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Cons. No. 25294-S

Affidavit of Rosalie Hankey

Jan. 8, 1947

(Nos. 25294-S, 25295-S, 25296-S,  
25297-S )

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Chicago, Illinois )  
Cook County ) ss

No. 25294-D  
No. 25295-D  
No. 25296-D  
A F F I D A V I T  
No. 25297-D

For  
Mr. Collins

ROSALIE HANKEY, being sworn, deposes and says as follows:

Consolidated  
No. 25294-D

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I am a graduate student of anthropology and am presently employed by the Department of Anthropology in the University of Chicago as Assistant in Anthropology. In July of 1943 I entered the employ of the Evacuation and Resettlement Study of the University of California at Berkeley, California. At this time I was 31 years old.

This Study was an organization especially set up by the University of California with funds donated by the Giannini and Rockefeller Foundations to observe and record from the sociological standpoint the evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific Coast ordered by Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt and the social phenomena which resulted therefrom. This Study was under the direction of Dr. Dorothy S. Thomas, a professor at the University of California. The Study employed a number of students of sociology and anthropology who acted as observers in the several assembly centers and relocation centers and also employed students of Japanese ancestry, who themselves were evacuated, to act as reporters. I was at first assigned by Dr. Thomas to the Gila Relocation Center and began my work there in July of 1943. The nature of my duties there included the recording of events and evacuee attitudes, and the preparation of reports describing and analysing the sociological phenomena. On February 1, 1944, after seven months of almost continuous residence at the Gila Center, I was directed by Dr. Thomas to visit the Tule Lake Center in Modoc, California to make a preliminary survey of the attitudes of the segregated evacuees. Approximately three weeks before this visit, the jurisdiction of the Tule Lake Center had been returned to the War Relocation Authority by the Military. At this visit I remained at the Tule Lake Center for two days. I made two succeeding visits to the Tule Lake Center: from March 14 to March 23, 1944, and from April 12 to April 17, 1944. Between these visits I returned to the Gila Center. On May 13 of 1944 I took up permanent study in the Tule Lake Center and remained there until May 9, 1945, except for three brief trips to consult with Dr. Thomas. Therefore, I observed substantially all of the sociological developments leading up to the renunciation of citizenship and was at the Tule Lake Center during most of the renunciations themselves.

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During all of this time, by the techniques described below, I assembled very full field notes on the renunciation program and submitted these to the Evacuation and Resettlement Study. I also submitted voluminous reports on evacuee attitudes toward renunciation. The University of California has recently published the first volume of its studies, which volume relates specifically to those evacuees who renounced their citizenship. The book was put into final form by Dr. Dorothy S. Thomas and Richard Nishimoto, who was the Study's observer in the Colorado River Relocation Center. To the best of my knowledge and belief, insofar as it deals with events taking place at the Tule Lake Center after segregation, this book is based entirely on my field notes and the manuscripts which I submitted, except for certain information gained after the renunciation program had been completed from talks with evacuees who were there at the time and from letters written by evacuees after the renunciation program was complete.

For the above reasons and because of the techniques employed by me, hereinafter described, it is my belief that I am qualified to speak as an expert on the social pressures obtaining within the Tule Lake Center prior to and during the renunciation program from December 1944 through May 1945.

I obtained information for my field notes in the following manner:

The accumulation of data on evacuee attitudes presented many difficulties to a person of Caucasian ancestry. The experiences of evacuation and the confining life of the Centers had intensified the pre-evacuation in-group solidarity of the Japanese residents. The WRA administration and its staff members, the visible representatives of authority, were commonly held responsible by the evacuees for the great variety of inconveniences, annoyances, and hardships of Center life. Therefore, the WRA staff, in general was regarded with considerable antipathy. The strong in-group sentiments of the Japanese and their dislike of the WRA administration were, in part, responsible for an additional phenomenon which increased the difficulties of sociological investigation. This was an extraordinarily powerful evacuee fear of being considered a stool-pigeon. This fear was coupled with a hatred of persons alleged to be stool-pigeons, i.e., traitors to their own people. Such persons were called inu, a Japanese



word meaning dog or informer. Any evacuee who appeared to be on markedly friendly terms with a Caucasian staff member or was observed visiting the Administration buildings when he had no specific business there exposed himself to being called an inu.

The inu phenomenon was a potent means of social control in all of the Centers of which I have knowledge. In Tule Lake it played a very significant part in the sociological developments which preceded the renunciation of citizenship. It was largely responsible for the fact that terrorists and persons guilty of violent assault were not denounced to the authorities. To be stigmatized as an inu brought social ostracism which in the crowded and confined life of the Centers was painful in the extreme. All meals were served in public mess-halls. An alleged inu, seating himself at a table, was greeted with an uncomfortable silence and meaningful glances. If he entered a latrine or boiler room, which were common places for gossip and discussion, he found that friendly talk or argument stopped with his appearance. Because of the lack of privacy which Center conditions imposed, he could find no escape and was reminded of his despised position many times every day. During a period of tension, he might be assaulted and severely beaten. In the Tule Lake Center at least seven men alleged to be inu were beaten. In the same Center, Mr. Hitomi, alleged to be an inu, was murdered. If, therefore, an evacuee or a segregee held opinions contrary to those which were considered the prevailing sentiment, he was strongly inclined to keep these opinions to himself or to voice them only to trusted intimates. He was also inclined to avoid the appearance of intimacy with WRA staff members.

I was able to substantially overcome the handicaps to sociological investigation outlined above in the following manner. To my informants I stressed the fact that I was not a member of the WRA administration but a student, hired by scholars who were interested in preparing an accurate account of events within the Japanese Centers. I stated that I would not show my data to the WRA administration and would not reveal the names of my informants. These contentions were not believed until my informants had the opportunity to observe that I had little association with WRA staff members and



that I did not attempt to pry into those matters which evacuees were reluctant to discuss with a Caucasian. In the Gila Relocation Center I began my field work by initiating a series of innocuous investigations, e.g., how Center life was affecting the children. This and similar projects gave me the opportunity to make frequent visits to the apartments of evacuees. After this program had been continued for several months, certain informants made overtures of friendship. They then began to give me an informal education on the genuine attitudes of the residents which often differed greatly from the stereotyped attitudes generally reserved for Caucasians. I gained intimate knowledge of those matters which a member of the in-group was morally obliged not to reveal to outsiders. When certain of these friendly informants began to give me a considerable amount of their time, I offered to pay them. This offer was refused. The situation which resulted put me under an ethical obligation. I was obtaining information through friendship and I had no means of recompensing informants except by rigorously observing the taboos of the in-group, i.e., keeping my promise that I would reveal no information given to me. This process was cumulative and, in time, I was given information of an extraordinary nature. In Tule Lake a self-avowed ardently pro-Japanese group determined to circulate one of their petitions without asking permission of the WRA administration. They feared that they would be denied permission, since a few weeks before, the WRA had emphatically informed them that it did not intend to embark on the program they sponsored. One of the most influential leaders of the group sponsoring the petition, allowed me to read it several days before it was circulated and described the pressure his group intended to apply to residents who did not wish to sign. In Tule Lake evacuee informants also gave me the name of the man who was alleged to control a gang of terrorists. This gang, I was told, had committed a series of assaults upon the so-called inu (stool-pigeons). These informants did not give this information to the WRA administration or, so far as I know, to the police. Moreover, a Japanese informant who was severely beaten, assured me that the aforementioned gang of terrorists was responsible for the assault. Previously, he had refused to name his



assailants to the WRA Internal Security. I did not reveal this, and much other information of similar character, to the authorities. Because of this policy I was able to obtain data which, I believe, far exceeds in accuracy and reliability the information gained by most Caucasians who were in contact with the Japanese in the Centers.

I was, moreover, able to develop excellent rapport with certain leaders of the pro-Japanese pressure groups. The parent pressure group I shall call the Resegregation Group. It was also known at various times as the Saikakuri Seigan and the Sokuji Kikoku Hoshi-dan. Membership in this group was by families. To the best of my knowledge, adult aliens and citizens and also minor children were considered members. In August of 1944 this body sponsored an auxiliary body for young men. This auxiliary body I shall call the Young Men's Fatherland Group. It was also called at various times the Sokoku Kenkyu Seinen-dan and the Hokoku Seinen-dan. Most of the members of this auxiliary body were to the best of my knowledge citizens of the United States. From May of 1944 until his internment in December of 1944 I was a regular visitor at the apartment of the man who, in my opinion, was the most influential leader of the Resegregation Group. He was also one of the two advisors to the Young Men's Fatherland Group and was an Issei. From July of 1944 until his internment in December of 1944 I frequently visited the other advisor to the Young Men's Fatherland Group who was a Nisei about 45 years old. This man was also alleged to be the leader of a gang of terrorists who assaulted persons who criticized either of the groups. I was also very well acquainted with and frequently visited four additional influential leaders of these groups. I was casually acquainted with others.

In this document it will be cumbersome to state specifically whether an informant was a member of one or the other group. The organizations were most intimately related and many or most of the members of the Young Men's Fatherland Group were members of the Resegregationist Group. On the other hand, older men, almost all of whom were Issei, advised the Young Men's Fatherland Group and, in my opinion, formed most of the policies of this youths' organization.

In addition I also developed good rapport with the chairman and other members of the body which was responsible for the much publicized demonstration of November 1, 1943. Many of these men later became very hostile to the aforementioned Resegregation Group.



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In addition to the persons described above I consulted a large number of other informants, some of whom were hostile to the Resegregation Group, some of whom disapproved of the group, and some of whom attempted to remain neutral. Some of these informants were nominal members of the Resegregation Group and some were not. Among my informants were Issei, Nisei and Kibei. I was, in fact, the only Caucasian who, in substance, made daily visits to the apartments of the Japanese residents of Tule Lake Center. I was also one of the very few who regularly entered the Center on foot and without an escort.

