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Jule Lake Field Report

Apr. 1944

Revised to

2 of 2

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U.S. Employment Compensation Commission, that no official spokesman for the farm workers had come forward, that the entire farm crop must be harvested, adding the following ultimatum:

"If the farm workers are not interested enough in the settlement of this problem to send official spokesman to the administration by 8:30 a.m. October 21st, it will be necessary for the WRA to request harvesting by the Army and consequent loss of the crops to evacuees. 1/

(By "loss" Mr. Best means only the loss of food; colonists obtain no money and get no compensation from the sale of these farm stuffs).

So far as can be determined, this ultimatum brought no response from "official spokesman." The reason for this delay on the part of the colonists is clear. The meeting of October 17 indicates that the organizing group, the Daihyo Sha Kai, had undertaken a formidable and time consuming amount of organization and investigation. Informant K. a loyal evacuee sent from Tule to Gila on November 8, explained the situation:

"They were not prepared to make their demands. They were trying to figure out the proper approach. They wanted to ask each block's opinion getting their channel work done" 2/

Controversy over Public Funeral

When Kashima's death was announced, the Daihyo Sha Kai decided by block consent to attend and make an occasion of his funeral. The intensity of public sentiment at this time is well illustrated by the following remarks made by M, one of the representatives:

"The figured the people who got hurt (when the truck turned over) represented the whole center ... They knew they couldn't all get in (the gymnasium) but they wanted to give him an honorable funeral because he represented all of us." 3/

Shizue Kai and George Kuratomi, as members of the Negotiating committee, now approached Mr. Best and asked permission to use the high school gymnasium for the funeral. While Mr. Best was still undecided, another group came forward,

1/ Tulean Dispatch, October 21

2/ Report, Dec. 24, 1943. p. 12.

3/ Notes, March, p. 63.

a proper and peaceful attempt to induce the Administration to improve the situation.

ATTITUDES ON THE FARM STRIKE

Unfortunately, few attitudes were expressed on the "farm strike." *and all but one of the statements given were at least 6 months after the strike itself.* Only one of the limited number of informants contacted approved of the strike itself. Some believed that it was instigated by pressure. Most significant are the statements of two ex-Gilans, "YS" a young kibe i girl, who staunchly supported the Daihyo Sha Kai in November, and "I", who also defended the representative body vigorously in a letter dated

Both of these informants were old and trusted friends of the writer, and in her belief, expressed their unreserved opinion. It should be remembered, however, that these statements were made six months or more after the farm accident and that the informants had been powerfully impressed with the futility of the strike and the misery and inconvenience of the long conflict with the WRA and the Army. Had they expressed themselves immediately after the accident, when the camp was undergoing its primary emotional reaction to the death of the farm worker, more sympathy with the farm workers and their plight would undoubtedly have been expressed.

Whether the verbatim statements of the old Tuleans were typical of that section of the population, the writer is not prepared to say at this time; all quoted here were nisei girls ~~xxx~~ with whom the writer had only a brief acquaintance.

"I" said:

7.

*Supposed to be a "second thought" given up and
my mind goes to the other way: Shaevel*

"I felt that the people on the farm at that time were more or less unreasonable in striking because they could have kept on working and watched a satisfactory negotiations to be put through before striking. They jumped the gun. It was brought on by high pressure speakers."¹

"YS" said:

"Well, I didn't think it (the truck accident) was the fault of the WRA like the people said it was and I didn't understand why the residents went on strike. There were many reasons, but they didn't sound very well grounded to me. The way everyone rushed to the farm office, standing in line and giving up their badges. . . ."²

Both of the above informants had lost their feeling of obligation to the Daihyo Sha Kai when they made the statements quoted. When a nisei girl from Topaz who ~~still sympathized with~~ the organization was asked for her reaction to the farm strike she said:

"I think that the farm accident came too soon. When we first came here we were disappointed and knew it had to be changed. If the farm accident had not come so soon we could have made the changes gradually."³

"N" an intelligent nisei block manager from Gila still considered himself a supporter of the Daihyo Sha when he expressed the following opinion, *which is possibly minor in attitude* ~~which appears to be a minority sentiment~~.

"I said, 'Why didn't they put in some licensed driver. Who does the truck driving? Does the placement officer put anybody in? Did the head of Placement have experience in that field?'

"I didn't blame them for striking. Before we came here they said they had requested a regular Army truck (to transport farm workers). They had suggested it many times and they couldn't get it. In October it's pretty cold to ride in an open truck."⁴

"O", a kibeï, and also a block manager and transferee from Gila stated:

¹R. Hankey, Notes, April, 1944, p. 30.

²ibid., October 12, 1944, p. 1.

³ibid., July 18, 1944, p. 1.

⁴ibid., April, p. 20.

"They said 'Strike.' That time they had so many acres from which to get vegetables. I don't see any reason in a way why they should quit working, since we got so much productive stuff. They could consult WRA officials while they're working. They could talk instead of quit. If the conference didn't go through, they could quit."¹

It is interesting that "O", a very conservative individual, apparently feels that the strike would have been justified if an attempt at negotiations had been made and had been rebuffed by the Administration.

The following attitudes were expressed by girls who were either old residents of Tule Lake or transferees whose general attitudes were very like the old Tuleans'. It is evident that these older residents had no sympathy with the strike.

young A nisei girl from Gila who *was repeating the opinion of the* prefaced her discussion of the events of October and November with the warning that many people did not believe as she did, *she* stated:

"First of all, when we heard of the farm accident, naturally, we felt sorry for the man who was killed. I never learned why they had that strike. It just doesn't make any connection. It seems like the radical people took over and threatened the foremen of the farm. It seems they (the foremen) were scared and wouldn't say anything. I don't know how those people got into power so quickly!"²

A nisei girl, an old Tulean resident who planned to remain in Tule Lake only until she could enter college stated:

"I think the farm strike was pushed by the kibeis. That group wanted to make a camp issue of it. . . . After the farmers got hurt they were having an awful lot of meetings. Before the 'riot' all they had was meetings, meetings, meetings.

"We were more or less absorbed in hospital work (the informant worked at the hospital) so I don't know too much about it. They brought in so many people to take care of (persons injured in the farm accident). The doctors were saying it was just like war - casualties after casualties."³

¹ ibid., April, p. 22.

² ibid., August, 30, 1944, p. 2.

³ ibid., August, 24, 1944, p. 2.

*concerned the residents of
the block*

Another old Tulean nisei girl said:

"There was a rumor here at that time that the people who came in (transferees) had started things their way. Being a Tulean, we felt that they were making it tough for us. We had nothing (like the strike) before they came in."¹

The following remarks were taken down during a conversation with four nisei girls:

N: (a transferee) "I don't think they should have stopped work. I felt the accident was no fault of the WRA."

S: "But I heard that the roads to the farm weren't good."

B: (an old Tulean) "We can't expect good roads."

N: "And the driver was only 16 years old."² He was too young."

L: (an old Tulean) "But whose fault was that? The fault of the Japanese who hired him!"

N: "It was a good excuse for them to start trouble. I myself felt it was the fault of the head Japanese."³

ATTITUDES ON THE ELECTION OF THE BLOCK REPRESENTATIVES - THE DAIHYO SHA KAI

The election of the block representatives, the Daihyo Sha Kai, was perpetrated so rapidly that it is probable that the predominant attitude of many of the evacuees consisted of a more or less profound sense of befuddlement. Several informants have commented upon the fact that camp life from mid-October through November appeared to be chiefly composed of an unending series of meetings. Chaotic as this period was, however, data gathered during many hours of discussion on the subject indicate that the people as a whole did not question the legitimacy either of the Daihyo Sha Kai or of the Negotiating Committee, that body of Daihyo Sha Kai members who composed the committee which carried on actual negotiations with the Administration. Informants who later criticized

¹ ibid., Sept. 19, 1944, p. 2.

² ibid., The driver was 19 years old.

³ R. Hankey, Notes, Sept. 14, 1944, pp. 3-4.

like the time last year
~~These~~ Attitudes must be interpreted with reservations. Probably

the majority of the residents did not approve of the strike. Yet, ~~these~~ *are too critical* statements do not show lack of sympathy with the farm group or disapproval of the attempt to gain certain concessions from the administration so much as a disapproval of the method used - stopping work. Had more statements been requested from strong Daihyo Sha Kai supporters, a better balanced picture could be presented.

ATTITUDES ON THE ELECTION OF THE BLOCK REPRESENTATIVES - THE DAIHYO SHA KAI

The election of the block representatives, the Daihyo Sha Kai, was perpetrated so rapidly that it is probable that *very few of the evacuees had a clear idea of* the predominant attitude *what was going on during the week following October 15.* of many of the evacuees consisted of a more or less profound sense of *they knew, however, that meetings were going on.* ~~bewilderment~~. Several informants have commented upon the fact that camp life from mid-October through November appeared to be chiefly composed of an unending series of meetings. Chaotic as this period was, data gathered during many hours of discussion on the subject indicate that the people as a whole did not question the legitimacy either of the Daihyo Sha Kai or of the Negotiating Committee, that body ~~32~~ which composed the committee which carried on actual negotiations with the administration. Informants who later criticised

Even though they knew that meetings were going on and most people, in spite of their reluctance to admit it to the outside world, had known that these representatives were preparing to approach the Administration with requests for the

youthful supporters of the Daihyo Sha, ^A ~~or because they resided in~~
~~blocks which where most of the residents were strongly pro-~~
~~Daihyo Sha.~~ Later, when the leaders were imprisoned and when
the organization had lost much of its support, ^{some of} ~~these~~ residents
accused the Negotiating Committee of plotting to take over control
of the center, using pressure at elections and employing terrorism.
They pointed to the fact that the proportion of old Tuleans on
the Daihyo Sha and the Negotiating Committee was disproportionately
small. ^{for and against} ~~What evidence has been acquired to support the former.~~
^{Given the circumstances they set for the next year continue.}
contentions will be discussed later. ^A In connection with the last
accusation, that the proportion of Tule Lake residents was small,
the probability is that the Tuleans were indifferent or disapproved
of the election and ^{when they lacked the courage to absent themselves} ~~showed this disapproval by not attending~~ the
first block elections at which the representatives were selected.
^{and said nothing.}
This attitude was stated frankly by a nisei girl, from Topaz:

"Come to think of it, they did have a lot of nerve represent-
ing us. But I realize they did call for representatives from the
block. The people weren't interested and only those went who
were interested and (consequently) they put in their own men."

Another nisei girl present when this statement was made,
added:

"Still, they would have gotten them in anyway. Before you
go to a meeting here, you know who's going to be elected."¹

Mr. Yoshimura, executive secretary of the Co-operative
Enterprise ^{for June to July 1944} and definitely opposed to Daihyo Sha, gave the follow-
^{excellent} ing explanation of why so few old Tuleans were elected.

"It was done this way. I'm from Minidoka. Quite a few
other people came from different parts of the country and were
mixed up in my block, quite a few from Jerome, Gila, Heart Moun-
tain, Topaz, and Poston, and few that stayed here. They wanted
to elect someone to represent our block. I didn't know anybody

¹ ibid., Sept. 14, 1944, p. 4.

but from Minidoka. So we had to do something. Naturally we elected someone from Minidoka. The result is more people from other centers got elected. These representatives went to meet and elected someone among the representatives to negotiate with the government. Nobody knows exactly who they were. Probably they were elected by pressure group methods."¹

Another source about statement was made by Mr. Kato
~~He~~, a member of the Negotiating Committee, admitted the justness of Mr. Yosumura's criticism of the confused manner in which representatives were selected. ~~He said:~~

"I will state frankly that the incident was too early. It was spontaneous. As Mr. Yosumura said, they couldn't help electing many people who were not capable. I know among the Daihyo Sha there were many people not qualified. Really, I'm not qualified to undertake such a tremendous responsibility. I refused when I was elected. They said I'll be all right.

"The incident was a thing that nobody could stop. We couldn't help it. It went that way." ^{2/}

Dismissed and incident X.
 Not only the statements quoted here but also a series of popular reactions, the last of which occurred in May of 1944, indicate that the concept of the Daihyo Sha as legitimate representatives was extremely strong. This sentiment appears to have increased in strength and stubbornness after the representatives were imprisoned. The more insistent the WRA and the Army became in contending that the body did not represent the people, the more vehemently the majority of the people defended the body's status. *The strength and importance of this attitude cannot be over-emphasized. A sense of obligation toward the men whom they had selected permeated for many months among people who might otherwise have been members of the body for "radio calumny" or other untoward reasons "kenned silly".*

¹ Notes, Feb. p. 27.

^{2/} ibid., Nov. 10, 1944, p. 4.

TULE LAKE REPORT

Rosalie H ankey
Gila

April, 1944

On October 14, a speeding fire truck answering a call turned over. Three firemen were seriously injured. This was followed two days later by a far more serious accident. A farm truck carrying at least 29 men turned over. The account published in the Tulean Dispatch of October 16, agrees in every important detail with the statements of informants:

TWENTY-NINE FARM WORKERS INJURED IN SECOND ACCIDENT, FIVE ARE CRITICAL

Soft Shoulder Beside Road Causes Truck to Overturn

Five residents were seriously injured and twenty-four others were treated for minor injuries yesterday afternoon in the second major accident to occur in the project within a week. The critically injured workers were: Tatsu Kashima, Toshio Yamada, Kensaburo Sawada, Tom Nakao and Takeshi Takagi.

The extent of the injuries was not known by the hospital at the time the paper went to press. Passengers with minor injuries were immediately sent home following treatments.

While speeding along about thirty miles per hour on the newly constructed highway to the project farm, a truck filled with farm workers turned over near the chicken farm when the driver attempted to pass a slow-moving truck. As the truck was overtaking the front vehicle, the hind wheel slid on the loose gravel bordering the highway and struck a soft shoulder, causing the Ford stake truck to turn over. Five passengers were pinned under by the rolling vehicle.

