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WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

STAFF MEETING - MAY 1ST

Speaker: Mr. Vance Rogers, Civic Organization.

Secretary: Mr. Thomas H. Lee.

Introductory Remarks

This is pretty much a case of the blind leading the blind. So far, I have never seen an assembly center nor a relocation project and I imagine that most of you people are very much in the same boat. Mr. Ferguson, I believe, has already talked with you concerning the legal basis of establishing and maintaining a form of civil government on the regional project. I will endeavor to confine my remarks to the non-legal phases of this important part of the entire job that we will have to do.

To begin with, I feel it is important not to have too many convictions concerning the precise structure and form of civil government which the project should take. On the other hand, it is equally important to be prepared to make constructive suggestions to the Japanese. I think we may assume that they will be anxious to have our suggestions.

Physical Lay-Out of Relocation Centers

Perhaps it might be well, at the start, to consider the physical lay-out of relocation centers. I think these will have considerable influence in determining the form of a community council. As many of you doubtless know, the plan for relocation centers calls for laying out barracks and blocks. Ordinarily the block will contain some fourteen barracks all but two of which will accommodate four families each. Two barracks in each block will be devoted to bachelor quarters. Toilet, bath and laundry facilities will be used in common by all residents of the block.

It is contemplated that each block will have a block manager who, in one sense of the word, will be a part of the administrative organization of the project. He will, for example, distribute mail, be custodian of property receipts, assume responsibility for policing the grounds, maintain necessary records concerning the residents and perform a variety of service functions. It is likely it will be desirable for each

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block to have a representative. There is a question as to whether or not an elected representative shall assume the function of the Block Manager or whether these two functions should remain separate. Personally, I think it might be desirable for an elective representative to serve in the capacity of block manager. However, I should be extremely reluctant to lay this principle down to the Japanese as a requirement.

Community Council

As far as my own thinking is concerned, I believe that a community council made up of all block representatives might be a desirable form of government. Certain other people who have given attention to the subject of project self-government feel that such a council might be unwieldy as to size. The council could, of course, elect an executive committee or a chairman, or, as someone has suggested, a number of blocks might be associated in precincts and each precinct might be represented on the community council. All I can say, at this time, is that final determination of the precise form to be used should be the responsibility of the Japanese themselves. The precinct idea does not appeal to me personally as I do not see the precinct having very precise functions. It is reasonably clear that the block and the community council will have clear-cut functions.

Immediate Steps

You are going to be faced the first day, when people arrive, with the organization of some form of representation among the entire Japanese population. My own thought is that you might select block managers on the basis of their experience and demonstrated qualifications as a temporary measure and let them function as a community council as well as block manager.

I am aware that there may be an element of danger in this procedure inasmuch as men and women thus selected may have a tendency to be elected at a later time by the people as a whole simply because they were put out in front in the first instance. However, I doubt that this will prove a serious draw-back.

I think it is important to realize that the block manager occupies an extremely strategic position in the entire social and governmental structure. In one sense he will be the first line of defense of the project manager. In the course of events, if he proves to be an effective leader, he will settle many disputes and straighten out many differences before such problems reach their project manager or the members of his staff.

Basic Considerations To the Functioning of Governmental Structure

The Japanese, like every other group that I know anything about, have their cliques and splits. One of the important differences that we may anticipate is the division of the popu-

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lation between the issei, the Japanese-born, and the nisei, the American-born. My own conviction is that the issei will have a tendency to take a very retiring attitude and will not attempt to assume much leadership directly, nor are they likely to be elected to office. While there is very little we can do about this, and it may even be a desirable thing, it should be recognized as a problem to anyone working with the entire group.

There are certain problems peculiar to the issei, such as their inability to read English and in many instances even to speak it, that should be called to the attention of elected representatives. It may prove necessary to encourage the nisei to recognize the problems of the issei; to avail themselves of advice and consultation from this group, at least in an advisory capacity.

You will hear a good deal of talk about the so-called kibei, that is those Japanese born in this country but educated in Japan. Many people feel that the loyalty of this group is under considerably more question than the loyalty of the nisei. Personally, I am a little less worried about this group than many people. Certainly I see no reason for discrimination.

There are of course a good many different religious groups, including several sects of Buddhists. To some extent these groups are in conflict and often splits along religious lines are evident. To me this is more an indication of a healthy society than a serious problem.

There is a good deal of concern over a semi-religious sect known as Shintoism. The keynote of this ethical doctrine or religious sect is worship of ancestors, including the emperor who is considered to be a direct lineal descendant of the first two Japanese mortals. It has been suggested that Shintoism should be barred in relocation centers. Since Shintoism is commonly practiced in the home, and since the very foundation of this country rests on religious freedom, and since prohibition on religious practices commonly causes a given practice to flourish, I for one see no reason why any prohibition should be contemplated. Indeed, I believe that it is pretty much a set policy of the War Relocation Authority that complete religious freedom will be tolerated within the limits of orderly conduct.

Voting Age

In the matter of voting age, we are faced with an interesting problem. If you adhere to the conventional age of 21, you eliminate from participation in local self-government young men and women who are taking considerably more responsibility for productive work and effort for making relocation centers going concerns than would be true in our regular society. One of the

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thoughts now being given consideration is that all Japanese in relocation centers will be permitted to enlist in what is known as the War Relocation Work Corps. If this idea becomes an adopted policy with the Authority, the age limit will probably be 16. Personally, I should be inclined to lay down a restriction that the age limit for voting should not be less than 16 but that the exact age can be left to the determination of the Japanese themselves. So far as I know, there is no general agreement as to what precisely should be done in this matter.

Law and Order

The present thinking among the staff is that the Japanese should take just as much responsibility as possible in developing measures for the maintenance of law and order in the community. There are a number of legal questions on which the attorneys are now working, which remain unsolved. However, it appears that Japanese courts can be established and permitted to function under the general Authority of the project director for most types of criminal cases and for some types of civil cases. In general, I think we should all like to see the Japanese settle as many of their disputes and grievances among themselves as possible. I hope that in the not too distant future I shall be able, either in writing or in consultation, to give more specific suggestions on this subject.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

STAFF MEETING - MAY 1ST

Speaker: Mr. L. J. Collins.

Secretary: Mr. Thomas H. Lee.

Subject: Community Enterprises.

By way of qualifying what is contained in these comments, it would be well to note that the speaker has only been a few days in the organization, consequently he might well wish to reserve the right to change his thinking or opinion on some of the things set forth, in the light of future developments or announcements of policies in variance with some of these ideas.

It appears that the thinking in organizing the entire program contemplates, as basic policy, as great a measure of autonomy for the occupants of the projects as is commensurate with efficient conduct of our relocation assignment. In developing this thought, in line with the whole purpose of this war effort, we would do well to attempt to retain for these people, victims of an artificial and at best awkward situation, as many of the rights they, as citizens, previously enjoyed in a democratic nation. As an example, the organizations would be privileged to take democratic forms in their operation and expression. One thing that probably is inherent in this statement is that we would not encourage any type of organization or program that would tend to advantage any one resident of the project at the expense of the others.

It is my understanding at present that the War Relocation Authority plans to supply shelter, subsistence, health services and education to the residents of these projects as well as other services of an incidental nature of which I am not aware. In any event, there will be a number of services economic in nature which will have to be met by organizations other than the War Relocation Authority. The Community Enterprises Division will have the responsibility of working with residents of the projects to help them develop these services for themselves. Among these will likely be such services as drug stores, barber shops, beauty parlors, shoe repair and radio repair shops, etc.

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Prior to the development of these services in any of the projects some intermediate agency, possibly a non-profit enterprise with funds adequate to finance initial stocks of goods, will be necessary so that at least a "canteen" type of service is ready to go when the first group of residents enter the project. Subsequently, as the people have developed their organization, it will be able to assume the operation and control of these initial programs, and presumably expand them.

At this point it is worth noting that any type of organization we encourage might well be thought of in terms of its long range values as well as its immediate solution to a problem on the project. These groups will be operating on what amounts to a monopoly basis in an isolated community, and further some of the factors normally existing in even this situation will not be the usual ones. As an example, wage scales and the whole relation of the citizenry of the community to the War Relocation Authority are quite unique factors. Therefore, the organization while operating on the project should do well from time to time to recall, and attempt to relate its problems to those it would normally face if operating in communities such as the members had lived in previously. The value of this is apparent if one realizes that these people are not apt to be able to resume their normal living as they know it before the war, and thus very likely they may benefit by the experiences had in the W.R.A. community, adapting them to meet their needs subsequent to leaving the projects.

Assuming that some type of cooperative organization is the answer to this program of community enterprise, it might be well to cite the so-called "cooperative principles" that we, through experience over the past one hundred years have evolved and proven fairly good guides for this type of enterprise. There are fundamentally three principles of cooperative operation and philosophy: (1) Voluntary membership - no discrimination because of race, creed or color. (2) One, and only one vote for each member and no proxy voting. (3) Earnings or surpluses distributed on the basis of patronage.

The following additional secondary principles might be cited here also: (4) Trade for cash, at current competitive prices. (5) Limit interest on capital investment. (6) Educate continuously.

In commenting on these cardinal principles one recalls immediately that in any type of consumption enterprise, the larger the number participating the less is apt to be the unit cost of service, which is a good business practice. It is also good business to permit voluntary participation which serves as a measure of satisfaction as well as retains a fundamental tenant of democratic type of operation.

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Elimination of proxy voting serves to protect individual expression of interest and need by prohibiting collection of proxies which conceivably could be used to the advantage of one individual at the expense of others using a service.

The cooperative philosophy assumes that surplus or "profits" (residual funds after providing for proper reserves) result from an overcharge and consequently are refundable to the individual members in proportion to their initial contribution to the profits through their patronage. Thus a clear distinction between a cooperative enterprise and the usual business enterprise becomes apparent in that dividends are paid to the users or customers rather than to the investors. The cooperative pays the investors interest or a "wage" for money in the same way as it pays a wage to its employees.

Practically speaking, our whole expansion of the Community Enterprise Program might well be based on need; as needs develop, establish services to meet them.

Relative to future financing and War Relocation Administrative controls, efforts are being made to determine by what channels, if other than the one mentioned, governmental funds may be loaned the Japanese controlled and operated associations to adequately finance their capital needs. It is thought, at this juncture, that the War Relocation Authority will reserve only such control as is required by the Wartime emergency, in all other respects permitting free operation of the enterprises. Perhaps it may require periodic audit reports on their operations. However, should Government funds be involved in such operations, any additional controls will likely be of such nature as to be stated in the loan agreements drawn at the time of the financing.

It is my understanding that the community council will be the supreme political body on the project and shall establish policy for all kinds of programs. It may then develop that this council would in general license enterprises, determine what taxes and what regulations are applicable to their operations in the same manner that any municipality would treat similar associations. In all probability, community enterprise would be subject to outside taxes and license fees in the same manner that any other incorporated association operating under the same civil statutes.

There are several problems as yet to be resolved. Your thinking on these would be appreciated.

1. Wage Policy: Will the cooperative or enterprise compensate the Government for the subsistence and shelter cost to the Government for each of its employees (if we are to assume that these projects are to be self-supporting, this would be a logical requirement).

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2. Competitive or Duplicating Services: Will there be need for more than one organization offering the same service? Competition between several associations offering the same service might stimulate efficiency and yet perhaps we should attempt to stimulate the organization and expression within a democratic organization so as to resolve this internally rather than by pressure from without.
3. Utilities and Rental Charges: As the services are obtained from the Government installations in other buildings, in all probability the W.R.A. should be compensated for these by the business. Provision should be made for determining just rates of compensation.

Minutes of WRA Staff Meeting

September 8, 1942

Present: Wilson, Utz, Clear, Barrows, McMenamin, Tozier, Provinse, Arnold, Sabin, Sigler, Baker, Stauber, Glick, McLaughlin, Buttedahl, Hughes, Leffler, Marks.

In summarizing negotiations with PHS to provide medical services to WRA, Mr. Myer said that PHS will not enter into an agreement with WRA to provide medical services at this time but will assist in recruiting doctors over 45 years of age or ineligible for military services. If the required doctors cannot be recruited by WRA, then PHS will reconsider entering into an agreement with WRA according to the original proposal. In answer to a question raised by Dr. Thompson, Dr. Draper said PHS would not be willing to commission older men and assign them to WRA, but would make their lists of such doctors available to WRA and would assist in any way possible in recruiting older doctors through the offices of Procurement and Assignment of the Manpower Commission.

In looking ahead, Mr. Myer said one of the big personnel problems is finding personnel to replace project directors, assistant project directors, and other key personnel when needed. He predicted that within the next six months WRA will have a fifty per cent turnover of key personnel due to their being called to service and other reasons. He said the project director's job is one of the toughest administrative jobs anywhere in the organization, namely because there has been no experience in many of the problems involved, and because of the handicap of working under war-time conditions. He suggested the preparation of a list of at least 8 or 10 people who would be available for key jobs when needed. Mr. Barrows and Mr. McMenamin were asked to develop selection and training procedures for people already on the staff, either as permanent or temporary employees. It was suggested that anyone interested in trying to run a project turn in their names for the list of candidates. Mr. Barrows seconded Mr. Myer's request and asked that suggestions be submitted to Mr. McMenamin in memorandum form not only for persons within the organization but also others on the outside. He added that perhaps in a year we will have trained evacuees to pick up jobs in the field now held by Caucasians, but a similar training program will have to be provided for them. Mr. Myer cautioned against implying a commitment in discussing possible positions.