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Maintaining contact with my informants in the face of the prevailing evacuee fear of being thought an inu required much tact and patience. I carefully arranged my visits so that I would not be observed by neighbors. I paid many visits during inclement weather when most of the residents remained indoors. The frequent severe dust storms, the bitter winter winds, and the thaws which rendered parts of the Center nearly impassable to a person not wearing heavy boots, provided ample opportunity for such visits. During periods of extreme community tension and fear, such as that which followed the murder of Mr. Hitomi, I corresponded with informants. In fact, after this murder one of my informants warned me to stay out of the center because the alleged gang leader had boasted that he intended to kill a Caucasian, and I, who entered the remote parts of the Center without escort, was particularly vulnerable. In my opinion, the fact that Tule Lake was a large community and that, except for the Resegregation Group it was socially disorganized to the extent that residents were inclined to confine their social activities to the blocks in or near which they lived, gave me a distinct advantage. Informants, in general, had little opportunity to discover who my other contacts were. I revealed no names. If, therefore, I visited an ardent member of the Resegregation Group and appeared to sympathize with his views,



he had little opportunity to discover that when I visited an individual who was hostile to the group, I gave the contrary impression. This was particularly important in regard to my contacts with the Resegregation Group leaders. Had my ordinary informants realized that I was on good terms with these powerful individuals, I would have gained little reliable data on how ordinary folk viewed the activities of the Resegregationists.

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The greater part of my field notes were taken down in approximately verbatim form. When the statements of evacuees appear in this document, they are reproduced, substantially without editing.

I intend to describe those sociological phenomena which I observed in the Tule Lake Center which bear on the renunciation of citizenship. Insofar as my data indicate, I shall state my opinions in regard to the motivations which led the citizen residents of Tule Lake to commit this act. Since I am of the opinion that the activities of the aforementioned Resegregation Group had an important bearing on the renunciation of citizenship, I shall present the history of the development of this group in considerable detail. This, in turn, will require a brief explanation of the sociological developments in the Tule Lake Center which preceded the formal organization of the Resegregation Group.

I was residing in the Gila Relocation Center when the policy of segregation was announced to the evacuees in the summer of 1943. What data I obtained in the Gila Center in no way contradicts the discussion of segregation presented by Dr. Thomas and R. Nishimoto in The Spoilage (pp. 84-112) or the analysis presented by the WRA Community Analyst, Dr. Morris Opler, in WRA Community Analysis, "Studies of Segregants at Manzanar." These authorities in substance hold that the reasons evacuees decided to become segregants and thereby assume the status of individuals disloyal to the United States were: fear of being forced to leave the Centers and face a hostile American public; concern for the security of their families; fear on the part of evacuee parents that their sons would be drafted if they did not become segregates; anger and disillusionment owing to the abrogation of their citizenship rights; bitterness over economic losses brought about by the evacuation. I was also told by a



Japanese informant that some Issei believed that Japan was going to win the war and that they would eventually reap benefits if they went to Tule Lake.

Most of the **segregoes** entered the Tule Lake Center in September and October of 1943. They were at this time far from **homogeneous** in status (loyal or disloyal) and in sentiment toward the United States. In the segregation movement children who held status as loyal citizens of the United States were allowed to accompany segregoe parents. Parents who held status as aliens loyal to the United States were allowed to accompany segregoe children. Moreover, over 1,000 pre-segregation residents of Tule Lake ineligible for segregation refused to leave that Center and were allowed to remain there. Therefore, at one extreme of the population were individuals who, when I made their acquaintance in Tule Lake, voiced sentiments which were decidedly pro-Japanese. At the other extreme, in my opinion, was a significant proportion of the population which had no intention of going to Japan and felt no sentiments resembling loyalty to Japan whatever. Between these two extremes was the bulk of the population -- the fence-sitters. Such persons, when I made their acquaintance, told me that they had come to or remained in Tule Lake to make up their minds. In my opinion, they did not look upon segregation as a final step committing them to inevitable expatriation or repatriation. Informants belonging to this group repeatedly made statements to me which may be paraphrased as follows: "All I want is that they let me stay here in peace until the end of the war." It is my opinion that these persons regarded Tule Lake as a refuge where they might remain in relative safety from the economic hardships and physical danger which they feared would be their lot if they attempted immediately to re-establish themselves in the United States.

It should be stressed that the groups described above were not static. Individuals and groups vacillated **constantly** as they were swayed by events, news, and rumors. A resented administrative policy or a newspaper report of an assault upon Japanese residing outside of the Centers would, for a period of time, increase the number of evacuees who believed that the United States held no future for them. This vacillation was one of the more salient social phenomena of Center life. Many of the phenomena hereinafter



described cannot be evaluated properly unless it is kept in mind. Prolonged insecurity and indecision may unbalance even individuals who possess great mental stability. In view of the fact that the substantial majority of the residents of Tule Lake had been in a state of indecision for almost four years, it is not surprising that they believed fantastic rumors, that they frequently did not think or act logically, that they were prone to take what appeared ~~the~~ immediate path to safety, and that they were predisposed to fall into mass anxiety which on several occasions rose to panic.

I did not visit the Tule Lake Center until February 1, of 1944. Consequently, I was not residing there when the events I shall outline briefly below took place. My statements are based on a great deal of data acquired after my arrival and on WRA documents.

It is my opinion that the demonstration of November 1, 1943 resulted substantially from a widespread evacuee sentiment that the living facilities in Tule Lake stood in great need of improvement. The listing of these alleged grievances would require many pages. On October 15, 1943, a truck transporting Japanese workers to the project farm turned over. Some 30 men were injured, several severely. One died within a few days. The Japanese farm workers refused to return to work. The residents, under the guidance of leaders who had attained some prestige in the Relocation Centers from which they had come, selected a Representative Body. This body determined to use the farm work stoppage as a means of obtaining a mitigation of the grievances referred to above. I am of the



opinion that at this time the Japanese Representative Body had strong support from the general residents.

On October 26, 1943, certain members of this Representative Body approached the Project Director, stating that the farmers were resolved to continue their work stoppage until the administration gave assurance that the complaints of the residents would receive attention. At this time, only the farmers had stopped work. The Project Director promised to do what he could to relieve the situation. However, without acquainting the Representative Body or the residents with his intention, the Project Director brought in non-segreguee Japanese from the Relocation Centers to harvest the crop. This action on the part of the Project Director deprived the residents of their only important bargaining point: the fact that the valuable potato crop would spoil with great loss if not harvested immediately. Moreover, it is my opinion that this action was viewed by the segreguees as a breach of trust on the part of the Administration. I believe that it greatly increased segreguee hostility against the WRA administration.

On November 1, 1943, Mr. Dillon Myer, National Director of the WRA, visited the Tule Lake Center. Seizing this opportunity to appeal directly to him, the leaders of the Representative Body engineered a mass demonstration during which a crowd of segreguees, variously estimated at from 5,000 to 10,000 surrounded the administrative buildings. According to WRA documents the behavior of this crowd was most orderly. However, a group of young Japanese entered the hospital. They attacked and severely beat the Caucasian Chief Medical Officer, who, in my opinion, was extremely unpopular with the Japanese residents. It is my opinion that these assailants had no connection with the leaders of the Japanese Representative Body. When order had been restored, the leaders of the Representative Body again presented the list of the residents' grievances. Mr. Myer promised to investigate the complaints and take action if they were justified. He made such a statement to the crowd which then dispersed quietly.

On the night of November 4, 1943, a fight broke out between a group of young Japanese men and a few Caucasians. Later, a Japanese informant told me that he had been the leader of this group of Japanese. He stated



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that this group had taken it upon themselves to watch the project warehouses at night in order to prevent the WRA administration from transporting food to the harvesters from the Relocation Centers. It is my opinion that this informant in this regard was telling the truth. While this fight was taking place, the Project Director requested the assistance of the Military Police. The Military assumed control of the Center. On the night of November 4 the Military arrested 18 young men found in the administration area, released 9 of them and confined the remainder.

Many informants told me later that on the night of November 4 they were not aware of the fact that the Military had assumed control of the Center, and that they set out for work the next morning as usual. This statement is credible for the evacuee residence section was at a considerable distance from the administrative section. In any case, a large number of evacuees approached the administrative section on November 5 at the beginning of the working day. They were probably joined by the relatives of the Japanese hospital staff, which had not been allowed to return to the Japanese section by the Military. These persons were met by a cordon of soldiers and told to return to their barracks. When these orders were not obeyed, the soldiers released tear gas into the crowd. Ten months later, informants still spoke of this event with great bitterness, holding that it was not just to throw tear gas at them when they were attempting to go to work.

The construction of a "man-proof" fence, separating the administrative buildings from the Japanese residence section was now begun. All Japanese work in the administrative section was temporarily suspended, since all residents were confined to the Japanese section. Within a few days the Japanese hospital staff and reduced garbage and coal crews resumed work as a result of a conference between the Military and members of the Japanese Representative Body. The Military, I was told, decided to cut the garbage and coal crews to one-third of their former size. This created difficulties for the Japanese Representative Body, which was caught between the stand of the Military and the attitude of the Japanese residents who did not understand why some persons were allowed to return to work while others



were not. Both parties then agreed to hold a mass meeting at which the Lieutenant Colonel and members of the Japanese Representative Body would speak, each explaining the situation to the residents. When this matter was put before a session of the Representative Body a factional dispute arose, certain members holding that the Military was not allowing the Japanese sufficient time to speak. Despite strong opposition from

the chairman of the Representative Body the anti-mass meeting faction swayed the body into voting not to attend the mass meeting. Messages to this effect were thereupon sent to each block and read in the mess-halls. The Military was not informed of this decision. At the appointed time, the Lieutenant Colonel and the regional director of the WRA entered the camp with a strong military escort and took their places on the outdoor stage. No Japanese came to hear them. They delivered their speeches, nonetheless.

On the same day, November 13, the Military declared martial law to be in effect. The Military also began to arrest the leaders of the Representative Body, some of whom went into hiding but gave themselves up voluntarily on December 1, 1943. Other men, suspected of being leaders, were arrested. A stockade was built to house these detainees.