The workers were returning to the project farm to harvest the mature crops. The accident occurred about two miles northwest of the center on the road to the farm.

The driver of the ill-fated truck was Harry Maruno, formerly of Heart Mountain. Further details of the mishap will be published in the Tuesday issue.

The colonists blamed WRA bitterly for placing these men's lives in the hands of the supposedly reckless driver, a boy 18 or 19 years old. This second accident dissolved the restraint which had hitherto held overt expression of resentment in check. The following day no farm workers appeared for work. The so-called farm strike had begun. The only information on its instigation appears in a letter translated from the Japanese which X placed on his Sociological Journal. "I don't

April, 1944

Rosalie H ankey
Gila

know the details yet, but I understand that the strike started when one Kibei had made a speech to the farm workers that they should not go to work until the Administration announced what they would do to these injured persons." 1/

Several remarks made by ordinary residents several months later indicate that the general camp feeling at the time of the farm accident and the strike was not uniform: From N, an intelligent Misesi block manager:

"I said, 'Why didn't they put in some licensed driver. Who does the truck hiring? Does the placement officer put anybody in? Did the head of Placement have experience in that field?

I didn't blame them for striking. Before we came here they said they had requested a regular Army truck (to transport farm workers). They had suggested it many times and they couldn't get it. In October it's pretty cold to ride in an open truck." 2/

From O, a Kibei block manager, strongly inclined to a policy of peace, order, obedience to the Administration:

"They said strike. That time we had so many acres from which to get vegetables. I don't see any reason in a way why they should quit working, since we got so much productive stuff. They could consult WRA officials while they're working. They could talk instead of quit. If the conference didn't go through, they could quit." 3/

From "I", an intelligent practical young man, very anti-administration:"

"I felt that the people on the farm at that time were more or less unreasonable in striking because they could have kept on working and watched a satisfactory negotiations to be put through before striking. They jumped the gun. It was brought on by high pressure speakers." 4/

From these and other statements it is apparent that although a camp wide sentiment that something ought to be done about the accidents existed, approval of the strike itself as the wisest step to take, was not overly strong. Satisfactory information on what took place in the colony in the next few days is impossible to obtain. However, the two accidents occurring in two days caused such indignation that a group of colonists determined to take action.

1/ Oct. 24, p.7.

2/ Notes, April, p. 20

3/ Ibid, p. 22

4/ Ibid, p. 30

Rosalie Hankey
Gila

April, 1944

Nothing positive is known of the preliminary organization of this nuclear group. There appears to have been a preponderance of segregees from Jerome. Immediately after the farm accident they proceeded to organize the colonists with remarkable speed. Their first overt act was to suggest the selection of representatives from each of the blocks. Representatives were accordingly elected or appointed from each block and the body thus formed was known as the Daihyo Sha Kai, 1/ or the Block Representatives. The Administration at this time was completely ignorant of how this was done. The Japanese, however, regardless of whether they supported this body or not, are in unanimous agreement, that after the farm accident, an amorphous, apparently self-appointed group, asked the people in block meetings and at mess to select block representatives.

M., one of the men elected.

"The block representatives were elected by the people. I was voted in. It's a big responsibility and you stick your neck out. I'm acting for the people." 2/

N., a block manager, ostensibly neutral, but actually somewhat pro-Daihyo Sha:

"The Daihyo Sha were all elected after the segregees came in. They were elected after the farm accident.

Mrs. Oda, wife of a block manager not sympathetic to the Daihyo Sha:

"They came from the farm incident. They may have been started already before that (this statement prompted by R. H.) After the accident and before the funeral we were told to get a representative from each block. I don't know who was behind it. At that time the people wanted to get together and speak to the Project Director." 3/

Mr. Oda, block manager, stands for peace and order:

"In this block I think they held a meeting and appointed a man for block representative. They thought he was capable. But

1/ The literal Japanese translation is "Negotiating Committee".

2/ Notes, March, p. 62

3/ Notes, March, p. 4

Rosalie Hankey
Gila

REPORT

April, 1944

some blocks elected them. There were 65 representatives in the organization." 1/

I., sympathetic to Daihyo Sha:

"All of the respective people in the block elected them. ... It was just a case of which representatives seemed most able. After every meeting the representatives always came back and at supper called for silence. They'd take Ayes and Nos for any question then. If there was no time in sess they'd call a special meeting at night." 2/

"What you call the block representatives always existed even previous to the trouble. Out of those that were representatives a lot relocated and new comers were elected to take their place... But there were quite a few old ones and that's one of the reasons why the people got so burnt up. The name, Daihyo Sha was first heard after the trouble (farm accident) ... Under that title they tried to carry on the first negotiations.

"It was definitely decided by block consent to attend the funeral, and make it a project wide affair by the Negotiating Committee." 3/

Mr. Yosurura, member of the Co-op and definitely opposed to Daihyo Sha, made the following statement. He has pro-administration leanings: Only one other informant, Akitsuke who is also anti-Daihyo-Sha also criticised the fact that the committee was chiefly composed of persons who were not old residents of Tule Lake. There may have been some criticism in November, but this is doubtful.

"It was done this way. I'm from Minidoka. Quite a few other people came from different parts of the country and were mixed up in my block, quite a few from Jerome, Gila, Heart Mountain, Topaz and Poston, and a few that stayed here. They wanted to elect someone to represent our block. I didn't know anybody but from Minidoka. So we had to do something. Naturally we elected someone from Minidoka. The result is more people from other centers got elected. These representatives went to meet and elected someone among the representatives to negotiate with the government. Nobody knows exactly who they were. Probably they were elected by pressure group methods." 4/

1/ Ibid., p. 33

2/ Notes, Feb., p. 13

3/ Notes, Mar. p. 39

4/ Notes, Feb. p. 27

Controversy over Public Funeral

When Kashima's death was announced the Negotiating Committee sent representatives to Mr. Best asking that he grant the use of the High School auditorium (also called the gymnasium) for a public funeral for Kashima and that he or some other member of the appointed personnel attend and make a speech of condolence.¹ Some informants say that this public funeral had been determined by block consent. The intensity of public sentiment at this time is well illustrated by the following remark by M who later became one of the representatives:

"They figured the people who got hurt (when the truck turned over) represented the whole center. . . They knew they couldn't all get in (the gymnasium) but they wanted to give him an honorable funeral because he represented all of us."²

According to Opler, Mr. Best, was at first inclined to grant this request. While he was still undecided another group headed by Mr. Takahashi came forward, stating that they, rather than the Kai-Kuratomi group should be given charge of the funeral, that they would be able to keep things under control.³ Takahashi's group implied that the Kai-Kuratomi group were radical. Takahashi was one of the trustees of the fund which was gathering money from the widow. He was also member of the Daihyo Sha Kai; and an unsuccessful candidate for the chairmanship; later he resigned and became advisor to the opposition group. It appears he attempted to undermine Kai and Kuratomi's control of the Daihyo-Sha almost immediately.

¹See p. .

²Notes, Mar., p. 63.

³ibid., p. 57.

Both the Kai-Kuratomi group and Takahashi's group were cautious and secretive in the extreme as to their exact origin and their connections, beyond insisting that they were the representatives of the people.

Best made an effort to meet Takahashi's group, sending representatives to certain barracks when requested, but the plan miscarried.¹

Mr. Best did not know which group to believe. The Daihyo-Sha Kai resented his refusal to accept them as legitimate representatives, but did not choose to expose the foundations of their organization. Opler states:

"The Administration was aware of a group. The representatives of it would come to talk to Best. They didn't feel it was necessary to tell the Administration how they had come to exist or who they were. They were pretty much organized from the inside."²

Eventually Best decided that he would give neither group the use of the auditorium. This was interpreted as a rude and heartless act by many colonists. It aroused great resentment and strengthened the position of the Daihyo Sha.

I. says:

"Mr. Best, in view of the fact that the crops were yet to be got in and that the farmers had not as yet returned to work, saw fit to refuse the request of the said committee. This, as you can see, was the act that sowed the seed for what was to come later."³

N. a somewhat pro-Daihyo Sha man said:

"I heard Kai and Kuratomi went to Best and he okeyed the use of the school. Just before the day of the funeral he turned around and said No. Who was the cause of it? They say Takahashi. . . . When Best refused the Auditorium the people resented it."⁴

¹Notes, Feb. p. 20

²Notes, Mar. p. 25

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⁴Notes, April pp. 21, 21.

meeting that meetings for which minutes are not available had been held between October 17 and October 23. Undoubtedly certain committees had been very active. Unfortunately, the reports of these committees were not available for translation, so analysis must rest on the discussion which followed the committee reports.

Chairman Kuratomi announced that he had received a written memorandum from the Project Director giving the Daihyo Sha Kai official recognition. If the minutes are correctly translated this is almost certainly a falsehood. After roll was taken it was found that 15 block representatives were absent. Kuratomi admonished the body for this lack of interest. From this point on the meeting is very interesting. Representative after representative hurled suggestions at the chair.

Kawamura: Colonists should be allowed to use electrical appliances such as iron and hotplates regardless of time or place at their free will. Space for living quarters is insufficient and the Administration should be informed of the condition.

Sasaki: I request that cameras be permitted within the Center.

Okamura: Colonists should be paid just as much as the men in the Army.

Yamanaka: Private enterprises are prevailing within the Center. Such should be restricted. Moreover Co-op is handling too many luxuries and food stuff, which not only affects the economy of the colonists but also encourages the WRA to be reluctant in their distribution of food.

.

Kurihara: There is no sewing machine in this center....Administration should be consulted to make such provisions without cost.

Nogawa: Tulean Dispatch has reports of the Imperial Headquarters' war news, which should be disseminated.

Uyeno: It is unfair for the Co-op to charge 5¢ for cashing Government checks, such should be stopped.

Sai to: Lumber for furnitures are furnished free to the colonists in Koston and it should be practiced here too.

Takeshita: Alteration of living quarters is imperative, especially in Block 59, Alaska and Mexico areas.¹

Kuratomi finally stopped this tide of suggestions and brought the body back to a discussion of the farm problem. ^{Chairman of the Warehouse Committee, Kazama had his notes.} The fact that pork was never served (~~was true~~), the suspicion that the products of the hog and chicken farms were being disposed of without the knowledge of the colonists was again brought up by Kuratomi. It was believed that these products were being shipped out of the center to the United States Army and Navy. ^{As loyal Japanese, they felt segregation felt they should not be obliged to furnish food for U.S. armed forces.} ~~The hospital problem was discussed and~~ Takahashi stated that ^{Insect Blue} the Caucasian doctors were too dictatorial; they were making the evacuee doctors' lives miserable. This too should be taken up with the Administration. Kazama, who appears to be highly emotional added:

"What do we care about the evacuee doctors! Their status of whether loyal or disloyal should be cleared. If there are loyal evacuee doctors, we should not have such doctors, even in case of sickness. I prefer death rather than be cared for by loyal doctors. Caucasian doctors are even better." (The floor was in turmoil.)¹

Kai quieted the outburst by saying:

"Kazama's and Takahashi's opinions are evidence of their mutual love for Japan, which I must commend. However, each doctor's status should be decided by his own will and Dr. Hashiba should be retained."

Takahashi went on to urge the retention of all evacuee doctors. He was interrupted by hecklers and Kazama again raised his voice:

"Due to our obligation toward the One and Only (the Emperor)...."

Kai interrupted and rebuked him:

"You have no right to hinder a representative who has a voice in the body. I advise that you refrain from such an act hereafter."²

¹ ibid., p. 3.

² ibid., p. 4.

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Law. Mr. Best referred him to the Department of Justice, Mr. Myer and the Spanish Consul. Supplementary to this, Kuratomi stated that the residents strongly desired resegregation. Mr. Best agreed that this would be a good idea. (A)

Farm Accident

Kuratomi opened the discussion of this issue with a demand on the part of the colonists that WRA announce that it would take full responsibility "in regard to these accidents" and express regret concerning them. The people, he added, wish to know what steps have been taken toward compensation." Mr. Best answered that all forms of the United States Employees' Compensation have been completed and transmitted to that Commission.

Kuratomi then bluntly asked the reason for the inhuman attitude of the Administration in regard to the funeral. Best denied he had inhuman tendencies. Kuratomi countered with the fact that he had refused to go or send a representative to the funeral and give a speech of condolence. The discussion rapidly disintegrated into a quarrel, in which Mr. Best ~~stated it was demanded that he go and Kuratomi denies it.~~ *understand that he had been ordered to go and that he would not agree to send a representative* Best stated that people were forced to go to the funeral, ~~which is a fact;~~ *B* Kuratomi denied it. ~~After arrogant words on both sides, Kuratomi stated that motor pool drivers should be over 21 years of age. This is already in effect, said Black.~~

Farm Acreage

Kuratomi stated that it was the desire of the people that they farm no more acreage than was necessary for the needs of the colony. *This was a fairly strong complaint.* Best inquired if this meant they wanted no more beef from Gila. Kuratomi agreed. Best immediately canceled a shipment of beef expected from Gila stating that 50 days must elapse before any beef could

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be procured through the Army Quartermaster. Kuratomi, apparently unperturbed, asked for a farm committee; Best stated that he was wholeheartedly in favor of the formation of such a body. He also assured the Committee that food had never been sent to the Army or Navy.

Public Schools

Black explained the proposed plan for public schools and in answer to a direct question, stated there would be no flag raising ceremony, and that attendance would not be compulsory. *enlarge*

Community Government

This is another major issue, Kuratomi stated that the people wanted a center organization to govern and take care of the center residents and negotiate with the Administration. The organization of this body was to be left entirely to the center residents. Best agreed that he too desired it, but that it must be completely representative. Black *made it quite clear* ~~added that it must be quite clear, however,~~ that there could not be such a thing as self-government, and asked that the present committee serve as an advisory committee to the Administration. Kuratomi again used the term "central governing body" and was corrected by Black. Kuratomi then stated the center desired that Block Managers be put under the supervision of this proposed Center Committee. *why?* It was explained that under WRA regulations this could not be done.

