

CHAPTER IX
RELATIONSHIP OF GROUP TENSION TO EXTREME CRISIS

Introduction

In stating the problem of this study it was suggested that one concern of this investigation would be to attempt an explanation of the registration crisis which, for two months during February and March, 1943, involved the Tule Lake community in a peak of tension and serious disturbances. Our attempt at explanation will take the form of the following thesis: that in a collectivity among whom there is a prior development of group tension, any major crisis that occurs will develop in such a way that all the typical behavior manifestations evidenced in the earlier development of group tension will be reproduced in the crisis period.

The hypothesis assumes that a sustained crisis like the registration disturbance could not occur without a previous organization of the collective tension of a population. The contrast between the explosive but short-lived and loosely organized farm strike with the organized reaction appearing in the registration issue suggests that something developed between the two events that accounted for the sustained character of the latter crisis. If the assumption is accepted, the implications of our proposition are these. A crisis must have its origin in some

condition of maladjustment, but the maladjustments underlying a major crisis will have been foreshadowed in the discontents in the discontents underlying the earlier development of group tension. Furthermore, the characteristic forms of behavior which appear in the earlier conditions of collective tension--typical modes of interpreting center situations, the usage of block structures to organize reactions, the functioning of protest and accommodation groups, and efforts to maintain group solidarity in the face of pressures from the outside--may be expected to recur in the crisis situation. It might be said that where an organized collective tension has appeared, something like a patterned reaction to tension situations tends to become established and to reproduce itself when the occasion demands.

But a crisis, of course, presents its unique aspects too. In so far as the evacuees had already developed definitions of situations, plans of action, and organization by which to meet tension situations, the effect of a crisis was likely to be that of throwing the entire mechanism into action. To be sure, the crisis too would require its interpretation, its unique collective definition of the situation, and there would be a period of momentary hesitation before the collectivity could become mobilized, but it is suggested that the mobilization would not take long, and it would occur along the lines of the patterns previously developed. In the second place, if the various phases of group tension were revealed over a period of

several months in the earlier development, in the crisis situation they would be manifested in a much shorter time. This in fact is virtually a definition of a crisis, that all the various phases of tension expressions tend to be telescoped into a relatively short space of time.

If our hypothesis is correct, that earlier conditions of collective tension foreshadow the events which are likely to occur in a crisis, the proposition may have practical utility for the purpose of control. Assuming a desire to prevent crises, our proposition would suggest the avoidance of those conditions associated with the earlier state of tension. Theoretically, the proposition has this implication, that a crisis may be regarded as a career of group tension within a larger career of tension, that a tension system is composed of smaller units of tension systems, the patterns of which are much alike.

Factors Underlying the Crisis

Registration and the background tensions.---In March, 1942, shortly after the outbreak of war, the selective service induction of the Nisei was suspended, and somewhat later they were reclassified to a 4-C (alien) category. The WRA looked upon the Army's evident skepticism of Nisei loyalty as unfortunate and dangerous, and worked to have the Nisei returned to their former selective service status. Through the intervention of the WRA, the War Department reconsidered its policy, and in late January, 1943, Secretary of War Stimson announced

the reopening of military service to the Nisei, and proposed a registration to determine the number of citizen evacuees eligible for the draft and for a volunteer Nisei combat team that was to be formed. At the same time, the WRA which was concerned to expedite the resettlement of evacuees requested a registration for leave clearance of all evacuees seventeen years of age or more. Through a mass processing of leave clearance, applications by the Joint Army and Navy Investigation Board, it was hoped the eligibility of individual evacuees for relocation would be determined once and for all. In the earlier relocation procedure, the Joint Board had inspected evacuee dockets only as individual applications were made, but this had proved inefficient and slow.

Thus, it was determined in the Washington offices of the WRA and the War Department that, beginning February 10, 1943, a registration should be started in all the centers simultaneously for the threefold purpose of registering (1) all evacuees, aliens as well as citizens, seventeen years of age or more, on applications for leave clearance; (2) all citizen evacuees of draft age for selective service induction, and (3) any citizen evacuee of draft age desiring to volunteer for a Nisei combat team. To the WRA, the War Department's acceptance of this registration program was a great triumph; it was considered the most significant step to date toward fulfilling the fundamental WRA aim of resettlement, and toward regaining for the evacuees rights which were lost in the evacuation. For the evacuees, on the other hand, the program was neither as simple nor as felici-

tous as the WRA officials seemed to think.

As early as October (1942), several months before the registration, a substantial proportion of the center people expressed negative attitudes toward military service for the Nisei. Takayama, at the request of the JACL national headquarters, had asked the councilmen to survey the male citizens of their blocks regarding their preference between volunteering for the Army or induction through selective service. Not only was preference generally for the latter although a fair number of Nisei showed interest in volunteering,¹ but at block meetings strong objections were raised, especially by the Issei parents, against the JACL's meddling in the problem of military service. The same sentiments again appeared when a recruiting team, composed largely of Nisei soldiers, arrived from the Army Language School at Camp Savage to recruit Japanese language candidates for the school.² characteristic of the Issei's view was the statement:

If the Government restores us our former home and business, I should gladly let my son volunteer if he wished. But there's no need for us to go begging for anything either to the Army or the Government. It's their turn to restore privileges to us. The JACL might be worth something if it were to demand the restoration of our rights. There's no need to go begging.³

The view was not that the selective service induction of the Nisei should be resisted if the Army chose to start it again.

¹Field Notes, November 10, 1942. According to the estimates of councilmen, subject to gross inaccuracies, willingness to volunteer expressed by draft age Nisei ranged between 0 to 40 per cent of the blocks.

²Field Notes, November 26, 1942. 35 youths volunteered.

³Field Notes, November 4, 1942.

but that there was no need to invite induction.

It seems the administration was misled about the community's attitude on military service. To a confidential inquiry from Dillon Myer asking for an estimate of the percentage who would volunteer if the opportunity were offered, Merrill replied:

I have discussed in a very guarded way, with quite a group of our best and leading Nisei, what percentage they thought would volunteer for service. They say that if the Army throws open enlistment for combat duty without restrictions, to all American citizens of Japanese ancestry, that at least 50 per cent of those at Tule Lake between the ages of 18 and 34 and single, would volunteer. The remainder would await the usual induction proceedings and would gladly serve in that way. . . .⁴

Yet, had the administration been realistic about the attitudes current in the center society at the time, it should not have been deceived by the optimistic guesses of the "leading" Nisei. There was the considerable bitterness about the losses and injustices of the evacuation, and the feeling that the evacuees' former status (rights) should first be restored before the group yielded further to the demands of the majority group. There was the concern about resettlement and post-war rehabilitation, a problem that would have become aggravated if the able-bodied sons were inducted into military service. And there was the skepticism about the white majority, and the suspicion that any favorable gesture of the whites would have behind it an exploitative motive. These were prevalent attitudes in the community, and careful observation of the community would have led to a ready recognition of them.

⁴Reply from . . Merrill to Dillon Myer, November 17, 1942, to an inquiry from Dillon Myer, November 10, 1942.

As for the relocation program, the resistances to it have already been discussed. Here again was to be seen the suspicion engendered among a substantial group of evacuees that the treatment from the majority group which would be received on the outside would be anything but favorable; that if evacuees were accepted, it would only be to perform the least desirable tasks which others were unwilling to accept. Likewise, there was the almost obsessive concern among those lacking financial means that if they were forced out of the centers, they might not be able to provide for their families.

We attempted to show in earlier chapters that some of these attitudes reflected fundamental concerns of the evacuees. Any event such as the registration which would stimulate these fundamental attitudes might have been expected to arouse critical problems. To avoid a crisis, the optimum condition would have been not to have a registration, but if the registration was necessary, careful planning should have been undertaken to keep the reactions at a minimum. The WRA evidently had partial recognition of the difficulties which would be involved in the registration program, but in terms of the events which followed, it seems clear that the agency did not take the precautions which it might have taken.

Organization of the registration program.---To keep at a minimum the resentment and anxiety reactions which might have been expected to the registration, the problem was to control the conditions which would favor the rise of protest organizations. To accomplish the latter, two objectives needed to be

achieved. First, the nature of the registration and the purposes of the selective service and leave clearance registrations needed to be so communicated to the residents as to keep negative reactions at a minimum. Second, the communication needed to be effected through those channels of the community which would bring the stablest leaders into play. These leaders were to be found in the Planning Board, the Council and the block advisory councils, and there were indications that when consensus could be achieved in these groups, that they could be quite influential over block opinions. The advantage of using these groups was that when the block leaders were given responsibility for a program, they were much less prone to react with immediate negativism, and more inclined to seek methods for effecting the program. The actual method of organizing the registration which was chosen, however, was an approach that sought to minimize the role of evacuee leadership in the program.

On January 29, 1943, the metropolitan newspapers sold at the project newsstands carried front page articles of the War Department's decision to form an all-Nisei combat unit; and on the following day the Tulean Dispatch devoted most of the issue to Secretary Stimson's announcement, and to statements from Dillon Myer, Rowalt and Cobley, the project director, commenting on the significance of the Army's decision. In these articles, the only facts established were that Nisei males of military age would be given an opportunity to volunteer for a Nisei combat unit, and that opportunities of employment in war production

would be opened to others. This was the first information received by the evacuees about the induction of Nisel into the Army.

On the next day, January 30, the Planning Board questioned Mr. Cobley about the new policy, but the Project Director denied having any more information than had already been made public. Again on the following day, officers of the Council and Planning Board approached Mr. Cobley for more specific information, but he merely stated that further information would be given after the return from Washington of Mr. Hawes, assistant project director, who had been sent to receive instructions in registration procedures. Hawes returned on February 2, but his only statement was, "Further clarification of recruitment will be announced by the Army team arriving on the project, February 6."⁵ The Council on February 3 decided to invite Hawes to give a clarification of the new policy, but the proposed discussion was never held. It was clear to the leaders in these organizations that some important action was pending, and they wished to be consulted on the voluntary enlistment program, but as Councilman Yada complained, "We should have been given all the dope as soon as it was known here, but the policy seems to be to keep us in the dark. I think the administration ought to tell us what it knows about the draft."⁶

From announcements in the Tulean Dispatch of February 4, the community learned for the first time that there was to be

⁵Tulean Dispatch, February 2, 1943.

⁶Field Notes, February 3, 1943.

a general registration beginning not later than February 10 at all the projects which would involve not only the recruiting of men for the combat unit, but also a registration of all evacuees seventeen years or more on applications for leave clearance. Aware of the resistance to relocation among many evacuees, Rowalt in his statement was careful to point out:

We are not trying to force any person to relocate who does not desire to do so. But there are increasing opportunities for evacuees to get jobs and if we can get a backlog of registrations on which we can be working, we should be able to get clearance for indefinite leaves for many people who later will want to relocate.⁷

The program involved three types of registration, for leave clearance, selective service, and the combat unit, but due to the vague way in which the residents were introduced to the program, they had no clear conception of the types involved, and were even inclined to suspect them of having a single purpose. For instance, one observer noted:

There seems to be suspicion on the part of the Kibei and Issei that this enlistment and offer of jobs in war industries is a means of getting people out of the projects. They suspect that there is some ulterior purpose behind the move which would benefit them at the expense of the Japanese people. They also seem to believe that the Nisei are fools to fall for anything like that and volunteer for the U. S. Army. There are grounds for this suspicion because recently the WRA has been trying to do everything it could to get people to resettle, and so far the program has not been very successful. They suspect that the Japanese will not be allowed in war industries because in the past minority groups had a difficult time getting any jobs of that kind.⁸

This was but one of the many misconceptions under which the community suffered. Lacking any definite information, the community moved toward the registration date discussing the com-

⁷Tulean Dispatch, February 4, 1943.

⁸Field Notes of James Sakoda, February 5, 1943.

ing program in washrooms, mess halls, places of work, and in the homes, on the basis of assumptions and guesses as to what was involved. Yet on the basis of their fragmentary knowledge the people were already forming opinions about the discriminatory character of a segregated combat unit, the lack of obligation to volunteer, and the dubious prospects of favorable employment on the outside. The administrators, too, were generally uninformed, but their thoughts were concentrated upon administering the program efficiently and of getting the greatest number of volunteers possible, considerations which later were to appear irrelevant.

The Army recruiting team which had been expected on February 6 arrived on the morning of the 9th, one day before the beginning of the registration. The day of their arrival was spent in meetings with the administrative staff, evacuee representatives, the interviewers and the people to give hurried instructions on the purpose and procedure of the registration. In the morning the Army team, composed of a lieutenant and three sergeants, met with the Council and Planning Board, and the team captain, Lieutenant Carroll, read a prepared message from the War Department that attempted to clarify, in carefully chosen words, the considerations which had led to the Army's change of policy toward the induction of the Nisei. No time was allowed for discussion. The block managers, in whose offices the registration was to be conducted, were called to a special meeting in the afternoon where Lieutenant Carroll again read the prepared message, and the remainder of the time was

taken by Mr. Robert Jones, chief of the employment and housing division, the WRA officer in charge of registration at Tule Lake, who instructed the block managers on their duties. There were numerous complaints that "Jones is no good at explaining things," and that the men did not understand what the registration was about. In the evening ward meetings were held at which members of the Army team again read the prepared messages, this time to the block residents, but little if any time was allowed for questions.

Of the registration programs at various relocation centers, the one at the Tule Lake Project proved the least successful and involved the administration in the greatest difficulties. There were errors of planning at the national office, but these errors were apparently greatly aggravated by the fact that less attention was given to preparation at Tule Lake than at any other project.⁹ At Tule Lake it seems that the administration pursued a deliberate policy of keeping information about the registration from the evacuees. Dillon Myer implies that the War Department was inclined to maintain secrecy about the registration program, yet the Army was not entirely responsible for the instructions to the team captains read, "Where there are differences of opinion as to the procedure at the camps, the advice of the project manager is to be given full weight by the military personnel."¹⁰ The fact is that at other centers more time was devoted to preparing the people and a different procedure

⁹WRA Community Analysis Report, "Army and Leave Clearance Registration at War Relocation Center," June, 1943. pp. 15-16.

¹⁰WRA Community Analysis Report, "Army and Leave Clearance Registration at War Relocation Center," June, 1943. p. 33.

of registration was used. Cobley had the misfortune of being unfamiliar with the project and the administrative personnel, and he unfortunately selected for his closest advisors in the program two men, Hawes and Jones, who were not among the competent men on the staff.

Cobley evidently interpreted the registration as primarily an administrative problem, not something involving issues and therefore a problem of organizing public opinion, but it will be seen that the program involved critical issues for the evacuees. The consequence was that the failure to prepare the people led to uncertainty and confusion when the day of registration came. Unprepared for the registration, the resulting indecision aroused serious resistances in the population. And the failure to take the organizational leadership into confidence played directly into the hands of the extremists and protest leaders who were best able to function in an atmosphere of confusion, indecision, negativism and resentment.

The registration procedure.---From the standpoint of preventing a crisis, not only the failure to prepare the evacuees adequately, but also the plan of the registration procedure was unfortunate.

