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Okhiro, Gary G.

Jule Lake under Martial law:...

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BLACK STRIKEBREAKERS IN THE COAL FIELDS

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>H. W. McNeill to W. H. Starbuck, March 22, 1891, "Incoming Correspondences," OIC Papers.

<sup>10</sup>Iowa State Register, June 6, 1891. Quoted in Leola Nelson Bergman, "The Negro in Iowa," The Iowa Journal of History and Politics, 46 (1945), 41.

<sup>11</sup>Bergman, 41.

<sup>12</sup>Press-Times, May 18, 1891.

<sup>13</sup>Press-Times, May 26, 1891.

<sup>14</sup>Press-Times, May 19, 1891. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 1, 1891.

<sup>15</sup>Press-Times, May 18-19, 1891.

<sup>16</sup>Press-Times, May 21, 1891.

<sup>17</sup>Press-Times, May 28, 1891.

<sup>18</sup>Press-Times, June 5, 1891. C. J. Smith to C. B. Tedcastle, July 1, 1891, OIC Papers.

<sup>19</sup>Washington (state) Adjutant-General, Biennial Report (1891-2), 22.

<sup>20</sup>C. J. Smith to C. B. Tedcastle, July 1, 1891, OIC Papers.

<sup>21</sup>Press-Times, July 14, 1891. Washington (state) Adjutant-General, Biennial Report, 80.

<sup>22</sup>Spero and Harris, 105-6.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid, 129.

<sup>24</sup>Herbert G. Gutman, "Reconstruction in Ohio: Negroes in the Hocking Valley Coal Mines in 1873 and 1874," Labor History, 3 (1962), 243-64.

<sup>25</sup>As Gutman has noted: "Men and women who sell their labor to an employer bring more to a new or changing work situation than their physical presence. What they bring to a factory depends, in good part, on their culture of origin, and how they behave is shaped by the interaction between that culture and the particular society into which they enter." "Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America, 1815-1919," American Historical Review, 78 (June, 1873), 531-88.

<sup>26</sup>The history of Black culture is a burgeoning field. The outstanding work of the past decade is Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll; The World the Slaves Made (New York, Pantheon Books, 1974).

<sup>27</sup>Cf. William Eric Perkins, "On Booker T. Washington," The Journal of Ethnic Studies, 1 (Spring, 1973), 56-62.

<sup>28</sup>August Meier, Negro Thought in America, 1880-1915: Racial Ideologies in the Age of Booker T. Washington (Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1969).

<sup>29</sup>Spero and Harris, 129.

TULE LAKE UNDER MARTIAL LAW: A STUDY IN JAPANESE RESISTANCE

by Gary Y. Okihiro

The wartime internment of persons of Japanese ancestry has drawn considerable attention primarily because it serves the purposes of writers whose concern are wider than the historical experience itself. There are those who regard the internment experience as historically significant because of its instructional value. That didactic approach, which forms a basis for the orthodox interpretation of the camps, has been the hallmark of popular writers, journalists, civil rights activists, ex-War Relocation Authority (WRA) officials, and members of the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL). To them, the forced removal and internment of 110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry was America's greatest wartime mistake, and the episode is a moral lesson to the nation, teaching that constant vigilance must be maintained to safeguard the civil liberties of all citizens because it could happen again to any minority group. Accordingly, those authors display a preoccupation with theories of responsibility for the mass removal and internment, and with constitutional issues.<sup>1</sup>

Apart from those concerns, the authors of the orthodox interpretation wrote with polemical objects in mind. While there were a few ex-WRA administrators who had an interest in answering their critics' charge of maladministration, the basic thrust of the authors of the orthodoxy was to refute the justification that "a Jap is a Jap." Their argument was based on the findings of sociologists who studied the camp communities and observed that Japanese society was not monolithic but was composed of what they determined to be geo-generational cleavages and varying degrees of assimilation. That refinement, when combined with other factors such as the education of Kibei in Japan, formed the basis for their explanation for resistance in the internment camps. Their conclusion was that not all Japanese were the same, and that although there were some who were "pro-Japan" in sentiment, the vast majority were loyal to America. While that insight was an advance over the racists' indiscriminate stereotype, it simply replaced one stereotype with another. Issei were generally seen as "pro-Japan" in sentiment, Kibei were simplistically equated with "troublemakers," and Nisei, as assimilated and "pro-American."<sup>2</sup>

Another stereotype and myth was that the Japanese surmounted the overwhelming odds of early White racism, confiscation of property, and internment to become America's model minority. The story of the Japanese in America, therefore, is a stirring chapter in American history in which an entire ethnic minority showed America to be a land of opportunity and of justice triumphant.<sup>3</sup> The internment experience is crucial to that myth of the model minority. By demonstrating the innocence of the Japanese, their forbearance and fortitude throughout internment, and their unswerving pro-American loyalty despite being

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deprived of their rights as citizens, the cornerstone of the myth is laid. From the fires of adversity came a people ennobled. Therefore, the visible forms of Japanese resistance in the internment camps must be explained in terms other than resistance against White racism and anti-Americanism.

