desire to propose in this letter a basis under which the transfer may be effected. The proposal hereinafter outlined have been discussed with the officials of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and, I believe, have their approval.

1. It is proposed that the War Relocation Authority assume jurisdiction over the Colorado River Relocation Center effective January 1, 1944

2. Personnel

(a) As stated in our previous correspondence, all personnel of the Colorado River Relocation Center who wish to remain with the Center are to be given an opportunity to transfer to the War Relocation Authority without prejudicing ~~xxxxxx~~ their re-employment rights in the Department of the Interior.

(b) In order to afford this Authority sufficient time to secure replacements for those employees who do not wish to transfer to the War Relocation Authority, determination is to be made by all employees on or before November 30, 1943, as to whether they will transfer. All transfers to the War Relocation Authority will be made effective January 1, 1944, with the possible exception of one or more employees required to process appointments, and make salary and travel payments, for employees appointed under the interim procedure referred to in 6(a) below.

(c) Employees on terminal leave at the close of business on December 31, 1943, will not be transferred to the War Relocation Authority but sufficient funds will be provided to the Bureau of Indian Affairs by the War Relocation Authority to continue payment of their salaries until termination of leave.

(d) The transfers will be made to Civil Service classification grades as established by the War Relocation Authority. In those cases where, due to differences in classification standards, there is a variance in salary rates, appropriate adjustment will be made; that is, if the War Relocation Authority salary rate is higher, the employee involved will be promoted subject, of course, to Civil Service restrictions, and, if the War Relocation Authority salary rates are lower, the employee

will be transferred to the lower grade but at as high as salary range as is possible in order that the least possible salary loss will be occasioned.

(e) A ~~xxxx~~ representative of this Authority will arrange to be at the Colorado River Center during November to conduct individual interviews with all employees regarding their transfer to the War Relocation Authority.

3. Property

(a) ~~Ex~~ It is proposed that a joint inventory be conducted by representatives of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and War Relocation Authority in December of all property on the Colorado River Center in order that the responsibilities of the Department of the Interior and the War Relocation Authority may be definitely defined.

(b) It is my understanding that there is property now at the Colorado River Relocation Center which is on loan from the Bureau of Indian Affairs and other Interior bureaus. It is ~~is~~ our desire to continue the loan of such property after January 1, 1944. on the same basis as is now in effect.

4. Funds

(a) The unexpended balances of funds transferred to the Bureau of Indian Affairs from the War Relocation Authority will be withdrawn on January 1, 1944, and the War Relocation Authority will assume responsibility for all existing obligations.

(b) An immediate direct allotment will be made to the representative of the War Relocation Authority referred to in 2(b) above, for the purpose there stated.

(c) The War Relocation Authority will assume responsibility for contracts in existence as of January 1, 1944.

5. Lands

(a) The Bureau of Indian Affairs will cooperate with the War Relocation Authority in efforts to secure a lease from the Colorado River Indian Tribes on the lands to be under the jurisdiction of the War Relocation Authority.

(b) The War Relocation Authority and the Department of the Interior will define, before January 1, 1944, the boundaries of the land to be retained by the War Relocation Authority.

(c) The extent of development work to be performed by the War Relocation Authority on the lands it is to retain will be stated in the memorandum of understanding later referred to.

6. Interim procedures

(a) All appointments made after announcement of the transfer will be under War Relocation Authority authority and procedures.

(b) All procurement and construction after announcement of the transfer will be in accordance with War Relocation Authority regulations and procedures.

7. General

(a) It is suggested that Mr. Wade Head announce the transfer upon his return to the Colorado River Center this month. I would suggest that he be furnished copies of a joint letter from your Department and this Authority to all employees of the Colorado River Center explaining the transfer and their privileges and rights. A draft of such a letter will be prepared in this office and forwarded to you immediately.

(b) All Center records are to be transferred to the War Relocation Authority except those which form an integral part of the Department of the Interior records. In the latter case, the records will be retained on the Center for a sufficient length of time to enable the War Relocation Authority to abstract any information required.

It will, of course, be necessary to enter into a new memorandum of understanding between the War Relocation Authority and the Department of the Interior prior to January 1, 1944, and many of the points covered in this letter will also appear in the new agreement in more detail. However, in order that we may proceed with the transfer without delay, I should ~~xxxxxx~~ appreciate your indicating your approval of the proposals made in this letter

Approved:

Sincerely,

D.S. MYER
Director

Secretary of the Interior
E. W. Clear:LR

JAN 15 1944

Hon. Jonathan Daniels
Administrative Assistant
to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

*other copy in
Public
Office*

Dear Mr. Daniels:

The dispersal of persons of Japanese ancestry throughout the United States from relocation centers, following their evacuation from the West Coast, raises special racial and economic problems. The receptiveness of various areas and groups has shown variation from unreasoned opposition to sympathetic and aggressive support.

The strongest opposition, as might be expected, comes from the West Coast which is presently closed, with particularly virulent expression from California. Agitation on the West Coast was in some measure responsible for the original removal, and has since continued with varied intensity against permitting any return and advocacy of even stronger measures such as continued retention in centers, deprivation of citizenship, and deportation. These expressions have been especially strong in Southern California and the great central valley. Adverse public sentiment, as reflected by editorial opinion and group action, has also found expression to a lesser extent in Washington and Oregon.

