

A7.02

67/14  
C

ALCOHOL - CARBON TISSUE  
25.1.13. ALCOHOLIC CARBONIZATION  
ALCOHOLIC CARBONIZATION  
ALCOHOLIC CARBONIZATION  
ALCOHOLIC CARBONIZATION

June 13, 1942

Grodzins

Interview with Robert Hawley, FBI agent, mentioned in San Francisco, working on the Japanese.

DD.

A7.02

Hawley was contacted through General Barrows, who ~~was~~ is an old friend of the ~~xxx~~ family. Hawley's father was a consular official in Japan for many years, and Hawley himself was born there. But he speaks the language "only passably" and reads it "hardly at all."

True to expectations~~xx~~ and to the FBI tradition, Hawley wouldn't say very much. And everything he did say was prefaced by "this is a personal opinion." ~~xxx~~ He said this mumness is inforded from the top and that even his superior in San Francisco (Pieper sp?) wouldn't and couldn't tell me anything ~~xxxx~~ more. Absolutely nobody can examine the files; this rule is NEVER broken, though it might be through ~~xxxx~~ J. Edgar Hoover, himself.

Item: It IS true that NO NESEI up to date has been convicted on a sedition, treason, or aiding the enemy. This does not mean Nesei have not been picked up for breaking curfew or on suspicion. But the larger statement stands and Hawley seemed to consider it only mildly surprising. He would not say anything about second generation Germans or Italia~~asxx~~ now --- but I promised to ask him again for some basis of comparison.

~~ITEM:~~ It is NOT TRUE that Japanese have not given evidence against other Japanese. Hawley specifically mentioned our ~~xx~~ L[ A] friend, Tokio Slocum. He qualified the larger statement with the assertion that the Japanese are "very closemouthed." He could not say, for example, that the Japanese had voluntarily given information against other Japanese, as far as he knew. His In his own experience, the information had come after "several

June 13, 1942

hours ~~xxxx~~ of questioning" or at least after interrogating of some sort. Comparatively, Hawley said ~~xxxx~~ he thought Japanese were "less apt to talk" than other classes. <sup>He</sup> ~~xxx~~ had no answer when I asked him if this ~~xxx~~ <sup>might be</sup> because they had less to talk about.

ITEM: Hawley thought that the FBI was doing "an entirely satisfactory" job in apprehending dangerous people before the evacuation ~~xxx~~ proclamation of February. He furthermore said that he thought that the FBI could have handled the entire situation satisfactorily, short of an actual invasion. This, of course, might be the beaurocrats evaluation of his own work. On the other side of the question, however, Hawley said that the evidence collected in the early mass raids disclosed a situation that "certainly justified" the "Military necessity" argument for mass evacuation. These two statements coming so close together <sup>him</sup> sounded strange to me and I accussed ~~xxx~~ of inconsistency -- if he thought the FBI was doing all right, then why was mass evacuation a military necessity? This he shrugged off --- it was certainly a matter of opinion, he said. General DeWitt's opinion could very well differ from his, and since the general was in ~~effixvix~~ the commanding position, then the general's opinion prevailed. Then, I asked, did these massbraids really uncover evidence of ~~xxxxx~~ organized plans to systematically aid the enemy? This Hawley pointblank refused to answer. But, inferentially, it would seem that rather ~~xxxxxxx~~ startling ~~xxxxxxx~~ material HAD been uncovered--- otherwise De Witt's stand would not be justified in Hawley's eyes. Hawley's demeanor indicated this, too.

Hawley ~~xxxxxx~~ seems ~~xxx~~ both intelligent and sympathetic ~~xxxxxx~~ towards the Japanese. He was very interested --

June 13, 1942

almost too interested --- in the study. He said he had heard about it and had meant to visit us in Berkeley. He ~~xxxx~~ wanted ~~xxxxxx~~ to know if the files would be available to the FBI.

I promptly said "No" but did say we would be glad to supply him with ~~xxx~~ data on an specific question he was interested in. He was most snooply about our propaganda investigations and our reports from the camps. ~~xxxxxxx~~ On the first score, he wanted to know about PRO-JAPANESE propaganda; and of course ~~xxxxxx~~ isn't there just ~~ix~~ any other than the stuff he knows about ~~xxxxxx~~ ~~the~~ in re: the fight for civil rights of the Nesei. On the second, he wanted to know about manifestations of disloyalty inside the camps and I told him our material didn't disclose any at all.