The orthodox interpretation explains Japanese resistance in the internment camps by citing the inexperience of the WRA administrators and the novelty of the situation. Once those initial problems had been resolved, that explanation concludes, resistance disappeared.<sup>4</sup> The frustration-aggression theory underlies a second explanation for the causes of Japanese resistance in the camps. This explanation views the various forms of resistance, the strike or "riot," as expressions and releases of pent-up pressures and frustrations.<sup>5</sup> A third causal explanation portrays resistance as an internal geo-generational struggle between Issei and Nisei, and Japanese from California set against those from the Pacific Northwest.<sup>6</sup> And finally, a fourth explanation admits to the presence of pro-Axis sympathizers among the internees, notably the Kibei, but it claims that these were only a small minority within the community. According to this explanation, Japanese resistance was generated by these troublemakers who stirred up discontent and used bullying tactics to coerce others to join in their protest.<sup>7</sup>

A small, but growing body of writings has questioned in recent years the orthodox interpretation of the internment camp.<sup>8</sup> These revisionists point out that the wartime removal of Japanese cannot be removed from its pre-war historical context and that the internment camps were a logical extension of the established pattern of interaction between White Americans and Yellow immigrants.<sup>9</sup> Further, Japanese resistance in the camps was a part of that historical legacy, its roots reaching back in time to the daily struggle for survival in a racist American West; it was continuous, and purposeful. The revisionists view the camps and Japanese resistance from the perspective of historical continuities and linkages, and they deny the orthodox interpretation of treating resistance in terms of unconnected "incidents," minority "troublemakers" and "pressure groups," and geo-generational cleavages. And finally, instead of using the internment camps to illustrate a point external to that experience as do writers of the orthodoxy, the revisionists stress that the experience is not so much a moral lesson to White America as it is a part of the history of Asians in America.

There are a number of difficulties in the revisionists' interpretation of the internment camps. A major impediment is the nature of the available sources. Early analysts of the camps all wrote from the orthodox point of view and the resource materials assembled as documents, letters, memoirs, and oral history tapes all reflect the biases of the WRA and the JACL. Until a more comprehensive and objective collection of reminiscences can be made of those who formed the camp majority, we will regrettably be limited by those myopic confines. Because of that barrier, the revisionists are unable to determine precisely the number of people who actually resisted, the degree of mobilization, the exact role of coercion, and even the forms and nature of resistance. In addition, there is a notable gap in their attempt to link resistance

in the camps with Japanese resistance to white racism in pre-war America. At this stage, it is too early to speak with any degree of certainty, and the revisionists can only legitimately claim that their interpretation represents a more reasonable attempt than the orthodox view. What is needed are a number of micro-studies which demonstrate the historical validity of their claim. This is written with that object in mind.

The Spoilage, by Thomas and Nishimoto, is a landmark in the orthodox interpretation of Japanese resistance: it is a detailed study of resistance at Tule Lake internment camp, it contains all the orthodox explanations for resistance, and it sets the tone for other studies on the internment camps. Its importance requires a re-examination of the argument employed in that work. Resistance, as characterized by Thomas and Nishimoto, was sporadic and not purposeful, and it was primarily intra-internee rather than anti-administration. The authors cite four basic causes for resistance: (1) the inexperience of the administrators and the initial discomforts of settling in; (2) geo-generational differences and rivalries; (3) conflicts between the old Tuleans and incoming "segregates";<sup>10</sup> and (4) pressure groups of radicals and pro-Axis troublemakers.

For Thomas and Nishimoto, the proof of that interpretation is encapsulated in the vote of January 11, 1944 in which a majority of Tule Lake internees rejected status quo.<sup>11</sup> In that vote there is a statistically significant correlation between blocks which favored status quo and the percentage of segregates. That is, blocks which voted for status quo or the continuation of radical rule had high percentages of segregates. That is, blocks which voted for status quo or the continuation of radical rule had high percentages of segregates in them. That correlation appears to support the authors' contention that protesters and segregates were essentially one and the same. Further, the rejection of status quo came after the radical leaders had been locked away in the stockade. From that, the authors conclude that when given a chance, the people turned to moderate leaders and a conciliatory solution in their desire to return to "normalcy."<sup>12</sup>

The events leading up to that vote in January 1944 and the vote itself, therefore, are crucial to the Thomas and Nishimoto interpretation of resistance and merit a re-examination of those events beginning with the military occupation of Tule Lake on November 4, 1943 and ending with the lifting of martial law on January 15, 1944.<sup>13</sup> Some highlights of that period include the incarceration of the Negotiating Committee, a vote of confidence in those imprisoned leaders despite the administration's efforts to elect new representatives, a hunger strike among the prisoners in the stockade, and the so-called return to normalcy following the vote against status quo.

Ever since the creation of Tule Lake internment camp towards June 1942, the Japanese protested various conditions considered to be unjust. There was a mess hall strike in July, a campaign for higher wages in August, and two labor strikes in August and September. The immediate basis for those protests was the people's concern that they were being doubly exploited by being placed in detention by the government and asked to work to produce their own food for sixteen dollars per month. But the underlying and more fundamental cause of the people's protests was the absurd injustice of their detention.