In general, those areas of the Coast where Japanese found greatest pre-war acceptance are also the ones which are most sympathetic in the present situation. Those areas in California where pre-war feelings were most intense, with segregated schools and similar restrictive measures, have been more hostile. The greatest relative number of repatriates and expatriates come from those areas where the Japanese remained a semi-segregated group in the community. Conversely, those from more tolerant areas have shown a great tendency to identify themselves with the United States.

The reaction of the intermountain states has varied widely. Arizona has been most consistent in its opposition. Historically, Arizona has had preclusive legislation on land ownership similar to California. The establishment of two relocation centers with a total population in excess of 30,000 and with no absolute guarantee that the people would be removed after the war has caused considerable adverse reaction among certain groups in that state. The Arizona fears have been given political expression by the Governor, and resulted in legislation practically banning all commercial transactions with persons of Japanese ancestry. The legislation has recently been declared unconstitutional by the State Supreme Court. The State Corporation Commission also held up granting a license to do business to the Gila River cooperative until certain changes were made in the original charter of incorporation.

There were a few hundred Japanese residents in Arizona before the war, and at least some of the present antipathy to W.R.A. and the Japanese goes back to the anti-Japanese riots of 1934 in the Glendale area near Phoenix. Certain agricultural interests in the Salt River Valley are the most openly hostile, with the stockmen, mining interests and others remaining quiet. Considerable antagonism could, however, be directed against the Japanese in Arizona, and W.R.A. has not encouraged or facilitated relocation in the state.

The present attitude of the Governor is that he does not want any more Japanese in Arizona after the war than were there before, and he does not want any kind of ~~xxxxxx~~ racial incident to develop during the war which can be attributed to his administration. For this latter reason, he is opposed to any more movement or visiting of evacuees ~~xxx~~ within the state than is absolutely necessary. It is rumored in the state at present that the Governor will be attacked by his political opponents in the next election on the grounds of his permitting the centers to be established in the state originally. The leading newspapers in the state have maintained a reasonably objective policy, and the Arizona Star in Tucson has done several excellent feature articles on the relocation center at Gila River. Visiting by evacuees to towns near their project for shopping and other purposes has had to be almost completely curtailed, but conditions are improving gradually as understanding of the problem grows.

New Mexico had only a handful of Japanese residents in the state prior to evacuation, and settlement there has been discouraged by official pronouncement of the Governor. Nevada had few Japanese, and settlement in the state has also been discouraged by the Governor and other official bodies. There has been no pronounced desire on the part of the evacuees to resettle in either state.

The other intermountain and mountain states held a few thousand Japanese previous to the war, and this number was augmented by several thousand voluntary evacuees just previous to the establishment of relocation centers. This area has been one of critical labor shortage, especially migratory farm workers. The major contribution of Japanese evacuees to harvesting of sugar beets, potatoes, and other crops in 1942 and 1943 has done much to gain an acceptance for them. They have filled a real economic need in these states, and, although the residents were probably basically not friendly, the need outweighed prejudices. The Japanese have shown a preference for this area because there were already a few of their number who had made the adjustment, available work was not too far distant from either the relocation centers where they had relatives or friends, or from California where many hoped to return, and because there was a sufficiency of jobs.

The influx has not been without some misgivings and without some friction on the part of the local residents. Action by labor groups at a steel mill and a copper mine in Utah led to a halting of further employment. There has been some discrimination, such as use of the swimming pool in Twin Falls, Idaho, in eating houses and other public places. The intense shortage of housing has led many to drift to the cheaper areas of the larger towns and create conditions similar to slum areas and Little Tokyos. This is particularly true in Denver and Salt Lake City.

Problems or potential problems have been created in northern Utah and northern Colorado, in parts of Idaho, and in the towns of Ogden, Salt Lake City, and Denver. The Authority recognized the situation by declaring these areas saturated, and, although they are not closed to settlement, additional settlement has not been encouraged. The post-war period may raise problems of considerable seriousness, since many of the evacuees have chosen the area because of its proximity to California, to which they hope to return after the war.

The receptiveness of midwestern communities to relocation of Japanese has been more consistently favorable than any other sections of the country. There have been isolated incidents and a few antagonistic pronouncements by individuals and groups, but the amount of public support for the relocation program and the acceptance of loyal Japanese American citizens and law-abiding Japanese aliens into communities have both been satisfactory.

The major newspapers in Kansas City, Milwaukee, Chicago, Des Moines, Cleveland, Cincinnati, New York, St. Louis, and Washington have published many favorable feature articles, news stories, and editorials. The many thousands who have found jobs and kept them is added testimonial to the acceptance that is being accorded.

Some farm groups have not been friendly, particularly in Ohio. The Governor of North Dakota has also indicated that he is unwilling to encourage resettlement in contrast with South Dakota where a number of families, including aliens, have been operating farm lands with others working as farm laborers.

The problem of the Japanese settling in large cities is primarily the same problem that all other war workers are facing. There is an abundance of jobs, a shortage of housing, and prices are high. Job discrimination has been due more to security decisions made by the Army than to unfavorable public acceptance.