Following up a report given last week on relocation policies from here on out, Mr. Myer said he feels strongly that relocation centers are second temporary stops for the evacuees and that the next job is to get as many relocated as possible. Several conferences have been held with Assistant Secretary McCloy and others concerning policies of WRA. It was generally agreed that evacuees should be released to go anywhere outside of the Western Defense Command providing they have jobs or some family to take care of them, providing of course the community is willing to accept them; that WRA make some check against FBI records of employer and employed; that evacuees keep WRA informed of their whereabouts at all times. This would mean a new trend in the program beyond projects. The organization might need to be expanded to work with groups and individuals interested in relocating evacuees. Our biggest job in moving into this new emphasis on the program is to clarify organization lines as well as to give a great deal of thought to what is needed in this third phase. Mr. Tozier inquired as to whether there was any possibility of getting the Federal Securities

Agencies to do the job, but Mr. Myer said WRA will need to take the initiative. He added that he considered it one of the most pressing problems we are facing at the present time and that with the limited personnel in Washington we would need a lot of help.

The project staff was discussed and Mr. Barrows pointed out that, under the original plan, there were to be two key positions as assistant project director, one in charge of project operations and one in charge of community services, but that the position of community services has been minimized. He stated that a redraft of the project staff chart will be available soon for the consideration of staff members. Mr. Myer stated his belief that we have a big enough job to require a project director and an assistant project director equally as well qualified, in addition to the operations and community services assistant. Mr. Barrows pointed out that the various positions at the regional and project levels were not consistent and that thought should be given to remedying this situation. Mr. Myer requested each division chief to prepare a statement of the responsibilities at the different levels and review the original project charts to find out where mistakes were made and suggest realignments just as soon as possible.

Mr. Barrows reported that the financial situation with respect to travel funds is acute. Because of unforeseen requirements, there is a serious shortage of travel funds allotted to us. In the beginning, he said, each division had submitted an estimate and by August 1st all except one had exceeded the estimate by some \$500 to \$2,000. Everyone was requested to consider carefully the necessity, work to be accomplished, and the cheapest way to travel in planning future trips. He suggested that air travel be reduced to actual emergencies. Mr. Myer added that travel funds must be conserved to enable necessary travel throughout the rest of the year.

The advisability of employing conscientious objectors on the projects was discussed by Mr. Provinse. About three months ago National Selective Service provided us with a list of names of about 450 conscientious objectors qualified for various types of work, and we entered into a cooperative agreement with the Board. As a result it was determined to try out not more than 10 men on one of the projects. Since the agreement was signed, there has been a great deal of objection voiced by the project staff and some of the evacuees, particularly to employing them as teachers. There are on the list, he said, some very well qualified people, particularly in the community services field, that arrangements might be made to use two or three instead of ten on one project, and he felt that teachers could be limited to elementary grades. The real question, he said, is whether we want to make use of the conscientious objectors. Mr. Myer stated that he considered the primary concern the public relations angle and that he has a very grave question as to the advisability of using them as teachers. In answer to a question, he explained that the public relations angle is a serious one because it involves purely emotional problems, and rumors once started would be difficult to control. Mr. Sigler pointed out that one of the main purposes of the system set up for the conscientious objectors was their application to useful work. Mr. Glick suggested we not employ them as teachers but felt they might be used as agricultural workers, clerks, etc. Mr. Marks suggested that our jobs as such required particular qualifications, and that they be used on jobs where there is a lack of qualified personnel. He added that they could be withdrawn at any time on our request if found undesirable. Mr. Myer said we must try to look at the situation objectively and, while he was concerned about using them on the projects, on the other hand he did not want to close the door entirely. He was, he said, almost ready to approve recommendations for

their appointment to jobs where they might fit in, except as teachers, but that he did not think we should staff projects with 5 or 10 and subject ourselves to the possibility of others misinterpreting our actions.

Mr. Utz reported briefly on a recent field trip to San Francisco, Granada, Tule Lake, Poston, Sacaton, Gila, Rohwer and Jerome. Tule Lake is the only area where there will be much agricultural production this year, and crops up there look especially good. At Gila they have about 40 acres of fall vegetable planted. At Colorado River they have about 200 acres in vegetables. Granada has very good possibilities for next year. It is expected that Tule Lake and several other areas, possibly Central Utah and Granada, will be producing quantities of seed for sale. All areas, he said, west of Arkansas are irrigated areas.

With reference to the Minidoka water situation, Mr. Myer reported that Mr. Bashore in a telephone conversation had stated definitely there would be water. He knows about the dust, is seriously concerned about it, and has given his promise to follow through on the matter without fail.

Mr. Stauber reported that he had information from G-2 of N. Y. indicating the type of person to be involved in the East Coast individual evacuation. There will be small shop owners, such as beauty shop operators, bakers, and other store owners, technicians, government workers, tradesmen, and a few miscellaneous, involving single men and women, family groups and children. During the course of several meetings, Mr. Stauber said he had acquired sufficient information to enable Mr. Barrows to begin an analysis of the fiscal pattern. Naturalized citizens of foreign extraction make up 50 per cent of the group, and American-born citizens the balance, with only about 3 Japanese in the entire group of 260, mostly cases reported by the FBI. They are given a hearing before Army officers and an opportunity to defend themselves. Following the hearing, recommendations are made by FBI and the Army as to whether the individual should be excluded. The Army is not concerned as to where they go when they leave, providing, of course, it is not within the area specified in the exclusion order, and it is up to the FBI to follow up on them once they leave the excluded area. In answer to a question from Mr. Glick, Mr. Stauber explained there are no plans to set up relocation centers for these people. However, if within a reasonable period after leaving the area, possibly two or three months, the individual has failed to make adjustments, it might be considered advisable to offer him an opportunity to go to a camp which we might need to establish for this purpose.

Mr. Baker pointed out the need for forms on which reports could be sent in to both Washington and the regional offices and inquired at what intervals it was thought reports should come in from the projects. The question was asked whether these would be a series of separate reports, and Mr. Baker explained that there would be one composite report from all divisions. Mr. Myer cautioned against loading project directors with long detailed reports. Mr. Baker said project directors will assign responsibility for the preparation of reports to the Reports Officer, who has an evacuee staff to assist him, and that the job can be done with a minimum of burden to staff members. Mr. Myer said he thought there should be two types of reports, one for a permanent record summarizing from month to month, which could be developed into an annual report, and should be a rather complete record. The other type of report should come direct to him from the project directors for the time being, and if not too costly, Mr. Myer said he would like to have weekly telegraphic reports that would enable him and division chiefs to keep currently in touch with things they need to know. Perhaps the report should be limited to the answers to two or three questions from each division, the

nature of which could be changed from time to time. The details of developing the reporting system were left with Mr. Baker.

Mr. Myer reported briefly on a conference he, Colonel Wilson, and Mr. Rowalt had with Assistant Secretary of War McCloy on September 4th, during which much was accomplished in clarifying relations with the Army. He also reported that, in a telephone conversation, General DeWitt informed him that he had signed the order to examine all packages coming into the centers within Military Area No. 1 for contraband. Following this, Mr. Rowalt had a conference with General DeWitt during which he read a transcript of the telephone conversation concerning the opening of packages and elaborated by saying that he does not see eye to eye with us and the Army would definitely have to remain in the picture in Military Area No. 1. Mr. McCloy has advised that he expects to make a trip to the West Coast within the next few weeks, at which time he will present to General DeWitt the WRA point of view and discuss with him the point of view of the Army. Mr. McCloy definitely believes that, if we are to operate as a relocating agency, we must move strongly in that direction and continue to be as objective as possible; that our responsibility is different from that of the Army and that we must take a definite stand.

Mr. Myer reported that it has been agreed with Mr. Ennis of the Justice Department that we would prepare a memorandum to the Attorney General outlining our position much as we did to Mr. McCloy. Among other things the question will be raised as to the position the Department of Justice will take, which will definitely tie in with the furlough and leave regulations to come out within the next few days. It is likely the problem will need to move up to the President for decision.

Mr. Myer inquired as to the status of locating camps for evacuees who have requested repatriation. Mr. Stauber reported that the Santa Fe Camp could probably be ready within six weeks and would accommodate approximately 1,000 people. It was mentioned that, although there had been a lot of speculation and rumor concerning a camp at Florence, Arizona, no one seemed to know anything definite, and Mr. Myer suggested that inquiry be made. Mr. Stauber was requested to work with Mr. Barrows on budget and with Mr. Glick on legal problems concerning arrangements to remove from the relocation centers as quickly as possible people who have requested repatriation, so that we might very soon make some decisions in connection with the problems involved.

Minutes of WRA Staff Meeting

September 16, 1942

Present: Wilson, Glick, Clear, Kimmel, Hughes, Buttedahl, Leffler, Arnold, Baker, Provinse, Sigler, Barrows, McMenamin, Collum, Cronin, Robinson, Utz, Reed, Stauber, Marks, Sabin.

Mr. Myer opened the meeting with a discussion of the employment policy generally and stated he considered this step the third phase of the relocation program and that a big part of our job would be getting people reassimilated outside areas. Summarizing the four conditions of the leave and furlough policy, Mr. Myer stated them to be: 1. that applicants have a place to go and something to do to maintain themselves; 2. that the community will accept them; 3. that they be cleared against the record of the FBI; and, 4. that they keep us advised of their whereabouts and what they are doing, so that we may keep track of them. He said we must provide the machinery to make this policy function. It is an important problem and really the third phase of the relocation program which involves the necessity of keeping records and determining where they will be located. It may involve some change in organization at the Washington level in order to expedite work on centers. Mr. Myer reported that he had lunch on Monday with Dr. Will Alexander, who is heading up a unit handling minority groups in the Manpower Commission. He suggested placing program emphasis on the need for manpower, and, after getting policies lined up with Justice, that we sell the program to the Manpower Commission and get them to endorse our leave and furlough policy because of the drastic need for manpower. Also, arrangements have been made for a conference on Thursday with Mr. William Haber, formerly Executive Director of the National Refugee Service, and who is now with the Manpower Commission. In a conference with Mr. Holland, Mr. Provinse, and Mr. Marks this afternoon, Mr. Myer said it was brought out that many of the church agencies have been interested in trying to render a service somewhat like the college relocation committee but they need organization. Contacts will be made with the Catholic Welfare Association, Jewish organizations, Friends Service Group, and other organizations with the idea of moving ahead rather quickly in setting up either a permanent or temporary committee which will work with us in the whole field of relocation, much the same as the college committee has worked with us. Their major responsibility, if accepted, would be in communities receiving evacuees in the field, and our responsibility would be to work out arrangements for placement, etc. This involves many things, such as statistical work and the question of where records will be maintained. Mr. Myer stated that he had asked Tom Holland for the time being to take the responsibility for bringing this problem in order and to work with Provinse, Marks, and anyone else who has a contribution to make, moving ahead as fast as possible.

Mr. Holland reported that he had attended a conference in S.F. about seven weeks ago in connection with harvesting work. Delegates of the sugar beet people, USES, FSA, WRA, and others were present. He stated that certain agreements were reached which would somewhat better our procedures. The trouble last spring, he said, was that recruiting was on a general basis and evacuees were misled as to what they would find. Under present procedures we will secure a written agreement from the companies stating the facts surrounding conditions at the fields. With five days notice either party may break the contract. This arrangement, he said, seems to be working better than the old system. He added that we will have about 5000 evacuees out for the fall harvest. With that many out we have had to tighten up on supervision

and when they change employers they are required to notify us. As a result we are doing more routine checking, and we are doing a large amount of recruiting. Last spring, 1700 went out and 450 came back, but, on the whole, very few problems were encountered. Mr. Holland expressed the thought that perhaps next year we can use the Work Corps idea for traveling in mobile camps through the harvesting areas. He commented that it is a particularly good program for older people because, under present policies, they can't leave the centers for permanent relocation and they are good farmers.

Mr. Myer supplemented Mr. Holland's remarks by giving a brief report on the Arizona situation. For the past two or three weeks, he said, there has been agitation on the part of folks in Arizona concerning the picking of long staple cotton. Consequently, there has been pressure from various sources to get the cotton section of Military Area No. 1 opened up for use of Japanese labor. As a result, through the efforts of Senator Hayden to get the matter straightened out, General DeWitt has agreed to allow evacuees to work in that area, with the exception of Pima County, subject to certain understandings, particularly, among others, that the military would handle the publicity. Mr. Myer stated one of his major concerns is the indication that there may be a military guard around the area. He added that Mr. Dinkle, member of the Manpower Unit of SOS, called at the office this afternoon and said the most recent suggestion is the use of colored troops to guard the evacuees. He was advised that, as far as WRA is concerned, that is definitely out; that it would be very bad for several reasons, particularly from the standpoint of public relations. Apparently the Army is worried about protecting the Japanese from the residents of the area. Since the Western Defense Command has decided to open up the area, they are becoming anxious to get crops picked because cotton is badly needed in the war effort.

Mr. Robinson of the San Francisco office gave a detailed report on the property management problems and methods of meeting them in the evacuation program on the west coast. He said the problems originated from several sources including attorneys representing evacuees, project attorneys, and the evacuees themselves. There were 200 requests for assistance from the evacuees themselves and there is every conceivable sort of problem. The most serious problem we are apt to face, he said, originates from two points, one in Bainbridge Island, where processing companies or Philipinos have taken over operations involving many problems in bringing about equitable settlement. The other is in Placer County, California where a large number of Japanese-owned farms were operated by highly specialized fruit farmers. In the individual exclusion program there are about 20 similar cases. Mr. Robinson stated that the individual exclusion cases started out with 250 and may run in excess of 1,000. Many cases are expected from Alaska. However, the individual exclusion cases so far have not involved much in the way of property management or travel funds. Mr. Myer stated that one of the reasons for bringing Mr. Robinson to Washington is to align east and west coast individual evacuation policies to conform. At the present time, he said, we are working with the Federal Securities Agency on the problem of looking after the individual evacuees, assuming that certain social agencies will pick up and carry on after one month.