Food Question

Kuratomi stated that the residents doubted that they were getting their full share of poultry and eggs. Zimmer explained that since June 22 no hogs had been slaughtered and that all the proceeds from the hog and poultry farms were going to mess management. Best intimated

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From a letter in X's Sociological Journal, Nov. 20, p. 4:

" . . . on November 1 the representatives made the following demands to Director Myer and Director Best: (1) to supply each block with brooms, buckets, mops, and other necessary items. (2) Swindlings by the appointed personnel in the Subsistence Department were charged. They requested to remove these crooked Caucasians. (3) To discharge the Caucasian employees from the hospital. They also charged that the money appropriated for medicines had been swindled by the Caucasians. (4) All the better grade agricultural products have been packed in the shed and sent to the outside. Formerly the residents had thought that these were being sent to other relocation centers. Lately they have been informed that most of these had been sent to the Army. They argued that they should not be producing for the United States Army.

October 27 Best telegraphed Charles F. Ernst, Project Director at the Topaz Center and , of Poston, requesting the recruitment of farm workers to harvest the crops at Tule Lake.¹

The following day he terminated the striking farm workers as of October 19, "due to failure to report for work."²

The first contingent of farm workers arrived in Tule October 30.

It was commonly believed that Best had stated that he would take no action in regard to the strike without notification. Many colonists were convinced that Best had broken his word. The harvesters were regarded as strikebreaking double-crossers. Resentment increased.

¹ The Topaz Times (Oct. 28, 1943), contains an interesting statement by Mr. Ernst: "In discussing the job I have been asked to find out if there is any trouble like a "strike" at Tule Lake. Last night I phoned to Tule Lake and received this information. 'There is no "strike" or labor trouble at Tule Lake.' The residents of Tule Lake have had meetings with their project director and have said they did not feel they should harvest crops that were going to other centers".

In Poston the existence of the strike was not officially announced until Oct. 31 (Poston Chronicle). The workers were offered 90 cents to \$1.00 an hour. "X" states that the telegram of October 27 did not state that a strike was in progress but did say that the Tule Lake people had refused to harvest the crop for shipment to the "loyal people" in other centers. X's Sociological Journal, October 27, pp 2, 10.

² Tulcan Dispatch, Oct. 28, 1943

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 "a" member of the Daihyo Sha said:

"The harvesters who came in were Japanese. That's what you call the double cross. It was just like an anti-strike. Best stopped the work but didn't give them a chance to consider it. He gave the people no notice of the fact that he was going to bring in the farm workers" If the Administration had put out officially that they couldn't do things (at the beginning of the trouble) I don't think the people would have got so angry. But they didn't tell the people anything."¹

"N" said: *Mr. Nakao, a nice block manager said:*

"It made me pretty sore. We were trying to negotiate and make things run smoothly. And here was a Japanese who did that. We felt pretty bad. Those fellows staying behind were supposed to be loyal to this country. On the cauliflowers that were sent in they'd write, "Sore mitaka fuchusei mono," "See what you get for being disloyal." That made us sort of - gave us a hatred toward those fellows. The people just coming in was bad enough."²

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 "I" said: *Mr. Fujimoto, who relocated from Sule in Sept. 1944 said:*

Previous to all this, Mr. Best gave word that any action he decided to take to harvest the crops in the fields would first be made public to the evacuees and the evacuee farmers. However, with no notification whatever he had brought in about 90 or 100 "yes-yes" Japanese to take over the harvesting. . . I thought it was kind of a dirty trick, putting it mildly."³

Food for these unpopular harvest workers was taken by night from the warehouse which held the colonists' food. Opler stated that the food was taken at night because the trucks were needed for other work during the day.⁴ Evacuees noted the fact that trucks were driven to the warehouses, loaded with large quantities of food and then driven off the project. The next morning Japanese employed

¹ Notes, Mar., p. 52

² Notes, April 1944, p. 21. *This colorful story is probably folk-lore. It is not likely that the harvesters, feeling themselves in a precarious position,*

³ Report, Dec. 24, p. 13. Notes, April p. 30. See also Notes, Feb., p. 14

⁴ Notes, Feb., p. 21

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considered tantamount to the segregation as "disloyal." Communication from "X".

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in the warehouse checked up on the missing items. According to one informant they found 120 sacks of rice, 50 cases of milk, many cans of corn and pineapple and much flour and catsup gone. They themselves never receive catsup at mess.¹ The fact that the food at Tule Lake was, in general, below the standards to which the colonists had been accustomed at other centers, and the well founded suspicion that graft existed among the A. P. members of the Mess Division added to the conviction of injustice. All informants agree that this removal of food was resented most bitterly.

Says "M":

"The food happened at night. The people didn't know about it. We figured this warehouse was for the center. What would you think if people came in with trucks at night?"²

Says "I":

"These workers were being fed from the project warehouse from which food was being taken out at all hours of the night and day. This led the evacuees to believe that they were being done out of a goodly portion of their food. Subsequent investigation upheld this belief."³

When the news spread, and the Negotiation Committee saw that it was widely publicized, it no doubt angered persons who had hitherto been indifferent or neutral. When Mr. Best was approached on the matter he is reputed to have said:

"It's none of your business because we haven't issued these things out to you yet, and besides we're feeding you people properly."⁴

The informant added, "They dismissed the case and that was the main trouble."

¹ Report, Dec. 24, pp. 13, 21

² Notes, Mar., p. 62.

³ Report, Dec. 24, p. 21.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 13. 14.

remarks were made on resegregation:

Question from the floor: Did the Negotiating Committee ever demand the WRA, resegregation of disloyal and loyal?

Chair: We have. Because we have the information by which we can distinguish the loyal from the disloyal.

Question from the floor: Regardless of their present address whether within or without the Center, they are all same Japanese. Disloyal or loyal status should not make any difference as far as Japanese are concerned.

Chair: Negotiating Committee will ask the WRA to rectify your misunderstanding on this matter of re-segregation of Japanese colonists. Re-segregation does not mean segregation among ourselves. The point is to divide between the loyal and the disloyal in the sense of their feeling.¹

Additional questions were asked: Takahashi wondered if 700 acres of farm land would be sufficient. Other members asked about compensation for the widow and about the age of truck drivers.

Two voices from the floor again made themselves heard:

"How will we distinguish the disloyal from the loyal?"

"Utmost care and consideration should be taken"

Kuratomi answered:

"Due to the Administration's lack of understanding of Japanese psychology, many tragical incidents may result. We have to remember that we are Japanese and are for the greater and righteous things. That's why we are discussing this for the purpose of unification."

Tsuda: There are several colonists who have rejected the registration and there are others who registered 'yes', who at the time of re-segregation stubbornly remained and are still with us. If we should demand re-segregation of colonists, how should we present the problem?

Chair: I have no plan as to the ways and means. I know definitely that by the first of next year, the president of the U. S., by proclamation will recognize Japanese status as pro-Japanese.²

The Chair then proceeded with the plan for the election of various divisional committees and plans for the function of the farm department, farm produce, chicken and hog farm, food supply, motor pool, hospital, betterment of living conditions, internal security, and education. He mentioned that Best had agreed to give the colonists free reign in managing the Internal Security Department.

¹ibid., p. 4

²ibid., p. 5

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Kozaka said:

"Wouldn't we be misunderstood if a central body is formed at this time without first consulting the colonists?"

Chair: No. Daihyo Sha Kai was elected from each block by ^{election} ~~recommenda-~~tion and this body was formed by that representative body so there is no inconsistency.

Kozaka: I make a recommendation that block representatives consult the colonists first before further going into the discussion of plan for the further formation of divisional committees.

Chair: (reluctantly) Of course, it should be that way. We cannot decide by ourselves. (All agreed)¹

Kai suggested that this plan be put before the colonists at a mass meeting. Kawamura suggested that this mass meeting be postponed "until we have accomplished something." Kai (according to the minutes) became indignant and demanded that Kawamura reverse his statement, saying, "If there's full collaboration among the Negotiating Committee the Daihyo-Sha and other committees, there should not be any monkey business." Kawamura reversed his statement.

Takahashi moved that the block representatives elect fitted persons for the various posts and that the final decision should be given to the Daihyo Sha Kai. A written recommendation should be conveyed to the colonists. This was unanimously carried.

Two days later Diller Myer arrived on the project. The Negotiating committee asked for audience with him and, according to evacuee informants, was refused.

¹ibid., p. 6. It is most unlikely that the secretary of the Daihyo Sha Kai commented upon the tone used by members in making statements. This "reluctantly" is without doubt an example of over-zealousness on the part of the hostile translators.

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The Negotiating Committee decided to make a demonstration of public support and on the night of October 31 sent false messages to the mess halls that on the following day Mr. Myer was going to give a speech and the people were to come to the Administration Building to hear it. They were told to be as orderly as possible and carry no weapons.

"So the representatives passed the word to each mess hall. They asked everybody to come to the Administration Building quietly, without sticks and without knives in their pockets. They wanted them to be as quiet as possible."¹

"The first thing we heard was about Mr. Myer. He is coming and we would appreciate your cooperation in coming to the administration building. I said to myself, 'Things should be straightened out.' Find out the true dope of how things are standing."

"The first time I didn't know the object why we should go. When I got there I find out the negotiation members were there to consult with WRA heads on the improvement of the center. . . . We went to the Ad. building there for four hours. After three or four hours we find out it was for nothing because the committee couldn't accomplish anything."³

When the crowd which gathered about the Administrative area appeared insufficient, the hoodlum element either was ordered or took it upon themselves to get more people out. They obtained cars and toured the camp, exhorting the people to come as "true Japanese" and threatening those who stayed away. Data are too vague to state exactly what the threats were. The following statement by "I" is probably close to the truth except that it is doubtful that the people as he implied were told they might be shot. The statement is also interesting psychologically. Like many persons in camp, "I" sympathizes absolutely with some of the "demands" of the committee;

¹Report, Dec. 24, p. 13

²Notes, April, p. 20.

³ibid., p. 23.

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nevertheless, he would not risk his skin at the demonstration.

"When this came out, it so happened that the goon-squad went on the war path The people gathered in some blocks. In some blocks the representatives asked the people to come because Myer was going to give a speech. Then, when there wasn't enough people there, a few members of the goon squads got cars. They said it wasn't safe to remain in the barracks and asked the people to head for the Administrative area. I sat tight. I figured if I'm going to get shot I can get shot here in this barracks. They talked to the people trying to make them go, saying, 'Are you Japanese or not?'"¹

By these various means a large crowd was induced to come. Estimates of its size vary. It may have been as many as 14,000 to the Administration Building. Many went out of curiosity.

Faced with this exhibition of "public trust in the representatives" Myer and Best decided to see the committee.

← The Japanese overran the entire Administrative area; the Administration building was completely surrounded. Many of the appointed personnel were panic stricken. The fears of those who had always expected the worst of the ^{Japanese} colonists appeared about to be realized. Some feared rape for their wives and children. ^{As the masses of people} While the conference ^{streamed past the hospital,} was going on Dr. Pedicord came out of the ^{building} hospital and, using insulting language, ordered the group about the hospital to disperse. Four or five of the hoodlum group followed him into the hospital and into his office ^{According to a statement by Dalton Myers he struck the first blow.} He struck one; they turned upon him and beat him severely. The variation in the versions of this occurrence are legion. Opler says Pedicord changed his own version every time he was interviewed.² Two Japanese informants said that the boys went to get Pedicord to ask him to come to the conference.³ However, Opler says that the nurses, who were eye-witnesses, testified that

¹Notes, Feb., p.

²Notes, Mar., p. 59.

³Report, Dec. 24, pp. 13, 22

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Pedicord came out of the hospital and ordered the boys out.¹

This is corroborated by M., ^athe Daihyo Sha informant, who added:

"He came from the inside of the hospital and told them to go to hell. That's why they went in. They had no authority in the hospital. A house is like a fortress. They stepped in because there was reason. I can't walk right into anybody else's house and made a stink!"²

Best and Myer are said to have realized that this episode was unrelated to the demonstration.³ However, it did not help the negotiations. Stenographic notes were taken at this meeting, but have not yet been obtained. The demands made to Myer and Best were released by the Daihyo Sha Kai later. They do not appear to differ at all from the demands made on October 26., except for the addition of the request for immediate discharged of the Caucasian employees in the hospital and the immediate termination of responsible WRA personnel. Director Myer, however, in conversation with the writer, indicated that he had been given considerable more information on the graft which was supposed to be existing among the Caucasian personnel.

18 DEMANDS MADE TO D. S. MYER AND R. R. BEST, November 1, 1943

(1) WRA should submit an official written statement apologizing to the colonists for their responsibility of the farm incident. At the same time WRA should settle with sincerity the pending problem to the satisfaction of its colonists.

(2) Project Director has given no expression of condolence to the family of the deceased in the farm incident which is unwarrantable.

(3) The inhuman attitude of the Administration at the time of the funeral of the late Kashima is unpardonable.

¹Notes, Mar., p. 59.

²ibid., pp. 61. 62.

³Opler, loc. cit.

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(4) Hospital's Official report of agreement concerning those injured in the accident should be made.

(5) In order to prevent future occurrence of an incident of this nature, plan formulated by the Administration is demanded.

(a) Absolute authority to select and appoint vehicle drivers, who must be 21 or over, by a committee selected from the colonists should be given.

(b) Discard all defective vehicles and purchase new ones. At the same time increase the number.

(6) Immediate clearance of the status of the Colonists should be made by re-segregating all those loyal to America from those who have applied for repatriation.

