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WRA

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

1943-44

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EVIDENCES OF AMERICANISM AMONG JAPANESE-AMERICANS

Statement by Dillon S. Myer, Director of the War Relocation Authority

In view of the fact that the Japanese side of Japanese-American life has been so strongly emphasized during recent weeks, I believe that, in the interest of fairness and accuracy, some attention should be drawn to evidences of Americanism among the Japanese-American people.

Of the 110,000 people of Japanese descent who were evacuated last year from the Pacific Coast military area, approximately 70,000 were born in the United States and are American citizens. Roughly 72 percent of this group have never even seen Japan. They have attended American public schools and have been subjected to all the other Americanizing influences that operate constantly in any American community.

More than 8,000 American citizens of Japanese ancestry--approximately half of them volunteers--are now serving in the United States Army. Some are in service overseas and three have already been cited for bravery in action. One is serving as a turret gunner in *Liberator* engaged in bombing operations over the Continent of Europe.

Over 1,200 of these soldiers volunteered for service from behind the wire enclosures of relocation centers. As a result, the centers today contain large numbers of service flags and other evidences of ties with the Army. Men in uniform are frequent visitors at the centers and arrangements for entertaining them are part of the regular community activities program.

There are many other evidences of Americanism among these people both in the relocation centers and in normal communities throughout the country. At all centers, training in American ideals and American institutions is part of the regular school program just as it is in public schools outside. Formal flag raising and the pledge of allegiance are a regular ceremony in most of the center schools. Practically all national organizations for young people--such as the Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, 4-H Clubs, YMCA, YWCA, and Junior Red Cross--have active programs at the centers and many thousands of members. Boy Scouts alone number several thousand.

Outside the relocation centers, the thousands of Japanese-Americans--including both those who have left the centers on leave and those who were never evacuated--are displaying their patriotism in the same ways as other civilian Americans. They are buying war bonds and stamps, donating money and blood to the Red Cross, and participating in salvage campaigns. Several hundred are serving effectively in the intelligence branch of the United States Army. Others are serving as language instructors, helping to train intelligence officers for the Army and Navy. Still others are working as translators with the Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information. Many are employed as carpenters, machinists, welders, and in other jobs essential to war production.

Presented before Costello Subcommittee of House Committee on Un-American Activities on July 7, 1943.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Washington, D.C.

In May of 1943 the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities (popularly known as the Dies Committee) appointed a subcommittee to conduct a special investigation of the War Relocation Authority program and of Japanese-Americans in relocation centers. This subcommittee -- composed of Rep. John M. Costello of California (chairman), Rep. Karl E. Mundt of South Dakota, and Rep. Herman P. Eberharter of Pennsylvania -- carried out its assignment in June and early July. The members held hearings in Los Angeles, visited the relocation center at Poston, Arizona, sent staff investigators to several of the other centers, and finally heard testimony of the National Director of WRA and others in Washington, D. C.

Throughout the entire course of the investigation, a large volume of inaccurate and misleading statements about the WRA were constantly appearing in the Nation's press. Some of these statements were attributed to members of the Committee; others were allegedly made by staff investigators or spokesmen; and some were derived from testimony of witnesses at the Los Angeles hearings. In order to counteract these charges and introduce the real facts into the record, WRA prepared a file of informational material for use at the Washington hearings.

Because of the seriousness of the issues involved, this material has now been made public. The file, which is attached, contains the following items prepared in connection with the Washington hearings of the subcommittee:

- ✓ 1. Comments by the War Relocation Authority on Newspaper Statements Attributed to Representatives of the House Committee on Un-American Activities.
- ✓ 2. Supplementary Comments by the War Relocation Authority on Newspaper Statements allegedly Made by Representatives of the House Committee on Un-American Activities.
- ✓ 3. Comments by the War Relocation Authority on Statements Reported in the Press Allegedly Made by Witnesses Before the Committee on Un-American Activities During Hearings in Los Angeles Between June 8 and June 17.
- ✓ 4. Further Comments by the War Relocation Authority on Newspaper Statements Allegedly Made By Representatives of the House Committee on Un-American Activities.
- ✓ 5. Statement by Dillon S. Myer, Director of the War Relocation Authority, before the Costello Committee on the House Committee on Un-American Activities, July 6, 1943.
- ✓ 6. A Statement of Guiding Principles of the War Relocation Authority
- ✓ 7. Statement of Testimony of Harold H. Townsend Before the House of Representatives Subcommittee of the Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Los Angeles, California May 26, 1943, 2:00 P.M.
- ✓ 8. Conversation Between W. Wade Head, Project Director, and H. H. Townsend, Supply & Transportation Officer, On December 1, 1942.
- ✓ 9. Letter to Hon. Martin Dies from Mr. D. S. Myer, June 2, 1943
- ✓ 10. Constitutional Principles Involved in the Relocation Program
- ✓ 11. Evidences of Americanism Among Japanese-Americans

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Sequins

STATEMENT ON TESTIMONY OF HAROLD H. TOWNSEND BEFORE THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA,
MAY 26, 1943, 2:00 P. M.

Harold H. Townsend, formerly chief Supply and Transportation Officer at the Poston, Arizona Relocation Center, appeared under oath before the sub-committee in an executive session on May 26. Some time prior to June 10, 1943, a transcript or excerpts from Townsend's testimony were supplied the press by the committee. Later a transcript was given the Project Director of the Poston Center. The Director and staff of the center have reviewed the Townsend testimony carefully and have prepared documentary evidence bearing on most of Townsend's assertions. We wish to take this opportunity to present for the record the comments of the War Relocation Authority on Townsend's testimony.

There is scarcely a page of this testimony that does not contain one or more false, misleading or exaggerated statements. While some of those statements are of comparatively trivial consequence, there are many others that misinform the Committee on fundamental aspects of administration at the Poston Center. It is on these latter comments in particular that the War Relocation Authority has prepared detailed comment.

Townsend's complete unreliability as a witness is revealed in his opening statement to the Committee when, in response to the direct question, "Have you ever served in the United States Army?", he replies, yes, for six months in France in 1918. As a matter of fact, Townsend never served in the Army. For the entire period of American participation in the first World War, Townsend was employed as a superintendent of guards by the Carter Oil Company of Tulsa, Oklahoma. In February 1919, three months after the Armistice, Townsend was sent as a YMCA worker to France where he served for six months as a hut secretary.

Of much greater seriousness, from the point of view of the committee before which Townsend appeared, is the false and misleading picture Townsend presented of conditions at the Poston Relocation Center, particularly during the period from November 18, to 24, 1942, during which one of the three camps at Poston experienced a sit-down strike and mass demonstration by a number of evacuees against certain policies of the War Relocation Authority and certain conditions at the center. During the strike Townsend became so emotionally upset and frightened that he reported a great many imaginary dangers, talked so irresponsibly to other members of the administrative staff that he threatened to spread panic among them, and finally left the center in a government automobile.

* * * * *

Presented before Costello Sub-committee of House Committee on Un-American Activities July 7, 1943.

After the strike Townsend returned and in an interview with the Project Director (of which a stenographic record was made) admitted that he had been wrong in his actions during the strike, admitted that he had greatly exaggerated the seriousness of the situation, and acknowledged that he was wrong in leaving his post of duty. Townsend's record prior to the strike had been poor. That record, together with his conduct during the disturbance caused the Project Director to ask for his resignation.

After Townsend realized that he had been dismissed, he took the course not infrequently followed by disgruntled employees. He prepared a long and highly emotional statement purporting to be a description of conditions at the Poston Center. This he broadcast throughout the country. One copy came into the possession of the War Relocation Authority in April 1943.

This same statement formed the basis of the testimony before the sub-committee. As a matter of fact, there is ample internal evidence in the testimony itself that Townsend's hearing before the Committee consisted simply of Townsend reading this prepared statement into the record with appropriate leading questions from time to time by the Committee's investigator. There was no cross-examination, and every statement, no matter how clearly fantastic, was accepted for the record at face value.

On June 18, 1943, when the sub-committee visited the Poston Center, the Project Director, having reviewed Townsend's testimony, asked for the privilege of making a statement on it for the record. The sub-committee refused to hear him. We have, therefore, in the interest of presenting the facts for the record, reviewed the testimony at length and prepared the attached summary of false statements made by Townsend together with an outline of the facts of each situation. All comments made on the following pages are fully documented in the records of the War Relocation Authority.

Attachment

FALSE STATEMENTS OF HAROLD H. TOWNSEND BEFORE THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA,
MAY 26, 1943, 2:00 P. M.

1. Page 2

Question: "Have you ever served in the United States Army?"

Answer: "Yes."

Question: "When?"

Answer: "1918."

Question: "Did you serve in France?"

Answer: "Six months in France."

Comment

Records of the War Department of men who served in the United States Army during the last war contain no record of military service by Harold H. Townsend. Records of the Carter Oil Company, Tulsa, Oklahoma, show that Townsend was employed by that company as a Superintendent of Guards from March 1, 1917 to January 15, 1919. Records of the YMCA indicate that Townsend served in France as a YMCA hut worker after the last war, from February, 1919 to August, 1919.

2. Page 9

Question: "Do they have a hospital in Poston?"

Answer: "They have a very fine hospital, a very large hospital, modern in every respect. Large enough to handle approximately 600 people and is usually filled."

Comment

The official rated capacity of Poston General Hospital is 250 beds with 120 beds available for occupancy. The average daily census of the hospital from July, 1942 to May 31, 1943, is given in the following table. The average daily census of patients for this period is 98.1.

<u>Patient Days</u> <u>in</u>	<u>Hospital Days</u>	<u>Daily Average</u>
July	2285	73.3
August	2827	91.2
September	2886	96.2
October	3115	100.4
November	3285	109.5
December	3407	109.9
January	3457	111.5
February	3157	112.7
March	2913	93.9
April	2785	92.8
May	2777	89.6

3. Page 10

Question: "Do you recall how much food was consumed daily?"

Answer: "We, by actual count, supplied 58 tons of subsistence per day."

Comment

During the month of December, 1942 -- the last month when Mr. Townsend was on duty at the project -- the average quantity of food delivered to evacuee mess halls was 27 tons per day. The evacuee population in the center at that time was approximately 18,000.

4. Page 11

Question: "The amount of the food and the type of food was determined by the WRA in Washington; is that correct?"

Answer: "Largely so, yes, sir."

Comment

During the period when Mr. Townsend was on duty at the Poston Relocation Center, supervision over the requisitioning of food by the center was exercised by the regional office of the War Relocation Authority in San Francisco, California. Since January, 1943, similar supervision has been exercised by the Washington office.

6. Page 12

Mr. Townsend: "The information that was furnished me by certain friendly groups was that they had placed different types of emergency food in secret cellars under the mess halls for the invasion armies and parachute

troopers. But in addition to that they had large caches of food throughout the desert, buried, that could be used for similar purposes. And this information was furnished by friendly Japanese who were endeavoring to get special favors, and we were constantly trying to find out what was happening to certain supplies, and we always had a number of Japanese that would give us information for an exchange of favors."

Comment

This story is entirely without foundation and was never mentioned by Mr. Townsend during the time he was employed at Poston. It is impossible that the evacuees could have stored food under the desert conditions at Poston in a manner to preserve it more than a few days.

6. Page 13

Mr. Townsend: "At numerous times we had these thieves caught, and produced evidence and information about the process of the entire thieving ring. The matter was placed before Mr. Empie, and Mr. Head, and Mr. Gelvin, and the M. P. authorities, and it was always stopped, because there was no way that they could see that we would be benefited by trying to prosecute them. We then established a daily loss of approximately \$500 through the thefts within the camp, which was agreed upon by all of us, and even at that they would not take any action towards prosecution."

Comment

Records of the Poston Internal Security Office indicate that Mr. Townsend made only three complaints about what he considered illegal activities within the project area. One was concerned with the fact that property of an evacuee was missing from a shipment received from the Salinas, California Assembly Center. Another had to do with three small Japanese boys playing hide-and-seek in Mr. Townsend's car. The third had to do with an evacuee securing scrap lumber from the salvage depot without authorization.

7. Page 16

Question: "Was the food that you served to the Japanese at Poston as good or better than that being served to the Army?"

Answer: "It was superior in every way"

Comment

Food at Poston was and is requisitioned through the Quartermaster Corps. In quality it is equal to or lower than that served at training camps and other Army centers. In quantity it is substantially less than that provided by the Army as evidenced by the ration cost, which has not exceeded 45¢ per person per day.

8. Page 17

Question: "Were the Japanese served ice cream at Poston?"

Answer: "Yes, sir, we had ice cream brought to us every day from the Golden State Creamery Company."

Comment

With regard to this statement, we have the following comment submitted by Mr. Joe A. Petta who has served as Assistant Chief Steward at the Poston Center since June, 1942:

"No ice cream has ever been purchased with government funds for evacuees. Ice cream received at Poston is paid for in one of the following ways:

- "1. It is purchased by the community stores using evacuee funds, for re-sale to evacuees.
- "2. Small quantities were purchased occasionally for the personnel mess during the summer of 1942. The personnel mess is operated as a government mess, and its expenses are paid by employees."

9. Page 17

Question: "And milk?"

Answer: "Milk orders run from 8,000 to 12,000 quarts of homogenized milk every day."

Comment

Milk received at the center has never exceeded 8,000 quarts daily. Deliveries reached this figure during part of December 1942 and January 1943 as a result of increased requisitions authorized by Mr. Townsend without consulting the Project Steward.

The current contract calls for maximum deliveries of 6,264 quarts daily, but there is an agreement with the vendor that deliveries to the center are contingent upon the needs of military establishments in the area and upon the requirements of other consumers. The vendor has recently notified the center that deliveries are likely to be reduced drastically in the near future.

10. Page 17

Question: "And butter?"

Answer: "We had the finest grade of Challenge butter and other high-grade butter that we could buy."

Comment

On January 28, 1943, the War Relocation Authority instructed all centers to discontinue the purchase of butter and to substitute oleomargarine. When point rationing on meats and fats was initiated on March 9, 1943, the restriction on the purchase of butter was lifted, with the proviso that two conditions must be met: (1) that the regular civilian allowance of 16 points per week for meats and fats should not be exceeded; and (2) that in the event of civilian shortages, butter purchases should be discontinued. Throughout this entire period, the Poston Center has continued to use oleomargarine because of its lower ration point value and lower cost.

11. Page 17

Question: "Was there plenty of meat and sausage of all kinds supplied?"

Answer: "The finest cuts and grade A meats; quarters and full carcasses of lambs and pork, and the best cuts of beef were brought in; on an average of one refrigerator car a day."

Question: "I believe you stated that all of it was of the very best grade?"

Answer: "The finest grade that we could get."

Question: "Was the grade of food better than that obtained by our own citizens in the markets and stores?"

Answer: "Very much better than you can buy in the open market."

Comment

Meats procured at Poston and other relocation centers have generally been U. S. Commercial (third) grade or lower. As a matter of

policy the War Relocation Authority avoids procurement of commodities known to be scarce in the markets where purchases are made. In November, 1942, voluntary meat rationing was introduced in the six western centers. This program was extended to the four eastern centers in January, 1943. All mandatory rationing restrictions of the Office of Price Administration are being and have been applied at all centers.

12. Page 19

Question: "What was done with the garbage?"

Answer: "Sir?"

Question: "What was done with the garbage?"

Answer: "It was taken -- we would load it onto equipment and dig ditches and throw it into the ditches and cover it up."

Question: "What happened with reference to the idea of feeding it to the hogs?"

Answer: "Up until January 30th there was nothing done at all. About January 30th Washington wrote the director and asked him how many hogs they had to use the 9 or 10 tons of garbage that we had in the camp, and we had been out trying to buy hogs, and we had every hog in southern California--through this same group that was building this \$25,000,000 corporation, we had every hog farm and every cattle farm tabulated, and we knew all the hogs available, so he had this hog man check the hogs, and at the time the letter was received there wasn't a hog in the camp. They then, without any knowledge on the part of the supply department, ordered in 200 200-pound hogs, and they answered Washington by telling them that we had 200 hogs.

"I would like to enlarge a little bit upon that. If you know anything about hogs, you know you wouldn't want to start feeding 200-pound hogs. They are ready for the market. They bought 200 200-pound hogs and paid 25 cents a pound for them. The same herd of hogs, as listed in the market, could have been bought for 17 cents a pound, and they were hogs that we were considering buying for butchering for pork. They were too old to be handled for feeders, and that order should have been for hogs that would have cost \$10 or \$15, to feed the garbage to, instead of paying 25 cents a pound. Now they have this number of hogs down there, weighing 300 or 400 pounds, and they are not fit for anything except lard."

Comment

During December, 1942, pursuant to a general policy adopted by the War Relocation Authority on December 3, 1942, steps were taken to establish a swine project at the Poston Center. Three hundred pigs were purchased January 13, 1943, in accordance with standard governmental procurement procedure. The pigs averaged 145 pounds each. Since then, 325 more pigs, averaging 115 pounds each, have been purchased. All were garbage broke, double vaccinated feeder pigs.

13. Page 21

Question: "Mr. Townsend, how many warehouses did you say were under your jurisdiction at Poston?"

Answer: "180."

Question: "180?"

Answer: "180 warehouses."

Comment:

There were 90 warehouses on the entire project, including six at the Parker railhead.

14. Page 21

Question: "How many Japanese were employed in the warehouses?"

Answer: "2700, I believe, in the -- now, wait a minute. In the warehouses, no. I think there were---"

Question: "An approximation will be all right."

Answer: "There were 680 Japanese and 4 white supervisors in the warehouses."

Comment

The maximum number of Japanese ever to be employed in the warehouses was 300. They were employed during the month of December, 1942, and distributed as follows:

Unit No. 1	133
Unit No. 2	107
Unit No. 3	60

15. Page 22

Mr. Townsend: "Now, as for the furniture, of course, the Poston development includes a very marvelous Caucasian personnel center. The plan showed 54 modern bugalows, and two dormitories, three stories, one for women and one for men, and the administration homes, which would cost somewhere between fifteen and twenty thousand dollars. There were to be four of them, and a beautiful park area, with swimming pools, and so forth. And this furniture was purchased for that purpose, to furnish those. It was all bought from Barker Brothers, and the prices on it were not reasonable. They were very, very high in consideration of the many, many carloads. We must have had, oh, at least 20 carloads of that type of furniture."

Comment

Quarters provided for the administrative staff at Poston include eight four-room cottages built during the initial construction period by the Army; twenty-four housekeeping apartments of from two to six rooms in one-story barracks-type buildings of temporary construction, similar to the theatre-of-operations construction found throughout the center; and 158 rooms size 7 x 14 feet in barracks-type dormitories. Each barracks dormitory contains a bathroom and from ten to twelve rooms.

There are no three-story buildings, no modern bugalows, and no individual administration homes other than the eight cottages built by the Army.

In accordance with the customary practice in public or private projects in such isolated locations as Poston, staff quarters are fitted with essential furniture. Furniture for the quarters at Poston was not all purchased from Barker Brothers, but in fact was secured from a number of vendors, chiefly in Los Angeles where the purchases were made by the office for Emergency Management.

All staff members pay rent to the government based upon the size and character of accommodations furnished.

16. Page 22

Question: "In addition to the food stored in the warehouses, what else was stored there?"

Answer: "There were supplies and equipment of every conceivable type in the numerous warehouses. The C.C.C. had sent in hundreds of carloads of miscellaneous equipment. We had warehouses that we moved the staff into and locked up, and they hadn't been opened for months, because it was just miscellaneous equipment. We didn't know what it was."

Comment

The Civilian Conservation Corps has not shipped in hundreds of carloads of miscellaneous equipment. It is estimated that two (2) miscellaneous carloads (100,000 pounds) would hold all the surplus items, such as tools. The C.C.C. automotive equipment that has been received did not exceed, at the most, ten (10) carloads. All warehouses are opened and inspected regularly in the ordinary course of business.

17. Page 24

Mr. Townsend: ".....Then there is another thing that occurs to me. We were very anxious to get school buses. We brought in -- we had 400 teachers,"

Comment

Elsewhere in the testimony (page 34) Mr. Townsend states that there are 100 Caucasian teachers and 200 or more Japanese teachers. In fact, on December 19, 1942, there were 203 teachers in the Poston schools; 83 were Caucasian and 120 were Japanese. These figures include not only elementary and secondary teachers, but also the Director of Education, three high school principals, one elementary principal, and twelve other supervisory educational personnel.

18. Page 25

Question: "Going back to the fleet of dump trucks bought in Los Angeles, do you recall the name of the firm those trucks were purchased from?"

Answer: "I think it was Finkelstein. Finkelstein is another one of the swindlers that we bought hundreds of thousands

of dollars of equipment from -- this firm of Finkelstein, and always there was a kick-back to the procurement representative."

Question: "Is Findelstein located in Los Angeles?"

Answer: "He is there, yes."

Question: "Is that his firm name?"

Answer: "Finkelstein and Company, one of these big salvage companies."

Comment

No trucks of any kind were purchased by the Poston Center from Findelstein.

19. Page 31

Question: "Were many of those Kibei on the internal police force?"

Answer: "I didn't get that."

Question: "I asked you, were many of the Kibei on the internal police force?"

Answer: "Yes, a large number of them were."

Question: "They composed the so-called goon squads that you have referred to?"

Answer: "Yes, sir. The police force was largely built up of the gestapo, as I have called them, because they tell you that they have trained under the German agents, and they were, in my estimation, the men that were guilty of the malicious beating up and all the malicious agitation in the camp, because the police force would not permit any decent American-born Japanese to take part, because he might expose some of their under-cover work."

Comment

At the time of Mr. Townsend's presence in Poston, there were three evacuee officers in charge of the police departments in the three units. All of these men were Nisei, or American-born and American-educated Japanese. The officers who assisted them and who held the rank of Captain or Lieutenant in the local police departments were all Nisei Japanese; only one of these had ever been to Japan at any time. This man held the rank of Captain in the police department of Unit Two and his loyalty and ability were unquestionable. A few Kibei were taken in to each

of the police departments as patrolmen, particularly because of their ability to speak Japanese and to deal with some of the older evacuees who had difficulty understanding English. These men were picked very carefully, and there has never been any indication that any of them were involved in troublemaking or subversive activities.

As to the testimony regarding the German training of any of the young men employed as policemen in Poston, Mr. Ernest L. Miller, Director of Police at Poston, reports that "such information has never been forwarded to me and I have to date seen no practice which would indicate any such training. I might add that, having spent some months in Germany in 1936 and surveyed Nazi police practices, I am thoroughly familiar with German methods of training and mannerisms, and I have never seen any evidence of such training or contact among any of the Japanese in Poston."

20. Page 33

Question: "Who is the head of the education department at Poston?"

Answer: "Mr. Cary."

Question: "Do you know anything about Mr. Cary's background?"

Answer: "Yes. Mr. Cary and most of the Caucasian staff were imported from Honolulu, and he was the principal of the McKinley High School there."

Comment

Out of a total of eight-three Caucasian school personnel at Poston, four (including Dr. Cary) were previously employed in Honolulu.

21. Page 35

Mr. Townsend: "Well, Dr. Cary and his assistant, Miss-- her name has slipped my mind -- they drew up the plan of education and put into effect, and the textbooks were ordered -- part of them were shipped in from Honolulu and part of them were secured from various other schools throughout southern California. They were discarded school books that we were asked to go out and pick up, and I had a letter from Dr. Cary asking me to pick up textbooks from at least eight or ten different communities around California."

Comment

The first orders for textbooks were taken from the official textbook lists used in the Indian Service. Shortly after Christmas, the way was cleared to purchase textbooks through the local procurement office. All textbooks used are standard texts, used by our American public schools, and printed by reputable printing houses. None of the textbooks was secured through the Los Angeles school authorities. No textbooks were shipped in from Honolulu. Fifty thousand textbooks were donated to the schools by twelve California school districts.