Mr. Stauber was asked to explain the distinction between temporary detention camps and internment camps. He said temporary camps are operated by the Justice Department through the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Internment camps are operated by the War Department through the office of the Provost Marshal. Col. Bryan

of the War Department is in charge of internment camps and also camps where prisoners of war are detained. These camps conform to the provisions of the Geneva Convention and are stripped down to bare essentials. Several different groups, he said, are maintained in detention camps. Some are nationals of countries who were at war even before the U. S. entered the war, such as the crews of German and Italian ships having overstayed their leave, and others. They will remain in these camps unless some kind of exchange agreement is worked out. Also in these camps are enemy aliens of various nationalities, picked up on charges of suspicion. People in the detention camps have been picked up by FBI and transported to the camps where they remain until given a hearing by an Alien Hearing Board. The Department of Justice reviews the Board's recommendation and the Attorney General's office finally determines whether the individuals will be interned, released, or paroled. Under certain circumstances enemy aliens can be put in jail. The term "concentration camp", he said, is a term developed by the Germans and Russians and is not applicable to either of these camps.

The question of outside distribution of policy statements was discussed, and Mr. Myer announced, inasmuch as they were not for general distribution, the division heads would be responsible for exercising discretion in sending them to individuals outside the Authority.

It was announced that the child labor policy statement would be out in a few days, and would supplement the employment policy statement. The provisions will conform with labor provisions laid down by the Children's Bureau of the Department of Labor.

Mr. Barrows discussed priorities and procurement and said that the most important problems is securing priorities for schools and administrative quarters. The problem has been up before the reviewing committee and he is informed that our PD 200 will be acted upon promptly. Granada and Tule Lake, he said, have gone over and probably Poston will go over in the morning. In addition, we have a PD 200 pending for a construction job having to do with the irrigation project at Manzanar. He said an administrative instruction setting up procedures for projects, giving them authority to make purchases, is in process.

Mr. Myer said the problem concerning insurance policies held by the evacuees had come to his attention; that he felt the payment of premiums presented a rather serious problem, and that consideration should be given to the question of whether loans should be made to evacuees to keep life insurance policies in force. Various comments were made, pro and con, and several suggestions were made as to possible ways of handling the problem. Mr. Glick reported that the question had been raised some time ago while evacuees were still in assembly centers, and that Mr. Frase had sent to him a memorandum on the subject. He suggested that perhaps one solution would be to get an insurance consultant to visit the projects to discuss the various problems and assist in working them out with the evacuees according to the provisions of their policies. Mr. Myer said this possibility should be explored; that, while we do not want to develop loan policies, he believed under the circumstances some consideration should be given to this problem of the evacuees. Mr. Stauber was asked to consult with Miss Gifford, Col. Hughes, and someone in the employment division since they had already done some work on it, in order that a determination might be made as to what should be done in the matter.

A report was made as to the status of instructions in process, as follows: Producer Enterprises now in hands of Mr. Kimmel; Health Services and Census is in hands of Mr. Barrows; Leave and Furlough Regulations is in the Solicitors office

and almost in final shape, Employment is in Mr. Provinse's office; Information is held by Mr. Baker.

Mr. Myer said there was some question as to whether we should loosen restrictions for releasing the wives of soldiers from the centers. This was discussed with Mr. McCloy, who took the attitude that outside military areas it would seem the wife of a selectee of Japanese ancestry should have the same opportunity to join her husband as anyone else. However, no decision was made as to what our policy would be. Mr. Myer reported that the WCCA had recently issued instructions with reference to mixed marriages, and that, under the policies set down, about 300 cases had been released from assembly centers. The question that we will have to determine, he said, is whether we should follow the same policies as WCCA in this connection. It was agreed that, if the Army thinks it is a good policy to release them under the various provisions which they have set up, there is no reason why we should not follow the same procedure. With reference to the release of soldiers' wives, it was agreed that it seems justifiable to release the wives of citizens in the Army. Mr. Glick suggested sending the cases direct to Mr. Myer to be handled individually.

Mr. Sigler announced that the report of the Bureau of Reclamation with reference to the water situation at Minidoka is on its way over to WRA.

Mr. Stauber reported that the date with reference to the evacuation of people from the Eastern Defense Command is still October 1.

Mr. Baker reported that a request had come from the Denver office raising a question as to who should handle requests at the project offices for comments concerning the program. Mr. Myer said requests should be referred to the Project Directors or the Reports Officers on the projects or cleared with them. He added that he thought possibly reports officers should be present during all interviews, although key people should not be restricted from talking to people generally. Mr. Baker was requested to prepare a brief statement relative to the matter.

STAFF MEETING HELD FEBRUARY 5, 1943

2:15 p.m.

Mr. Myer: I served notice on the way back from my trip on the two gentlemen who accompanied me on all of the trip, that they could flip, if they cared to, as to who would make the report to the staff on the three meetings, and I understand Philip Glick and John Provinse divided the honors. I don't know whether Philip has the last half, or the first half.

Mr. Glick: May I say a word about the way in which John and I divided this report between us? We agreed that I would start with a general statement supplying some general information about the three meetings and the trip as a whole. Then we were going to take up separately each of the major topics that were discussed at the three meetings, and some of them he was going to report on, others I was going to report on. In each case we were going to try to indicate how the discussion ran generally, and insofar as any decisions were reached, what the decisions were.

I think it will probably help you if I give you the complete list before going any farther. The reception or the announcement of the organization of the combat unit was the first one discussed at most of the meetings, and I am going to talk about that. Then the problem of reports between the Washington and field offices, John will take. The report to them on the hearings before the Senate subcommittee, we decided, Mr. Director, that you should personally report on that. Then community government, John will treat. Control and punishment of offenses, I will summarize that. Internal security, John; social analysis, John; leave and employment -- we didn't know that Davis McIntyre was going to be here, so I think the committee very quickly wants to hold a meeting and change the agenda, have Davis summarize those. Segregation, John would summarize. And then we have a list of five items also discussed, but much less elaborately treated: industry, schools, construction, liquor and guns. We may have omitted some of the items discussed at the meetings, but --

Mr. Myer: I think you have plenty. I'll try to check the list as we go along.

Mr. Glick: First on the meetings in general: three meetings were held, at San Francisco, Denver, and Little Rock, that was the order in which the meetings were held. All the project directors were invited to attend. Each project director was told he could bring anywhere from one to three people on his staff with him, and he was free to select who those should be. Actually, at the San Francisco meeting all four project directors were present. I am not able from memory to recall who the other members of the staff were that were present.

Mr. Myer: There were, I would say, at least two people from each of those projects, and I think in one case, three.

Mr. Glick: At Denver, Mr. Stafford was not present because he was recently married and absent on his honeymoon. He was represented by Phil Shafer, assistant director, . . . the other directors and members of their staffs were there. At Little Rock, both project directors were present. I should say Mr. Cozzens, Mr. Smart and Mr. Whitaker were present at their respective meetings. In general, we had from 15 to 20 people at each meeting.

The second general remark I'd like to make is that John and I checked with each other, and agreed that these three meetings were decidedly and exceptionally successful. The discussion was very full and moved along in excellent humor. Everybody was full of his problems, and had a good many ideas and suggestions. The meetings gave everybody an awfully good feeling, and I personally add that it is my own judgment that as a result of the clarification that took place at these meetings and as a result of the additional information supplied everywhere around, the WRA is probably in a better administrative position at this moment than it has ever been since its organization. Also, that the general morale and feeling, tone, on the part of the project directors and key members of their staffs, most of whom were of course at these meetings, is high; that they feel in general that we have weathered one or two very severe storms and are very much the stronger for it.

I don't know that there is anything else in general I need to say, except -- there is one other point that won't come up in the topical summary, so I better mention it now. The Director held two press conferences in the course of the trip, one at Denver, and one at Little Rock. The one at Denver came, as I understand it, very spontaneously, almost at the last minute, and at the request of the press. It occurred on the morning of the third day, and we were able to get the first newspaper reports of it the last minute before we rushed for the train. It was an exceptionally successful press conference. The men who came to the press conference in many cases some were prejudiced against the program, and in almost all cases, uninformed about the program. After a few questions, Mr. Myer suggested he'd be very glad to provide some general background information about it, proceeded to do so, and was heard out with very good effects upon the reporters present. The result was that even the Denver Post carried a very favorable article about the WRA program that afternoon, and in general headlines for the article and all the captions throughout the story, instead of using the word "Japs", used the word "Japanese".

Mr. Myer: That was the most significant thing.

Mr. Glick: Everybody at the meeting felt, after the report of the press conference, that that was quite a high water mark in connection with our activities. I think largely as a reaction to that, but why I am only guessing, the minute we hit Little Rock

Mr. Myer suggested it might not be a bad idea to inform the gentlemen of the press, if they wanted to ask any questions or talk about the program, he'd be quite willing to meet them toward the end of the third day. A much smaller number turned out, I don't recall exactly how many.

Mr. Myer: Two, one from the American Legion and one from the Press Gazette.

Mr. Glick: We left Little Rock, however, before there could be any reactions from that press conference.

Mr. Provinse: We had competition there from a milk rationing program.

Mr. Myer: Furthermore, we had a press conference in Little Rock about six weeks before that at which all of them were present. I particularly hoped Gene Rutland would come, but he ducked me and didn't come.

Mr. Glick: We came to the three meetings with the general intention of devoting approximately the first day or day and a half to whatever project directors or their staff wanted to throw up for discussion, and the last day and a half for going over the agenda prepared in Washington. Actually we departed from that a good deal. In San Francisco we departed from it because Dillon was tied up by plane and train, and got there toward the end of the second day of the conference, and since we felt Dillon would want to hear chiefly what the project directors would want to bring up, we began at the other end. At the later two meetings, as a matter of fact, we also did not follow that separation, primarily because we discovered that the things the project directors wanted to talk about, with a few minor exceptions, were the same things we included on the Washington agenda.

Mr. Myer: Furthermore, we had the military items to report which we started with, and that led into other things.

Mr. Glick: What we have in mind in general for the rest of the report is to take these up by topics rather than separate meetings, because I think it will be much easier and clearer to get the picture that way. The first topic is assigned to me. Selective Service.

Dillon was not at the meeting in San Francisco when I started with that, but did arrive to correct one misapprehension I created in my statement on that subject. The announcement was received very favorably. We had emphasized that it was a military secret in order to be sure there would be no leak, because it was still about a week before the announcement from Secretary Stimson was due. I don't recall that any of the people at the San Francisco meeting expressed any concern over the way in which this new activity might be received at their projects. In general

they welcomed it. They felt it would help them materially to meet the criticism the evacuees had offered in the past of being discriminated against and not being permitted to serve in the army. They were all very alert to the great importance it would have in speeding up the leave program, because it is harder to snipe at the mothers and fathers of American soldiers than Japanese evacuated from the West Coast.

There was some concern in the San Francisco group about the fact that this merely called for the organization of a combat unit, rather than general extension of selective service, and some little question, although we got that to a much greater degree at Little Rock than San Francisco, over whether the evacuees might feel that their being all put together into a single combat unit instead of dispersed throughout the army represented discrimination, but the concern on neither of these phases was particularly strong at the San Francisco meeting.

I had said in the course of my statement that it was definitely decided that the schools would be closed during the process of filling in questionnaires, at least for the first few days, so the school teachers could aid in the filling in of the questionnaires. Dillon later explained it was decided we probably would not need to do that, although the project directors could keep that in mind if it were necessary, that it would probably be possible to do the actual clerical work without closing the schools for that purpose.

Staff Member: Incidentally, they have decided to do that at Tule Lake, close the schools.

Mr. Glick: On the very day on which the announcement from the Secretary of War was expected, that gave quite a dramatic touch and color to the whole business. The thing was explained to them, and then later in the afternoon Mr. Myer was able to read to the meeting the telegram that gave the verbatim press release of the Secretary of War and the press release prepared for us for issuance in connection with the subject.

At Denver, the reaction to the announcement was much the same as at San Francisco, on the whole, the very strong feeling that this would greatly improve feeling within the center and greatly expedite the whole leave program. At Little Rock, there was a slightly different reaction. Ray Johnston pointed out (he is project director at Rohwer) that we must not assume, from the fact that the evacuees had been pressing for being accepted in the army, that all of them would receive this announcement with glee, and that we would have no trouble whatever in getting the 3,500 or whatever number is allocated to the relocation centers as immediate enlistments in the army. He remarked that when

a small dog runs up and down behind the fence barking at a big dog, and suddenly sees a hole in the fence, he doesn't immediately run right through the hole. And he cautioned us that we might expect a little reaction of that sort here.

At Little Rock, they were much more disturbed over the possibility of feeling that the organization of a separate combat unit instead of general dispersion in the army was discriminatory and based on caste consideration, and so on. First it was emphasized that there would be others dispersed throughout the army, as there are at present, so you actually have both a combat unit and general dispersion throughout the army. Furthermore, the organization of a combat unit has tremendous propaganda value, both internally and otherwise, because it is easier to write stories about a unit, and there is also great value in it from the standpoint of short wave broadcasting to China, Turkey, and countries of that sort.