(7) There is no necessity of cultivating land more than necessary for our subsistence. Unemployment created by minimizing the area should be given other opportunities of employment. It is absolutely unpardonable for the WRA to ship the farm products to the Navy, Army and loyal Japanese.

(8) Public school should re-open immediately, however, subjects, pertinent to American principle should not be taught. Only language and knowledge should be the object and aim of the public school education.

(9) Officially recognized central consisting body composed of colonists' representatives should be formed. Function should be left up to the free will of the representatives. WRA should accede to the plan of instituting departments, as well as authority to function as the colonists see fit.

Negotiation should be done solely with this central consulting body. Employment in the farm, hospital, motor pool, school, mess, mess warehouse, sanitation, and Internal Security should be given to better the condition in this center.

(10) Block Managers should come under the jurisdiction of the central consulting body.

(11) Disposition of chicken and hog should be made clear to the colonists. Fair means of distribution to colonists must be practiced.

(12) Improvement of latrines and shower rooms.

(13) Improvement of roads.

(14) Immediate construction of proches.

(15) WRA should assume responsibility for the poor quality and insufficient supply of food. Food for children should be given special consideration.

(16) Responsibility of the WRA in accepting more colonists relative to the insufficient preparation.

(17) Sole responsibility of the WRA in an event of a strike.

(18) Treatment of the colonists in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Conference.

These 18 demands were submitted to the Project Director and D. S. Myer.

Immediate discharge of Caucasian employees in the Hospital and immediate termination of responsible WRA personnel.

From M.:

"Why we asked for better facilities: in the beginning of evacuation they said, 'If you're loyal and go into camp they'll provide you with everything, clothing, and board. You don't have to worry about anything.' Then you know what happened.¹

Faced with this bewildering list of demands, surrounded by thousands of Japanese, knowing that Dr. Pedicord had been assaulted, and hearing the screams of the hysterical nurses and other members of the appointed personnel, Myer and Best were in a difficult position. As Opler points out, they were conscious of a great paradox in the committee's demands:

"The group said: (1) We represent the center; the people believe in us. And in the same speech usually (2) we've got to have further segregation. There are two big groups here. By this they meant unconsciously the minority they didn't control.²

They were by no means convinced that the committee was representative, so they temporized and appeased. They said they would do what they could.³ They promised to investigate the accusations of graft on the part of appointed personnel.⁴ What else, if anything, Myer and Best promised is not known.⁵ However, immediately after the conference, some of the members of the Negotiating Committee spread the news

¹Notes, Mar., p. 62

²Notes, Feb., p. 20

³From M.; see Notes, March, p. 62.

⁴Spicer's statement to X; See X's Sociological Journal, Mar. 13, p. 5.

⁵Stenographic notes of this meeting are in the record. Best's permission, however, must be obtained to see them.

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that he had promised to fire Dr. Pedicord, fire the grafters, and see that no more food was taken from the warehouse. M. says he did not hear Myer mention the food-warehouse matter.¹

After this conference which lasted from about two to four o'clock in the afternoon, Best and Myer made short addresses to the people. George Kuratomi gave a report of the conference and Reverend Kai appealed to the residents to remain calm during the negotiations and commit no violence. Many evacuees who were not present insist that Dillon Myer made certain promises at this time. However, no evacuee informant has stated that he heard Mr. Myer make any specific promises, except the promise to investigate the grafting. One evacuee present, a reliable informant, stated:

"He (Myer) didn't make any promise. He said, 'I have confidence with Best.'²

A teacher present, who is not anti-Japanese, stated that she remembered no promises.

~~After the conference which lasted from about two~~
~~The report of Myer's speech which appeared in the Tulean~~
~~Dispatch of November 2~~ ^{printed} ~~seems as complete and as accurate as any~~
~~informant's statement:~~ ^{appears}

DELEGATES CONFER

Myer Addresses Local Residents at Ad. area.

Presenting the requests, suggestions, and demands of the colonists, seven representatives of the residents met with National Director Dillon S. Myer and Project Director Raymond R. Best yesterday afternoon.

During the conference which lasted over two hours, practically the entire population showed their support by surrounding the

¹Notes, March, p. 62.

²Notes, April, p. 23.

administration building area during the entire afternoon.

At the end of the negotiations Myer addressed the local residents over the public address system and stated that he has met with the people's delegates to discuss their representations. Expressing utmost confidence in Director Best, Myer concluded by asking residents to cooperate with the administration in settling all problems.

George Kuratomi, a member of the representative group, gave a brief report of the proceedings with the WRA officials.

In conclusion Reverend Kai appealed to the residents to remain calm during the negotiations and not create violence harmful to the Japanese interests.

The seven representatives will meet today and tomorrow with the national director and the project director to discuss further the points brought out in yesterday's initial conference.

On the addresses made by Kai and Kuratomi at this time, Opler made the following remarks:

"A meeting was held in Mr. Best's office. The minutes indicate that there were no complete promises made. After the meeting inside there were some speeches. Kuratomi interpreted in Japanese only, what had been decided at the meeting. 'Remember what this man has promised.' This was followed by a speech by Kai of the Dai Nippon order. Kuratomi was under the influence of Kai."

The best explanation of this misunderstanding over the promises comes from "J" who became well acquainted with Mr. Best when he was confined in Leuppe during Best's term as director:

"The first fault with Mr. Best is that he 'Yesses' too quick. I found that out in all my conversations with him. Before I complete my conversation he says, 'Yes, I know; Yes, I know!' I'd like to know what he knows because I haven't completed the sentence.

And a man thinks he has made a promise. Two weeks will pass and he doesn't do anything. Two weeks later you go back and he 'Yesses' you again. Unless people have eyes to see and observe him properly, they will always take it for granted that he made the promises. I noticed that in Moab and Leuppe."²

Mr. Yosumura of the Cooperative who is definitely anti-Daihyo-Sha and somewhat pro-Administration said on February 3:

¹Notes, Feb. p. 19.

²Notes, March, p. 16.

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"They did ignore their promises. But you must consider that a few days after that there was another incident. (The November 4 disturbance which brought in the army.) Probably they would have kept their promises if they had not been scared."¹

This brief remark is very significant. Mr. Yosumura puts his finger on one of the salient factors responsible for the Administration's policy and its unfortunate results. If the Administration had not been so "scared," it is likely that the course of events would have been quite different. Opler stated several times that during this period the staff members were in a state of panic: It was rumored that a couple of kibei driving a truck had tried to run down Best's child. Best himself was afraid of being kidnapped.²

The Daihyo Sha Kai had scored a pronounced victory. From Nov..1 to Nov. 4 it was at the zenith of its power. The committee had forced the Administration to receive them as the people's representative body. With remarkable sagacity, *avoided major errors while* the members had *shown* *and* the political foresight *to wait until* the administration had committed a series of acts which progressively increased the hostility of the evacuee population toward WRA, i.e., refusing to grant the use of the gymnasium for the funeral, sending a photographer to the funeral, calling in the harvest workers and feeding them with food which the colonists thought belonged to them, and finally, refusing to recognize as representatives the members of the committee which the people themselves had selected by block election or appointment.

~~The committee lost no time in publicizing the fact that it had~~
negotiations were proceeding favorably, and, according to Spicer,

¹Notes, Feb., p. 27.

²According to Spicer and Opler; Report Dec. 24, p. 26. see also Notes, March.

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conclusive evidence ~~at present~~ as to the extent of the support given the representatives. But that the committee had the support of "the people" is admitted even by Japanese decidedly hostile to the Daihyo Sha. Several honest, unsophisticated informants imply that support was almost unanimous. K, the "loyal" coal crew worker who left Tule, said:

"Until this was straightened out they didn't want to work. Most of the people were behind it."¹

M. who is very honest, although being a member of the Daihyo Sha his opinion must be taken with reservations, said:

"At that time everybody believed in the Daihyo Sha, because we all had one camp and were trying to make it livable."²

Two men who are employed in the Cooperative and are very much against the committee's policies said:

"Kai, Kuratomi, and Kurashige?, they had done their best for the Japanese in Jerome. Whatever they did there was the best for the Japanese. The people from Jerome worshipped him and believed in him (Kai). He was honest but misguided."³

"They were supported by everybody."⁴

Support, however, was not unanimous. Conservatives disapproved of the fuss and feared the reverberations outside the center.

"It's really a disgusting story. I think some of the people (Negotiating Committee) wanted power. They say, 'We are working for the people.' I've heard a lot of rumors. I believe they're working for themselves. . . . Maybe they really tried to bring the center better. But they're demands were more like order than suggestions The leaders had no self-control themselves. There was so much excitement The rest of the public just follow them."⁵

¹Report, Dec. 24, p. 12

²Notes, March, p. 62

³Notes, Feb. pp. 26, 27

⁴Notes, Mar., p. 19.

⁵Notes, Feb., p. 8.

"A minority does the most foolish things without any consideration and does not know what will happen and influence the rest of the people. I am deeply disappointed."¹

The lack of unity was deplored by those individuals themselves in favor of the strike and the stand being made against the Administration:

"A letter from Tule Lake mentioned that there is no unity for the strike on the part of the community. The kibel are exerting a great deal of pressure with threat of physical violence. He wished that the whole community would support the strike."²

The beating of Dr. Pedicord and the actions of the "Undisciplined young men was severely criticized.

"On the other hand, when the people came to the Administration building they were forced to go. On that day I saw some of the young men drag out Dr. Pedicord. I was about 200 feet away. I didn't know who that old man was. I saw him dragged and hit by a young fellow. I saw that his head was bald. I felt quite sorry. He couldn't defend himself. I felt they shouldn't do that kind of thing.

"I was looking forward for punishment on those young people. But evidently they (the administration) didn't do anything about it."³ They should have been punished. That was a great mistake (not punishing them). Later when I saw Mr. Myer he said Pedicord started the fight. If I was there and had any authority I would have stopped them. But with the mob psychology they would probably have hit me."⁴

"I" admits: They might have been goon squads but they were representatives."⁵

". . . Some of the representatives weren't exactly the people who ought to be acting as representatives. You can understand that trouble can arise from a fanatical kibel being a representative."⁶

¹From a letter; see Report, Dec. 24, p. 25.

²X's Sociological Journal, Nov. 4, p. 5.

³The Administration tried but was unable to apprehend Dr. Pedicord's assailants.

⁴Notes, Feb., p. 27.

⁵Notes, Mar., p. 39.

⁶Notes, Feb., p. 14.

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unconsciously and sometimes consciously overemphasized any such tendency.

The chief task before the body was the selection of what the minutes term a "Negotiating Committee." This is confusing, since a Negotiating Committee had been functioning very actively for at least a week. What is no doubt implied is the selection of a permanent Negotiating Committee, who, with the consent of the people, were to head up the proposed community organization, and function as the properly selected head of the colony's representative organization. It was to preside at each departmental committee meeting, the departments being listed as follows: (1) Hospital; (2) Agricultural Department including chicken and hog farm; (3) Motor Pool; (4) Warehouse; (5) Food Supply, Mess Management, and Mess Halls; (6) Betterment of Living Condition, including Sanitation, Construction, Social Welfare, Highway Engineering, Placement; (7) Internal Security; (8) Education; (9) Complaint, including strikes and grievances; (10) Religion; (11) Fire Department.¹

and the sub-committees were
The first question raised was how this ~~Negotiating Committee~~ ^{permanent} was to be selected. Yamatani recommended that a Selection Committee be formed to be composed of one person chosen from each ward. The minutes are confused here, but it appears that Yamatani's suggestion was approved. It was decided to delete the committee on Religion and leave it in the hands of Reverends Kai and Mohri. Kuratomi then suggested that prior to the selection of this Negotiating Committee, a mass meeting should be held to obtain the approval of the people. He also advised that written personal histories should be attached to the names of the recommendees. Kai suggested

¹Minutes of the Meeting of the Daihyo Sha Kai, Nov. 2, 1943, p. 1.

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~~received assurances from WRA that their demands would be met,~~
~~specifically that Myer had promised to discharged the unpopular~~
~~members of the appointed personnel.~~¹ That this was widely believed
is shown by the almost unanimous insistence of evacuees that the
promises were made and later broken.

Activities of Daihyo Sha Kai immediately after Nov. 1.

Had the negotiations ended here, with no further incident,
they might have kept control of the camp. However, the more level-
headed members realized the danger of such outbursts as that which
resulted in the beating of Dr. Pedicord. Efforts were made to control
the over-enthusiastic belligerent ^{strong-arm} ~~hoodlum~~ group. This was first
done by announcements in the mess halls.

N. says:

"The Block Representatives would come back to the block
and state that the young fellows - those in their teens and
up to 22 were too hot tempered and they would like them to
be quiet and decent. All the block representatives came back
to the block (our's is still in the stockade) and said for
the young people not to take matters into their own hands.
This was right after the farm accident in October."

~~N's statement and the remarks of other evacuees imply that the~~
~~Negotiating Committee met frequently with the block managers.~~²

ATTITUDE OF THE CAMP POPULATION IMMEDIATELY AFTER NOVEMBER 1.

The successful demonstration and the apparent capitulation of
the Administration added greatly to the Negotiating Committee's
prestige in the eyes of the people. ^{while} It is impossible to present

¹X's conversation with Spicer, Sociological Journal, Mar. 13, p. 5.

²"M", "O", and "I" probably can give more information on this point.

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that a written report of the decision of the Recommending or Selection Committee be distributed in the blocks the next day. The ways and means of recommendation were to be left to each ward. By Monday, Nov. , it was hoped that the Negotiating Committee would be selected and work would be resumed.