22. Page 39

"The Chairman: Was there any produce raised around the camp and used there?"

"The Witness: There wasn't when I left there. If there was, it was put in there since."

Comment

In addition to products harvested and used from seventy-two acres farmed within the residential blocks between the barracks, there were 89,720 pounds of vegetables harvested on the acreage farmed by the Agricultural Division up to January 1, 1943. Since that time, agricultural production has been increased so that on June 1, 1943, there was a total of 228 acres being farmed in addition to the acreage in the blocks. The June first report shows a total of 901,896 pounds of sixteen different types of vegetables harvested by the agricultural department.

23. Pages 47-82

Most of the last half of Mr. Townsend's testimony is devoted to a lurid and imaginative description of what Townsend calls a riot at Poston Center during the period from November 18 to November 24, 1942. He states that government property was destroyed, that a violent mob took possession of the center, that the lives of the administrative personnel were endangered, etc.

Comment

A number of his specific statements are dealt with in detail below. However, it should be pointed out that there was no riot at Poston, no violence or destruction of government property, and no harm to Caucasian employees or their families.

Camp I at Poston experienced during the period in question a sit-down strike, accompanied by a demonstration and mass meetings of evacuee representatives. This was not a unified pro-Japanese movement as Mr. Townsend has represented. In fact, Camps II and III were in no way affected by the incident. Only a part of the activities at Camp I were suspended by the strike. Essential services were maintained, and while there was considerable tenseness for a time in the relations between evacuees and the administrative staff over the grievances which were in question, there was no violence or disorder.

Immediate cause of the strike and demonstration was the arrest of two evacuees suspected of having beaten other evacuees. Leaders of the striking evacuees insisted that the two held were innocent, that they were held more than seventy-two hours without charges, and that they should be given a trial under the regulations of the Community Council. Actually, in the judgment of competent observers who have investigated the strike thoroughly, the protest about the arrest of the two evacuees was merely the immediate cause of the disturbance which had its origin in many causes, among them bitterness resulting from evacuation, inability of the Authority to provide school buildings, heating stoves for the barracks, and other facilities which had been promised at the time of evacuation, frustration resulting from the discomforts of

camp life, and similar causes. Agitation by actual pro-Japanese persons may have contributed, but there is no evidence that it was a particularly important factor in the incident.

With regard to the sensational report of the strike presented by Mr. Townsend, the following statement was signed by sixty-one employees and members of employees' families who lived at Poston Camp I throughout the strike:

"We, the undersigned, are living in Poston, Arizona in barracks or houses provided by the government for the administrative staff employed by the Colorado River War Relocation Project. These quarters are located in Block 34 of Unit 1, which is inside the compound of the Colorado River War Relocation Project. We further certify that we were occupying these quarters in November, 1942, at which time there was a disturbance in Unit 1 of Poston.

"There have been several charges and allegations, made under oath, such as the 'poor simpleton cowering Caucasian employees, (were) standing around like whipped children, lucky to be spared and allowed to live from hour to hour with ambulances filled with disguised soldiers with machine guns guarding their sleep so that they would not be slaughtered or burned as hourly threatened.' We wish to testify that there was no terrorism or violence at any time, nor were we afraid of bodily injury at any time. To further substantiate this, those of us with children felt at ease to have our children remain in Poston throughout the disturbance. We continued to move freely throughout the camp in the course of our regular assigned duties."

The best evidence showing the falsity of the statements Mr. Townsend presented to the committee, however, is provided by Townsend himself. During the strike Townsend became emotionally upset. He spread wild rumors among his administrative associates. At the height of the strike he left his post of duty without authorization and went to Los Angeles. He returned to Poston about November 29. On December 1, 1942, Townsend was interviewed by the Project Director, Wade Head. There follows a stenographic transcript of that portion of the interview bearing upon the period of the strike:

Head: "Good morning, Mr. Townsend.

Townsend: "Good morning. I just got your memorandum and want to discuss it with you. Please let me apologize for my actions during the strike. I must have been so upset I didn't realize what I was doing. I was afraid that I and the other employees were going to be slaughtered by the Japs.

Head: "Mr. Townsend, if you do not mind, I am going to have notes kept on this conversation, inasmuch as your actions of the last few days have been such that they cause me to doubt your honesty and reliability. Do you object?"

Townsend: "I don't blame you for wanting a record of everything I have to say."

Head: "Now, Mr. Townsend, you said you were frightened; did you actually see, personally, any signs of violence on the part of the people or the destruction of any government property?"

Townsend: "Since having time to calm down I realize that there was no sign of violence, and now that the trouble has been settled and I have had time to look around, it is easy to see the crowd must have been peaceful all the time and there was no sign of any damage to any government property."

Head: "Do you consider that sufficient reason for leaving the project and failing your duties during the time of trouble?"

Townsend: "I don't know what I meant. I lost my head, I guess. I would have done more harm here than good in that condition."

24. Page 50

Mr. Townsend: ".....The M.P.'s were not allowed to be in uniform on our side of the highway, so Captain Dougherty took the hospital ambulance and mounted machine guns on it, and set the ambulance at the rear of our Caucasian sleeping quarters, with soldiers in civilian clothes to keep the Japanese from approaching the barracks and burning them up, as they said they would. And we were only comfortable when those ambulances were sitting out there. But they were not in uniform."

Comment

The hospital ambulance was in the charge of the Chief Medical Officer of the center and was at no time used by Captain Dougherty or any other officer of the M. P. Company. No machine guns were mounted on it. It was not stationed in the rear of the Caucasian sleeping quarters and was not manned by soldiers of the United States Army, either in uniform or in civilian clothes. Captain Dougherty was not at Poston during the strike but had been transferred from this station several days prior to the period in question.

25. Page 51

Mr. Townsend: "Now, I don't know that I mentioned it in here, but there are over one thousand Japanese soldiers and Japanese officers in that camp and I have talked to them and have been told very definitely about their program, that this group of men on Terminal Island were in that category. And they will tell you if you ask them. They are the most indifferent fellows. If you ask them, 'Were you fellows organizing on the West Coast?' they say, 'yes, we had our program all set up.' I have asked them, 'What were you going to do?' and the answer was, 'As soon as our soldiers came over, we were going to help them.' They tell you right off that they were going to win the war. And that is the type of man that is drilling over there almost daily in military tactics, right under our noses in that camp. They drill them in various ways, but still drill them, and they are making soldiers out of them, and they are not kidding about it. They don't even presume to hide it.

"For instance, I can take you down to an admiral down there. He was our chef in Camp 3. I can't quite recall his name. I talked to him. I know he was an admiral in the Japanese Navy, and he was running a fishing boat at San Pedro. I said to him, 'Is it a fact that your boats were equipped for military purposes?' "He said, 'Yes, all of our boats were equipped so we could convert them.' He said that all the Japanese fishermen are military men. He is a fine Jap, if you can stomach that sort of stuff."

Comment

This story is entirely without foundation. It is significant that Mr. Townsend had not reported such a situation while he was employed at Poston and has presented absolutely no evidence in support of his statements. Specifically, he has not supplied the name of the alleged admiral.

26. Page 55

Mr. Townsend: "..... Schools closed, the hospital was ordered to close by the mob, but remained open against orders"

Comment

Schools were not closed. Two teachers out of 101 in Camp I dismissed classes the afternoon of November 18. The next day, and all remaining days of the strike, all classes were in session. Camps II and III were at no time affected by the strike. There was no interference with the employees of the hospital or with the operation of the hospital in any manner whatsoever.

27. Page 60

Mr. Townsend: "Now that condition came about because the milk truck came in, and the Japanese met the milk truck. It was driven in by truck and trailer from the Golden States Dairy, and the driver was in the habit of taking the milk directly to the warehouses. They met the milk truck and jumped on the truck and diverted it."

Question: "Was there a white man driving the truck?"

Answer: "Yes, the Golden States Dairy delivery man, driving a refrigerator truck. He refused to drive the truck over to the group, so they started to unload the truck, and did unload the truck and started to throw it out. I went into the dispatcher's office, and there was a carton of milk thrown through the windows."

Comment

Elsewhere Mr. Townsend says "cases of milk were dumped and cartons of milk thrown at everyone on the highway and around the camp." The Golden States Dairy Company denied that part of this statement having to do with stopping and diverting the milk truck. With regard to the rest of the story, we have the following statement from Dr. Edward H. Spicer, a member of the administrative staff at Poston:

"I went over to the motor pool about 7:00 P.M. on November 18. Mr. Townsend and the Truck Dispatcher were there. Mr. Townsend in an excited manner told me that two cases of milk had been dumped somewhere in camp and that a can of milk had been thrown through the window of the Truck Dispatcher's office. Dr. Leighton, who was with me, asked where the milk can was. Mr. Townsend pointed to a cardboard quart carton about thirty feet from the Dispatcher's office. It was empty, lying on the ground, and there was no evidence of milk having been spilled around it. It appeared to have been tossed there empty. There was no evidence of any window having been broken by this or any other milk container."

28. Page 64

Mr. Townsend: "At 9:00 o'clock, in front of the Caucasian barracks, the chief of the fire department and his assistant -- the chief of the fire department, Mr. Fien, and his assistant, Mr. Woodhouse, were accosted by a group of Japanese policemen and a fight started because the fire department car had been driven into a part of the camp. It was necessary for more than a dozen Caucasians with pea-shooters to go out and stop the attempt made by the police department to beat up the fire chief and his first assistant. This created a considerable disturbance, and it was thought it would be necessary to move the Caucasian personnel over to the military quarters."

Comment

The fire chief and his assistant were stopped while driving in excess of the speed limit through the project area by evacuee policemen on traffic duty. They were not molested; there was no fight; and it was not necessary for other administrative personnel to rescue them.

29. Page 64

Mr. Townsend: ".....One of the most disturbing things was the removal of our flags from all parts of the camp and the need of our Caucasians putting up the large flag at the office, under threats that it would be removed, with all replaced by the 'Rising Sun.'

"Loudspeakers, stolen from the warehouses, had been installed, and during day and night the Japanese national anthem was heard through the length and breadth of the camp, with wild cheers and loud demonstrations toward setting fire to the whole camp, which they had threatened to do if the military forces were brought in, or crossed the highway. That is the way they put it." /

Comment

Elsewhere in his testimony Mr. Townsend states that the American flag was taken down and the Japanese flag flown. We have affidavits from eight responsible officials of the Poston Center that the two American flags which customarily were flown over Camp I were flown all day and every day during the period of the strike, November 18 to 24, and thereafter, No guard was placed over either flag and neither was lowered except at the customary hour of sunset.

With regard to the assertion that the Japanese flag was flown during the strike and that the Japanese national anthem was played over a loudspeaker system, we have positive evidence that the claim is without foundation. Included in the evidence is the following statement from Father Clement, M. M., of Parker, Arizona:

"This is to make known and to testify that in the recent mass meetings of the strike, which were held at Block #28 in Poston, the banners and flags that were used and seen, were signs to signify merely the presense of representatives of the different blocks of the camp, and in no way were these flags or banners used to denote a pro-Axis sentiment.

"Likewise, in regard to Japanese music that was played over the public address system at these meetings, there was no martial or Japanese patriotic music played. It has been alleged, however, that one song, 'Aikoku-Ko-Shinkyoku' usually played for departing soldiers had been played. This can be readily explained, however, by the fact that it is my certain knowledge that minors who could not read Japanese titles, selected records at random, from the large assortment which included this record.

"As a Catholic priest and Chaplian working for the welfare and morale of the whole camp, I testify that I have neither seen the Japanese flag used, nor heard martial music played during the recent emergency. From having interviewed many Japanese, I do not believe that such music has been played, nor the Japanese flag displayed.

(Signed) Father Clemen, M.M.
(Maryknoll Missioner)
Parker, Arizona"

30. Page 65

Mr. Townsend: "About 12:00 o'clock midnight on the third day of mob control about 200 of the mob advanced to the motor pool where they reached the highway across from the pool. They were halted by the M.P., and advised they were not allowed to cross the highway. They started to move forward, and the M.P. fired over their heads. His orders were to fire over their heads, and then into them. He was at once supported by another M.P. with a machine gun. The mob that had advanced in regular military wedge formation stopped, and in a few minutes the entire M.P. company was there in trucks with fixed payonets ready for action. The Japs retreated.

".....Standing behind the M.P., seeing the determined look and the immediate response of his buddies, all heavily armed, and the angry mob facing their first setback, defiant and ugly but still without a leader, make things look pretty near a crisis."

Comment

With regard to the above, we have the following statement by Ernest L. Miller, Chief of Internal Security, and Mr. Leonard L. Nelson, Unit I Administrator, Poston:

"On the night of November 18th, about 11:00 P.M., Chief Kiyoshi Shigekawa and six of his men came to the administration building and asked if it would be possible to get another truck for patrol. While the Chief was inside discussing the matter with Chief of Internal Security Miller and Acting Project Director Evans, the six boys apparently thought they might as well go and pick up the truck, as they must have been over-confident that the truck would be given to them. Mr. L. L. Nelson was walking toward the motor pool at this time and saw the police approaching the M.P. guard stationed in front of the motor pool. There were four or five M.P.'s standing by the pool and a weapon carrier loaded with six or eight more soldiers drove up at this moment. The soldiers ordered the police to halt which they did. They said they were from the police department and were supposed to pick up a truck. The soldier told them not to come across the road but they started to cross. They said it was all right as they had permission. One M.P. shot over their heads and the policemen ran back to the administration building."

31. Page 66

Mr. Townsend: ".....Many of the Caucasians had left with their families, who had been confined to their barracks."

Comment

Mr. Townsend, himself, is the only employee definitely known to have left his post of duty on the project during the strike.

32. Page 67

Mr. Townsend: ".....and at 8:15 the good squad went into the barracks of one of the Japanese informants that had been working with the F.B.I. and the young man being absent, this good squad beat up his mother and father to a point where they were not expected to live,

breaking the arm and ankles of the father, and breaking both arms and fracturing the skull of the mother, and bruising her in nearly every portion of her body."

The Chairman: "Do you have the names of those Japanese?"

Mr. Townsend: "I have in the records some place."

The Chairman: "How long did they remain in the hospital?"

Mr. Townsend: "I went in to see them the following morning after this had happened, or, I went in the next evening, and the next morning or about mid-day the following day there were other victims put in the hospital, and these people had disappeared."

The Chairman: "In two days they had disappeared from the hospital?"

Mr. Townsend: "Disappeared from the hospital."

The Chairman: "Did you ever see them afterwards at the camp?"

Mr. Townsend: "No, I never saw them, and the riot followed soon after that, because this squad, this good squad, went out and wanted to beat up everybody that had given any information to these F.B.I. men."

Comment

The following information is taken from the records of the hospital concerning all patients submitted to the hospital as a result of the beatings in question:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Admitted</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	<u>Treatment</u>	<u>Condition on Discharge</u>
Seta, Francis Joe	10-18-42	Laceration of scalp	Suture wound	10-26-42 Fully recovered
Kurisaki, Lyle	11-1-42	Laceration of head Contusion of body	Suture wound	11-5-42 Fully recovered
Nishimura, Kay	11-15-42	Concussion of brain Multiple of laceration	Suture wound	11-30-42 Fully recovered

<u>Name</u>	<u>Admitted</u>	<u>Diagnosis</u>	<u>Treatment</u>	<u>Condition on Discharge</u>
Yamada Sawa	11-15-42	Laceration of hand	Suture laceration	11-26-42 Fully recovered
Yamada, Jisuke	11-15-42	Laceration of skull	Suture wound	11-26-42 Fully recovered
Yamada, Hatsumi	11-22-42	Neurosis due to fear	Sedation	11-26-42 Improved
Kido, Saburo	1-31-43	Contusion of head and face. Laceration of hand	Suture wound	2-15-43 Fully recovered

These patients were discharged upon full recovery and completion of treatment. During their stay in the hospital, visitors were restricted to immediate members of the family, police and project officials upon direct authorization of the Chief Medical Officer. Strict orders were given that no one was to be admitted except on a pass signed by the Chief Medical Officer. A complete record of all visitors was kept. This record indicates that Mr. Townsend at no time visited these patients nor requested to visit them.

33. Page 70

Mr. Townsend: "The mob had used five thousand gallons of gasoline the first two days."

Comment

During the first two days of the strike, November 18 and 19, the total amount of gasoline used in Unit I was 1,726 gallons. This included gasoline for trucks carrying supplies from Parker to Poston, distribution of food and other supplies in the unit, ambulances, water trucks, and other normal functions. The consumption of gasoline on the 11th and 12th of November, two normal work days previous to the strike, was 2,080 gallons.

34. Page 75

Mr. Townsend: "..... Up to date there has been no prosecution for any offense or for any outlary or drime in any of the camps. On the Poston battlefronts the Japs have won all battles up to January, 1943."

Comment

Up to the present time, our records indicate that there have been eight (8) men tried in the State of Arizona courts for state offenses, seven (7) of these men were found guilty and sentenced. There have also been five (5) men taken to the Federal courts in Phoenix, Arizona, tried for Federal offenses, and convicted. This number does not, of course, include persons tried on the project for violations of project rules and regulations, or persons transferred to internment camps because of evidences of loyalty to Japan or because their activities were such that their presence was detrimental to the welfare of the project.

35. Page 76

Question: "How many so-called pleasure cars did you have at Poston?"

Answer: "About 70 or 80."

Question: "Were they all owned by the government?"

Answer: "All Government sedans."

Question: "Government sedans. Were these automobiles used by the Japanese at night?"

Answer: "Exclusively."

Question: "What did they use them for?"

Answer: "Pleasure, running around the camp in the remote areas, for scooters, and playing around, as would be expected."

Comment

From the beginning motor equipment has been handled at Poston through a centralized motor pool, with passenger cars on permanent assignment only to the police force, the hospital, and one or two key administrative persons. There is absolutely no foundation for the statement that evacuees were allowed to use official cars at night or at any other time for pleasure driving.

36. Page 76

Mr. Townsend: "By pooling the trucks, we saved 1,775 gallons of gasoline in the first weekend, Saturday night, Sunday and Sunday night, and continued to save 1,000 gallons per day, by actual pump records. That is by the trucks that were impounded. Then later on, if you want to bring in the cars, we did the same thing and saved 300 gallons a day by taking the cars away from them."

Comment

The assertion that 1,000 gallons of gasoline per day were saved by establishing a pool system while Mr. Townsend was at the center has no foundation of fact.

37. Page 77

Question: "While you were at Poston did the Japanese who were interned there make automobile trips to visit their relatives and friends in the Midwest and East?"

Answer: "They did, with written orders by Mr. Head to supply them with transportation."

Question: "What was the reason for these trips?"

Answer: "Any excuse. Sickness in the families or for the purpose of looking after a sold automobile that payments had not been made on, being unable to make collections on crop sales or various agricultural ideas, and for any miscellaneous excuse the Japanese were allowed to take government equipment and make trips up to 2,500 miles, using government credit cards."

The Chairman: "All their own cars had been left at their homes by the evacuees?"

The Witness: "Oh, yes. They didn't have their own cars, except those which we leased from them, you see."

The Chairman: "And they used the government equipment?"

The Witness: "They used to use them, these big sedans, and drive them into these metropolitan centers out there. With soldiers sitting out there in the desert and seeing a load of Japanese going by in the big government cars and giving the boys a big horselaugh. It was terrible, and is still going on, but not quite so viciously, because the camp has been under quarantine."

Question by Mr. Steedman:

"You say that some of the cars traveled as high as 2,500 miles. Did the speedometers indicate that when they returned?"

- Answer: "Yes. In starting them on the trip it was usual to give them a credit card and to keep a complete record, so we took the speedometer reading upon their leaving and upon their returning."

Comment:

No evacuee has every been allowed to take a government car on a trip outside the project on personal business. No evacuee has ever been authorized to use a government credit card. Evacuees have in some instances been taken to Los Angeles and Phoenix for special medical treatment, or for similar purposes involving serious emergency. In all such cases the evacuees were accompanied by Caucasian escorts. On two occasions, March 20 and June 3, 1943, Thomas Masuda was sent in a government car from Poston to Phoenix, Arizona, to transact official business for the center with officials of the State. Since he entered no restricted zone, he made the trips without escort.

During the period Mr. Townsend was employed at Poston, no evacuee was permitted to leave the project area without an escort. No trip of as much as 2,500 miles has been taken from Poston in a government car, except one unauthorized trip to Oklahoma City which Mr. Townsend, himself, took without the knowledge or permission of the Project Director.

REMARKS OF REPRESENTATIVE HERMAN P. EBERHARTER
(OF THE DIES COMMITTEE)

March of Time, August 26, 1943

ANNOUNCER:

Last June, in Los Angeles, a three-man congressional subcommittee completed an investigation of western evacuee centers for alien and U.S.-born Japanese. One high spot was the testimony of a former official of the Poston, Arizona, Japanese relocation center, Harold H. Townsend:

VOICE 1:

The Japanese are hoarding food, bread, and other supplies for Japanese parachute troops and invasion forces.

ANNOUNCER:

This week, the subcommittee published its report. Said chairman John M. Costello of California:

VOICE 2:

Japanese are being released without adequate checks on their loyalty to the United States. Among the Japanese set free are 23 members of the Butoku-kai, a subversive youth section of the Black Dragon society.

ANNOUNCER:

But Chairman Costello was speaking only for himself and South Dakota's Representative Karl E. Mundt. Hearing the same testimony, the third member of that subcommittee disagreed with his colleagues' conclusions, disputed their statements, had recommendations of his own to make. Tonight, that congressman, Herman P. Eberharter of Pennsylvania, is at our March of Time microphone in Washington, D. C. Mr. Eberharter.

EBERHARTER:

After careful consideration, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the report of the majority of the investigating subcommittee is prejudiced. Most of its statements are not proven. The stories of Japanese hiding food, bread, and other supplies for any enemy invasion force were shown ridiculous when projects were visited. So far 16,000 evacuees have been released, yet the report seeks to make a great deal of the release of 23 who were members of Butoku-kai--a Japanese fencing society. Neither the report nor the hearings offered any evidence that any of the 23 were subversive.

After wind and fury, the report implies the War Relocation Authority is doing a very bad job, stressing a few shortcomings and ignoring the many good points our investigation disclosed. The evidence showed the WRA is doing a good job in handling an extremely difficult problem. The majority report repeats the charge that the Japanese evacuees were supplied with food in greater variety and quantity than to the average U.S. citizen. Evidence completely rebutted that charge. All rationing restrictions are strictly applied, and food costs have averaged about 40 cents a day per person.

(over)

Contrary to the majority report of the Dies subcommittee, evidence indicates there is much less crime of any kind in the relocation centers than in an American community of the same size. The climax of the majority report is three feeble, meaningless recommendations. I agree fully with the first: that segregation of the disloyal Japanese be effected at once. But this program was announced by WRA months ago. Intelligent determination of the loyalty of more than 100,000 people cannot be made in a week or a month, and the WRA's efforts to be fairly certain in its actions is commendable.

The second recommendation of the majority is that a new board be made up representing the WRA and the intelligence agencies of the government, to pass on applications for release. But there has always been close cooperation between the War Relocation Authority and army and navy intelligence and the FBI. One more board is unnecessary and would simply divide responsibility.

The third and last recommendation favors a thorough-going program of Americanization for Japanese who remain in the centers. Of course I favor that, just as I'm against sin. Considering the magnitude of the job, the difficulty of the legal issues involved--that is, the constitutionality of confining citizens not charged with any crime--and considering the complexity and delicacy of the problem of resettling such a large number of people in the midst of a war, the WRA has acted efficiently and capably. I think it is better to let the WRA carry on, unhampered by unfair criticism.