I did not personally get the impression that Little Rock was very deeply concerned about these things, although they were much more sharply concerned than either of the other two were, and the general feeling there too was that this was a great victory for WRA, and should improve general administration and tone within the centers and should speed up leave procedures.

Mr. Myer: I think one of the reasons we got this reaction from the two groups at Little Rock was that they were the only two projects where the news had already broken before they left the projects, just a few hours before, and they had gotten some of the first reactions, so that they had a little of the feel of it. However, Paul Taylor told me he had two or three boys who had expressed disappointment at the separate unit on the first afternoon that they had gotten the news. And one or two of them came back the next morning to him and said, "We've been thinking this thing over, and think perhaps the special unit is a good thing, because it will give us a good deal more publicity".

In other words, they began, after they thought it through, to think of the total problem, where the first reaction was resentment because they were putting them in a special group as the negroes and other people. So Paul felt when they had time to think the thing through, they would not only accept it, but see the larger pattern, and what we get first would be the self-interest reaction. But I think that was the major reason as to the difference between your reactions. However, Ray Johnston, who is always pessimistic, indicated that probably 25 percent of the young people in that age group would indicate their willingness to volunteer, but thought that was being very conservative, but "not more than 25 percent" is the way he put it. I said, "If you get 25 percent to volunteer out of that group, that will be 400 people".

Mr. Glick: The next item on the agenda is reports between Washington and the field, and John will summarize that.

Mr. Provinse: Before we get to that -- have we had any information from the projects reporting upon how this has been received at the project?

Mr. Myer: We have had a little, John; here is one report just came in today from Manzanar. John, we didn't leave any instruction for any regular report on it, I wonder if we shouldn't?

Mr. Baker: We wired for it yesterday.

Mr. Myer: "Evacuee reaction to army announcement generally passive. Significant that we have seen no mention of it coming back through daily reports from block manager offices. This means managers have instructed the clerks to make no mention of it. ... Estimate 200 volunteers to be a top number." If we get 200 at Manzanar, I won't be too unhappy about it, but I am guessing when this thing starts to roll, they will get a lot more than they think.

Mr. Holland: I talked to Joe _____ this morning on procedural details, and they figure on conservatively about 300, and hope it may go as high as 600.

Mr. Myer: Did he raise any question about publicizing the item in project papers?

Mr. Holland: No.

Mr. Provinse: The emphasis that the Director put upon the discussion on reports was the need for the project director to submit reports, reports of two kinds; one, the regular periodical reports, the weekly reports particularly, which would contain a more narrative statement than they now contain, the emphasis being upon keeping us informed in here as much as possible of all the little things that were happening, even though at the particular time they occur the project director did not feel they might be important and therefore did not want to bother the Washington office with reporting. When it was explained to them that these little things, when they were able to be lumped together here, frequently show a pattern which becomes of considerable significance to the program generally, most every project director was willing to admit that, and recognize that he perhaps had been a little derelict in transmitting incidents that had happened on his project, that were not isolated incidents but were a part of something prevalent in all the centers which, when lumped together, formed some kind of pattern which became significant for the Washington Director to know about.

I think they were all very wholehearted in their protestation that they would in the future keep us well informed of all the

things going on. That included also special reports of things which were of more significance than could wait until the weekly report was prepared, at which time they would either get on the phone or send a teletype or special airmail letter covering that particular incident. So I think we will have initiated by the project directors probably a more full reporting type of work than we have had heretofore.

When the Director turned the tables on them then, and asked them to tell him where they needed to be kept informed, what type of information and what type of report they wanted from this end, there was not nearly as clear formulation. Of course, we had the jump on them, because we had been thinking about this on the way out, whereas it was put to them in a minute or two, so it took them a little while to formulate what they thought they ought to have from Washington.

I think the San Francisco office was more aware of the need for some regular reporting system coming down from this end, and after a little bit of fishing around, when the Director indicated that he might be agreeable to submitting a weekly report of a couple of pages, it was seized upon pretty rapidly out in the San Francisco meeting as being a very worthwhile thing to have. And this report that the Director suggested might be made by him directly to the project directors came out as a result of some discussion in this staff meeting two or three weeks ago, when Tozier raised the question about whether or not certain policy determinations that we were making in reply to questions from a specific project were at the same time being sent on then to the other projects. There are many wires and letters that go out in answer to specific questions covering policy, and I am sure that many of them do not get to other projects, so that we do not have a uniform type of reporting out policy determinations on certain points in the Washington office.

So when the Director suggested that such a letter might come from this office which once a week would bring together the things that had been decided here, or things that were of importance to the whole program, it was seized upon pretty rapidly by the people in San Francisco. The other people accepted it also, but had not thought particularly of the need for such a type of reporting. As finally arrived at, the letter that the Director would sign would be a letter prepared here which would contain probably three types of data: one, things which were not restricted or confidential, but news items which could be passed on down in brief form, so the project director could even publish them in the local paper or give them widespread distribution; other items of a more restricted nature which could be passed out to a few key members of the staff; other items confidential in nature,

which would be intended rather exclusively for the project director or one or two people he would want to inform. Those would be definitely marked in each letter, so the people would know what type of information was being dealt with under any particular heading. Suggestion was made that the part of the letter that could be given widespread distribution be written separately from that which was more restricted and confidential, so that the whole letter might be given out at the time of its receipt, and the confidential restricted part held back.

I did not get at any of the meetings any feeling that we were not reporting to them activities at the Washington level frequently enough or full enough. They did not seem to be so much concerned over that. They were concerned about the slowness of getting answers to questions, the slowness in getting out administrative instructions. Those were the things that seemed to worry them more than whether or not we were keeping them informed on particular phases of the program. They were somewhat disturbed about one other angle, and that was the speed with which we sent out requests for information, many telegrams arriving Monday morning asking for a report to be submitted to the Washington office by Monday noon.

Mr. Myer: Or Saturday before.

Mr. Provinse: Yes, the Saturday before. We tried to explain that on the basis that during the past two or three weeks we had these requests from the Senate, or WPB, for information which we needed within the deadline set up, but I do think all of them felt that we were putting the bee on them a little bit too fast so far as getting these reports back in. Was that your impression, Philip?

Mr. Glick: Yes.

Mr. Myer: May I comment on that too? Coverley explained it would be very helpful if you take a few more words and explain why you want it. He felt it would help the morale of the staff to feel it was put to a useful purpose. I know at this end we like to know why people wire in, and do certain things for them so rush, and I think there is the same reaction at the other end. I think it is a very good suggestion. If we could just give them the reasons for the urgency, they would go at it with much better spirit.

Mr. Provinse: Relating to the two matters of reports, the numbers of questionnaires being circulated, or the number of times these people have to be contacted with relation to a certain thing -- some of the repatriation lists have been submitted

four or five times. We have used WRA 26's, we have our basic family records, we now have the work that is being done under Selective Service, and there will be reports in connection with property, all of which duplicate to a considerable extent material previously obtained, and which is available on some of the other forms. There is a rising tide of rebellion on the part not only of the evacuees, but also the part of the administrative staff, as to the number of those questionnaires and schedules, and I think we ought to look pretty carefully at the need for and how much of the material might be available from other sources, before we go into any questionnaires.

Mr. Barrows: I would like to recall that at one time you authorized us to set up a system of duplicating copies of significant letters. That was started, but somewhere in the shuffle of reorganization, they got lost, but I wonder whether that should be reexamined. The idea was when a person wrote a letter involving policy and sent it up for signature, he would suggest it be contained in a series of duplicated letters that come in and go out.

Mr. Myer: I think this should be taken care of now in this plan for a weekly summary from the Director to the project directors rather than by duplication of telegrams and letters. I think, however, that if the divisions will make note of that sort of thing, and remember to do it, it will be much easier for us to check the policy, I mean check the items.

Mr. Baker: There is one thought that occurs to me in connection with the general, unrestricted items. I wonder if that sort of material is not already included in our weekly digest?

Mr. Myer: Generally, yes, but there might be some last-minute stuff that might be important to go into the letter. Our general understanding was this, if it was not marked, it would be unrestricted, but it would be marked according to plan otherwise -- restricted, confidential, or secret.

Mr. Rowalt: That weekly report has also softened down to the point where it isn't particularly useful for any purpose.

Mr. Glick: I have a little bit of question as to whether or not frequently there may be a letter valuable for general distribution not so much for news, as for the reasoning it gives or explanation of background?

Mr. Myer: We have two things already, and I want to comment on the other one -- that is, we will have, when the Director's letter begins going to the Assistant Field Directors and

Project Directors. That presumably is the type of thing needed. It would not be very long, but we would try to catch what happened in a week's period that they should know for good administration and keeping them informed on things we know about and they should know about, most of them restricted.

Mr. Barrows: I just prepared a restricted letter for your signature to a project director on this subject: we have heard that in one project where they ordered beef to meet their normal needs, the Army switched and shipped them ham and bacon. We have just issued an order they are not to purchase any ham and bacon until further notice. On the one hand that shows a very cooperative attitude on the part of the Quartermaster Corps, they didn't want us to be hungry and got what they could, but on the other hand, we'll never be able to explain the presence of ham and bacon by saying the Army shipped it to us, because the answer of the people who complain will be, "Let them go without any meat". Therefore I wrote this letter suggesting the project director or steward take advantage of the first opportunity he had to go to the depot, talk the problem over with the subsistence officer there, and see if they could work out some other substitution to meet our requirements without creating a public relations problem. I didn't want to slow down our getting food in any way, because they ought to handle it themselves, but should that go in this weekly letter?

Mr. Myer: I think not in that kind of a case. It is so urgent that a special letter should go to the project director, probably sending a copy to the other one, because it is something for direct administrative action that ought to be handled expeditiously and be in shape to have it in the files, so if anybody finds those hams, the background will be taken care of. I think your office should prepare the letters to all directors on that.

Mr. Barrows: If that sort of thing doesn't go in it, the stuff you get from my division won't have much substance in it.

Mr. Myer: For instance, I used this report we had at San Francisco on the proposed Selective Service and Army Unit. If we had not had that, we certainly would have gotten out to the directors ahead of time a summary of that situation, that is, a week or ten days before this thing broke. There will be a lot of items that will come up from time to time. Let me summarize what they said they would like to have, to give you some idea of the type of thing we could put in.

The San Francisco group said they would like these telegrams for information to tell why -- I'll run through the whole group -- they said general preparedness is important, their internal public relations were as important as the outside, and on such things as Selective Service, they should have the

knowledge ahead of any other break that might come, if we could get it. I'll run right on down through. Somebody said they ought to have expansion of the information sheet, and then somebody said, "It's too long now, we shouldn't talk too much about people, we should give more facts." That's talking about the Review, John -- people have taken trips, and so on, wasn't of much interest to the projects, and that probably should be boiled down.

Here's one: What type of questions do the Senators ask in the Senate hearings, what is the type of information requested? They would like to have had a statement on the Senate hearings. I did get out a special letter on that. They hadn't all gotten it, but some of them had, by the time we got to the others. They wanted a copy, for example, of the statement prepared for the record, which is somewhat longer than we would put in a letter.

Any items that affect the national program now. Let me give you an example of two or three types of things that happened today that I think I'd put in a letter -- I'm not sure. I have talked to Miss Thompson today about Mrs. Roosevelt's request to visit a project while the soldiers are there. I'd like to let the project director know that we have that in mind, and if it can be done, as a part of this general campaign of recruitment. I think the introduction of a bill of any kind on the Hill should be checked and put into this item of news to them, with any information we have about its possible significance, as the Senate hearings were. I think any developments -- well, for example, today Elmer talked with the WPB about the Heart Mountain schools. There's been a lot of background on that I think they should know, even though it affects Heart Mountain, I think the rest should know the revision being made on it.

I think there are a lot of things of that type, if we can make notes in this office; I think a lot of them will come out of this office on the mail that comes through here and the type of things we talk about. I don't want them long, and I don't want duplications of other things we normally put out. I think we should check all secret, confidential mail that comes across here, and see if there is any of it they have any real concern with and should know about. Another little item is Gurnea's trip with Hoover. We sent word out ahead, but to give them more detail on it and the reason for it would be helpful. It is that type of thing -- they feel they are being taken in on a little more intimate detail of certain important developments. Does that give you an idea?

Mr. Barrows: Yes.

Mr. Myer: Is it all right, do you think?

Mr. Barrows: Sure. I was thinking about this problem we've been working on, the question sent in by Stafford about operation of a bus between the project and Twin Falls. There's a question about our being able to do certain things, and the question of the administrative reason and feasibility. Some little summary of that might well go to all the centers.

Mr. Myer: I think that is all right, because it involves an important issue.

Mr. Barrows: This is a commuting proposition, between the project and town, where people live.

Mr. Myer: Oh, yes, I remember.

Mr. Glick: Next is the report on the Senate Military Affairs Subcommittee.

Mr. Myer: There was a great deal of interest in that. As I say, we had already gotten out our letter. The group as a whole were quite delighted that we were taking the attitude we were taking, as we presented it in the letter, saying we're glad it was up, and we're glad to be investigated. We thought we could use it as a basis of having people visit the projects, and have a better understanding of the program; and not to be too much concerned about it, although we were taking it seriously, and it was helping us to get a lot of things together we needed to get together anyhow. It did lead to quite a lot of interest and discussion -- not too much discussion, but some, individually at least, and in groups to some extent -- on the public relations problem in relation to Congress, their part in it, what they could do in relation to State legislatures and to State officials and others, and that was discussed in some detail. There was some agreement that certain people would make certain visits in areas and keep contacts where they had not already done so.