After the declaration of martial law and the arrest of these leaders the residents entered upon a partial strike. In substance, they refused to return to work until the apprehended men were released. Doctors, nurses, mess workers, block managers, and the coal and garbage crews continued to work. The Military continued to make arrests and by mid-December of 1943 over 200 persons were confined in the stockade.

For over two months the residents maintained their partial strike. However, as the weeks passed, the monotony of a life without employment or recreation, the strict curfew, and the hardships imposed by the loss of the monthly pay check and clothing allowance markedly decreased the enthusiasm of the early period of the strike. In mid-December of 1943 a new group of Japanese leaders arose and with strong assistance from the WRA administration attempted to influence the residents to abandon the partial strike. In mid-January of 1944 a ballot was arranged and the



residents voted to stop the strike by a plurality of 473 out of 8,713 votes cast. The WRA resumed control of the Center, using the new group of leaders, the Co-ordinating Committee, as a liaison body between the administration and the residents. Jobs were quickly filled and evacuees were now allowed to enter the administrative area with a pass, submitted to the sentry at the gate.

*all persons should be removed*  
Twenty days after the referendum vote had been cast I made my first visit to the Tule Lake Center. It is my opinion that at this time even conservative residents deeply resented the past policies of the WRA administration and that they disliked and distrusted the administrative sponsored Co-ordinating Committee. Many persons claimed that the members of the Co-ordinating Committee were not their elected representatives (as, indeed, they were not). Some informants called certain of the acts of the former Representative Body silly, foolish, and radical, but stoutly maintained that this body had been and still was the legitimate representative body of the people.

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In March of 1944, during my second visit to Tule Lake, I became aware of the existence of an underground pressure group. This group spread propaganda and distributed pamphlets which were designed to discredit the Co-ordinating Committee. This group also agitated to obtain the release of the men detained in the stockade. Some of the members, to my certain knowledge, had relatives who were detained and who were alleged to have been beaten by the WRA Internal Security on November 4, 1943. It is my opinion that during February and March of 1944 this underground group was not regarded with respect by most of the residents. My informants usually spoke of the group with derogation, calling the members agitators and radicals. In the spring of 1944 this underground group was considerably strengthened by the arrival of certain parolees from Santa Fe, the Department of Justice internment camp. *also* Some of these parolees, I was informed, had contributed to anti-administrative disturbances in Relocation Centers before their internment and in my opinion they were agitators of experience and prestige. In addition the underground group established a connection with a man who, I was informed, was a powerful gang leader from the Manzanar Center. This man,



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I was told, had led a pre-evacuation gang on Terminal Island, California and was also credited with having instigated much of the violence which occurred in the Manzanar Center in December of 1942. I was personally acquainted with this alleged gang leader and in my opinion he was very clever. He was, in any case, never called to task for these alleged activities by the authorities.

It is my opinion that these experienced agitators took control of the up to this time rather inept underground group which continued to circulate propaganda against the Co-ordinating Committee and against the WRA administration. I believe and have data which indicate that they spread rumors to the effect that the members of the Co-ordinating Committee were inu (stool-pigeons), that they were not "true Japanese", and that they had betrayed the people to the WRA administration. They added to the constant stream of rumors that the members and supporters of the Co-ordinating Committee were being paid large sums of money by the WRA administration and that they were making large profits in graft at the expense of the residents and with the connivance of the administration. The officers of the Center's Co-operative Enterprise, who had substantially supported the Co-ordinating Committee's political coup were particularly singled out as inu and grafters par excellence.

The Co-ordinating Committee countered with propaganda to the effect that the activities of the underground group were "un-Japanese" and that "true Japanese" were persons who behaved in an orderly manner and did not bring hardship and misery upon their fellow residents.

The propaganda of the underground group was by far the more effective. Many of the residents were disgruntled and bored. Probably one-third of the employable residents were not given work, since the Center was so crowded that jobs were not available. The residents, in short, were pre-disposed to repeat, and to some extent believe, almost any rumor about the inu. Many, however, continued to voice disapproval of the underground agitators.

In April of 1944 the underground group emerged and adopted the name, Saikakuri Soigan (literal translation is "Appeal for Resegregation"). This body will hereafter be called the Resegregation Group. The leaders sent a



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letter signed by an unimportant member of the organization to Attorney General Biddle, requesting permission to circulate a petition for the signatures of those residents who desired early return to Japan and who, meanwhile, wished to be separated, in Tule Lake, from those not so inclined. This letter was channeled to the WRA administration at Tule Lake and permission was given to circulate the petition providing "that the survey will be made without commitment on the part of the administration." I made my third visit to the Tule Lake Center several days after this petition was presented to the people and found the residents in great confusion. Rumors had spread that those persons who did not sign the petition would not be allowed to expatriate or repatriate. The WRA administration had issued a statement that it had no intention of carrying out a resegregation and that no petition had been authorized. Almost all of my informants expressed disapproval of the petition. They stated that they saw no point in separating the residents of Tule Lake on the narrow basis of whether they were willing to return to Japan on the next exchange boat. By refusing to sign the petition, however, they exposed themselves to the epithet of "fence-sitter". Almost every informant stated forcefully that the fence-sitters ought to get out of Tule Lake but no one admitted that he might be a fence-sitter. The Resegregation Group obtained some 6,500 signatures of citizens and aliens, a figure which includes the dependents and minor children of the signers. In absentia signatures were also accepted. The relatives of men confined in the stockade signed for them. Persons who had signed the petition were thereafter considered members of the Resegregation Group. Many signers were citizens of the United States, although the leadership clique, the policy makers, was almost entirely composed of aliens.

The wife of a leader of the Resegregation Group, made the following statement to me in an interview which took place on April 13, 1944. "We're going to stick to Japan. We cannot raise our children overnight to become Japanese subjects." I asked her how the Resegregation Group proposed to distinguish between those residents who sincerely desired to return to Japan and those who did not. She said, "Those guys who won't



say 'Yes' to the petition are the guys who are going to stay here ( in the United States)." I then asked her what was to be the fate of the thousands of people who had not signed. She replied, "Those other people -- they didn't stick up for us in the crisis. It's not our business to worry about them."

In addition to stirring up a great deal of excitement and confusion, the petition put the harassed Co-ordinating Committee out of existence. The members of this body resigned, telling me that they bitterly resented the fact that the WRA administration, without consulting them, had recognized their political opponents to the extent of allowing the circulation of the petition. From this period (late April, 1944) until the end of my stay in the Center (May, 1945) the Japanese residents of Tule Lake had no formal representative body which might present community problems to the WRA administration. The WRA made an attempt to sponsor such a body. The Resegregation Group vigorously opposed this attempt. Many informants held that a person who accepted a position on this proposed representative body would be called an inu.

The leaders of the Resegregation Group, in my opinion, now turned their energies to activities calculated to keep the Center in a state of turmoil. They told me frequently that thereby that would prove to the WRA authorities in Washington that trouble would not stop until a resegregation took place. The leaders continued to spread propaganda against the now ex-members of the Co-ordinating Committee and other so-called inu, who were usually individuals who counselled a modicum of co-operation with the administration and/or criticized the policies of the Resegregation Group. For instance, a leader of the Resegregation Group told me that Mr. Hitomi, the general manager of the Co-Operative Enterprise, had attempted to bribe the alleged gang leader and Resegregationist with a large sum of money to influence the recently arrived segregees from the Manzanar Center to join the Tule Lake Co-op. This and similar stories were widely circulated. In this regard it is significant that much later the Project Attorney, Mr. Noyes, told me that an officer of the Co-op had made an affidavit to the WRA Internal Security that this alleged gang leader repeatedly threatened the officers of the Co-op. This affidavit was



submitted just prior to the relocation of the affiant.

✓ A series of assaults added to the mounting tension. Certain men, some of whom, in my opinion, had openly criticized the activities of the Resegregation Group were attacked at night and severely beaten. Mr. Hitomi's brother was beaten and is said to have suffered a fractured skull. The wife of a leader of the Resegregation Group bitterly criticized before me a certain man who was openly protesting against the Japanese drills in which children were urged to participate. Shortly thereafter, this man was beaten. Several of the beatings, I was told by informants, were engineered by the alleged gang leader. Each beating was followed by rumors that the victim had been an inu (stool-pigeon). None of the assailants were apprehended by the police. On the morning of July 3, 1944, Mr. Hitomi, the General Manager of the Co-op and an alleged inu, who had been the object of particularly vicious gossip, some of which, in my opinion, was spread by leaders of the Resegregation Group was found before the apartment of a relative with his throat cut. I was told that the remaining members of the Co-op's Board of Directors received an anonymous communication to the effect that they would be next. The Japanese members of this board resigned in a body. About 15 of the most notorious inu, including the evacuee chief of police, fled from the Japanese section with their families and were given temporary quarters on the administrative side of the fence. Shortly thereafter, the Japanese members of the Internal Security resigned. (Later, after considerable difficulty, wardens were recruited with the understanding that they were expected only to keep order in their own blocks.) The residents of the Center were so frightened that I was unable to pay visits for several weeks. Several informants requested that I never call on them again.

The WRA Internal Security attempted to apprehend these assailants. They could accomplish little, however, against the tremendous fear of being stigmatized as an inu.

From this point forward many of my informants began emphatically to express dissatisfaction over the lawlessness and, as some termed it, the gangsterism and hoodlumism which prevailed in the Center. Repeatedly, they voiced the desire that they might get some peace and order. No one, however, dared to state that someone ought to inform to the administration. The following statements are typical:



July 24, 1944: an Issei:

"In this camp no really able man will show his face because so many narrow minded fanatics are in camp.....Even your safety cannot be guaranteed. ....These agitators think that by making trouble here they are doing good for Japan. That's extremely wrong."

On July 19, a Kibei girl, a teacher in one of the Japanese language schools, made the following statement:

"My students are asking me, 'Sensei (teacher)', they say, 'What would you think if I got leave clearance and got out of here?'....They say: 'Gee whiz, what's going to happen to us?' "

On July 13, 1944 the project newspaper, the Newell Star, published a statement explaining that the Congress of the United States had passed a law which provided that a citizen of the United States might make a formal written renunciation of nationality. No informant commented upon this statement in the month that followed.