For the report he had to hand in, I gave him the names of the ~~xxxxx~~ senior members of the staff, the dope on the Rockefeller grant, and the fact that we had the full cooperation of the government agencies concerned.

Hawley is the kind of man whom, I think, would talk informally --- once one gets to know him. We got along very well and before I left he had promised to ask ~~ixxx~~ Pieper about specific figures on the number of Issei arrests and other specific material. Also, I have a date to go to lunch with Hawley next week; he's going to bring along the Japanese ~~max~~ expert of the Naval Intelligence, who, Hawley said might be able to tell me more than he could.

Grodzins in Washington  
Report #5  
September 25, 1942

~~DD~~

A7.02

Morning:

Mr. Tolan's secretary turned over to me all the correspondence the congressman had received from his constituents on the Japanese. There were relatively few of these (fewer than fifty), almost all urging evacuation. I am briefing these on 2 x 4 cards showing the name of the sender, his address, and the main line of argument used. Several form letters, the origin of which is not shown, are among this group.

Behind one of the desks in the Tolan Committee's Office, I found some additional exhibits that Attorney General Warren sent to the Committee, but which arrived too late to be included in the printed record. These consist of some fifty photostats of letters from California law enforcement officers to Warren giving their views on the Japanese situation around the middle of February. With the fifteen or so letters of the same type that were published in the San Francisco hearings, I think these photostats constitute a good survey of the attitudes, opinions, and prejudices of California law enforcement officials.

At noon I called Milton Chernin. We have a luncheon date for Monday afternoon.

Afternoon:

I finished with the Tolan Committee material and went to the Justice Department where I was directed by a friend of Lamb to Edward J. Ennis, Director, Alien Enemy Control Unit, Department of Justice. Mr. Ennis handled the entire West Coast situation for the Justice Department from the beginning of the war until the February 19th Proclamation. He opposed evacuation from the first and is hopping mad about the whole thing. He wants to give us the complete story from the viewpoint of the Justice Department in order, I

suspect, to justify that Department's stand in the matter.

Ennis told me:

(1) "Evacuation took place because the California farmers wanted the land that the Japanese owned."

(2) General DeWitt at first did not ask for mass evacuation because of the economic dislocation he feared it might cause. As a military matter, however, DeWitt would have preferred all persons moved a hundred miles back from the Pacific Coast. When public clamor arose insisting upon Japanese evacuation, the only barrier for removing the Japanese was lifted. In other words, DeWitt wanted evacuation but at first did not take any action to get it because he feared the public consequences. When the demand became great, he took the normal military steps for the greatest safety. If public pressure had not been created, DeW. would have been satisfied with much less than mass evacuation.

(3) The Army staff at first did not think mass evacuation was necessary. The first prohibited areas were very limited once. When public clamor grew on the West Coast, when the lobbies got busy, when congressional delegations started their action, the Army revised its demands on the Justice Department and asked for the enforcement of restrictions in large prohibited areas.

(4) When the Army finally demanded that the Justice Department enforce such restrictions in the entire territory that later became area A, the Justice Department refused to accept such a large responsibility, saying that (1) it thought such precautions unnecessary and (2) it was not capable of adequately enforcing such restrictions.

(5) The Army, backed by what amounted to public hysteria, was able to carry the matter before the President and the February 19th Proclamation followed. The Justice Department (Mr. Ennis) actually aided in the drawing up of this proclamation when it was apparent the

matter was being taken out of its hands.

Ennis is willing to spend a week-end with me in going over the documents in his office and in giving me specific citations for the story. From February 1st to 19th, there were continuous conferences between the Justice Department and the Army and the Justice Department and the congressional delegations. Memoranda were written about all these meetings and I will have access to them, if they can be found (Justice Department filing stinks, cf. below.) Ennis, furthermore, will turn over to me for examination all the correspondence that the Justice Department received as well as all the mail that was turned over to the Department by the President and various senators and congressmen.