The registration problem hinged on the questionnaires, and a difficulty of the preliminary discussions was that the residents were given no opportunity to familiarize themselves with the questions which they were to answer. Several forms

were used, the titles and purposes of which were:

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| WRA Form 126 | "War Relocation Authority Application for Leave Clearance" required of male citizens, 17 years or more in age. |
| WRA Form 126 | "War Relocation Authority Application for Leave Clearance," same as above, but required of female citizens and all aliens 17 years or more. |
| DSS Form 304A | "Statement of United States Citizens of Japanese Ancestry," a special selective service questionnaire to determine willingness and eligibility for military service; required of male citizens 17 years or more. |
| DSS Form 165 | Statement by citizen males volunteering for the Japanese American combat unit. |

The questions on all these forms were designed to ascertain the "loyalty" of those registering, and their eligibility for relocation or military service. The bulk of the questionnaires inquired into personal data, past activities, and affiliations, but two questions numbered 27 and 28, the so-called "loyalty questions," which were asked of all persons, became the major source of controversy. On DSS Form 304A for male citizens, the question asked:

27. Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on combat duty, wherever ordered? _____

28. Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and foreswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or organization? _____

With slight modifications the same questions were asked of the female citizens and all aliens. The wordings were:

27. If the opportunity presents itself and you are found qualified, would you be willing to volunteer for the Army Nurses Corps or the WAAC? _____

28. Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and foreswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor or any other foreign government, power, or organization? _____

The questions were to be answered either "Yes" or "No," although later qualified answers were permitted, but in unqualified form they involved numerous ambiguities for the evacuees. Male aliens confronted with Question 27 about joining the Nurses Corps or the WAACS were nonplused, and aged female aliens often answered with amusement. Question 28 presented serious difficulties for the aliens. Because of their ineligibility for citizenship in the United States, the Issei felt they could not foreswear allegiance to Japan without becoming a people without a country, but they did not wish to answer "No" and be considered disloyal.

On DSS Form 304A, the male citizens also faced difficulties. Regarding Question 27, they asked whether a "Yes" meant that the individual wished to volunteer. This clearly was not the intention, but the Army itself must have been confused, for in its General Instructions to Team Captains was the statement, "Male Citizens who answer Questions 27 and 28 of DSS Form 304A in the affirmative will execute, in the presence of the Team personnel, DSS Form 165."¹¹ Yet, the latter form was to be executed only by those wishing to volunteer. There were Nisei who resented the segregated military units,

¹¹WRA Community Analysis Report, "Army and Leave Clearance Registration at War Relocation Centers," June 1943.

but who interpreted the acceptance of service "wherever ordered" as implying a sanction of any conditions imposed by the Army. Persons with personal and family problems were fearful that affirmative answers to 27 and 28 might lead to immediate induction by selective service, but they feared that a negative answer to Question 27 might imply disloyalty. Apart from the question of military service, there were objections to swearing "unqualified" allegiance to the United States when the nation did not grant unqualified rights of citizenship; and others objected to the inference in the statement, "Foreswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor," that citizen evacuees had an allegiance to the Japanese emperor that they should renounce.

Finally, considerable concern developed about the title of WRA Form 126 and 126 Revised, "Application for Leave Clearance," for many evacuees interpreted the title as implying a desire to relocate. In view of the WRA's recent vigorous promotion of the relocation program, some suspected a ruse by the agency to get signatures on a document by which the evacuees could be forced out of the centers.

These difficulties about the questionnaires were faced in all the centers. But the ambiguities at Tule Lake were aggravated by the way in which the registration was organized. The procedure as it was outlined in the instructions to the block managers was:

Registration will be conducted in the block managers' offices. School teachers, a Caucasian teacher and a Japan-

ese American assistant in each block, will serve as registrars. The block managers are responsible for notifying the residents of their turn to register, assist as interpreters, and otherwise helping the registrars. Except for those who have registered for repatriation to Japan, registration is compulsory for all evacuees seventeen years or more. Registration will start in all the blocks on the morning of February 10, and will proceed barrack by barrack beginning with the lowest numbered apartments. The females and aliens complete their registration at the block manager's office, but the Nisei males of draft age are required to proceed to specially designated offices where army personnel will supervise the military conscription part of the registration.¹²

The procedures at the Minidoka and Granada Projects, where the registration was most successful, were quite different. At Minidoka the registration was started at one end of the project and was completed two blocks at a time until the other end was reached. At Granada, the registration of male citizens on the selective service questionnaire was completed first before the application for leave clearance was undertaken. These methods were in contrast to the procedure at Tule Lake where registration was started in all the blocks at the same time and on all the questionnaires simultaneously. Several disadvantages resulted from the latter. The presentation of all the questionnaires at the same time not only created confusion about the different types involved, but the resistance induced by each questionnaire had a multiplicative effect upon the resistances toward the other questionnaires. Furthermore, since all the blocks started registration at the same time, when difficulties arose they aroused a collective reaction of the entire Tule Lake population, but the reactions at Minidoka could largely

¹²Field Notes, February 9, 1943.

be restricted to those blocks in which the registration was taking place greatly simplifying the problems of control. In general, the procedure followed at Tule Lake favored the appearance of crowd-like reactions and presented circumstances favorable to the extremist leaders.

Collective Definitions of the Crisis Situation

The initial confusion.--Not the least important of the factors underlying the registration crisis were the issues which the program created among the evacuees. The basic issues did not all stand out immediately, but as we pointed out the registration touched on matters of fundamental concern to the evacuees, and it was not long before the issues became collectively defined.

On the morning of February 10, block managers notified the residents of the first barracks that they were to register. Very few persons registered, and here and there incidents occurred which gave hints of the troubles to come. At an office in 1608 where a sergeant was stationed to interview citizen males:

One Issei came yelling in to prevent his son from joining the Army. He was almost violet. Then a Kibei came walking in and in a loud voice he demanded that his citizenship be revoked. Everybody was so shocked that they just sat around listening to him raving away. Since he spoke in Japanese, the soldier there didn't know what he was talking about and no one volunteered to interpret it for him.¹³

Other reports began to circulate of Nisei and Kibei who had torn up their birth certificates in symbolic repudiation

¹³Field Notes of Tamotsu Shibutani, February 10, 1943.

of their American citizenship when they learned that they were being asked to serve in the American Army after being subjected to the evacuation. In all the blocks questions arose about the interpretations which would be given their answers, and the Council and Planning Board offices were flooded with calls regarding various problems of registration.

From the reactions of the people, three issues were immediately apparent: (1) the absence of guarantees for future security and equal opportunities in the event the male citizens were inducted, (2) the objectionableness of the title, "Application for Leave Clearance," and (3) the inability of the Issei to answer Question 28. Anticipating difficulties if something was not done to prevent trouble, a committee of the Council and Planning Board went to Mr. Cobley and Lieutenant Carroll with three proposals. First, the committee requested a three day postponement of the registration to allow time for its clarification. Carroll claimed that registration for military service could not be suspended because of selective service regulations, but Cobley agreed that the registration for leave clearance might be suspended. Second, the difficulty of Question 28 for aliens was pointed out. Cobley admitted the difficulty, and replied that it would be permissible to leave the question a blank or give a qualified answer, but he desired two or three days of observation. If the registration showed confusion, he agreed to wire Washington for clarification. Third, the committee requested permission to change the title of WRA Form 126 from "Applica-

tion for Leave Clearance" to "Registration for Leave Clearance," to which Cobley was agreeable. Cobley and Carroll suggested that if all the questions pertaining to the registration were gathered together, they would answer them or refer them to Washington.

A meeting of the Council, Planning Board and Block Managers called on the same afternoon for the purpose of compiling the questions threatened to become a protest meeting. The main concern was with Question 28 for the aliens. It will be remembered that the Issei were asked to foreswear allegiance to Japan. As persons ineligible to citizenship, the Issei faced the paradox of not wishing to be disloyal to the United States, but also of not wishing to disavow the only citizenship which they had.

During the discussion, at least three points of view were offered of how to deal with Question 28. Some Issei wanted the question restated or taken out to remove the dilemma. A group of extremists, however, quickly dominated the meeting with strong recommendations that everyone answer with an unequivocal "No." The argument went:

1st Issei: To Americans this question is very simple for it means that there is only one country of their allegiance. Now, it seems that in this camp there is some doubt as to how this question should be answered. But I believe a little thought will show that the answer for the Japanese is as simple as for the Americans. For us Japanese there can be no problem as to how we are to answer this question. Can we foreswear allegiance to the Emperor? The answer is, "No!"

Nisei: Does the man realize that we Nisei also have a stake in this question? Some of us want to remain in this country, and we also have Issei parents who may want to remain with us. It isn't as simple as merely to answer "No" to the question.

2nd Issei: If it is compulsory that we answer Question 28, then we should answer "No." (Applause)

3rd Issei: In my opinion we should all, without further quibbling, agree to register the answer "No" to Question 28. (Applause)

4th Issei: How would it be if we asked for a general opinion on this issue right now?¹⁴

It should be added that there were many Issei who agreed with this view during the heat of these angry discussions, but who later quietly registered in the affirmative when the question was modified. The pressure to get common agreement upon some specific protest response was also to become a prevalent feature of the registration period, but on this occasion Dick Yokoda, chairman of the Council who was presiding, avoided the issue by adroit chairmanship.

A third suggestion was that some means be found to avoid the entire registration. One speaker urged inspection of the Geneva Convention to determine whether the evacuees could be considered "prisoners of war" and thus come under the protection of the clause restricting forcible questioning of prisoners. A study of a copy of the Treaty gave inconclusive results, but a related idea that was suggested eventually gained importance. Because of the vagueness of the instructions on the previous day, some people were under the impression that the registration was not compulsory. Rowalt's statement in the Tulean Dispatch, as one person pointed out, clearly stated that the registration was compulsory for everyone over seventeen.¹⁵ Nevertheless, there was evident confusion on this point. Others raised questions about the degree of compulsion involved, if the

¹⁴Field Notes, February 10, 1943.

¹⁵Tulean Dispatch, February 4, 1943.

registration were compulsory. Cobley's agreement to allow blanks or qualified answers on Question 28 for the Issei, and his permission to suspend the leave clearance registration for three days were given relatively scant attention.

Block meetings held on the same evening ostensibly for the purpose of gathering questions became more an occasion for the expression of opinions and the formation of block policies with regard to the registration. These meetings during the registration period were unusual for their very large and prompt attendance. Block reactions varied according to leadership and composition. In one block with a minority that favored registration, the following discussion occurred:

Harry Uyeda, Kibei councilman of the block, reviewed the meetings of the morning and afternoon, and clearly stated that the objective of the block meeting was to gather questions. The Planning Board representative spoke cautiously of the opinions at the afternoon meeting, and mentioned that he himself favored answering "No" to Question 28, but he advised careful thought upon the problem. The Issei present seemed predominantly in favor of a "No" answer.

But the chief concern was upon the Nisei registration. Arai, who has a son of military age, referring to a statement by Mr. Cobley that by volunteering the Nisei's responsibility to prove their loyalty when the Government showed little regard for the Nisei's rights. He also wanted to know what assurance the Government gave that parents would be cared for if the sons were inducted. Resentment of white discrimination dominated the discussions. As one Issei put it, "If the Nisei are used in combat, they'll be sent to the forefront of battle, just as the Negroes were in the last war. The keto are out to save their own necks, and they come running to us only when they need help. Yet they give us nothing in return for what they ask." Other Issei spoke in a similar vein.

Some Nisei who had seldom attended block meetings before and had never spoken previously were quite articulate on this occasion. Kaz Akagi, a college-age youth whose parents were much afraid of his induction, spoke at length of the discrimination against the Japanese minority.

Said he, "We need to start fighting for our rights. We've been kicked around all our lives because of race prejudice, and it's time we started doing something about it. . . . We have to take into consideration our parents too." Ed Kimura, a married Nisei of thirty, also referred to the discrimination, giving examples of it against the Nisei in the Army. He felt that if the President and the press came out in support of the Nisei, the problem might be considered differently. Ed's brother, a Kibei, speaking in Japanese, exclaimed, "I want to speak as a Nisei, a citizen of the United States. As far as I am concerned, my answer to Question 28 is 'No!'" (Applause.) Only one Nisei, a married girl, spoke up to say, "As long as the registration is compulsory, is there any reason why the Nisei shouldn't sign? I think it's pretty clear what our allegiance is."

Toward the end of the meeting, Kaz Akagi moved that the block people agree not to register until their questions were cleared up. Chairman Uyeda blocked the motion by referring to the purpose of the meeting and the compulsory nature of the Nisei's registration. However, the insistence of Akagi and others forced a vote, and a clear majority voted in favor of the postponement. The chairman prevented embarrassment by not calling for the contrary vote.¹⁶

In Block 25, a conservative rural group, the view was overwhelmingly that everyone, both Issei and Nisei, should answer "No" to Question 28. It will be noted that this was a different reaction from that of taking a block vote to get agreement upon postponing the registration. In Block 47 the Nisei councilman arranged the meeting so that the Issei would discuss their problems in a separate group from the Nisei and Kibei. The Issei decided to register under the provision that Question 28 might be omitted. Among the Nisei and Kibei, it was agreed that Question 28 was a routine question asked of anyone requesting leave clearance and that there should be no hesitation about answering "Yes." In still another block, strong pressure was exerted toward getting a unanimous agreement not to register until further clarification had been received, when an Issei Christian

¹⁶Field Notes, February 10, 1943.

minister, Reverend Shirata, arose and declared, "I am an Issei born in Japan, and I do not have citizenship in this country. However, since it is my intention to remain in this country, I intend to register and to register 'Yes' on Question 28."¹⁷ The minister's statement prevented a vote on the motion, but he was later beaten for this action.

The hundreds of questions submitted to Copley and Lieutenant Carroll reflected the confusion of the people, first, with respect to the technical aspects of the registration procedure, and, second, regarding the rights and duties of evacuees as it bore upon their answers to the questionnaires. A series of questions referred to the difficulty of the Issei in answering Question 28, but this difficulty was removed by a teletype message from Dillon Myer received on the third day of registration, which said:

The following question shall be substituted for question 28 in Form 126 Revised for aliens: "Will you swear to abide by the Laws of the United States and to take no action which would in any way interfere with the war effort of the United States?"¹⁸

The Issei generally agreed that the substitute question was reasonable, but a number of other issues remained unsolved. The various questions when classified reduced to the following types:

1. What interpretations will be given to various combinations of "Yes" or "No" answers on Question 27 and 28, especially for the Nisei males? That is, what do "Yes" or "No" answers mean?
2. What tangible advantages, such as the reopening of the

¹⁷Field Notes, February 11, 1943.

¹⁸Tulean Dispatch, February 13, 1943.

Pacific Coast, may be expected if the Nisei enter military service?

3. What are the reasons for the segregated combat unit, the filing of a special selective service form, and the restrictions against the entry of Nisei soldiers into the exclusion area which prevents their visiting parents in the relocation center? Are these not discriminatory?
4. What provisions will be made for the care and support of parents and families of inducted Nisei who are left in the centers?
5. Is not the "Application for Leave Clearance" a device to force the people out of the centers?
6. What guarantees of equalitarian and friendly treatment from the majority group are there if the evacuees answer "Yes" to the loyalty question? What are the consequences if they answer "No?"
7. Is the registration compulsory, and on what legal grounds can the WRA force compliance?¹⁹

The administration added to the cross pressures in the situation by announcing that, "The penalty for not registering on Form 304-A by all male citizens over the age of 17 and under 38 is \$10,000 fine or 20 years in prison, or both."²⁰

Thus, the first days of the registration were spent in clarifying questions which might have been discussed and settled before the beginning of registration. In the meantime, although there were numerous meetings as well as informal discussions of the registration issues, there was little or no registration taking place in the blocks. Unfortunately, the initial resistance that had been aroused by the unfortunate wording of Question 28 for the Issei established a tendency with respect to the entire registration.