On August 12, however, the Resegregation Group leaders organized a young men's group ostensibly devoted to the study of Japanese history and culture (the Sokoku Kenkyu Seinen-dan, hereafter called the Young Men's Fatherland Group). Among the formal aims of this young men's group, which, to my knowledge, were not at this time publicized among the general residents was the following statement:

"Since the outbreak of war between Japan and America, citizens of Japanese ancestry have moved along two separate paths: (1) for the defense of their civil rights on legal principles, and (2) for the renunciation of their citizenship on moral principles."

*alone*  
Two prominent leaders of the Resegregation Group were the advisors to the Young Men's Fatherland Group, but this fact was at first carefully concealed from the WRA administration and, so far as I was able to determine, from the general residents. In fact, to the best of my knowledge and belief, until September 24, 1944, the connection of this group with the Resegregation Group was very carefully concealed from both the Administration and the residents. The first meeting of this organization was held in the high school auditorium with the permission of the WRA. Some of my informants stated that they believed the contention that this organization had no political aims and joined it. In my opinion, they were telling the truth,



for in November of 1944, they attempted to withdraw. A few expressed suspicion of the leaders. Within a few weeks, the organization claimed some 600 members, most of whom were citizens.

This organization obtained office space from the WRA. Frequent meetings were scheduled for its members. As the weeks passed, the speeches delivered at these meetings took on an increasingly Japanese nationalistic tone. Outdoor exercises which took place before dawn were made compulsory for members. Gradually these exercises became more militaristic. Week by week additional militaristic features were added. Bugles were purchased. By late November of 1944 members were wearing uniforms consisting of a sweat shirt bearing the emblem of the rising sun even when they entered the administrative area. They were also required to shave their heads in imitation of Japanese soldiers.

On October 30, the Issei advisor to this organization explained its aims to me:

"If we were training in open daylight, it will not impress the people much....But by getting up early in the morning, by exercise and training after worshipping and praying for victory and eternal life for our soldiers, these young people can be deeply impressed."

On August 30, the WRA administration called certain of the leaders of the Resegregation Group into conference and gave them a letter written by Mr. Dillon Myer which was dated July 7. This letter denied any administrative intention of a resegregation. The leaders of the Resegregation Group did not announce this administrative denial to the members of their group. Instead, without the knowledge of the administration, they mimeographed Mr. Myer's letter and distributed it widely, mistranslating the last paragraph as follows:

"However, I am sure that all problems in the Tule Lake segregation center that need attention and improvement will be studied and remedied in consultation with the representatives of the Resegregation Group....Needless to say, I am sure Director Best will be glad to discuss frankly with you the question of resegregation about which your representatives have communicated."

It is my opinion that by mid-August of 1944, the leaders of the Resegregation Group, whose plans for a resegregation were not going very well, were



giving the political potentialities of the renunciation of citizenship much thought. These leaders frequently brought the topic up in conversation with me. The following statements are typical.

On August 28, the wife of a leader stated:

"We figure that something will have to be done (by the Administration) in September. That's when the denunciation (not mis-spelling) will come through. If we stay here as we are another trouble (uprising) is going to come up....We've been tolerant enough about the school (American school) here."

On September 7, the Issesb adviser to the Young Men's Fatherland Group speaking of the proposed renunciation, stated to me:

"We don't know how far this will go. But certainly those who wish for immediate repatriation to Japan and at the same time don't wish to be inducted into service or relocate wish to renounce their citizenship."

Despite the fact that the leaders of the Resegregation Group had on August 30 been told by the WRA administration that there was to be no <sup>resegregation</sup> resegregation, they, on September 24, 1944, brought forth another/petition. This petition was accompanied by an explanatory pamphlet in Japanese with an English translation appended. A part of this pamphlet stated:

"Whereas, we realize the uselessness of our American Citizenship, and so as soon as and in the event a law of renunciation for citizenship become effective, we gladly renounce our citizenships. Therefore, we make clearly our positions by being a real Japanese. Furthermore, we be classified clearly as an enemy alien and thereby be treated in accordance with the Geneva Conventions."

I called on one of the most influential leaders of the Resegregation Group, on September 21, three days before the petition was circulated. He showed me the pamphlet and made the following statement, which I recorded verbatim:

"You know the people behind this have been working underground for a long time. Anyone who would have come out openly would have been put in the stockade. We have been working on this since April, awaiting the moment, but we had to keep it secret. Now the time has come."



"If the Administration recognizes this movement, we will have a good mutual understanding. Besides, Mr. Myer sent us a letter and recognized this movement.

"Those who refuse to sign this will have people asking them, 'Are you loyal to Japan or not? If you are not loyal to Japan, why don't you go out?' The people will have to realize this -- as long as their appearance is Japanese they will have to sign this. If they don't sign they will be known as not loyal to Japan and will be told in public, 'You are not Japanese. Why don't you go out?'

"Of course, many people who don't want to go back to Japan will sign this, but then they will go in a corner and keep quiet."

On September 27, the WRA administration issued a statement that the petition was unauthorized. My data indicate that the Resegregationist leaders continued their efforts to get signatures. On September 30 a married couple, both influential leaders of the Resegregation Group, exhibited anger over the denial of authorization. The husband asked me, rhetorically, "How can you get authority for a petition like this?" He added that the next time his group "put out something" they were going to take the paper to the block manager beforehand "and he better not say anything". His wife then told me that the Resegregation Group had received a letter from Mr. Ennis of the Department of Justice, advising them to hold on, that everything was going smoothly and that they would be notified when the renunciation of citizenship forms were ready. Concerning the plans of the Resegregationists, she remarked: "We are going ahead even if the people squawk."

As soon as the petition began to be circulated I attempted to determine how it was being received by the residents. No informant who was not an enthusiastic member of the Resegregation Group spoke in favor of it. I am emphatically of the opinion that the substantial majority of the residents disapproved of the petition and resented the social pressure applied by its circulators. I shall not list all of the derogatory statements made; those that follow will suffice.

On September 26 an Issei informant stated that he disapproved of the petition. He added: "I asked one man, 'Why did you sign the paper?' He said, 'So-and-so said so-and-so and I signed it.' They (persons who behave in this manner) don't have any judgment."



On September 28 an older Nisei informant stated:

"One point I really oppose -- they threaten to use force....Many people are wondering whether they should sign or not. They're afraid. Many are being led into it.

"Another thing, I've heard that(the nominal leader of the Young Men's Fatherland Group) stated that they had a number of killers (in his group). Why does he say that?"

On October 2 a male Kibei informant who lived in a block where many members of the Resegregation Group also resided, stated:

"I say, 'Leave me alone and I'll leave you alone!' If I feel like it, I'll sign. I haven't signed yet.

"I'm Japanese no matter what they say! Even if we sign or don't sign it won't do any harm."

On October 12, the same informant stated:

23 { "I don't like the way the Sokoku Kenkyu (Young Men's Fatherland Group) threatens people. They say, 'If you don't sign you're going to be drafted.' So a lot of dumb people signed....

"But I think those who signed were wise. I'm too stubborn to sign and that makes me enemies. It's better to be like the proverb: Nagai mono niwa nakeroro; okii mono niwa nomareyo -- let the long snake wind around you; let the big snake swallow you.

"If I were Project Director I would segregate them. I'd give each person a pink paper and a white paper and an envelope. Then those who want to be segregated could sign the pink paper and those who didn't could sign the white one. Then they could mail it to the WRA and nobody see it. Then I'd like to see how many would sign!"

At this time I was surprised at the almost unanimous disapproval which informants who were not leaders /of the Resegregation Group voiced concerning the petition. I was not surprised that they disapproved but that they expressed their sentiments so frankly, for I am of the opinion that the leaders of the Resegregation Group were feared. I also suspected that some of the persons who spoke derogatorily of the petition before me were signing it nonetheless, for it was painful to be told in public: "You are not Japanese." Moreover, a rumor was widespread in the Center that the Department of Justice was



going to take over the Tule Lake Center soon and that when this occurred those persons who had not signed the petition would be forced to leave. Besides, the WRA administration had denied the petition authorization. As several informants stated: "To sign it won't do any harm." It is, therefore, my considered opinion that at this period (September and October 1944) a very substantial proportion of the residents disapproved of the activities of the Resegregation Group, and that they were irked by the demand that they commit themselves to an early return to Japan. Many, however, signed the petition to be on the safe side whatever transpired. Without doubt, however, there were a number of individuals who signed the petition through the desire for an early return to Japan.

In my subsequent visits to the leaders of the Resegregation Group, I was impressed by the fact that though they boasted of the number of signatures they were getting (10,000) they were not pleased by the reception the petition was getting from the people. Moreover, it is my opinion that certain residents were beginning to take steps toward an organized resistance. One of my informants, an elderly Issei, told me that he advised persons who consulted him not to sign the petition. He also told me that he had made a speech before a group of Nisei telling them that nothing would be gained by making trouble and that agitation only brought suffering upon the women and children in camp.

"I said that this camp is no place for young men to make trouble. They should study. I said, 'Young men, behave yourselves.' "

During an interview which took place on October 10, 1944, this informant denounced the Resegregationists leaders to me, stating that they were misleading the youth of the Center. He stated: "I say the Japanese government is not so narrow minded as you."

I was concerned for the safety of this informant who, in my opinion, was showing unusual courage in speaking publicly against the Resegregation Group. I warned him that one had to be careful what one said in camp, for there were dangerous men about. He laughed and called the Resegregationist leaders cowards. Five days later, while he was returning from an evening meeting of his church in the company of two elderly Issei friends, he and his friends were attacked by a group of assailants and beaten severely. When he recovered, he told me:



"The three of us were coming home from a religious meeting at block 52. I heard noisy footsteps. One of my friends was at my side, the other was 15 feet ahead. The first man who was attacked yelled. I turned around and saw that big stick. I can still see the club like a frozen picture, but I didn't see anything after that."