The only disturbance of importance involved four Hawaiian nisei and several Filipino sailors in Chicago. The Filipino sailors, in uniform, attacked the nisei and seriously injured one. Press stories were confused. This event led to a report that evacuees living on the near north side were advised to move out of that neighborhood.

Congested housing has prevented the concentration of large numbers in one area and thus has minimized the criticism that might be directed against a group in a self-segregated area. The numbers now living in such places as Chicago and Milwaukee, although representing several hundred, are still unsufficient to cause any considerable amount of comment. Reception of Japanese has been particularly good in New York City, where some two thousand Japanese were already living, and in Washington, D.C. where a number now reside.

The southern states represent a difficult area because of an already existing racial situation, generally low wages in comparison with those received in California and elsewhere, and a relatively large surplus population for agriculture and industry. The latter situation would tend to discourage resettlement, while the former, combined with sentiments against Japanese due to the war, might lead to adverse reaction.

Actually, the situation in the south has been good despite the fact that there has been ample chance for expression of national and racial antagonism because of the location of two centers in Arkansas and the training of the Japanese-American combat team at Camp Shelby, Mississippi.

Jim Crow rules and laws have not been operative. Japanese Americans have been accorded the same privileges and associations that the whites reserve for themselves. There is no discrimination in public conveyances, in eating houses, stores, or any other place where discrimination might be expressed. A bill introduced into the Arkansas legislature to provide segregated schools was defeated. The two Little Rock papers have been friendly, and one editorially lamented the segregated character of the combat team recruited by the Army and being trained at Camp Shelby. These soldiers have been entertained by surrounding residents, have been invited and participated in a number of social events in New Orleans, and have made use of the white USI center without discrimination.

The reaction of organized labor to the evacuation and subsequent relocation has been mixed. In general, labor groups on the West Coast have been most outspoken in their criticism of Japanese Americans, while those in the eastern states have been friendly. The CIO has been more friendly than has the AFL, both on the West Coast and elsewhere.

The AFL stand on Japanese imigration, citizenship, exclusion and similar issues has been consistent throughout the years. As a labor organization it early protested the unrestricted imigration of Japanese and other orientals to the West Coast. Recently labor councils in various cities in California, Oregon, and Washington have gone on record opposing the return of the Japanese to that area.

The CIO and the Industrial Union Council of San Francisco have gone on record approving the return of the Japanese as soon as military conditions permit. Previous to evacuation, a number of Japanese Americans were members and active in the National Maritime Workers Union. The first-named union made arrangements and facilitated the transfer of members to its locals in other parts of the United States, with the result that Japanese American sailors are now on boats on the Great Lakes and the Atlantic. Kilssoo Haan of the Sino-Korean League has attempted to stir up labor against the Japanese, and following a speech by him the Continental UAW-CIO in Detroit passed a resolution protesting release of Japanese Americans. It has been reported that the appearance of Kilssoo Haan at other meetings has been prevented.

Adverse action has been taken by a number of unions. The workers of the Columbia Steel Company at Geneva, Utah, and the Open Pit Miners Union at Bingham, Utah, have protested evacuee employment. Adverse action was also taken by the Detroit and Wayne County Federation of Labor, Michigan; Building Trades Council of Marion County, Indiana; Mason City, Iowa; AFL; Milwaukee AFL; Decatur Trades and Labor Assembly; Cook County (Ill) Hospital ~~xxx~~ Lunchroom Attendants, AFL; Grand Rapids Federation of Labor; Executive Council, Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Union, AFL; and the Continental local previously mentioned.

Favorable action has been reported by three groups. R. J. Thomas, President of UAW-CIO, made a favorable statement; the Lake County Industrial Union Council, CIO, Gary, Indiana passed a favorable resolution; as did the Washington, D. C., Industrial Union Council, CIO.

The employment of American-born Japanese by the United States Civil Service Commission has been the subject of special rulings and such persons have been given special treatment. A procedure for their employment was established by Circular Letter 3982 of March 27, 1943, which provided that American citizens of Japanese ancestry, providing they fulfilled other qualifications, could be employed following certification by the War Relocation Authority that leave clearance had been granted except for positions where appointments are made "subject to investigations", in which case the application file would be sent to the Investigation Division for further processing and acceptance or rejection.

This procedure was altered by Circular Letter 4025 issued June 23, which tightened and slowed the process of Civil Service appointment. The new procedure made two substantial changes. It provided that no Civil Service position could be filled by a citizen of Japanese ancestry without investigation, that such investigation was the responsibility of the Investigation Division, and that applicants would not be certified for employment until the investigation was favorably concluded.

This procedure was again modified August 20 by Circular Letter 4056 which retains the restrictive provision of the second procedure with the modification that all investigations must be completed within three weeks. Our Personnel Office reports that in terms of actual experience it takes from four to fourteen weeks to clear an individual.

Even though the Civil Service Commission had agreed to take applications and to certify those who successfully passed its investigation, the employment of Japanese Americans was not immediately stimulated. There have been numerous reports of local agencies who have refused to certify a person because of his ancestry. One such case was the refusal of the Department of Agriculture to hire a person of Japanese ancestry. As a result of efforts of the United Federal Workers Union a non-discriminatory policy was established and the individual employed.