MINORITY REPORT OF THE HONORABLE HERMAN P. EBERHARTER

It is not possible for me to agree with the findings and conclusions of the other two members of our subcommittee, who constitute the majority.

After careful consideration, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the report of the majority is prejudiced, and that most of its statements are not proven.

The majority report has stressed a few shortcomings that they have found in the work of the War Relocation Authority without mentioning the many good points that our investigation has disclosed or the magnitude of the job with which the Authority is dealing.

Since the close of our hearings I have made some inquiries in order to clear up some points about which I was in doubt and on which the testimony did not seem to be sufficiently clear, the results of which inquiries have not been communicated to the other members of the subcommittee, because the subcommittee has never met to discuss the contents of a report.

There are a few basic matters that ought to be kept clearly in mind, which I wish to summarize here at the beginning before dealing with the body of the majority report of the subcommittee. It should be remembered that the relocation centers administered by the War Relocation Authority have been intended from the very beginning to be only temporary expedients. These relocation centers are not supposed to be internment camps. Dangerous aliens are placed in internment camps, but those camps are administered by the Department of Justice and should not be confused with the relocation centers. When the Japanese population was removed from the west coast they were at first free to go anywhere they wanted within the United States so long as they stayed out of the evacuated area. The first plan contemplated merely free movement and did not provide for any kind of relocation centers. For about a month thousands of evacuees were permitted to leave the west coast voluntarily for other parts of the country. Most of them have since continued to live anywhere they wanted to.

It was soon found not feasible to permit such voluntary movement to continue because trouble began to develop in places where people were not ready to receive these Japanese who had been ordered to move. It was then that the plan was changed to establish relocation centers in which the Japanese could live until it was feasible for them to get reestablished in normal life.

The dangerous aliens among the Japanese population on the west coast were picked up by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other agencies in the first few days after Pearl Harbor. Practically all the rest were presumed to be loyal and safe. It was necessary to evacuate the whole group, even after the dangerous aliens had been picked up and interned, because there was danger that the west coast would be invaded by the Japanese Army. But once removed from the west coast it was believed these people presented no further danger.

Dillon S. Myer, Director of the Authority, has told this subcommittee that about two-thirds of the people removed from the west coast are American citizens. Such a proposition as this, of moving approximately 70,000

American citizens away from their homes, has never been attempted before. Our Constitution does not distinguish between citizens of Japanese ancestry, or of German or Italian ancestry and citizens of English, Scotch, Russian, or Norwegian ancestry. Loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry have the same rights as any other loyal American citizens. I believe the Government was entirely right, therefore, in permitting free movement from the west coast so long as that was possible, and then in providing relocation centers when that proved necessary. The whole point of the program is to help the loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry, and the law-abiding aliens, to leave the relocation centers after investigation, and become established in normal life.

The rights of citizens to live as free men are part of the "four freedoms" for which we are fighting this war.

The testimony produced before this subcommittee shows that large numbers of the Japanese-American evacuees are working in war plants and in agriculture, and doing a good job. The Army has found that many of them are so trustworthy that they are being used in Military Intelligence and other secret work of high military importance. The evidence shows there were something like 5,000 loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry in the Army before the evacuation. Early this year the Army organized a special combat team of Japanese-Americans which is now in training at Camp Shelby, and which is made up entirely of volunteers.

Life in the relocation centers is not a bed of roses. The houses are of plain barrack style. The food is adequate but plain. The great majority of the relocation center residents are working at necessary jobs in connection with running the camps. They are raising much of their own food. For this work they get paid, in addition to their keep, only \$12, \$16, or \$19 a month. Even loyal American citizens in the relocation centers are working for these low wages.

Because of these facts I am disturbed about some of the ridiculous charges that were made early in our investigation. Stories about the Japanese people hiding food in the desert and storing contraband in holes under their houses, were shown to be ridiculous when a project was visited. However, the majority's report fails to withdraw these charges.

The report of the majority makes a big point about 23 persons who were released from the camps and who are found to be members of Butoku-kai, a Japanese fencing organization. This is 23 people out of 16,000 released. Even in the case of these 23 neither the majority report nor the hearings offer any evidence that any of the 23 were subversive.

I, for one, want to emphasize that just because a person is a member of an organization alleged to be subversive, I do not ipso facto conclude that the particular person is subversive. Certainly, mere proof of membership in an organization alleged to be subversive does not provide legal grounds for arresting or detaining such a person. Proper investigation may determine such a person to be intensely loyal to the United States.

After all the wind and the fury of a long report that creates the impression that War Relocation Authority is doing a very bad job, the comments of the majority members are climaxed by three feeble, meaningless recommendations.

These recommendations hardly support the prejudiced tone of the report. I shall discuss them later. At this point I want to take up some of the specific matters discussed in the majority's report.

The Report of the Majority

Administration of relocation centers.

In the majority's report the following language appears:

This committee does not consider it necessary to discuss in detail the administrative errors and deficiencies of the War Relocation Authority which were indicated by voluminous evidence received in the course of the subcommittee hearings. The Director of the War Relocation Authority, Mr. Dillon S. Myer, was frank in admitting that many mistakes had been made. Only those administrative errors which bear directly or indirectly upon the subject of subversive and un-American activities come within the special interest of this committee.

The implication of this paragraph is that the administration of the War Relocation Authority program has been lacking in competency and efficiency, that many mistakes have been made, and that Director Myer acknowledged that this was true.

Actually, Director Myer expressed the judgment before the subcommittee that a good job is being done in administration of the relocation centers and of the program as a whole and that such mistakes as were made, particularly in the early months of operation, were largely such as would inevitably occur in the development of a new and unprecedented program. There was nothing in the evidence heard by the subcommittee that would bear out the implication that the program was being incompetently or inefficiently administered. All things considered the preponderance of evidence indicates that the War Relocation Authority is doing a good job in handling an extremely difficult problem.

Fitness of War Relocation Authority personnel.

The majority's report states that much of the personnel in the War Relocation Authority is manifestly unfit for the job. The only specific evidence which is referred to in the report or which was presented before the subcommittee to substantiate this conclusion was the assertion that few of the administrative personnel had a prior knowledge of Japanese culture, language, and habits. Director Myer, in his testimony, states that the War Relocation Authority staff included some persons who were especially chosen because of their acquaintance with Japanese culture and language and that these persons had served as advisers to other members of the staff. A considerable number of the staff were formerly residents of California and

other Western States who in the past had a great deal of contact with persons of Japanese ancestry living in this country.

The fact that apart from these two groups most of the War Relocation Authority staff had no previous close contact with Japanese or Japanese-Americans seems not particularly significant. For one thing, there are comparatively few people in the United States who understand the Japanese language or are well acquainted with Japanese culture. Apart from that, it would have been unfortunate had the War Relocation Authority sought to employ a large number of such persons when actually they would have been and are more usefully employed by other agencies of the Government engaged directly in the war against Japan. Furthermore, the War Relocation Authority would be subject to severe criticism were it dominated by people who have previously been intimate with the Japanese or Japanese-Americans and therefore subject to the accusation of being unduly sympathetic toward them.

Americanization.

Anyone genuinely interested in the problem of continuing the Americanization of the Japanese-American population of this country must acknowledge that the greatest force for Americanization is free, friendly, and continuous contact with non-Japanese-Americans in normal communities. The evacuation and isolation of the Japanese population in relocation centers away from normal contacts is an almost overwhelming obstacle to the assimilation of the Japanese-Americans, as it would be to any immigrant population. To say, as the majority's report does, that--

the War Relocation Authority had before it an almost unparalleled opportunity to inaugurate a vigorous educational program for positive Americanism--

is an almost complete inversion of the true situation. Americanization is best accomplished not by formal programs of education, but by the continuous day-to-day mingling of the immigrant group among the general American population. By way of illustration, the story is told of an educated, loyal Nisei during the very early days of evacuation when his family was still in an assembly center, who protested bitterly that his children, who had always spoken good English, were learning broken English from their less well Americanized companions.

Far from having an unparalleled opportunity in the relocation centers to effect Americanization, the War Relocation Authority is confronted with the very difficult problem, under such artificial circumstances, of preventing the development of a distinct relocation center culture which is mostly American but partly Japanese. Anyone sincerely interested in the Americanization of the loyal Japanese must see that the best Americanization program is found in the relocation of evacuees in normal American communities.

The majority's report bases a strong criticism of the authority on the fact that the Authority has carried on the evacuee pay roll at each center certain recreational supervisors who were especially concerned with sports and recreational activities of Japanese origin. Particularly, criticism has been directed against the teaching of Judo. Reference is

made to the employment of 90 Judo instructors at one center. Director Myer explained that this overemphasis on Judo at that particular center had long since been corrected by the Authority. He also explained that such instruction in Judo as still continues at the centers is carried on under a program formulated after consultation with competent intelligence officers of the military service. It is a matter of common knowledge that Judo is taught to soldiers in the United States Army and that Japanese-Americans from the relocation centers are often used as instructors in Judo classes outside the centers.

It was also brought out in Director Myer's testimony that the teaching of the Japanese language in the centers, originally prohibited, is now conducted largely for the benefit of persons who will become Japanese language teachers for the United States military and naval services.

As to Americanized recreational activities, the evidence indicates that baseball is the most popular sport among the evacuees at the relocation centers. Basketball and football are also very popular. Boy Scout work, Girl Scout work, and the like have a following multiplied many times over that accorded to similar activities of Japanese cultural origin. Among the evacuees there are many thousands of members of such organizations as the Young Men's Christian Association, Young Women's Christian Association, Girl Reserves, Hi-Y, Camp Fire Girls, and Future Farmers of America. A large proportion of the adult population belongs to parent-teacher associations, the American Red Cross, and similar organizations.

Evacuee food.

Among the complaints listed as reasons for this subcommittee's investigation is the charge that—

the Japanese evacuees were being supplied food through the Quartermaster Corps of the Army in greater variety and quantity than was available to the average American consumer.

This charge is repeated in the report of the majority members but it is not brought out that the evidence received before the subcommittee completely rebutted the charge. The facts which the subcommittee's investigators established and which were borne out by other testimony received by the subcommittee are these:

1. All rationing restrictions applicable to the general public are strictly applied in relocation centers.
2. Food costs have averaged about 40 cents per day per person and are subject to a top limit of 45 cents per day per person on an annual basis.
3. Director Myer testified, without contradiction, to the effect that the centers are instructed to refrain from purchasing commodities of which there are general or local shortages.
4. Within the limitations set by rationing and the 45-cent daily cash allowance, the authority has provided an adequate diet meeting reasonable wartime standards.

Discipline in relocation centers.

Another of the complaints listed as reasons for the subcommittee's investigation was the charge that--

the discipline in the various relocation centers was very lax and that considerable Government property had been destroyed by some of the Japanese.

No specific comment is made concerning this complaint in the majority's reports.

Actually, the evidence produced before the subcommittee indicated that there was much less crime of any kind in the relocation centers than in the average American community of the same size. By and large the evacuees have cooperated with the administration of the centers in maintaining order and discipline. Considering the emotional and social demoralization involved in evacuation, the conduct of the evacuees has been exemplary. The evidence indicates that ordinary crime at the centers has been negligible.

Manzanar gangs.

In the majority's report considerable space is given to certain activities attributed to the Blood Brothers Corps at Manzanar. Two statements are necessary in reference to this discussion. In the first place, it should be pointed out that the War Relocation Authority did, according to the evidence presented to the subcommittee, take rather effective action in handling these gangs. An isolation center was established and the gang leaders were transferred to that place. At present it appears that activities such as those of the Manzanar gangs have been eliminated. Secondly, the evidence concerning existence of the Blood Brothers Corps is very indefinite. No one has been discovered who belonged to the supposed organization and the only evidence of its existence consists of certain apparently anonymous letters purporting to be written by a member of the corps. The point is that very little worth-while evidence is actually available on the existence of a Blood Brothers Corps. The evidence indicates that Manzanar probably had more troubles than any of the other relocation centers but the evidence also indicates that the sources of trouble there have now been eliminated.

Segregation.

In the majority's report the War Relocation Authority is severely criticized for not having entered upon a program of segregating disloyal evacuees from the great majority who are loyal before public hearings before this subcommittee had revealed the urgent need for segregation. Actually the facts are that on May 14, 1943, at a press conference in Washington, Director Myer announced the program of segregation and the announcement was given newspaper publicity. This was before the hearings of this subcommittee were begun and long before the United States Senate adopted the resolution referred to in the majority's report. Furthermore, Director Myer had in April written a letter to Senator A. B. Chandler, chairman of the Subcommittee on Japanese War Relocation Centers of the Senate Committee

on Military Affairs, in which letter he stated that a program for such segregation was being worked out. Senator Chandler gave this letter to the press shortly afterward.

Had it been physically possible to make a fair determination immediately at the outset of the establishment of the relocation centers as to the loyalty or disloyalty of each evacuee, many of the difficulties of the War Relocation Authority would have been eliminated.

Nevertheless, I believe that the War Relocation Authority could and should have speeded up the plan for segregation more than it did. I feel that the actual movement of segregants should have been initiated more quickly. It is true that intelligent determinations on the loyalty of more than 100,000 people cannot be made in a week or a month and the War Relocation Authority's efforts to be fairly certain in its determinations are commendable. However, many of the evacuees who were known to be disloyal could have been moved out of the regular relocation centers sooner than was done. A certain amount of criticism on this point is therefore justified.

The legal aspects of the relocation program.

The constitutional difficulty of confining citizens not charged with any crime is not discussed in the majority's report. Legality of such detention becomes increasingly difficult to sustain when it involves citizens of the United States against whom no charges of disloyalty or subversiveness have been made, particularly, if the detention continues for a period longer than the minimum time necessary for ascertainment of the facts. The principal justification for detaining citizen evacuees in relocation centers is that such detention is merely a temporary and qualified detention. They are detained until they can be sifted with regard to their sympathies in the war and until jobs can be found for them in communities where they will be accepted.

Such action may be sustained as an incident to an orderly relocation program, but any unqualified detention for the duration of the war of loyal citizens would be so vulnerable to attack in court as to imperil the entire relocation and detention program. That the leave regulations are legally necessary is emphasized by a recent decision of the Federal court for the northern district of California which dismissed a petition for writ of habeas corpus brought by an evacuee, on the ground that petitioner had not exhausted her administrative remedies by applying to the War Relocation Authority for leave (In re Endo).

In Hirabayashi v. United States, decided on June 21, 1943, the United States Supreme Court heard an appeal by a citizen of Japanese descent who had been sentenced concurrently on two counts: First, for violation of curfew regulations, and secondly, for failure to report for evacuation. The Court sustained the conviction solely upon the basis of the curfew count and avoided consideration of the conviction on the evacuation count. The natural inference that the Court found it comparatively easy to uphold the curfew, while encountering comparative difficulty in determining the legality of the evacuation, is reenforced by passages in concurring opinions by Mr.

Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Douglas. Mr. Justice Murphy, in his concurring opinion, said of the curfew orders:

In my opinion this goes to the very brink of constitutional power.

Since the detention accompanying the evacuation is a more drastic restriction of liberty than the mere evacuation itself, there is even more reason for the opinion that such detention is to be justified under the Constitution only if it is carefully limited with all possible respect to the rights of citizens in the current emergency. The legal problems of detaining citizens cannot be disregarded by the governmental agency responsible for administering the leave program.

It is apparent that the leave program of the War Relocation Authority has been formulated with a thoughtful view toward assuring the legality of the Authority's program as a whole, and it is probable that without the leave program the whole detention plan might well be subjected to successful legal attack. That this protection against such attack has been set up and put into effective operation, thus giving greater assurance of the continued detention of those who under the program are not entitled to leave, is a fact for which the Authority is definitely to be commended.

Leave program for the War Relocation Authority.

A principal object of the War Relocation Authority's leave program, it seems, is the separation of evacuees believed to be loyal to Japan from those loyal to the United States. This is the same thing substantially as the segregation program. The best way to segregate the disloyal from the loyal is to relocate the loyal in normal life. That is what the leave program is designed to achieve. This takes time, however. It seems unfair to the loyal, in the meantime, to allow them to be confused in the public mind with the disloyal, therefore, segregation should be and is being undertaken as a separate program. As soon as segregation is completed it seems that the leave program itself for the loyal evacuees should be substantially speeded up.

Administration of leave program.

On October 1, 1942, the present basic leave regulations of the War Relocation Authority became effective, on publication in the Federal Register. They provide that any evacuee citizen or alien may request indefinite leave from a relocation center. To support the request, the evacuee must show that he has a job or can take care of himself, must agree to report changes of address to the War Relocation Authority, and must have a record indicating that he will not endanger the national security. In addition, the War Relocation Authority must satisfy itself that the community in which the evacuee proposes to relocate will accept him without difficulty.

Much of the substance of the majority's report is concerned with the problems of releasing evacuees from relocation centers. The essential question raised by the report is whether or not the War Relocation Authority

has exercised reasonable precautions and careful judgment in determining which evacuees shall be granted leave. The majority's report concludes that it has not. As evidence for its conclusion, it relies chiefly upon two arguments: (1) 23 evacuees who have been given leave from the centers may be dangerous because they had some connection with an allegedly subversive organization known as Butoku-kai; (2) the present procedures of the Authority do not provide sufficient checks on the record of individuals released.

As to the first of these arguments, the majority's report does not allege that these 23 members of the Butoku-kai are subversive or dangerous, but does state that--

The release of these 23 Japanese is evidence of the incompetence of the War Relocation Authority to exercise proper safeguards both for the national security and for the thousands of loyal Japanese as well.

In a letter dated July 16, 1943, to this subcommittee, Director Myer gave specific information concerning the circumstances under which leave was granted to these 23 persons. It was brought out that, as to 16 of the 23, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had records which disclosed no report or derogatory information. As to 5 of them, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had no records whatever. One was released for school work under an agreement with military intelligence. One, an alien, was paroled, under the regular sponsor parolee agreement prescribed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice. That accounts for all 23 of them. Director Myer states that no evidence was given to the Authority either from the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any other agency that any one of these 23 persons was dangerous or subversive.

Leave clearance procedure.

The second major argument advanced in the majority's report in support of its strong condemnation of the leave clearance procedures followed by the War Relocation Authority is that procedures have recently been so liberalized as to remove certain essential safeguards. It is stated that while originally the Authority made what is called a home check and a name check and all leave clearance was granted by the Director in Washington, since April 1943 project directors have been authorized to "make their own determination (with certain limitations)" as to the release for indefinite leave of an evacuee and that the home check and the name check have been eliminated. ("Name check" is the term used by the subcommittee to describe the process of securing such information as is available in the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation before granting leave to an individual.)

This statement is misleading in three respects. In the first place, "the certain limitations" are extremely important in that they withhold the right of the project director to grant leave to the following categories of people:

1. Evacuees who answered no or gave a qualified answer to the loyalty question during the Army registration.
2. Repatriates and expatriates.
3. Paroled aliens.
4. Shinto priests.
5. Those whose leave clearance has been suspended by the Director.

These categories include all evacuees about whom there is generally reason to have doubt. That these "certain limitations" are in force is established both by the provisions of the Administrative Instruction (No. 22) given in evidence, and by the direct testimony of Director Myer before the subcommittee.

In the second place, in discussing checks made on loyalty of evacuees applying for indefinite leave, the majority's report mentions a home check and a name check, but does not mention the check-up made at the project. Director Myer testified that such a check-up is regularly made. The project staff is in a position to know a good deal about the evacuees.

In the third place, the statement is made in the majority's report that on April 2, the War Relocation Authority further liberalized its release program by eliminating the Federal Bureau of Investigation name check. The evidence indicates that the Federal Bureau of Investigation name check has not been eliminated, but rather that all names of evacuee adults are being submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has almost completed its check on all the evacuees. As soon as a derogatory report is received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation on one of the individuals, the project director is notified and is instructed not to grant leave to the individual in question.

Japanese-Americans in the civil service.

The majority's report intimates that the War Relocation Authority has set up a plan to place hundreds of Nisei in civil service employment of the Federal Government and it describes, under the heading "An Indefensible Release Procedure," one case in which an attempt was made to secure civil service rating for a Nisei. In response to my inquiry, the following letter was received:

War Relocation Authority,
Office of the Director,
Washington, August 18, 1943.

Hon. Herman P. Eberharter,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Eberharter: I am glad to respond to your telephone request for information concerning the investigation made by the War Relocation Authority before issuing indefinite leave to the person named in a letter sent by Mr. Elmer L. Shirrell, a relocation supervisor of the Authority, to the director of the seventh region of the United States Civil Service Commission on

May 26, 1943. The person referred to in the letter is Mary Nakasuji.

Mary Nakasuji applied to the War Relocation Authority for leave clearance in November 1942. A check of the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was made on December 12, 1942, which indicated that the records contained no information on the applicant. Reports were secured by the project internal security officer and by the evacuee's immediate employment supervisor at the center. Both reports were strongly favorable.

A letter received from a Mr. George M. Osborne, 4693 Alice Street, San Diego, Calif., dated December 31, 1942, states:

"I have known Mary and members of her family for several years. I sincerely believe her to be a very good American citizen. We know she is of Christian faith and has demonstrated to the utmost her democratic views regarding American ideals and our American standard of living. I highly recommend her as to character."

After considering the results of the name check, results of the check of the Federal Bureau of Investigation record, project report, and this letter of endorsement, this applicant was granted leave clearance on January 20, 1943. She left the Granada relocation center on March 13, worked as a secretary and bookkeeper in the Young Men's Christian Association at 19 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, and on June 6 went to work with the Roberts Manufacturing Co. at an increased salary. She is still employed there. Reports on her work are favorable. She has not yet taken a civil-service examination, but has filled out Standard Form 57 in order that her eligibility for civil service may be determined.

On July 2, 1943, the Japanese-American Joint Board concurred in the granting of indefinite leave to Miss Nakasuji.

If you would like any further information concerning this case, or any other aspect of our work, please do not hesitate to call on me.

Sincerely,

D. S. Myer, Director.

In view of the facts, I believe the letter written by the relocation supervisor seems fully justified in this case.

It is unfortunate that the majority's report should have relied so heavily upon a mistaken interpretation of the facts in this case when the true facts would have been readily available.

Conduct of evacuees who have been granted leave.

It is worthy of note that of all the evacuees who have been released on both seasonal and indefinite leave by the War Relocation Authority, numbering more than 16,000, no report of disloyal or subversive activity has been made to the Authority or to this subcommittee.

Moreover, among the Japanese-American population numbering 290,000 in the continental United States and Hawaii, only 32 percent of whom are in relocation centers, there have been no established cases of sabotage while there are thousands of cases of loyal workers in industry, agriculture, and in the armed forces of the United States.

When proper weight is given to the importance of preserving democratic and constitutional principles in the treatment of the Japanese-American population with, at the same time, proper regard for national security, it is evident that the relocation centers and the outside relocation program are being administered efficiently and well.

The recommendations of the majority report.

I have already commented on how mild the recommendations of the majority report seem after the severe language of its findings.

I agree fully with the first recommendation, that segregation of the disloyal should be put into effect at once. As I have said, I believe the War Relocation Authority should have moved faster on this than they did, although it is not an easy thing to distinguish the loyal from the disloyal among 100,000 persons.