Formulation of the issues.--After the difficulty about

¹⁹Memorandum to Mr. Dick Yokoda, Community Council, and Mr. M. Kinoshita, Planning Board, from H. M. Copley, Feb. 12 and 15 1943.

²⁰Field Notes, February 12, 1943.

Question 28 for the Issei was removed, the concern of the evacuees focused mainly on two aspects of the registration, first, the induction of the Nisei, and, second, the possibility that the residents would be forced to relocate by signing the application for leave clearance. The first of these questions attracted the greater attention, although the problems with respect to the latter dovetailed into those of the first.

The question as to whether the Nisei males should register for induction involved a number of subsidiary issues which became the focal points of conflict between groups of differing views. Chief among the issues was: What kind of future opportunities may the Nisei expect if they choose to remain in the United States, and what by contrast, would be their expectations in Japan? At one block meeting:

No one else had an opinion to offer, and the chairman called upon Joseph Sawada (a Kibei, with six years of education in Japan, and a college graduate in this country) to give his point of view. He got up and spoke in English saying that the time had come for Nisei to get off the fence and make up their mind on which side they stand. He pointed out that loyalty to one's country was an important thing, and the Nisei had only one citizenship. . . . He also hinted that Nisei cannot be sure of a welcome in Japan (from his own experience). He stressed the fact that the problem was an individual one and each one should make up his own mind.

After he finished speaking there was a great silence. Clearly the large majority of the audience did not agree with him. Then one young Nisei about nineteen or twenty got up and said that he was against serving in the Army because the treatment of the Japanese in the Army was going to be discriminatory. Another said that he was against serving because Nisei had no rights at the present time anyway. Mr. Yamasaki said that Sawada was not accepted in Japan because he did not try, hinting that he could not speak Japanese well. He felt sure that the Nisei would be welcome in Japan. Takeda sneered that those who could not be assimilated in a country were at fault themselves.²¹

²¹Field Notes of James Sakoda, February 10, 1943.

And as another Issei with a grown son of military age remarked in an informal small group discussion:

Some Nisei are absolutely baka (fools). The question in this issue is whether one wants to preserve his life, or whether he wants to preserve a worthless citizenship. Any "punkinhead" should know the answer to that one.²²

Glowing accounts were often given of the future that would lie ahead of the Nisei in Japan or Manchuria and other conquered territories in the Far East. This, too, involved speculation about an unknowable future, but the groups arguing in this vein had the advantage of being able to point to the patent lack of opportunities for the Nisei in this country. In the light of the evacuation, it could readily be argued that continued belief in a future in this country was based on an illusory faith.

I accidentally overheard a terrific argument in the Arai family between Sam and Ruth, the son and daughter, and their father. Mr. Arai was violently opposed to Sam and Ruth registering, and rather preferred that they repatriate. He demanded to know how they could be so stupid as to have continued faith in the United States when, despite their citizenship, they had been evacuated. He listed all the evidences of discrimination against the Japanese before and after the evacuation, dwelling long and harshly upon the efforts of various California organizations to take away Nisei citizenship, the confiscation of evacuee property by local government and interest groups, the activities of the Dies Committee, and the mistreatment of beet sugar workers helping the war effort. He asked again and again if these were not sufficient evidence of the treatment the Japanese would receive in America in the future. Sam and Ruth were having a difficult time countering their father's embittered comments on race discrimination. Mrs. Arai, who has a mind of her own, today was trying to mediate the differences between father and children. Sam finally said with irritation, "If you haven't any trust in the Government, there's no use arguing. You think Japan is such a wonderful place, so why don't you and mother go on back there. Ruth and I will stay here; we'll get along." With that, he banged out of the house.²³

²²Field Notes, February 18, 1943.

²³Field Notes, February 14, 1943.

In this form, the issue became a question of answering "Yes" on Question 28 with the expectation of seeking a future in this country, or of answering "No" and of deciding upon a future in Japan. As vociferous as the group was which favored the negative answer, large stakes were nevertheless involved in such an answer, and considerable hesitation was actually felt about giving an unequivocal "No." Many felt that if the Government would give clear-cut guarantees of the restoration of the evacuees' rights, for instance, by reopening the Pacific Coast and returning the people to their former homes and communities, that they would then have no hesitation about answering affirmatively to the loyalty question. Consequently, one of the primary issues was: Should the evacuees wait to get such proof and assurance first before registering? To the degree that the evacuees supported the view of waiting to get guarantees before registering, the completion of the registration was forestalled. As one Nisei argued in contradicting a speaker who had declared that in view of the compulsory nature of the registration, there was no time to wait for guarantees:

No, I disagree. I think this is the time for all Nisei to get together and make a stand for their rights. I am as willing as anyone else to shoulder a gun for the United States. But before I do that, I want to know three things. In the first place, there has been a lot of discrimination against the Nisei in the Army. I think it's pretty bad when Nisei who are even willing to give up their lives for their country are discriminated against. Another thing I'd like to know is, when are the newspapers and magazines going to stop printing propaganda stories of the Japanese? The Government can control these expressions, yet they permit these things to continue. I think we should also wait to find out how the Government is going to take care of our mothers, fathers and sisters before we go into

the Army. We've got to think of our parents; we Nisei can't go our own way without consideration for our parents. We should demand that the Government give us an answer on these three points before we register. The Nisei should unite themselves to gain these demands.²⁴

From these discussions there resulted other primary issues. Should the evacuees register? And was the registration an individual problem, or was it a collective problem in which the group could demand conformity with a majority decision?

The issues surrounding the discussion of the leave clearance registration took much the same form. Was there reason to distrust the WRA's contention that no forced relocation of the evacuees was contemplated? What guarantees would the Government give that the Pacific Coast would be reopened to the evacuees for relocation, and what guarantees would be given regarding the restoration of losses and rights?

Inaction as tentative solution.--Administrative reports on the progress in registration were discouragingly poor. In the third day of registration, most blocks reported, "None registered, no activity," or, "Three registered, no activity;" and in Blocks 47 and 16 where the residents had proceeded to register under encouragement from the block leaders, these same residents suddenly became panic stricken and asked to have their signatures erased from the registration forms.

It has been seen that there were diverse reactions to the registration issues. Some wished to register and answer affirmatively to the loyalty questions; a few Nisei males wanted

²⁴Field Notes, February 16, 1943.

to volunteer for the combat team. Others who had serious doubts about a future in this country, were inclined to answer negatively, and were easily influenced by extremists who enjoyed the opportunity to voice strong nationalistic sentiments. Parents were fearful of their sons' induction, and preferred that the latter repatriate rather than to be taken into the Army. The Nisei did not want to give up their citizenship, and still others wished to wait for guarantees from the Government before making any decision.

Intense personal conflicts were aroused by these cross-pressures. For example, there was the indecision of a Kibei youth of about twenty-five who had received several years of education in Japan and was attending college in this country prior to evacuation:

He has been to Japan for a number of years and went through a commercial school, and returned to America in 1941. He speaks Japanese well, and English with a slight Kibei tinge. He has been to Junior College and is desirous of getting more education in America. He associates with Niseis, and seems to prefer their company to the company of Kibeis. This Americanized trend plus his education has made him see that he has an obligation to the United States at this time. Evidently he has argued with his parents that he is going to answer "Yes" to Question 28, and they insist that he should answer "No." He is worried because he does not know what to do. He is inclined, it seems, to go ahead and answer "Yes" just the same.²⁵

(Four days later) The last time I spoke to him he was in doubt as to whether he should comply with the pressure that his parents were putting on him to make up his mind to live in Japan. Yesterday, however, I learned that he had changed his mind. His argument was that if he should fight for the United States he would never be accepted in Japan as a fullfledged Japanese. His excuse seems to be rather weak, but he wants to believe firmly in it. However, after listening to further arguments for American from some Nisei, he seemed to reconsider his position again.

²⁵Field Notes of James Sakoda, February 13, 1943.

I think he is still on the fence, not knowing exactly where he stands.²⁶

Because of the greater stakes involved in the Nisei male registration, the pressures upon this group were the greatest; but the demands of family solidarity brought pressure upon all the members to act uniformly with regard to the registration.

Mary was crying in the office today. She says she doesn't want to go to Japan, but her parents are insisting that she answer "No" and eventually repatriate. It seems her folks are afraid her brother will be drafted. Mary says she wants to stay in this country even if she's here alone, but her parents won't hear of it. She doesn't know what to do, and goes about her work all day with that worried and tense look. For a while she kept saying she was going to register "Yes" in spite of her parents, but I guess her folks are putting on a lot of pressure and she's afraid now that she'll have to agree with them.²⁷

The Issei, too, even those without grown male children, were likewise caught in the toils of the dilemma.

Mr. Tomita is a poor but fairly intelligent Issei of about fifty-five years who operated a small farm in Oregon before evacuation. His wife is definitely feeble-minded and is the object of both pity and irritation in the block. They have four children, all apparently normal but unkempt, the oldest of whom is about ten. The family finances are clearly in a bad state. During the sugar beet harvesting season, despite Mrs. Tomita's inability to manage the household adequately by herself, Mr. Tomita went out on seasonal leave hoping to improve their financial status. Although he is generally a rather stable and thoughtful person, he has an exceptional suspicion of the leave clearance form and has several times questioned whether WRA 126 Revised might not be used to force people out of the centers. The problem of re-establishing the family on the outside weighs heavily on his mind, and he is therefore strongly opposed to signing the leave clearance application.²⁸

As it seemed to many persons caught in these circumstances, it appeared dangerous to answer "Yes" to the loyalty questions.

²⁶Field Notes of James Sakoda, February 17, 1943.

²⁷Field Notes, February 18, 1943.

²⁸Field Notes, February 17, 1943.

but it seemed equally threatening to answer "No." The least dangerous course appeared to be that of not registering, and the latter policy was likely to be safest if the entire community agreed unanimously against registering. Led by those who were aroused to intense uncertainty by the dilemma of the registration, and also by those who saw in the situation an occasion for protest, a widespread movement developed in the blocks to get block agreements of refusal to register.

The Organization of Resistance

Block alignments and conformity demands.--By the end of the first week of the registration, in a large percentage of the blocks there was a vocal majority of those who were opposed to the registration and whose aim was to gain block consensus on a policy of non-registration. Likewise, in these blocks there were in larger or smaller degree a minority that was in favor of registering and were staunchly opposed to agreement upon any block policy of nonregistration. Their point of view was that the registration was an individual problem (kojin, kojim no mondai da), and that whatever view anyone else might hold, they desired freedom to take individual action.

Certain characteristic differences existed in the membership composition of the anti- and pro-registration groups. using data from the completed registration, Dorothy Thomas and George Kuznets analyzed statistically the difference between the "loyal" and "disloyal" at Tule Lake in the period including and immediately following the registration. While their defini-

tion of the "loyal" and "disloyal" do not exactly correspond with our meaning of pro- and anti-registration, the meanings are sufficiently close to make their characterization applicable to the present account. They report:

Statistical analysis of variations in proportions "disloyal" indicates significant and systematic "net" relationships (when all possible factors are held constant) with a number of exogenous variations in acculturation or assimilation; religious preference for the Occidental patterns of Christianity or agnosticism (low disloyalty) versus the Oriental pattern of Buddhism (high disloyalty); biculturalism in training and education, the extremes being the "pure" Nisei, educated only in America, and the Kibei returning recently after years of education in Japan; origin in certain areas of California, where economic and social segregation from the majority group was pronounced, as against origin in the more tolerant Pacific Northwest; occupation in nonagricultural pursuits, where, on the whole, contact with and accommodation to the majority group occurred to a greater degree than was true with the farming element. In brief, Buddhists were proportionately more "disloyal" than Christians or agnostics; the order of "disloyalty" proportions descended from Kibei to Issei to Nisei; Californians were more "disloyal" than Northwesterners. Less consistent on a "net" basis, but suggestive, were the differentials in occupation, the farming groups tending to be more "disloyal" than the nonagriculturalists.²⁹

It must be emphasized that this characterization was based on proportionate differences, that it does not refer to the variations which were also present. For instance, by the end of the registration 52 per cent of all the Nisei (including Kibei) and 58 per cent of all the Issei subject to registration answered affirmatively to Question 28. Furthermore, many Nisei were anti-registration, while there were Issei and Kibei who were pro-registration; and these variations were true for all the categories mentioned in the above quotation. But in all the blocks it was apparent that the anti-registration forces

²⁹Thomas and Nishimoto, op. cit., pp. 105-106.

were led by the Issei and Kibei, and heavily supported by those who were least assimilated into American society.

As in earlier periods of peak tension, much of the resistance to WRA policy was organized within the blocks, and it could be said that much the same action structure, of protest leaders and followers, was utilized in organizing the opposition to the registration. The chief differences were the greater importance of the role of the Kibei on this occasion, the number of Nisei who gave vocal support to anti-administration views, and the high intensity as well as the great enlargement of the supporting group. Furthermore, the structure varied from previous organizations in terms of the particular issue involved, for some individuals and families saw in the registration critical personal stakes of a kind not involved in earlier issues. The Kibei's active role in the anti-registration movement, for instance, resulted from their peculiarly difficult situation, that they were mostly male citizens and therefore were subject to induction, but that many of them had received much of their education in Japan and found difficulty in denying allegiance to Japan or in engaging in a shooting war against Japan, especially in the light of the evacuation.

It was largely in block meetings that the alignments were determined and that pressure was exerted toward conformity with the policy of non-registration. The cleavages in Block 5, for example, might be pictured as follows:

Block 5 had a mixed composition of families about equally divided between those from an isolated farming community in

northern California and those from rural and urban Oregon and Washington. On previous issues, most of the Issei had anti-administration, only a small group of them holding to an essentially neutral view. There was a minority of Nisei, mostly from the Northwest, who were pro-registration; a smaller group of the same age, mostly from rural California, who were anti-registrationists; and a number of younger Nisei of registration age who were influenced by their parents against registration. A small group of Kibei, less significant politically than in some blocks, played an active role in the registration issue.

The chairman of the block meetings was either Harry Uyeda (Seattle), the Kibei councilman, or Joe Murakami, the young Issei block manager. Both of these men were against interference with the registration, and despite criticisms and threats from some block residents, used their chairman's prerogative in preventing action that would embarrass the pro-registration group. Mr. Shimomura, the Issei representative to the Planning Board, who had a son of military age, was opposed to the registration, but was very cautious about expressing his personal views in these meetings. He had been a compromise choice for the office after Mr. Uyeda had resigned following some block trouble.

From the first meeting on the registration, Mr. Arai (Portland) and Mr. Akagi (Seattle), both of whom had sons of military age, spoke strongly against the registration. Arai was excitable and weak, fearful of the consequences of his son's induction; Akagi appeared to speak mainly from family self interest. Both of Arai's grown children were opposed to their father's view; but Akagi's son, Mas, was one of the Nisei leaders of the anti-registration group. At the first meeting, he forced the chairman to take a vote on his motion for a block compact against registration until further clarification had been received, and later at a Nisei meeting, he unsuccessfully led another similar attempt. Mr. Uyeda, Harry's father, was the best educated and most capable of the Issei leaders, a strong-headed man who engaged in violent arguments with his son over the issue, but he was somewhat restrained in the meetings by the knowledge of his son's contrary views. Uyeda had a following, but Arai and Akagi could be called leaders only by virtue of the frequency with which they articulated the popular anti-registration position. A few other Issei spoke at the meetings, but their voices were largely supplementary to the arguments of Uyeda, Akagi and Arai.