Such information as we have concerning the action of state civil service agencies is limited. Few of the evacuees have lived in their new localities long enough to fulfill residence requirements. California has taken legislative action to prevent former employees from claiming compensation for the period of absence, but no similar steps are reported from Oregon or Washington, where the situation may be quite different. In Colorado, where the Civil Service Commission certified a qualified Japanese American resident for a state job, there was a protest.

Objection to employment of Japanese in county or municipal systems has been isolated and involved other persons than the supervisory personnel. The union in the Cool County Hospital made objection to such employment, but this was later withdrawn.

Agreement with a municipal hospital in Baltimore to employ nurses aides was cancelled because of the protest of Negro organizations based on exclusion of Negroes from the same institution.

The National Japanese American Student Relocation Council, working with various institutions of higher learning and the War Relocation Authority, has done a fine piece of work in student relocation. It was the objective of this group to make

arrangements for those who had been attending West Coast universities to continue their schooling, and to assist those who had graduated from high school to find suitable college for enrollment. The program has been complicated by the number of schools that are used by the Army or Navy, and schools near defense plants or in vital areas which are closed to Japanese Americans and by special clearance needed for students entering the Eastern Defense Command. Not all schools have been willing to accept students, and in some instances there have been protests from local people. The residents of Parkville, Missouri, protested students at Park College. The president stood his ground on admitting Japanese Americans, and after some discussion local people have accepted it. Protests have also come from Jackson, Michigan, where the school board refused admittance to the municipal junior college; from Iowa, where, in addition to local protests, a resolution was introduced in the State legislature. The Arizona legislature passed a similar resolution. The Idaho Attorney General has ruled that evacuee children must pay tuition in the state schools.

There has also been considerable criticism of Japanese Americans attending colleges and universities based on the reasoning that while American boys were being inducted into the Army Japanese could attend colleges. Numbers of letters expounding these sentiments have been published in newspapers and addressed to congressmen.

The almost complete success of the adjustment of students and acceptance by townspeople is highlighted by some outstanding instances. One young man was elected president of the student body at Oberlin College; another, president of the Freshman Class at Heidelberg College. Many have taken an active part in athletics, and Colorado State College of A & M., the University of Utah, and Louisiana State have nisei on their football squads.

The only real problem has been in the intermountain and west central states where the number of students who had applied or ~~enrolled~~ enrolled caused these schools to put a top limit on the number eligible in order to forestall ~~criticism~~ criticism.

In general, student relocation has been restricted by action of the Army and Navy in proscribing schools for Japanese Americans because of classified war work carried on in the institution more than it has been by the policies of the educational institutions. This problem has been under constant discussion with the War and Navy Department representatives, and present indications point to an early and reasonably satisfactory solution.

The Chandler subcommittee of the Senate Military Affairs Committee and the Costello subcommittee of the Dies Committee have each made investigations and recommendations regarding the W.R.A. and the evacuees. In addition, there have been a number of members of both Houses who have made derogatory comments toward W.R.A. and the evacuees at one time or another. Principal among these are Representative Rankin, Senator Tom Stewart, and some congressmen from West Coast and intermountain states.

The Dies Committee investigation received wide newspaper publicity with stories of charges made by ex-employees of W.R.A. and others, most of which were proved to be exaggerations, half-truths, or outright falsehoods. Most of these were refuted by the W.R.A. with facts, but such information was not widely publicized nor did the Committee formally acknowledge the truth of such rebuttals by news releases or in the formal report. Representative Eberharter protested the methods of the committee and filed a minority report which presented an entirely different picture.

The national policy toward the Japanese Americans and toward the evacuees has been, on the whole, good. There are still some restrictions to which all are subject. They are, of course, not free to enter certain portions of the Western Defense Command. In other portions, special restrictions are still in force. Entrance to the Eastern Defense Command until recently had to be preceded by clearance from the Japanese American Joint Board.

Seamen, of whom there are several hundred among the Japanese Americans, were originally accepted for the merchant shipping service. Several months ago this policy was reversed by the Maritime Commission, and seamen returning to New York and other eastern ports were removed from vessels and not allowed to re-ship. This matter has recently been discussed with representatives of several interested Federal agencies at a special meeting in New York, and the report of the committee appointed at that time recommends re-employment of the shore-bound seamen after security investigations to be conducted by the appropriate intelligence branch, probably the ~~Coast Guard~~ Coast Guard.

The Army and the WAC's are open to volunteers, but not the Navy or WAVES. Employment in defense plants is limited to a few who have had special investigations and are passed by the Joint Board. The Civil Service still treats applicants in a special category.

Such restrictions are indicative that the Japanese Americans, and particularly the evacuees, have not yet had the full rights of participation in American society which from an official point of view should be restored to them.

Political and special interest groups over a period of months have passed discriminatory resolutions and have engaged in agitation of various types. The American Legion at its 1942 National Convention passed a resolution voicing opposition to War Relocation Authority policies and calling for the return of control of the centers to military authorities for the duration of the war. At its 1943 convention it was resolved that all functions of the War Relocation Authority and control of all persons of Japanese ancestry within the United States or its territories be placed under the direct supervision of the War Department. The Veterans of Foreign Wars passes a resolution at the 1943 Encampment opposing the infiltration into American communities of citizens and descendants of citizens of Japan.