The subcommittee's second recommendation is that a new board be established, made up of representatives of the War Relocation Authority and the various Intelligence agencies of the Federal Government to investigate evacuees who apply for release from the centers and to pass finally upon their applications. The subcommittee's investigations have made clear that there has always been close cooperation between Army Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, and the War Relocation Authority. The War Relocation Authority has always had access to the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I do not see any necessity for establishing still another board. I do not see that the results would be any different than they are now since the records of all these Intelligence agencies are now available to the War Relocation Authority. Such a board would simply divide responsibility among a number of agencies, and then no one person or agency could be held responsible for results.

There is nothing in the record of leave clearance granted by the War Relocation Authority that justifies the setting up of a board to take over this function. Moreover, it seems pretty clear that the agency of the Government charged with the detention of citizens, particularly those to whom leave is denied, should be the agency which makes the actual determination to grant or deny leave in individual cases. In short, the granting of leave is an essential part of the legal basis for detention and should not be separated from the administration of relocation centers.

No recommendation for the establishment of such a board as is recommended by the subcommittee majority was made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, or the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department.

The third and last recommendation of the majority's report is in favor of a thoroughgoing program of Americanization for Japanese who remain in centers. Of course I am in favor of that; everybody is in favor of Americanization just as everybody is against sin. Of course I am sure the majority members of the subcommittee would not want to push this idea so far that they will turn these camps into a "social experiment."

Mr. Myer testified that there is a great deal of Americanization work going on in the centers. The schools are active in this work, and many of the younger people are members of Future Farmers of America, The Red Cross, the Boy and Girl Scouts, Camp Fire Girls, and similar agencies. Adult English classes are provided for hundreds of aliens.

Certainly, we would need an extraordinarily intensive Americanization program for loyal American citizens who are detained in seeming contradiction of American principles and the "four freedoms." Certainly, also, the best way to push Americanization of this group is for the War Relocation Authority to go ahead with its program of restoring full freedom of movement to the loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry and the law-abiding aliens who are now in relocation centers.

I believe the War Relocation Authority should complete its segregation program, should continue its Americanization program, and should, by all means, go ahead with its resettlement program.

Summation.

It is my conclusion that, considering the magnitude of its job, the difficulty of the legal issues involved, and the complexity and delicacy of the problem of resettling a large group of people in the midst of a war, the War Relocation Authority has acted, by and large, efficiently and capably, and has carried out the spirit and intent of the President's Executive order under which it was established. I think it is better to let the War Relocation Authority carry on unhampered by unfair criticism.

Respectfully submitted.

Herman P. Eberharter

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Washington

June 2, 1943

Hon. Martin Dies
Chairman, Special Committee to
Investigate Un-American Activities
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dies:

I have noted in the press recently a number of statements by representatives of the Committee on Un-American Activities which have a direct bearing on the work of the War Relocation Authority, and have the effect of seriously interfering with the program which this agency has been instructed by the President and the Congress to carry out. The statements have been so misleading to the public, and so fraught with errors and half-truths that I am impelled to record my comments for your information.

Several of the statements have dwelt upon the presence of organized and dangerous pro-Japanese elements in the West Coast population prior to the outbreak of war. No mention is made of the fact that the federal intelligence agencies apprehended several thousand suspects immediately after Pearl Harbor, and that those found guilty upon hearings have been incarcerated in internment camps. Instead the implication is strongly made that all such subversive individuals are to be found in the population of the relocation centers.

On May 29, Mr. Robert E. Stripling, identified as Chief Investigator of your Committee, was quoted in the press as saying that spies and saboteurs are being released from the relocation centers. The charges were not supported, but nevertheless they unquestionably would have the effect of arousing mistrust of all persons of Japanese ancestry who are seeking to relocate. Since the War Relocation Authority grants leave from its centers with the provision that an individual may be called back at any time for sufficient reason, I am only discharging my responsibilities when I request that I be supplied with the names of any persons released from relocation centers who are spies or saboteurs or who have been trained in saboteur schools. I suggest also that the names and evidence be made available immediately to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

In a statement to the press on May 31, which I understand also was made by Mr. Stripling, it was charged that evacuees in relocation centers are provided with foods of kinds and quantities not available to the general public. Except for the amounts of food on hand at the Manzanar Relocation Center which presumably were accurately reported, the statement was erroneous and consequently misleading. The statement was made that "prime" beef was provided for the evacuees. The beef ordered for relocation centers is third grade. The Committee spokesman completely ignored the fact that

rationing restrictions of the OPA are in force at relocation centers, that the actual cost of food is approximately 40 cents a day per person, and the WRA has deliberately refrained from purchasing certain kinds of food known to be scarce. These facts were made known to the committee's investigators who visited the Manzanar Relocation Center, and could have been quickly and readily confirmed by a telephone call to this office.

The Office of the President has just referred to me the telegram of May 19 from Representative J. Parnell Thomas, a member of your committee, urging Presidential action in stopping further release of people of Japanese ancestry until section II of your committee's report on Axis activities can be issued, and the Committee's investigation of the relocation centers can be completed. In the absence of any supporting facts, we must regard Mr. Thomas' request as purely personal, and insufficient to warrant a change in the policies of this agency.

We have our own records on all persons above 17 years of age in the relocation centers, and we also have available to us information from the records of the federal investigative agencies. In the interest of national security we do not release any evacuee if his record indicates any reason why it would not be advisable for him to live outside a relocation center. On the other hand, the manpower situation plus the constitutional guarantees demand that loyal American citizens and law-abiding aliens be given every opportunity to contribute to the war effort by productive work in normal communities.

Investigators for your Committee have visited a number of the relocation centers, and have received complete collaboration of the staff there. We in the national office will be glad to cooperate fully in providing facts which your committee may desire concerning the policies and procedures of this agency. To date no member or representative of the Committee has asked me for any information or has been in touch with member of the Washington staff.

In the meantime, I hope it will be possible for representatives of your Committee to refrain from making public statements concerning the War Relocation Authority on the basis of incomplete information. Continuance of this practice of issuing irresponsible statements can only lead to the conclusion that the Committee has abandoned its assignment of fact-finding and in this instance is devoting itself to the oppression of a minority. Such a course can contribute only to nation disunity and hinder the war effort.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ D. S. Myer

Director

Comments by the War Relocation Authority
On Statements Reported in the Press
Allegedly Made by Witnesses
Before the Committee on Un-American Activities
During Hearings in Los Angeles Between
June 8 and June 17.

1.

Statements reported by the United Press in a dispatch from Los Angeles dated June 16 and allegedly made before the subcommittee hearings by Mayor Fletcher Bowron of Los Angeles.

Statement: "...the nation's most dangerous Japanese, according to a Los Angeles police report, was released from the Poston Relocation Center without ever having been confined there and now is working in a boys' camp in the middle West. The Japanese, Kiyoshi Okura, former member of the Los Angeles Civil Service Commission, belonged to numerous Japanese organizations, and, although he professed to be a Presbyterian, was married in a Shinto Temple."

Comment: Our records show that Mr. Okura was released by the War-time Civil Control Administration from the Santa Anita Assembly Center on November 1, 1942 to go to Boys' Town Nebraska. He has never resided at Poston or any other relocation center and has never been under the jurisdiction of the War Relocation Authority at any time.

Statement: Another Japanese released under questionable circumstances was Miya S. Kikuchi, taken from Manzanar Relocation Center for a lecture tour under the auspices of the National YMCA.

Comment: Mrs. Kikuchi was released from the Manzanar Relocation Center on short-term leave in October 1942. She was absent from the center only two weeks and is still residing there at the present time.

2.

Statements allegedly made at hearings by Earl A. Best, the former Assistant Steward at the Heart Mountain and Poston Relocation Centers, and reported by the Los Angeles Times on June 17.

Statement: At Poston fresh milk was ordered for all, even though it cost an estimated \$2,000 a day and the evacuees seemed satisfied with evaporated milk. Project Director Head ordered the fresh milk as "we do not need money to win the war."

Comment: In a teletype message dated June 22, Project Director Head has the following comment to make regarding the statement allegedly made by Mr. Best:

"Only conversation with Best regarding fresh milk was on purchase of same. He said that canned milk could be used and my answer to that was that canned milk could be shipped to our troops, where fresh milk could not and that the small additional cost of fresh milk did not hinder the war effort. It was also pointed out that fresh milk would be purchased on government contract only and would come from surplus of Imperial Valley and other nearby areas in California. The amount to be ordered was 3600 quarts per day at 46 cents per gallon or a total of \$414.00 per day. This milk was to be given only to children up to 12 years of age, expectant and nursing mothers, and invalids."

Statement: During an inventory conducted at the Heart Mountain Relocation center, it was discovered that evacuee mess hall workers were hoarding large quantities of food in attics and secret store-rooms.

Comment: During September, October and November of 1942, when much of the initial supplies and equipment were being received at Heart Mountain Center, the Center was short of storage space. As a temporary expedient, staple foods were issued to the mess halls in excess of current needs in order to utilize mess hall space for storage purposes. In a large number of mess halls attic space was used for this purpose. In two mess halls, supplementary store rooms were constructed. These are the so-called secret store-rooms to which Mr. Best refers. Since they were so constructed as to occupy ground floor space in the middle of the mess halls, they were in no way concealed.

Shortly before Mr. Best reported to Heart Mountain as Assistant Steward, a new Chief Steward was employed. He ordered the general inventory to which Mr. Best refers in his statements. He concluded that the storage of food in mess halls should be discontinued but decided to reduce the stocks in the mess halls not by moving them back to the warehouses but by reducing future issues so that in the course of a few weeks the stocks would be reduced by normal consumption. His decision in this matter was carried out. By the time our investigation was made early in April, in only two mess halls were substantial quantities of food still stored in attics. In four others, small amounts were on hand. These food stuffs were removed to the warehouses following the investigation.

This was in no sense a secret hoarding of food by the Japanese. All foods issued to the mess halls were charged to them at the time of issuance and all came within the cash ration allowance of 45 cents per day -- except in September when the initial stocks were issued. In September the ration cost averaged $46\frac{1}{2}$ cents per person per day. During the first three months in 1943, the reduction of mess hall stocks by the method adopted by the Project Steward was reflected in ration costs which averaged from 35 to 37 cents per person per day.

Statement: An evacuee mess hall worker at the Heart Mountain Center traded liquor for hams and other food.

Comment: Mr. Best has no actual evidence that transactions involving exchange of food for whiskey have ever been carried out. We have checked as completely as possible all the information supplied us by Mr. Best in a signed statement on this subject and have found little specifically supporting his charges.

One local farmer who had a contract to remove garbage from a few of the mess halls acknowledges that at Christmas time he purchased small quantities of liquor for a few of the chefs. He insists he used money supplied by them and made no profit on the transaction. Although we have no other evidence contradicting his statements, he has been ordered not to conduct such transaction in the future.

It is the policy of the Authority to enforce those liquor regulations which under State and Federal law are generally applicable to the territory in which a specific center is located. An evacuee given leave for other purposes might buy liquor and bring it into the Heart Mountain Center or any evacuee might order liquor by mail. We have, however, had surprisingly little difficulty with the liquor problem on any center. There has been so little evident drinking that we think the present policy has demonstrated its soundness.

3.

Statements reported by the Associated Press in a dispatch from Los Angeles dated June 12 and allegedly made before hearings of the Subcommittee by Norris E. James, former Reports Officer at the Poston Relocation Center.

Statement: Boulder and Parker dams are in constant danger of sabotage from residents of the Poston Relocation Center.

Comment: Parker Dam is situated approximately 30 miles up the Colorado River from the Poston Relocation Center and Boulder Dam lies nearly 75 miles farther up stream. No evacuee at Poston or any other relocation center is permitted to leave the outside boundaries without a permit at any time. After dark, no evacuee is permitted even to leave the confines of the community proper without a permit. The exterior boundaries of the center are guarded by a company of military police and have been ever since the center was first established.

Statement: Trouble began at camp last fall after Poston had received 365 Japanese regarded by the Federal Bureau of Investigation as potentially dangerous from internment camps in North Dakota and New Mexico.

Comment: Any person of Japanese ancestry who is transferred from an internment camp to a relocation center has appeared before a hearing board in the internment camp and has been paroled under the regular procedures of the Department of Justice.

Statement: ".....the leaders of the strike emerged as leaders of Poston Camp No. 1.

Comment: All the evidence we have available indicates that present leaders of Poston Camp No. 1 were among those most active in trying to prevent the strike.

4.

Statement reported by the AP in the dispatch from Los Angeles dated June 10 and allegedly made before Committee hearing by Harold H. Townsend, former Chief Supply and Transportation Officer at the Poston Relocation Center.

Statement: "They (i.e. the evacuees at Poston) stated that they were hoarding food, bread and other supplies for parachute troops and for invasion forces....they had large caches of food throughout the desert buried that could be used for similar purposes.

"....that camp (i.e. Poston Relocation Center) is 100 percent of the idea that Japan will have the United States in a few months. There are over 1,000 Japanese soldiers and Japanese officers in that camp. They tell you right off that they were going to win the war and that is the type of man who is drilling almost daily in military tactics right under our noses in that camp. They drill them in various ways, but still drill them, and they are making soldiers out of them and they are not kidding about it. They don't even presume to hide it."

Comment: We have no evidence to support these charges beyond the statements attributed to Mr. Townsend who was discharged from the Poston Center for incompetence and whose entire testimony before the subcommittee is shot through with inaccuracies, distortions, and downright mis-statements of fact. The charges were never brought to the attention of project authorities while Mr. Townsend was on duty at Poston but were made for the first time at the subcommittee hearings in Los Angeles -- nearly six months after Mr. Townsend had left the center.

Statement: During a riot at the Poston Center last November, the Japanese flag was hoisted on a pole in front of the jail. Loud speakers stolen from the warehouse, were installed and the Japanese National anthem was heard throughout the camp, "with loud cheers and demonstrations toward setting fire to the whole camp". Meanwhile "the poor simpleton cowering Caucasian employees stood around like whipped children lucky to be spared and allowed to live from hour to hour." The ambulances were filled with disguised soldiers with machine guns guarding their sleep so they would not be slaughtered or burned, as was threatened."

Comment: This statement is almost completely without foundation. There was no riot at the Poston Center. In November, there was a strike and demonstration which involved no violence or destruction of government property. Sworn affidavits from 61 people (members of the project staff and their families) indicate that these people, who were in residence at the project throughout the entire period of the demonstration, were at no time in fear of bodily injury or any act of violence. Other affidavits from the Internal Security Officer at the Project and a Catholic missionary priest who was present during the demonstration categorically deny that any Japanese flag was raised or that Japanese marshal music was played over the public address system.

at any time. The demonstration was on the whole, an orderly one and never involved the disruption of vital community services such as hospitalization and mess operations.

Statement: "Cases of milk were dumped and cartons of milk thrown at anyone on the highway and around the camp.... The milk came in every night during this riot and the rioters took the trucks and ice cream and other supplies that came into the camp, took them right over to their lines."

Comment: This statement is wholly untrue.

Statement: The food served to the Japanese at Poston is "superior in every way....about 25 percent better" than they give the United States Army.

Comment: From the standpoint of quality, the food served at Poston Relocation Center is and always has been equal or inferior to that served in the U. S. Army. It has never been superior. From the standpoint of quantity, the food served at Poston is probably about 25 percent less than that served at Army training camps and cantonment throughout the United States.

Comments by the War Relocation
Authority on Newspaper Statements
Attributed to Representatives of
the House Committee on Un-American
Activities.

During the past few weeks the House Committee on Un-American Activities (popularly known as the Dies Committee) has been investigating the program of the War Relocation Authority. While this investigation has been going forward-- and to some extent even before it was fairly under way-- numerous statements on the WRA and its program allegedly made by members, investigators, and "spokesmen" of the Committee have been appearing in the Nation's press. Some of these statements are true; some are completely without foundation in fact; and others are a compound of half-truths blended with either careless reporting, slipshod investigation, or deliberate distortion. To run all these statements down and prepare a factual comment on each would require more manpower and more money for communication with field offices than the War Relocation Authority can afford to expend while engaged on a war program. The Authority has, however, taken time to select some of the more flagrantly inaccurate statements attributed to representatives of the Committee and has prepared factual comment on them.

These statements and the WRA comments are listed below:

1. The WRA is encouraging high government officials to take Japanese from the centers as farm workers or domestics, so that greater public trust in the Japanese may be created.

(Statement attributed to a "spokesman" for the Committee in a story from Washington appearing in the San Francisco Examiner of May 23).

Comment: The Authority has never "encouraged" any government official to employ an evacuee at any time. Like all other employers, government officials are fully entitled to forward job offers to the War Relocation Authority for submission to the evacuees at the centers.

2. Both alien and American-born evacuees are being fed so well through the Quartermaster Depot of the Army that they are sending packages of butter, coffee, and other rationed food to friends outside the centers.

(Statement allegedly contained in a report submitted by field investigators of the Committee and appearing in a story published by the Washington Times Herald on May 23).

Comment: As the War Relocation Authority has pointed out on numerous occasions, evacuees at relocation centers are subject to the same rationing restrictions as all other civilians in the United States. We have absolutely no evidence that any evacuee has ever sent any rationed food to persons outside the centers. If this were done, it could be done only at the expense of the sender's rationed allowance.

3. As many as 76 per cent of the Japanese in one camp have refused to profess their loyalty to the United States.

(Same source as that of Statement No. 2).

Comment: No comment seems necessary on this statement beyond the fact that it is completely untrue.

4. The disclosures of the Committee have not hampered the release of 27,000 for work in agricultural and industrial communities and education at government expense.

(Same source as that of Statement No. 2).

Comment: At the time when this story was published, a total of 12,799 evacuees had left the relocation centers either temporarily or permanently under the regular leave procedures of the War Relocation Authority. Of this number, about 800 are students who left the centers to continue their education. Neither the WRA nor any other Federal agency has provided any of these students with financial assistance.

5. "...we have no evidence of proper check being made by the War Relocation Authority before releasing Japanese..."

(Direct quotation attributed to Robert E. Stripling, Committee investigator, in a United Press dispatch from Washington dated May 29).

Comment: If the Committee had no evidence that proper check is being made, this can only be because the investigators did not take the trouble to examine the War Relocation Authority's leave procedures. Before granting indefinite leave to any evacuee, the Authority checks all available records at the relocation center. If there is any question about the individual involved, a further check is made of the records maintained by Federal investigative agencies. The Authority firmly believes that, in granting leaves, it has taken and is taking every proper precaution to safeguard the national security.

6. (a) Evacuees in the centers are permitted large quantities of gasoline for pleasure driving, some using government automobiles.
- (b) They have been allowed to bring their own automobiles to the centers and use them mainly for "visiting back and forth."
- (c) One camp has clamped down on pleasure driving and saved 1,000 gallons of gasoline the first week.

(Statement attributed to Rep. Joe Starnes, Acting Chairman of the Committee in a United Press dispatch from Washington dated June 2. Rep. Starnes has categorically denied ever having made the statements).

Comment: All of these statements are wholly unfounded. No evacuee is permitted to use a personally owned automobile at any relocation center. Only in a very few cases have evacuee-owned automobiles even been stored within the centers, and in all these instances, the cars have been impounded by the War Relocation Authority. All evacuees who have used their own automobiles in going out of the centers on indefinite leave have obtained their gasoline through the local ration boards and in accordance with the regular rationing procedure.

7. Evacuees at the centers are allowed five gallons of whiskey per person.

(Statement attributed to Acting Chairman Starnes by the Washington Times Herald in a local story appearing on June 4. As in the case of the statements immediately above, Rep. Starnes has denied ever making or even authorizing this charge).

Comment: This statement scarcely deserves comment. The only whiskey ever made available to the evacuees by the War Relocation Authority has been dispensed strictly for medical purposes in accordance with the prescription of a practicing physician. A small amount is stored at each center for this purpose and is kept constantly under lock and key in the custody of the Chief Medical Officer.

8. They receive \$50 from the WRA in addition to clothing and transportation when they leave relocation centers to take jobs. Many make a practice of working a short time, then returning to the camp and leaving again to benefit a second time from the \$50-leave-taking present.

(Same source as that of Statement No. 7; also denied by Rep. Starnes).

Comment: The first half of this statement is partially true; the latter half totally untrue. The War Relocation Authority does provide financial assistance to each evacuee going for the first time on indefinite leave to take a job in cases where the individual lacks the necessary ready cash to make the trip and establish himself in his place of employment. No evacuee, however, is entitled to more than one grant of this kind. Those who return to the centers and then go out a second time receive no financial assistance whatever from the WRA in connection with the second trip.

9. "They/the Committee's investigators/ have reported that one of the main reasons why the Japanese are so belligerent is because of the influence and teachings of the Shinto priests who are still permitted to preach and teach in the relocation centers."

(Part of a direct quotation attributed to Rep. J. Parnell Thomas, member of the Committee, by the Los Angeles Times in a local story published on May 20).

Comment: The War Relocation Authority has never tolerated the preaching or teaching of State Shintoism at relocation centers and has no intention of doing so.

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November 25, 1943

Mr. Dillon Myer, Director
War Relocation Authority
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Myer:

In view of the approach of the second anniversary of Pearl Harbor Day, I am writing to inquire whether your agency has taken any special precautions against the recurrence of the unfortunate events which transpired on the previous anniversary.

It would be most unfortunate if there were any demonstrations in behalf of Japan in any of the relocation centers this year. In spite of the events at Tule Lake during the present month, I am sure that nothing would tend to restore public confidence in the administration of the centers than to have genuine pro-American demonstrations held in the centers. Since the admittedly disloyal element has largely been removed from the centers, such demonstrations could readily be arranged without occasioning any untoward incidents.

In any event, I trust that you will take whatever measures appear necessary to prevent any further disturbances or riots in the centers, as these incidents are proving repeated sources of hostile propaganda of great benefit to our enemies. Likewise a cessation of these outbreaks will help to allay the fears of the people generally, but more particularly the people of the West Coast, who because of their knowledge of the Japanese are more sensitive to such events.

Trusting that you will do all in your power to insure the quiet passage of Pearl Harbor Day this year, I am

Very sincerely yours,

/s/

John M. Costello, M. C.

COPY

December 4, 1943

Hon. John M. Costello
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Costello:

I wish to acknowledge your letter of November 25 concerning the probably public reaction to any incident or disturbance in a relocation center on the anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack. I have brought this problem and your letter to the attention of all of our Project Directors except Tule Lake, where, as you know, the Army is currently in command of the center. There I requested that a copy of your letter be given to the Commanding Officer for such action as he considers appropriate.

The one center other than Tule Lake at which there might be reason to fear a pro-Japanese demonstration at any time is Manzanar, where, as you know, some 1,000 persons scheduled for segregation remain to be removed. The Project Director there, Mr. Ralph P. Merritt, has taken special steps which we believe will prevent any clash between the loyal American majority in the center and the pro-Japanese group of segregants at any time.

I should like to call attention to an error in fact in the first paragraph of your letter. No unfortunate event occurred at any relocation center on December 7, 1942. I assume that your reference is to the disturbance at Manzanar which resulted in the injury to a number and the death of two evacuees when the Army was called in the center to disperse a crowd on December 6, 1942. The demonstration was in protest over the arrest of a man, popular in the community, on a charge of beating another man who was generally unpopular. There is no evidence that the date had any significance, although the proximity to December 7 cause some people to associate the event with the anniversary of Pearl Harbor.

I am keenly aware that any disturbance in a relocation center is likely to provide a topic of propaganda useful to our enemies. I am also aware that certain groups and individuals in this country, for some reason, are carrying on a deliberate campaign of misrepresentation and exaggeration which has the effect of stirring up suspicion and hatred of persons of Japanese ancestry in the United States regardless of their citizenship, and that such a campaign provides the enemy with a foundation for propaganda statements to the effect that this nation preaches democracy but practices prejudice and discrimination.