As I say, I had not given much thought to reporting on that, excepting that the matter was reported to them in reasonable detail at each of the meetings, and I think they were quite pleased to have the facts about it. I have already indicated, and I'd like to make somebody responsible for this, if they will take it, that they would like to have a copy of the statement prepared for the record, if it is not too big to make up. If they publish the record, of course we can send them the record.

Mr. Rowalt: They should have it before that. The record would not be published for quite awhile.

Mr. Myer: Do you want to look after that, or shall I ask John Baker?

Mr. Rowalt: Yes.

Mr. Myer: They didn't ask for the whole record, Elmer. They would also like to have, as indicated here, some indication of the type of the questions that the Senate committee were interested in, if we can get that together. If we had the whole record, that would take care of it, but until that comes out, they won't know. They feel that would give them some idea of the type of problems that they have to pay special attention to in relation to their administration of the center, and that was significant. That is about all I have to say on that.

Mr. Glick: You might state that you said at each of the meetings that it was your personal judgment that the bill itself probably would not be reported out of the committee.

Mr. Myer: I indicated we had heard that probably was the case.

Mr. Glick: I thought that was of significance, because I think that part of the discussion gave the impression that the bill had primary significance not so much whether WRA should be transferred to the War Department or remain an independent agency, but rather the relation of the WRA program to Congress. . . .

Mr. Stauber: Was there any difference in the seriousness with which that proposal in Congress was received as between the folks on the Coast and those in the interior?

Mr. Myer: I don't believe there was, I can't remember that there was. Of course, we got to the Coast late, and it had not been discussed before I got there. There was quite a lot of interest on the part of the Coastal group in getting the report, they were sort of waiting until I got there in getting facts on it, and they were not long in asking me about it.

One other point on the Western thing I'd like to throw out to the staff before I forget it here: somebody suggested while we were talking about type of service rendered to the project, and how they should be rendered, that now that we are getting squared away, they thought many of the staff members at the project level would appreciate people visiting projects -- Washington people out in the field -- not insisting on their working on Sunday, just because they were there. They are a pretty hard-worked crew, and while they are willing to do it, somebody suggested we should probably tell our own staff to propose that perhaps they have a day of rest. . . . They are on almost twenty-four hour duty anyway.

Mr. Provinse: Just a footnote to the public relations angle, on the broadcast that John D. Hughes made that some of us here heard. We picked up information out on the West Coast that he had spent two hours with one of our staff people previous to making that broadcast, and he got a good deal of his information directly from headquarters.

Mr. Myer: And a very good one. I find that he has been following the thing pretty closely from the start. He had visited several of the assembly centers, and had quite a lot of background, and it was easy for him to get up to date.

Mr. Glick: The next topic is community government.

Mr. Provinse: Well, community government discussion revolved largely around the one point that has been the sore spot, I suppose, since it was first started, and that was the participation of aliens -- the Issei Nisei question -- and I think without any difference of opinion, all thought that the Issei ought to be brought in in some responsible way to local government. When it came to the question of whether or not they should be elected and put on the council, most of the projects felt we should also allow them to be elected to the council.

We found our greatest opposition there in the projects that already had their permanent organization. In other words, Harvey Coverley resisted very strongly issuing an administrative instruction at this time. He has all this thing through, and he doesn't believe we should upset that now, and put them back in. That was true also at one other project, Ernst, who had acceptance on the part of the community generally that the Issei would secure their representation on some non-elective basis.

We found one project where we were told some three or four weeks ago there is no local government planned, and where they resisted putting local government in. That is Minidoka. They are operating there without even a temporary council of any type, using evacuees for advisory purposes if and when evacuees have some advice to give, but making no use of them if they don't need them. In other words, it is pretty close to what the Indian Service has used the last 150 years in Indian administration, prior to Mr. Collier's going into the Indian Service, where you simply run the project in the most efficient way you can, and if you feel you need advice from some of the people, you get it, and you pick such leaders as you need in your administration. And they are having what they claim to be very good results, as far as administration is concerned.

No one knows exactly what it is doing in terms of some of the things we had in mind when we think of local government, that is, permitting these people to develop their government, people who up to this time had not had a chance to work in governmental affairs. They are not getting that chance at Minidoka. Whether or not that is too great a price to pay for the ease with which Minidoka is running is hard to say. It might be a good place for a test case, that is, having one of these projects carry on without the type of local government organization

that exists at other projects.

The question was put as to whether or not we should change this, and it was pointed out that if we were going to change it, this might be the best time to go into it, because we are rapidly skimming off, and will as our employment program speeds up, the more able of the younger citizen group who will be eligible for holding office, which means that we are throwing back upon the alien and non-citizen group a less and less well qualified group from which to select leaders for their council. If we did want to change, perhaps we'd have an opportune time to open up the council, and say that non-citizens can participate. It was suggested that instead of doing this at this particular time, we might do it at the next regular election, so that we would have, say, four, five or six months under one type of government before we opened it up for the Issei to participate.

Mr. Baker: Is there uniformity as to the period of election for the councils?

Mr. Myer: Yes, after they are once elected, they are six-month periods.

Mr. Provinse: There are two projects at which there are now temporary governments operating; one at Manzanar, where they have a committee of 108, which is represented really by an executive council of 4 people, or an executive committee of 4 people, 2 of whom are Issei and 2 of whom are Nisei. At Poston, they have a committee of 72 which is operating, but in a letter which has come since I came back, from Dr. Ishimaru, they're going ahead with the reestablishment of the regular council.

Mr. Myer: They have reelected their council at community 1, and it is functioning. Dr. Ishimaru is reelected, but he resigned, and they put in -- I can't think of the boy's name, but he's a two-fisted type chap. This chap is the chap that stood out when I was down there, because he got up and in a very pugnacious manner went after our wage policy, and he certainly took off his gloves when he did it. He had on a big-checked shirt, and probably boots, and there wasn't any question about his pugnacity. I didn't resent it, he isn't too bitter, but he just takes the gloves off and wades in. He recently wrote a letter to all Senators on that particular subject and others, a letter addressed to Wade Head, in which he objects for not getting a chance to run their own business, objects to the wage scales, and so on. They showed it to me from Denver on. He's that type of person, but Wade Head says he is doing a pretty good job of running the council and handling the Issei, probably the only type person to handle that particular situation at the moment. Nobody pressures him off the map, he knows how to stand his ground.

Mr. Provinse: I got one sidelight on that request which they sent. Apparently they sent it to the project director, and asked that it be submitted to the council. One project director was not going to submit it to the council, but after consulting with several people, they advised strongly against withholding this thing. He held it up for about 10 days, but he is planning to do it.

Mr. Myer: That was Guy?

Mr. Provinse: That was Guy. If we wanted to change and put the Issei into the council, we will find some resistance on the part of those projects that have organized their local government and overcome some of the objections that were made. If we don't want to do that, I think every project is prepared to go ahead and secure the support of your alien group to something that is not a regularly elected political activity, that is, through an advisory group or planning council of some sort. I think every project feels that they can, without recognizing the political rights of the Issei in the council eventually, go ahead and get the help of this elder group through some other type of activity, but I think they all realize that will require some fight in order to do it.

Mr. Glick: I have a few notes I'd like to add to that discussion on community government, John, if I may.

At the San Francisco meeting, the suggestion was made that if WRA does change the existing policy to permit aliens to become members of the community council, that a quota should be established in the instruction to safeguard having a majority of citizens on the council. But when the project directors were asked what kind of a quota they would recommend, the four project directors supplied four ways. The director at Gila said, "Let Washington decide". The director at Manzanar said there should be no quota, but let each project decide what quota would be appropriate. The director at Colorado River said to divide the project in precincts . . . Coverley said to let Tule Lake alone as it is.

It was pointed out at Denver if we now change the policy barring aliens from membership on the council, we would have to make a good statement of our reasons for it, otherwise it might be a sign of weakness -- if any policy of WRA is objected to long and loud enough, it probably will change. So Mr. Myer said that he had in mind stating the two reasons John has mentioned, the effect of a large number of people going on leave, and the Selective Service policy.

Mr. Ernst made this suggestion, that if the instruction says that one of the reasons for the change of policy is that citizens

are going out more readily than aliens, he said the aliens would interpret that that the WRA would modify the leave policy as to aliens. There was both pressure therefore that we do give this for the reason in change of policy, if we do change the policy, and argument against giving this for the reason. No decisions were given on any of these, they were simply discussed, and passed on to the next topic.

By the time we got to the Little Rock meeting, the discussion of Issei - Nisei had boiled down so that Mr. Myer said fundamentally we faced five alternatives, and stated them this way: One, we can continue under present policy prohibiting aliens from becoming members of the council. Two, we could repeal that policy, and say both aliens and citizens would be eligible on the council. Three, we could say aliens are eligible with citizens to serve on the council, but with some limitation of numbers -- proportional representation, or there must be a majority of citizens, or perhaps the precinct idea suggested by Wade Head or some one else. Four, limit the aliens to an advisory committee, advising either the project director or community council, or both. Five, no self-government at all, but the project director appoint a committee made up of anybody he wanted. It was quickly pointed out that the fifth was not being considered by WRA, therefore a decision probably would lie within one of the first four alternatives.

Mr. Provinse: We never did poll the group to find out which they preferred.

Mr. Myer: No, it would take too much time. But they said it should be either three or four.

Mr. Glick: I tried to take notes on that, but I couldn't find out where Paul Taylor stood.

Mr. Myer: He finally came over to 4, it would either be representation of aliens on the council with a limited number, or a citizen's group with advisory council.

Mr. Provinse: An advisory committee really set up in an administrative instruction.

Mr. Myer: Yes, maybe even arranging for elections for it. I just have one other comment to make on this, that John is correct. Wherever they have got the thing set up and it is now functioning, where they've made the adjustment as they have at Tule Lake with the planning council practically really running the council in my opinion, and Ernst has the advisory council, where they've made that adjustment, they don't like to change it. Other than that -- well, Lindley was one that didn't want to back off, because they were about ready to go, but he changed

his mind in this meeting, if you remember, and said, "Yes, some provision should be made for Issei participation".

But it came down to this: while they were not together, as indicated by Philip's statement here, by far the great majority of them felt that there should be some kind of Issei participation. They did not want it too rigid, so that they had to throw it wide open. The most of them felt there should be proportional representation, with quite a few feeling there should be a majority of citizens on the council. They would like to have it rewritten, if it is rewritten, arranging so that there could be Issei participation either definitely recognized as an advisory group or as voting members within limitations, but leaving some leeway for the project itself and the people on the project to work within those limitations, rather than making it too definite just how many should be elected in each place, and what that proportion should be, but I think in all cases they would say the number of Issei should not be over fifty percent.

Mr. Provinse: One other comment I think might be worth while from the standpoint of the worth-whileness of these meetings. With the exception of Whitaker, Smart and Ernst, there were no project directors present, or no members of the staff present, who had participated in any of the meetings in San Francisco when this policy was drawn up. They all thought we had made an arbitrary decision, with the result that they were unaware completely of the experience we had at Manzanar when we did have a council on which Issei predominated, and they were quite surprised to find out we had any background experience where Issei had taken over command of the council, where they had conducted the meetings in Japanese largely, and where the whole thing was pointed toward more and more Japanesation. But I think we have fallen down in acquainting the projects, particularly outside of California, with some of the things that were taken into consideration at the time the policy statement was adopted, and these meetings did furnish an excellent opportunity for further clarification of some of those things.

Mr. Myer: I'd like to ask, while we are going along, that Provinse' Division and the Solicitor's Office take the responsibility of trying to draft -- I won't say we'll put it out -- but trying to redraft our community government policy statement within the general lines I have just outlined here, which I think is the consensus of opinion.

Mr. Glick: Are you ready to indicate which of the four alternatives you wish?

Mr. Myer: I should say it will probably be three or four, or both, leaving it open for either if that seems feasible, because it needs to be thought through if we are going to change it. Certainly the first and the last one are out. I think it is the general consensus there should be some limitation of number, and it should be either three or four, and I am pretty sure, Philip, that the way we are going now, we should formalize No. 4 if we decide not to go with 3, providing for an advisory committee of Issei. We should go at least that far.

Mr. Glick: Ratify and confirm what is being done?

Mr. Myer: That is right, because it is being done anyway, and it should be done if we don't change the policy.

Col. Wilson: I have recently read a paper that Embree wrote, and was published by the Smithsonian Institute on the Japanese. I think it is splendid reading for background.

Mr. Myer: It is labeled "The Japanese, By John F. Embree".

Col. Wilson: It has nothing to do with this, but it pointed out very directly to me that in restricting this government to American citizens, on account of their youth bracket - their age bracket - their extreme youth, we have to surmount the greatest hurdle in Japanese custom. Embree makes one statement in there that in social organization, and that sort of thing, no young Japanese can ever occupy a prominent position.

Mr. Myer: Paul Taylor told me after we had this discussion that he had about three very strong members on his council, two of them were in their forties, one of them about forty-six or seven, the other about forty-three or four. He said if they should happen to go out on indefinite leave, he said, "I don't know what we would do under our present setup, because we'd have no one to tie to." These men are old enough to deal with the Issei, are accepted by the Issei, are the backbone of the council, that is what it really comes down to.

Mr. Glick: Next was trial and punishment of offenses.

We summarized administrative instruction 34 as it reads now, because with discussion we had come to these meetings with the conviction that a great part of our difficulty in the past in the trial and punishment of offenses was due to the lack of general information as to what administrative instruction 34 provided, and the general pattern laid out. We began to make that summary, and emphasized particularly that administrative instruction 34 had contemplated that the temporary community council had only a short life, and before long the organization drafted a permanent plan of government which would set up a permanent council; that the council would

have general authority to adopt ordinances covering the making of arrests, docketing of cases for trial, the trial procedure, and the actual trial of persons who had violated the regulations, and the council in turn would have an opportunity to adopt rules as to what are offenses within the relocation centers.