The Hearst newspapers have been particularly bitter in their attacks on persons of Japanese ancestry and on the administration of the centers by W.R.A. Their attacks have been more or less continuous, but reached their peaks in June and November 1943, both coordinated with investigations carried on by the Dies Committee. The McClatchy papers in California have followed a similar pattern of stimulating race hatred. Sporadic outbursts have also appeared in the Los Angeles Times, Denver Post, and in the Washington Times-Herald, although in the latter paper the critical articles and news stories have been directed at the W.R.A. administration rather than at the evacuees.

Accompanying this letter are certain documents which present in greater detail the story of reaction to Japanese Americans by various groups and individuals. These documents cover the period January 1 to September 1, 1943

Sincerely yours,

D. S. Myer

Director

Enclosures

cc: Director

JHP:provinse HP
1/13/44

FEB 28 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDERSECRETARY

Subject: Certain Facts Concerning the Population of
the Tule Lake Center

Dear Mr. Fortas:

You asked, through Mr. Frank, for a breakdown of the population at the Tule Lake Center that will indicate the total number residing at Tule Lake because they have been segregated and the total number residing there because they are the family members of segregants who have chosen to accompany the segregants at Tule Lake. In the case of this last group, you have asked for a division of the total figure into the number that are adults and the number that are minors.

The population now at Tule Lake consists, in part, of those who formerly resided at the Tule Lake Center and were permitted or required to remain there at the time of the mass segregation movement, and, in part, of those who formerly resided in the other centers administered by the Authority and were permitted or required to transfer to Tule Lake at the time of the segregation movement. I can give you the figures you have asked for with reference to the group that were transferred to the Tule Lake Center. We do not now have in the Washington office a reliable breakdown along these lines for the group that continued in residence at Tule Lake. I am asking for that information and will forward that to you as soon as we have received it

1. A total of 4,971 evacuees remained in the Tule Lake Center at the time of the segregation movement either as segregants or as the family members of segregants.

2. A total of 8,561 evacuees were transferred to the Tule Lake Center at the time of the mass segregation movement, in September and October 1943. Of this total, 6,480 were segregants and 2,081 were family members of such segregants.

3. Of the 2,081 family members 1,167 were 17 years of age or over, and 914 were under 17.

I am using 17 years of age as the dividing line between adults and minors because that is the dividing line we have been using for purposes of leave clearance.

The figures given above for the population now resident at Tule Lake (4,971 plus 8,561) come to a total of 13,532. A report we received on February 19, 1944, however, reveals a population now resident in the Tule Lake Center of 14,902. We have asked the Project Director to explain the discrepancy in these figures of 1,370. It is probable that the 1,370 evacuees are those who were unable to leave the Tule Lake Center in September and October because they were hospitalized or infirm,

or because they had not been definitely classified as to their eligibility to leave the center. It is possible, also, that some evacuees in this group are "unauthorized residents" in that they were supposed to leave but failed or refused, for one or another reason, to do so.

I should point out, also, that approximately 1,900 segregants and members of their families are being moved this week from the Manzanar Relocation Center to the Tule Lake Center. They were not included in the mass movement in September and October of last year because housing accommodations were not available for them at the Tule Lake Center at that time. In addition, we shall be moving small numbers of evacuees to the Tule Lake Center during the next three or four months as we complete the leave clearance process and issue further denials of leave clearance. The figures given above do not, of course, include the 1900 people moving from Manzanar. A breakdown of that group is not yet available.

Sincerely,

D. S. Myer

Director

cc: B. Ralph Stauber

PMGlick:hb

2-28-44

MAR 1 1944

Hon. Harold L. Ickes
Secretary of the Interior
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Attached is my memorandum to you on Major Problems of the War Relocation Authority--Past, Present, and Future. Copies of this are being sent to Mr. Fortas and Mr. Straus.

Sincerely,

D. S. Myer

Director

Attachement

MAR 1 1944

Hon. Harold L. Ickes
Secretary of the Interior
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Attached is my memorandum to you on Major Problems of the War Relocation Authority--Past, Present, and Future. Copies of this are being sent to Mr. Fortas and Mr. Straus.

Sincerely,

D. S. Myer

Director

Attachement

MAR 1 1944

Hon. Harold Smith
Director
Bureau of the Budget
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Smith:

Enclosed are estimates and justification in support of the request of the War Relocation Authority for its third annual appropriation. The total of these estimates by programs is as follows

Washington and Field Service Offices	\$ 1,571,709
Relocation Centers	33,052,107
Segregation Center	7,201,346
Relocation Offices	1,046,090
Evacuee Property Offices	1,008,528
Evacuation of Institutionalized Persons	<u>536,973</u>
Total	\$44,416,753
Less: Payments for subsistence and quarters	<u>400,000</u>
	\$44,016,753

The entire program of the War Relocation Authority is outgrowth of the war emergency. Therefore, these estimates are based upon your letter of June 24, 1943, stating that all estimates for the fiscal year 1945 should be based on the assumption that the war will continue throughout that year. These estimates assume not merely that the war continue through the fiscal year 1945, but that the military situation in the Pacific will continue to require the exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the evacuated area of the Pacific Coast throughout the fiscal year. If the military situation in the Pacific should permit the relaxing or elimination of the present exclusion orders so as to permit all, or a substantial portion of the evacuees of Japanese descent to return to the evacuated area at the beginning of the fiscal year 1945, or at the middle of the fiscal year, these estimates would need to be entirely re-examined.