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This informant also voiced the opinion that his speech before the Nisei had been reported to the Resegregationist headquarters and told me that the attack upon him had been instigated by one of the advisors of the Young Men's Fatherland Group, the alleged gang leader. He added that the attack had been led by an Issei who was known to be the so-called gang leader's right hand man. I was given this information after making a promise of strict confidence. My informant feared that if he testified against his assailants, the gang would attack his children.

At this time the rumor that another man named Tambara had been threatened spread widely through the Center. The wife of the Issei advisor to the Young Men's Fatherland Group told me: "They wrote him, 'Would you like to be another Hitomi?'" (Hitomi was the man murdered on July 3, 1944.)

On October 21 the alleged gang leader addressed the members of the Young Men's Fatherland Group. At this meeting several informants told me that he incited the young men to violence and promised to take care of them if they got into trouble. Several informants stated with disapproval that he had quoted a Japanese proverb, which like many proverbs, is flexible in interpretation. It may, however, be translated to mean: "To help the cause, we must kill those who stand in its way." Most informants translated it: "The little guys must die so that the big guys may live." They left no doubt in my mind, however, that they believed that the so-called gang leader was threatening persons who opposed the policies of the Resegregation Group with violence.

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I called on this alleged gang leader several times during this period and we had lengthy conversations. During my visits his outer office (he was a block manager) was occupied by several muscular young men. While conversing with him I was obliged to sit so that I faced a large Japanese flag. On October 23 he told me that during a recent altercation he had had with the Project Director a group of "70 or 80 boys" had surrounded the block managers' headquarters and "demonstrated their offensive spirit."



On October 30 the aforementioned right hand man of the alleged gang leader knifed a young Nisei. I was told by several informants that the father of the victim had been a Resegregationist, had "found out how rotten they were" and had publicly criticized the alleged gang leader. The Project Attorney, Mr. Noyes, told me that the victim gave less and less incriminating evidence every time he testified in the hearings held by the WRA Internal Security. The Issei advisor to the Young Men's Fatherland Group accompanied the defendant to his hearings and his trial before the Modoc County authorities and vouched for him. The defendant was given a sentence of 90 days. Later, informants reported that the alleged gang leader and the Issei advisor were boasting that this light sentence was evidence that they could protect their own.

During this period one of my most reliable informants, a Nisei and a veteran of World War I, told me that he had been repeatedly threatened with physical violence because he openly criticized the Resegregation Group and the alleged gang leader. I was on excellent terms with this informant and interviewed him frequently for over a year. In all of this time, he, to the best of my knowledge, never misinformed me deliberately. I believe, therefore, that from mid-October until the end of November 1944, this informant lived in expectation of a violent physical assault from the Resegregationists. He showed me a black-jack which he carried whenever he left his apartment at night. After the beating of my Issei informant and the knifing, this informant stated that he thought matters had gone far enough. He thereupon sent a written denunciation of the alleged gang leader out of the Center to several Japanese friends, with the instruction that if he were beaten or killed or if he gave the word, this denunciation was to be given to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He then informed the alleged gang leader of this action and stated that if another beating occurred, he would denounce him. No more beatings occurred that came to my attention. Moreover, shortly thereafter, the alleged gang leader resigned his position as advisor to the Young Men's Fatherland Group, a fact which I checked with leaders of the Resegregation Group.

I affirm that to the best of my knowledge and belief many residents of the Tule Lake Center and I myself, believed that one of the advisors to the



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Young Men's Fatherland Group led a gang which assaulted persons who criticized the policies of the Young Men's Fatherland Group and the Resegregation Group. I also affirm that many residents believed that persons who opposed the Resegregation Group were in immediate danger of physical violence from this gang.

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On November 3, 1944, the Resegregation Group and the Young Men's Fatherland Group vigorously sponsored a pretentious ceremony to celebrate the birthday of the emperor Meiji. Non-members were forbidden to attend this ceremony. I was invited to attend this ceremony as a guest and did so, deeming it an opportunity to gain some idea of the numerical strength of the supporters of the group. Since the participants stood motionless for over an hour, I had an excellent opportunity to count them. Approximately 600 members of the Young Men's Fatherland Group were present and approximately 1,800 additional adults and children. This is significant, for the birthday of the emperor Meiji was considered an important holiday and any member of the Resegregation Group who did not attend this ceremony could not, in my opinion, have been an enthusiastic member. Moreover, if he did not attend he stood in danger of serious reproof from fellow members.

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It is my considered opinion that until December of 1944 the substantial majority of citizens residing in the Tule Lake Center were not markedly interested in the renunciation of citizenship and did not welcome the opportunity to renounce. On August 14, 1944, the first Japanese who was not intimately connected with the leadership clique of the Resegregation Group introduced the subject of the renunciation into conversation with me. Between that date and December 5, when Mr. John L. Burling of the Department of Justice arrived at the Tule Lake Center, I had 95 interviews with informants (excluding all interviews with leaders of the Resegregation Group). To my certain knowledge some of these informants were nominal members of the Resegregation Group. Others were not. Some 80% of my informants were citizens. Approximately 60 of these interviews were very extensive, lasting several hours or an entire afternoon. All of the interviews were informal, for it was my policy to allow the informant to direct the greater part of the conversation. Almost invariably, when informants were concerned over a matter, they introduced the subject into our conversations.



In the many pages of verbatim data I collected between August 14, 1944 and December 5, 1944, the renunciation of citizenship was mentioned six times by informants who were not leaders of the Resegregation Group. Only one informant stated that he intended to renounce. This man, an extremely reliable informant who was hostile to the Resegregation Group stated that he intended to renounce because he had committed himself to return to Japan and would not break his word. On September 4, he stated:

"If there are people who will renounce their citizenship merely to escape the draft it would be a good thing if the (American) government sent them first to Japan -- then they'll get drafted there.

"When it comes to a final showdown, I think most of the Nisei will turn it down (will not renounce)....Roughly 60% of the people in camp are citizens. I think if 50%(of the citizens) renounce their citizenship, they'll be doing good. It may be less. "

On September 26, the Issei informant who was later assaulted, stated:

"My common sense opinion is this: from the Japanese part, the right of American citizenship is already denied. So it is not necessary for them to make formal declaration of denouncing it."

It is my opinion that at this period (August 1944 through November 1944) the attitude of the leaders of the Resegregation Group regarding the proposed renunciation of citizenship was in marked contrast to that of the residents who were not members of this group and to many residents who were nominal members of this group. I believe that the leaders of the Resegregation Group during the months of October and November 1944 expected that the jurisdiction of the Tule Lake Center was soon to be taken over by the Department of Justice. I believe that they anticipated that an especially early and enthusiastic eagerness to renounce citizenship would cause the members of their group to be recognized by the Department of Justice as individuals particularly worthy of remaining in Tule Lake (under the Department of Justice) while the "fence-sitters" whom they stigmatized as "not loyal to Japan" would be forced to leave the Center. In fact, they repeatedly attempted to give me the impression that they were in almost constant correspondence with the Department of Justice and I am certain that they also gave members and residents this impression.



On October 5, 1944, an enthusiastic member of the Young Men's Fatherland Group and the Resegregation Group told me that during a conference with Mr. Best, the Project Director, the Director had told him that it was almost a certainty that the Tule Lake Center was going under the Department of Justice within 60 days. On October 6, the Project Attorney, Mr. Campbell, told me that the WRA administration was seriously considering making an announcement to the Japanese residents that the Tule Lake Center was to be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice. On October 9, the wife of a leader of the Resegregation Group told me that the petition of September 24 had 10,000 signatures and added:

"We are not going to take any more (signatures) because soon we'll be under the Justice Department."

On October 10 Mr. Dillon Myer addressed the WRA staff at Tule Lake and stated according to my notes which are not verbatim that "He didn't know to whom the Tule Lake Center was going to be turned over."

On October 16 the young Resegregationist who stated that he had had a conference with Mr. Best, told me:

"If the Justice Department does not take over it would put me in a tough spot because I made a report to the Resegregation Committee that they (Justice Department) would take over in 60 days. Mr. Best (the Project Director) definitely told me that this would take place within a week after the (presidential) election....When I made this report to the Resegregation Committee, they were very happy over it."

On October 16, an informant who disliked the leaders of the Resegregation Group, and, in my opinion, was repeatedly threatened by them, stated:

"The Resegregation Group are bragging throughout the camp that it is because of them that the camp is going under Justice. I said to one, 'If your influence is so great as that, you could do much more for the Japanese in other ways.'"

On October 23, the alleged gang leader and advisor to the Young Men's Fatherland Group told me:

"The people are anxiously awaiting for the denouncement of it (citizenship). When Mr. Best made the statement that within 60 days the camp would be under Justice (Department) the people were delighted. We more or less expect it."



I am informed that in the latter part of October 1944 the Department of Justice began to receive petitions for permission to renounce citizenship bearing the signatures of many persons and also received requests for renunciation which were typewritten forms imitating the official forms. Such forms, I am told, were not accepted.

On December 12, the young Resegregationist who told me that he had conferred with the Project Director and been told that the Center was soon to go under the Department of Justice told me:

"Mr. Best (the Project Director) double-crossed me again. Mr. Best told me definitely that typewritten copies (of renunciation forms) would be sufficient and for me to send in the typewritten copies. I was on the spot (before the Resegregationists) because I reported this."

On December 9, a young Kibei who resided in a block where the Resegregationist Group was very strong, told me:

"The Sokoku bunch (Young Men's Fatherland Group) want to go (to Japan) earlier than any of the rest."

Her husband added:

"The Sokoku bunch typed their forms on the typewriter so that they could be the first ones. I told our neighbors that their forms wouldn't be any good."

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I am strongly of the opinion that the leaders of the Resegregation Group were substantially if not entirely responsible for the aforementioned petitions and improper forms and that they hoped by an early renunciation on the part of their citizen members to achieve their long sought goal -- resegregation. I have no information on the manner in which the proposition to renounce en masse was put before the members. It is probable, however, that the suggestion was placed before the young men at a meeting or meetings. Whether this is so or not, it is my opinion that members of the Young Men's Fatherland Group who, at this time, refused to apply for renunciation of citizenship or spoke against the suggestion stood in danger of physical violence from members of their own group and knew that they stood in such danger. I have no explicit data that such threats were made.