You may remember that I pointed out to you on July 6 that the methods followed by representatives of your committee during the period of May and June of this year were causing disunity and providing the enemy with material for propaganda. I gather from your letter that you now recognize the dangers in providing the opportunity for the widespread publicizing of misinformation or exaggeration which may prove useful to the enemy and react unfavorably against American prisoners of war in Japanese hands.

Sincerely,

D. S. Myer

Director

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Supplementary Comments by the
War Relocation Authority
on Newspaper Statements Allegedly
Made by Representatives of the
House Committee on Un-American
Activities.

* * * * *

1.

The San Francisco Examiner in a story from Washington on May 11 attributed the following statements to an "informant" in the offices of the Committee:

A report to be submitted by a subcommittee (of the Committee on Un-American Activities) in about three weeks, will oppose release of any Japanese whatsoever, American citizen or alien, from confinement. This report will insist that "known Subversives", estimated to number more than 25,000 in the centers, be taken from their "comfortable environment" and placed in rigidly guarded Department of Justice detention camps for enemy aliens.

Comment: The most significant fact about these statements is that they appeared in print on May 11 -- the very day the Committee started its investigations at the Manzanar Relocation Center. If the statements are accurately reported, it would seem quite obvious that individuals directly connected with the investigation had reached conclusions and formulated recommendations before the investigators had ever visited a relocation center or requested any information from the War Relocation Authority.

If the Committee has evidence that there are more than 25,000 "known subversives" in relocation centers, we earnestly hope that it will be turned over to the authorized investigative agencies of the government and to this agency with all possible promptness. As this is written, the Committee has submitted to the War Relocation Authority no evidence whatever in support of this charge.

2.

"Records of the Dies Committee show that prior to Pearl Harbor, there was a 'Japanese-American Veterans Association' in Los Angeles. Our investigation revealed that this was not a harmless organization of ex-servicemen, but actually a division of the Japanese army. In Japanese records, which we have recently obtained, the Japanese themselves called this organization the Japanese army reserve and listed company commanders and where the commanders were located. Our records also show that the Japanese had a completely trained infantry unit on Terminal Island on December 7, 1941. Why they did not strike then I do not know."

(Direct quotation attributed to Rep. J. Parnell Thomas, a member of the Committee, in an Associated Press dispatch from Los Angeles dated May 13).

Comment: Although this statement contains no direct charges against the War Relocation Authority, it does carry the clear implication that a large number of the evacuees in relocation centers constitute an active military threat to the United States. The statement probably refers to the Imperial Veterans Group of Southern California, an organization centered mainly in Los Angeles County in the days before Pearl Harbor. The Group was composed mainly of veterans of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 -- men well over 50 years of age. Information available to

us indicates that the organization probably never had more than 140 members at any one time. All alien members located within the United States have been apprehended as enemy aliens and have never been under the supervision of the War Relocation Authority.

3.

"...if the War Relocation Authority is in fact releasing thousands of the Japanese as routine procedure, it must be releasing many who are not loyal to the United States, who would become distinctly dangerous should opportunity present itself."

(Part of a direct quotation attributed to a "spokesman" for the Committee by the Los Angeles Examiner on May 14).

Comment: To characterize the leave procedures of the War Relocation Authority as "routine" shows a gross misunderstanding of those procedures and of the manner in which the Authority is conducting its program. In granting indefinite leave to evacuees, the Authority checks all available records on the individual involved at the relocation center. If there is any evidence of questionable activity, a further check is made of the records maintained by the Federal Investigative agencies. Every proper precaution has been taken and is being taken to safeguard the national security.

4. In a dispatch from Los Angeles on May 19, the Associated Press reported that Rep. Thomas had telegraphed President Roosevelt urging that WRA stop release of evacuees from relocation centers. The Congressman was also reported to have commented on the case of a wealthy Japanese from Los Angeles who had been apprehended by the FBI and sent to Camp Livingstone, La. The following statement was attributed to Rep. Thomas as a direct quote:

"It has been reliably reported that he (the interned Japanese) has stated the food and wine at his camp are excellent and that he is concerned only with his expanding waistline. Are we to release this fat-waisted Jap while our American boys on Guadalcanal are barely receiving enough food with which to keep alive?"

Comment: The clear implication of the remark allegedly made by Representative Thomas is that the interned Japanese may well be released from Camp Livingstone under the leave procedures of the War Relocation Authority. Camp Livingstone is an internment camp administered by the Department of Justice. Its inmates are in no way eligible to apply for leave under the program of the War Relocation Authority.

5.

"Certain government officials responsible for administration of the WRA have lost sight of the fact that America is at war, that America has enemies, and the Japanese in and out of America are as much our enemies as any other Axis peoples."

(Direct quotation attributed to Rep. J. Parnell Thomas in a United Press dispatch from Los Angeles dated May 19).

Comment: The War Relocation Authority has not lost sight of these facts and has no intention of doing so. Our belief, however, is that all loyal Americans and law-abiding aliens---regardless of ancestry---should be given a chance to contribute their energies and skills in the battle of production. We also believe that unwarranted confinement of our people of Japanese descent gives the Japanese government a powerful propoganda weapon to use in convincing the peoples of the Orient that the United States is conducting a racial war.

6.

The Committee wants to know why the personnel of the WRA includes many members of organizations which have been characterized as communistic by the Department of Justice.

(Statement allegedly made by a "spokesman" of the Committee in an interview purported by the Los Angeles Examiner from Washington on May 20).

Comment: All employees of the War Relocation Authority are investigated as a regular procedure by the Office for Emergency Management Investigations Division. One copy of the investigation report is sent to the War Relocation Authority and another to the Civil Service Commission.

In all cases where the Civil Service Commission considers an employee unfit to work in a war agency, the WRA is informed of this fact and ordered to terminate the employee. Of the employees so far terminated under this procedure by the Authority, none have been dismissed because of affiliation with a subversive organization. In fact, our review of the investigation reports has not revealed a single employee of the Authority who holds membership in any organization considered subversive by the Department of Justice.

7.

(a) Many Japanese released from relocation centers have been trained in espionage and sabotage, in a school operated in Tokyo by the imperialistic Black Dragon Society how to carry out a program of destruction in the United States in the event of war;

(b) The school was known as the North American school of Military Virtue;

(c) Its graduates in this country number 10,000.

(Statements attributed to Robert E. Stripling, Chief Investigator of the Committee, in an AP dispatch from Washington dated May 29.)

Comment: The school in question is apparently the Hokubei Butoku Kai Kodo Gakuin which seems to have been established on the outskirts of Tokyo some time in 1938. Information available to us indicates that this school was intensely nationalistic and included a practicing hall for Kendo, the art of Japanese fencing. The Dean of the school was Takichi Nakamura, leading Kendo expert of Japan. The sponsor of the school was the Military Virtue Society of North America, a group organized in Japan to inculcate the Japanese spirit overseas. Some time during March 1937, Nakamura issued a "Manifesto on the Enlargement of the Activities of the Military Virtue Society of North America" at San Pedro, California. This Manifesto contains the following information:

"Within the last several years, many members of our Military Virtue Society have gone to Japan for study, but their record has not been very good. In fact, there were many who returned with bad habits ... Not only did these Nisei, who went to Japan, fail to grasp the Japanese spirit or gain anything, but many of them returned to the United States definitely disaffected."

The War Relocation Authority has made a rather careful study of the number of American-born Japanese in relocation centers who have received all or part of their education in Japan. Of the more than 70,000 American-born Japanese in relocation centers, our records show that about 2,000 have had schooling in Japan since 1938, the year the Military Virtue School was founded. This figure includes not only adolescent males, but girls and extremely young boys. In the light of this fact, it is difficult to see how there could possibly be "10,000 graduates" of the school in the United States.

8.

(a) The Committee has acquired a list of the 10,000 members of the "Butoku-Kai", an organization affiliated with the Black Dragon Society of Imperial Japan and composed of young American-born Japanese;

(b) Many of the members of this organization are now being released from relocation centers.

(Information allegedly gathered at headquarters of the Committee and published by the San Francisco Examiner on May 22).

Comment: The War Relocation Authority has never seen any list of members of the Butoku-Kai. If the Committee has such a

list, we hope that it will be made available to us at the earliest possible date in order that we may use it in connection with the investigation previous to the granting of indefinite leave.

9.

The Seattle Post-Intelligencer service, in a story from Washington dated May 23, reported that the Committee was expanding its investigation to include the following points:

(a) A report that the WRA is planning to import Japanese evacuees from South American allied countries for eventual release in the United States after periods of nominal confinement in relocation centers.

(b) The formal report of investigators that disloyal Japanese at the Rivers Relocation Center, Arizona have disrupted attempts to maintain camouflage net factory there.

(c) The coincidence that a recently reported Japanese invasion plan mentions contemplation of use of 10,000 Japanese Americans, while almost exactly that many names compose a list of the American membership of the Youth Movement of the Black Dragon Society, the world-wide secret society operated by the Japanese war office.

- Comment: (a) The Authority has never contemplated any plans to import Japanese evacuees from any South American country and has neither funds nor authority with which to do so.
- (b) It is true some few of the evacuees at the Gila River (or Rivers) Relocation Center did attempt to dissuade the residents from collaborating in the establishment of a camouflage net factory at the project. All the evacuees known to have engaged in such activity have been removed from the center and sent either to internment camps or to an isolation center. The factory was established according to plan and has achieved an excellent production record.
- (c) See comments on Statements No. 7 and No. 8.

10.

"We are not so sure that the top directors of the WRA know everything that is going on in their organization. That is why we are going to search thoroughly for the origin of the program under which thousands of Japanese from the centers are being liberated now for willy-nilly distribution over the country ..."

(Direct quotation attributed to a "spokesman" for the Committee by the San Francisco Examiner in a story from Washington published on May 23).

Comment: The suggestion that the leave program of the War Relocation Authority was initiated without the knowledge or consent of the Authority's ranking officers is completely without foundation. The Director of the Authority takes full responsibility for origin of the program and for its execution.

11.

"What persons, what influences, are responsible for the flagrant discharge of the Japanese from the centers at the rate of 1,000 weekly in the face of the proof we are offering that perhaps as many as 40 per cent of the Japanese are loyal only to Japan and that thousands may become active traitors, spies, saboteurs, and fifth columnists in general?"

(Direct quotation attributed to Rep. J. Parnell Thomas by the Seattle Post-Intelligencer in a story from Washington dated May 24).

Comment: The comment directly above is also applicable here. It might be added that the Committee has never offered any proof to the War Relocation Authority regarding the loyalties or disloyalties of any evacuees at the relocation centers.

12.

The San Francisco Examiner, in a story from Washington dated May 25, attributed the following statements to Rep. Thomas in the form of a direct quotation:

- (a) "The Dies Committee investigators and I found conditions very bad in the War Relocation centers."
- (b) "At one camp the Japanese objected to a fence which confined them. They tore it down. It stayed down and the Japs are still roaming around there at will ..."
- (c) "Camp newspapers are virulently critical of anyone who opposes Japanese interests ..."
- (d) "Short wave radios are permitted, although even a Japanese subject may not own or use one in Japan."

Comment: (a) Representative Thomas had never visited a relocation center at the time this story appeared.

(b) It is true that a section of the fence surrounding the Minidoka Relocation Center in Idaho has recently been removed and has not yet been replaced. This particular section of the fence was so located that it cut off some of the project farm lands from the community proper

and its removal was in the interest of efficient operations. It was removed by evacuee labor crews working under orders of the War Relocation Authority and with the full knowledge and consent of the military authorities.

The statement that evacuees at this center are permitted to "roam around at will" is wholly inaccurate. At Minidoka, as at all other relocation centers, no evacuee is permitted to leave the relocation project area without a permit at any time. And after dark, no evacuees are allowed even to leave the community proper without a permit.

- (c) If the "Japanese interests" referred to are those of Imperial Japan, this statement is wholly without foundation. The War Relocation Authority has reviewed relocation center newspapers since they were first established and has never seen one line of criticism directed against any person because of his opposition to the interests of Imperial Japan. If, on the other hand, the statement refers to the interests of the Japanese-Americans, criticism seems wholly in accord with the American principles of free speech. Like any other group of Americans, the evacuees at relocation centers are naturally critical of those who oppose their interests.
- (d) In accordance with plans formulated some time ago, the War Relocation Authority recently prohibited the use of short-wave radios at all relocation centers. Prior to the time when this regulation went into effect, American citizens among the evacuees were permitted to use short-wave sets at the four centers which lie outside the Western Defense Command.

13.

"The agents report that 'Ronin' used direct physical threats to gain anything they wish. They rule peaceful Japanese with a brutal hand and white supervisory officials, we are informed, kowtow just as deeply to their wishes. Their common act is to walk into commissaries and demand an extra side of beef, or something like that."

(Direct quotation attributed to a "spokesman" for the Committee by the Baltimore News Post in a story from Washington dated May 27).

Comment: The term 'Ronin' may be freely translated to mean "gangster". Although there have been trouble-makers in some of the relocation centers, all those who could be identified as such have been removed either to internment camps or to an isolation center operated by the War Relocation Authority. The statement that trouble-makers have walked into a commissary and "demanded an extra side of beef or something like that" is utterly false.

14.

The pro-Japan element is determined to stay in confinement because "something terrible is going to happen on the West Coast by October 1."

(Statement attributed to Robert E. Stripling by the Milwaukee Sentinel in a story from Washington published May 28).

Comment: This statement stands in flat contradiction to statements allegedly made by Mr. Stripling on other occasions to the effect that "many" pro-Japanese have been and are being released from relocation centers.

15.

(a) Transcripts of questioning of Japanese by camp directors showed the latter pleading with the evacuees to change their answers from "no" to "Yes" on a question concerning loyalty to the United States. Young Japanese in particular were urged to assert their loyalty so they could be released for work in American communities.

(b) The camp directors, many of them recruited from the WPA, are anxious to release Japanese despite their assertions that they are not loyal to the United States.

(Statements allegedly contained in report received in Washington from field investigators of the Committee and appearing in the Washington Times Herald on May 28).

Comment: (a) Since other newspaper stories dealing with questioning of evacuees have referred specifically to Mr. Ralph P. Merritt, Project Director at Manzanar Relocation Center, we have asked for Mr. Merritt's comments. In a teletype message dated June 7, he makes the following report:

"The story from the Dies Committee (representatives) that I urge disloyal Japanese to say they are loyal is complete abuse of material I voluntarily offered them to show the thoroughness with which records were developed to clarify loyalty or disloyalty and to recommend to you denial of leave clearance to each of the cases quoted in this article. Men questioned are group known as kibeï who have American citizenship but for most part educated in Japan and speaking only Japanese. During registration due to language difficulties it is claimed that errors were made by interviewers and to clear all records we reviewed each case with results shown in interviews which will become basis for denial of leave to legally detain such types of citizens. If Dies Committee honestly desires to assist our work in securing necessary records such stories which cause confusion, weaken authority, and interfere with war effort will cease. Quotations by use of evacuee names has put all evacuees on notice not to testify freely as before. We have recommended no leaves as yet but when

we do, no doubtful cases will be on our list." //

(b) None of the ten project directors at relocation centers was recruited from the Work Projects Administration and none has ever favored granting indefinite leave to evacuees who are disloyal to the United States.

16.

- (a) Evacuee residents of one camp, receiving monthly wages from the War Relocation Authority, refused to unload coal, shipped in for their own use, with the result that camp authorities employed residents of nearby Klamath Falls, paying them 90 cents an hour to do the work.
- (b) A dinner was given at the Minidoka Center in honor of Charles Takahashi, who is under a four-year Federal prison sentence for having sold scrap iron to Japan after a ban was placed on such activity. At this dinner, George Townsend, an assistant WRA director, served as toastmaster and 4,800 pounds of turkey was served. At the trial of Takahashi and Osawa, his partner, H. R. Sprinkel of the Minidoka WRA staff appeared before the court and pleaded for leniency. Sprinkel returned to the center in Takahashi's Cadillac sedan driven by Takahashi. Takahashi has been allowed to keep his car at the camp, using it to drive to Twin Falls daily, although the machine carries only an "A" sticker.

(Statements attributed to Committee investigators, Tom Cavett and Gene Hagberg, in a story appearing in the Denver Post of May 29).

Comment:

(a) The WRA has experienced some difficulty in maintaining coal unloading crews at a number of the relocation centers for the obvious reasons that the work is dirty and unpleasant and brings no more compensation to the evacuees than other, less arduous duties. The center referred to in the story is quite obviously Tule Lake project which is located about 30 miles from Klamath Falls, Oregon. The director of this project specifically denies employing residents of Klamath Falls or any other community to unload coal at any time.

(b) Mr. Harry L. Stafford, Project Director at the Minidoka Relocation Center, in a teletype message dated June 7, 1943, has made the following statements on the charges centering around Mr. Takahashi:

"No dinner tendered C. T. Takahashi. Dinners referred to and turkey purchases appear confused with banquet tendered by administration to volunteers for United States Army and their parents, at which time turkey was served .. Turkey justified for volunteers banquet on basis that our daily meat and fish costs are \$1,019.33, while turkey requisition ~~amount~~ amounted to \$1,808.63 and was used for two days making cost per day \$904.31, or cheaper than normal meat expense per day. Only other time turkey

ever purchased by project administration was for Christmas Dinner."

"Dinner referred to ... as having been given to Takahashi was a personal party given by members of the coal crew members and was not purchased with project administration funds.

Purchase was made from independent meat company, of Twin Falls, and amounted to 150 pounds turkey, paid cash \$70.00. The so-called dinner for Takahashi was held January 24 in mess hall 5 and only cost to government was use of facilities. Coal crew, under Takahashi completed a successful effort to unload 38,000 tons by hand and party was in nature of a celebration. Dyke Miyagawawas toastmaster at this dinner referred to. Takahashi is not in charge of motor pool and never has been."

"Reference to Townsend as toastmaster may have been confused with fact that Townsend organized banquet for United States Army volunteers. He is not assistant project director but is chief of community services."

"Sprinkel did not appear in defense of Takahashi and Osawa. He was ... escort (required under military rules for evacuees entering the restricted West Coast area) and attended court sessions called specifically for purpose of giving sentence and was asked by defense attorney, with permission of court, to answer questions about their behavior at Minidoka for purpose of further bail which court subsequently allowed, permitting these individuals to return to project while case is under appeal."

"Western Defense Command, in travel permit authorizing Takahashi and Osawa to travel through excluded area, authorized use of Takahashi's car, and supplemental gas rations permitting travel was issued by Seattle ration board for one-way trip to Eden, Idaho. "A" card rations are granted all car owners regardless of need and his were issued by ration board in nearby community. C. T. Takahashi has storage for his car in Jack's Garage, Eden, Idaho, He does not have authorization to travel daily to Twin Falls"

17.

- (a) The 85,000 Japanese in relocation centers are among the best fed civilians in the world.
- (b) Reports show a plentiful supply of beef, pork, mutton, canned pork and beans, potatoes, coffee, canned fish, and chocolate bars in the centers.

- (c) A week's shipment to Manzanar from the Quartermaster Depot at Mira Loma, California, included 22,500 lbs. of white potatoes, 1,330 lbs. of coffee, 12,000 lbs. of hard wheat flour, 12,000 lbs. of soft-wheat flour, 12,000 lbs. of pan-cake flour, more than 5,700 jars of marmalades and jams, 14,400 cans of evaporated milk, 180,000 lbs. of rice, 7,200 lbs. of spaghetti, 21,500 lbs. of sugar, 2,500 lbs. of bananas, 120 boxes of grapefruit containing 300 grapefruit per box, 240 boxes of oranges containing 200 oranges per box, 240 boxes of apples and 26,000 lbs. of fresh vegetables, 10,000 lbs. of beef, 5,000 lbs. of pork, 2,800 lbs. of mutton, 1,200 lbs. of salt pork, 2,200 lbs. of frankfurters, 2,000 lbs. of pork livers, 4,000 lbs. of corned beef, 2,800 lbs. of fresh pork sausage, and 2,200 lbs. of bologna.

(Statements attributed to investigators of the Committee in an AP dispatch dated May 31).

Comment: (a) The statement that evacuees at relocation centers are "among the best fed civilians in the world" is highly dubious and definitely misleading. In March, 1943, when point rationing of food became effective, the WRA registered with the OPA as a "institutional user" of rationed foods and became subject to all rationing restrictions applicable to such users. The Authority has gone beyond OPA requirements for institutional users and has established food consumption quotas for relocation centers on exactly the same per capita basis as those applicable to the civilian population of the United States as a whole. Even before point rationing went into effect, the Authority practiced voluntary rationing in accordance with quotas suggested by the OPA. The cost of food served to evacuees at the centers has never exceeded 46 cents per person per day and it has been the constant policy of the Authority to avoid purchase of foods which are not available to the public generally or which are locally in short supply.

(b) The statement that canned pork and beans have been purchased and stocked at relocation centers is wholly untrue. The phrase "chocolate bars", conveying the impression that evacuees are being provided with candy bars, is misleading. The Authority has occasionally purchased baking chocolate as a substitute for cocoa when the latter commodity was not available. Candy bars, however, have never been furnished to evacuees in the messhalls at relocation centers.

(c) Whether intentionally or not, this paragraph clearly conveys the implication that the quantities indicated were intended for one week's use at Manzanar. The fact is that only coffee, meats, fresh fruits, fresh vegetables, dairy products, and lard are received weekly. Other foods are received monthly. As previously noted, consumption of all rationed foods is strictly limited to civilian quotas, and the per capita cost is also strictly limited.

18.

The committee is investigating information that the War Relocation centers are "heavily staffed" with Caucasian conscientious objectors to war.

(Statement attributed to Robert E. Stripling by the New York Journal American in a story from Washington, dated June 2).

Comment: Of the approximately 1800 employees of the WRA, there are two who have been classified as conscientious objectors by the Selective Service System and who were assigned to the Authority from Civilian Public Service Camps. If any other employees of the Authority should be classified as conscientious objectors, they will be removed from the WRA payroll and sent to Civilian Public Service Camps in accordance with Selective Service procedure.

19.

"We do not want any representative of this agency (i.e. the War Relocation Authority) to come here and attempt to censor any testimony developed in this hearing. I have declined Mr. Myer's offer. I have read most of the newspaper accounts of these hearings and they have been very factual; in fact I think the press has made every effort to give a fair and accurate account of the testimony."

(Direct quotation attributed to Representative John M. Costello, member of the Committee and chairman of the subcommittee investigating Japanese-Americans, in a United Press dispatch from Los Angeles dated June 16.)

Comment: The offer to which Representative Costello refers was contained in a telegram addressed to him by Director Myer on June 7. The text of this telegram is quoted in full:

"I am informed that a sub-committee of the committee on un-American activity under your chairmanship is opening hearings today in Los Angeles to investigate activities of Japanese and Japanese-Americans in this country. The War Relocation Authority will welcome the opportunity to cooperate with the committee by supplying information on those phases of the problem for which this agency is responsible.

Because of recent statements in the press attributed to members and representatives of your committee in which facts have been garbled I suggest it may be helpful to have statements concerning policies and procedures of the War Relocation Authority checked before statements are released to the press. To this end, while you are on the coast, I am glad to offer you the services of Mr. R. B. Cozzens, field assistant director of this agency, whose headquarters are in the Whitcomb Hotel, San Francisco. Mr. Cozzens is thoroughly conversant with W.R.A. program, and he will be at your disposal to assist in any way by supplying or checking information."

20.

"We have a definite report that at camps No. 1 and No. 2 Poston, Arizona, on the Colorado River Indian Reservation the Government spent \$100,000 in constructing inclosures with the idea that they would be valuable in the event the camps were ever used for prisoners of war."