That was crystallized by the farm labor strike in October 1943 following the accidental death of an internee, Kashima, when a farm truck on which he was riding overturned. To most of the internees, Kashima's death was a senseless loss because he would not have died had there been no interment camp. That mood was reflected in the composition of Daihyo Sha Kai, the representative body of the people, in elections which were held the day following Kashima's death. The majority of the sixty-four representatives, one chosen from each block, were individuals who had the reputation of being aggressive opponents of the White administration. Largely because of that and in disregard of their representative nature, the Daihyo Sha Kai and the Negotiating Committee were never granted legitimacy by the administrators and instead were seen as antagonists and troublemakers.

When Dillon Myer, the National Director of the WRA, visited Tule Lake the following month, the Daihyo Sha Kai resolved to present their complaints directly before him since negotiating with Best, the Tule Lake director, had been shown to be futile. The local bureaucrats denied that request to speak with Myer, and the Daihyo Sha Kai decided to force the issue. In a massive show of support, thousands of internees surrounded the administrative building in which Myer was visiting with Best. George Kuratomi, the spokesman of the protesters, outlined to Myer the people's grievances which included Best's dishonest dealings, White racism among certain administrators, inadequate food, overcrowding, and the lack of basic cleaning equipment. But beyond those specific complaints, Kuratomi asked that "we be treated humanely from this Government, this Government of the United States."<sup>14</sup> Myer's response was to align himself firmly with Best and his policies and not give any encouragement to a consideration of the people's demands.

Having failed to receive an acceptable response to their grievances from the WRA, who in the minds of the people were representatives of the United States government, the protesters had no other option but to turn to the Japanese government through the Spanish Consul for redress and support. At this point, there developed a major tactical fracture within the populace. The more conservative protesters who hoped for a post-war future in America viewed the appeal to Japan as incompatible with that desire because White Americans would perceive that to be "un-American." These continued their protest but only through what they considered to be "legitimate" channels--the WRA, the Army, and the Congress. Others who saw no future for themselves and their children in a post-war America viewed the appeal to the Japanese government as their final option. Their first meeting with the Spanish Consul took place on November 3, two days after the confrontation with Myer, and despite his inability to improve the conditions of camp life, the protesters had at least found a receptive ear.

Meanwhile, there was much concern among the White administrators for their personal safety, having witnessed Japanese activism in the mass demonstration of November 1. They demanded military protection in the form of tanks and machine guns, and insisted that a man-proof fence be erected between the administration and internee areas. When Myer and Best failed to give them

that reassurance, they went directly to Lt. Col. Verne Austin on November 2 and received Austin's promise that Army troops would guarantee their safety. Best, miffed that his staff went over his head, dismissed two of his most outspoken critics, and within a week twenty staff members resigned.

Best, Myer, and the WRA were confronted with not only internal criticism from their staff for their handling of the mass demonstration of November 1, but also were charged with pampering the Japanese and administrative inefficiency by White residents of the Tule Lake basin and the press, and they faced possible censure from state and national legislative investigating committees. Thus, the November 1 demonstration took on national significance, and the pressure on the WRA to stamp out the resistance seemed to come from factors other than the Japanese protesters themselves. On November 4, following a minor scuffle between a handful of Japanese and White administrators, Best called in the military, a decision which appears to have been precipitated not by the scuffle but by the other pressures mentioned above.<sup>15</sup>

The turning over of the camp to the military, therefore, was a hardening of position vis-à-vis resistance and a crackdown against protesters. But Army rule did not end resistance because it failed to rectify the causes of that resistance. Like the WRA, the Army viewed the camp in terms of pressure groups and enemy provocateurs,<sup>16</sup> but unlike the WRA, they were efficient in their repression of Japanese resistance. Individuals were arbitrarily arrested and detained, and there was no recourse or discussion of grievances. Still, throughout the period of military rule, the Daihyo Sha Kai urged restraint and open dialogue, but as conditions became progressively more oppressive, their strategy of appealing to the Japanese government was shown to be ineffective and that tactic came increasingly under fire from both extremes of the protest spectrum. On November 12, Austin announced that he no longer recognized the Daihyo Sha Kai as the legitimate voice of the people and the following day, he ordered the arrest and detention of members of that representative body.