In spite of the special efforts of the War Relocation Authority to stimulate relocation of eligible evacuees, three-quarters of the appropriation requested for the fiscal year 1945 is for the administration of relocation centers. If the exclusion orders should be eliminated, or relaxed to permit those persons to whom the War Relocation Authority has granted indefinite leave to return to their homes, much of the \$32,752,392 net requested in 1945 for the operation of relocation centers would be unnecessary, as would a substantial part of the expense of the Washington Office and field

offices outside relocation centers. Under any circumstance likely to be created by changes in the military situation, the need for the segregation center, for which \$7,135,433 is requested, would probably continue for the duration of the war.

Sincerely yours

D.S. Myer
Director

CC: Director
L. Barrows
Finance

LBarrows:as/scb/sk
3/12/44

MAR 30 1944

MEMORANDUM for the Secretary

Subject: Recent Developments in WRA Centers.

We hope to keep you informed of current developments at the centers under supervision of the War Relocation Authority. To that end, we shall, as circumstances warrant, submit to you reports summarizing developments which we believe will be of interest to you.

Prisoner of War Camp Near Rohwer

We have just received from the director of the Rohwer center a report that farmers in that vicinity are anxious to establish a camp for prisoners of war, in order to have the use of their labor; the War Department has approved a site adjacent to the Rohwer center. The interest farmers have asked that they be permitted to tap our water system to provide water for the 150 or so prisoners of war who would be quartered in the camp. We anticipate that there may requests for other facilities, such as electricity, sewage disposal, telephones, etc. An earlier suggestion from near-by residents, that a portion of the center proper be set aside for a prisoner of war camp was turned down by both this agency and the War Department. We are requesting more detailed information from Project Director Johnston concerning the organization of the group of farmers and the possibility of future requests for facilities. We would like to assist the local farmers, but foresee the possibility of administration difficulty if even a small prisoner of war camp is established next door to a relocation center.

Nine Draft Evaders

Nine boys of military age at Poston who had refused to report for pre-induction physical examinations, were arrested on March 25 by agents of the F. B. I., and on March 28 were sentenced to three years in prison.

Summary of Selective Service Activity

At the beginning of the current week (March 27) 1,535 nisei had been called for pre-induction physical examinations; 463 had been accepted and 296 rejected on physical grounds; 11 had volunteered for service and three were actually inducted. Reports of the week of March 20 indicated that approximately 40 men would be called for induction this week. As of Monday,

53 men had refused to report for physical examinations. Some West Coast local boards persist in sending additional forms for the men to fill out, although the necessary forms were filled out more than a year ago. Selective Service is notifying the local boards that this is no longer necessary. The War Department has informed us, and we have relayed the information to relocation center officials, that anyone who causes an evacuee to fill out another questionnaire, on which he might change an affirmative answer on military service to a negative answer, would be guilty of interfering with the Selective Service laws.

Nine Draft Evaders at Heart Mountain

Thirty-seven boys at Heart Mountain have refused to report for their pre-induction physical examinations. At this center there has been organized opposition to Selective Service, led by the so-called Fair Play Committee. Two of the leaders of the committee were denied leave clearance and were sent to Tule Lake on March 29.

Opposition by Rocky Shimpō

Closely allied with the resistance of the Fair Play Committee has been the Rocky Shimpō, a Japanese-English newspaper published in Denver. This paper is nominally under the supervision of the Alien Property Custodian, but in recent months has become increasingly strong in its opposition to the acts of the United States Government. This opposition takes its most violent form in relation to Selective Service. The sheet has given widespread publicity to the statements and acts of the Heart Mountain Fair Play Committee. Protests have been made by WRA to the Alien Property Custodian and to the Post Office Department, which presumably has been exercising censorship over the paper. Action by both of these agencies is expected momentarily which may result in either a change of personnel of the paper or perhaps even in the liquidation of the paper. WRA feels that the paper can be made a useful medium for reaching many of the evacuees, but that the staff of the paper would have to be changed before this will be possible.

Progress of Relocation

Relocation on indefinite leave continues at a somewhat accelerated pace. During the week ending March 18, 387 persons left the centers on indefinite leave, making a total of 20,283 who had relocated on this presumably permanent basis; 2,489 were absent on seasonal leave.

Evacuee Relationships

At Gila River, the system for gaining evacuee collaboration is being altered. Up to the present time, there has been a dual system of evacuee participation: In each block, there has been a block manager, appointed by the administration; and a council representative, elected by the residents. Both jobs are to be abolished and a series of Block Coordinators appointed to perform functions which have been carried on in the past by both the managers and council representatives.