"Our investigators say that Japanese gangsters in the camps circulated a petition that the fences be removed. When the petition met no response these gangsters tore great sections of the fences down and dared the camp officials to have them erected again."

(Direct quotation attributed to Mr. Robert E. Stripling by the Los Angeles Examiner in a story from Washington dated June 1.)

Comment: This statement is almost wholly unfounded. No fence has ever been erected around Camp No. 1 or Camp No. 2 at the Poston Relocation Center. A fence has been built around the entire relocation area, embracing three separate communities and a total of 80,000 acres of land, at a total cost of \$17,000.00.

A few sections of this fence were removed under supervision of the construction foreman in order to facilitate land subjugation, road construction, and other work at the center. All these sections were closed as soon as the work was completed, and the fence is now wholly intact.

21. Officers of the Japanese-American Citizens League attend so many confidential staff conferences of the War Relocation Authority that Myer has expressed feeling that Congress would "jump down his throat" if it knew to what extent the League was formulating WRA policy.

(Information allegedly discovered by "agents" of the Committee in a raid on JAACL Headquarters in Washington and reported by the New York Journal American in a story from Washington dated June 17.)

Comment: No officer or member of the Japanese American Citizens League has ever attended any staff conference of the WRA, either confidential or otherwise.

Further Comments by the War Relocation Authority
on Newspaper Statements Allegedly Made By
Representatives of the House Committee on Un-American Activities

1.

"They (i.e. WRA personnel) have refused to call the Army when they've had strikes and riots."

(Direct quotation attributed to Representative John M. Costello by the San Francisco Examiner in a story from Los Angeles dated June 3)

Comment: There have been two major disturbances at relocation centers -- one at Poston in November 1942 and the other at Manzanar in December of the same year. The disturbance at Poston was in the nature of a strike and demonstration against the project administration. At no time was there any violence, any destruction of government property, or any justification for calling in the military police. During the Manzanar disturbance -- which did involve a certain amount of disorder -- troops were called in at the request of WRA and remained in the center until after order had been completely restored.

2. An American born Japanese who proclaimed that Japanese-Americans should kill the President of the United States was permitted for at least five months to deliver virulent pro-Japan speeches in the Japanese language before meetings in the WRA center at Manzanar. The remark about the assassination of the Chief Executive was reported to War Relocation Authority officials at once by Japanese Americans loyal to the United States but no action was taken.

(Information allegedly obtained by Committee investigators in a raid on headquarters of the Japanese-American Citizens League and reported by the San Francisco Examiner in a story from Washington dated June 19)

Comment: This report is correct in stating that remarks attributed to Juichi Uyemoto were reported to E. R. Fryer, Regional Director of the War Relocation Authority, by Carl Yoneda, but it is incorrect in asserting that the War Relocation Authority took no action. A copy of Yoneda's letter which was dated July 11, was received in the Washington office of the War Relocation Authority and was immediately transmitted to the Department of Justice under a covering letter dated July 24, from the Director to the Attorney General.

Uyemoto remained in the Manzanar Center until October 23, 1942, at which time he was admitted to the Los Angeles County Hospital, Psychopathic Ward for diagnosis and treatment. On October 29, 1942, he was transferred from the Los Angeles County Hospital, after court commitment, to the Camarillo (Calif.) State Hospital. He is still in the Camarillo State Hospital and is suffering from a severe condition described as dementia praecox catatonic. It appears clear from the records that Uyemoto was having mild disturbances as early as March 1942. These became progressively more serious until they reached the point of danger to those about him.

Statement by Dillon S. Myer, Director of the War Relocation Authority, before the Costello Committee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, July 6, 1943.

The manner in which the War Relocation Authority conducts its program is of concern to all the people in the United States, and it has a significance which goes far beyond the geographic boundaries of this country. Undoubtedly, the WRA program is being watched in Japan, where thousands of American soldiers and civilians are held as prisoners or internees; in China, India, Thailand, Burma, and many other countries whose collaboration we need if we are to defeat our enemies with a minimum loss of life.

The manner in which the problem is treated has a direct bearing on relations with our allies in winning the war, and on the position of this nation in establishing the terms of peace.

The grave international implications of this program demand that it be approached thoughtfully, soberly, and with maturity, and that public statements concerning it be made only after thorough understanding of the facts.

The program of the War Relocation Authority has been under investigation for the past eight weeks in such a manner as to achieve maximum publicity of sensational statements based on half-truths, exaggerations, and falsehood; statements of witnesses have been released to the public without verification of their accuracy, thus giving nationwide currency to many distortions and downright untruths.

This practice has fostered a public feeling of mistrust, suspicion, and hatred that has had the effect of

Providing the enemy with material which can be used to convince the peoples of the Orient that the United States is undemocratic and is fighting a racial war.

Undermining the unity of the American people.

Betraying the democratic objectives which this nation and its allies are fighting to preserve.

It may lead to further mal-treatment of our citizens who are prisoners or who are interned.

Comments by the War Relocation Authority
On Remarks of Representative John M. Costello
Made in the House of Representatives
June 28, 1943

(Congressional Record, Vol. 89, No. 121, pp. 670607)

1.

"No effort seems to have been made to promote a program of Americanism among these people."

Comment: Positive efforts to promote Americanism have been made continuously at all relocation centers. They have been made through the schools, in adult education classes, in discussion forums, and through organizations such as the Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, YMCA, YWCA, Red Cross and many others.

2.

"The papers published at each of the centers are largely written in Japanese."

Comment: Each relocation center newspaper does contain a Japanese section for the benefit of residents who are unable to read the English language. This section ordinarily takes up about one-fourth of the total space of each issue and has never occupied more than 50 percent of the space. Material carried in the Japanese section consists mostly of official announcements and is reviewed as a regular procedure both by the War Relocation Authority and by the Department of Justice.

3.

"....there has been absolutely no genuine effort to determine the fitness of the Japanese being released."

Comment: The War Relocation Authority makes a thorough investigation of the behavior record of each evacuee who applies for indefinite leave at a relocation center. In all questionable cases, a further check is made against the records of the Federal investigative agencies. If there is any evidence from any source that the evacuee might endanger the internal security of the Nation, permission for indefinite leave is denied.

4.

"The majority of Nisei, if removed from a pro-Japan influence, would develop into patriotic and loyal citizens in the main. They readily adopt American customs, American sports, and an American way of life."

Comment: The War Relocation Authority wholeheartedly agrees. We also believe that the most effective way to continue the Americanism process among the Nisei is not to keep them confined in the crowded, abnormal environment of relocation centers, but to restore all those with good records as speedily as possible to the mainstream of American life. In fact, this is one of the principal objectives behind the WRA leave program.

5.

"Unless there is an immediate change of program in these centers the net result will be that practically the entire group of people of Japanese ancestry will be so thoroughly indoctrinated with anti-American principles as to make an undesirable element in our population, this in spite of the fact that no finer opportunity for Americanization has ever been granted any Government agency."

Comment: As stated above, the War Relocation Authority has made and is making every effort to promote Americanization in the relocation centers. It is difficult, however, to carry on a program of Americanization behind wire enclosures among a group of people who find themselves ceaselessly branded as un-American in the press and over the radio by certain public officials and private organizations.

MINORITY REPORT OF THE "DIES" COMMITTEE

Report of the Honorable Herman P. Eberharter, Member of Subcommittee
of the Special Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives

Seventy-Eighth Congress, First Session
House Resolution 282

It is not possible for me to agree with the findings and conclusions of the other two members of our subcommittee, who constitute the majority.

After careful consideration, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the report of the majority is prejudiced, and that most of its statements are not proven.

The majority report has stressed a few shortcomings that they have found in the work of the War Relocation Authority without mentioning the many good points that our investigation has disclosed or the magnitude of the job with which the Authority is dealing.

Since the close of our hearings I have made some inquiries in order to clear up some points about which I was in doubt and on which the testimony did not seem to be sufficiently clear, the results of which inquiries have not been communicated to the other members of the subcommittee, because the subcommittee has never met to discuss the contents of a report.

There are a few basic matters that ought to be kept clearly in mind, which I wish to summarize here at the beginning before dealing with the body of the majority report of the subcommittee. It should be remembered that the relocation centers administered by the War Relocation Authority have been intended from the very beginning to be only temporary expedients. These relocation centers are not supposed to be internment camps. Dangerous aliens are placed in internment camps, but those camps are administered by the Department of Justice and should not be confused with the relocation centers. When the Japanese population was removed from the west coast they were at first free to go anywhere they wanted within the United States so long as they stayed out of the evacuated area. The first plan contemplated merely free movement and did not provide for any kind of relocation centers. For about a month thousands of evacuees were permitted to leave the west coast voluntarily for other parts of the country. Most of them have since continued to live anywhere they wanted to.

It was soon found not feasible to permit such voluntary movement to continue because trouble began to develop in places where people were not ready to receive these Japanese who had been ordered to move. It was then that the plan was changed to establish relocation centers in which the Japanese could live until it was feasible for them to get reestablished in normal life.

(over)

The dangerous aliens among the Japanese population on the west coast were picked up by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other agencies in the first few days after Pearl Harbor. Practically all the rest were presumed to be loyal and safe. It was necessary to evacuate the whole group, even after the dangerous aliens had been picked up and interned, because there was danger that the west coast would be invaded by the Japanese Army. But once removed from the west coast it was believed these people presented no further danger.

Dillon S. Myer, Director of the Authority, has told this subcommittee that about two-thirds of the people removed from the west coast are American citizens. Such a proposition as this, of moving approximately 70,000 American citizens away from their home, has never been attempted before. Our Constitution does not distinguish between citizens of Japanese ancestry, or of German or Italian ancestry and citizens of English, Scotch, Russian, or Norwegian ancestry. Loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry have the same rights as any other loyal American citizens. I believe the Government was entirely right, therefore, in permitting free movement from the west coast so long as that was possible, and then in providing relocation centers when that proved necessary. The whole point of the program is to help the loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry, and the law-abiding aliens, to leave the relocation centers after investigation, and become established in normal life.

The rights of citizens to live as free men are part of the "four freedoms" for which we are fighting this war.

The testimony produced before this subcommittee shows that large numbers of the Japanese-American evacuees are working in war plants and in agriculture, and doing a good job. The Army has found that many of them are so trustworthy that they are being used in Military Intelligence and other secret work of high military importance. The evidence shows there were something like 5,000 loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry in the Army before the evacuation. Early this year the Army organized a special combat team of Japanese-Americans which is now in training at Camp Shelby, and which is made up entirely of volunteers.

Life in the relocation centers is not a bed of roses. The houses are of plain barrack style. The food is adequate but plain. The great majority of the relocation center residents are working at necessary jobs in connection with running the camps. They are raising much of their own food. For this work they get paid, in addition to their keep, only \$12, \$16, or \$19 a month. Even loyal American citizens in the relocation centers are working for these low wages.

Because of these facts I am disturbed about some of the ridiculous charges that were made early in our investigation. Stories about the Japanese people hiding food in the desert and storing contraband in holes under their houses, were shown to be ridiculous when a project was visited. However, the majority's report fails to withdraw these charges.

The report of the majority makes a big point about 23 persons who were released from the camps and who are found to be members of Butoku-kai, a Japanese fencing organization. This is 23 people out of 16,000 released. Even in the case of these 23 neither the majority report nor the hearings offer any evidence that any of the 23 were subversive.

I, for one, want to emphasize that just because a person is a member of an organization alleged to be subversive, I do not ipso facto conclude that the particular person is subversive. Certainly, mere proof of membership in an organization alleged to be subversive does not provide legal grounds for arresting or detaining such a person. Proper investigation may determine such a person to be intensely loyal to the United States.

After all the wind and fury of a long report that creates the impression that War Relocation Authority is doing a very bad job, the comments of the majority members are climaxed by three feeble, meaningless recommendations.

These recommendations hardly support the prejudiced tone of the report. I shall discuss them later. At this point I want to take up some of the specific matters discussed in the majority's report.

The Report of the Majority

Administration of relocation centers.

In the majority's report the following language appears:

This committee does not consider it necessary to discuss in detail the administrative errors and deficiencies of the War Relocation Authority which were indicated by voluminous evidence received in the course of the subcommittee hearings. The Director of the War Relocation Authority, Mr. Dillon S. Myer, was frank in admitting that many mistakes had been made. Only those administrative errors which bear directly or indirectly upon the subject of subversive and un-American activities come within the special interest of this committee.

The implication of this paragraph is that the administration of the War Relocation Authority program has been lacking in competency and efficiency, that many mistakes have been made, and that Director Myer acknowledged that this was true.

Actually, Director Myer expressed the judgment before the subcommittee that a good job is being done in administration of the relocation centers and of the program as a whole and that such mistakes as were made, particularly in the early months of operation, were largely such as would inevitably occur in the development of a new and unprecedented program. There was nothing in the evidence heard by the subcommittee that would bear out the implication that the program was being incompetently or inefficiently administered. All things considered the preponderance of

evidence indicates that the War Relocation Authority is doing a good job in handling an extremely difficult problem.

Fitness of War Relocation Authority Personnel

The majority's report states that much of the personnel in the War Relocation Authority is manifestly unfit for the job. The only specific evidence which is referred to in the report or which was presented before the subcommittee to substantiate this conclusion was the assertion that few of the administrative personnel had a prior knowledge of Japanese culture, language, and habits. Director Myer, in his testimony, states that the War Relocation Authority staff included some persons who were especially chosen because of their acquaintance with Japanese culture and language and that these persons had served as advisers to other members of the staff. A considerable number of the staff were formerly residents of California and other Western States who in the past had a great deal of contact with persons of Japanese ancestry living in this country.

The fact that apart from these two groups most of the War Relocation Authority staff had no previous close contact with Japanese or Japanese-Americans seems not particularly significant. For one thing, there are comparatively few people in the United States who understand the Japanese language or are well acquainted with Japanese culture. Apart from that, it would have been unfortunate had the War Relocation Authority sought to employ a large number of such persons when actually they would have been and are more usefully employed by other agencies of the Government engaged directly in the war against Japan. Furthermore, the War Relocation Authority would be subject to severe criticism were it dominated by people who have previously been intimate with the Japanese or Japanese-Americans and therefore subject to the accusation of being unduly sympathetic toward them.

Americanization

Anyone genuinely interested in the problem of continuing the Americanization of the Japanese-American population of this country must acknowledge that the greatest force for Americanization is free, friendly, and continuous contact with non-Japanese-Americans in normal communities. The evacuation and isolation of the Japanese population in relocation centers away from normal contacts is an almost overwhelming obstacle to the assimilation of the Japanese-Americans, as it would be to any immigrant population. To say, as the majority's report does, that--

the War Relocation Authority had before it an almost unparalleled opportunity to inaugurate a vigorous educational program for positive Americanism--

is an almost complete inversion of the true situation. Americanization is best accomplished not by formal programs of education, but by the

the continuous day-to-day mingling of the immigrant group among the general American population. By way of illustration, the story is told of an educated, loyal Nisei during the very early days of evacuation when his family was still in an assembly center, who protested bitterly that his children, who had always spoken good English, were learning broken English from their less well Americanized companions.

Far from having an unparalleled opportunity in the relocation centers to effect Americanization, the War Relocation Authority is confronted with the very difficult problem, under such artificial circumstances, of preventing the development of a distinct relocation center culture which is mostly American but partly Japanese. Anyone sincerely interested in the Americanization of the loyal Japanese must see that the best Americanization program is found in the relocation of evacuees in normal American communities.

The majority's report bases a strong criticism of the Authority on the fact that the Authority has carried on the evacuee pay roll at each center certain recreational supervisors who were especially concerned with sports and recreational activities of Japanese origin. Particularly, criticism has been directed against the teaching of Judo. Reference is made to the employment of 90 Judo instructors at one center. Director Myer explained that this overemphasis on Judo at that particular center had long since been corrected by the Authority. He also explained that such instruction in Judo as still continues at the centers is carried on under a program formulated after consultation with competent intelligence officers of the military service. It is a matter of common knowledge that Judo is taught to soldiers in the United States Army and that Japanese-Americans from the relocation centers are often used as instructors in Judo classes outside the centers.

It was also brought out in Director Myer's testimony that the teaching of the Japanese language in the centers, originally prohibited, is now conducted largely for the benefit of persons who will become Japanese language teachers for the United States military and naval services.

As to Americanized recreational activities, the evidence indicates that baseball is the most popular sport among the evacuees at the relocation centers. Basketball and football are also very popular. Boy Scout work, Girl Scout work, and the like have a following multiplied many times over that accorded to similar activities of Japanese cultural origin. Among the evacuees there are many thousands of members of such organizations as the Young Men's Christian Association, Young Women's Christian Association, Girl Reserves, Hi-Y, Camp Fire Girls, and Future Farmers of America. A large proportion of the adult population belongs to parent-teacher associations, the American Red Cross, and similar organizations.

Evacuee Food.

Among the complaints listed as reasons for this subcommittee's investigation is the charge that--

the Japanese evacuees were being supplied food through the Quarter-
over

master Corps of the Army in greater variety and quantity than was available to the average American consumer.

This charge is repeated in the report of the majority members but it is not brought out that the evidence received before the subcommittee completely rebutted the charge. The facts which the subcommittee's investigators established and which were borne out by other testimony received by the subcommittee are these:

1. All rationing restrictions applicable to the general public are strictly applied in relocation centers.
2. Food costs have averaged about 40 cents per day per person and are subject to a top limit of 45 cents per day per person on an annual basis.
3. Director Myer testified, without contradiction, to the effect that the centers are instructed to refrain from purchasing commodities of which there are general or local shortage.
4. Within the limitations set by rationing and the 45-cent daily cash allowance, the Authority has provided an adequate diet meeting reasonable wartime standards.

Discipline in relocation centers.

Another of the complaints listed as reasons for the subcommittee's investigation was that charge that--

the discipline in the various relocation centers was very lax and that considerable Government property had been destroyed by some of the Japanese.

No specific comment is made concerning this complaint in the majority's reports.

Actually, the evidence produced before the subcommittee indicated that there was much less crime of any kind in the relocation centers than in the average American community of the same size. By and large the evacuees have cooperated with the administration of the centers in maintaining order and discipline. Considering the emotional and social demoralization involved in evacuation, the conduct of the evacuees has been exemplary. The evidence indicates that ordinary crime at the centers has been negligible.

Manzanar gangs.

In the majority's report considerable space is given to certain activities attributed to the Blood Brothers Corps at Manzanar. Two statements are necessary in reference to this discussion. In the first place, it should be pointed out that the War Relocation Authority did, according to the evidence presented to the subcommittee, take rather effective action in handling these gangs. An isolation center was established

and the gang leaders were transferred to that place. At present it appears that activities such as those of the Manzanar gangs have been eliminated. Secondly, the evidence concerning existence of the Blood Brothers Corps is very indefinite. No one has been discovered who belonged to the supposed organization and the only evidence of its existence consists of certain apparently anonymous letters purporting to be written by a member of the corps. The point is that very little worth-while evidence is actually available on the existence of a Blood Brothers Corps. The evidence indicates that Manzanar probably had more troubles than any of the other relocation centers but the evidence also indicates that the sources of trouble there have now been eliminated.

Segregation.

In the majority's report the War Relocation Authority is severely criticized for not having entered upon a program of segregating disloyal evacuees from the great majority who are loyal before public hearings before this subcommittee had revealed the urgent need for segregation. Actually the facts are that on May 14, 1943, at a press conference in Washington, Director Myer announced the program of segregation and the announcement was given newspaper publicity. This was before the hearings of this subcommittee were begun and long before the United States Senate adopted the resolution referred to in the majority's report. Furthermore, Director Myer had in April written a letter to Senator A. B. Chandler, chairman of the Subcommittee on Japanese War Relocation Centers of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, in which letter he stated that a program for such segregation was being worked out. Senator Chandler gave this letter to the press shortly afterward.

Had it been physically possible to make a fair determination immediately at the outset of the establishment of the relocation centers as to the loyalty or disloyalty of each evacuee, many of the difficulties of the War Relocation Authority would have been eliminated.

Nevertheless, I believe that the War Relocation Authority could and should have speeded up the plan for segregation more than it did. I feel that the actual movement of segregants should have been initiated more quickly. It is true that intelligent determinations on the loyalty of more than 100,000 people cannot be made in a week or a month and the War Relocation Authority's efforts to be fairly certain in its determinations are commendable. However, many of the evacuees who were known to be disloyal could have been moved out of the regular relocation centers sooner than was done. A certain amount of criticism on this point is therefore justified.

The legal aspects of the relocation program.

The constitutional difficulty of confining citizens not charged with any crime is not discussed in the majority's report. Legality of such detention becomes increasingly difficult to sustain when it involves citizens of the United States against whom no charges of disloyalty or subversiveness have been made, particularly, if the detention continues for a period longer than the minimum time necessary for ascertainment

of the facts. The principal justification for detaining citizen evacuees in relocation centers is that such detention is merely a temporary and qualified detention. They are detained until they can be sifted with regard to their sympathies in the war and until jobs can be found for them in communities where they will be accepted.

Such action may be sustained as an incident to an orderly relocation program, but any unqualified detention for the duration of the war of loyal citizens would be so vulnerable to attack in court as to imperil the entire relocation and detention program. That the leave regulations are legally necessary is emphasized by a recent decision of the Federal Court for the northern district of California which dismissed a petition for writ of habeas corpus brought by an evacuee, on the ground that petitioner had not exhausted her administrative remedies by applying to the War Relocation Authority for leave (In re Endo).

In Hirabayashi v. United States, decided on June 21, 1943, the United States Supreme Court heard an appeal by a citizen of Japanese descent who had been sentenced concurrently on two counts: First, for violation of curfew regulations, and secondly, for failure to report for evacuation. The Court sustained the conviction solely upon the basis of the curfew count and avoided consideration of the conviction on the evacuation count. The natural inference that the Court found it comparatively easy to uphold the curfew, while encountering comparative difficulty in determining the legality of the evacuation, is reinforced by passages in concurring opinions by Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Douglas. Mr. Justice Murphy, in his concurring opinion, said of the curfew orders:

In my opinion this goes to the very brink of constitutional power.

Since the detention accompanying the evacuation is a more drastic restriction of liberty than the mere evacuation itself, there is even more reason for the opinion that such detention is to be justified under the Constitution only if it is carefully limited with all possible respect to the rights of citizens in the current emergency. The legal problem of detaining citizens cannot be disregarded by the governmental agency responsible for administering the leave program.

It is apparent that the leave program of the War Relocation Authority has been formulated with a thoughtful view toward assuring the legality of the Authority's program as a whole, and it is probable that without the leave program the whole detention plan might well be subjected to successful legal attack. That this protection against such attack has been set up and put into effective operation, thus giving greater assurance of the continued detention of those who under the program are not entitled to leave, is a fact for which the Authority is definitely to be commended.

Leave program for the War Relocation Authority.

A principal object of the War Relocation Authority's leave program, it seems, is the separation of evacuees believed to be loyal to Japan from those loyal to the United States. This is the same thing substantially as the segregation program. The best way to segregate the disloyal from the loyal is to relocate the loyal in normal life. That is what the leave

program is designed to achieve. This takes time, however. It seems unfair to the loyal, in the meantime, to allow them to be confused in the public mind with the disloyal, therefore, segregation should be and is being undertaken as a separate program. As soon as segregation is completed it seems that the leave program itself for the loyal evacuees should be substantially speeded up.

Administration of leave program.