WB

Mr. Burling arrived at the Tule Lake Center on December 5, 1944. I was told that he had come to initiate the hearings for renunciation of



citizenship. Several of my informants apparently believed that the fact that Mr. Burling was calling the leaders of the Resegregation Group and the Young Men's Fatherland Group to see him indicated that these leaders might be apprehended and punished.

On December 14 an Issei informant told me:

"I've heard that 18 of the Resegregationists have been called in. The people first thought they were arrested by the FBI. All of them (the people) are pleased, excepting those who are members, of course. They (non-members) want them to be taken away."

He added:

h { "The members of the Sokoku (Young Men's Fatherland Group) are narrow minded. Many of them were sorry after they signed and found out what was inside. But if they change their signatures, they're scared. So they can't cancel their signatures, not even if at the same time they didn't want to be one of them."

(In my opinion, this informant was referring to cancellation of membership, not cancellation of renunciation of citizenship applications.)

On December 15 a Nisei informant told me:

"I heard that their (Resegregation Group) leaders were being pulled in. But we don't discuss those things openly. It isn't healthy."

2 I visited a number of the leaders of the Resegregation Group and the Young Men's Fatherland Group at this time and observed that some of them appeared frightened by the tone of their hearings with Mr. Burling. The chairman of the Young Men's Fatherland Group asked me why the first question Mr. Burling asked at the hearings was, "Are you a member of the Sokoku." He expressed the opinion that renunciants should only be questioned on their desire for renunciation of citizenship. Another member of the Young Men's Fatherland Group who was present stated: "We haven't been influencing anybody to take out renunciation papers, even though the administration says we have."

From December 8, 1944, until December 17, the date on which the residents heard that the Western Defense Command was about to withdraw the public proclamation and orders of 1943 which had ordered the exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast, no informant who was not



an ardent Resegregationist, stated that he intended to renounce his citizenship. On December 11 a Nisei girl asked me if she would have to renounce her citizenship in order to go back to Japan. She stated that she was not going to apply, but added that "there was a big rumor in camp" that those who did not renounce would not be allowed to go to Japan.

On the same day the chairman of the November 1943 Representative Body, who did not renounce his citizenship, stated:

"I'm not going to renounce mine. If a man doesn't have Japanese citizenship and if he renounces it, he'll be without a country....I wouldn't want to fool this country or evade any obligation to this country by saying that I wanted to go back to Japan and then stay here."

On December 15, a Nisei girl stated:

"They say it's so hard for you to renounce your citizenship because they want to see that you're not avoiding the draft. There's a rumor going around camp that those who do not renounce citizenship are going to be drafted..."

"I hear a person say yesterday -- a Nisei -- 'You know, I denounced my citizenship and I hated to go to the hearing.' 'Why?' I asked. He said: 'I have to say awful things about America or they won't give me my renunciation and I don't want to do that.'"

I have now described the sociological phenomena in the Tule Lake Center relevant to the renunciation of citizenship up to the announcement of the lifting of the exclusion orders. My data indicate that up to this time the residents of the Tule Lake Center who were not enthusiastic members of the Resegregation Group or the Young Men's Fatherland Group exhibited no marked desire to renounce their citizenship. It is my opinion that they did not welcome the opportunity to renounce and that a substantial majority of the residents, at this time, had not yet made up their minds whether to return to Japan or not. Yet on December 26, 1944, some 2,000 applications for renunciation were received by the Department of Justice. In January, 1945, 3,400 additional applications were received. My data indicate and it is my opinion that the announcement of the lifting of the exclusion orders and the policy followed by the WRA administration and the Department of Justice from the middle of December 1944 through January 1945 produced a state of



mind among the citizen and alien residents of the Tule Lake Center which was substantially responsible for the majority of applications for renunciation. The paramount reason for renunciation was, in substance, the fear that those persons who did not renounce their citizenship would be forced to relocate.

WB. This phenomenon may be difficult for a person who has not been a segregatee to understand. Certainly, an outsider after reading this document would be inclined to conclude that a logical person or even one possessing ordinary common sense ought to have welcomed the opportunity to get out of Tule Lake. Emphatically, it is my opinion that this was not so. The segregatees had been stigmatized as "disloyal to America" and as "rioters". They feared that if they took up residence outside the Center they would meet grave economic hardship and discrimination; they feared physical violence from Caucasians if they relocated; they feared that their sons would be drafted; parents feared that if they allowed their Nisei children to relocate they would lose touch with them and that they, the parents, might be obliged to return to Japan alone. The total effect of these fears produced a phenomenon which amounted to far more than the sum of its parts. The residents of Tule Lake had been confined in various Centers for almost four years. It is my opinion that they were predisposed to fall into mass anxiety and mass hysteria, conditions which are not accompanied by logical or well considered action. If the facts and suggestions presented above are kept in mind, the events to be related will be easier to understand.

On December 17, 1944 the residents learned of the proposed lifting of the orders excluding Japanese from the West Coast. On December 19 the project newspaper, the Newell Star, announced "that the new system will permit the great majority of persons of Japanese ancestry to move freely anywhere in the U. S. that they wish to go." It added that "after January 20 all restrictions will be lifted except in the cases of individuals who will be specifically and individually notified." On the same day a mimeographed announcement by Dillon Myer was distributed among the Japanese residents to the effect that "all relocation centers will be closed within a period of six months to one year after the revocation of the exclusion orders." The same day, Mr. Best, the Project Director of Tule Lake, announced to the Japanese residents that "the Tule Lake Center will be



considered a relocation center and a segregation center for some time to come. Those whom the Army authorities designate as free to leave here will be in the same status as residents of a relocation center." The Army Team of some 20 officers began to hold hearings on December 18 or 19. Only male residents were called to these hearings.

Residents whom I visited in the week following the announcement appeared shocked and surprized. Some expressed anxiety. No one, however, stated that he would take advantage of this order and relocate. Instead, a number of rationalizations were voiced, to the effect that they, as segregees, would be allowed to remain at Tule Lake. When, however, the male residents were called for their Army hearings, most of them were not given detention orders. Within a few days it became apparent that segregee status was no guarantee that they might remain in Tule Lake.

On December 24 a Nisei girl told me that she was worried by the results of some of the Army hearings to which young men of her acquaintance had gone. In spite of their pro-Japanese statements, they had not been given detention orders. On the same day a Nisei boy told me that he had just returned from his Army hearing. He stated that the soldier had asked him if he wanted to renounce his citizenship. "So I said I was going to renounce, because I figured that then I could stay in Tule Lake." He assured me that another young man of his acquaintance had stated that he told the soldier he was loyal to Japan and had applied for expatriation but still he was handed a permit to leave camp, providing he did not go to certain exclusion areas. The sister of this informant then asked me: "They (WRA) won't force us out, will they? What can we do after everything we had is sold?....Our family might be able to get along if we had a lot of boys, but still that won't do any good because they'll have to go into the Army."

On December 19 a Kibei told me:

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*H.B.* "Four men in my block were called by the Army. They asked them questions like, 'Do you want to go out or do you want to renounce your citizenship?'"

Realizing the effect that such questions put by Army hearing officers would have on the Japanese residents, I made several attempts to determine whether these assertions on the part of my informants were true. Mr. Noyes,



the WRA Project Attorney told me:

"Best (the Project Director) talked to Army officers about the renunciation and resettlement questions (put by Army officers). When Best inquired about the significance of asking if the evacuee had applied for renunciation of citizenship they answered that it was instructions from the Presidio. And they said that they asked about resettlement just to be human."

On December 23, an ardent Resegregationist spoke scornfully of the fear of people who did not desire to leave Tule Lake:

"The fence-sitters say they are going to grab on with their hands (to keep from being forced to relocate). They say, 'Let the others go first...Then when everything's safe, we'll go.'"

On December 29 a Nisei girl stated:

"Are they going to kick us out? What good will that do, when we don't want to get out? ...We hope that by renouncing citizenship we will be allowed to stay here, but we are not sure. WRA should inform us of this."

I do not affirm that the Army hearing officers asked residents of Tule Lake whether they were going to renounce their citizenship or whether they were going to relocate. I do affirm, that to the best of my knowledge and belief, many residents believed that such questions were asked. I also affirm that this belief, coupled with the statements issued by the WRA administration was in large part responsible for the fact that on December 26, 1944, some 2,000 applications for renunciation of citizenship were received by the Department of Justice.

On December 27 the officers of the Resegregation Group and the Young Men's Fatherland Group were removed from Tule Lake to the Department of Justice Internment camp at Santa Fe. It is my opinion that the relatives of the interned men and other Resegregationists interpreted or chose to interpret this internment as the first step in their long awaited project of a resegregation. Informants stated that relatives of internees were boasting of the "safe" status of the internees and predicting that within 50 days they would be re-united. The internees would be returned to Tule Lake while persons who were not members of the Resegregation Group would be "kicked out". A rumor, which had probably existed before, became widespread.



It held that individuals who had not renounced their citizenship by January 20 would be "kicked out of camp" or would be drafted.

On January 2 a Kibei informant told me:

"They (Resegregationists) keep saying that anybody sent to Santa Fe is taking a step forward to becoming a real Japanese. If this propaganda takes effect it will cause great trouble....I think the Hoshi-dan (Resegregation Group) undoubtedly has started the rumor that by renouncing citizenship the people will be allowed to stay here at Tule Lake."

On January 3 a Nisei informant stated:

"The people picked up say they're glad. They say we (persons not interned) are going to be kicked around while they will be safe and sound."

On January 19 an informant told me of a rumor which he said had been current for several weeks:

"They say all those persons who have not renounced their citizenship will be kicked out of camp....Some people are also being told to answer in a radical way so that their citizenship will be taken away."

Meanwhile, expressions of anxiety and fear increased in number and in force. Many residents complained that they had been given no specific information by the WRA as to who was going to be allowed to stay in Tule Lake.

On January 2 a Nisei informant stated:

"We wouldn't mind going back to San Francisco if we had everything as when we left it. We'd jump right out. But we've lost everything."