One family, the Kimuras, played a particularly prominent role in the registration controversy. Ed Kimura, the eldest son, assumed the leadership of the Nisei anti-registration group, and teamed with Mas Akagi in trying to organize the block Nisei in this direction. At the same time, he apparently did not condone strong-arm methods and was concerned to restrain his hot headed Kibei brother, Jim, who wanted everyone to join in an unequivocal anti-registration posi-

tion and favored the use of coercive methods to achieve this end. This family of eight, including the daughter-in-law, quite obviously constituted a solid bloc opposed to the registration, and by their persistent efforts to gain block agreement upon non-registration, made of themselves anathema to the pro-registration group. Members of the latter group were particularly afraid of Jim Kimura whose tough habits and violent temper made it appear possible that he would resort to gangster tactics to gain his end. A group of Kibei who voiced strong objections to the registration gave support to Jim Kimura's extremist views.

The minority of Nisei, Issei and Kibei who favored registration rarely spoke at the meetings for it was apparent that argument would have little effect in swinging the views of the anti-registration group, and the expression of pro-registration views could only bring criticism and danger to one's self. Harry Uyda was largely left to defend the rights of the pro-registration group by himself. At the Nisei meeting, others showed a more noticeable tendency to speak out against the anti-registration program.

No clear-cut leadership and followership emerged, but from these meetings and the common gossip of the block, it was made quite clear how the residents of the block aligned themselves on the registration issue. There were those whom one eyed with suspicion and an undertone of antagonism, and there were others, even those who had hitherto been relative strangers, with whom one felt a common bond of kinship.

In some blocks more definite forms of organization emerged. Leaders stood out more sharply, and cliques existed which planned policies and maneuvers. But in most blocks the conditions were similar to that in Block 5, in which the organization of sentiments, and the followers simply aligned themselves behind the chief protagonists of their view.

One further step in organization was taken at this stage with the introduction of petitions declaring the refusal of people to sign the applications for leave clearance. These petitions first appeared in Ward II, on February 14 which was four days after the opening of registration. Where the petitions were considered in block meetings, it seems that the

block residents generally voted favorably upon them. However, it was not until somewhat later that these petitions became a community-wide phenomenon, and acquired greater significance. The more systematic organization of resistance in the community was to come with the increase of administrative pressure upon the evacuees.

Effects of administrative pressure.--The final efforts at the clarification of the registration were made by Mr. Cobley and Lt. Carroll at a joint meeting with the Planning Board and Council on February 15. The administration waited one day to note that there were no changes in the community's reaction, and then announced on February 17 a new set of registration rules.

The new rules were: (1) effective February 17 registration in block managers' offices will cease, and effective on the morning of February 18, all registration will be in the administration area; (2) beginning that morning, only citizens, both male and female, will register; the alien registration to be postponed until the completion of the citizens' registration; and (3) each day a list of the blocks which are to register will be published. The announcement was accompanied by a message from Mr. Cobley in which he urged the residents to cooperate, and warned that the failure of male citizens to comply was punishable under the Selective Service Act, and that willful obstruction of the military enlistment would be punishable under the Espionage Act by a fine of not more than \$10,000 or imprisonment for not more than 20 years.³⁰ Although no one at

³⁰Tulean Dispatch, "Supplement," February 17, 1943.

Tule Lake realized it at the time, the military registration was not under the authority of the Selective Service Act, and failure to comply was not punishable in the manner alleged.³¹ The announcements of the day also included instructions to male citizens of Blocks 13, 25, 32, 9, 42, and 53, and the female citizens of Blocks 15, 38, 36, 21, 44, and 70, to report for registration on the 18th.

On the evening of February 17 meetings were held in those blocks whose male citizens were required to register on the following day. At Block 32 where not only the Block residents but also many interested persons from all parts of Ward III gathered, a strong movement favoring agreement upon a non-registration policy was disrupted when the councilman from Block 24 suggested that if the youths failed to comply with registration regulations, there was danger of martial law being declared. In Blocks 25 and 42, however, block compacts which were agreed to by a large percentage of the male citizens were formed with the understanding that in the event of punishment for failure to register, there remained the alternative of filing repatriation papers. The Block 42 Kibei and Nisei were especially active in organizing the resistance by contacting the other blocks which were to register on the following day. An agreement was made for a meeting on the following morning, to which representatives from the blocks in question would be sent, at which plans would be discussed of what to do in the event that punishment was

³¹The military registration was ordered by the War Department and was not under Selective Service regulations. See, Community Analysis Report No. 93, WRA, p. 35.

meted out.³²

The male registration on the morning of February 18, the first day under the new plan, was very slow, and although the rate picked up in the afternoon, scarcely more than seventy-five of the 250 Nisei and Kibei males who were expected appeared for registration. On the other hand, at the office of the Internal Security Division, only a short distance from the registration station, a long line of Nisei and Kibei youths formed of those who were intent upon securing repatriation applications. Mr. Allenby, Chief of Internal Security, reported that 1,425 applications for repatriation were secured by the evacuees on February 18 alone, although only 214 applications were completed and filed by the midnight of February 18. Possession of the repatriation form, it seems, was regarded a safeguard in the event that punishment became imminent.

In the public statement issued by E. M. Rowalt, assistant national director of WRA, before the beginning of registration, it had been explicitly stated, "No registration will be made, however, of persons who have applied for repatriation."³³ Filing for repatriation was one method of avoiding the registration, and was somehow regarded as less dangerous than answering negatively to the loyalty questions. On the evening of the 18th, however, the Dispatch headlined a statement by Major Marshall, who had arrived on the previous day under special dispatch from the War Department to assist the

³²Field Notes of James Sakoda, February 17, 1943.

³³Tulean Dispatch, February 4, 1943.

registration at Tule Lake, in which the assumption that applicants for repatriation were exempt from the registration was denied. Repatriation procedures were continued until the noon of the following day when, upon confirmation from Dillon Myer of Major Marshall's interpretation, the office was suddenly closed, the discontinuance of repatriation was announced, and applicants were told that they had to register. Various rumors regarding the stoppage of repatriation appeared, and trouble impended in the administration area as a mob of fifty youths, mostly from Block 42 but supported by a crowd of others, marched upon the administration offices demanding that repatriation be reinstituted. The crowd gradually dispersed after a further clarification of the order by an administrative officer. Cobley later wrote to Myer complaining of the contradictory character of the orders, "Announcement of this only increased our problem as it convinced many dubious evacuees that the government was not acting in good faith."³⁴ The effect unquestionably was to increase the resistance of those who had counted upon repatriation as a method of avoiding the registration.

The hostility of many of the administrative personnel toward the evacuees which had been increasing steadily throughout the registration reached a boiling point during the rush on the repatriation office. The fire chief, seeing some of his workers in the queue in front of the repatriation office, forthwith discharged them. The project attorney remarked, "When I

³⁴Letter from Henry Cobley to Dillon Myer, March 6, 1943.

came back and saw these people lined up for repatriation, I wished for a machine gun for five minutes."³⁵ At the time Cobley had announced the new procedure of registration to his staff, he had concluded his instructions with the statement, "We have been weak; but now we will be strong."³⁶ There were some in the administrative personnel who would have used sterner methods than the Project Director in dealing with the recalcitrants.

On February 19, the administration made its first arrest when Murano, the alleged "Number One Agitator," was apprehended on a presidential warrant and confined at the Klamath Falls jail. Concerning the arrest, the project attorney wrote:

It appeared that at a joint meeting of the Planning Board, the City Council and representatives of the Administration and the Army, Murano arose and gave the speech of which I have already told you and which resulted in his apprehension. I questioned Murano and was satisfied that he was definitely anti-administration and probably pro-Japanese.³⁷

Murano's speech, made in Japanese at a public meeting, had actually been scarcely incendiary, and there were more dangerous men in the project, but the administration was convinced that a key group of obstructionists was blocking the registration, and desperate efforts were being made to determine who the anti-registration leaders were. Murano's arrest led to rumors that several people had been arrested, increased the inususpicion, and increased the fear of opposing the registration;

³⁵Field Report of Robert Billigmeier, "Registration at Tule Lake," p. 28.

³⁶Ibid., p. 26.

³⁷Letter from Patrick Reilly to Philip M. Glick, March 17, 1943.

but the arrest had little effect in lowering the resistance.

The failure of accommodation leaders.--When the difficulties of the registration first appeared, evacuee leaders felt that the administration had brought the trouble upon itself by failing to consult community leaders in preparing the registration program. Despite their resentment at the administration for its failure to take them into confidence, they were also conscious of a responsibility to help break the stalemate. The hope that the questions and answers submitted during the first week would clarify the problem for the evacuees and lead to their registration was rudely shattered by the evacuees' reaction that the answers were vague and unsatisfactory.

Dick Yokoda and Reverend Nishikawa of the Council and Planning Board, respectively, called an informal meeting of Nisei and Issei leaders because "conditions could only get progressively worse," and, "something definite has to be done to swing opinion in the other direction."³⁸ In this meeting of a dozen people, retrospective criticisms were made of what should have been done, and analyses were made in terms of the psychology of the evacuees, but no concrete suggestions for overcoming the resistance to registration were forthcoming.

In both the Council and the Executive Committee of the Planning Board, the general feeling was that the continued opposition to the registration was harmful to the community and unnecessary. Under pressure from both the residents as well as the administration to take leadership by stating their position

³⁸Field Notes, February 17, 1943.

on the registration, the Directors of the Planning Board and the Council met at the end of the first week of registration to prepare separate public statements. In the Council, the issue arising out of the discussion was: Should the Nisei first make demands for the recognition of their rights before registering, or should they register first and then make their demands? The councilmen representing the California blocks favored making the demands first, while those from the Northwest took the opposite view. The lengthy discussion proved inconclusive, and the statement prepared for the people was considered so ambiguous and meaningless as to be unsuitable for publication.

At the same meeting, the Council endorsed a statement, "To the Issei Residents," prepared by the Planning Board, the translation of which read in part,

As to the questions raised by you concerning the contents of the questionnaire, we have already received answers from the Administration as was reported to you at the block meetings last Tuesday evening, February 16, 1943. According to the investigations we have made, it seems to be clear that whether you register on Form 126 Revised, WRA, as "Application for Leave Clearance" or merely as "Registration," you will not be compelled to leave the project as long as you do not want to do so. And moreover, even if we all collectively refuse to register, we would not gain anything by so doing. As to why the Government makes it compulsory for you to register, the Administration answers that it is only for the purpose of having the status of all the Issei residents cleared within the shortest possible period of time. To those of you who have applied or who have decided to apply for repatriation, having made up your minds to return to Japan as soon as opportunity presents itself either before or after the war, this registration matters no longer. But to those of you who wish to remain in the United States of America even though you may have no intention of leaving the War Relocation Authority center for the duration, this is something which requires very careful thought, and which is not to be dealt with lightly. However, each family has different problems and the

Planning Board is not in a position to decide what to do for you all. Therefore, we urge you to give your utmost consideration to this matter, and make your decision most wisely.

Since the registering of the Nisei is concerned with the Selective Service, we desire that you give all the more serious consideration. We feel that the parents should act as consultants to their children so that your children may wisely make their decisions.

The Board of Directors of the
Planning Board³⁹

The plan was to mimeograph and distribute the statement to the community, but Mr. Cobley refused approval because of his objection to the clause, "Parents should act as consultants to their children. . . ." and to what he considered its ineffectiveness in expediting the registration program.⁴⁰ Thereafter, the Planning Board decided to instruct the residents to take their questions directly to the administration. Another statement prepared by the Planning Board Directors for issuance to the members of civic organizations declared:

This is to remind you that the representatives of the above mentioned organizations should make every effort to dissuade their block people from making any group decision.

Registration is a matter of individual judgment, and the final decision should be left up to each person. The Planning Board members are instructed to refrain from occupying an instrumental position at meetings that attempt to formulate such a policy.⁴¹

This statement too was rejected by Mr. Cobley with the comment:

³⁹Memorandum from the Planning Board to H. M. Cobley, February 18, 1943.

⁴⁰Report to Dillon Myer, "Chronological Order of the Registration, "Community Council and Planning Board, April 14, 1943.

⁴¹Memorandum from the Board of Directors of the Planning Board to Planning Board members, February 20, 1943.

I hardly believe it would assist materially in clarifying the situation. In particular, I feel that it would be unwise to concur in the first sentence of the second paragraph. Registration is not a matter of individual judgment. It is a requirement. For that reason, I feel the statement might possibly be misleading.⁴²

An observer in the administrative staff points out that Cobley and certain other individuals in the administration by this time thoroughly distrusted the Community Council and Planning Board. He wrote:

The project attorney confirmed this when he admitted that the project director and he himself regarded the civic bodies with suspicion during the registration crisis. He asserted that "we then wrongly regarded the city council and planning board as focal points in the resistance to registration." This point of view had been firmly implanted in the minds of the project director and the project attorney when the civic bodies refused to take a strong stand in favor of registration and maintained that registration was a matter for individual judgment.⁴³

The point of view was indeed an error for the two organizations contained precisely those community leaders who might have helped the administration in effecting the registration program. At the point when the Council and Planning Board were called upon to aid the administration, after the resistance in the blocks had become widely organized, it was both dangerous and useless for the organizations to take a strong stand in favor of registration. The point in time when these liaison organizations might have been helpful was before the beginning of registration. Before the rise of tension and excitement,

⁴²Memorandum from H. M. Cobley to the chairman, Planning Board, February 23, 1943.

⁴³Field Report of Robert Billigmeier, "Registration at Tule Lake," p. 112.

these parliamentary bodies might have been effective in leading rational discussions of the issues involved, and could have taken steps to prevent the rise in strength of the protest elements, but once the tension had arisen to a high level, the power was all on the side of the protest groups. As one person expressed this point, "The civic organizations had the responsibility of reaping the wild oats the WRA had sown."⁴⁴

Terrorism in Extreme Crisis

Reactions to administrative coercion.--Block 42, composed largely of farm families from Upper Sacramento Valley, was one of the six listed by the administration whose male citizens were required to register on the first day under the new plan. The project attorney said of the plan, "Major Marshall and Mr. Cobley decided to select various blocks known to be centers of agitation and force the registration in those blocks."⁴⁵ Presumably, Block 42 was selected by this criterion, but it was also decided that special attention should be directed at some single block, and for reasons not explained, "Block 42 was selected as the first guinea pig. . . ."⁴⁶

During the noon hour of February 18, their scheduled registration date, Mr. Cobley and Major Marshall unexpectedly appeared at the Block 42 mess hall where the people were gathered for lunch and spoke to the residents. Major Marshall emphasized the penalties for the failure to register, and Cobley

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 112.

⁴⁵Letter from Patrick Reilly to Philip M. Glick, Solicitor, WRA, Washington, March 17, 1943.