These minutes show that the Daihyo Sha Kai and the existing Negotiating Committee headed by Kai and Kuratomi had confidence in Best's and Myer's permission to proceed with the organization of a legitimate representative group. The impression gained is that the negotiators felt they had gained recognition and that by and large they had a fairly clear field before them. As for the Administration - in spite of the hysteria of certain factions - the men in the highest positions thought that the crisis had passed. Opler is reported to have said on the night of November 3 that there wasn't going to be any more trouble.¹

On the night of November 4 the Daihyo Sha Kai met again to proceed with the important matter of the organization of a representative group. Kuratomi opened the meeting by announcing that he had received a memorandum from the Project Director stating that the appointed personnel of the Hospital, including Dr. Pedicord, the doctors and nurses, would be terminated as soon as possible.

"As they (the Administration) were convinced that the confusion was the responsibility of the Administration, they will retain only one Caucasian Hospital Manager. Thus, the Chair revealed a part of the consequence of the negotiation with the Administration."²

Discussion followed on the pressing question of the selection of recommendees for the proposed Negotiation Committee. Takahashi

¹According to Harkness, Superintendent of Schools, in informal conversation with the writer.

²Minutes of the Tule Lake Center Daihyo Sha Kai, Nov. 4, 1944, p. 1.

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stated that he did not think a Selection Committee consisting only of nine men was fair and suggested the addition of one man from each relocation center. Yamagata suggested that the Selection Committee should be chosen from men with technical abilities. Kuratomi replied that in some departments there were no men with technical abilities. Takahashi continued his opposition and eventually won his point:

Anonymous: By selecting the Committee by wards will prevent trouble of segregating many unqualified persons.

Uchida: As Mr. Takahashi suggested, I recommend that Selection Committee be picked up from each Center segregates, one or two persons from each center.

Chair: I do not approve of that because such practice will repeat the same trouble we have gone through in the past.

Uchida: However, this is very important. I maintain that my recommendation is more fair.

Chair: There are segregates from eight different centers. If we were to choose committee from them, there will be some unfairness and disadvantage.

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Uchida: A month will be sufficient to know ones ability and intelligence.

Takahashi: A month is not enough to know a person's character and intelligence. For example, in my block, I was appointed by the Block Manager. Unless representatives are elected from the group who came from the same center, it isn't fair.

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Mohri: May I make a suggestion that the committee (Selection Committee) be selected from each center segregates and also 9 or 10 from the Daihyo Sha Kai for the Selection Committee.

Chair: With respect to the recommendation of each block recommender, we should proceed with the selection by the form we have here. First plan is that the Selection Committee be chosen from each center segregates; second, selection of nine from the Daihyo Sha Kai; third, selection from the wards; fourth, joint committee of center segregates and nine selected from the Daihyo Sha Kai.

(Four plans were submitted to the floor and the Chair especially explained plan 4.) Result of the voting was as follows:

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Plan 1 - 3 votes
Plan 2 - 8 votes
Plan 3 - 25 votes
Plan 4 - 27 votes

Chair asked whether the decision was agreeable to all and the answer was 'agreeable.'

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Yamanaka: One from each center is fair and square.

Tsuda: I have been in Tule Center for over a year but I am not still sure of a good person, so we can't expect perfection at this time.

Mohri: Your statement is not clear. State more clearly.

Tsuda: In order to perfect the representation of the colonists, I recommend that two be chosen from each block.

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Takahashi adhered to the selection of two persons from each center. Thus the question was put to vote and the result was as follows:

Two persons from each center - 36
One person from each center - 17
Two persons from each center - 14
(Poston three persons)

(The above vote is ambiguous, unless the third choice means "two persons from each center and three from Poston.")

"It was decided to proceed with the selection and all center representatives were instructed to assemble in one group and decide

At this moment Warden Yoshio Kobayashi came in to report that Caucasians were transporting food supplies to the outside by trucks. Kobayashi reported through Tsuda, Supervisor of the Wardens. Tsuda then instructed that the license numbers of the trucks be taken down and keep note of food stuff being taken out and report to the supervisor at once. He further advised Kobayashi not to go alone but stop at the Internal Security and pick up three or four night patrols to go along with him and he further warned to refrain from taking rash actions by all means. Kobayashi bowed and went out. Upon hearing this conversation several youths followed Kobayashi."¹

It was now past 11:30 and Takahashi suggested postponing the

¹ibid., pp 1 - 3.

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selection. Kai, according to the minutes "(indignantly)" insisted that "for the sake of the Project Director and the colonists, we should complete this selection even though it may take the whole night."

"At this moment another youth came running in and reported to Kai, addressing him as Sensei, that the Army had entered the Center. Noise of the guns and machine guns, which broke the tranquillity of a cold dark night, increased. Kai instructed the youths to command all other youths to disperse before any action or injury occurred. The youths hurried away.¹

The remainder of the meeting was chaotic, and probably contains a considerable amount of interpolation by the translators. Since the Administration regards these statements as evidence that the Negotiating Committee was selected undemocratically they are included here in toto:

The literary quality of this quotation and the recounting of Kobayashi's report which is also considered evidence that the Daihyo Sha Kai fostered the conflict at the warehouse, differs markedly from the usual tone of the minutes.

The Chair then called each divisional committee head and suggested that 2 representatives from each Center should be sufficient. As the Chair restated his suggestion, he added that one representative should represent Manzanar, which will make the total Selection Committee, 15. Suggestion was raised from the floor stating that the Chairman also should be included. The Chair continued to mention that the selection will be made tonight and as the final step, the decision will be referred to the colonists for their approval, to which majority of the body agreed. Voice was heard from the floor stating that since the ~~Committee will have no difficulty from the colonists~~ representatives were duly elected from the blocks, elected Selection Committee will have no difficulty from the colonists. There were number of visitors at the meeting who voiced that, "even though we are not representatives of blocks, we have great faith in the Selection Committee. We will see to it that there will be no complaint hereafter."

Chair: At any cost, we must complete the Selection Committee by tonight, since the colonists are so concerned of the outcome; therefore,

¹ ibid., p. 4.

Ady Kurston Dec. 26/2

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I appeal to all block representatives to seriously consider this matter. (It was put to vote by the Selection Committee chosen from the Daihyo Sha. Unanimous approval of the group was received.)

It was now 1:30 a. m. and the thundering roar of the tanks, armored trucks, and jeeps rumbled near the Block 15 Mess Hall. Thereupon, recommendees' history cards were submitted to Kai by the block representatives. Other Selection Committee surrounded him, as Kai personally did the selecting by going through each history card by reading and acting quickly as a machine. Great majority of the Committee was selected by Kai himself. Departmental committees were selected by 2:00 a. m. and the meeting adjourned.

Sounds of the guns were no longer audible, however the rumbling of the Army trucks and tanks was heard.¹

While this arduous task of selecting a Negotiating Committee was being carried on, events were transpiring which radically altered the situation and rendered all this effort vain. ^{As has been previously mentioned} A group of young ^{fellows had been} Japanese were guarding the warehouse area to see that no more food was taken away for the harvesters. ^{The attack of their leader, a member of the N.C.} About 9:50 p. m. Mr. Best sent several Caucasians to the Motor Pool to get keys for the trucks. Among these men were Mr. Zimmer, Assistant Project Director and Mr. Cahn. As the trucks were being taken out a fight started between the Caucasians and the Japanese.² Mr. Schmidt, Head of Internal Security, called the Army for help.³ Then Mr. Best called the Army. The Army and Internal Security arrested a large group of young men in the warehouse and closely adjoining personnel residence area or approaching that area. All but nine of these young men were released the same night. Some Caucasians and some Japanese ~~are reported to have been~~ ^{were} severely injured in the fight.

The above account lists what is known to have occurred. On every other detail there is disagreement; disagreement between the

¹ibid., p. 4.

²Spicer's letter to Province, p. .

³So Schmidt stated to the writer.

Caucasians themselves and disagreement between the Caucasians and the Japanese.

There is disagreement among members of the Administration as to what use the trucks sent for by Mr. Best were to be put. All the evacuees and Mr. Opler believe they were intended to transport more food from the warehouse. Spicer,¹ and later Diller Myer in an interview with the writer, stated that they were to be used to transport harvesters.² When this statement was repeated to Mr. and Mrs. Opler, they were dumbfounded. Opler stated that he was absolutely certain that the trucks were sent for food. Said Mrs. Opler, "Where would they go to get what harvesters?" It is difficult to imagine where harvesters would be transported at this hour of the night.

(This must be checked.)

Three evacuee accounts of what transpired follow:

"The only way to stop this (removal of food) was to put a guard and then to watch so they wouldn't take the stuff away from camp. That night, November 4, the semi-truck reached the warehouse. So the youngsters got excited and started causing trouble. Some of the Japanese got beat up. Some of the Caucasians ran away from them and reported it to the army. Within 20 minutes the army had moved in. They caught ten of them around the military area, where the Caucasian staff lives. They were just innocent bystanders and three of them were just warehouse watchmen."³

"Both of them (Myer and Best) promised that 'hereafter there will be no more food taken from the warehouses at night.' . . . A few nights later a truck drew up to one of the warehouses and demanded the watchmen (Japanese) to open up. They refused -- result: a couple of cracked heads and martial law."⁴

"Around midnight on the 4th two trucks loaded with food at the warehouse tried to take them out of camp. The Warden on watch

¹Report, Dec. 24, p. .

²Notes, Mar., p. 44.

³Report, Dec. 24, p. 14.

⁴ibid., p. 22.

thrown at residents standing by the zone limit.

Barb wire fences are being built southwest of the hospital area to keep the residents away from the Ad. area.

However, the facts of the incident are being closely guarded by the people's committees."

Residents Asked to Stay Calm, Com, Pass Resolutions.

"Trust in the actions of the resident's delegates, and do not take any individual actions," exclaimed the committee of seven representatives chosen to settle Thursday night's incident. Five resolutions were passed by the committee affecting the colonists' conduct during the following week.

"Young men are asked to be sensible and prudent due to the present situation, and residents are asked to refrain from spreading unfounded rumors, and congregating in more than five in a group. That the WRA properties within the center should not be damaged or destroyed, was emphasized by the committee resolutions.

The resolutions were agreed upon by the representatives to bring about a peaceful conclusion, and violators of the rules will be punished by due action of the entire populace warned the committee. The delegates also stated that the infractors of these rules are working against the peace, harmony and the well being of the entire camp."

Center Residents Pass Regulations.

The following regulations governing the conduct of the residents during the ensuing period have been made up by the seven representatives delegated by the residents and their delegates: ~~11~~ 11

1. Trust the actions of this committee and do not take any individual actions.
2. Do not congregate in groups of more than five in the open.
3. Do not spread any unfounded rumors.
4. Young men! Be sensible and prudent about everything that you do.
5. Do not destroy anything in the center. Leave the entire camp and its facilities as it has been in the past.

Any person who willfully violate these regulations will be punished by due action of the entire populace as the infractor is working against the peace harmony and well being of the entire camp.

~~These seven men were the original members of the Negotiating Committee.~~
As explained by Kuratomi: "That was the Negotiating Committee. Nogawa was on it too. Volunteers were added to bring things to a favorable solution. Anyone who had an empty hand was asked to help it. The men were able volunteers

who held some important position in the coming permanent body (chosen at the Nov. 4th meeting). They weren't delegated. We had to do it in an arbitrary manner. R. Hankey, Notes, ~~Dec~~ Jan. 2, 1945, p. 4.

- 35D 85
9. Parcels and C.O. D. will be delivered to the Block Managers. Registered mail will be delivered at the following place and time.

Ward 1 -- 9:30 A. M.
2 -- 11:00 A. M.
3 -- 10:30 A. M.
4 -- 9:00 A. M.
5 -- 10:00 A.M.
6 -- 1:30 P. M.
7 -- 2:00 P. M.

Outgoing wires and messages will be negotiated again from 1:00 P.M.

On November 6 the Daihyo Sha Kai met again, at which time Kobayashi, a member of the Negotiating Committee (not the young warden who was arrested) made the following report on an interview with Colonel Austin:

1. According Colonel Austin, 10 youths are confined in the hospital, however, they are not injured.
2. Permission will be granted for meeting within the building.
3. Tear gas was used because the crowd refused to disperse.
4. Hospital employees will be asked to remain within the building until the incident is under control Report emergency cases to the Project Director.
5. In case of emergency, interviews with Authorities will be given.
6. No need of worry for food will be distributed daily.
7. Army will withdraw when Colony returns to normalcy.

Following statements were made from the floor:

1. There are several blocks without coal.
2. Some mess halls inconvenienced because of insufficient supply of Dutch Cleanser.
3. Toilet papers should be distributed as soon as possible.
4. Delivery of mail should be taken care of as soon as possible.
5. Disposition of garbage should be taken care of to prevent accumulation, which creates unsanitary condition.

Chair: Army entered the Center upon request of the WRA. Colonists are requested to maintain tranquility as much as possible, especially the Dai-hyo Sha representatives are asked to control the youths. In spite of the Army's agreement to interview us at any time, it will be unwise for us to call upon them at the present time. Those detained by the Army will not be permitted to return to the Center until they have their hearings.

At this time a youth brought a message and presented it to the Chair, who read it as follows: As far as known up to date, those injured in the incident are Hayashida, 23; Nakamura, J. 40; Todoroki, 28; Kobayashi, 59; Marubashi, 4 2; Kodani, 48; Yamane 27; Ogasa, 38; Tahara, 4; and five others whose names are unknown. ^{1/}

*Insert
C to D
Nov 6 minutes
here.*

Next Kuratomi reported on an ^{very favorable} interview with the Spanish Consul which took place November 2. ^{2/} ~~The Spanish Consul had promised to do what he could on the hospital situation. Upon presentation of the food supply inventory prepared by Sugimoto (which the writer believes was also shown to Myer on November 1 and caused him great astonishment) the Spanish Consul was very much surprised and asked how he had gotten hold of it. The Consul had also promised to do what he could in the matter of the termination of the appointed personnel and lack of facilities. (furniture) in the apartments. Lastly, he had emphasized that any rash or inconsiderate action on the part of the colonists would ultimately be their own responsibility. 2/ (It is doubtful that the Consul was as amenable to Kuratomi's suggestions as this report implies.)~~

The meeting closed with the following statement by the chairman:

"We were planning to call a mass meeting but because of several youth's rash action an incident of this nature occurred, which is very lamentable. You Daihyo Sha representatives are requested to see to it that people refrain from such actions in the future. ~~3/~~

1/ Minutes of the Daihyo Sha Kai of the Tule Lake Center, Nov. 6. 1943, p. 1.