Eberharter Minority Report

The sub-committee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities which investigated the disturbance at the Tule Lake Segregation center submitted its report some weeks ago. One of the members of the sub-committee, the Hon. Herman F. Eberharter of Pennsylvania, has just issued a dissenting report, a copy of which is attached.

Jail Cases

Trials for offenses which are classed as felonies are held by county officials, or other appropriate officials, outside the relocation center. In one recent case at Tule Lake, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to serve 90 days in jail, but the county jail was full and the county refused to provide quarters for carrying out the sentence. WRA placed the man under guard in a wing of the center hospital. This, of course, is only a temporary solution. We hope to work out a satisfactory relationship with the local authorities.

California State Chamber of Commerce

The California State Chamber of Commerce has appointed a seven-man committee to study post-war problems of persons of Japanese ancestry in the United States. That there will be at least a fair balance in membership of the committee is indicated by the fact that two of the men appointed to the committee ~~are indicated by the following list~~ are President R. G. Sproul of the University of California, and A. J. Lundberg, President of the Key System Transit Company of San Francisco. Both of these men are members of the Committee on American Principles and Fair Play, which has advocated tolerance for Japanese on the West Coast. The Committee from the Chamber of Commerce has asked for cooperation from the War Relocation Authority in making its studies, and we, of course, will comply with the request.

Fire at Central Utah

Fire on March 29 caused damage estimated at \$850. in staff quarters under construction at the Central Utah center. Cause was found to be an over-heated coal stove in the nearly-completed building.

D.S. Myer

Director

Attachment

Director's copy

JCBaker:LH, Mar. 30, 1944

MEMORANDUM to the Secretary

APR 4 1944

E2.07

Following are recent developments in the program of the War Relocation Authority which we believe will interest you:

Guayule at Poston

Project officials at Poston have been notified by the Forest Service that, because of a reduction in the guayule program of that agency, the supervision of experimental work in production of guayule at Poston will be discontinued as of May 1. About 2.5 acres of ~~xxxx~~ guayule have been grown there. We are recommending to Poston officials that WRA continue to care for the plants and note their progress, although supervision and assistance are not available from the Department of Agriculture.

Native Sons of Golden West

Native Sons of the Golden West, a California organization, issued a press statement on March 24, in reply to statements made by me in a speech in Salt Lake City on March 23. I had emphasized the right of evacuees to return to the exclusion zone when the military situation permits, in spite of the fact that there were certain organizations opposing their ultimate return. Walter H. Odemar, chairman of the Native Sons Committee on Japanese Legislation, told a Native Sons chapter that "they could be proud of the fact that they are members of an organization of the type referred to by Mr. Myer that is one doing everything within its power to keep the Japanese from being returned to this vital coastal area during the war----its campaign would soon be spread throughout the country as prophesied by Dillon Myer."

Fortune Magazine Reports on WRA

The April issue of Fortune Magazine carries an article on the WRA program, written by two staff members who visited several WRA centers, including Tule Lake, and also interviewed a number of evacuees who had relocated in New York. Illustrations are by a nisei girl formerly at the Central Utah center. Another article in the same issue deals to some extent with WRA handling of evacuees' ~~xxxxxxx~~ property.

Pamphlet on Nisei in Uniform

We are collaborating with the War Department in obtaining information and photographs for a pamphlet to be issued by WRA on Japanese Americans in the Army. The Army Signal Corps will provide many of the photographs, while WRA will prepare the text and publish the pamphlet.

D.S. MYER
Director

Director's copy

JCBaker:LH
Apr. 3, 1944

MEMORANDUM to the Secretary

APR 4 1944

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D. S. MYER
Director

Director's copy

JCBaker:LH
Apr. 3, 1944

SEP 21 1944

Lieutenant A. H. Leighton
Office of Indian Affairs
Merchandise Mart Building
Chicago, Illinois

Need
Leighton's ltr.

Dear Lieutenant Leighton:

Your letter of July 12 written from Tuba City, enclosing your monthly report of July 10 and the statement of proposed answers to the Sub-committee, dated June 27, arrived during my absence in the field. Since my return this is the first opportunity there has been to review them and I apologize for not replying more promptly.

A careful reading of your July 10 report leaves me quite disturbed. There are certain points on which I do not agree and many others on which I do agree. Obviously some of your assumptions are not supported by fact but I have come to the conclusion that part of the trouble again is in the lack of communication between WRA headquarters and the projects.

To start with, I think you have made two or three assumptions which are not founded on facts. You indicate that it is our policy to empty the centers to the exclusion of all other considerations. While it is true that our major objective is to carry out the relocation program, it is not true that this is being done to the exclusion of all other considerations. You further make the statement that the public is not ready to receive the evacuees. This assumption amazed me a little in view of the fact that the least of our problems during the last six months, except in Arizona and California, has been the gaining of public acceptance. There has been a little trouble here and there, but on the whole this task has not been nearly as difficult as we had anticipated about a year ago. It is becoming less difficult as time goes on~~xx~~ and ~~xxx~~ as our educational program becomes more and more effective. You have indicated a change in the number of approved universities to be a sign of reaction in public sentiment against receiving the evacuees and I cannot agree with you. This particular action resulted from determinations made within the Navy Department and in my judgment had no relation to the general public acceptance of persons of Japanese ancestry. You have pointed out that the employment policy and the reduction in food costs are indicative of indirect coercive methods being utilized by WRA to force relocation. I can understand how this assumption might be made by one not fully conversant with the situation because the interpretation has been made particularly in relation to the employment policy.