On January 3 another Nisei informant stated:

"I don't know what's going to happen to us! It's very confusing. I think everybody feels that. They don't know what's what yet. In the first place why do they want to kick us out? It's their fault we came here. They can't say, 'We'll give you 25 dollars and coach fare. Get out by such and such a day.'"

"Since the people have been in camp three years, their funds are exhausted. It's all right for people who can afford it."

This informant then added:

"Can people be thrown out even if they renounce their citizenship?"

On January 5 the WRA officials reiterated their intention of getting all evacuees who were "cleared" out of all the Centers. An official



pamphlet was distributed throughout the Center in which Mr. Myer reaffirmed his earlier statement that the prime objective of the WRA was "to restore the people residing in relocation centers to private life in normal communities". It is my opinion that this statement did not reassure the residents of Tule Lake.

On January 5 an Issei informant stated:

"They (the Japanese) have nothing to depend on...I don't know one person who wants to go out."

On the same day a Nisei stated:

"My intention is to stay here until I'm forced out."

On January 8 another Nisei informant stated:

"The people are very much at a loss due to the fact that they can't make a decision. The WRA officials admit they're in the dark themselves. They don't know what to do or what it's all about."

"I've got six children and my wife. Also my father and mother. To go outside you have to have a certain kind of home. If they want me to go out the least they can do is to give me some kind of housing and say, 'Now, will you take this?' Instead, they are saying, 'America's going to help you. So you go out and do what you can.' That's not dependable. We want some assurance if we're to go out. By staying here, I'll have a roof over my children's heads and enough to eat, although I don't like the food."

"When the Army came out to ask us to make this decision I told the Colonel, 'If you set a deadline, I will renounce my citizenship due to the fact that I have no place to go.'"

On January 9 another Nisei informant stated:

"Under the international agreement, they can't kick the aliens out of camp. That's the reason that so many people are renouncing their citizenship."

Meanwhile, a number of informants who, in my opinion, were influenced by newspaper reports describing the statements made by certain residents of California, told me of rumors which were being circulated in the Center.

On January 13, a Nisei stated:

"California is the last place I'd want to go back to with all I've



been reading. They say the Army will back us up. But that's only against mob violence and not against what an individual might do. If some person beats us up, we can't do anything about it."

On January 12, another Nisei stated:

"People are saying that some Japanese were killed around Stockton (California). Reading the papers and considering all other facts, the people have a feeling of not wanting to return to the Pacific Coast."

On January 14, another Nisei stated:

"What do they want us to do? Go back to California and get filled full of lead? I'm going to sit here and watch."

On January 15, another Nisei stated:

"Rumor is being circulated that five Japanese were killed in Fresno (California)."

Such rumors and the sentiments which they engendered endured for many months. On May 8, 1945, a Nisei informant stated:

"Yeah, you're free all right if you go out. You've got civil rights. Civil rights to be dynamited! Civil rights to have your head cut off! They're even trying to take poor Doi's land away from him now."

This informant's sister, who was present, tried to calm him, and explained to me: "If they had made an example of those soldiers (who attempted to dynamite Doi's residence in California) it would have helped."

On January 24 Mr. Burling released a letter written on behalf of the Attorney General condemning the activities of the Resegregation Group, stating that they "are intolerable" and that they "will cease". One informant criticized the letter as "sarcastic". One Nisei, who had some legal training but, to the best of my knowledge, had no connection with the Resegregation Group or the Young Men's Fatherland Group, remarked:

"The Department of Justice is not sincere. They are hounding people with a childish mentality and making them act like kids...They've got you behind the eight ball once you renounce."

"The way these hearings were conducted it seems as if Burling had the final say of whether to accept a renunciation or not. The law states that it is the Attorney General who had the final say. As I see it, it's a frameup. I'd hate to live in this country if Burling was Attorney General."



Other informants, however, appeared to be distinctly pleased at the verbal castigation the Resegregation Groups had received:

On January 27, an informant stated:

"Confidentially speaking.....I think he's got brains in his head. Many of the people think he did the right thing....The Department of Justice really meant business. The people were kind of happy."

On January 31, another informant stated:

"It sure disgraced many of them (Resegregationists). If they had shame enough, they wouldn't have the face to come out with. We all agreed that that ought to have put a stop to it. But it seems it didn't."

On February 8, another informant stated:

"It was time somebody told them off!.....After all, this is American soil."

On the same day, another informant stated:

"The people thought, 'That's telling them!'"

The Resegregation Group and the Young Men's Fatherland Group, however, continued their activities. They also continued to spread propaganda to the effect that internment was a badge of honor, that internment made one a "true Japanese", and that their group was shortly to be placed "safely" in a Center under the Department of Justice, while all other residents of Tule Lake would be forced to relocate,

On January 29, 1945, a statement by Mr. Dillon Myer was released in the project newspaper that "those who do not wish to leave the (Tule Lake) Center are not required to do so and may continue to live here or at some similar center until January 1, 1946". My data indicate that this statement did not reassure the residents. Instead, it is my considered opinion that the six weeks of tension, fear, and extreme insecurity brought about in part by the residents' interpretations of Administrative policies and the Army hearings and, in part, by the internments and the rumors circulated after the internments had, by the end of January 1945, brought the residents to a state bordering on panic. The phenomena of mass hysteria are to so great an extent marked by lack of logic that they are difficult to describe in a document of this nature. I shall offer the following statements made by informants between January 26, 1945, the date of the second internment,



until the end of February 1945. On the basis of my intensive study of the situation, I affirm that to the best of my knowledge and belief, these are not the statements of a few atypical individuals but that they are a rather mild representation of the state of mind of the substantial majority of the residents. I also affirm that to the best of my knowledge and belief in these specific statements my informants were telling me the truth, except when they state that the members of the Young Men's Fatherland Group were glad to be interned. Here, a closer approach to the truth would be, "They say they are glad to be interned."

On January 29, a Nisei girl told me:

"The Hokoku group (Young Men's Fatherland Group) were all glad to get sent to Santa Fe. They have this one feeling that now their status is sure about the draft."

On January 30, an Issei informant told me:

"Most people are glad those radicals were picked up....but the radicals are still stubborn so we better keep quiet. If I should say what I think in public they (Resegregationists) would say, 'Beat him up!'"

On February 1 a Kibei informant told me that the Young Men's Fatherland Group was going about the camp asking for signatures which would indicate that members were still loyal to the organization. He said, "Those who refuse to sign they call 'dog'." He added that a friend of his who had been scheduled for internment and then released feared physical violence from members of the Resegregation Group because he had not gone to Santa Fe. "Mr. Doi came to stay here (at the informant's apartment) at first, but I told him to go back to block 59. That's what a man has to do."

The Kibei's wife added:

"Gee, I hope the day will come when we can go to the laundry and wash our clothes and not have the Hokoku people glaring at us."

On February 8, a Nisei woman stated:

"When the so-and-so Hokoku go (to internment) we can't go and say, 'We're sorry your son was taken away.' You have to congratulate them!"

"I heard some of them (Resegregationists) complimenting a family whose son was sent. They say they are true Japanese. The man said,



'Next trip it will be my son.' They (Resegregationists) are just tickled pink.

"A week ago my husband met a friend who had a bozu hair cut (shaved head). He said, 'What, are you bozu, too?' 'Sh-h-h,' the friend said, 'This is camouflage. Otherwise nobody in my block will talk to me.'.... I hear that in block 74 there are two girls who refused to become members of the (Resegregationist's) girl's organization. All the other girls won't speak to them now."

On February 13, a Kibei informant stated:

"In the minds of the people of the Center has been the general impression that by going to Santa Fe they'll be recognized as aliens and they feel that their renunciation of citizenship is granted. Whereas if you are a gentleman enough to be peaceful and quiet, renunciation will not materialize."

On February 16, a Kibei girl told me:

"Many of the parents are trying to make their sons join the Hokoku (Young Men's Fatherland Group). This is especially in the Manzanar section. One boy has a duck cut and wears zoot suit clothes. His parents are trying to make him join the Hokoku. He says, 'Golly, I can't do that. How would I look in Santa Fe?'"

On February 28, a Nisei girl stated:

"I know some poor kids, their parents made them shave their heads... But they still roll up their jeans to show their Argyle socks (Argyle socks were, evidently, the height of style for adolescent Nisei). A lot of kids say that when they're 18 they'll have to join the Hokoku due to their parents' pressure and the draft."

On February 28, my most reliable informant, a very blunt man, stated:

"Many Issei and families are forcing their sons to join the Hokoku-dan merely to escape the draft. I told them, when they get back to Japan they will use some means to keep their sons out of the Japanese Army. They were surprized to hear me say that."

In my opinion anxiety and panic reached a peak in mid-February, immediately after the interment of February 11, when most of the members of the Young Men's Fatherland Group were removed from the Center. I was



assured by several informants that the remaining Resegregationists on February 12 had held a great rally in the Manzanar section. At this rally, it was reported, the people had been told that all citizens who were not members of the Young Men's Fatherland Group (which, of course, implied renunciation of citizenship) would be drafted by March 1. (At this time most renunciants who were not members of the Young Men's Fatherland Group had not yet received official notices that their renunciations were accepted by the Attorney General.) I cannot affirm that such a meeting was held or that such statements were made. On February 13, however, I received a letter from a Kibei (dated February 12), part of which follows:

*Turned*  
"The condition in the center has been most unsettled because of recent mass pick-ups (internments). The current rumor which in my opinion is the most vicious has it that unless people (young men, of course) sign up with the organization, they will be subject to draft by March of this year. There seems to be a great increase in the membership of said body. The people are under the impression that if you are a member, then your chance of renunciation is guaranteed; whereas, if you are not, you just don't know when you will be able to renounce your citizenship....The result if left unabated, will not only be tragic but dreadful. I don't know what you are able to do, but for justice's sake please take some action."

On February 13 I consulted my most reliable informant, an older Nisei, and asked him about these rumors. He stated:

"Those rumors are being heard about the camp. It has a tremendous effect. People are joining the Hokoku. It's going over like wildfire.