A tactic employed to stamp out resistance by both the Army and the WRA was to drive a wedge between the majority whom they perceived to be basically co-operative and the minority who were the troublemakers. In a speech on November 13, the day on which the arrest and detention of members of the Daihyo Sha Kai began, a WRA official expressed that conspiratorial view: "It is our belief that the majority of the people in this colony do want to live in peace and harmony, that many of you are willing to work and carry on necessary services, but that a few, in order to gain power for themselves, have attempted to gain such power through force."<sup>17</sup>

And in accordance with that strategy of isolating the troublesome minority, the Army, on November 16, reiterated that they did not recognize the Daihyo Sha Kai as the legitimate representatives of the people and announced that instead, the block managers would fulfill that function. The block representatives, of whom the Daihyo Sha Kai consisted, were elected in free elections sponsored by the people themselves, in contrast with the block managers who had been appointed by the WRA. The Army's reason for recognizing the block managers as their contact with the people was "because they are representatives of the WRA...."<sup>18</sup>

*Correct!*

That the Army and WRA's conspiratorial view of the camp was grossly inaccurate and that they stubbornly refused to acknowledge the pervasiveness of resistance are clearly illustrated in their meeting with the representatives of the internees on November 18.<sup>19</sup> Austin expressed his suspicion of Japanese motives in the opening statement, that "All discussions held here... will be in English throughout the meeting." The block managers, aware of their impossible position, tried to make certain that the administrators understood the mood of the people regarding the announcement of November 16 that they, and not the block representatives, were to be the link with the internees. "We represent the WRA," protested Mayeda, "and we do not represent the people in the colony." Yamatani, a member of the Temporary Communications Committee,<sup>20</sup> added that, "we are still supporting 100% our negotiating committee."<sup>21</sup>

The meeting continued with the block managers pressing the Army on their exact duties since they were henceforth to be the people's representatives. The administrators replied that they were to maintain order<sup>22</sup> and enforce the 6 a.m. to 7 p.m. curfew. Furukawa, a block manager, pointed out that in the past, it was the duty of the wardens and not the block managers to maintain order, and he observed that previously, when the block managers had tried to move constructively to improve the mess halls, the WRA had stifled that initiative. The block managers were trying to get through to the administrators that they were not truly representative of the people and that they did not want to be caught in the middle, being seen as inu ("dogs" or "collaborators") by the people for enforcing the administration's unpopular regulations and being powerless to change administrative abuses and excesses.

When the Army tried to press the block managers to commit themselves to maintaining order without giving the assurance that they would have a voice in policy-making, the block managers sought to postpone that commitment by suggesting that they wait until after the expected visit of the Spanish Consul. That led an annoyed Lt. Col. Meek to respond, "We don't need him for negotiating..." and, "As far as we are concerned it doesn't make any difference whether he comes or not." Austin reiterated that point and concluded by saying, "Due to conditions that exist in this camp today, the Army is not interested in dealing with the committee with whom we are dealing. We do not believe or feel that it is a representative committee."

The administrators were not interested in dialogue and in understanding the true mood of the people because they had already formed an opinion of that mood. And they were not interested in suggestions about the operation of the camp from internees who held contrary opinions. They were seeking Japanese who reflected their viewpoint and fit into their priori conceptions. Because any internee who was openly critical of the existing order was considered to be subversive by the Army, many were afraid to demonstrate their true inner feelings. That repressive atmosphere created by an arbitrary administration was pointed out by Shirai when he responded, "Everybody [is] afraid to become a representative on a committee. Afraid that you will pick us up." The pressure to conform was not the monopoly of so-called internee pressure groups, but was a consciously directed policy of the administrators.

*who wants to be a legal dog?**resistance not attacking*

Methodical repression of the populace by the Army began the day after that meeting of November 18. Austin, in Proclamation Number 3, required that all internees, twelve years and older, receive identification badges which they had to carry with them at all times.<sup>23</sup> And on November 22, a comprehensive plan was formulated for a massive search of the Japanese area to be carried out on November 26. Among the stated purposes for that search were: (a) the taking into custody of trouble-making Japanese;<sup>24</sup> and (b) the confiscating of contraband such as knives, clubs, guns, explosives, and signalling devices. The search was to be carried out by three groups of about 150 men, each soldier carrying full field equipment and a gas mask, and every officer having side arms, clubs, and gas grenades.

The block managers were informed of this search only on the designated day, when the raid was launched with the precision of a well-planned military maneuver. The soldiers netted 25 tons of rice and other grains, 22 barrels of saké mash, 400 boxes of canned goods, 20 crates of dried fruit, 20 cartons of cereal, 2 saké stills, a Japanese language printing press, 500 knives, 400 clubs, 2 public address systems, and 500 radio receivers.<sup>25</sup>

Meanwhile on November 24, Austin and Best concurred on the erecting of a stockade which would include four barracks for the incarceration of "trouble-makers." Various lists of such persons were drawn up and these were methodically hunted down and placed in detention in the stockade not having been charged or given a hearing. On December 4, Austin announced to the people "You are notified that the members of the negotiating committee now in military custody are not and will not at any time negotiate with the Army, the WRA, or anyone else and they will not return to the colony." He therefore advised that the people hold elections for a new representative committee.<sup>26</sup>

The same day, the block representatives met to discuss Austin's suggestion and decided that they would place the matter before the people. There were three questions on the ballot the following day, December 5. These were: (1) should the Daihyo Sha Kai be dissolved and new representatives be elected to negotiate with the Army?; (2) should status quo be maintained? (i.e. should we support our present block representatives and the Negotiating Committee?); and (3) should there be a general strike in support of those who were imprisoned in the stockade? The results of that day's voting were as follows: three blocks favored a general strike, three blocks voted for new elections, five blocks remained undecided, and fifty-three blocks favored status quo.<sup>27</sup> Despite the administrators' coercive tactics, the referendum of December 5 was evidence of an overwhelming vote of confidence in the Daihyo Sha Kai and the Negotiating Committee.