We then pointed out that we had been disappointed because the evacuees took months of debate, under these committees, to draft their permanent plan of government. One thing that these meetings sharpened up that I, at least, had not realized before, was this: we were pretty clearly bargaining for trouble when we provided the aliens could not be members of the community council, but could be members of the organization commissions, because the organization commission then found itself obstructed. The alien members hated to approve a permanent plan of government that would deprive them of participation in the local government. Therefore the organization commissions tended to spend a lot of time raising questions about this. Then they would write the Director in Washington, appealing from that policy, and weeks would go by that way. The result was, the organization commission spent more time trying to get around that particular provision, and finally working out the idea for a planning committee at Tule, and an advisory committee at Central Utah, or as at Heart Mountain, working out the idea of a bi_____ council, one open to citizens and one to aliens.

So a great part of the reason for the delay in getting the permanent plans of government from the projects is tied in with this question of alien participation in the community council, but the result of that delay, we pointed out, was that months after administrative instruction 34 was issued, we had no permanent councils. Even today, there exists only one at Tule Lake, and two other projects that have had their permanent plan of government approved, have not yet had time to hold the referendum on it or hold the elections for necessary officers, and there has been no time to adopt ordinances defining offenses, and the judicial council has had no procedures defined. Nothing has been set up to show when a case must be docketed and tried, whether you need a subpoena for arrest, no procedure to govern search and seizure, and so on.

One of the conclusions we drew from that part of the discussion was that community government had not failed in the centers as of today, it had not yet been tried; and the second conclusion we drew was that we would have to take care of this interim period, because today only one council is organized and only three approved community governments. It may be another ten months before the tenth project is through with the work.

So after that general background, we laid out these as proposals for discussion: That the Director issue an administrative instruction defining certain acts that would constitute an offense within the center . . . That would provide a definition of offenses, and definite trial procedure, using the project director's offices for whatever period may further elapse before the permanent plan of government gets fully organized.

The next suggestion was that a further instruction be issued regulating the making of arrests. We pointed out the relationship of arrests to incidents at the center. The most important point we stressed for the instruction in case of arrest was this, that police officers be authorized to make arrests without warrant in only one case, where the offense is committed within the presence of the officer. To get a warrant, either the police officer or a complaining witness or member of the project director's staff could give a statement to the director indicating there is reasonable ground to believe an offense has been committed, and reasonable ground to believe a certain person has committed the offense, and then a warrant for his arrest would issue.

The instruction would also provide that once arrested, he could be placed in jail, and within 24 hours of that time, the project director, advised by the project attorney, would determine whether the offense is one triable by the project director, by the evacuee judicial commission, or turned over to the State or Federal Court for prosecution. If either of the latter two, arrangements would be begun for turning them over to the State or Federal Court. If for the first two, the case was to be docketed within those 24 hours for trial. Cases were to be reached for trial as rapidly as possible. There was to be a regular procedure provided to give a reasonable amount of dignity to these proceedings, not requiring lawyers on both sides, not requiring common law procedures, but a reasonable amount of ceremony to give dignity and impressiveness.

The last question to be discussed in this field was: what kind of cases shall be tried by the project director and what by the judicial commission? The next problem was: define the relative jurisdictions of these four agencies. When is the case to be tried by the project director, when by the evacuee judicial commission, when by the State Court, and when by the Federal Court? The present administrative instruction says if it is a State felony, turn it over to the State Court; if it is a Federal felony, to the Federal Court, although that last point is not clearly stated; but if it is a misdemeanor under State law, then both the project director and the evacuee judicial commission have jurisdiction to try the case. The theory behind that was that the project director must be given general power to exercise

disciplinary authority . . . but then he would encourage the evacuee judicial commission to try cases. In that way, you could encourage the judicial commission to act fully, but be protected against a breakdown. That was the theory last August. It was repeatedly pointed out that that results in the willingness of the judicial commission to pass the buck. They feel if we do not act, the project director will. Therefore, particularly in the case of gang beatings, they follow a hands-off policy.

We then outlined three possible alternatives that might be followed, and invited discussion. Actually there are at least two others that have been suggested since, but since they did not play a big part in the meetings -- the fourth one did at the Little Rock meeting -- I will only mention those discussed at meetings. The three discussed at all of the meetings were: One, leave it alone, on the theory that present policy is best, and that actually this overlapping of jurisdiction between the project director and evacuee judicial commission by itself would not have caused a breakdown of enforcement machinery if all the other difficulties had been taken care of. Certainly it is true that it is a procedure that enables us to meet any situation that may arise. If the judicial commission is willing to try it, it can, and if it cannot, the project director can.

The second alternative was to provide this: Once the director had issued his instruction defining certain offenses, only the project director could try the violation of those offenses. But when the community council adopted an ordinance on the same subject as an offense covered in the instruction, thereafter the commission of the offense would be a violation of the regulation of the community council, and such cases would be triable only by the evacuee judicial commission; State felonies in the State Courts, and Federal felonies in the Federal Courts. So in brief, the second alternative would mean if the offense were an offense only because it was a violation of a regulation of WRA, the project director tries it, but if the offense violates a regulation of the community council, the judicial commission tries it.

The third alternative was this: Define certain types of offenses which by experience we know the evacuee commission does not well handle, and the best illustration of that is a gang beating, and those would be only in the jurisdiction of the project director to try. All other offenses would be tried by the evacuee judicial commission. They pointed out that the second and third alternatives are close together, but approach from opposite ends. In the second alternative, the community council determines what the jurisdiction of the evacuee commission shall be, because if they do not adopt an ordinance defining, for example, assault and battery, the offense is not within their jurisdiction. So that you

really still have a division by offenses, only the community council determines, in effect, by adoption or non-adoption of an ordinance, whether the project director or judicial commission tries it.

In the third alternative, it would be the Director of WRA making the determination rather than the community council, although we have the change that in certain offenses only the judicial commission has jurisdiction to try. Therefore there is no passing of the buck. If they do not act, it is an obvious breakdown of law and order machinery. The project director can call them in and use persuasion . . ; if they do not act and refuse to respond to persuasion by the project director, under our instructions nobody could punish that. On the other hand, that may be the price you have to pay for the development of a sense of responsibility, and perhaps that is wise, and if we discover from experience that it really does break down on that point, then a change can be made for that reason.

A fourth alternative which was discussed at Little Rock, as nearly as I recall, was this: We might set up, by reference analogy to the common law, procedure by which the project director or a group of people would quickly examine every offense charged as soon as it was ready to be filed, and determine whether it is best to be tried by the project director or by the judicial commission, or whether it is a felony and should hence be turned over to the State or Federal Courts, in the light of all facts known at the time.

Well, I don't know that we got very much help in the choice among these alternatives from the project directors. I think the best part of the value of that discussion was simply educational. They got to understand what 34 provides, and what the alternatives are. I think there was a general feeling that this was too much of a lawyer's problem for a general group discussion. . . Again, no decision, of course, was reached on the choice of one of those alternatives, any more than any of the other questions.

Mr. Myer: Philip, I'd like to ask that you go ahead drafting an instruction on this, so we can get it into the pot. It is my general judgment, although I'm not sure I have it properly sized up, that the general feeling was, that of the group as a whole, perhaps, (1) they did want the interim period instructions; (2) that on the final basis, that we should definitely determine that certain types of crimes should go to the outside under different State laws; (3) indicate that the project director should try all cases until community council and the community government set up ordinances, and that as fast as ordinances were established, then a judicial commission would handle those cases that were set up under ordinances, and they would be taken out of the project director's hands at that stage of the game, but he would

continue to handle the remainder. In case they set up no ordinances, he would continue to handle the whole business, which would give them an opportunity to take over the part they thought they could handle.

Mr. Provinse: One reaction at Arkansas to that last point was that if you give the project director this authority, it is going to be too easy, particularly if you depend upon the Issei, for them to say, "What is the use of his doing anything about it"?

Mr. Myer: That is true. On the other hand, there was the feeling that generally speaking, they felt that here was an opportunity for them to step in, and they could take over just as much as they felt they could handle of it.

Mr. Glick: Louis was working on a draft of an administrative instruction on the subject, and made a point I have never thought of that I think you probably ought to incorporate in this instruction. It was indirectly mentioned, I think, at Little Rock.

You remember, under administrative instruction 34, we have said they may not impose any fines, and as a matter of fact, I still believe it is at least doubtful that we have any legal authority to authorize levying of a fine, since these are administrative rather than judicial proceedings, under the final analysis. Inasmuch as the maximum punishment we can impose is jail, or depriving of employment privileges -- probably the maximum jail sentence is 3 months, and at one project they felt that was not enough, they wanted to give a man 5 years, --

Mr. Myer: If he's done anything that bad, he better go to the State Courts.

Mr. Glick: That is the point. Louis suggested that we provide also that where the act is a misdemeanor, but the penalty provided for that act under State law is deemed adequate whereas the penalty we could provide would be deemed inadequate, in such case too, in the project director's discretion, the case may be turned over to the State Courts for prosecution, even though it is a misdemeanor.

Mr. Provinse: That is being done at the present time, Philip, down at Gila.

(Recess at 4:05 p.m.)

4:15 p.m.

Mr. Glick: The next two are both yours, John, internal security, and social analysis.

Mr. Provinse: The internal security situation is somewhat long.

The intensity of concern, which was high in the West, becomes increasingly less important as you go East, and that is true also of the problem of segregation. In San Francisco, they didn't feel they could talk about any other things on the agenda until we settled the question of segregation and internal security. In Denver, it was about the second day before it was mentioned, and in Little Rock, not much concern was expressed about it, although they asked whether or not we were going to discuss it. Just what is behind that difference in emphasis, it is hard to understand, whether it is geography, or experience we have had, whether there are more hangovers of the assembly center on the West Coast than some of the other centers -- it is pretty hard to put your finger on it, but there was much more concern in the West than the East with problems of segregation and internal security.

On the West Coast, all of the projects, of course, had submitted names of people they wanted taken out for segregation, and all of them felt they ought to have more internal security personnel than were allowed them, the most recent instruction allowing six for a project of 10,000, with the exception of Poston, where they felt they could get along with one internal security chief, plus three assistants, one in charge of each one of the camps, 1, 2 and 3.

The maintenance of normal law and order, due to the fact that we are dealing with a fairly well disciplined population, does not seem to be the big question. I think all of them felt they did not need any great number of people in maintaining control over the crime that might exist. There was very little crime in terms of drunkenness or assault cases of the normal type, or thefts or breaking, that could not be taken care of with the minimum of Caucasian police. The thing that seemed to disturb the people on the West Coast were these patterns of riot and patterns of unruliness, and what probably were manifestations of anti-administration and anti-American feeling, which was probably something that could be cured more by treatment or correcting some bad administrative situations that might exist, which no number probably short of as many as we have soldiers or administrative Caucasian personnel would take care of.

Decision was made, however, at Manzanar, where the pressure probably is greater than any of the other places, that ten Caucasian police would be authorized, and that on a temporary basis, Mr. Merritt might increase that by 20 more, but that was to be on a temporary basis. He would keep them for a

month or two months or three months, just long enough to get the thing back into the normal situation.

Mr. Barrows: Did he say where he was going to get twenty?

Mr. Provinse: He thinks he can pick up some guards or police with necessary qualifications, though I think it is going to be very, very difficult to do it. He felt he could get them from some of the WCCA people.

Mr. McMenemy: Manzanar has picked up some people who probably would be adequate for night watchmen or guards, but have no background or previous experience in police administration. The Civil Service Commission has turned them down, and quite rightly so. They picked them up at \$2600, and they are simply not worth \$2600 to anybody, so I am inclined to doubt that we can pick up qualified people at \$2600. I have advised them to recruit them as guards at \$1680.

Mr. Provinse: He did not want people, necessarily, trained in a police force, he wanted them very largely as guards.

Mr. Myer: We are having some government property stolen, and he felt responsible for it, and it had to be guarded. My argument was that the more guards he put on, the more property he would have stolen. We argued it out in some detail, and I finally said, "I'll give you authority to hire not to exceed 30, and not to exceed 3 months." I haven't written it yet, but I will tomorrow. "That force is merely temporary. You will get back on a normal basis within as short a time as possible, and not to exceed 3 months, and I am going to tell you that it is my judgment that you do not need 30 people, and that you will run into more problems having 30 people, but I am giving you that authority at your request." That is the understanding with Merritt.

Mr. Stauber: Is it fair to ask a question, Dillon?

Mr. Myer: I don't know.

Mr. Stauber: Whether the reason for this desire to increase the personnel is that they feel that the evacuees are simply not dependable?

Mr. Myer: They feel at the moment evacuees are not dependable in guarding government property, that they are ^{not} taking any responsibility for it, and that they won't. They will guard their own setup. My point was that they will never feel responsible for guarding it if we continue to take that responsibility. That is as much a part of the project as anything else, and we might as well start in getting back on the beam now as later on. So that is the difference in point of view. I think it started right with the fact that while soldiers were in the center, the only part they guarded was the warehouses, and they felt when the soldiers were

withdrawn, they had to have for the time being a large group of Caucasians guarding government property. Once having made the decision, it was perfectly natural they wanted to argue their point. Merritt finally told me, "If you give me this authority, the chances are I won't use it".

Mr. Barrows: What was the number the WCCA at one time proposed?