"The people are in a quandary and don't know what to do. They just follow the mob. I told people who came to me to ask for advice, 'You are like a bunch of sheep.'

"I gave those parents hell for being so jittering and not having a mind of their own. Renunciation is the only idea. Parents want their sons and daughters to renounce so they can go to Japan with them. It's fantastic in a way....

"The trouble with most of the Japanese in this camp or in any other camp is that their mind is not made up. They swing from one side to the other. They will fluctuate."



On February 19, a Nisei girl stated:

"A week ago the people were in hysterics....They were so excited. They said, 'The draft papers are right there....they'll draft us all over camp.' "

On February 13, a well educated and intelligent informant remarked:

"Sociologically speaking, I wonder if the people have not been tortured in their minds for so long -- all they can think of is what's happening right in front of their eyes and they aren't looking forward to the future at all. None of them think of the fact that the war might end and then what position would they be in?"

When March 1 passed and no residents were drafted the acute excitement slowly abated. It was not until March 16, however, that the WRA announced to the residents that those activities in which Resegregationists had taken part, e.g., parades, drilling, bugling, were unlawful and prohibited.

I received relatively little information from informants on how the renunciation hearings were conducted. Several informants commented on the short time the hearings took; two mentioned that they had been treated courteously. One informant stated that an acquaintance who had had a hearing regretted that he felt obliged to make derogatory statements about the United States in order to make sure that he would be granted renunciation. No informant stated or implied that any kind of duress was exerted at the hearings by the hearing officers of the Department of Justice. It is, however, my opinion and belief, that a great many citizens made false statements at their hearings, regarding their loyalty to Japan and to the Japanese emperor.

Much has been said in this document about persons who renounced their citizenship and almost nothing about those who did not. Undoubtedly, the substantial majority of persons who did not renounce their citizenship did so because their ties to the United States were so strong that they were able to resist the extraordinary sociological and psychological pressures which were brought to bear upon them. It is of interest, however, that, in my opinion, the most courageous and open adherents of non-renunciation were a group of young men who were alleged to be gamblers. These young men on two occasions openly defied the Young Men's Fatherland Group, which had publicly stigmatized them as "gamblers" and "sake-drinkers".



On December 15, 1944 a group of about a dozen of these alleged gamblers entered the block where the Young Men's Fatherland Group had its headquarters. One of the young men challenged the male secretary of the Resegregation Group and the two men fought with a mop and a piece of wood, while the other so-called gamblers stood about and held off a crowd of angry Resegregationists. The non-Resegregationist was victorious and after the fight he addressed the crowd, denouncing the Resegregationists as "ruining the young men in the Center." The leaders of the Resegregation Group, in my presence, voiced threats of extreme physical violence against this group of alleged gamblers but did not carry out the threats, since the issue was subordinated by the excitement which followed the internment of December 27, 1944.

I was well acquainted with a number of these alleged gamblers and, as far as I know, they did not renounce their citizenship. Their open defiance of the Resegregation Group was, in my opinion, intimately related to the fact that even though they were greatly outnumbered, they were, by the late fall of 1944, the only group in the Center which possessed the organization and man-power to risk physical combat with the Young Men's Fatherland Group. In regard to the fact that they did not renounce their citizenship, it is my opinion that they were hard-headed realists. On February 5, 1945, when many of my other informants were in a state of extreme anxiety fearing that their applications for renunciation would not be accepted, I had a long interview with members of this alleged gambling clique. They discussed the renunciation with comparative calm. One stated:

"After all, as I see it, my American citizenship isn't anymore good to me than a roll of toilet paper right now. In fact, it's less good. But I was born with it and I'm not going to give it up. It might come in handy later."

#### SUMMARY OF THE MOTIVATIONS WHICH LED TO RENUNCIATION OF CITIZENSHIP

As a student of anthropology and sociology I view the phenomena relevant to the renunciation of citizenship as a cumulative process which may be traced back to the evacuation. In the spring of 1942 citizens of the United States were removed from their homes and confined in relatively unpleasant surroundings under Military guard. Over a thousand Nisei who later renounced their citizenship were between the ages of 14 and 18 years



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of age when they were evacuated. In the fall of 1943 over 6,000 citizens were segregated to the Tule Lake Center and stigmatized as disloyal to the United States. Certain of the factors which motivated these persons to become segragees have been stated on pp. 7-8 of this document. There were, however, a substantial number of citizens who were taken to or remained in Tule Lake who, at the time of segregation and after segregation, held status as loyal citizens of the United States. To affirm that residence in the Tule Lake Center did not contribute to the development of confidence in the United States, to a sense of security in regard to the intentions of the United States, or to a realization of the rights and responsibilities of American citizenship, is, in my opinion, a distinct understatement. From the early months of 1944, the Resegregation Group, whose leaders affirmed a fanatic loyalty to Japan, was permitted to propagandize the residents of the Center. In August of 1944 this organization made a deliberate attempt to draw American citizens residing in the Center into an auxiliary organization, the Young Men's Fatherland Group, which among its other aims listed the renunciation of American Citizenship. Numerous speeches of an extreme Japanese nationalistic character were delivered to the young men. They were urged to participate in militaristic exercises. In addition, the Resegregation Group had within its body a group of terrorists who repeatedly assaulted residents who criticized their policies and activities. Only one of these assailants, to my knowledge, was apprehended and punished. Furthermore, up until December of 1944 no authority at any time substantially attempted to discourage the Resegregation Group. Not until January of 1945 was the group formally reproved by the Department of Justice and not until March of 1945 did the WRA announce that the activities of this group were illegal and prohibited.

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In addition to the influences described above, the residents of Tule Lake for almost four years had been subjected to the demoralizing effect of life in the Centers. They had suffered endless annoyances and irritations, which were all the more grievous because they were thought to be unjustified. They had been stigmatized by the press as rioters. Certain grave brutalities were said to have been committed upon Japanese young men by the WRA Internal Security on the night of November 4, 1943. (I have not

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included these specific data in this document, though I have statements from young men who said they were beaten and statements from a doctor and a nurses aide who attended them.) The residents, for a long period, had almost no opportunity for recreation and many who desired work could not be given employment. They had almost no contact with any friendly American of Caucasian ancestry. Their country, they thought, had cast them off and considered them "disloyal". In short, for almost four years, their experiences had been of a nature calculated to make them lose faith in America and blight their conception of the value of American citizenship.

Despite these experiences, I affirm, that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the very substantial majority of the citizen residents of Tule Lake in November of 1944 did not welcome the opportunity to renounce their citizenship. I affirm that to the best of my knowledge and belief they were markedly un-enthusiastic. I affirm that the very substantial majority of residents in Tule Lake had resisted the frenzied efforts of the pro-Japanese groups to force them to participate in pro-Japanese activities. I affirm that some individuals, who, in my opinion, possessed great moral and physical courage, spoke against these pro-Japanese activities and were brutally assaulted. I affirm that some rash youths still dared to wear their hair in a duck cut and that many young people still passionately desired to relocate when they could obtain the permission of their parents. With a full realization of the gravity of my statement, I, who knew these residents better than any other non-Japanese, affirm that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the substantial majority of citizen residents of Tule Lake, despite their detention and despite the extraordinary pressures to which they had been subjected, were capable of re-assuming the duties and responsibilities of American citizenship.

It is for the reasons stated above, that the events which followed the lifting of the exclusion order, are, in my opinion, peculiarly tragic. I have, I believe, made it clear that the residents of Tule Lake, owing to the statements made by the WRA, their interpretation of questions asked at the Army hearings, the internments, the rumors which followed the internments, and the irrational state of mind which accompanies long detention and isolation, tension, and insecurity, were thrown into a state



of panic. Most of them may be compared to a crowd of persons who believe that they are about to be bombed, rush to shelters, and find there officials whose statements they interpret as "Renounce your citizenship or you cannot enter." Fear of grave economic hardship, fear of physical violence from hostile citizens of Caucasian ancestry, fear of family separation, the fear that non-renunciants would be drafted, to which were added tremendous parental and familial pressures based on these fears were the major motivations of renunciation. During the months of March, April, and May of 1945, the families of internees continued to boast of their impending "safety" and to taunt non-members and persons who had not renounced their citizenship with the imminence of involuntary relocation.

At the time of this panic I was convinced -- and I so stated to the hearing officers of the Department of Justice -- that the great majority of residents were not renouncing their citizenship out of loyalty to Japan. I was also convinced that very many of the residents did not appreciate the gravity of their act and later would attempt to get their citizenship back. Many residents assured me, I believe in all sincerity, that renunciation was like the Military Questionnaire and the Segregation, i.e., they could change their minds. Some assured me that their hearings before the hearing officers of the Department of Justice were brief and therefore they were sure that later on they would be given a longer and more thorough hearing. This was, in short, not the first time that they had been given a hearing which they were assured was very grave and which, later on, had signified little. Indeed, at the time of segregation they were assured by the WRA that they would be allowed to remain in the Center until the end of the war.

In my opinion, the threat of immediate physical violence from Japanese residents was a relatively minor motivation toward renunciation of citizenship. I was told frequently that the leaders of the Young Men's Fatherland Group had forced people to renounce their citizenship. I have no evidence, however, that the force referred to implied physical violence. It is my opinion that members of the Young Men's Fatherland Group who refused to renounce their citizenship stood in danger of physical violence and were aware of this. Certain individuals who lived in blocks where many Resegregationists also resided may well have been threatened with violence if



they did not renounce even though they were not members of the Resegregation Group. During my residence in the Center, I collected no specific data that such threats were made.

During my residence in the Center no Japanese resident stated or implied that the hearing officers of the Department of Justice or any member of the WRA administrative staff employed duress at the renunciation hearings to influence residents of Tule Lake to renounce their citizenship.

\* *But Japanese says did..*

/s/ ROSALIE HANKEY

Subscribed and sworn to before me  
this 8th day of January, 1947.

(SEAL) /s/ EDWARD T. DUFFY  
Notary Public

My commission expires Oct. 9, 1948