Ennis said that the present policy of the WRA, following the recent meetings in San Francisco, is to give greater and greater opportunity for the Japanese to reenter normal life outside the coastal areas. He then turned me over to the chief of one of the enforcement units of his department, Leo Gitlin. Gitlin corroborated Ennis' version of the process by which the War Department took over the evacuation. Gitlin added the following to the story.

(1) The Justice Department received no great demands for evacuation until, at the end of January, the first restrictions were placed on enemy aliens of the West Coast. Then came the deluge. Gitlin estimates that "at least six thousand" letters were received.

(2) He thinks that the columnists had much to do with stirring up sentiment, especially John B. Hughes (radio commentator), McLemore, Lippman (Gitlin thinks his column was the real turning point), Pegler and Runyon. This was all culminated by an editorial in the Washington Post accusing the Justice Department of "biddling" the Japanese question.

Though he did not say so, Gitlin implied that all this took the starch out of the Attorney General and made his backing of Ennis' opposition to evacuation less strong than it might have been.

(3) Gitlin said that he saw a confidential report from the West Coast Naval Intelligence that stated definitely that mass evacuation over such a wide area was not necessary.

(4) Gitlin quoted a conversation that he overheard between Hiram Johnson and Ennis which went as follows:

Johnson: "We have to get the damn Japs out."

Ennis: "Senator, you don't really think they are dangerous."

Johnson: "Well, not really dangerous."

Ennis: "Well, are they unscrupulous?"

Johnson: "No, not unscrupulous. They just work too damn hard and we can't compete."

I will check this with Ennis. Gitlin said he "almost fell over" when he heard it.

(5) The editor of one of the Los Angeles papers came to Washington to tell the Justice Department that mass evacuation was not necessary. Gitlin will find the name of this man for me and try to find the memoranda that were written following his visit.

(6) (Gitlin)

Gitlin said the Justice Department "was elated" when Tom Clark was appointed in the West Coast, but "terribly disappointed" at Clark's actions. "We feel Clark sold us out," Gitlin said.

While I was talking to Gitlin, he called a file clerk of the Justice Department and asked her to send down "all the Japanese material." Twenty minutes later, three boys came in pushing a large library truck, all three shelves of which were filled with files. The leader of the file boys said, "There's at least twice as much upstairs."

The very mass of the stuff astounded me. A cursory examination showed that much of the material was extraneous to our study. The filing system is so lousy, however, that it will be necessary to examine almost every one of the files to extract from the mass of general crank letters those on Japanese. Furthermore, there is much material in these files that does not pertain directly to public sentiment on the West Coast but that does pertain to other aspects of the evacuation study. The problems arising out of the possible methods of handling this mass of material are covered in the attached letter.

\* \* \* \*

89  
A7.02

The number of briefs of letters now approaches 400. A cursory examination of the mail after February 20, shows the awakening of liberal sentiments in favor of hearing boards for individual Japanese. The immobilization of liberal groups before February 20 is difficult to explain. From the point of view of the Japanese, it is tragic. Mr. Ennis confirmed Mr. Gitlin's statement that evacuation might not have taken place if these liberal statements had appeared earlier.

I hope to finish with the Justice Department files about the end of this week. I have an appointment with Mr. Ennis for Monday or Tuesday evening of next week when "we will work all night" to put together a consecutive story. After that, Mr. Ennis will arrange interviews for me with Messers Rowe and Fahy. After that, also, I will see Mr. Clark.

Material being copied from Mr. Ennis' personal files which <sup>is</sup> ~~are~~ informative about the following topics: (1), the large farming organizations put concerted pressure on the Attorney General, personally, in support of evacuation. Letters in the file include messages from the Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association of Central California, Prune The Ralph E. Myers Company, S. D. Christerson, and the California ~~RUNE~~ and Apricot Growers' Association.

*The war* (2), Conclusive data to the effect that the Justice Department <sup>before</sup> had a long list of Japanese deemed dangerous, who were incarcerated immediately upon the outbreak of war. This is substantiated in the Ringle report (Naval Intelligence), part of which is attached.

(3) The survey of public opinion on the West Coast by the Division of Intensive Surveys, which shows that there was no concerted mass opinion for evacuation at the end of January.

(4) The decisive part played in evacuation by Manchester Boddy, publisher of the liberal Los Angeles Daily News. Boddy's letters to the Attorney General are being copied and Ennis will report a conference that was had with him in Washington. Boddy's idea was a voluntary evacuation camp for the Japanese to

[#8]

Sept. 29, 1942

which they could go before being permanently employed in other sections of the country. Apparently he was very influential.