Mr. McMenamin: Thirty-six.

Mr. Myer: More than that, I think, thirty-six within our own project, one per block.

Mr. Stauber: What is the situation at Tule Lake? Does Coverley feel the same way about it?

Mr. Myer: Coverley feels he wants three around the boards rather than two around the boards, as we had authorized. He has a larger project. Under our present authority, he would be authorized to have none; he wants 12, and I am willing to concede it. He probably won't get them, because he probably can't get them. Cobey said he'd like to have ten if he could get the right man or men, but he didn't think you could recruit them nowadays, and five was all they would be able to find of the type of people you could utilize.

Mr. Stauber: I asked the question because I ran into the feeling, on my visit there, among certain members of the staff, that there should be a tighter policy with regard to guarding government property.

Mr. Barrows: To tell you the truth, I think on this government property, one reason it has been lax is because there hasn't been an adequate property control system. We did not get out a basic memorandum until 70. And Tule Lake is slower than most centers -- I wouldn't say slower than most, but certainly it is not the first in getting that system into operation. And since there was no effective way in checking up, it encouraged every one to be careless, and as that system gets to working better, I believe it ought to help the situation.

Mr. Myer: Going back to Manzanar. I used very effectively, I think, Cy Fryer's story at Gila about the camouflage lumber. They asked to take our guards off and put their own on, and that was the only night they had any lumber stolen. My position in all cases when this question came up was that there are no in-betweens. We either simply have a small staff to handle the training and general responsibility that there is to be done by the administration of property, not less than 3 or not more than a dozen people of the administrative type, or we go all out

and guard every block, and put it in the hands of soldier guards or guards with guns, and that we give no responsibility to the evacuees at all for it. We assume the responsibility of everything, cut out community government and everything else, and really do a job of guarding it. The more I see of it, the more I believe that very strongly.

Mr. Stauber: Either the evacuees can be trusted to do it, or can't, one of the two.

Mr. Myer: And if they can't, the moment we let them know they can't be trusted, we've got to go all out, not with 36 guards, but with one on every corner of every building.

Col. Wilson: Then your relocation center becomes a concentration camp.

Mr. Myer: That is exactly what it does. After talking with these people, we have general agreement on that, but we do have the pressure that comes from a lot of people that haven't thought that through, and even some of our own staff. I have a letter here from J. Edgar Hoover on Gurnea's trip that upsets me. . . . As an instance, Major McCook, in charge of supply, discussed this item, which in my opinion he had no business talking to Gurnea about at all. It was not in his field. He presented a point of view that he's getting clear off base on.

Mr. Stauber: He gets into it because they've had a lot of food theft there.

Mr. Myer: Probably. And having been in Japan, he has a lot of basis for it, but it puts us in a bad spot every time somebody goes off base and sounds off . . .

Mr. Stauber: Is there any way of putting pressure on the evacuee force and getting them to recognize their responsibility?

Mr. Myer: Sure. They are doing a pretty good job in most of these centers, I think a better job than we expected under the circumstances.

Mr. Provinse: One or two other points I might make. One was the relationships with FBI, so far as going on to the project and picking up an individual. The night that we were in San Francisco, we talked a good deal, the day before, and on the Sunday night we were there, we had a long distance call from Poston, and the FBI had gone into the project and pulled three people out. They told the acting project director they were going to get them, but that was about all the advance notice they had. That has happened at all of the projects more or less -- less, I think, at the Arkansas

projects than anywhere else -- and it is a disquieting and uncertain factor in the lives of every individual there, because some are picked up and interned, and some are released. They never know when this is going to strike. One thing that needs to be done is to work out better relations with the FBI in the arrests they make, so that they will come to us and get our judgment on the individuals they do pick up, still recognizing that we are responsible for the internal security of our projects. They have a legitimate right to reach into our projects, but only after they have discussed it with us.

Another item is something I felt, and I think the other felt too, that we remove the Manzanar situation, which everyone knows about, from the other projects; that there is a growing feeling on the part of the evacuees, as well as the administrative staff, that that thing is not going to happen here. They are getting new support among the evacuees that they are not going to let such a situation come about at the other centers as occurred at Manzanar. If there are gangs developing and if crises are developing, they would like to be in on it, so they can take a hand in it and see it does not develop. That is very strong in the intermountain projects and Arkansas.

Mr. Myer: They are not saying it can't happen here, they are saying it won't happen here.

Mr. Provinse: In connection with the FBI relationships -- Mr. Gurnea, of course, was assigned by Mr. Hoover slightly more than a month ago to make this inspection trip. He had visited four of the projects by the time we got to San Francisco, and we got reports from the project directors there as to what type of inquiry he was making, and some of them were a good bit concerned. He was asking questions they felt were completely outside of his jurisdiction. At Manzanar, he was trying to find out what their wage policy was, how much agricultural land they had in, what type of work opportunities there were, asking what they thought were a lot of irrelevant questions. He and Merritt, I think, had quite a long discussion after Merritt stopped him on some of these questions to see what his function was in making this examination.

That was partly, again, our fault, in not informing them that it was something more than law and order he was going out to look at, that it was something more than setting up a police force. I think the FBI wanted to know something about the conditions on the projects, to see if it was safe to run with one, or if you had to have 50. The project directors felt that Gurnea was going much beyond his jurisdiction in some of the questions. It made us a little bit

disturbed at Gurnea's visits, because he seemed to be doing this at the Western projects.

When we got on the plane at San Francisco to go to Salt Lake, Gurnea happened to be on the same plane, so we rode from San Francisco to Salt Lake with him, and it was the first chance that either Philip or Dillon had to meet him, and we did have a pretty good talk. I came out with confirmation of my original conviction that he was all right, and I think that was supported by the conversations had with Dillon and Philip. He's a person who does go in and find out things, but at the same time admitted that he was learning a lot on this trip himself. He had some feeling for the situation in which these centers were brought into existence. He feels that it is a problem, that it is one of the toughest in the United States. He is in sympathy with the leave program, of getting the people out, and of trying to provide for their care within the centers without a great amount of FBI activity. Still he is an FBI man. So I think we won't fare too badly from the standpoint of his inspection of the projects.

Mr. Holland: What job does he have over there?

Mr. Provinse: He has been an investigator on the West Coast, so he was in on the early part of the program as well. He worked with the military people on the original evacuation. I think he was the second man in the San Francisco office, but he was brought into Washington about six weeks ago.

Mr. Barrows: Is he under that fellow that was quoted so freely by Wallgren?

Mr. Myer: I'm afraid so.

Mr. McMenemy: The San Francisco office refused to be of any help to us in the first attempts to recruit. They wouldn't give us a copy or let us look at the copy of the graduates of the National Police Academy.

Mr. Myer: Will you write that to me so I'll have it on record here?

Mr. McMenemy: We got a copy. We went up to the local man, to the International Police Chiefs Association, and he said, "Why don't you take the FBI Academy list? Here's a copy."

Mr. Provinse: Gurnea is today at Minidoka, I think. He went to Salt Lake and Minidoka, and will visit Granada and Heart Mountain next week, and then go on to the two Arkansas projects. Some one has been with him all the time. Cozzens was with him for a time, Phil Webster is now travelling with him, and Joe _____ expects to pick him up to go to Heart

Mountain. Joe was denied his priorities on the plane to Billings and missed the plane, so Phil is going on over with him, and Joe wants to get back here for South American work. So some one has accompanied him all the time. They resisted that at first in the FBI, but Gurnea said he appreciated having some one who had been in on the development of the program, and felt he was getting a great deal from that person travelling with him. So there has been no feeling that we were trying to shove someone off on the FBI man while he was making this trip.

Schmidt, who has been at Manzanar, is going to be brought into the Washington office for the next week or ten days to help particularly with regard to the organization of the field work, and will do field inspection work out of the Washington office.

Mr. Myer: Can I comment on that just a moment? We found at San Francisco that Schmidt had been replaced by Gilke . . . consequently we arranged to bring him in here. I did not know that, and we'd asked Schmidt to go to Manzanar and stay there for some weeks until things got squared away. Schmidt will probably not be the top man here, John is looking for a top man, and Schmidt will probably be the second man.

Mr. Provinse: I spoke to Gurnea about Schmidt, and he said he thought he would make an excellent man for field inspection work. He didn't think he was qualified to head some of the organizations in the Justice Department, or things like that, but would make an excellent field man. -- I don't have any other items. I haven't been able to find my notes yet.

Mr. Glick: Next is social analysis.

Mr. Myer: I don't believe there is much to be discussed on the social analysis problem.

Mr. Provinse: There isn't much to be discussed on that. On the problem of segregation, as I indicated earlier, the West Coast feels very strongly. The intermountain group on the whole, I think, feel they can take care of their own. The Arkansas people felt that what they would like to have is a place in which to put the repatriates, and they could take care of the rest of the situation. In our survey which preceded our meetings, we got lists of names of people to be looked at, and perhaps to be taken out of the centers on the four Western projects, all told about 150 individuals recommended for further inspection and possible segregation. When the difficulty of setting up another center, getting priorities for buildings, was explained, I think we got some modification of the urgency of the matter of segregation.

Mr. Barrows: Who do they want segregated?

Mr. Provinse: Well, it varies from recommendations to segregate rather large groups of people, to Minidoka, which said they don't have to segregate any one. The groups of individuals that were talked of for segregation in the California office were the old bachelors, the childless couples, those categories where no roots have been put out in this country, where there are no children, where they really have no stake in the future.

Mr. Barrows: You mean childless --

Mr. Provinse: Childless aliens, yes. The category of parolees and deportees, people who have been paroled from the detention camps or who have been slated for deportation as soon as they can be deported, that they ought to be removed in a group and put somewhere else. Repatriates I think were recommended almost straight across the boards by every one for taking out; and then certain selected individuals among the Kibei. Of course, the Kibei would be inspected very closely, and not all of them taken out, but at least some of the ringleaders among the Kibei. That plus chronic troublemakers were the categories that were suggested by the most determined ones for segregation policies.

Mr. Barrows: They feel they should all be dumped together somewhere?

Mr. Provinse: Repatriates would be separated.

Mr. Barrows: They are the people we've given up on?

Mr. Provinse: No, I don't think there was that feeling necessarily that we should give up on them at the time these suggestions were made. We also could go into these segregation centers, and through the proper kind of educational therapy and discussion, a lot of those people could be rehabilitated in a different direction, perhaps go out on leave. Those who recommended any group type of segregation felt we should continue to work on these people. It was not to be necessarily inflection of any bad name on these people because they were being moved.

Mr. Stauber: Was there any evidence or any expression of opinion that (a) the repatriates and (b) the parolees were actually a bad influence, that particular individuals were making trouble, or was it simply the fact that the repatriates had expressed a desire to go back to Japan?

Mr. Provinse: It is pretty difficult to get at. Some said the parolees were definitely a bad influence because they did come back

embittered from their experience. Maybe some were not wilful trouble makers, but at least a few of them in the detention camps had come back with the idea in mind that they would cause trouble.

The repatriates were thought of as being a group who had declared themselves more anxious to live in Japan than here, that the mere presence of them on the project, even though they might not be saying or doing anything, posed a problem for everyone that came into contact with them, and you did have a difficult social relationship brought about by the presence of the repatriates on the project. I think even in Arkansas, where they do not feel strongly the need for segregation policy, they both felt rather strongly, as well as Whitaker, the need for the repatriates being taken out.

Mr. Myer: Whit's point was the public relations on the outside. He puts it all on the outside, that if the public once hears that we have one percent of the people, or even anybody, in there that want to go back to Japan, that they pollute the center by their presence there.

Mr. Glick: Pollute, by the way, should be quoted, that was his actual word. He's thinking of the public.

Mr. Myer: He's thinking of the outside public relations, once they hear about it and know generally about it. I might add this, that I think Whit is a little prejudiced on the fact that he wants to sell us that Louisiana job they've been looking over the second time for repatriates, and I finally pointed out to him I didn't think it would hold all of them.

Mr. Stauber: It isn't half big enough.

Mr. Barrows: Why don't we get Mr. Stauber to ship a few of them out?

Mr. Provinse: I think personally I've come back with a less strong feeling toward segregation than I had when I left.

Mr. Myer: We almost made a Christian out of John.

Mr. Provinse: I was one of the main advocates for segregation, and I still think some removal process should be available, but I am not willing to see any categorical segregation. Of course, I don't know as I ever have been.

Mr. Barrows: We surely ought to take the rotten apples out of the barrel.

Mr. Provinse: And I think we should have some means, perhaps, of finding out a little bit of those whose skin has been bruised anyhow.

Mr. Barrows: The leave program is the only sound segregation program.

Mr. Provinse: That is why we did not adopt one last August.

Mr. Glick: I don't have anything to add to segregation.

Mr. Myer: You want me to add what I have now, or wait? I have some comments on both of these things I made notes on, but I didn't want to cover anything that is covered otherwise.

This segregation matter is something we are going to have to move on right away, and as I understand it, there has been some work done here in the interim period which I haven't had a chance to look over. Louis, I believe you folks have worked over some proposals in lieu of what was left before we went away on segregation policies, is that correct?

Mr. Sigler: There is a proposed statement that the committee has worked over for your consideration on segregation on the basis of general classes. I think it was worked over by Cy and Elmer and Ed Ferguson and Sol Kimball. It provides for segregating repatriates, alien bachelors, alien married couples without children, parolees, and Kibei on the basis of an individual hearing.

Mr. Glick: Is there also an administrative instruction on segregating just the trouble makers?