But the pressures against maintaining status quo continued to build up the longer the Army remained intransigent in releasing members of the Negotiating Committee from the stockade and insisted on dealing only with a new committee of internees. That hopeless deadlock was pointed out by the Spanish Consul on December 13 at a meeting with the people, when he urged that the internees elect a new negotiating committee because the present Committee was powerless to effect change while in the stockade.<sup>28</sup> Despite that recommendation, few of

*many Japs*

the Japanese ventured to express support publicly, fearing to be viewed as pro-administration and against the imprisoned but still *de facto* leaders of the people. Yet, by isolating the members of the Negotiating Committee from the camp, the Army made it difficult for the leaders to communicate with the people.

Between the end of December 1943 and the beginning of January 1944, a series of events occurred which brought the situation to a head. According to one account, on the morning of December 30, Lt. Schaner, the Police and Prisoner Officer, arbitrarily took Yoshiyama and Tsuda, two prisoners, from the general stockade and confined them to a small cell within the stockade enclosure.<sup>29</sup> Schaner himself had selected these two previously to be the spokesmen for the prisoners, and his high-handed confinement of them reinforced the arbitrary manner in which the White administrators disregarded the internees' human rights.<sup>30</sup> In protest of Schaner's harassment of prisoners, the stockaders refused to assemble for the roll call at 1300.

One of the prisoners, Mori, spoke with Schaner about the situation and received the latter's promise that Yoshiyama and Tsuda would be released if the prisoners cleaned up the stockade area and assembled for the evening roll call. The Japanese fulfilled those conditions but by the next morning, Yoshiyama and Tsuda still had not been released. To protest that breach of promise the prisoners refused to assemble for roll call that day, December 31, but only after armed troops were brought into the stockade later in the day, did the Japanese yield and file out of their barracks.

At the roll call, Schaner again arbitrarily pointed to a prisoner, Uchida, and ordered him to be confined to the small stockade along with Yoshiyama and Tsuda. Then he challenged the Japanese, "Now if there are any more of you who would like to go with him, just step up towards the gate." After a moment's pause, one of them, Koji Todoroki, stepped forward and according to an Army eyewitness, "a murmur passed through the prisoners, followed by the entire group breaking ranks and moving in the direction of the gate."<sup>31</sup>

The men were forced to remain in line and stand in the snow for about three hours during which time Schaner conferred with Austin. Schaner returned to announce to the prisoners, "I was just waiting for that. You men will be put on bread and water for twenty-four hours. You men will have to learn that we mean business and will not tolerate such a demonstration."<sup>32</sup> Trucks then entered the stockade and removed all stores of foodstuffs. One of the Japanese brought in from the outside to help load the trucks showed a reluctance to carry out that task, and he received "a few tender cuffs from Lt. Smith and S/Sgt. Anderson which made him change his mind." Meanwhile, Schaner ordered a search of the prisoners' quarters, which was conducted, according to one military observer, "in a most unnecessary destructive method."<sup>33</sup> Many personal items were stolen from the Japanese including radios, pens, watches, cigarettes, and cash.

Following that display of flagrant abuse and disregard of their rights, the prisoners vowed to go on a hunger strike until the release of all prisoners in the stockade. One of the prisoners, Tsuda, explained why that decision was made. "The reason the men...are on this hunger strike is because they know

not the reason they are in the stockade. They feel they have been unjustly confined and the reason given to them is that they are the potential troublemakers and strong arm men of the colony, which they feel is not true. This is the manner in which they are trying to prove their sincerity and show that they should be vindicated."<sup>34</sup> The prisoners were protesting the arbitrary nature of their arrest and confinement, and they were trying to point out to the administrators once again their error in seeing the camp in terms of pressure groups and enemy provocateurs.

To the internees, the entire situation was absurd and senseless. In the first place, their removal and internment was an absurd though hardly unexpected happening. The White camp administrators, while accusing the Japanese of using pressure groups, employed high-handed and terror tactics in dealing with internee protest against what they considered to be violations of their fundamental human rights. Further, the administrators stubbornly refused to examine the protesters' demands objectively, rejected out of hand the legitimacy of the people's chosen representatives, and equated any criticism of their administration with pro-Axis sentiments and saw them as subversive and destructive of the American war effort.

At the same time, those same administrators lectured to the internees about the virtues of American democracy while incarcerating those who had been elected democratically by the people and who were exercising those rights of democracy. To the Japanese, there was no rational basis for the existence of the stockade or the presence of tanks and soldiers in the camp. The entire situation could have been simply resolved had the administrators accepted the legitimacy of the Daihyo Sha Kai, shown sincerity in discussing camp problems, and treated the internees as people with basic human rights.<sup>35</sup>

The prisoners' hunger strike lasted from January 1 to January 6, 1944 without producing any tangible concessions from the administration. The administrators kept the camp population ignorant of the protest until the third day of the strike when a group of concerned internees asked Austin about "rumors" of a hunger strike among the stockade prisoners and Austin confirmed its veracity. Despite an anonymously authored call among the internees for a demonstration of solidarity with the hunger strikers, there is no evidence of any such visible show of support.<sup>36</sup> Instead, the available sources show that there was a growing sentiment among the populace against status quo in an attempt to break the current deadlock.