(5) When the February 19th Proclamation was made, plans were only laid for voluntary evacuation. Mass evacuation was decided upon only after trouble in communities to which the Japanese wished to go. Ennis will fully substantiate this next week. Documents in the files are only indicative.

(6) Continued evidence of conflicts between the Justice Department and the War Department.

(7) Substantiation of the statement that I had only received verbally before, that the policy promulgated at the recent San Francisco meeting of WRA authorities is one of using WRA camps as a faucet from which Japanese will be sent for employment in the central regions of the country.

\* \* \*

*Very truly  
yours*

Interview with John Burling, Assistant to Mr. Fnnis, Alien Enemy Control Unit,  
October 8, 1942.

Burling is a young New York lawyer and like every person in the Justice Department to whom I have talked, violently ~~xx~~ opposed to the principle of evacuation. He added the following points to the story.

1. When Burling came to work for the Department on December 26, 1941, the Army was pushing the J. D. to immediately issue contraband regulations for the West Coast. It is Burling's belief that the Army's preoccupation with getting through these regulations is one reason why there was no talk about evacuation earlier.

2. On January 21, the Army sent to the J. D. its first request for restricted and prohibited areas on the West Coast. Burling says that the first of these areas was granted the Army in the hope that they might relieve the terrific public pressure that was just then beginning to build up. The limitation of areas, however, had the opposite effect and resulted in further demands by the public and by the Army. Burling thinks that the refusal of some of these extreme demands resulted in the Army's determination to take over the job. The J.D., however, calculated that the Army would not want the task and when the J. D. refused to administer mass evacuation, J. D. officials did not think the Army would assume the administration of it. Thus, to Burling's view, mass evacuation resulted from a misjudgment of the Army's intentions by J. D. officials. If the J. D. had thought the Army would take over, the J. D. might have taken a different line of defense from "we can't administer it."

3. The first areas limited by the Army were in California and were closely related to military objectives. The Washington and Oregon areas which came afterward, however, were too large in the opinion of the J. D. and the J. D. submitted counter proposals. The J. D., furthermore, resisted the enlargement of areas in California. The Army met this resistance with even larger demands and the final one was total mass evacuation.

4. Burling said that Rowe told him that DeWitt at first did not want mass evacuation.  
(This is the third person who has quoted Rowe's story to me. I will see Rowe on Monday.)

Burling thinks that public clamor was the sole factor that brought about the evacuation. "Military necessity had nothing to do with it." Burling's description of the first meetings of the California Congressional Delegation, which were attended by him, Ennis, Rowe and Bendetson, are most interesting. Bendetson, apparently acting under orders, seemed to have as his sole purpose the placating of congressional sentiment. In these early meetings he did not argue for mass evacuation but rather expressed tacit approval of the idea by agreeing with the congressmen in almost everything they said. Thus, he admitted that General DeWitt did not believe there was much reason for evacuating aliens only and "from the military standpoint" believed that the evacuation of all Japanese would be preferable. But there was no insistence upon this latter stand and no definite program advocated. "Bendetson was just trying to do a smooth public relations job."

Grodzins  
Interview with Attorney General Biddle  
October 13, 1943

A7.02

Pre-evacuation: "I never thought evacuation was necessary ~~but~~ and I still don't think it was. Nevertheless, there was no way that I could stop it. The army ~~xxxxxx~~ authorities were insistent, they talked in terms of military necessity, and, in time~~xxxxxx~~ of war, there is no way you can stop the army on such a thing.

"The best evidence that you could possibly have to demonstrate how powerful were the influences of public opinion is the very fact that General De Witt and the other Generals did not become interested in evacuation until several months after the war began. The very fact that they did not push evacuation immediately after Pearl Harbor and did push it only ~~later~~ <sup>after</sup> there was a considerable public clamor is such a self-apparant fact that many people overlook it. Yet I think it is that simple.

"Of course, I tell you frankly that --- so far as the information we had ---- I do not think Evacuation was necessary. But at the same time, we were not appraised of the actual military situation. And General DeWitt may have had more grounds for fearing an attack on our shores than I thought, or think, he had.