2/ ~~Ibid., p. 2.~~ See p. 72 B.

3/ ~~Ibid. No 1.~~

On November 6, Lt. Col. Austin issued the following proclamation which was printed in the Tulean Dispatch of Nov. 9:

"The Army having taken over control of the Tule Lake Segregee Center at the request of WRA, strict discipline will be maintained at all times. No outdoor gatherings will be permitted. The Commanding Officer will be glad to meet with any problems relative to the administration of this Center."

Two Japanese expressed their sentiments toward the army at this time as follows:

"... The residents are taking the presence of the soldiers in the block nonchalantly and continuing their passive resistance. Their attitude is 'What can't they do if we don't do anything at all. We are guaranteed of food, clothing, and shelter.'"¹

mut later?

"One night I went directly to the post and asked them to stop it (the informant refers to the soldiers shining their spot lights on the coal workers and inadvertently blinding them). They could have shot me. That showed that the Tule Lake guards were very understanding. Their Commanding Officer had been trained right During the riot they used to bring in the food with an escort of two jeeps, two semitrucks, and four, five trucks. Twelve soldiers escorted the food trucks. That was a comical sight. Like the old Chicago gangster days."²

The immediate effect of army control upon the general population was a series of hardships and inconveniences. Mail delivery was held up until November 9. The delivery of milk and baby food was seriously curtailed. People rushed the Cooperative stores to stock up for the lean days ahead. The shelves were soon emptied. The army confiscated the Tulean Dispatch's mimeographer and typewriters on Nov. 11, but returned the mimeographer two days later. The greatest hardship was the stopping of the distribution of coal. K. says:

"Then from the fifth to the sixth of November people began hollering about there not being enough coal. There was no milk. Only the seven-months-old children were getting milk through the warden's office. Children over seven months old were going

¹X's Sociological Journal, Nov. 20, p. 5

²Report, Dec. 24, p. 18.

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best not to override the Negotiating Committee. He complained that he had been threatened by a man named Yoshiyama because he (Yamatani) was not supporting the Negotiating Committee sufficiently. *addition*

Yamatani: . . . I have been doing my best to contact the Spanish Consul to visit this Center. Yet, my integrity has been doubted by some Negotiating Committee which I just can't stand for.

Kawamura: Do you object to the attitude of the Negotiating Committee?

Yamatani: Yes, especially when my integrity is looked upon with doubt. It is intolerable.

Yamagata: As one of the Coordinating Committee members, my opinion is the same with Mr. Yamatani's.

Kawamura: I feel the same way. Colonists bring all their complaints and grievances to the Coordinating Committee just because the Negotiating Committee members are hiding. They don't realize that we have no authority to negotiate with the Administration or the Army. On top of that we are regarded with suspicion, that I, for one, thought of resigning.

Yamatani: I understand how Mr. Kawamura feels since I feel the same way. However in due time, the Spanish Consul will come here. Until that time, I wish you would refrain from resigning.¹

a big husky fellow,
Toshio Shimonishi was appointed as official messenger of Kai,

Kuratomi, Hayashi and Kimura, the hiding members of the Negotiating Committee. However, Yamamoto, a member of the Negotiating Committee, questioned the authority of these hiding men, stating that they had no authority to give instructions from hiding. He felt that as a member of the *original* Negotiating Committee he should have been consulted. *?*

A "voice from the floor" added to the confusion:

"By their action (hiding Committee) I don't think there is any necessity of maintaining the Co-ordinating Committee. Why doesn't the Negotiating Committee come out and take the initiative in the negotiation with the Administration and the Army?"²

¹Minutes of the Tule Lake Center Daihyo Sha Kai, Nov. 16, 1944, p. 1.

²ibid.

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Shimonishi: (the messenger) Even though you (the group present claim that you are giving your utmost support to the Negotiating Committee, there are some Daihyo Sha who are spreading irresponsible statements against the Committee, which peeves the Committee very much... The inconveniences we are subjected to suffer at this time are for final victory in the near future.

Voice from the floor: What do you think you are? Go back and tell those spineless Negotiating Committee to come out and work together with the Coordinating Committee. In spite of bad reputations, we are doing our utmost for the Daihyo Sha's mission. You have no grounds upon which you should complain now.¹ *comment.*

The policy and outcome of the status quo policy was questioned:

Watanabe: Could you explain to us fully the policy and the object and if possible, the consequence of status quo. To what extent will the colonists benefit by it?

No answer was given by the Chair.

Shimonishi: The policy of status quo has been duly approved by those Negotiating Committee. Regardless of the outcome you are held responsible to uphold it.

Kawamura: Is there any possibility of satisfying the colonists who are complaining about status quo, but still uphold the policy, I have no objection to stick to it. However, I think this is an impossibility.

Yamatani: Somehow our only hope is to wait for the arrival of the Spanish Consul.²

After bickering at length over what status quo implied and whether they were bound to support it the members came to no decision.

Even when the possibility of a prejudiced translation is discounted, this meeting shows a leaderless, puzzled group with most of the members incapable or afraid to take any initiative, distrusting themselves and the hiding leaders. To their distraction they pin their one remaining hope on the arrival of the Spanish Consul, as a prelude to resuming negotiations with the Army and WRA.

¹ibid., p. 4.

²ibid

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On November 29 Kai and Kuratomi presented an ultimatum from the Negotiating Committee which had been drawn up for the residents' signatures. The signatures were not attached to the copy given the administration. (This appears to have been the second of two petitions; the first was initiated about the second week in November.) This document lays the blame for the incident that brought about Army occupation on the Administration for refusing to heed the committee's request that no more food be taken from the warehouse and states that Best's excuse, that Caucasian personnel were in danger of being kidnapped, is false.

RESOLUTIONS PERTAINING TO THE COMPLETE AND SATISFACTORY SOLUTION OF THE INCIDENT BEGINNING NOVEMBER 4, 1943 WHEN THE U. S. ARMY TOOK POSSESSION OF THE TULELAKE CAMP, NEWELL, CALIF.

Whereas, the negotiation committee, which was duly elected by the block representatives who were in turn elected by the block residents is our sole mean of conducting negotiations necessary for the well being of the residents of this center and especially in view of the fact that we, the residents of this center, give our undivided support to the above mentioned committee, and,

Whereas, we, as the residents of this center know that the present situation was caused by the failure of the WRA Administrators to heed our request not to take commodities out of the center warehouses in the middle of the night, and,

Whereas, Mr. Raymond R. Best, the Project Director, gave as his excuse for calling in the military that a group of center residents threatened to kidnap the Caucasian personnel, which statement is a plan false. As a result many unnecessary arrests have conducted.

Therefore in order to bring this unfortunate incident to a satisfactory and complete solution we, the center residents, feel that we must put forward the following resolutions to express out unqualified support of our representative committee.

RESOLUTION

- 1) Not to enter any negotiation with camp administrators other than through our negotiation committee.
- 2) To demand the wholesale resignations of the WRA appointed personnels, who were here prior to November 4, 1943. 1

interpretation was stated as follows:

These names, furnished by more than one group without solicitation, indicates that the colonists are beginning to get certain people's numbers and are in the mood to transmit that information both from group to group in the colony, and more significantly to Caucasian officialdom. The Army Intelligence officer, Capt. Hartman, reports the same tendency for people in the colony to point the finger, which he says, "is most unusual for Japanese, who detest informers and suspect officials." Thus the village is moving ahead to a breaking of the deadlock imposed by the Daihyo Shas by pointing the finger at particular individuals.

Simultaneously the Co-op and the Civic Organizations supported the organization of a counter goon-squad, which Opler describes as a strong arm opposition group of about 500 young men "supported by the more moderate and thoughtful elements in the Center." These young men planned to go in a body to the headquarters of the Negotiating Committee and request that the remaining members of the Negotiating Committee and the Daihyo Sha Kai resign.² There is a startling difference between the opinion of Dr. Opler on these men who contacted the Administration and the opinions of the majority of evacuee informants. The attitude which seems particularly attractive to Dr. Opler, i. e., that these men felt that Tule Lake was not really the place for them, would damn them with the ordinary colonist. "Tule Lake", said most residents is no place for people who feel like that.

Opler states:

Mr. Mayeda is here simply because his parents appealed to him to remain with them because their other son had "forsaken them." Since that time, they have finally come around to agreement that Tule Lake is no place for him. Mr. Furakawa is also here simply because of family reasons; as the father of five young children, and the sole support of aged parents, he feels he cannot go elsewhere and relocate; his father intends to die in Japan. Mr. Shimada likewise seems to have regrets about

¹ibid.

²Opler's letter to Spicer, Dec. 29, pp. 4,5.

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The writer is strongly inclined to view these statements as propagandistic. Certain young men may have misjudged themselves in this dramatic activity, but it is most unlikely that they had any serious intention of carrying out their threats.

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yesterday afternoon at mess 18 voted unanimously to cancel the meeting scheduled for this afternoon at the community stage. The negotiating committee had planned to make a detailed report to the entire residents as to the proceedings of the conferences. However with the temporary termination of the negotiations with the Army officials, the committee members felt that there wasn't any report to be made to the center at such a meeting.

The committee reported to the elected delegates present that the negotiations with the Army had been cancelled because the Army did not recognize the committee as true representatives of the people. According to the committee, the Army felt that they know how many workers were needed in each division and the WRA having worked with the Japanese should know who should work in each division.

The entire congregation expressed unanimous accord that there wasn't any necessity for negotiations if the Army had taken such an attitude.

This humiliation was not to be endured. The army abandoned ~~its vain policy of attempting to~~ ^{all deal with the} ~~contact~~ "a real Negotiating Committee" and, in an effort once and for all to root the leadership out of camp, ordered ^{their} ~~the~~ arrest of the Negotiating Committee. Martial law was

declared; a strict curfew from 7 p. m. to 6 a. m. was ordered. Those ^{the Army "bull pen" a couple of tents fenced in by a strong} captured were placed in ~~a separate stockade surrounded by a man-proof~~ ^{wire fence.} ~~fence and watch towers.~~ However, Kai, Kuratomi, Komura, Sugimoto, and ^{escaped the arrest and hid themselves.} Hayashi ~~were not to be found.~~

~~Whether the Army at this time went in for wholesale internments must be checked. Evacuee informants imply this:~~

Substantiated

"Then, the first thing that happened, the army started to put people in the stockade. At one time there must have been from 125 to 150. That is a small estimate. (The informant is correct when he says this is a small estimate.) In this block about six were taken. They weren't any of the block representatives, it so happened. The boys yanked from here happened to be Hawaiian born. They suspected the Hawaiians because the ringleader came from Hawaii. That was Kai."²

"They took a person and his three room mates here. Only the room mates were just living with him. But a bachelor can't live by himself in one room. They keep taking people into the stockade."³

¹ Ibid., November 13

² Notes. Feb., p. 11.

³ Notes, Mar., p. 34

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Heckler: Such trifling matter as signatures should be handled by someone other than the Negotiating Committee.

Negotiating Committee: If that's the way you feel, it's o.k. with us. We'll retire. (Thereupon, the Chairman and all other Negotiating Committee left the floor.)

Takahashi was elected temporary Chairman and the discussion on signatures continued.

Takahashi: The first thing to discuss is how to make good use of the signatures. The question is whether to obtain the signatures by giving support and confidence to the block representatives or to obtain each colonists' signature. Ages of the colonists should also be considered.

Yamagata: If authorities have any suspicion as to the support of the Negotiating Committee by the colonists, such should be announced by means of a P.A. system.

Takahashi: The mass meeting was rejected unanimously so there's no chance of using the P.A. system. The primary problem is to decide how to use the signatures effectively. I think individual signatures are more effective.

Tsuchiya: There is a possibility of abusing the signatures. Therefore, until the submittal of such, Daihyo Sha of each block should take responsibility and guard it.

After a lengthy discussion, the result was as follows:

Signatures be obtained in every block
Date: November 13, 1943
Age: 18 years or over, regardless of sex
Resolution will be printed on top of the signatures
Two forms will be prepared, one to be given to the authority and other to be retained by either the Daihyo Sha Kai or the Block Managers. The form which is to be submitted to the authority will be a 'copy' form.

This petition was circulated at this time. It is not known how many were obtained nor whether a copy was presented to the Army. If it was, it had no effect on the Army. The aftermath of the cancelled mass meeting swept it into the background.

Lt. Col. Austin and Mr. Cozzins were not aware of or ignored this cancellation, and prepared their speeches in advance. Dr. Opler, who

¹ Ibid., pp. 3-5

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out that it was useless to consult with such a Committee any longer."¹

Sugimoto, the head of the Food Investigation Committee made the following pessimistic report:

I have been negotiating on the food situation and submitted the full report of the investigation up to date. Authorities' attitude is just as Hayashi described. As for the coal and garbage crews, 130 workers were employed up to date, yet only 60 are to be retained. . . . Yesterday, authorities agreed to retain the entire coal and garbage crews and today they changed their mind and reduced the number to such a minimum that we can see that the WRA has no co-operation. Reinstatement of all evacuee workers have been agreed yesterday and they promised to answer by 10:00 a. m. today, but they haven't kept the promise As a whole, the oppressive attitude of the Army is such that they wouldn't even recognize us. Even regarding the mass meeting, when they questioned us we answered that some 3,000 will attend. Army pointed out that mere 3,000 attendance was only a small part of the Colony and implicated that Daihyo Sha Kai has little support from the colonists. Another thing they pointed out was that among the Negotiating Committee only two are old Tuleans which means that old Tuleans are not supporting you (Daihyo Sha).²

Kuratomi explained to the body that the incident (of Nov. 4) had occurred before the selection of the departmental committees, and that "the negotiations had been taken up by volunteers for the benefit of the colonists." Tsuchiya suggested that the signatures of the colonists be obtained as proof of public support.