However, there has been no thought or intention of utilizing coercive methods in order to promote relocation. Employment at the projects has been a real problem right from the start. There was considerable over-staffing of routine jobs at the centers and we determined early in the summer to reduce employment in many of these activities for a number of reasons: (1) To make certain that every individual made his contribution to the center; (2) to assist them in maintaining self-respect by insisting on a full day's work; (3) to assure that government funds were properly expended only for services rendered.

It is not our intention to reduce permanently the total employment at the projects if there are people who wish to work. I do not know of a project that lacks ample opportunities for employment of able-bodied men in public works of some type, and it will be our policy to provide ample employment opportunities at the centers, if that is possible, for those who do not relocate. Nevertheless, it will make for a healthier situation if we always have a few people looking for employment. I want to repeat, however, that it is not our policy to reduce employment at the projects as a means of forcing people into outside work. After reviewing the instruction that went out I will have to admit that it might be misinterpreted and am taking steps to clarify it. The true intent was made clear during the project directors meeting at Denver so that I believe it is understood by them.

In my ~~xxxx~~ judgment your interpretation regarding food costs is 100% wrong. Estimates have been made as to the amount of food to be produced at the projects for subsistence purposes for this year and in presenting the budget we estimated that out of the 45¢ total, the cash outlay for food purchased outside the centers would be 31¢. Never at any time has there been any thought of utilizing the food policy in order to gain relocation. As a matter of fact the basic reasons for growing food at the centers should be quite evident. Because of transportation problems and the lack of certain types of foods on many of the markets it became essential to produce as many vegetables and as much meat and animal products at all centers where possible in order to maintain an adequate diet which would include the proper varieties of food. The food production program provides opportunities for project employment which would not otherwise be available and supplies a better quality and variety of food than can be obtained from the market. There is no change whatsoever in the food policy this year as compared with last year other than those changes forced by national rationing which affect everyone both inside and outside the centers. I believe the basic assumptions made in this case are responsible for our difference of opinion regarding your recommendations.

After going over your recommendations in detail I want to repeat, in connection with number one, that there is no coercion intended, either direct or indirect, and our policy in relation to project operation is to maintain a middle-ground approach in trying to provide the minimum of decent subsistence. Certainly it was never intended to provide more than that and I have made the statement several times that those in the centers who wish to make more money or raise their standard of living beyond that maintained at the project would have to do so on the outside. That does not mean that we are going to lower the standard; it simply means that it is not practical for a number of reasons to provide opportunities for a higher standard of living in the relocation centers.

With your number two recommendation I agree in part. The selection should be instituted largely on an individual basis; however, I think both approaches are necessary. In view of the mixed family situation of Issei elders and American youngsters, it is my judgment that we have to think first of the youngsters.

I agree with both three and four. Major steps have been taken to provide information to the American public through the establishment of fifty field offices and through a very ~~xxxxx~~ effective program of education. Real progress has been made in this field. We have not done as good a job at the projects as I would like to see done, and a great deal of time and thought is being devoted to this problem at the moment.

In your number five recommendation you state that it should be assumed that relocation centers are the best places for most of the elderly aliens and their younger children during the war. I am in violent disagreement with this point of view. From the standpoint of the elderly aliens who speak little English I can understand that it would be much easier for them to remain in relocation centers than try to make the adjustment ~~xxx~~ on the outside. However, where there are children I definitely feel that they should be reestablished in normal communities and schools just as fast as it ~~xx~~ is possible to do so and that the elders should make great sacrifices in order to assist in accomplishing this. It is a question as to whether they assure themselves of temporary security now for the duration of the war period or whether they seek a more permanent security that may be attained by proceeding to relocate now. It seems to me that it is an argument between a long-time adjustment of a large group of people as compared with temporary adjustment for a couple of years that might lead to more mal-adjustment later.

I am in agreement with your sixth recommendation. You may be right about number seven, but I ~~x~~ believe that private enterprise should be developed outside of the centers for good reasons.

Your eighth recommendation surprises me somewhat. It has been the policy of WRA from the beginning to provide recreation equipment initially and certainly we have followed the policy of encouraging community and recreational activities generally. I cannot understand why you imply that it has been otherwise.

In number nine you recommend segregation and, of course, as you know, that is under way and the policy had been announced at the time your report was written.

In general I am in agreement with your number ten, particularly where you point out that the problem of the Japanese in America is more important to the national life than the number of people involved would indicate. We have recognized that important fact right from the start.

I have read over your proposal of June 27 of what might be said to a Congressional Committee but did not see the draft prior to the time of the hearings. We said just about what was suggested and ~~xx~~ after examining the statements made before the Committee and the testimony given at the time of the hearings I am sure you will agree that this is true.

Sincerely yours,

D. S. Myer

Director

DSMyer:ih
9/17/43