There are several interesting features in the argument employed against status quo. Keeping in mind that the official (WRA and Army) and orthodox explanation is that the movement against status quo indicated that the majority of the internees rejected the legitimacy of the Daihyo Sha Kai and Negotiating Committee and simply wished for a return to "normalcy," we will examine some of those features. The basic premise of the argument against status quo was that the people were being severely oppressed, both in the stockade and in the camp, since martial rule. The Daihyo Sha Kai, the argument continued, had failed to alleviate that oppression, both because they were not recognized by the administrators and because they were being held prisoners in the stockade. Therefore,

the argument concluded, a new committee must be elected, one leading to improved camp conditions and the release of those in the stockade.

The argument here was a practical one: it was not a rejection of the Daihyo Sha Kai as the legitimate representatives of the people but was a recognition of the impasse and that this solution was the only option permitted by the administrators. Further, their appeal was not to American patriotism but to Japanese ethnicity. The members of the Daihyo Sha Kai, the argument went, were not displaying the "true Japanese spirit" because "true" Japanese would resign having failed. And the appeal concluded, "we have no other desire than to exist as a true Japanese and to return to Japan unashamed."<sup>37</sup>

On January 10, Austin sent out a memorandum to the block managers with instructions on the upcoming referendum which was to decide on the question of status quo. That there would arise confusion among many of the internees on the issue being voted upon was assured by Austin's instructions to the block managers. These instructions failed to be accompanied by a sample ballot, and one of them stated: "Whenever any questions should arise from the floor the chair should state that he is not in a position to answer them. The only purpose of the meeting is to have the block residents vote on the question listed on the ballots."<sup>38</sup> The following day, January 11, Austin held a meeting with all the block managers to discuss the voting which was to take place that night. At the meeting, he reinforced the notion that should the people vote against status quo, military oppression would end. "A great deal depends upon the manner in which these meetings are held," Austin admonished, "as to whether this colony comes back to normal, in which I believe you are all interested."<sup>39</sup>

That night, voting was held in the camp with the ballots simply labelled, "Against Status Quo" and "For Status Quo." The results of the voting as reported by the Army was, 4,593 against status quo, 4,120 for, and 228 undecided.<sup>40</sup> One internee report disputed that count and accused the administrators of rigging the election results because no internees were present at the tabulation of the votes. That report went on to claim that a true count was, thirty-one blocks for status quo, twenty-nine blocks against, four blocks undetermined, and one block abstained.<sup>41</sup> Also, one of the internees later testified that "the ballots were none too good and some people didn't understand the meaning of status quo."<sup>42</sup> But apart from the question of the validity of the results, the vote revealed the reluctance of the people to cast a vote which could be interpreted as being a repudiation of the Daihyo Sha Kai, despite the argument that such a vote would be followed by the release of the men in the stockade and a lessening of military oppression.

In a meeting held on January 14 between those who had favored the abolishing of status quo and Daihyo Sha Kai members who were in the stockade, their unity of purpose was reaffirmed although they had chosen two different approaches to that one basic goal.<sup>43</sup> Both groups lamented the fact that the issue had split the internees. "I surely hate to see the Japanese divided," commented Inouye, "and hate to see them fighting with each other." Shimada explained why that division was brought about and why they had voted against status quo. "Let me repeat this," he asserted, "the Army would not give a chance to talk

about [the] release of you people, unless normal condition was first returned." Inouye, a spokesman for the stockade prisoners, reconfirmed the unity of purpose of both groups and offered: "We realize all the things you people are going through and have told the men in the stockade that you people were working so hard for the common goal. We are just as worried as you people are."

On January 15, 1944, just four days after the status quo referendum, the Army formally turned over the administration of Tule Lake internment camp to the WRA, ostensibly after having fulfilled their mission of stamping out resistance. They had accomplished that by isolating the troublemakers from the majority of the people and were vindicated in the recent referendum which they interpreted as being a repudiation of the Daihyo Sha Kai and a vote for the return to "normalcy." Austin expressed his persistent belief in the orthodox view of resistance on the even of his departure: "The block representatives were all appointees of the pressure group and while some of them were capable and responsible members of the Colony the rest were actively engaged in fomenting unrest, discord and recommending violence to those desiring a return of normalcy within the Colony."<sup>44</sup>

While the period of military rule is merely a limited window into Japanese resistance at Tule Lake, it is a time segment crucial to the orthodox interpretation of resistance. That interpretation maintains that it was during that repressive period that the internee majority were permitted to express themselves freely because of the incarceration of the radicals, and that expression was a rejection of status quo and the election of moderate leaders.