The fact that the army was allowing only 45 minutes for the mass meeting scheduled for the next day was then discussed. Takahashi then stated that 45 minutes was absolutely insufficient and that if the Army would give no more time the mass meeting should be postponed indefinitely.

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Chair: It is apparent that we will encounter many obstacles because the Army does not recognize us as the true representatives of the people. Seven Hospital employees have been terminated and Fukui has been arrested and his whereabouts is unknown. Fearing the consequences, I

¹ Minutes of the Meeting of the Tule Lake Center Daihyo Sha Kai, Nov. 12, p. 1.

² Ibid.

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withheld that announcement, but as a whole just because of the Army's frivolous attitude, the Negotiating Committee is on the spot. The Committee's efforts will not solve this problem. We have assured the Army that we have the backing of 15,000 colonists. "Try and get it" attitude of the Army and their request to some employees to resume work * * * *

Voice from the floor: If you are at the point of resigning, for what purpose should we call tomorrow's mass meeting?

Voice from the floor: Should the authorities assume such an attitude, then we should notify all those who are about to resume work to refrain and at the same time, support the Negotiating Committee.

.....

Chair: Seven Negotiating Committee have already resigned because of several reasons. One of which is that the Army bluntly stated "try and get it" which discouraged them.

Tsuchiya: I recommend that forms for colonists' signature be prepared by Messrs. Takahashi and Yamanaka in time for the meeting tomorrow.

Takahashi: The matter of time, 45 minutes, for tomorrow's meeting is not settled yet. I think that mass meeting is not necessary. Indefinitely postpone it. Signatures can be taken at any time.

Voice from the floor: If that's the order from the Army, what's the use of calling the mass meeting tomorrow?

Chair: I favor Takahashi's recommendation. Unanimously approved by body.)

Tsuchiya: I make a suggestion that the resolution be drawn and signatures be obtained and that should be guarded by the Daihyo Sha.

Voice from the floor: Don't let the authorities take advantage of it.

Heckler from the floor: Daihyo Sha are the representatives of the colonists, so let the Daihyo Sha sign it. Same thing.

Chair: Don't leave such a large space on the signature forms or there will be the danger of being utilized for other purposes.

Takahashi: Two forms should be prepared and submitted to the Negotiating Committee and to the Block Managers for safekeeping.

Tsuchiya: Signatures should be submitted at tomorrow's mass meeting and I think it's absolutely necessary. (He had already forgotten that the decision was made).

¹Ibid., p. 3.

and that the farm workers were swayed by radicals whom the farm foremen

were afraid to resist. 1/ The informants making these statements, however,

and the writer is strongly inclined to believe that the accusers were not able to present evidence. Interviews with two of the farm

pressure are afterthoughts
foreigner brought forth only as a

foremen brought forth only vague implications that they did not approve

of trouble making. The writer is inclined to believe that fiery speeches

by the former and the initial "leaders,"
were made, denouncing the carelessness of the Administration and calling

upon the farmers to behave like "true Japanese", to refuse, for thier own

protection, to return to work until the administration had provided the

compensation to which the injured persons were entitled and had taken

steps to guard against a recurrence. The term "strike" was to be strictly

avoided, say informants. The aim was "to refuse to work" until the issue

was settled.

~~To some individuals~~ such speeches would sound like good sense, to

others they ^{might} appear very radical. In the face of the emotional

state which so serious an accident would produce, ~~persons of the latter~~

~~conviction~~ would hesitate to speak or if they did speak, they would be ignored.

"C", a young man of the former conviction who became a leader of the

Daihyo Sha Kai, gave his account of the attitude of the farm workers and

the course of events. His statement was preceded by a description of

the low standard of the facilities at Tule Lake and the remark, "We

didn't do anything about it until the truck accident." Undoubtedly,

these future leaders along with many of their fellow segregees, were

convinced that some action would have to be taken sooner or later to

alleviate the conditions they had found at Tule Lake. The farm accident

and the appeal of the farm group furnished an ideal basis for the initiation

of this action, in short, it was the spark which touched off the accumulation of grievances.

1/ See p.

REPORT

Rosalie Hankey
Gila

April, 1944

From a letter sent to X before October 24:

" ... all the farm workers went on a strike and the camp is in a big commotion demanding the Administration to account for the accident. Every block held a meeting and elected a representative to form a council to negotiate with the Administration." 1/

Representatives were accordingly selected from all but two blocks, either by election or appointment. As to the legitimacy of this body proper, there can be no doubt. But the character of the group which instigated the elections remains, for the most part, a well kept secret. Spicer believes that Kai, Kauatomi, and other "leaders" had been "sizing up the situation from the minute they came in," that they were well acquainted with the "foci of dissatisfaction by the time the farm trouble started ... These minority leaders (in other centers) with a good deal of experience in center politics got together as soon as they reached Tule Lake and began to develop plans for dominating the majority here with their program and leadership." 2/ The most influential leaders were from other centers, especially from Jerome.3/ However, that they had been plotting deliberately to take over center leadership since their entrance to Tule, rests only on the statements of informers and is, at present, an open question. 4/ Mr. Kurihara, although he was still confined in Leuppe at this time, is almost certain that the picture of the leaders plotting since their arrival at Tule is false.

"That opinion was circulated by the Caucasian people, that the boys from Topaz and Jerome were trying to get hold of the controlling interest and trying to get the people under their control. When these boys had acted, we had quite a discussion in Leupp with Mr. Fredericks. He

1/ X's Sociological Journal, Oct. 27, 1943, p. 7.

2/ See Spicer's letter, Report, Dec. 24, pp. 28, 29.

3/ This may some day be settled by contacting Kai and Kuratomi themselves.

4/ Notes, March p.47.

REPORT

Rosalie Hankey
Gila

April, 1944

strongly believed at that time this opinion gotten through the newspapers, that those boys from various centers were trying to get hold of the leadership in the camp. I argued with him that it wasn't so. The only reason the boys from Jerome took the leadership here was because they themselves were leaders in Jerome. When they got here they naturally took leadership again, especially of the Jerome faction. Jerome constituted the greatest number. I doubt whether they were trying to get leadership or that the plot was formed before. A thing of that nature happens spontaneously." 1/

Some colonists were puzzled by the development. There was and still is considerable criticism of some of the policies of the selected body, the Daihyo Sha Kai, on the part of its supporters and by neutral colonists. It would be a grave error, however, to label the bulk of the representatives fanatics and agitators. When reliable information is obtained, they will almost certainly be shown to be comparatively able men, most of them respected in their blocks, selected because they were considered men of courage and, or because they had participated in some type of Administrative negotiation in the Relocation centers from which they came. 2/ The selection of men who had proved themselves in negotiations in other centers partially explains their preponderance on the Daihyo Sha (one of Mr. Best's expressed objections to the body). 3/ It was composed mostly of Issei and Kibei. 4/

First Meeting of the Daihyo Sha Kai.

On October 17, the day after the farm accident, these elected and appointed block representatives met in the block 16 messhall and held their first formal meeting. The minutes of this and later sessions were

1/ Notes, April p. 17.

2/ I base this statement partly on my own judgment and partly on the hypothesis of J. Kurihara. See Notes, March, pp. 15, 47, April, p. 17.

3/ Ibid., p. 25

4/ Ibid., p. 62

This section is to be entirely redone.

REPORT

Rosalie Hankey
Gila

April, 1944

obtained and translated ^{by} ~~from the~~ Japanese ^{for the Japanese Study} by ~~Byron Akitsuki~~. ^{1/} Since Akitsuki later took an important part in fighting the Daihyo Sha Kai, these documents must be employed with circumspection. The minutes will be quoted and discussed here at length for they are the most significant existing document relating to the spectacular events to come. The course of business and the topics of discussion reveal the psychological state, the motives and the intentions of the body, which, as has been stated previously, were largely misunderstood by the administration.

The meeting was attended by 73 men, each representing a block and by others who are referred to as "non-Daihyo Sha". Nominations were made for a chairman and Hyakutaro Mori was appointed temporary chairman by applause. It was then suggested that all non-members leave the floor to facilitate the calling of the roll. Whether this suggestion was carried out cannot

~~The presentation of these translated minutes to the study was done in absolute confidence. Mr. Akitsuki's name must not be mentioned in publication without his permission.~~

I/- not pro-DHS

"That election was held in every block. The Army more or less called that one. They were supposed to have united the people for the psychological moment to spring that question; whether they wanted to discard the status quo or continue. To help out, the bunch who wanted to discard the status quo kept pulling the people right and left. They said that anybody who was inciting the Japanese to continue the status quo strike, and that more or less damned a large majority were only hurting themselves.

I came here to be left in peace. If they leave me alone I'll leave them alone.

Anyway people got wise that the longer they maintained the status quo they were going to yank them and stick them in the stockade. Besides, their finances were petering out. Here - they're still paying off on the October checks. Now these fellows who were not working got no clothing allowance, no welfare, no income.

Another point of view: the people here are supposed to be loyal to Japan now. Here's an argument some of the bright boys advanced. They said, in returning to normalcy we'll be drawing salaries. Then on top of that the government have to pay us clothing allowance. That's just that much less money that the U. S. government is going to have to manufacture armaments to beat Japan. I couldn't see it. I know myself that regardless if the Japanese draw this monthly stipend, they'd not make much difference to the U. S. treasury. But it sounds good on the surface and it swayed some of the stubborn people. They had a referendum vote. Two soldiers were present. They took a vote of all persons over eighteen. The soldiers with one Japanese present counted and tallied the votes. There was a majority of 400 votes to return to normalcy.

K - March The main reason was not because they didn't want to stick with the Negotiating Committee but - one of the main reasons was lack of finance. Another reason is they didn't want to loaf along doing nothing. Time lags so monotonous.

When the vote was taken here - the status quo lost by 400 votes. That shows that the people who are favoring status quo are greater in number. Because many who favored status quo did not vote. They thought it was the way to go to the stockade. A lot of people thought they might be pulled in. They had a soldier by the vote box.

Oda - Conservative in April

I said No because our block said No. I thought deep in my heart it was very silly to keep on in a situation like this. We might as well change the system and have a better way to run the camp. I didn't have any objections to that election. I thought we did not have the authority to run the camp. WRA has the power. We listen to what they say and obey the law. If we keep going forever, we're just sunk.

I in April

You'd be surprised how many people voted for status quo. They were still

gluttonous for punishment - or they had voted for it in the beginning.
 (giri) It was my opinion that status quo wouldn't accomplish a darn
 thing but would only increase the people's sufferings. You can't
 have status quo and expect things to improve.

Many others -

COORDINATING COMMITTEE IN FEBRUARY

Oda's - conservative -

This new Coordinating Committee is all right. (Who elected them?)
 That's what I'd like to know. I think they were elected from each
 division head."

- - - - -

I -

The committee, they are so-called men with ability. Akitsuki was an official
 in the Copp here. I don't think they want political power. They were
 elected by the wards. Each fellow was elected from a ward. There are **A13**
 seven wards, each with ten blocks."

N - agreed with O - but doubt if he did. (Unless Great weather watcher)

COORDINATING COMMITTEE FEB TO MARCH * DAIHYO'S MAKE BID TO

MANZANAR - THE RE-SEGREGATION ISSUE

Feb. 12 - reports on failures of Feb. 2nd to Division Heads.

Only gains - tofu manufacturing will be undertaken by the Coop
Black promised to contact police dept. in regard to
opening south gate.

Reported majority of stockade internees' attitudes
"had entirely changed."

Increasing pressure on part of some colonists for release of interned
men.

Feb. 14, petition to Best and Austin from Block 9 residents. Bl.
residents will assume responsibility.

Feb. 16 - ~~xxxxxx~~ CC protests against Army patrols entrance into
women's latrine.

Feb - 16 - CC wants to retire - form a central committee and get
out Takahashi, chief mover.

First move by opposition - Daihyo -

Feb. 18 -

Peace movement - Uchi, Sakai and Matsuda.

CC Memo: The fact that this delegation had enough courage to
approach the Advisory Council for consultation and the Council granted
such opportunity this Committee feels that such grant was due to the lack of
understanding of Japanese psychology and our object.....The reason why
we resent, is that we feel that such frivolous action on the part of the
Advisory Council will give an impression that the Committee has been
discredited.

This Committee has no intention to ask you to stop altogether
such interviews or consultations, however, hereafter, please bear in
mind that such opportunity given to such delegations will give an
impression that anyone can consult the Administration directly on
this matter, thereby ignoring the Committee's position and curtailing
it's work.

Perchance that should you find these delegation more fitted for the
work than the Committee, we are always ready to wash our hands of the
matter any time.

Feb 19 stockade letter.

Takahashi appointed advisor to the CC Feb. 24

Takahashi speaks at Ad Council and CC meeting stressing:

1. release of those considered leaders and also innocent youth.

Black emphasizes committees work should be measure not by number of releases from the stockade but by employment, living conditions and decent community atmosphere.

Akitsuiki says still not nearly enough employment, people losing faith -

Life photographer takes pictures.

Feb. 27 - Takahashi writes excellent memo to the Administration:

About 50% of colonists still for status quo ---actively trying to support it.

other colonists, less stable, not organized.

Suggests: 1st the leaders of those more than half of the colonists who support pro status quo take the initiative to pacify their followers.

2nd point- begs for a new Negotiating Committee.

On Feb. 28, XX CC recommended release of 61 men.