⁴⁶Ibid.

read the names of the 54 male citizens of the block who were required to register. By noon of the following day, only 19 had registered and 35 still remained unregistered. Again at noon of the following day, Marshall, Cobley, Allenby and Reilly appeared at Block 42, repeated in stronger terms the requirements of registration, and read the names of the 35 who were still unregistered asking each person to respond when called. Only a half a dozen men responded, and as the four men departed, the residents broke out in catcalls in Japanese, rattling of dishes, and the breaking of a few dishes to show defiance.

This was the same day that repatriation procedures were suddenly stopped. Upon hearing of this, the unregistered boys in Block 42, led by some Kibei, held a meeting at which it was decided that the group would descend en masse upon the administration to demand the right of repatriation. The approach of this delegation and the accompanying crowd caused a flurry of excitement in the administrative offices, but they merely handed to the internal security officer who met them at the door a batch of filled-out repatriation papers for themselves and families. They then handed him a paper which stated: "To the Board of Selective Service: We the undersigned do not wish to sign to selective service, but to repatriate we will sign any time. So until then there won't be any business."⁴⁷ Under this sentence appeared the typewritten names of 34 boys. The crowd then yelled "Banzai" and departed.

⁴⁷Letter from Patrick Reilly to Philip M. Glick, March 17, 1943.

Cobley, his staff, and the military officers immediately decided to arrest the thirty-four youths, but there were delays because it was felt that the internal security officers could not do it alone, and the WRA could not get immediate clearance for the Military Police to enter the project to protect the arresting officers. That evening, Allenby, who was genuinely concerned about the fate of the Block 42 youths, went to the block alone to try once again to persuade them to register. He was met only with hostility.

On Sunday noon, February 21, permission was finally received for the use of a limited number of the Military Police, and the arrest of the thirty-four youths was scheduled for 5:00 p.m. that evening. One Nisei reported of the arrest scene:

I got to Block 42 just as the troops had gathered the boys together in trucks and were preparing to depart. I had seen people from my block running in the direction of 42, as if there were a fire, and not knowing what was up, I ran with them. I was surprised to see all the soldiers, a dozen or more, standing around with Garand rifles, bayoneted, surrounding the entire block. No one was permitted to enter or leave the block while they were on guard. Four or five of the soldiers were extremely tense and had their fingers on the triggers though not pointing their guns, but others were very nonchalant and were merely packing their rifles by the barrel. I thought that something might happen, but no incidents occurred. Most of the boys in the truck, those who were being taken, were smiling and apparently unconcerned about their situation, as if they were on a lark. As the trucks were about to pull out, these boys waved their hands. Each had a little bag or suitcase.

A huge crowd of people were milling about on the fringe of the block. Boys in the crowd were taunting the soldiers, saying, "Bet you're scared to shoot at us. A bunch of cowards coming in with guns and bayonets. Why don't you shoot at us? Etc." I was horrified when, just as the trucks started to move, the people raised their hands in the air (both arms at once) and shouted, "Banzai! Banzai!"⁴⁸

⁴⁸Field Notes, March 1, 1943.

The same scene reconstructed by Takemori, the Kibei leader, is also worth reporting, for it was in reaction to the Block 42 incident that Takemori mobilized the Kibei, and the account reflects something of the sentiments which led him and others to take action.

About eight days after the commencement of registration there occurred an incident that many of us will not forget for a long time. An army of soldiers surrounded block 42 and at bayonet points, plus light machine guns, captured thirty-five boys of that block. I have heard about this occurrence from an eye-witness. Tears swelled my eyes as I heard his description of the heart rending scene. Where little brothers and sisters clung to the departing boys tearfully hysterical in their demand to wish to accompany them. Old men stood by helplessly, their eyes wet, dimmed, their lips hard pressed by angry teeth. Mothers pathetically waved farewells to boys whom they never expected to see again, their choked voices bade the boys "to take care of themselves--goodbye." Some men raised their voices above the tumult of the crowd and shouted lusty "Banzais" to impart to the departing boys that they would not be forgotten. All the residents of the near-by blocks attracted by the commotion in Block 42 massed there and witnessed this distressing sight. Those that saw this Commando style method of the army, hustling their prisoners into their trucks, were embittered with an impression that cannot easily be dismissed from their minds.⁴⁹

This version reflected the reactions to the Block 42 incident of a great many evacuees. Considering the wide publicity that was given the penalty for failure to register--of twenty years in jail and/or \$10,000 fine--the families undoubtedly expected the worst for their sons. In Block 42 immediately after the arrests, excited crowds milled about. As one person described it, "The situation was plenty tense and the people were plenty sore. Everyone was muttering threats under his breath. . . . They were all talking about vengeance."⁵⁰

⁴⁹Takemori, "The Factual Causes and Reasons Why I Refused to Register," Leupp Isolation Center, June, 1943.

⁵⁰Field Notes of Tamotsu Shibutani, February 21, 1943.

The immediate thoughts of vengeance were directed at the inu, both informers and collaborators in the registration, who by some logic were considered responsible for the arrests. News of the arrests spread quickly throughout the project. The idea that the boys were "arrested at the point of the bayonet" especially struck the imagination and created resentment.

Shortly after the arrests, meetings were called in Ward V which were marked by intense excitement. The main discussion concerned methods of gaining the release of the arrested youths, and with the extremists dominating the meetings, it was agreed that there should be no cooperation with the administration until the arrested youths were released. For instance, in Block 44 of Ward V, where there were a number of family friends of the Block 42 residents, the rules were established that, (1) no one should register until the youths were freed, (2) a petition signifying this stand should be circulated in the block and throughout the project, and (3) a general strike of the block people should be called for as long as the youths remained imprisoned. Because of the suspicion of inu, it was decided to post guards at every corner of the block to apprehend anyone behaving suspiciously, or signifying an intent to cooperate with the administration. Similar rulings were established in other Ward V blocks.

The peak of protest.--At 9:00 p.m. of February 21, four hours after the arrests, an emergency meeting of the Planning Board and the Council was called to discuss the release of the

arrested youths, and the further policy with regard to the registration. The civic leaders were incensed over the arrests, but the administration's evident intent to punish those who failed to register presented a serious problem to the community. The general strike and the nonregistration policy proposed at the Ward V meetings were also discussed, but the majority was opposed to such drastic action. "The Planning Board asked for a little more time, and said that if they could not solve the problem, they would turn the matter over to the group to do as it pleased."⁵¹ In extremely heated discussions that continued into the early hours of the morning, the Planning Board and Council finally agreed that a delegation should approach the administration on the following morning to request the immediate release of the arrested youths, and a new plan of registration.

Representatives who felt that the discussion of the general strike had been inconclusive routed block residents out the bed at 2:00 a.m. to discuss the problem of gaining the release of the arrested youths. Others called block meetings immediately after breakfast on the following morning. The ringing of mess hall gongs calling people to block meetings gave a sense of extreme emergency. Furthermore, the stillness of a sullen gray morning was broken at 8:00 a.m. by the wail of the fire siren blowing an unfamiliar oscillating signal that was to indicate the emergency closing of school. Someone had broken into the firehouse to set it off. Although much excited talk

of a general strike and of other possible methods of protesting the arrests occurred at these meetings, no concrete plans emerged.

The Planning Board and Council delegation met with Mr. Cobley and Major Marshall to request that the arrested youths be unconditionally released, no further arrests would be made, and questionnaires be sent and answered through the mail. All of these requests were refused. Cobley also indicated his distrust of the organizations and of his intention of carrying out the registration in his own way. In the afternoon the civic organizations met to hear the results of the negotiations. After deciding that they had the trust of neither the administration nor of the people, and that they could accomplish nothing further, the members of the respective organizations voted to resign en masse. In the evening, block meetings were called for the purpose of electing new Planning Board members--the Council election being withheld because of the complexity of its election--, but many difficulties were encountered in this election. In many blocks nominations were so maneuvered that the most vocal critics of the registration were nominated and elected, but those elected were often unwilling to accept the office. There seemingly was nothing as effective in quieting the critics as to elect them to a responsible office. From this point on, the role of the Planning Board in the registration was insignificant and other more significant events led to the denouement of the program.

On the same evening, February 22, one day after the arrests, the Kibei led by Takemori and some of his friends held

the first of the "Kibei Meetings." Of some estimated 600 male Kibei at the Tule Lake Project, about 300 attended the first mass meeting of their group. The prevailing sentiment was that the Nisei could not be trusted on the registration issue and were childish in their thinking about it, while the Issei were muddled and fearful of taking the necessary action. Particularly since the resignation of the Planning Board and the Council, it was felt that the Kibei must take leadership in the time of crisis.

The main point on the agenda was the writing of a petition against the registration which the Kibei hoped to circulate throughout the project. It seems there was some difficulty about maintaining discipline within the new organization and that opinion was divided as to the action which was needed. In particular, one section of the Kibei group favored the use of violence to silence certain pro-registration leaders, but the leaders of the meeting were opposed to such tactics. A petition was finally formulated which stated in substance:

Because of the past discrimination against the Japanese in America, and the unequal treatment accorded us in the present registration, we, the people of the Tule Lake Project, Newell, California, demand the following of the WRA:

- (1) That we hereafter be treated as Japanese nationals.
- (2) That we be taken at bayonet point by the Army and be given the same treatment as the 34 boys from Block 42.
- (3) That our absolute refusal to register be recognized.⁵²

The petition was apparently a part of the Kibei's strategy for gaining the release of the Block 42 youths. If the male citizens were regarded as Japanese nationals, they would not be

⁵²Field Notes, February 23, 1943.

subject to penalties for failure to comply with Selective Service regulations. And if the Army were forced to apprehend a great mass of the Nisei, it was felt that the Army would be embarrassed by the lack of space in which to confine such a large group. The scheme depended for its success upon the full support of all the male citizens and other evacuees; therefore, Kibei representatives with copies of the petition were assigned to each block to get the required signatures. As a further part of the plan, it was also agreed that a mass meeting should be held at the outdoor stage on the following morning, and a march upon the administration buildings be made to hand the signed petitions to Mr. Cobley and Major Marshall.

The Kibei meeting ended at 10:30 p.m., but to put the plan into immediate effect, it was necessary to call out the block residents to get their signatures. Block meetings were called into session as late as 1:00 a.m. in the morning, and in every instance considerable pressure was applied to get everyone's signature on the petition. A favorite tactic was to require the signing of the petition to take place publicly at the block meeting so that each person's stand on the issue would be known to all others. The following case is typical of the pressures to which the pro-registration minority was subjected:

We had a block meeting on Monday night which was adjourned after some discussion about electing a Planning Board representative and other matters. I went home and got into bed, but some time after midnight somebody started ringing the mess hall gong and people came around saying there was a meeting again. I later found out that the Kibei demanded a petition be presented to the people immediately. I wouldn't have gotten up if I'd known what it

was about, but like a sucker I got dressed again and went. The Kibei wanted the people to sign the petition. Some of the agitators were all for having everyone sign. I was trembling in my boots--I tell you, I was made, and I was scared. Jeb Adachi then told the Kibei off and said he wouldn't sign anything he didn't want to. He just got up and stomped out of the room. I admired his guts. I didn't know what to do, but I decided there wasn't any use my sticking around either, so I got up and walked out. Pretty soon there was a little group of us outside, and we talked things over wondering if the Kibei would try anything on us. One girl was so scared she started crying, but I told her not to worry and took her home. Actually, I don't think I had much more confidence than she did.⁵³

Knowing that the Kibei were not afraid to use violence, those unwilling to sign the petition faced a real danger in refusing cooperation. Despite the great amount of pressure from the Kibei and the anti-registration forces, however, there were invariably a few individuals who took the leadership in resisting the Kibei, thus encouraging others to do likewise. The Kibei pressure continued for several days, but the petition was not as successful as had been hoped. The march on the administration buildings planned for the following morning did not materialize.

Assaults on the inu and the function of terrorism.--From the first day of the registration, there had been a rapid rise of feeling against the inu. Rumor, which had some factual basis to it, spread that the JACL had actively promoted the Selective Service induction of the Nisei, and resulted in a revival of the hostility toward the JACL leaders. Takayama, Yada and Tanaka, the most prominent of these leaders, received anonymous threats and other indications of a possible attack from the anti-registration extremists. Takayama, the most widely hated of this group, rec-

⁵³Field Notes, March 12, 1943.

ognizing his extremely dangerous position, suddenly left the project on the second day of registration with the understanding that his wife and children would follow. The conditions in the block, however, were made unpleasant for his family, and the attempt of a group of Kibei to despoil the Takayama apartment was foiled only the presence of a Nisei strong man who had taken it upon himself to protect the Takayama family.

As the anti-registrationists engaged in violent criticisms of the WRA and the Government, their concern about the inu (informers) increased correspondingly. Following the Block 42 arrests, the concern acquired the proportions of a collective psychosis. But it was not only the inu in the sense of true informers who came under attack; anyone leading or speaking in favor of the registration was similarly labelled.

On the night after the arrest of the Block 42 youths, a group of Kibei, probably led by some extremist Issei from Ward V (especially Block 48), made a series of physical assaults and attempted assaults upon those whom they regarded as the prominent inu. One of those attacked was an Issei Methodist minister, Reverend Shirata, who had prevented a block compact against registration by speaking of his own intention to register. The Kibei forced their way into his home, and while a couple of men restrained his pregnant wife, others beat the minister about the body with a stick. A more serious beating was inflicted upon Matsuda, the Kibei editor of the Japanese section of the Dispatch, who lived in a block diagonally across from Ward V and

Block 48 in an isolated corner of the project. At a block meeting on the day following the arrests, when the Ward V petition signifying a refusal to register had been presented, Matsuda alone had spoken against it. Because of this, several Kibei broke into his home and struck him over the head with a steel file, allegedly with an impact so hard that it broke the file and necessitated twelve stitches in his scalp.

The attack upon Dick Yokoda, Chairman of the Community Council, failed when he was found not to be in at the time the Kibei visited his home. At the Yada home where Yada, the JACL leader, was sick in bed, his wife locked the door and windows when she sensed that a gang was seeking entry, and the latter left after breaking some windows. And in the attempted attack upon Reverend Nishikawa, an Issei Christian Minister and a Director of the Planning Board, the minister coolly invited the Kibei into his home and talked them out of making the attack. Every one of the chosen victims were men who had been prominent in trying to prevent block action against the registration, or who had tried to promote the registration.

To those who carried out these attacks, the victims and intended victims seemed thoroughly deserving of the beatings. By an unexplained logic it was concluded that such inu who had interfered with the forming of a united front against the registration had been responsible for the arrest of the Block 42 youths. Also, the pro-registration stand of these men endangered the position of those like the Kibei who found it difficult to answer the loyalty question in either the affirmative or negative.

and believed themselves best protected by the avoidance of the registration. In general, it was felt that these leaders were acting against the welfare of their own group. And now in the scheme to gain the release of the Block 42 youths through a united resistance of the entire community, these leaders were considered the chief threats to the program. By beating some of the pro-registration leaders, the extremists apparently hoped that others with similar inclinations might be intimidated into agreement with the anti-registration group.

Stories of the beatings were the talk of the community on the following morning; anti-registrationists who were openly delighted with the development told and retold with much elaboration what they knew of the attacks. They seemed to feel that the anti-registration forces had won a signal victory, and were particularly pleased with the obvious fear engendered among the pro-registration group. But as it will later be observed, the show of violence put the Kibei group in a bad light, split their group on the issue of violence as a method of control, and eventually helped to undermine the resistance to registration.