"Furthermore, I think that if evacuation had <sup>not</sup> taken place, we would have had a very nasty situation on the West Coast -- very bad for the Japanese, themselves, I mean --- just terrible.

"You~~x~~ say your work is, in part, a critical evaluation. Do you find anything to criticise this Department about?"

Oct. 13 ; 1943

Grodzins: (Experimentally) I think you made a mistake to complicate your objections to the necessity of evacuation by injecting into this an argument that the Justice Department couldn't administer such a program. Second argument not on merits of case, and weakens the main thing, etc,etc.

Biddle: "I can't agree with you altogether. We didn't discuss administrative ~~feasibility~~ feasibility --- it wasn't that the Justice Department couldn't ~~carry out~~ carry out the evacuation, rather (rawtha) it was a case where I thought the Justice Department simply shouldn't be a part to a program in which citizens were to be deprived of their liberties. That was a military matter and the military properly had to administer it. Such a program was no program for a Department of Justice to carry out. It was a military task.

-----

Above is the real substance of half hour interview: ~~Drivia~~: 1) Biddle thinks WRA doing good job but thinks publicity is terrible; 2) Biddle ~~still~~ continues to fail to reach agreement with military, is opposed to the methods of the individual exclusion program, and ~~says~~ "we refuse to support the War Department on the individual exclusion cases"; 3) Biddle made an interesting statement re continued detention, copy of which is attached; 4) Biddle thinks the study is "a wonderful thing", is opposed to the idea of no publication until after the war, and indicated that he would be glad to have data supplied by his department used in publications before the war --- in fact, "as soon as possible"; 5) last words (demonstrating genteel background): "please stop by to see me again the next time you come to town".

Page 1  
Report #15

28  
A7.02

Shadyun

Interview with James Rowe, the Assistant to the Attorney General, October 15, 1942.

"I am convinced that the whole story lies in the single fact that the Army folded under pressure.

"When I was in San Francisco the first week of January, General DeWitt told me, in referring to the demand already made by <sup>a</sup> the Los Angeles group, that he 'thinks mass evacuation is damned nonsense!' and I agreed with him and still agree with his original statement. Mass evacuation is damned nonsense and there was no good military reason for it."

Proclamation 9066 was actually put through in less than two days. The Justice Department had no idea that the Army was considering the evacuation of citizens and aliens from large territories until an evening meeting at Attorney General Biddle's home

OCT. 15, 1942

which can now be definitely dated on February 17. Before this evening meeting, there had been discussion of evacuation of aliens and citizens from small strategic areas. And the Justice Department previously had refused to evacuate citizens from Bainbridge Island. The January 17th meeting was called to adjust the differences between the Justice Department and the War Department in regard to the huge areas in Oregon and Washington that the Army had set forth from which it wanted all aliens excluded. But the question of citizens being evacuated was not being considered.

"The argument waxed hot and though the Attorney General did not back Ennis or me with much force, he at least did not argue against us, and we had refused every Army demand successfully. Suddenly General Gullian (Provost Marshall General) reached in his pocket and pulled out a slip of paper which contained an order giving the War Department power to remove citizens and aliens.

"I laughed at him. The old buzzard got mad. I told him he was crazy, and I immediately perceived that he was pulling the Army tactic of attacking when on the defense.

"But in another minute I thought that I was crazy. Because the Attorney General immediately wanted to get to work polishing up the order. His attitude amazed me. Ennis almost wept. I was so mad that I could not speak at all myself and the meeting soon broke up.

"The next morning we met in Mr. Stimson's office and I arrived about three minutes late. Ennis was there when I arrived, arguing with Stimson and Biddle and getting absolutely nowhere because his own boss was against him. Now Biddle was wholeheartedly in favor of the resolution. Ennis and I might have combatted Biddle's passive acceptance of 9066, but it was impossible for us to oppose his energetic approval.

"So Ennis and I ~~left~~ helped draw up the resolution that very morning, and on the way home in the cab I had to convince Ennis that it was not important enough to make him quit his job."

Rowe pushed 9066 through the budget and had it signed by the evening of the 19th, just two days after it was suggested for the first time. After it was signed by the President and announced, Biddle remarked plaintively to Rowe: "Jim, I thought it would

Oct. 15, 1942

"...get back to my desk." This, I think is an interesting twinge of conscience, because Rowe said that Biddle was well aware of the fact that once he approved of such a measure it never required any further action upon his part.