In contrast, it can be seen that there had been a history of resistance and there was no such dramatic break, because both groups, for and against status quo, were committed to a program of reform and the continuing fight for a recognition of their humanity. Their disagreement was in the method of resistance. One group believed that the release of prisoners in the stockade was the first step toward a peaceful relationship between internees and administrators, while the other group held that the latter would be followed by the former. Further, the vote against status quo was not necessarily a vote against the Daihyo Sha Kai. In fact, the leaders in that vote saw it as a practical solution to the impasse created by the administration's intransigence. And in the final analysis, both those who favored status quo and those opposed to it were united in the underlying and pervasive struggle for human rights.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>See e.g., Morton Grodzins, Americans Betrayed (Chicago, 1949); Jacobus tenBroek, Edward N. Barnhart, and Floyd W. Matson, Prejudice, War, and the Constitution (Berkeley, 1954); and Roger Daniels, Concentration Camps, U.S.A. (New York, 1971).

<sup>2</sup>See e.g., Dorothy Swaine Thomas and Richard S. Nishimoto, The Spoilage (Berkeley, 1946).

<sup>3</sup>See e.g., Leonard J. Arrington, The Price of Prejudice (Logan, Utah, 1962); Bill Hosokawa, Nisei: The Quiet Americans (New York, 1969); and Harry H. L. Kitano, Japanese Americans: The Evolution of a Subculture (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1969).

<sup>4</sup>Edward H. Spicer, Asael T. Hansen, Katherine Luomala, and Marvin K. Opler, Impounded People (Tucson, 1969), pp. 15-16, 23, 63-64; and Alexander H. Leighton, The Governing of Men (Princeton, 1945), pp. 90-92.

<sup>5</sup>Carey McWilliams, Prejudice (Boston, 1944, pp. 173, 176; Dillon S. Myer, Uprooted Americans (Tucson, 1971), pp. 59-65; and Shotaro Frank Miyamoto, "A Study of the Career of Intergroup Tensions: The Collective Adjustments of Evacuees to Crises at the Tule Lake Relocation Center," Ph.D. diss. University of Chicago, 1950.

<sup>6</sup>McWilliams, Prejudice, 177-78; Paul Bailey, City in the Sun (Los Angeles, 1971); and Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage.

<sup>7</sup>McWilliams, Prejudice, pp. 179-80; and Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage.

<sup>8</sup>Douglas W. Nelson, "Heart Mountain: The History of an American Concentration Camp," M.A. thesis, University of Wyoming, 1970; Gary Y. Okihiro, "Japanese Resistance in America's Concentration Camps: A Re-evaluation," Amerasia Journal, 2 (Fall 1973), 20-34; and Arthur A. Hansen and David A. Hacker, "The Manzanar Riot: An Ethnic Perspective," Amerasia Journal, 2 (Fall 1974), 112-57.

<sup>9</sup>As done for the Chinese in Alexander Saxton's, The Indispensable Enemy, Berkeley, 1971.

<sup>10</sup>Tule Lake became a "segregation center" after September 1943 following the so-called loyalty registration which segregated the internees into "loyals" and "disloyals." Those who were designated as "disloyals" were termed "segregates" and transferred to Tule Lake internment camp.

<sup>11</sup>"Status quo" was the continuation of the Daihyo Sha Kai and Negotiating Committee as the legitimate representatives of the people. The Daihyo Sha Kai had been formed in October 1943 by a free and democratic election of all the internees of Tule Lake camp. Its composition, in the words of Thomas and Nishimoto, consisted of "belligerent, vociferous individuals who had gained the reputation of being aggressive opponents of the administration...." The Negotiating Committee was composed of fourteen members of the Daihyo Sha Kai who were nominated to serve as the larger body's mouthpiece in negotiations with the administration. Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage, p. 117.

<sup>12</sup>Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage, pp. 184-86.

<sup>13</sup>A separate paper to be published in a forthcoming edited volume covers the period before martial law.

<sup>14</sup>"Transcript of the Meeting," November 1, 1943, in Japanese American Research Project, Collection 2010, Research Library, University of California, Los Angeles [henceforth referred to as JARP Collection], Austin Papers, Box 43 [henceforth referred to as AP], Folder 4, Document 3.

<sup>15</sup>Oral history interview with Dillon S. Myer, May 20, 1968, in JARP Collection, Box 397, No. 300.

<sup>16</sup>The orthodox interpretation of resistance falls into this same error. Protest, by the WRA and Army, was seen as being anti-administration and disruptive. In its most extreme form, the WRA and Army viewed themselves as representatives of the American government. Resistance, therefore, was anti-American and even disruptive of the entire war effort. To the internees, protest was constructive and designed simply to gain a recognition of their fundamental human rights and for a more satisfactory life in the camps. As evidence of this contrast, see Leighton, Governing of Men, pp. 81-89; and Spicer et. al., Impounded, p. 133, in which at Poston, members of the WRA staff equated the internees with the Japanese enemy.

<sup>17</sup>Speech by Mr. Cozzens, November 13, 1943, in JARP Collection, AP, Folder 5, Document 23.

<sup>18</sup>Notes by Lt. Forbes at a meeting held November 16, 1943, in JARP Collection, AP, Folder 5, Document 27.