As a result of the extreme tension induced among the pro-registrationists by the beatings of Shirata and Matsuda, the thought of organizing a vigilantes committee to protect themselves apparently suggested itself to a number of individuals, but no action was taken at the time. At least one individual approached the administration to suggest that martial law would be a relief

after the strain of waiting for a beating, but both Cobley and Major Marshall indicated their reluctance about calling in the military police except as an extreme measure. Three nights after the first beatings, another attempt was made by a large gang of Kibei, this time upon a Mr. Ogawa, a resident of Block 42 who was rumored to be an inu. The attempt failed for several reasons, and the gang left after breaking several windows in the Ogawa home, but the attempted beating renewed the concern of pro-registration leaders to organize for self protection.

Led by men like Yokoda and Reverend Nishikawa who had already been threatened, meetings were held at which a plan was devised to organize some of the "tough" Nisei gangs like the Hawaiians, Pensioners, and Wakabas, who allegedly were "itching for a showdown fight with the Kibei," into "goon squads." A test of strength was to be made at the "Cal Club Rally" (University of California students) to which some Issei and Kibei had objected as long as the Block 42 boys were in prison, and which they had threatened to disrupt. The "goon squad" came prepared with clubs and lead pipes, but the Kibei, who by this time were having other troubles, failed to appear. The Hawaiians were said to have gone home disappointed. The vigilantes committee, in fact, was organized just when the resistance to the registration was about to be broken, and its effectiveness as a method of self protection never came under test.

The Decline of Resistance to Registration

Factors contributing to the decline of resistance.--

Among the conditions which contributed to the gradual breakdown of resistance were: (1) the parental fears aroused by the arrest of the Block 42 youths; (2) a reinterpretation of the registration issues made possible by further clarifications from the administration; (3) the failure of the Kibei protest movement; and (4) the arrest of a number of Issei and Kibei resistance and gang leaders.

During the week following the Sunday arrests in Block 42, a noticeable increase in the rate of registration occurred. On Monday, registration was slow since agitation to gain the release of the Block 42 boys was at its height and people were afraid even to approach the administration area. On Tuesday, however, 217 male citizens registered, more than on any previous day; and a new high was reached on Wednesday. This decline of resistance was particularly well reflected in the developments in Block 25, one of those which had been required to register on the same day as Block 42 but which likewise had agreed upon a nonregistration policy.

The most noticeable evidence of the change of sentiment in Block 25 was the sudden decline in power of the chief anti-registration leader, Tokita. During the registration crisis, Tokita had gained control of the block meetings, having pushed aside the block manager and planning board representative.

By Monday evening, (the day after the arrests), however, Tokita had become rather unpopular. He heard from someone in the block that some people questioned the fact that he was the right man to lead the people because he had no children. Probably the feeling was that Tokita as a leader was not considerate of the feelings of the parents. . . .

Tokita on his part evidently felt that things were not turning out so well and that his position was becoming very risky. Consequently, he offered to give up his leadership position, saying that he had no right to be a leader because he did not have a son.

When he left, however, he made a dramatic statement about how he had done all he could for the people even at the risk of his own life. He was willing to be dragged off by the FBI at any moment for the things he had said and done, and he felt that the block people did not appreciate it. Some of the block people asked him to continue with his leadership, and told him that it was cowardly to withdraw at that time. However, he preferred to drop out of the picture, and the majority of the people were willing to let him do so.⁵⁴

The observer suggests, "With Tokita out of the picture, the whole outlook for Block 25 changed." Several persons of pro-registration sentiments who had hitherto not said a word at the block meetings, now dominated the meeting. The block manager, the planning board representative, and an educated Kibei all spoke in favor of registering. A woman who was concerned for her sons "made an indignant appeal saying that the people should think more seriously about the matter instead of making a festivity out of it." The former chief cook arose and shouted, "That's right," and started to make a fiery, dramatic speech.

He argued that to Niseis with only an American citizenship the country was like a father, and there was nothing wrong in the father asking for an answer of Yes or No to a question. It was natural that all Niseis should go out and register. He spoke for some time, taking off his glasses and shedding tears and making those at the meeting, both Isseis and Niseis, do the same. The important thing was not what he said, but that he chose the psychologically right moment to say it. After he spoke there was a silence, no one saying anything for a while.⁵⁵

⁵⁴Field Notes of James Sakoda, February 23, 1943.

⁵⁵Ibid.

It was decided that the whole block should register if the administration would guarantee that the Nisei would not be drafted if they answered "No" to both Questions 27 and 28. The block manager was instructed to inquire of Mr. Copley on this point.

As a result of the inquiry by the Block Manager of 25, a mimeographed statement from Major Marshall was circulated in all the blocks stating:

Nisei or Kibel who answer "No" to questions No. 27 and 28, and who persist in that answer, cannot anticipate that the Army of the United States will ever ask for their services or that they will be inducted into the armed forces by Selective Service. . . .

A "No" answer on question 27, accompanied by a "Yes" answer on question 28, is not regarded by the War Department as a proof of disloyalty in the individual, or as bearing on that question. . . . these men have the minimum chance of being called into the military service.⁵⁶

This answer was heralded in Block 25, and elsewhere as well, as throwing an entirely new light on the problem. In Block 25 which had initiated the inquiry, the residents showed feelings of relief and euphoria.

The feeling of most of the people was that they had been about to commit a terrible thing, but had been saved from it. The two or three families who had been about the only ones to register were again treated by the block residents as one of them. The Planning Board had congratulated the block on its accomplishment. Feeling that the whole issue of registration was solved by this one move, of getting a signed statement from Copley, the block residents went on record asking that the City Council, which had resigned, reconsider its resignation and come back to work.⁵⁷

However, not everyone agreed that the issue had been solved. In particular, there was the problem of dealing with

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Field Notes of James Sakoda, February 23, 1943.

the Kibei organization which now dominated the protest movement in the community. Several blocks sent delegates to the Kibei Meeting to determine whether the Kibei did not also think that the administrative clarification of Questions 27 and 28 settled the difficulties. The Kibei not only rejected the suggestion, but prepared in answer a long statement entitled, "Why You Should Not Register," a badly written, garbled argument purporting to show that either positive or negative answers on the loyalty questions would play into the hands of people who wished to deprive the Nisei of their citizenship and property. A mimeographed copy was posted in every block. There was a good deal of ridiculing of the Kibei's arguments.

In most blocks there still were protest leaders who were strongly opposed to registration, but everywhere there were definite signs of the weakening of the mass support behind the protest. With this shift of mass sentiment, those who favored registration but who had hitherto been afraid to voice their views now began to speak openly of their opinions. For instance, at the Kibei meeting of Thursday, February 25, for every argument against registration, there were as many or more counter-arguments favoring registration. To the suggestion that no one should register until the Block 42 youths were released, speakers gave reasons for believing that the administration would be lenient with them especially if the community cooperated on the registration. The threat of punishment for the failure to comply, and the possible solution offered by the adminis-

tration's clarification of the loyalty questions were repeatedly mentioned. In the end, the conclusion reached was that each family would have to make its own decision about registration.

The Kibei organization which had suddenly emerged on the night following the Block 42 arrests made of itself a formidable group in the few days that it functioned. Using the slogan of "A united resistance to save the Block 42 boys who sacrificed themselves for us," the Kibei placed the block residents on the defensive by thus indicating their obligation to sign the petition of nonregistration. Moreover, although the Kibei organization was not directly responsible for the beatings, it was accredited with the responsibility, and the apparent readiness of the Kibei to use violence made them much feared. The Issei, for instance, treated the Kibei with a respect that was never shown the Nisei. This was in part due to the shift of role of the Issei resulting from the political emergency of the Kibei. Relative to the accommodationist Nisei, the Issei had been the radical protest group; but relative to the extremist policies of the Kibei, the Issei found themselves in an accommodationist role.

Nevertheless, the Issei still retained the balance of political power in the community, and the Kibei's failure to capture the Issei's support was an important factor in their lack of success in the role of leadership. Many Issei were disturbed about the extreme wording of the Kibei's petition, and by the latter's coercive tactics, for they were concerned that their children should not be arrested for their refusal

to register. The Kibei's use of violence also drew disapproval and even sharp criticisms from many quarters. Little things added to the critical attitude toward the Kibei. At the Kibei meetings to which the Issai were invited, the latter took affront at the Kibei's tendency to jeer at statements which they did not like. It was observed that their discussions were poorly organized, and that they seemed not to know what they were doing. Even the flashy striped shirt, scarf neckwear, and slicked hair of one of the Kibei leaders received adverse comment.

The ranks of the Kibei group itself showed disorganization. A number of those who at first responded to the call for support of the Kibei movement deserted for various reasons. They disapproved of the violence tactics. They disagreed with the extreme wording of the petition. Or they lost interest as the meetings failed to produce any practical plans for solving the difficulties. Between the leaders and sub-leaders, disagreement existed especially on the question of coercive tactics.

By the end of the week following the arrests in Block 42, the influence of the Kibei group and the anti-registration forces was noticeably on the wane; at least the pro-registrationists felt a substantial weakening of the pressure from the anti-registration movement. Nevertheless, the resistance to registration was still far from being broken, and uncertainty remained as to what new developments might arouse new tensions. Today, with all the facts at hand, it is possible to see that

the decline of resistance started almost simultaneously with the peak of protest shortly after the arrests in Block 42; but to evacuees in the situation without the advantages of hindsight or of a total view of the community, it was difficult to judge whether the weakened pressure from the anti-registrationists represented a trend or merely a pause before renewed action.

The final blow to the anti-registration movement was dealt when the administration initiated a series of arrests after the attempted beating of Mr. Ogawa in Block 42. On a lead received at the wardens' office, three Kibei who had participated in this attack were picked up by internal security officers soon after they returned to their apartments, and from information given by them, ten more were arrested on the following night on the charge of an attempted assault upon Ogawa. All of these men pleaded guilty, were tried in the county court, and received sentences of four or six months in the county jail with half of the sentences suspended. Some of these men in turn gave information about other Issei and Kibei resistance leaders which led to further arrests.

In the meantime, an unused CCC camp not far from the Tule Lake Project had been prepared for use as a temporary isolation center. The administration instituted a practice of calling in all the known Kibei who had failed to register, and of sending them to the isolation camp if they persisted in their refusal to register. As soon as it was learned that this practice was being followed, a large number of Kibei packed

their bags prepared to go directly to the CCC camp when their turn came. Some even volunteered for the camp. In those blocks, as in Ward V, where anti-registration feeling was still strong, the block residents joined in giving a warrior's send-off to the Kibei called for registration interviews; but in most blocks the processing attracted relatively little attention. During the early period of these Kibei interviews quite a number were taken to the camp, a few were dismissed, others were returned to the community to allow more time for thought, and a minority agreed to register after their questions were answered. Among the latter were even a few who answered affirmatively to Questions 27 and 28. By the middle of March, over 100 Kibei were confined at the CCC camp. Although 666 male citizens still refused to register at the end of registration, the apparent reason for not confining this entire group was the problem of sustaining such a large population at the CCC camp.

It will be remembered that the administration had earlier warned that a refusal of male citizens to register would be a violation of the Selective Service Act punishable by maximum penalties of twenty years in jail and/ or \$10,000 fine. On February 26, Dillon Myer informed Copley that due to a misunderstanding, "The Selective Service System therefore did not issue a regulation requiring the filling in of the questionnaires. . . ."⁵⁸ Under the circumstance, the only punishment which could be applied to those refusing to

⁵⁸Letter from Dillon Myer to Henry Copley, February 26, 1943.

register was for a violation of WRA regulations involving a maximum penalty of 90 days confinement in jail or suspension of certain compensation privileges or both. Trials were held, and a minority was given the maximum ninety days sentence and sent to the Moab Isolation Camp, the rest being returned to Tule Lake.

The balance sheet of the registration.--The registration of the male and female citizens had originally been scheduled to close on March 2. A summary of the registration through March 1 revealed, however, that 50 per cent of the male citizens and 48 per cent of the females still were unregistered. Cobley decided to extend the registration of citizens to March 10; and to encourage registration during this period, started the removal of the recalcitrant Kibel to the CCC camp on March 2 with the hope of thus reducing the anti-registration pressure in the community. The plan proved relatively successful, for about 1,600 additional persons registered during this period reducing the unregistered citizens to about 20 per cent.

According to the registrars who observed the registration during the extension period, those now registering were motivated by the desire of not being sent to the CCC camp. One of them reported, "Before this the majority of the people registered because they had definitely made up their minds as to how they would answer the questions. This is not so now."⁵⁹ In a sense, the extension period brought to a head for many of

⁵⁹Field Report of Robert Billigmeier, "Registration at Tule Lake," p. 65.

those registering all the doubts and problems which had constituted the basis of the mass resistance to registration. The result was that the majority of those registering in this period did so with misgivings, and that a high percentage answered "No" to both Questions 27 and 28. Due to the lack of space only a single illustration can be given of the characteristic dilemma of the Nisei who was faced by the alternatives of registration or of punishment for a violation of the Selective Service Act. The administration, it should be noted, never revealed the error of its original assumption that the military registration had been authorized by Selective Service. The following case is of a twenty year old Nisei male who remained unregistered until the last day of the extension period.

In the beginning of the registration, Bill Kawasaki had wanted to register affirmatively to the loyalty questions. However, his parents strongly advised him against it, and under the influence of his parents, friends, and block pressure, Bill gradually changed his views on the registration issue. Toward the end of registration, Mrs. Kawasaki seemed sad and disturbed, as if she were awaiting a disaster. Her son, Bill, seemed to have firmly made up his mind to go to jail instead of registering. He said he saw no reason for registering, and wanted to protest it because of the treatment he had received in being put in a place like this. On the other hand, he didn't want to be disloyal to the United States, and didn't want to answer "No" to Question 28. His mother explained that Bill had associated a great deal with Caucasians in school, that he had played in the school band where he had close contact with them, and that he used to be invited into their homes and would invite them to his home. He had never experienced discrimination until the evacuation. One of his teachers had tried to make it impossible for him to give one of the graduation addresses, but the evacuation had eliminated that possibility anyway.

Bill offered a number of reasons for not registering. He felt that military service requirements for the evacuees were unwarranted. He wished to protest the registra-

tion because of the discriminatory treatment, and felt that it was time for the Nisei to fight back instead of taking things lying down. He thought that discrimination would continue in America, and that the Nisei's future here was dark. In addition, he remarked, "It would have a bad psychological effect on me if I register. What could I tell my friends and those about me?"

Mrs. Kawasaki was worried. She felt that the advice she had given her son at first had been ill-advised. But she and her husband had decided that since he seemed determined not to register, they would let him decide for himself, rather than have him blame them for anything later. Bill was determined to study while in jail, and had packed away a great many books in his suitcase.

To clarify matters for himself, he sought out Major Marshall and his friends for further information and advice, but until the last day he was undecided as to what he finally should do. Bill Kawasaki registered on the final day, answering "No" to both Questions 27 and 28, then went home, and without eating, went to bed early.⁶⁰

To many evacuees the critical difficulty about the registration lay in their necessity of having to choose between accepting military service or of not accepting it. In the larger American society, seemingly, military service was not a matter of choice, but of its simple acceptance as a collectively defined obligation and necessity. To persons participating in the larger society, identified with it, and exposed to the system of rationalizations and conformity pressures supporting military duty, it was natural and necessary that the eligible males accept military service. The difficulty of the evacuees with a markedly different set of experiences than the majority group, especially of those least assimilated into the larger society, might be said to have been their inability to understand and accept the system of rationale supporting military induction. The fact that Japan was one of the enemy nations

⁶⁰Adapted from Field Notes, James Sakoda, March 8-10, 1943.

was not a necessary condition of the confusion, but in the case of the Japanese minority, undoubtedly added to the dilemma of choice.