Further facts:

1- After 9066 was through the President, Rowe immediately set to work in getting the WRA organized. He was largely responsible for its inception because <sup>he</sup> didn't want the Army to keep the poor people a minute longer than was necessary."

2- Rowe is certain that if Biddle had not given in, the Army would have been well satisfied with a compromise. He is equally certain that the Army was surprised and a little overwhelmed by their success, as is evidence by the months lapse between the signing of 9066 and the first exclusion orders.

3- Rowe likes Biddle and it was obviously difficult for him to condemn him as he did. He excuses for Biddle were (a), the fact that Biddle was in such a precarious position as far as his job was concerned, and (b), public opinion was <sup>so</sup> strong that the Army would probably have received its way a month later than it did, anyway.

<sup>Rowe</sup>  
4- ~~Rowe~~ was almost solely responsible for the Tolan Committee going to the West Coast. He thought it would relieve the pressure on the Justice Department. (This confirmed by Lamb later.)

The interview with Rowe was supposed to last for "no more than fifteen minutes." It lasted for an hour and twenty minutes, making me late for my appointment with the Assistant Secretary of War. Mr. Rowe saved my skin by having a government car drive me to the War Department.

Page 4

Report #15

Hodgins A7.02 DJ

IV Interview with Mr. Tom C. Clark, October 16, 1942.

Mr. Clark impressed me as being the least able and most evasive of all the Justice Department people that I have seen. He seemed to have no specific ideas about what he was supposed to have done and what he did on the Coast and no clear picture of the events as they had developed. Rather, his story was a jumbled one of speeches he made, the rising ire of the people, the criticism of the first prohibited areas, his flying back to Washington for the February 17th meeting, and his conviction that no one could tell the good Japanese from the bad.

Page 5- Report #15

Oct. 15, 1942

Clark did say that he thought that "at least 90%" of the Japanese were loyal, but said that the problem of separation was impossible.

Clark further left no doubt that in his opinion the public sentiment on the Coast had been a prime factor in evacuation. In fact, he talked about practically nothing else, though he did say that "the general (De Witt) is an able man, and he could afford to take no chances."

The interview was short and as a whole very unsatisfactory. Clark did say he had a good many personal papers on the evacuation that he would send me. I will write to him, explaining our project and requesting that these papers be sent to the Berkeley office for our examination.



31 VII

True.

Interview with John Burling, assistant to Edward Ennis,  
October 13, 1943

Grodzins  
G

A 7.02

The meeting was in the nature of a rapprochement with Burling following a misunderstanding via letter during the past year. Though the misunderstanding, itself, was not mentioned at all Burling obviously appreciated the sentiments and talked freely for more than an hour, in addition to showing me some file data.

1. After the widely publicized FBI raid, in the spring of 1942, there were great differences of opinion between Western Defense Com - man and Justice Department as to the significance of the raid, and of the contraband collected. DeWitt and Marshall wanted everybody who was caught with contraband interned, irrespective of intent or of any linkage between the contraband and possible danger to internal security. DeWitt sold this idea to Marshall, who in turn got after Roosevelt, who in turn ordered the Solicitor General (Biddle out of town) to follow Marshall's recommendation. An order was issued and chaos followed. People were detained for having flashlights, Red Cross medals, rusty pistols, etc., etc. Biddle came back and was convinced by the Alien Enemy Unit of the absurdity of the whole thing. A corps of lawyers was set to work analyzing the cases of those interned. The results were ludicrous. An alien woman (German in this case) being detained, for example, because she had in her ~~own~~ possession the sword of her husband, which he had received upon his graduation from Annapolis; a Japanese was interned because the FBI man discovered that his radio had a short wave band still working, even though the man presented incontrovertible evidence to demonstrate that he had paid to have the short wave band removed. Such cases were very numerous.

2. Even J.E. Hoover, on May 5, 1942, wrote a memorandum advocating extreme toughness with those caught with contraband and a broad interpretation of what contraband consisted of.