<sup>19</sup>The proceedings of this meeting were taken from, Evacuee Meeting, November 18, 1943, in JARP Collection, AP, Folder 6, Document 1.

<sup>20</sup>The Temporary Communications Committee had been appointed by the Daihyo Sha Kai to serve as their representatives throughout the period of their detention by the Army.

<sup>21</sup>As noted before, the Negotiating Committee consisted of fourteen members nominated from among the Daihyo Sha Kai to serve as the mouthpiece of that representative body.

<sup>22</sup>Proclamation Number 2, November 13, 1943, spelled out some of the regulations which were to be enforced. These included the prohibiting of outdoor meetings without prior military approval, and no incoming or outgoing telephone or telegraph messages without administrative consent. JARP Collection, AP, Folder 5, Document 18.

<sup>23</sup>Proclamation Number 3, November 19, 1943, in JARP Collection, AP, Folder 6, Document 4.

<sup>24</sup>Various members of the Negotiating Committee had successfully eluded arrest by the Army by going into hiding. These included Kuratomi, Kai, and Sugimoto.

<sup>25</sup>JARP Collection, AP, Folder 6, Documents 7, 11, 15, 17.

<sup>26</sup>Notice to All Residents of Tule Lake Center, December 12, 1943, in JARP Collection, AP, Folder 7, Document 6.

<sup>27</sup>JARP Collection, AP, Folder 7, Document 7. Cf. "Minutes of the Meeting of the Dai-Hyo Sha Kai of the Tule Lake Center," December 5, 1943, in the Bancroft Library collection of material relating to the evacuation and internment, University of California, Berkeley, Folder R 2.25, which records the final vote to be: three blocks for a general strike, four blocks for new elections, two blocks were undecided, and fifty-six blocks for status quo.

<sup>28</sup>JARP Collection, AP, Folder 7, Document 17. Another indication that the internees were trying all avenues open to them was their petition to the U.S. Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, dated December 7, 1943. The petition summarized the events which led to the military occupation of Tule Lake and asked for administrative co-operation and dialogue. JARP Collection, AP, Folder 7, Document 32.

<sup>29</sup>Another account states that these men were confined to the small stockade because they had laughed out loud during the calling of the roll. Yoshiyama and Tsuda, however, were not laughing at the White soldiers but at two men who were trying to load cartons of tobacco. JARP Collection, AP, Folder 8, Document 26.

<sup>30</sup>See e.g., JARP Collection, AP, Folder 8, Document 24.

<sup>31</sup>"Stockade Prisoners Rebellion," an investigation by S/Sgt. Sam Yeremian, December 31, 1943, in JARP Collection, AP, Folder 7, Document 30.

<sup>32</sup>"Stockade Prisoners Rebellion."

<sup>33</sup>"Stockade Prisoners Rebellion."

<sup>34</sup>Interview with Hiroyoshi Tsuda, January 5, 1944, in JARP Collection, AP, Folder 8, Document 8.

<sup>35</sup>Interview with Hiroyoshi Tsuda; and "Meeting of the Spanish Consul," November 3, 1943, in JARP Collection, AP, Folder 4, Document 4.

<sup>36</sup>"Voice of the People," in JARP Collection, AP, Folder 8, Document 10.

<sup>37</sup>JARP Collection, AP, Folder 8, Documents 15, 16, 17, 19, 20.

<sup>38</sup>Memorandum, Austin to Block Managers, January 10, 1944, in JARP Collection, AP, Folder 8, Document 18. The block managers were to read a statement from a pamphlet prepared by the administration to the assembled people immediately before the voting began. Unfortunately, there is no record of what that statement said. "Minutes of a General Meeting of all Block Managers," January 11, 1944, in JARP Collection, AP, Folder 8, Document 21.

<sup>39</sup>"Minutes of a General Meeting of all Block Managers," January 11, 1944.

<sup>40</sup>JARP Collection, AP, Folder 8, Document 22. Despite the statistically significant correlation between blocks voting for status quo and the percentage of segregationists in those blocks, the link is not necessarily a causal one.

<sup>41</sup>"Report of Present Condition," by the Nippon Patriotic Society, in JARP Collection, AP, Folder 8, Document 29. This protest of the official count is important when one considers the 228 listed by the Army as "undecided." If, for instance, that 228 and the 247 disenfranchised stockade prisoners voted for status quo, those favoring status quo would have a majority of 4,595 to 4,593.

<sup>42</sup>"Report of the Informal Interview of the Divisional Responsible Men and the Detained Stockade Internees," January 14, 1944, in JARP Collection, AP, Folder 8, Document 26. On the morning of the vote, soldiers rounded up some members of the Daihyo Sha Kai and status quo sympathizers. That may have influenced a number of the Japanese to vote in conformance with the Army's wishes. Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage, pp. 181-82.

<sup>43</sup>The proceedings of this meeting were taken from, "Report of the Informal Interview," January 14, 1944.

<sup>44</sup>Letter from Austin to de Amat, January 14, 1944, in JARP Collection, AP, Folder 8, Document 27.