Furthermore, the problem was not one that readily subjected itself to rational deliberation. A primary consideration concerned the future rewards from military service which the evacuees might expect, but no one could guarantee what these rewards might be. A prediction based on past experience, in fact, could logically have led to the conclusion that the evacuees might expect few rewards, and only continued restrictions of opportunities. There was the sentimental regard of the Nisei for America, but there was also the sentimental regard of the Issei for Japan. In families with split opinions among the family members, there was the felt need to arrive at some common decision so that the family might not be broken up by the consequences of the registration. And there were the cross pressures within the community. To people in these circumstances, a threat of punishment existed whether they answered "Yes" to the loyalty questions, answered "No," or failed to register.

In the last week of registration for the citizens, a high percentage answered "No" to the loyalty questions, but apparently did so as the choice involving the least evil. In summary, of 2,969 male citizens required to register, 2,341 registered and 628 (21 per cent) failed to register. Of the males who registered, 791 (37 per cent of registrants) an-

swered "No" to Question 28. Of 2,783 female citizens who were required to register, 2,051 registered and 732 (21 per cent) failed to register. Of those who registered, 431 (21 per cent of female registrants) answered "No" to Question 28.⁶¹

In the meantime, the alien registration on the "Application for Leave Clearance" began on March 3, taking one ward per day, but after the first week, continued in a desultory manner until March 25. The registration throughout was poor, but because of another administrative reversal of the rules, Copley learned that he could not enforce the alien registration. By an announcement from Dillon Myer dated February 27 which reached the Tule Lake Project on March 6, the registration of female citizens and of all aliens was declared not compulsory. Copley in stating his grievance over these frequent changes of instructions wrote:

Now, however, we are confronted with an even more perplexing difficulty. We have at all times stated that registration was compulsory. I repeated this statement several times last evening at an Issei meeting where we faced a critical audience. We were repeatedly asked what penalty would be imposed for failure to comply with this compulsory ruling and dogged this question by stating that the penalty had not yet been announced. Now our position is further weakened by the fact that the registration for other than male citizens is not compulsory.⁶²

The result of such confusion was that the Issei's registration was necessarily inefficient, and was reflected in the

⁶¹War Relocation Authority, United States Department of the Interior, The Evacuated People, A Quantitative Description. (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 164.

⁶²Letter from Henry Copley to Dillon Myer, March 6, 1943.

summary statistics of the alien registration. Of 3,075 male aliens who were required to register, 1,803 registered and 1,272 (41 per cent) failed to register. Of 2,016 female aliens who were required to register. The number of aliens who answered "No" to question 28 was negligible.

In the overall result of the registration, of 10,843 who were required to register, 4,456 evacuees (41 per cent) either failed to register or answered "No" to Question 28. In all other centers there were no more than a handful who refused to register, and except for Manzanar and Gila River, in no other center was there a comparable percentage of those who answered "No" to Question 28.⁶³ In general, the registration proved far less successful at Tule Lake than at any other WRA relocation center.

By the latter part of March, the excitement of the registration had virtually subsided, and people again turned their attention to the problem of maintaining themselves and the community. Block relations and community functions were again revived, and the intense interpersonal conflicts of the registration period were largely gone. Nevertheless, relations in the community were not the same as they had been prior to the registration. People made a distinction between the "No-No" and the "Yes-Yes" groups, and a sense of strain existed between them.

⁶³War Relocation Authority, United States Department of the Interior, The Evacuated People, A Quantitative Description. (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 164.

The distinction between the "Yes-Yes" and "No-No" groups was taken even more seriously by the administrative personnel, who, as early as the Shirata and Matsuda beatings in February, discussed the need for the segregation of the "pro-Americans" from the "pro-Japanese" so that the former might not be constantly subject to the influence and pressure of the latter. In time, the "No-No" group came to be stigmatized publicly as politically disloyal to the United States, and subsequently Congressional action was taken requiring the WRA to segregate the "No-Noes" of all the centers and interne them for the duration of the war as a safeguard against sabotage by such persons. Tule Lake was selected for the segregation center to which the "disloyal" from all the other centers would be sent, which required that all the "Yes-Yeses" at Tule Lake be transferred to other centers or relocated to the outside. This process was undertaken during the Summer of 1943, and completed by September.⁶⁴

⁶⁴For an account of the effect of the registration answers upon the segregation, and of the life in the Tule Lake community as a segregation center, see Thomas and Nishimoto, op. cit.

CHAPTER X

THE REDUCTION OF INTERGROUP TENSION

Some General Principles Underlying The Reduction of Intergroup Tension

Scientific knowledge and the control of tension.--The general principle underlying any rational method of social control may be very simply stated. It involves the application of knowledge of the kind that is stated in the form: given conditions A, B, and C, behavior X is always present; but given the absence of A, B, or C, or any combination of them, behavior X is always absent. All rational control is dependent upon such propositions, or some modification of them. By way of a simple illustration, if a certain mother is observed to yield to her child's demands whenever he cries, and never to yield as long as he does not cry, then crying would be a rational method for the child to employ in making demands upon his mother, as long as the aim is to have his demand fulfilled. In fact, even if the mother does not always yield when the child cries, but yields more frequently than not under the circumstance, it still might profit the child to cry in making his demands. In this instance, the applicability is restricted to a single mother-child relationship, but if similar propositions can be found for classes of objects, they would have a general applicability.

The above form of proposition coincides exactly with

the form in which scientific knowledge is presented, and it is this equivalence of form which makes scientific knowledge useful for the purpose of control. To be sure, the objectives of science and of control are somewhat different. Scientific knowledge, it might be said, is simply descriptive, specifying the conditions under which a certain phenomenon may be expected. To induce control, the conditions must be manipulatable, and be so manipulated as to bring about the desired consequences. For the latter function, however, it may be seen that scientific knowledge is instrumental, for it provides a guide regarding the way in which to manipulate the conditions if a certain consequence is to be produced. Furthermore, the step from the possession of scientific knowledge to its application in a problem of control may not be as direct as our statement would seem to indicate, for the abstract statements of science usually do not take account of all the variables which occur in concrete situations of control. Nevertheless, the success of science in all fields of control and its demonstrated superiority over other methods seem to testify to its utility in spite of any shortcomings which may be involved.

While making no claims for this study of any serious contribution to scientific knowledge of social behavior, the aim here has been to produce propositions based on observation of a kind which state relationships between conditions and consequences. We attempted to investigate the conditions which

were found to be associated, at least at the Tule Lake Project, with the rise of collective tensions, and likewise those associated with the decline of tensions. To the extent that we have achieved generalizations about human behavior, the conditions which were found to be associated with the rise of collective tensions should suggest the conditions to avoid if the emergence of tensions is to be avoided. Similarly, the conditions which were found associated with the decline of collective tensions should suggest the conditions to introduce if the reduction of tensions is desired.

In our analysis of the collective tension at the Tule Lake Project, several conditions were discussed which were considered among the principal factors determining the career of tension. Among these conditions were: (1) the underlying collective stresses as reflected in their persistent preoccupations, (2) the communicative process by which the socialization of tensions occurred, and, (3) the group organizations by which adjustment to the tension situation was sought. The following discussion will concern itself with an attempt to show the relevance of our previous findings regarding these conditions to the problem of controlling or reducing intergroup tension.

It should be noted that while we shift freely, seemingly without discrimination, from the term "intergroup tension" to "group tension," and back again, that this is done advisedly. In the last analysis, any investigation of intergroup tension necessarily must proceed by the separate though perhaps con-

comitant study of the two groups involved in hostility, and what is said for group tension therefore has direct implication for the understanding of intergroup tension.

The control of basic stresses.---A basic assumption of this study was that tension is motivational in behavior, and that the career of tension simply involves the unfolding of adjustmental efforts made in response to the tensions. The tension, in turn, we said was initially caused by the blockage of some basic action tendencies. This suggests two possibilities in the way of reducing the underlying tensions: (1) by removing the underlying blockages of action tendencies, (2) by the channeling of the tension induced action tendencies into paths where substitute satisfactions may be achieved, or (3) by the reinterpretation of the blocked action so that the impulse toward that action is largely dissipated.

In some situations the reduction of intergroup tension through the removal of the underlying blocks to action seems to be a possibility. Among the evacuees, high levels of tension were reached during the evacuation and in the centers apparently as a result of the disturbances to behavior which these events created. Today, in the post-war communities of the Japanese minority on the Pacific Coast as well as in the Mid-West and East, the evidence indicates that the tension associated with center life no longer exists.¹ In fact, one

¹War Agency Liquidation Unit (formerly the War Relocation Authority), U. S. Department of the Interior, People in Motion, the Post-War Adjustment of the Evacuated Japanese Americans (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1947).

post-war study of evacuees who had returned to Seattle revealed that the majority felt their relations with white Americans was better now than it was before the war.² It seems that the protest tendencies exhibited by the evacuees at the relocation center were simply in reaction to the limitations imposed by the evacuation and center life, and that the tensions were eliminated as soon as the people were freed from center restrictions. Because of the impossibility of demonstrating that other conditions of change did not bring about this reduction of tension, the argument, that the removal of blocks to action reduced the tension, cannot be offered as conclusive. Nevertheless, in view of the direct connection between center frustrations and the rise of tensions, and the marked reduction of tensions following resettlement, it seems reasonable to assume that the removal of the frustrations had an important influence upon the reduction of tension.

In most problems of tension reduction, however, the introduction of such radical changes of conditions is seldom possible. The more typical case is: given the circumstances of life in a relocation center, what can be done to reduce a tension that has emerged? The basic principle of tension reduction is again to unblock the interrupted action tendencies. The first problem which arises at this point is: what are the action tendencies which are blocked? In dealing with collective tensions, we suggested that the identification of the basic collective frustrations may be made through an analysis

²Ibid... pp.

of the persistent collective preoccupations of a population. At the Tule Lake Project, we found such persistent preoccupations as the anti-JACL feeling, the concern about the canteens and the unfavorable balance between income and expenditure, and the concern about the rumor of further relocation. The popular antagonism toward the JACL was correlated with the evacuees' need to maintain self regard through protest in a situation where their familiar role and status had become shattered; the concern about the canteens was correlated with the insecurities connected with post-war rehabilitation; and the recurrent rumor of relocation to another center was related to the anxieties of the people that the American treatment of the evacuees might become progressively worse.

If one of the important blockages of action which resulted from the evacuation was the interruption of the familiar roles by which the Japanese minority previously maintained their self regard, the method of control that the administration might have introduced was to provide the means by which the evacuees could achieve self realization in some other way. The administrative provision of "self government" through the Community Council was apparently intended for such a purpose, but the Council fell short of fulfilling the intended effect in two respects: (1) the Council was patently subordinate to the WRA administration, and (2) it excluded from participation the Issei who were the politically most influential group in the community. There were indications that the creation of the Planning Board, the Issei's counterpart of the Council, had a

stabilizing and tension reducing effect upon the Issei. Furthermore, evidence also seemed to indicate that the consequences of negotiation relations, as between the mess hall committee and the administration, proved much more effective in reducing evacuee discontent than did the liaison functions of the Community Council. In a bargaining relationship, the evacuees could act as the peers of the administration, giving a much greater sense of "self government" than was achieved through the Council. Actually, the project administration resisted negotiations apparently under the assumption that negotiation between a government agency and a population of detainees could not be countenanced, yet, as the method employed by Project Director Wade Head at Poston would seem to indicate,³ such a relationship was possible without involving the administration in the loss of either status or efficiency.

There was also the possibility of having the evacuees reinterpret the nature of their stresses. For example, if the evacuees could have been made to see the evacuation as not involving any loss of status, their reactions no doubt would have been different; but given the circumstances of the evacuation, such a change of conception was scarcely possible.

Control of the communicative process.--If, as we have argued, collective tension requires some kind of communicative process, a basic method for controlling tension would be through the manipulation of the communication channels.

In the emerging phase of collective tension, it was

³Leighton, op. cit., pp. 202-210.

seen that the consensus necessary to collective tension does not appear suddenly in the group as a whole, but that it develops first in a number of subgroups, and extends gradually to the larger population. It was also seen that the level of tension at any given time is not uniform throughout a population, but that focal points of tension exist from which the tension may spread to other groups. These facts suggest a number of possibilities with respect to the control or reduction of collective tension.

In the first place, when the level of individual dissatisfactions is rising in a population, no immediate collective reactions need be expected except of the spontaneous crowd variety, but the growth of consensus (collective definitions of issues and hostility objects, plans of action, etc.) in various subgroups would need to be watched closely. In particular, attention should be given to the focal points of tension, subgroups in which discontent and disorganization are relatively widely manifest. The problem of control then would be of isolating the high tension subgroups, of breaking up the groups, or of somehow dealing with the discontents of the groups so as to reduce their tensions before communication to other groups could occur.

Consensus in the subgroups also appears only through a communicative process, and here again the communication channels are subject to control. The method by which communication occurs differs according to the varying circumstances of the groups. For instance, the farm crew at Tule Lake was

shown to have abundant occasions for getting together and discussing the common "gripes" of the group, and it was probably not accidental that the first and most explosive strike took place among them. By contrast, the mess hall crews which in many respects had as many troubles as the farm crew were segregated into sixty-two mess hall units, and the development of a group tension among them occurred more slowly. It was, in fact, only after the organization of a mess hall committee, composed of representatives from all the mess halls, that joint action among them became a possibility. Knowing that the communication of discontents will occur wherever people are able to get together, the application of controls requires the identification of the main channels of communication and of influencing what is communicated through those channels.

In the later phases of collective tension where a structure of collective action has developed, the usual channels of communication become better known. On the other hand, the recognition is generally of the formal channels, and there is frequently an unawareness or an underestimation of the significance of the informal communication channels. Very often, the problem of reducing tensions involves persuading the leaders of a certain point of view, such as of the need for compromise. In highly centralized organizations, the communication by which solutions of differences may be sought is mainly channeled through recognized leaders of the respective groups, although even here sub-leaders may have a significant influence upon the views of the heads of the groups. But where, as at Tule

lake, the views of the elected leaders were often directly in opposition to the leaders in block meetings, the influence upon elected leaders had relatively little influence upon mass opinion because the flow of communication became blocked at an intermediate point. In this situation, what was needed was not merely persuasion of the elected leaders, but also some technique for influencing the leaders of the informal organizational structure.

Organized behavior and its control.--Collective tension may occur in groups with varying degrees of organization. Group organization here refers to the arrangement of the behavior of individual members that enables collective action toward a group goal to occur. The organization may be simple, as in mobs and panic crowds, or it may be complex, as in a labor union or other formal associations. The control over a group that is possible depends upon the degree of complexity of its organization.