March 1 a letter to Mr. Schmitt requesting more.

March 3 Akitsuiki attempted to resign.

MANZANAR PEOPLE COME IN ATTER PART OF FEB.

Akitsuki's statement - described as what inu would write: or _____

Pamphlet distributed by oppositionists among Manzanites - March 11.

True picture of the facts.

Roots of Incident lie in question of evacuee status -

Lotsof wildness - but

The fundamental root was the accumulation of resentments on the part of the evacuees for the above-mentioned hypocritical and inconsistent policy on the part of the Administration.

Demonstration orderly - on Nov. 3, at ceremony of Meiji Setsu, Rev. Kai announced that the colonists' demands were fully accepted by the Administration. Upon hearing this the colonists were ~~extremely~~ elated.

During the incident nearly a thousand innocent ones were picked up and every apartment was searched, for which even a mere child of three-years of age was indignat.

Imperial government repeatedly delivered stiff protest, which was considered stronger than an ultimatum.

Ever since the beginning of the incident, by cool indifferent attitude as if in a neutral position, yet in every way opposing the great tide of the center, thereby regarded as an enigmatic existence, was no other than the executives of the Co-op. Those who rallied to this campaign were gamblers, bootleggers, and shameless egoists, or the so-called money makers of the center. To this the WRA employed, in order to carry out their damnable policy, the "dogs" hired with excellent salary to assist this movement.

CC "fielders" try to find source - trace it to Language School but get no further.

ATTITUDES EXPRESSED IN MARCH -

Qdas - conservative - out of things - very status-quo block

"There has been no change in the peoples' attitude toward the Coordinating Committee. (No improvement) To me they all think the same way. But they don't do anything about it.

The curfew came and people went back to work very quietly. To tell the truth, I believe they've changed somewhat; but they don't say anything aloud. So many have gone back to work anyhow.

There are still people in the stockade. Some fellows were taken from our block and haven't come back yet.

- - - - -

~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~

I's bother - not pre-Daijyo

The Coordinating Committee - That bunch is a bunch of inus and Akitsuki is the biggest inu of them all. He'll probably get his brains beat out one of these days. I don't know who elected them or not. Akitsuki used to be head of the Co-op during the big trouble. And the big shots sold WRA rice, oranges to the people. The money they got from that they divided among themselves.

Some people trying to get investigation by lawyer. Akitsuki probably got wind of that. It was getting hot under the seat, so he quit the Co-op.

- - - - -

Bill

pro status quo: voted for it. supported it.

As far as work is concerned status quo is cracking. But some minority groups are much stronger.

Those fellows in the stockade - everybody signed their names after Nov. 4 saying these people are the true representatives. As more and more say in here, we signed our names saying these men are our representatives; it isn't right to give in. The minority group for status quo says, "If you let people out of the stockade, everything will be all right.

The majority of the people are against status quo, but in their heart they don't like to see people in the stockade.

They don't thank the CC for anything. I'd still like to know how they got in there. I went back to the paper which said, "The Army and WRA will recognize the Coordinating Committee.

If those nine come out of the stockade I think all this status quo will just vanish into thin air. If all the 125 come out the status quo will forget everything.

- - - - -

K

It is known through the camp that the inu gave away the negotiating committee. They sell their soul for a few pennies. They make my blood boil. Probably the loyal people are here for the Administration to make use of them.

Already read what he said about CC and Yamatani.

Denounces the Co-op.

- - - - -

Yamashiro * I know the CC works hard. I respect them. But I think status quo against status quo will be a big trouble in the future too.

83

- - - - -

Co-op people - I can only tell you my personal opinion. I suppose some of the fellows in the stockade should be left out. A good many didn't mean anything, not knowing what the consequence was to be. The real agitators - the real leaders were nothing but agitators. They should be kept there their whole life as far as I'm concerned. They just want to start trouble.

Complain about Manzanar. - We were treated like criminals, Manzanar was treated as prince. Even their stoves was started already.

But don't you think WRA can't do something if they want to do it!

- - - - -

Akitsuki complains about Ad. Council's especially statement they made that Ad. Council had reached the limit of its patience.

Huyoke had said, If I should come home late and my wife accused me of being disloyal to her - if she keeps on doing that - I will truly do something to deceive her.

I asked what CC had accomplished in the last month during my absence.

Said he, "Nothing whatsoever."

- - - - -

List of men in CC - the nefarious big shots
I - Feeling toward the Administration hasn't changed at all. The only thing that has changed is that the people in the center have more or less realized that to try to go against the Administration would be hurting themselves. They're getting smarter.

They're going to have work or else!

100% of the inu are the loyal bunch. I wouldn't be surprised if Akitsuki and that bunch are all loyal.

Squawks about treatment of Manzanar.

- - - - -

I had a friend of mine pulled into the stockade January 10. Best said he saw no charge against him from the request of WRA. He hesitated to release him. I went to Schmitt. The last remark he gave to me was, "It's up to the CC."

Here is a rumor - there are four big gambling places run by the Judo fellows who guard the Coordinating Committee. The other small places are raided, but they stay away from these boys. They are not closed.

APRIL *

Re-segregation Petition -

Acceptance by Black -

Last Straw - resignation of Coordinating Committee -

April 8 - resegregation petition

sent it to Biddle - ~~/Myer/~~ - Ickes, Myer Best Black -

Asks for signatures of those who applied for repatriation and want to be resegregated because of the earnest desire to catch the first chance of the exchange ship.

Black allowed signing of petition stressing it had no further segregation in mind.

Really got the people excited - came at same time ~~for~~ as request for signatures - for repatriation - checking.

Black the denied further segregation. And that no authorization or authenticity was given to the circulation of such a petition.

-b - - - - -

SERIOUSNESS OF PETITION ISSUE

When I arrived Ad. seared

People's attitudes:

K. The only thing that will kill it is for the Administration to act in time to hasten the segregation of the Yes-Yes group, the American loyalists. If they don't, it will come to a head. The only other way is to have the army continually patrol the camp.

The Coordinating Committee and the Civic Organizations group are suspected. ~~From our point of view, they are loyalists.~~ From our point of view, they are loyalists.

The removal of the internees is not important in the segregation movement.

The general trend of public opinion of the people is: they got to get rid of sever off the head, of the men on the Coordinating Committee. Unless they get rid of these men there's going to be trouble. ... There is the greatest tension here.

- - - - -

Bill all for it, but admitted two groups - one who wanted to separate those who had applied for repat. / poor expat. from all the others. The others who said, "We are all Japanese."

Denied it was tied up with status quo.

We wish to be separated from the inus, that's the main point.

- - - - -

Mrs. Q quite frank on backing petition - but couldn't tell me how to separate

sheep from the goats.

- - - - -

Y - Naturally the status go is still under ground. So I think he just put his name on the paper and did it. - Not really for petition - or else cautious.

This Coordinating Committee may get a 2 by 4 one year later. People are very scared about the stockade.

If the loyal group got out it would help a lot but only halfway - But if the next exchange boat came, they the people would have hope. Now there is no hope at all.

Mary Hashinote - for segregation - Yes Yes out. (Not separate Nono and repatriates.)

Kurihara - Whoever, said No, must be considered as Japanese, regardless of what they have in their hearts. The only things we could ask is that those who openly said Yes be removed from the camp. It may split the families - but regardless, we want them out.

Denounces promoters of petition - as pressure group.

Bill -

- - - - -

Had changed his mind -

People who said Yes and asked for repatriation should be allowed to stay. "Outright support of the petition is not very strong. I've been talking to a fellow who says he did not sign the petition but says, "We have to be segregated."

- - - - -

Odas conservatives :

I think it's better if the loyal group go out so that we could stay here peacefully. Otherwise, we don't get settled down.

- - - - -

I -

Personally I think the resignation of the CC is just the result of the Life photographer being here. Those poor saps got their faces in the magazine. Before that there was quite an outcry about inus and stoolies. Then life came out..... I saw two by fours coming. It came to a head when the pictures came out.

The guys believe the petition is a radical goon squad business. The group behind the petition is more or less responsible for the incident that happened in November. They proposed the general strike and the hunger strike. They are just a minority who feel they have to make a name for themselves so they'll be honored when they get back to the old country.

When this petition was circulated in this block - looked for official approval didn't find it so didn't sign it.

The only segregation the colonists are in favor of is the segregation of the Yes-Yes from the No-Nos. The majority doesn't care if there any distinction made between the NO-Nos and repatriates.

The last week there's been a lot of talk about dog hujting with baseball

bats. If there's any trouble here in the next five or six months, it's going to be because of keeping the Yes-Yes in camp.

NEW ELECTION *

Leuppe - yes Leuppe no.

Releases - yes and no???????

Advised against it by evacuees.

Brought out in paper with tremendous publicity/May
April 4-

Announces election by secret ballot May 22, - 2 to 8 p. m.
pro tem chairmanship of B. M. to nominate 5 candidates.
2 delegates from each ward for Arrangements committee who
will make plans for actual election.

Before Nominations - Attitudes

I * Nobody cares a thing about having a representative government. So far as I can see, nobody is going to break their neck trying to work up a few representatives for the block. They just don't care. Things are going along pretty good, so leave well enough alone.

Let block managers handle it - they can't be put in stockade.

Ku - People are not very enthusiastic about it - Favors it - but will be called inu unless they stand up to Ad. If they do stand up put in stockade.

If would be best if the body stood up and spoke for the rights of the Japanese, even if they are thrown into the stockade. Then they'll be idolized. But if they fall into line ~~W~~ they're going to be called stooges no matter what they do.

Stresses resentment of people in stockade.

N * resegregation will come up again.

They're going a head with this committee - but I personally would like to see the people in the stockade released. People say, "What's the use, we put up representatives once and they wouldn't recognize them."

May - It doesn't seem as if this representative body is going to go through. I hear so many people say as long as they are obligated to the Daihyo Sha they will refuse to vote until they're released.

Yamashiro - People are feeling pretty bad. If you do good for the people you get put into the stockade. If you do good for WRA you get called inu. So I'm going to play baseball.

Fukumoto - They people are confused. They are still confused. The reason they are refusing to support petition is that the stockade matter is still unsettled.

Glee over refusal -

This is a great victory for the Japanese people.
Great deal more talk about stockade and giri - even Oda's.

I * The suggestion came from the other end. It had a rank odor, that's all. It's too much for the WRA to try to be helpful.

Nov. 16 meeting.

tried to wire to Spanish consul -

good deal of accusation and squabbling - Yamatani complains has been threatened for not supporting Daihyo Sha.

hookling as to why support status quo.

Army demanded block managers give up hiding men.

Nov. 17, ward chairmen, block managers and Daihyo Bha met.
discussed question of reaponsibility.
buildign up high hopes onSpanish Consul -

Nov. 17 Coordinating Committee gets reply from Spanish Consul -
"State the reason for my coming to the center."

On consultation sent out message to Consul.

"Colonists are no longer able to endure the inconveniences caused by the martial law/ and desire nothing but normalcy! We request for your immediate visit.

Martial law deleted by censor.

November 18

Joint meeting of Army ward chairman of block managers and Daihyo Sha.

~~General Austin prohibits~~
Austin prohibits use of Japanese???

States he will never recognize the five men in hiding.
Attempt to explain formation of Negotiating Committee -
Increased Nov. 4.

Block managers refuse to take up place of Negotiating Comm ttee.
Daihyo Sha meeting - Nov. 25.

More squabbling -

Argue on Yamatani being accused of being inu
Argue on maintaining status quo.

Coo dinating committee wants to get out of it and leave it to
Neg otiating committee. especially Yamatani.

~~XX~~

Nov. 29, Kai and Kuratomi present ultimatum from the Negotiating Committee drawn up for residents signatures.

Lays blame on Caucasians for taking food from warehouse.
Brands Best's fear of kidnapping as false.

Pretty wild resolutions.

1. Not to enter into negotiation with administration except through Negotiating Committee.
2. Demands wholesale resignation of all appointed personnel here before Nov. 4.
3. Withdraw army.

4. Hold Best to promises.

5. Immediate and unconditional release.

6. Reemployment of all workers.

Only $\frac{1}{2}$ of colonists signed the petition.
Formal surrender.

meeting with permission of F. B. I.

Kai Speech -

Entire colonists of the Tule Lake Center are Japanese, even though they may have been born in the U. S. Nevertheless, they are Japanese and have determination to be Japanese. Therefore, the N. C. representatives are representatives of the entire Tule Lake Center. From now on we should disregard the status of issei and nisei and bind together as father and son.

Appoints an acting Negotiating Committee to function in his absence in stockade.

Kuratomi - points out international implications.

"As the Negotiating Committee stepped into the car, Chairman Takahashi grasped hands of Rev. Kai and said, "There's nothing to worry about your family as the ~~xxxx~~ entire colonists will be responsible." Kai thanked him with tears. Such dramatic scene was enacted and the automobile began journey to meet the authorities. Thereupon all the Daihyo Sha returned to the meeting place.

Placed in tents.

Met in the afternoon - argue and accomplish little.

Some say support N. C. - some duty to help colonists.

Takahashi says policy of status quo not important, To support NC. is our entire aim. All unanimously agreed.

Place five new members recommended by Kai on N. C.

This Second Negotiating Committee rebuffed by Meek.

Faced important decision. If NC disbanded leaving leaders in stockade, would betray them and admit guilt. giri -

Dec. 4th considered 3 paths.

1. continue the status quo.
2. Call general strike.
3. Dissolve Daihyo Sha Kai.

Takahashi speaks for disbanding.

After argument decided to put the matter before the people.

votes - 2 blocks undecided

locked doors

3 for General Strike

4 for dissolution.

56 blocks for maintaining status quo.

Meeting next day Dec. 5, disorganized and erratic - leadership gone.

Decide to hit canteens for selling luxuries. and demand cooperation of block managers.