On October 1, 1942, the present basic leave regulations of the War Relocation Authority became effective, on publication in the Federal Register. They provide that any evacuee citizen or alien may request indefinite leave from a relocation center. To support the request, the evacuee must show that he has a job or can take care of himself, must agree to report changes of address to the War Relocation Authority, and must have a record indicating that he will not endanger the national security. In addition, the War Relocation Authority must satisfy itself that the community in which the evacuee proposes to relocate will accept him without difficulty.

Much of the substance of the majority's report is concerned with the problems of releasing evacuees from relocation centers. The essential question raised by the report is whether or not the War Relocation Authority has exercised reasonable precautions and careful judgment in determining which evacuees shall be granted leave. The majority's report concludes that it has not. As evidence for its conclusion, it relies chiefly upon two arguments: (1) 23 evacuees who have been given leave from the centers may be dangerous because they had some connection with an allegedly subversive organization known as Butoku-kai; (2) the present procedures of the Authority do not provide sufficient checks on the record of individuals released.

As to the first of these arguments, the majority's report does not allege that these 23 members of the Butoku-kai are subversive or dangerous, but does state that--

The release of these 23 Japanese is evidence of the incompetence of the War Relocation Authority to exercise proper safeguards both for the national security and for the thousands of loyal Japanese as well.

In a letter dated July 16, 1943, to this subcommittee, Director Myer gave specific information concerning the circumstances under which leave was granted to these 23 persons. It was brought out that, as to 16 of the 23, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had records which disclosed no report or derogatory information. As to 5 of them, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had no records whatever. One was released for school work under an agreement with military intelligence. One, an alien, was paroled, under the regular sponsor parole agreement prescribed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice. That accounts for all 23 of them. Director Myer states that no evidence was given to the Authority either from the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any other agency that any one of these 23 persons was dangerous or subversive.

Leave Clearance Procedure.

The second major argument advanced in the majority's report in support of its strong condemnation of the leave clearance procedures followed by the War Relocation Authority is that procedures have recently been so liberalized as to remove certain essential safeguards. It is stated that while originally the Authority made what is called a home check and a name check and all leave clearance was granted by the Director in Washington, since April 1943 project directors have been authorized to "make their own determination (with certain limitations)" as to the release for indefinite leave of an evacuee and that the home check and the name check have been eliminated. ("Name check" is the term used by the subcommittee to describe the process of securing such information as is available in the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation before granting leave to an individual.)

This statement is misleading in three respects. In the first place, "the certain limitations" are extremely important in that they withheld the right of the project director to grant leave to the following categories of people:

1. Evacuees who answered no or gave a qualified answer to the loyalty question during the Army registration.
2. Repatriates and expatriates.
3. Paroled aliens.
4. Shinto priests.
5. Those whose leave clearance has been suspended by the Director.

These categories include all evacuees about whom there is generally reason to have doubt. That these "certain limitations" are in force is established both by the provisions of the Administrative Instruction (No. 22) given in evidence, and by the direct testimony of Director Myer before the subcommittee.

In the second place, in discussing checks made on loyalty of evacuees applying for indefinite leave, the majority's report mentions a home check and a name check, but does not mention the check-up made at the project. Director Myer testified that such a check-up is regularly made. The project staff is in a position to know a good deal about the evacuees.

In the third place, the statement is made in the majority's report that on April 2, the War Relocation Authority further liberalized its release program by eliminating the Federal Bureau of Investigation name check. The evidence indicates that the Federal Bureau of Investigation name check has not been eliminated, but rather that all names of evacuee adults are being submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has almost completed its check

on all the evacuees. As soon as a derogatory report is received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation on one of the individuals, the project director is notified and is instructed not to grant leave to the individual in question.

Japanese-Americans in the civil service.

The majority's report intimates that the War Relocation Authority has set up a plan to place hundreds of Nisei in civil service employment of the Federal Government and it describes, under the heading "An Indefensible Release Procedure," one case in which an attempt was made to secure civil service rating for a Nisei. In response to my inquiry, the following letter was received:

War Relocation Authority,
Office of the Director,
Washington, August 18, 1943.

Hon. Herman P. Eberhartter,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Eberhartter: I am glad to respond to your telephone request for information concerning the investigation made by the War Relocation Authority before issuing indefinite leave to the person named in a letter sent by Mr. Elmer L. Shirrell, a relocation supervisor of the Authority, to the director of the seventh region of the United States Civil Service Commission on May 26, 1943. The person referred to in the letter is Mary Nakasuji.

Mary Nakasuji applied to the War Relocation Authority for leave clearance in November 1942. A check of the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was made on December 12, 1942, which indicated that the records contained no information on the applicant. Reports were secured by the project internal security officer and by the evacuee's immediate employment supervisor at the center. Both reports were strongly favorable.

A letter received from a Mr. George M. Osborne, 4693 Alice Street, San Diego, Calif., dated December 31, 1942, states:

"I have known Mary and members of her family for several years. I sincerely believe her to be a very good American citizen. We know she is of Christian faith and has demonstrated to the utmost her democratic views regarding American ideals and our American standard of living. I highly recommend her as to character."

After considering the results of the name check, results of the check of the Federal Bureau of Investigation record, project report, and this letter of endorsement, this applicant was granted leave clearance on January 20, 1943. She left the Granada relocation center on March 13, worked as a secretary and bookkeeper in the Young Men's Christian Association at 19 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, and on June 6 went to work with the Roberts Manufacturing Co. at an increased salary. She is still employed there. Reports on her work are favorable. She has not yet taken

a civil-service examination, but has filled out Standard Form 57 in order that her eligibility for civil service may be determined.

On July 2, 1943, the Japanese-American Joint Board concurred in the granting of indefinite leave to Miss Nakasuji.

If you would like any further information concerning this case, or any other aspect of our work, please do not hesitate to call on me.

Sincerely,

D. S. Myer, Director.

In view of the facts, I believe the letter written by the relocation supervisor seems fully justified in this case.

It is unfortunate that the majority's report should have relied so heavily upon a mistaken interpretation of the facts in this case when the true facts would have been readily available.

Conduct of evacuees who have been granted leave.

It is worthy of note that of all the evacuees who have been released on both seasonal and indefinite leave by the War Relocation Authority, numbering more than 16,000, no report of disloyal or subversive activity has been made to the Authority or to this subcommittee.

Moreover, among the Japanese-American population numbering 290,000 in the continental United States and Hawaii, only 32 percent of whom are in relocation centers, there have been no established cases of sabotage while there are thousands of cases of loyal workers in industry, agriculture, and in the armed forces of the United States.

When proper weight is given to the importance of preserving democratic and constitutional principles in the treatment of the Japanese-American population with, at the same time, proper regard for national security, it is evident that the relocation centers and the outside relocation program are being administered efficiently and well.

The recommendations of the majority report.

I have already commented on how mild the recommendations of the majority report seem after the severe language of its findings.

I agree fully with the first recommendation, that segregation of the disloyal should be put into effect at once. As I have said, I believe the War Relocation Authority should have moved faster on this than they did, although it is not an easy thing to distinguish the loyal from the disloyal among 100,000 persons.

The subcommittee's second recommendation is that a new board be established, made up of representatives of the War Relocation Authority and the various Intelligence agencies of the Federal Government to in-

investigate evacuees who apply for release from the centers and to pass finally upon their applications. The subcommittee's investigations have made clear that there has always been close cooperation between Army Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, and the War Relocation Authority. The War Relocation Authority has always had access to the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I do not see any necessity for establishing still another board. I do not see that the results would be any different than they are now since the records of all those Intelligence agencies are now available to the War Relocation Authority. Such a board would simply divide responsibility among a number of agencies, and then no one person or agency could be held responsible for results.

There is nothing in the record of leave clearance granted by the War Relocation Authority that justifies the setting up of a board to take over this function. Moreover, it seems pretty clear that the agency of the Government charged with the detention of citizens, particularly those to whom leave is denied, should be the agency which makes the actual determination to grant or deny leave in individual cases. In short, the granting of leave is an essential part of the legal basis for detention and should not be separated from the administration of relocation centers.

No recommendation for the establishment of such a board as is recommended by the subcommittee majority was made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, or the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department.

The third and last recommendation of the majority's report is in favor of a thoroughgoing program of Americanization for Japanese who remain in centers. Of course I am in favor of that; everybody is in favor of Americanization just as everybody is against sin. Of course I am sure the majority members of the subcommittee would not want to push this idea so far that they will turn these camps into a "social experiment."

Mr. Hyer testified that there is a great deal of Americanization work going on in the centers. The schools are active in this work, and many of the younger people are members of Future Farmers of America, the Red Cross, the Boy and Girl Scouts, Camp Fire Girls, and similar agencies. Adult English classes are provided for hundreds of aliens.

Certainly, we would need an extraordinarily intensive Americanization program for loyal American citizens who are detained in seeming contradiction of American principles and the "four freedoms." Certainly, also, the best way to push Americanization of this group is for the War Relocation Authority to go ahead with its program of restoring full freedom of movement to the loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry and the law-abiding aliens who are now in relocation centers.

I believe the War Relocation Authority should complete its segregation program, should continue its Americanization program, and should, by all means, go ahead with its resettlement program.

over

Summation.

It is my conclusion that, considering the magnitude of its job, the difficulty of the legal issues involved, and the complexity and delicacy of the problem of resettling a large group of people in the midst of a war, the War Relocation Authority has acted, by and large, efficiently and capably, and has carried out the spirit and intent of the President's Executive order under which it was established. I think it is better to let the War Relocation Authority carry on unhampered by unfair criticism.

Respectfully submitted,

Herman P. Eberharter

DIES PROBERS LIST NAMES OF JAP SPY GROUP

Un-American Activities Committee Locates
10,000 Members of Black Dragon Society

By RAY RICHARDS

S. F. Examiner Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON, May 22. -----

The Dies House Committee on Un-American Activities has acquired a list of the 10,000 members of the American youth organization of Japan's Black Dragon Society and has found most of them to be Japanese-Americans, it was learned today.

At the committee's offices high concern was expressed that many of the memers -- spies, traitors, saboteurs and fifth columnists in general -- are now being released from relocation centers in the announced program of the War Relocation Authority to free thousands in as short a time as possible.

LAUNCHED IN 1929.

The committee's evidence indicates that the Japanese youth movement in America, or Butoku-Kai, was launched in 1929 at the personal behest of Mitsuri Toyama of Osaka, the aged chief of the Black Dragon Society, and that the southern California director for several years was Tomokazu Hori, former socialite Japanese consul at Los Angeles. It was in southern California that most of the Japanese in America lived.

BRIBED AMERICAN.

Hori, who caused an American youth to go to a Federal penitentiary for twenty years in 1936 by bribing him to don a sailor's uniform and steal plans for North Pacific maneuvers from warships at Los Angeles and San Diego, is now the Foreign Office spokesman at Tokio, and broadcasts propaganda regularly to the United States west coast.

The evidence in the hands of the Dies Committee, fruit of an investigation of war relocation centers launched two weeks ago, shows that hundreds of the young male members of the Butoku-Kai, citizens of this country by virtue of American birth, interrupted their high school and college education in the United States to attend the "North American College of Military Virtue" maintained by the Japanese Government

DIES PROBERS LOCATE BLACK DRAGON NAMES --2

near the War Ministry in Tokio for the teaching of sabotage under the course title of "Service to Japan on Return to North America."

The investigators have come into possession of records showing that in 1938, when 3,000 Butoku-Kai members of the west coast held a convention at San Francisco, the Japanese counsel general there declined to deliver an address, explaining, "WE DO NOT WANT TO AROUSE SLEEPING DOGS."

RULES WAR POLICIES.

The committee's spokesman announced that when Dillon S. Myer, director of the War Relocation Authority, is called shortly before the committee, he will be asked if his year's supervision of the centers had apprized him of the existence of the 10,000 name list of spies and traitors -- one of the largest active fifth columns ever formed in any country.

The Black Dragon Society, organized originally as a league of Japanese veterans after the Russo-Japanese war and named for the campaign along the Amur, or Black Dragon River, now includes in its membership all important Government officers, and rules Japanese war policies.

It was to the society's white-whiskered chief, Toyama, that Premier Tojo recently is said to have reported that a tremendous force to invade the United States this year was being trained, and that Japanese-Americans would play a leading part in the army of occupation.

The Black Dragon Society's Butoku-Kai is similar to the Hitler youth movement -- fanatically patriotic and militant.

Documents acquired with the membership list, it was explained at the Dies committee offices, give details of the courses of training administered to the young Japanese when they became "Kibei" by going from their American homes to the "North American College of Military Virtue" in Japan.

TAUGHT SABOTAGE.

The first phase instilled Bushido, or "the way of the warrior." Thereafter the students were given specialized courses in sabotage -- and sent back to the United States to await a signal.

DIES PROBERS LOCATE BLACK DRAGON NAMES -- 3

A committee spokesman said that signal never was received because the army rounded up all the 107,000 Japanese on the West coast soon after Pearl Harbor.

Definite announcement was made at the Dies committee offices today that the first section of the report on the inquiry into the relocation center, which was directed on the west coast by James Steadman, the committee's representative at Los Angeles, will be issued in two weeks.

At that time the committee will present copies of the big list of Butoku-Kai members to the War and Navy departments, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the War Relocation Authority.

SUMMON WRA HEAD.

Myer will be summoned to a full dress hearing of the committee promptly thereafter, to answer a long series of questions concerning the operations and policies of the war relocation authorities.

Particularly, it was said, the interrogation will center on the origin of the program to release the Japanese in large numbers, and on the nature of tests the WRA has applied to them to determine their loyalty.

The spokesman said Myer also will be asked why the authority has not segregated the thousands of known subversives from harmless Japanese in the centers, even when the Japanese ideographs representing the Ketsumeidan, or "blood brotherhood," the executioners for the Black Dragon Society, were chalked persistently on building.

EMPLOYMENT OF REDS.

Another question, it was stated will be the reasons for employment in the authority, at high salaries, of attorneys and others known to belong to communistic organizations.

Senator Albert B. Chandler, Kentucky Democrat, chairman of a subcommittee of the Senate military affairs committee which also is investigating the relocation centers, recently issued a statement saying Myer had "dealt deceptively" in his testimony before the committee, and would not be called on again for information. He was not under oath there.

The Dies committee spokesman said Myer will be placed under oath when he testifies before that group.

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Union Calendar No. 384

78th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - House Report No. 1161

INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN
PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN
THE UNITED STATES

REPORT
OF THE
SPECIAL
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SEVENTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
H. Res. 282

TO INVESTIGATE (1) THE EXTENT, CHARACTER, AND OBJECTS OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES, (2) THE DIFFUSION WITHIN THE UNITED STATES OF SUBVERSIVE AND UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA THAT IS INSTIGATED FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES OR OF A DOMESTIC ORIGIN AND ATTACKS THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT AS GUARANTEED BY OUR CONSTITUTION, AND (3) ALL OTHER QUESTIONS IN RELATION THERETO THAT WOULD AID CONGRESS IN ANY NECESSARY REMEDIAL LEGISLATION

Report on the Peace Now Movement



FEBRUARY 17, 1944.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union and ordered to be printed

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1944

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REPORT

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SPECIAL

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SEVENTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MARTIN DIES, Texas, *Chairman*

JOE STARNES, Alabama

J. PARNELL THOMAS, New Jersey

WIRT COURTNEY, Tennessee

KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota

JOHN M. COSTELLO, California

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HERMAN P. EBERHARTER, Pennsylvania

ROBERT E. STRIPLING, *Secretary and Chief Investigator*

J. B. MATTHEWS, *Director of Research*

II

Report on the Peace Now Movement



Approved for printing by the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1944

Union Calendar No. 384

78TH CONGRESS }
2d Session }

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

} REPORT
} No. 1161

THE PEACE NOW MOVEMENT

FEBRUARY 17, 1944.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. DIES, from the Special Committee on Un-American Activities submitted the following

REPORT

[Pursuant to H. Res. 282]

THE COMMITTEE'S INVESTIGATION

For some 5 months, the Special Committee on Un-American Activities has had the Peace Now Movement under investigation. After careful checking of the organization's public activities during this period of time, the committee decided that the so-called movement properly came within the scope of its work. On February 7, 1944, agents of the committee served a subpoena on the organization, which called for the turning over of its bank accounts, records, correspondence, and membership lists to the committee.

Our findings are based almost entirely on the files which the organization turned over to the committee under the terms of the subpoena.

The organizing committee of the Peace Now Movement, at the present time, consists of the following individuals: George W. Hartman, chairman; Dorothy Hutchinson, associate editor; Marjorie Ewbank, treasurer; and Bessie Simon, secretary. The organization's national headquarters are located at 15 East Fortieth Street, New York City.

ORIGINS AND BACKGROUND

There are numerous pacifist groups in the United States, outstanding among which are the Society of Friends (Quakers) and the Fellowship of Reconciliation. The pacifism of most of these groups has a religious basis, and in time of war the large majority of their members are content to limit the expression of their religious philosophy to private conscientious objection to direct participation in actual

military combat. The Selective Service Act makes provision for these individuals when they are liable to military service. Only in exceptional cases do the members of these pacifist groups feel called upon to carry on any propaganda or agitation which is calculated to enlist converts to pacifism.

The Peace Now Movement grew out of the pacifism of these exceptional individuals in such groups as the Society of Friends and the Fellowship of Reconciliation.

In the early part of 1943, Mrs. Dorothy Hutchinson prepared an address entitled "A Call to Peace Now," which she delivered before the Society of Friends at Fallsington, Pa. This address was subsequently published in a 36-page pamphlet with the endorsement and recommendation of the following individuals:

Howard Brinton	Griffith Levering
Anna Pettit Broomell	Frederick J. Libby
Henry Cadbury	Albert J. Livezey
James Coney	A. J. Muste
Edith Hilles Dewees	Ray Newton
Thomas Foulke	Elbert Russell
Paul Comly French	Douglas Steere
Hannah Clothier Hull	C. Clayton Terrell
Emily Cooper Johnson	Elizabeth Yarnall

Mrs. Hutchinson's "A Call to Peace Now" and her later pamphlet, "Must the Killing Go On?" have been widely distributed by the Peace Now Movement. The former appears to have become something of a bible for the so-called movement.

The theme of the Peace Now Movement is well expressed in the words of Mrs. Hutchinson's "A Call to Peace Now," in which she writes as follows:

We cannot trust our own Nation and her allies to dictate a just peace, if they come to the peace table as victors.

Mrs. Hutchinson says further:

Even a nominal victory would be not only unnecessary but positively detrimental.

For these reasons, the Peace Now Movement is carrying on its propaganda and agitation for an immediate armistice without "even a nominal victory" over the Axis Powers.

LAUNCHING OF THE MOVEMENT

The Peace Now Movement was formally launched at a meeting of a few individuals in Philadelphia on July 10-11, 1943. "These persons, in every instance," according to an official history, "were either Quakers or members of one or all of the leading peace organizations." (For the organization's own statement, see appendix 1.)

The account books of the organization show that it was launched with meager finances. Frederick J. Libby contributed \$300 and Mrs. Hutchinson \$200. Receipts and expenditures have been small ever since. Only 11 other persons appear to have contributed as much as \$50. From all sources, according to the organization's books, only the sum of \$2,565.70 was received between August 13 and December 31, 1943, of which a little more than \$100 was unexpended at the end of the year.

The following persons, other than Frederick J. Libby and Mrs. Dorothy Hutchinson, have contributed sums of \$50 or more to the Peace Now Movement:

Bessie Simon	\$100. 00
Mrs. J. Sargent Gram	100. 00
Verna Wacker	100. 00
George L. Paine	100. 00
Louis Mayer	100. 00
E. Hewitt	100. 00
W. Appleton Lawrence	75. 00
Richard Rhoads	75. 00
E. Haswell	65. 00
A. S. Olmstead	50. 00
Mrs. G. Austin	50. 00

JOHN ALBERT COLLETT

During the first 2 months of the organization's activities, one John Albert Collett was field secretary of the Peace Now Movement.

Collett was born in Oslo, Norway, on August 3, 1911. His parents were Emil and Gudren von der Lippe Collett. He grew up in the Norwegian capital, but there is a gap of some 10 years prior to his arrival in the United States for which the committee has been unable to account. Three weeks after Hitler's occupation of the city of Oslo, John Albert Collett was issued a passport by the Nazi-controlled police department of the city. Some months thereafter, he arrived in the United States, coming from Norway via Russia (which was then in league with Germany under the terms of the Stalin-Hitler Pact). Collett's passport bears the date April 30, 1940.

That an alien should be permitted to move freely about the United States organizing American citizens into a group whose activities (as will be shown presently) are clearly seditious, borders on the incredible.

While Collett was listed on the letterhead of the Peace Now Movement as its field secretary, actually he appears to have been far more important in the so-called movement than that title would indicate. In the organization's files he is referred to as "the one who is creating a movement." The other officers of Peace Now consistently paid him a deference which is far from understandable in the light of his age and his very recent arrival in this country.

One of his enthusiastic backers in the Peace Now Movement wrote Collett, as follows:

A Norwegian friend of mine in the Norwegian consulate here in New York told me your name was well known in Norway—his ideas, however, would not coincide with the movement, as you so well understand I'm sure.

While he was on a national tour for Peace Now, Collett got into serious trouble. In Cincinnati he was arrested and convicted for voyeurism. His offense was too disgusting to be recounted in its details in this report. It is something of a commentary on our carelessness that a man should be so actively associated with a seditious movement without ever being apprehended and then find himself instantly in the toils of the law for the minor crime of voyeurism. Collett admitted the truth of the charge against him but pleaded illness. He was discharged after paying a fine of \$100. He had wired the treasurer of Peace Now for the money with which to pay the fine. Later, the other officers of Peace Now, according to letters of

the organization in the committee's possession, conspired to alter certain entries in the organization's account books so that no connection between Peace Now's finances and Collett's fine would appear in the records. After his arrest and conviction, Collett promptly resigned his position as field secretary. National headquarters of Peace Now sent out a letter in which it was stated that Collett, as well as its treasurer, Dorothy Hutchinson, had resigned on account of ill health. Both Mrs. Hutchinson and Collett are still active in Peace Now, however, although the latter works anonymously.

OTHER LEADERS IN PEACE NOW

Mrs. Dorothy Hutchinson, formerly treasurer and now associate editor of Peace Now, has already been referred to as the author of the most important printed propaganda of the movement. George W. Hartman, chairman of Peace Now, was formerly a professor at Columbia University. He is now on the faculty of Harvard University. He has run for mayor of New York City and lieutenant governor of New York State on the Socialist Party ticket. Although not an official of the organization, Mark Shaw, of Boston, has been of considerable assistance in the preparation of Peace Now's propaganda.

SEDITION

On October 23, 1943, the national headquarters of the Peace Now Movement sent out 37 identically worded letters to some of the most prominent religious leaders in the United States. Again on October 25, 1943, 20 copies of the same letter were mailed to yet other prominent religious leaders, and on December 11, 1943, 2 more such communications were mailed. The text of the letter is as follows:

As this war proceeds, many of us feel that it is taking us further and further away from the goal we hope to reach.

The Peace Now Movement was started about 3 months ago by a group of individuals who are convinced that this war is both unnecessary and futile. Information about the movement is spreading rapidly and we hope soon to be functioning on a Nation-wide scale. Our aims have been placed before the Department of State and Department of Justice so that we are proceeding openly in this expression of our constitutional rights.

Those who started this movement are Christians and it is our belief that the Peace Now Movement can be a channel through which all the Christian forces may once more take their stand for the principles of the Christ. Those teachings are well known to all of us. The amazing thing is that out of the Far East should rise up the truest follower of these teachings. We have been given many centuries to learn the lessons the Christ taught and unless we can prove now that we have to some extent learned these lessons there is good reason to foresee the decline of the white race.