The organization of a crowd is simple in the sense that it is dependent almost exclusively upon the focused attention of the members upon some common object. It has been suggested that the underlying theoretical principle for controlling crowds is to redirect the attention away from the common object.⁴ Because the crowd is organized largely by the focusing of attention, disturbance to the common object would have the effect of disorganizing or unorganizing the group. It should be noted, however, that the disorganizing

⁴Blumer, op. cit., p.

or unorganizing of a crowd is only a partial step toward its control, for it is then necessary to reorganize the people in some other orderly way of action that does not involve the threat of crowd behavior. Thus, in a theater panic caused by a fire, the first problem is to distract attention from the threat of the fire so that, second, a more orderly procedure to the exits may be instituted.

In the early phases of an emerging collective tension, when as at Tule Lake the people were individually under tension but had not as yet developed any degree of consensus regarding their problems, the organized behavior which occurs is likely to be of the simple variety. Thus, an excess of rumor-mongering was characteristic of the period. The farm strike was in many respects a spontaneous crowd-like phenomenon occurring primarily as a reaction to the dissatisfaction with the breakfast of August 15. The confusion of issues on the occasion, however, tended to becloud the images underlying the crowd action, and in the absence of a more mature protest organization in the farm crew, undermined the sustaining quality of the reaction. The farm negotiating committee which did not approve of the strike attempted to restrict the main issue to the inadequate meals, and the administration took emergency steps to correct the food condition. In general, it seems that in the early phases of an emerging collective tension, such measures may be adequate to control collective reactions.

In more complex organizations where a basis of consensus is laid and a more highly differentiated action structure is evolved, the problem of control tends to be different. While

there may at times be some purpose in seeking to disrupt the organization of an established association, this is not only difficult but also generally undesirable for the purpose of control, for sooner or later reorganization will become necessary and may involve graver problems than previously existed. The problem, rather, is to manipulate the existing organization toward achieving the desired end.

However, as we earlier indicated, the organization of a group involved in intergroup conflict tension is not usually limited to a single system, but is differentiated into at least three systems: the accommodationists, the protesters, and the passive reactionists. The controls which are possible vary with the type of group which is being dealt with. Furthermore, these three types are not to be thought of as necessarily separable groups, for the same individuals may at one time perform leadership functions in the accommodation system, and at another in the protest system. They are better understood as systems of reaction, one or another of them dominating depending upon the circumstances.

In general, intergroup tensions are most easily reduced when accommodative tendencies dominate the respective groups. Our data indicated that the accommodationist viewpoint tended to prevail as long as the level of collective tension remained relatively low. The problem in dealing with accommodationist systems lies not so much in persuading the leaders, although this too is not an insignificant problem, but rather of ensur-

ing that the accommodation leaders will be able to persuade their following, especially when compromises are involved. Particularly is this true in periods of rising collective tension when the masses are likely to be more protestive than the accommodation leaders. What is required is that the accommodation system (the structure of leaders and sub-leaders,) be well entrenched so that extremists cannot readily make inroads of influence upon the masses. The difficulties at Tule Lake were in no small part due to the weaknesses of the accommodation system below the level of the Community Council. Under the circumstance, the continued effort of the administration to work through the Council served only to antagonize the block leaders who regarded the Council as unrepresentative.

As a corollary, it might be said that any action of the outgroup that weakens the status of the accommodation leaders would undermine the possibility of effectively working through them. Thus, with the steady increase of protest activity on the part of the evacuees, the relatively favorable position of the "liberal" administrators was undercut and caused their displacement in power by the "disciplinarians" who were the least willing to compromise with the evacuees on any issue. Likewise, in the pre-registration period, the unwillingness of the administration to divulge any information about the registration to the Council or Planning Board placed them in a position of being unable to control the blocks on the issues, and gave encouragement to the extremists to take control of the meetings. When circumstances are developing which pre-

dictably will lead to high levels of tension unless controlled. it seems well to throw as much responsibility as possible upon any well entrenched accommodation system to develop its own solutions to the rising problem. Externally imposed controls weaken the status of the accommodationists, antagonize the masses, and favor the rise of critics and rebels who will prove much more difficult to deal with.

As the level of tension rises, power in the group tends to shift from the accommodation leaders to the protest leaders. The masses who previously were more characterized by passive reaction increasingly identify themselves with the protest movement. The failure in control in such a changing circumstance is frequently that control continues to be sought through the accommodation leaders, whereas the latter may actually have become unrepresentative of the prevailing group sentiment. In general, control over an organized group can be achieved only through whatever leadership is in power, and if the protest leaders dominate, they are the ones who chiefly have to be taken into account.

Rising as they do in a period of increasing tension, the protest leaders are likely to be characterized by dogmatism and an unwillingness to compromise. The problem here is to break down the stereotypes which are the guides of action. One line of tactic that might be employed is to maneuver the protest leaders into positions where they are forced to test their stereotypes (panaceas, slogans, etc.) against the reality of

the problem. In this connection, it may be noted that the refusal of controlling agents to recognize the protest leaders very often plays directly into the hands of the protest leaders, for the latter then are given no responsibility for dealing with realistic problems. Further, if in recognizing their power, the protest leaders however are to be prevented from using their improved status for the purpose of aggravating the tension, one general method to employ is to require that the protest leaders confine their activities to solving the immediate difficulties. All this depends upon gaining agreement between the conflicting groups on the nature of their problem, but if agreement on the problem cannot be reached, there could scarcely be even the beginning of a solution.

There are other techniques for controlling protest groups. It was found that the protest groups flourish best in periods of relatively high tension. Our data also indicated that unless a group has good morale, protest is difficult to maintain because of the fatigue which may set in among people exposed to an extended period of tension. When high level tensions continue for some time, it may be expected that manipulation of the protest leaders may be easier in the later phases than in the earlier, and that in the long run an automatic reduction of the tension may occur as a result of fatigue in the group. Likewise coercion may also be employed in breaking up a protest movement. During the registration the administration was successful in seriously weakening the resistance by its arrests. The danger of coercive methods, however, is that while

it may be effective in disrupting organized resistance. it may well leave a residue of individual resentments which will continually stand in the way of harmonious intergroup relations and may provide the basis of future protest efforts.

But the manipulation of organization cannot of itself solve intergroup problems, for in the last analysis, the underlying collective stresses need to be alleviated if tension is to be reduced. The significance of organization within a group under tension is that it represents the adjustmental efforts of a people to the maladjustments which they feel. While emphasis has been given to the difficulties of dealing with protest systems and the greater ease of manipulating the accommodators, this should not be understood to imply that the stresses underlying protest may be overlooked.

Symbolic and Non-Symbolic Factors in Tension

Non-symbolic elements.--The idea of reducing the tensions of a group implies the aim of changing the behavior of the group members. If the problem is one of changing behavior, the question arises of the kinds of behavior which are to be changed, and the possible differences in methods which may be employed in changing different kinds of behavior.

There are undoubtedly numerous ways of classifying behavior. One classification which seems relatively unambiguous and useful for our purpose is a dichotomous distinction between symbolic and non-symbolic behavior. By symbolic behavior we shall understand any action in which meaningful communication is involved. By non-symbolic behavior, then,

will be meant action in which meaningful communication is not involved. Since we are interested in collective tensions, some modifications of the above definitions are offered. By symbolic collective behavior will be meant collective action that is based upon a consensus, a common verbal understanding about the behavior involved. By non-symbolic collective behavior will be meant a collective action that is not based upon such a consensus. In this sense, collective excitement will be regarded as a non-symbolic behavior of a group for it is seldom that a group identifies itself as in an excited state, but an object of collective hostility will be considered symbolic for the group usually identifies in an explicit way who its enemy is.

Certain kinds of non-symbolic collective behavior which are important to the rise or fall of tensions are quite readily controllable. One of the characteristic reactions of a population upon whom a critical event impinges is the tendency of its members, if they have the slightest degree of group identification, to seek each other out in the hope of getting a solution of the difficulty. Usually, no consensus exists that this is the way to react in a critical situation, but people behave in this fashion, and, by our definition, this kind of behavior will be considered a non-symbolic collective reaction. Such a tendency appeared among the evacuees at Tule Lake during the registration. Almost as soon as the registration opened, the residents proceeded to interact with neighbors, friends within the block, friends outside the block, and leaders both within the block and in the larger community to get answers which they themselves

did not have. The effect of such interaction was to induce a collective reaction of the community as a whole that was much more difficult for the administration to contend with than would have been the reactions of smaller units. There seems no doubt that the administration's policy of starting the registration simultaneously in all the blocks virtually ensured this kind of reaction. If it had been desired to contain the reaction within smaller units, the better practice would have been to present the problem only to small local groups taken one at a time. In other centers, it was further found that the separation of the male citizens' military induction registration from the leave clearance registration of all others was found efficacious in limiting the extent of the collective reaction.

Again, some blocks and wards at Tule Lake were characterized by a greater degree of vacillation on issues than were others. Inspection of the block and ward composition of the areas showing the greatest amount of such vacillation indicated that the tendency was most characteristic of the blocks and wards having the least homogeneous populations. Tule Lake was somewhat unique among the ten relocation centers in having among its residents people from all three states of the Pacific Coast. On the whole, there were noticeable differences of attitudes between those from different states; and they tended to react to each other with a sense of strangeness and even of alienation, never completely overcoming these feelings even

after a year's residence together. It appeared that the blocks, like those in Ward I, which were populated by diverse groups from California, Oregon and Washington had less stability in block opinions than did those, for example, in Ward II composed almost entirely of people from Sacramento. There is even some reason to suspect that the instability of the Tule Lake community as a whole was in no small part accountable to the diversity of its population, by contrast with such relatively stable and homogeneous centers as Minidoka and Granada. The population composition of the centers and their blocks was to a considerable degree controllable by the WRA, and the control of collective instability could, in some degree, have been maintained by a better arrangement in center populations.

It appears that non-symbolic collective behavior, by virtue of its not being explicitly verbalized and brought within the consensus of the group, is relatively easily manageable. Yet, seemingly, they constitute a factor of some significance in determining the levels of tension which may appear within a population. If this is so, the non-symbolic factors would appear to deserve a good deal of attention in any program of tension reduction primarily because of their ready manipulability, and the consequent gains in tension control which may be achieved at relatively small cost.

Symbolic elements.--More prominent and recognizable in collective tension situations is behavior that is collectively defined and thus symbolically identified. Collective definitions

of the situation, issues, objects of hostility, and plans of action arise in the course of tension development and become guides to collective action. To the extent that such symbolic factors influence the behavior of people, the problem of changing their behavior becomes a problem of changing their mode of symbolization.

The changes in symbolization which are here referred to do not simply imply changes in superficial verbal habits. For example, one WRA administrative instruction condemned the use by the administrative personnel of the term "Japs" and recommended the usage "evacuees," but any change of label was probably a relatively unimportant influence upon the administrators' conception of the people and their behavior toward them. The change desired is a change in the expectations which are associated with particular symbols--for example, that the object identified as an "evacuee" may be expected to respond in a given way in given situations.

The clue to the method of changing symbolic systems may perhaps best be found by considering how collective symbols first come to be established in tension situations. To take as an example the emergence of the WRA as a collective object of hostility, it will be recalled that this process took place within the first three months after the arrival of the evacuees at the Tule Lake Center. The identification of the WRA with the white majority group and the American Government which had been responsible for the evacuation of the Japanese minority predis-

posed the evacuees to view the WRA and its personnel with hostility; yet the initial inclination of many evacuees at Tule Lake had been to look favorably upon the agency. Among the first signs of antagonism occurred in the disgruntlement of workers with the inadequate work equipment and disorganization in work operations. Another sign was the critical attitude toward the canteens which many felt were impoverishing the evacuees and offering the WRA a means of avoiding the responsibility of providing subsistence requirements. Immediately prior to the outbreak of open antagonism, widespread criticism of the WRA developed over its failure, contrary to the promises which had been previously issued, to meet wage payments, and provide work clothing, adequate meals, and lumber for partitions in the apartments. The distrust and suspicion of the WRA generated by these circumstances were crystallized during the farm strike and other subsequent disturbances.

Three facts emerge from this analysis of the way in which the hostility toward the WRA became established among the evacuees at Tule Lake. First, the hostility toward the WRA was a mode of collective adjustment developed by the evacuees to meet their tension condition. If their collective tensions flowed from the insecurity and frustration involved in center life, it was functionally useful to be hostile toward the agency that was deemed most directly responsible for the condition, for hostility was a necessary correlate to criticisms and demands upon the agency. Second, the attitude toward the WRA was a product of the evacuees

of the evacuees' experience with the agency. But the evacuees' experience with the WRA was selective, guided by the particular tensions which motivated the population in its experiencing. Not all evacuees developed the hostility although they were exposed to the same circumstances, but it appeared particularly among those most sensitive to the slowness of wage payments and the lack of subsistence provisions. Third, the hostility gained reinforcement by being made a part of the consensus of the group.

This characterization of the process by which a particular system of symbolization becomes established within a collectivity also suggests the method by which symbolic systems may be altered in tension situations. If a given definition of the situation is a mode of collective adjustment, the problem of symbolic modification is to make the group recognize that the definition does not yield the desired adjustment and solution of difficulties. The further question is, how may a group be made aware of the failure of a particular symbolic adjustment?

There apparently is no one answer to the latter problem, but to indicate the kind of method which may be employed, and also to show the possibility of inducing such a change, an illustration may be given from the registration crisis. One of the collective symbolic adjustments occurring during that crisis was the formulation of the nonregistration policy. It was shown that this plan of action developed as a reaction to the

indecision created by the registration issues, and that it was popularly considered the best way to avoid the difficulty. Seemingly, the people did not at first take seriously the administration's warning that those refusing to cooperate would be arrested. Following the arrests of the Block 42 youths and later of the Kibei, however, a notable change of sentiments occurred in which the nonregistration policy was no longer considered an adequate solution to the registration difficulties, but rather as itself containing a threat. At the same time, the administration issued a bulletin making it clear that those answering negatively on the loyalty questions would not be asked to serve in the armed forces. The result was a sharp reversal from the nonregistration policy, and, as one observer reported of a block meeting in which such a change of sentiment occurred, "The feeling of most of the people was that they had been about to commit a terrible thing, but had been saved from it." That is, the previous plan of action was now rejected as having been fundamentally in error.

Several factors apparently contributed to the tendency to reinterpret the situation. First, it could be said that the change of definition was achieved by a displacement of motivation, a substitution of the motive of avoiding arrest for that of avoiding the registration. Second, the change in behavior of the WRA changed the evacuees' experience with the WRA as an object. However, a point of key significance in this connection was the fact that the WRA's change of behavior was of a

specific kind, one that introduced a new state of tension that was in opposition to the previous one, and which therefore served to disrupt the behavior organized about the earlier tension. Objects can change without causing a change of behavior in the acting agent, but when an object changes in such a way that it stimulates new tensions, it seems that it then may especially have modifying effects upon the organism. Third, at the point that the evacuees' original plan of action had become undermined, the administration introduced an idea which the evacuees interpreted, in this new context, as permitting a resolution of their difficulties. Fourth, the arrests of the Kibei and Iseki who were the leaders of the nonregistration policy undermined the organization behind the program, and facilitated the destruction of the group consensus.

The foregoing hypothesis obviously does not by itself offer an answer as to how collective tensions are to be reduced through the manipulation of symbolic systems. For instance, some symbolic changes serve only to raise the level of tensions. It leaves us with the question of what particular symbolic manipulations are effective in reducing collective tensions. While a complete answer is not given, we believe that our account has at least the virtue of indicating the general method which must be employed if any kind of symbolic manipulation is to be achieved.

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