3. Attached is a memo written by Burling and Ennis for Biddle's signature which points out all the absurdities of the tremendously publicized FBI raids. This is an important document, even though it was probably never sent to the President. It shows that despite the tremendous load that Hoover collected in his raid that "We have not . . . uncovered through these searches any dangerous person, that we could not otherwise know about."

4. Unfortunately, the cases ~~are~~ digested were never tabulated statistically because the policy was changed before that was necessary. It might be a good idea for us to try to get the digest so that we could tabulate them ourselves.

A 7.02  
1/23/45

Ennis and I had a cordial reunion. I will see him several more times and the following points were gathered during a very informal sort of conversation;

1. Ennis, liked Meyer, is hopping mad about the Army attitude with respect to the return to the Coast. He was completely opposed to the Army reprocessing the evacuees in any way. In conversation with General Wilbur and the Attorney General, Ennis declared that the acquiescence of Justice to the Army plan was, purely and simply, a trade by Justice for wholehearted co-operation from the Army. Mr. Biddle was pained at ~~Ennis~~ E. 'S ~~bluntness~~ bluntness and shut him up.

2. Nevertheless, until overruled by the Attorney-General Ennis will have nothing whatever to do with the Army's list of detainees. McCloy has promised him that the Army will not even send a list of detainees to the Alien Enemy Control Division. Ennis ~~said~~ said, \* Any further incarceration of Japanese aliens (in addition to those already at internment camps\*) will be a matter solely between WRA and the Army.

3. Ennis is worried about the operation of the renunciation of citizenship law. He know thinks that there should be no such law, but, on the other hand believes that unless it had been passed a much worse statute might have been put across by the California hotheads. He was opposed to sending Burrlling to Tule during this crucial period but was overruled on this point by his superiors. He favors getting Burrlling away as soon as possible.

GRODZINS

A7.02

Grodzins notes

Interview with

A. G. Biddle

Wed., Feb 17, 1945

With Ennis saw Biddle at  
3:30 p.m.

Wanted to clear up two points  
as follows:

① Cabinet did not discuss  
necessity of evacuation in any formal  
way at all.

② President interested in Jap. 9066  
problem, but merely signed 9066  
when brought to him as joint  
project of War + Justice Dept's  
on Feb. 19. Pres. did not  
review basis of policy at all.

Biddle, in mellower mood  
than last year, did not repeat that  
he had opposed mass evacuation.  
Rabner, said not sure it was necessary,  
but that something had to be done, that  
army needed "undoubted responsibility"  
& that, in natural course, Army had  
done job.

From this - we turned to comment -  
J. D. - WRB controversy + my point re:  
necessity of JD immediately screening  
those on Army stop list ~~that~~ was  
later taken up with Ennis + Berling

Proble in ~~in~~ - Feb. 18, 1945 -

(p. 2)

(2) in separate conference, ~~This, in turn,~~  
~~led to idea that~~ I saw Berling  
means to Berly attacking Myers  
and Coxens policy and asking for  
immediate change of policy + <sup>canceling</sup> ~~canceling~~  
of Myers current <sup>the carrying out of Myers gun staff offered him.</sup> ~~imp.~~ (Memo,  
Berling to Wechsler, Feb. 9, 1945)  
I stated my disagreement <sup>with</sup> Berling's  
argument — and he admitted it  
had "agency". This, in turn, led me  
to remark about loose coordination  
of WRA with Justice, Army & others.  
~~could, in~~ Immediately, Berling &  
Emis had an idea (suggested by me)  
that I ought to work for Fortas  
(as "Special Assistant to Under Sec. of  
Interior") acting as general liaison  
& trouble-shooting man. They  
took me to Ass. Atty. Wechsler, admitted  
I was then in disagreement with  
current J. D. policy, <sup>but nevertheless</sup> ~~and~~ suggested  
to recommend me to Fortas. Wechsler  
forthwith called Fortas, told him  
I ~~know~~ "know" more about Japs ~~problems~~  
than anybody like "Quis" and he  
~~with~~ recommended that Fortas  
see me. I am to call Fortas  
Thursday afternoon for appointment.

A7.02

Jan 27

3 p.m. Anderson  
+ Elliot saw Eum's

Jan 28

2 p.m. Anderson saw  
Eum's again

Jan 10 - Some talk ✓  
by Dr. Witt that  
was evacuation unnecessary.  
Ferris -