This is a direct invitation to ask you in your high office, and those in authority in your denomination, to publicly request all the followers of Christ under your banner at once to lay down their arms and cease supporting this war. The church is strong enough to stop the war if it exert itself.

Yours for Peace Now,

—————, *Secretary.*

The first sentence of the last paragraph of the foregoing letter clearly brands the Peace Now Movement as an un-American group, at least one of whose officers has been guilty of sedition.

Within very broad and generous limits, the supreme law of the United States recognizes and provides for bona fide cases of conscientious objection to participation in war on the part of individual

citizens. These limits are clearly transgressed by those who go beyond private conscientious objection and advocate treason. The laying down of arms, such as was advocated in the letters sent out from the national office of the Peace Now Movement, would, of course, be treason and would subject all those who were guilty thereof to the supreme penalty. In the solemn judgment of this committee, the mailing of each and every one of these letters from the office of the Peace Now Movement was a seditious act deliberately designed to lead toward wholesale treason on the part of the armed forces of the United States.

In the foregoing judgment, we have chosen our words with the greatest care. The phrase, "deliberately designed to lead toward wholesale treason," has been used advisedly and is justified by the evidence before us. On October 29, 1943, the secretary of the Peace Now Movement sent a follow-up letter to a religious leader who rejected the organization's request for him to advocate a treasonable course of conduct for his followers. In this follow-up letter, the secretary declared:

And we are putting it to you straight from the shoulder. We would so much rather Christians would be guilty of treason to this administration than guilty of treason to the Christ.

The serious nature of the Peace Now Movement's advocacy of our troops' laying down their arms is thus explicitly recognized by one of the officers of the organization. This advocacy of the supreme crime is not made less serious by the author's phrase, "guilty of treason to this administration." As the author must know, the course of conduct advocated for our troops would not constitute "treason to this administration" but treason against the United States.

The declaration of war, by virtue of which the armed forces of the United States are now engaged in a global struggle with the Axis Powers, was an act of the American people expressed through their Representatives in the Congress of the United States, which is the only method under our form of government by which the people of this country may express their will.

The request of Peace Now that certain outstanding religious leaders of the country invite their followers to lay down their arms immediately involved a plan for mass treason which was truly colossal in its conception. For example, all of the cardinals of the Holy See who are resident in the United States were among those invited to participate in this act of treason.

The following religious leaders are those to whom the national headquarters of the Peace Now Movement addressed its letter in which these leaders were requested to call upon their followers in uniform to lay down their arms at once:

- Charles P. Morlan, clerk, Ohio Yearly Meeting, Route 1, Salem, Ohio.
- Mahlon Newlin, clerk, North Carolina Yearly Meeting, George, N. C.
- Henry H. Perry, clerk, New England Yearly Meeting, 31 Milk Street, Boston, Mass.
- Rev. Joseph C. Robbins, president, Northern Baptist Convention, Newton Theological Seminary, Newton Centre, Mass.
- L. E. Conner, president, General Conference of Church of God, Seventh and Franklin, Oregon, Ill.
- Dr. Lee Elmore Baker, president, General Conference of Advent Christian Church, 305 Calumet Avenue, Aurora, Ill.
- John S. Stamm, General Conference of Evangelical Church, Third and Reily Streets, Harrisburg, Pa.

- Bliss Forbush, chairman, Friends General Conference, 510a York Road, Baltimore, Md.
- William Wistar Comfort, clerk, Yearly Meeting of Friends, Walton Road, Haverford, Pa.
- Most Reverend John T. McNicholas O. P., 5540 Moeller Avenue, Norwood, Ohio.
- Most Reverend Samuel A. Stritch, 1555 North State Street, Chicago, Ill.
- Most Reverend William Cardinal O'Connell, 2101 Commonwealth Avenue, Brighton, Mass.
- Most Reverend Michael J. Curley, 408 North Charles Street, Baltimore, Md.
- His Eminence William Henry O'Connell, archbishop of Boston, Boston, Mass.
- His Eminence Dennis J. Dougherty, archbishop of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, Pa.
- Dr. T. C. Pollock, United Presbyterian Church of North America, 5034 Hazel Avenue, Philadelphia, Pa.
- Dr. Donald W. Richardson, Presbyterian Church in the United States, Union Theological Seminary, Richmond, Va.
- Bishop J. S. Flipper, African Methodist Episcopal Church, 488 Houston Street, Atlanta, Ga.
- Prof. L. Fuerbringer, president, Lutheran Synodical Conference of North America, 801 DeMun Avenue, St. Louis, Mo.
- Rev. H. L. Yochum, president, American Lutheran Conference, 4835 Three Mile Drive, Detroit, Mich.
- Rev. Ferdinand Q. Blanchard, Congregational Christian Churches, 287 Fourth Avenue, New York, N. Y.
- Wilson T. Ehmmons, clerk, Iowa Yearly Meeting, What Cheer, Iowa.
- Robt. D. Kohn, president, American Ethical Union, 2 West Sixty-fourth Street, New York, N. Y.
- Archbishop William Ernest Robertson, African Orthodox Church, 122 West One Hundred Twenty-ninth Street, New York, N. Y.
- Most Reverend Archbishop Athenagoras, Greek Archdiocese of North and South America, 25-19 Thirtieth Drive, Astoria, N. Y.
- Most Reverend Francis J. Spellman, 425 Madison Ave., New York, N. Y.
- Rt. Rev. Henry St. George Tucker, president, Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, 297 Fourth Avenue, New York, N. Y.
- Mildred A. Hooper, secretary, Life and Advent Union, 125 Kelsey Street, New Britain, Conn.
- J. L. McElhany, president, General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, Takoma Park, Washington, D. C.
- Rev. C. H. Hewitt, executive secretary, General Conference of Advent Christian Church, 305 Calumet Avenue, Aurora, Ill.
- Dr. Henry Sloane Coffin, Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, Union Theological Seminary, New York, N. Y.
- Most Reverend Dennis Cardinal Dougherty, 1723 Race Street, Philadelphia, Pa.
- Most Reverend Thomas J. Walsh, 552 South Orange Avenue, South Orange, N. J.
- Most Reverend Moses E. Kiley, 2000 West Wisconsin Avenue, Milwaukee, Wis.
- Most Reverend John A. Floersh, 1118 South Third St., Louisville, Ky.
- Most Reverend Edward Mooney, 1880 Wellesley Drive, Detroit, Mich.
- Most Reverend Joseph Schrembs, 18401 Shaker Boulevard, Shaker Heights, Cleveland, Ohio.
- Nathan H. Knorr, president, Jehovah's Witnesses, 124 Columbia Heights, Brooklyn, N. Y.
- Ralph S. Coppock, clerk, Ohio Yearly Meeting, 711 Wright Avenue, Alliance, Ohio.
- Milo Kauffman, Mennonite Church, Hesston, Kans.
- Most Reverend Francis J. L. Beckman, 140 Fremont Avenue, Dubuque, Iowa.
- Most Reverend John Gregory Murray, 239 Selby Avenue, St. Paul, Minn.
- Frank C. Brown, Kansas Yearly Meeting, Haviland, Kans.
- Most Reverend John J. Glennon, 4510 Lindell Boulevard, St. Louis, Mo.
- C. E. Lemmon, president, International Convention, Disciples of Christ, First Christian Church, Columbia, Mo.
- Hon. Pat M. Neff, president, Southern Baptist Convention, Baylor University, Waco, Tex.
- Rev. D. V. Jemison, president, National Baptist Convention, U. S. A., Inc., 1605 Lapsley Street, Selma, Ala.

Dr. G. L. Prince, president, National Baptist Convention of America, 2610 Avenue L, Galveston, Tex.
 W. W. Peters, Church of the Brethren, McPherson, Kans.
 Allen U. Tomlinson, president, Five Years Meeting of Friends, Whittier, Calif.
 Edward Mott, Oregon Yearly Meeting, 5527 North Kerby Avenue, Portland, Oreg.
 Lud H. Estes, secretary, General Conference of Methodists, 1120 Faxton Avenue, Memphis, Tenn.
 Most Reverend Urban J. Vehr, 777 Pear Street, Denver, Colo.
 Most Reverend John J. Cantwell, 100 Fremont Place, Los Angeles, Calif.
 Most Reverend Joseph F. Rummell, 2809 South Carrollton Avenue, New Orleans, La.
 Most Reverend Edward D. Howard, 2053 Southwest Sixth Avenue, Portland, Oreg.
 Most Reverend John J. Mitty, 1000 Fulton Street, San Francisco, Calif.
 Archbishop Beckman, Dubuque, Iowa.
 Robert W. Searle, 71 West Twenty-third Street, New York 10, N. Y.

PEACE NOW'S APPEAL TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

The Peace Now Movement had the brazen audacity to go over the head of its own Government in an appeal for certain neutral governments to use their "good offices for facilitating negotiations between the warring nations now or in the immediate future." We reproduce below the letter which Peace Now addressed to Franco's Ambassador in the United States:

PEACE NOW MOVEMENT,
 Box 4 W, 336 East Fifty-third Street,
 New York, 22, N. Y., July 27, 1943.

MR. DON JUAN FRANCISCO DE CARDENAS,
 Ambassador, Spanish Embassy,
 2700 Fifteenth Street NW., Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. DE CARDENAS: I send you enclosed two copies of a manual stating reasons for a cessation of hostilities and start of negotiations now.

I hope you will send a copy to your Government with your own comments. Our hope is that your Government may see its way, either by itself or together with other neutral governments, to offer its good offices for facilitating negotiations between the warring nations now or in the immediate future.

Sincerely,

JOHN A. COLLETT.

P. S.: I am aware that the manual needs many improvements, and we are now working on alterations. I feel, however, that even in its present state that you will find the material to be of value.

OPEN LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT

The seditious nature of Peace Now is further illustrated in "an open letter to the President of the United States" which was found in the files of the organization. This open letter closes with a threat that the sender's "sanction and support of any Allied invasion of Europe involving the armed forces of the United States" will be withheld under specified circumstances. The text of this letter is as follows:

AN OPEN LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

DEAR MR. ROOSEVELT: Believing that you have not made proper efforts to find common ground with the peoples of the enemy countries in order to bring about the cessation of hostilities, I wish to put myself on record as being opposed to an Allied invasion of the continent of Europe—at least until such a public attempt to reach a reasonable basis of agreement is made.

Reports have repeatedly reached this country that Germany is willing to negotiate a decent and honorable peace; but to the best of my belief and, knowledge your administration has not made the slightest gesture to meet such proposals half way or stated precisely what is unacceptable about them.

It is my belief that a peace offensive should be made before the order to attack is given. It is wrong to continue the slaughter of thousands of young Americans until we have made an honest attempt to adjust grievances and come to terms with all our adversaries.

UNLESS SUCH AN OFFER OF A DEMOCRATIC PEACE CONFERENCE IS MADE, I WITHHOLD MY SANCTION AND SUPPORT OF ANY ALLIED INVASION OF EUROPE INVOLVING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES.

Respectfully,

THE PRINTED MATERIAL OF PEACE NOW

Obviously in the light of its small budget, Peace Now has not been able to flood the country with its printed propaganda. Most of its material consists of single mimeographed pages. This committee has copies of the following (titles and brief explanations of each):

- "Was the United States Tricked into War?" The implication of this two-page mimeographed document is that the administration and the British Government together tricked the American people into a war to protect the "white empires."
- "Actions Speak Louder Than Words in International Affairs." In this single-page mimeographed document, the charge is made that "America threw more economic weight into the side of war than any other nation." The document further states that "there is nothing whatever to fight about."
- "Answers to Some Common Questions and Objections to a Negotiated Peace Now." This single-page printed document is credited to George W. Hartman, Chairman of the Peace Now Movement. Professor Hartman declares that "our refusal to negotiate is an act of tyranny," and that "if the United States won't 'bargain,' that means we are continuing the conflict to avoid making a just peace."
- "General Statement of the Peace Now Movements." This single-page printed document declares that "it is conceit which keeps the war going."
- "Appeal for Uncommon Sense." This single-page printed document calls for "a negotiated peace now, between all the peoples of the earth which would use the conference and discussion method to correct injustices and to promote the general welfare of the world."
- "Is the Atlantic Charter Adequate?" This three-page mimeographed document states that "the strangulation of German and Japanese trade by our tariffs and import quotas gave Hitler and the Japanese military clique their toehold."
- "Peace Now Without Victory Will Save the Jews." This single-page mimeographed document is a report of a speech by Jessie Wallace Hughen.
- "Suggested Activities for Local Peace Now Committees." This single-page mimeographed document, which outlines some methods by which Peace Now works, is included in this report as appendix 1.
- "America Faces the Great Decision." This two-page printed document is a speech delivered by George W. Hartman at Carnegie Hall, New York City, on December 30, 1943. Professor Hartman declares that "because all the warring nations have been selfish and stupid in roughly equal measure, we must now spend one-half of our incomes murdering one another."
- "If We Were in Japan's Place." This mimeographed document, as its title indicates, is an implied justification for the Japanese course of conduct which eventuated in Pearl Harbor.

The method by which the foregoing propaganda is distributed is well illustrated by the following excerpts from a letter sent by Leo Charles Donnelly, of Detroit, to Bessie Simon of Peace Now headquarters in New York.

All of your Peace Now literature is good. To the degree that you can see your way to express packages of any of it gratis, I will enclose it with my mailings. As I almost entirely pay all of expenses with the work here, I do not see my way clear to buy your literature.

We try to mail out monthly to all commissioners of schools in the 1,400 Michigan towns, also to all ladies aid societies in the 1,400 Michigan towns. We also try to mail to Wayne County ministers, priests, rabbis. Wayne County takes in Detroit and several small towns. At times we try to mail to 7,000 Detroit school teachers. We also try to mail to Detroit osteopaths, optometrists, chiropractors, chiropradists, believing they are close to poor people.

We try to mail to 154 Detroit newspapers (small and foreign press) to a couple hundred Detroit labor unions, social workers, societies, and about 1,800 leading businessmen. In other words, we try to mail to formers of public opinion.

We load our envelopes hoping that the literature will be spread among employees. Have mailed as many as 7 separate sheets, printed both sides carrying 14 messages. We know it is not good advertising, but we believe in God, we believe in spreading seed, hoping that some will fall on good ground.

(For an outline of the Peace Now Movement's activities in local communities, see its suggestions in appendix 2.)

PEACE NOW DISAVOWED

Early in the life of the Peace Now Movement, various pacifist groups disavowed all formal connections with the movement. Included in this report, as appendix 3, is a letter in which it is stated—that neither the Fellowship of Reconciliation, nor the National Council for the Prevention of War, nor the War Resisters League, nor the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, nor the Friends are supporting or endorsing the Peace Now Movement above referred to.

The main reason given in this letter for the repudiation of Peace Now was the grave concern "over Mr. Collett's statement that he is willing to accept money from any source."

CONCLUSION

This committee finds that the Peace Now Movement is an un-American group whose activities are calculated to interfere with the successful prosecution of the war.

The committee finds that in specific instances the so-called movement has been guilty of acts whose nature is clearly seditious and which tend toward the encouragement of treason.

The committee finds that Peace Now's propaganda is of such a nature that it will serve the interests of Goebbels' Nazi propaganda machine. It should be noted that the Nazi drive for a "negotiated peace" coincides almost exactly with the setting up of the Peace Now Movement. When the war took a definite turn in favor of the Allied Nations, the Nazis finally realized that the best they could hope for was a "negotiated peace." At about that time, the Peace Now Movement took up the same theme. Goebbels' is undoubtedly using the fact of such an organization's existence in America to bolster the morale of the Germans.

The committee also finds that Peace Now's propaganda can do incalculable harm by its dissemination in neutral countries, to which the organization has addressed it. Even though Peace Now be small and without significant influence in the United States, there is no doubt that enemy and certain neutral countries will seize upon its

propaganda to try to show that American morale is disintegrating and that the Nazis and the Japanese still have a chance of salvaging something from the war.

The committee further finds that Peace Now's propaganda will have the effect, if it is believed, of undermining the morale of the American people who are guarding the home front and of the armed forces on foreign fronts who may not be correctly informed concerning the full facts of the organization.

Fortunately for America, the Peace Now Movement has not been as successful in winning recruits as its founders and officers have desired. Its propaganda has not been effective in turning aside the American people, or any substantial number of them, from giving to the utmost for the decisive defeat of the Axis Powers. The movement's claim of some 2,000 members may or may not be correct. Even if the number were only 200, Peace Now would not be less un-American in its designs.

The committee recognizes the right of individuals to their own opinions concerning the nature and necessity of war in general or the roots and blame for the present war in particular. When, however, such opinions run counter to the position which the American people as a whole, speaking through the Congress of the United States, have taken, there is no reasonable ground for permitting individuals or groups of individuals to translate their dissenting opinions into sabotage of the Nation's war effort. It is the latter which Peace Now has done, and to the extent that it has exercised any influence whatever, even in limited circles, it has contributed to the cause of the enemy.

If organized government is to prevail, both citizens and aliens who are resident in America must be compelled to desist from sedition, sabotage, and treason.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I. STATEMENT

An informal group of concerned individuals met at the Whittier Hotel in Philadelphia July 10 and 11 to discuss and map out an adequate campaign on a national scale for a peace-by-consultation now or at the very earliest date possible.

We agreed that we wanted to set up a temporary organizing committee that would cooperate with the existing peace organizations as far as possible for the promotion of a Nation-wide Peace Now Movement.

Among the tasks before us this summer are as many as possible of the following:

To establish a complete office staff in New York and to start Peace Now groups in other key cities.

To build up a volunteer corps in each of these cities.

To start immediately a concerted effort for funds.

To build up a representative group of supporters and backers and an influential sponsoring committee.

To create appropriate and striking literature—fliers, folders, leaflets, pledge cards, posters, etc.

To line up good speakers for mass meetings and radio broadcasts.

To cultivate friendly cooperation with the press.

To hold regular meetings of the organizing committee.

The following are continuing as active working members on the committee: George W. Hartmann, chairman; Dorothy Hutchinson, treasurer; John A. Collett, field secretary; and Bessie Simon, corresponding secretary.

We agreed upon the following as a tentative statement of principles which adherents to the movement might be asked to sign and which could be used as a petition and as a basic form of card membership:

We believe in Peace Now because—

- (1) We want to save our country and the world from the multiplying sufferings and waste of a war to military victory;
- (2) We want to prevent a dictated punitive peace which would inevitably lead to future wars;
- (3) Negotiations for stopping the war are possible as soon as the United Nations publish to the world fair and reasonable peace aims.

Our summer activities will be preparatory to a more active and extended campaign to start in the fall.

Since our conference, the Peace Strategy Board (an informal coordinating council of representatives from many of the peace organizations); has set up a special committee, including some of our members, to work for Peace Now. We propose to work in close coordination with this group.

The task before us is tremendous, and it is obvious that concerted efforts of a great number of groups and individuals are needed. While the subcommittee of the Peace Strategy Board may place its main emphasis in the beginning on a peace-aims campaign, our own organizing committee intends to start a Nation-wide movement for Peace Now and an armistice now. This will be parallel to the strong British movements now under way and will attempt to enlighten the American public on the forgotten causes of this war, to correct current interpretations of war guilt, to struggle for a peace policy which will be fair to all peoples, and to awaken a popular demand for a peace by negotiation.

Both approaches, ours and that of the Peace Strategy Board, seem important and we intend to supplement rather than to compete with the special committee of the Peace Strategy Board.

As time is short and as work with the various sections and groups of the population must be started at the earliest possible moment, it seems important that we begin our preparatory work immediately, while at the same time duplication and overlapping of effort will be avoided to the greatest possible extent.

APPENDIX 2. SUGGESTED ACTIVITIES FOR LOCAL PEACE NOW COMMITTEE

1. Set a day for weekly committee meetings.
2. Set aside certain evenings a week for the executive members of the committee to do preparatory and active work.
3. By telephone, mail, and personal contacts—
 - (a) Line up new members for the committee.
 - (b) Form a large volunteer corps and try to find the right people for the right jobs.
 - (c) Raise funds.
 - (d) Contact influential people for support and sponsorship.
4. Secure appropriate and striking literature, such as leaflets for mass distribution. We shall be glad to supply you with our literature at cost. The name of your committee can be placed on it. If you publish your own literature, try to have it clear, brief, and convincing, with illustrations if possible. We would appreciate receiving samples of your publications.
5. Organize distribution of leaflets outside churches, factories, movies, or combine the distribution with poster walks.
6. Pass petitions for signature from house to house and forward at once to your Congressman and Senators.
7. Arrange open meetings. If possible, put an ad in the paper announcing them. Speakers should be helped with points, or outlines for their speeches, charts, maps, etc. (We shall be glad to help with suggestions for this purpose.) Open meetings might also be held in neighboring communities and towns, and new local committees should be started in them.
 - (a) Petitions should be passed around to be signed with names and addresses of interested persons. (See attached copy.¹)
 - (b) Take up collection at each meeting.
 - (c) Encourage the people present to contact personally, if possible, or by mail, their Congressmen, Senators, newspaper editors, and others about the urgent need for Peace Now.
8. After your committee has a good solid start, arrange a mass meeting.
9. Cultivate friendly cooperation with your local press and your radio stations. Prepare special news releases for them when this seems appropriate.
10. As soon as sufficient funds are raised, employ a full time secretary and later increase the staff if possible in order to expand the above and other activities.
11. Keep in constant touch with our office for the sake of mutual support and cooperation. We shall always be glad to be of the greatest possible assistance in every way.

APPENDIX 3. THE FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION, 2929 BROADWAY, NEW YORK CITY, AUGUST 20, 1943

DEAR FRIEND: Recently an organization called the Peace Now Movement, address, Box 4, 336 East Fifty-third Street, New York City, has been set up by a few individuals. John A. Collett is the moving spirit and field secretary pro tem. It has been announced that he contemplates a trip to the Middle West in a few days. In response to inquiries, we point out that neither the Fellowship of Reconciliation, nor the National Council for the Prevention of War, nor the War Resisters, League, nor the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, nor the Friends are supporting or endorsing the Peace Now Movement above referred to. The first three of these organizations have for several weeks been planning through the Peace Strategy Board a "Wage Peace Now Campaign" for the fall. The first step in arousing public interest in formulation of specific peace terms by the United States and making them known to the governments and peoples of all lands with a view to ending the war honorably at the earliest possible moment is the circulation of the leaflet and petition, copy of which is enclosed herewith.¹ Cooperation of all who are interested in promoting this objective is welcomed.

The Fellowship of Reconciliation national secretaries regard it as most unfortunate that with the Peace Strategy Board for coordinating the activities of the pacifist organizations already in existence, another organization should be set up having ostensibly the same objectives and necessarily appealing chiefly to the same people for contributions of time and money.

¹ Not printed.

We are gravely concerned also over the fact that the Peace Now Movement has announced an ambitious tentative budget of over \$100,000, and over Mr. Collett's statement that he is willing to accept money from any source. We believe that there is great danger that persons and organizations with ulterior motives will take advantage of this policy and this in turn may lead to the whole pacifist movement for bringing the war to an end through peace by consultation being discredited. The fact that one New York paper, PM, is already carrying on a systematic campaign to link pacifists interested in bringing the war to an end with Nazis and Fascists in the minds of the public, proves that the danger is not an imaginary one.

Without, therefore, on the one hand impugning anyone's motives or on the other hand attempting to dictate any individual's actions, we wish to emphasize that the Fellowship of Reconciliation has no connection with the Peace Now Movement or with Mr. Collett's present activities.

Yours in fellowship,

A. J. MUSTE,
J. N. SAYRE,

Cosecretaries.

JOHN M. SWOMLEY, Jr.,
Associate Secretary.

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