Mr. Sigler: Yes. Dillon asked what had been done in addition to what you proposed before you left here. There is a draft of the instruction ready for you on segregating trouble makers.

Mr. Myer: I will say this in summary of what I feel about the discussions as we went along. You could swing people almost any way you wanted to swing them by waiting until they made their statement, and putting up all the objections you had to it. Wade Head, for example, was way over here on segregation last year, and he didn't think there should be any last August. Then before we went out to these meetings, he stepped over, and said there should be quite a lot, and before we got through the discussion, he moved back to almost his former position, and didn't know quite where he was. You can do that sort of thing after going through it, because there are so many different things that you have to consider in the whole problem.

So I think that the group as a whole would like if it could be done without too much of a problem in the way of getting physical facilities, doing it quietly, and moving quietly into it, to have the repatriates moved out of the centers. And I would too, if it could be done on that basis, and if I thought they were going to be repatriated. I raised the question in each case each time as we went along, to see whether or not, if they were not repatriated, they should be moved, because

after all, you are putting a little more stigma on them if you move them into a separate group than if you leave them with the rest. In case they did not go to Japan, they would be a little more stigmatized, both during the war and after.

I also pointed out that most of these people who made the early requests for repatriation were not the people Japan wanted. They were older, disillusioned people who, for the most part, wanted to go back, and they were not the ones Japan wanted, and they were gradually beginning to realize that perhaps, and may change their minds before they get around to it. The question is then whether we'll ever find who the repatriates really are, and who will go, if any.

Mr. Stauber: Do you care to have me make an observation on the general situation of whether there will be repatriation or not?

Mr. Myer: Your idea will be no, won't it?

Mr. Stauber: No, I merely wanted to say that the United States is sending a note to Japan in reply to the turn down that we had on the list that was submitted early in November. In this reply, which assures the Japanese government we are interested in continuing plans for the exchange, there has been inserted, as a result of our insistence, that Japan give consideration to the several thousand people who have asked to be repatriated, even though they were not mentioned by the Japanese. But it is apt to be some ways off yet.

Mr. Myer: I am quite sure of that, and it looks like it would be postponed until the war is nearly over. I would say this, that generally speaking, on the projects they do not want group segregation, having any arbitrary groups of any kind.

Mr. Glick: Categories.

Mr. Myer: Categories, and so on. Some want individual segregation of those who are trouble makers, some do not at this stage of the game, and I believe it is about fifty fifty. Those who do not, I asked them how they would like to have a few additional bad boys, if we need to begin to spread them around and break up the situation, and some of those said they didn't want them, and one or two said they would be glad to have them. Minidoka was one of them. Guy Robertson was one who said he could handle what he had, but didn't want any more. So when you begin to put people on the spot, you get different reactions.

I might say -- this is not anything official -- after hearing all these discussions, and after thinking through from there the whole problem involved, if you are interested, I'd be glad

to give you the Director's feeling at the moment, not with the feeling that it is final at all, because we have public sentiment and a lot of other things to consider, but, (1) in view of what Ralph has just said, I am getting very cold about segregating repatriates until we empty up some center or other, because I do not feel like building a new center to put repatriates in, and going through all the process of utilizing, and the criticism that comes from utilizing, critical materials for doing that kind of a job, because we'd get it sure as the devil. Staffing a new center is going to be a real problem; the matter of schools, and all the headaches that go along with setting up additional centers.

The other one I have already hinted at, when I said I did not want to stigmatize these people further if they are not going back to Japan, and there are a great many of them that are genteel people, I am sure, with youngsters attached to them, who are going to continue to live in this country. You know that I have always been against other than repatriates -- any other type of categorical removal, and I still am. There are certain groups where I would look more closely if I were going to pick out trouble makers. It just about boils down to this, that we can take care of all the aliens that are causing real trouble, if we are ready to put up the goods on them, by sending them to the internment camps, and they are willing to take them.

It then comes down to the citizen group, some of them are Kibei, the bad boys in that group, to the institutional type of case, the people who probably should go to insane asylums or to prison, and other places. Our main problem is that we are going to have a very difficult time to get the courts to act normally in putting people in prison and holding them, and when they don't hold them, they come back to us and become more or less martyrs, so we have the very difficult legal problem.

One of the biggest worries on my mind at the moment in our whole administrative problem is a camp like Moab, setting out there with no legal sanction, with 16 people, six of whom we are disposing of, ten will probably stay there, citizens of the United States, not very good living conditions, we can't move their families in with them. So it now comes down to this: are we going to have one center for that type of case, and if we do have that type, are we going to have individuals or families? If we do have families, is it fair to put the youngsters in with a bunch of hardboiled boys of all types, mental cases, etc.? And it becomes more intricate by the moment.

So I am at the moment in the mood -- and I was back last August, excepting I'd go a little further -- I want to get all the help

we can from the Intelligence agencies in the proper manner, and all the other agencies, in sorting up any tough aliens and putting them where they belong. As far as the rest of the element is concerned, I wish we could put them in the same place, but we can't, and I think we're going to have to solve that problem, and we may have to solve it by shifting them around the centers, having them marked, and put special guards on them, or we may have to have a separate center for them. But we do have a very great question about the family type center. Most of these people, if they go, want their families with them, of course they do; the family becomes a problem to them if they don't go. But that is not the final answer. I don't want to settle all the things that have to be done until we can think it through. This needs to be discussed further.

Just a few comments on internal security. It was stated in all meetings, and we felt it should be the general policy without writing it, that jails should not be on any of the centers; where they had them, they should not use them; they should arrange with the local officials for use of jails through contract -- and gave reasons for it, and nobody wanted to argue that question at all. It was accepted, I think, by all the ten centers, and that settled the thing at Tule that Harvey had up.

The gun situation was discussed at all the centers, and was only challenged once. The general policy as outlined was about this: that we should not have guns in the homes of administrative employees, but they should be put in a safe place, either in MP headquarters, or a special place. That was generally accepted, at least there was no argument against it. Even the internal security people should not carry guns, that was accepted. I agreed they should have them where they could get to them, but they should not carry them. The only man that questioned me was Hatchett, and of course he is new, from the FBI, and likes to have his gun, not where you could see it, but he thought he should have it, but he was willing to go along.

On liquor. It was understood that we would not write any administrative instructions on liquor. It was agreed we should not have liquor on the project, but we probably would have. There were two types of cases, one where people were selling it, and the other where they had it for consumption. If it was not illegal otherwise, we should not make a case against it here. We hadn't had much drunkenness, and should allow the projects to utilize their own judgment and work it out with the evacuees themselves -- and that was pretty well accepted. It was agreed that if they are breaking the law, such as selling liquor without license or making liquor without license or bootlegging in any sense in that respect, it is the same type of crime that it

would be at other places, and it should not be overlooked if they had the evidence in that respect. That is a question not of liquor, but of crime. I told them I didn't know of anything I'd hate worse to sign an administrative instruction on than liquor, because you might not be right. You would be wrong whatever you did. And that was accepted, I think, generally.

Mr. Stauber: I happened to be in the station at Tule Lake when one of the wardens walked in with a jug of home brew he picked up from somewhere. We didn't sample it, at least not until after I left, I don't know what they did then.

Mr. Sigler: There is a letter in here from Coverley saying they found a fairly large amount of home brew in the making.

Mr. Myer: I'm sure that some of it is being made in the messhalls. But they do have some cases where people are actually selling liquor without license on the project.

Mr. Barrows: How are they getting it?

Mr. Myer: There are all kinds of ways to get it in, Leland. --
What is the next subject?

Mr. Glick: Leave and project employment.

Mr. McIntyre: The meeting afforded a much-needed opportunity, I felt, to discuss and clarify the place of the projects in the whole leave and reemployment program. There has been some tendency on the part of several projects to feel that project administration was one thing, and leave and reemployment was something else, and that they had no particular responsibility for the outside program, that that was something that was carried along by a separate staff, and they had no particular place in that program. But in these meetings, --

Col. Wilson: You mean the project director had no interest in it?

Mr. Myer: We told him he didn't.

Mr. McIntyre: I am speaking generally of the project administration, not particularly the director, but some of our employment people and educational people, and generally the project administrators together. That was not the view taken at the meetings, but I am saying there has been in the past something of that tendency, and there has been quite a little problem to get the projects into the full program of leave and reemployment. These meetings, however, afforded an opportunity to lay out the whole pattern and the whole program of leave and reemployment, and how it was

to be operated; and particularly to illuminate the crucial position of the project in that whole scheme, and to demonstrate and bring home to the project directors and other people present the fact that the leave and reemployment program has its roots in the project, and depends on the projects for its success.

There was a good deal of discussion on how the leave program was set up, and the functions to be performed by the Washington office and by the relocation supervisors working through the Middle West and other parts of the country, and then bearing particular emphasis on the function of the project in processing leaves and in training people to compete for jobs in the general labor market, in selecting and placing people in outside jobs, and in general, the whole field of preparation for relocation and in making the necessary adjustments from the labor supply point of view on the project as people began to go out on leave in large numbers. There was a great deal of interest in this program, in this part of the discussion, and I gained the impression that we had been successful in bringing home to the project directors and members of the staff more successfully than we had at any time previously, the importance of the role of the project in the whole outside employment and leave program.

The projects made some point to the effect that the leave and reemployment program was likely to operate rather readily and successfully for about twenty-five or thirty thousand Nisei, and that we could look forward to accomplishing that much of relocation with comparative ease. The feeling was that the older people would be rather difficult to interest in outside employment, and that after we had skimmed the cream off the crock in the first twenty-five or thirty thousand people, we would then run into heavy weather, getting the older people and the aliens and the large families out of projects during the period of the war. However, the situation was summed up pretty well by one director, who remarked that with people going out on leave, the project's responsibility for selecting those who would go into the jobs that were found, was guiding the urban and industrial and city people into jobs of that level, and guiding the agricultural people into agricultural jobs, and at the same time finding the labor supply and making the adjustments to carry on essential project activities, and to go on and develop programs of training in preparation for relocation. This project director remarked that the time had come now when we had to start planning our employment program. We could not any longer regard the labor supply and people on the projects just a great pool that we could pull here and pull there, and send out to the projects without much forethought.

Mr. Holland: Who was that?

Mr. McIntyre: I think that was Phil Shafer. Several of the projects had two principal complaints -- I might say only two complaints that deserved to be rated as such. They complained that while they had been reasonably active in the educational programs on their projects to interest people in applying for leave, and while they had set up their leave processing machinery, they were not getting enough action out of Washington, and they cited several figures which I think were reported in here at the time. They complained that it was very difficult to continue to put pressure on their people and to run public forums and discussions, and slant their projects toward the outside world, when leave clearances were not coming through, at least in the numbers that they thought they should have.

There was also some complaint that actually not very many jobs had come back to the projects. They were not getting very many jobs that would interest skilled and semi-skilled people among the residents. What they were getting was mostly domestic service. Of course, there is no denying the truth of that in general, that most of the jobs that have developed have come spontaneously, without much job-finding activity, even in domestic service. There was pointed out to the directors and their staff the characteristics of the organization that is being set up in the West and Midwest, to find jobs, and our hope that we would be able to develop a sufficient number of opportunities over a wide enough range of occupations, that with some notable exceptions, people could expect to reenter the American community in approximately the same occupational status as they enjoyed before evacuation.

The projects, some of them, were concerned to have more guidance from Washington on policy questions relating to employment, and in general, there had been so many new developments and new plans and new procedures prepared during the last few months and coming so rapidly, that our existing administrative instructions on employment have lagged quite a bit behind the reality. Even though our administrative instruction 27, which set forth in August the basic policy on employment, even though that has been supplemented by several supplements and patched up by memoranda to the projects on special subjects, there does appear to be a need demonstrated by these meetings for reviewing, in a rather comprehensive fashion, our whole structure of employment policy, and writing up either an amendment to the existing administrative instruction, or probably preferably a completely new instruction bringing us up to date on where we stand now on employment policy.

Mr. Stauber will be interested in the insistence of the Arkansas projects on having some statistical comparisons on how they were doing on employment matters as compared with other projects, how

many people they have in the nineteen-dollar category and twelve-dollar category, and how many people employed as cooks, assistant cooks, dishwashers, farm hands, and so on, as compared with other projects.

Mr. Glick: Particularly Paul Taylor felt it would help him a great deal if he had that.

Mr. McIntyre: I believe in general that covers it.

Mr. Myer: On that particular one, I'd like to say that, first, No. 27 has never been revised as yet on the matter of wage policy in relation to private industry. That ought to be done soon. I'd like to ask, Tom, that you and Mac take another look at 27, and in addition to that, what we have already discussed here. But I want to tell the rest of the group, it is essential that we get written very soon the responsibilities of the field offices that are set up on employment work in relation to the projects, the responsibility of the projects in relation to outside employment, so there is no question about whose job is what, and how it is to be handled. I'd like to suggest that Don Sabin -- probably all of you -- this matter discussed this morning regarding group labor, and particularly as it relates to the beet companies, because that is the major one; but there should be written --

Mr. Holland: Let us write these down.

Mr. Myer: I want to review 27. I am thinking particularly about the fact that for the last two months we've had private industry out, and have made no revision of the wage policy. And the statement as to the responsibilities of the relocation offices, Sabin, the responsibilities of the project in relation to that general job. You understand the field officers were not at the meetings, and all the leave officers and employment officers were not at the meetings, and what was said at these meetings should be put on paper.

Then I started to say that our procedures on recruitment at the center should be written up. I am thinking at the moment of our problem with the sugar beet people. They should not be allowed to roam over the centers, they should be put in a corner some place, and arrange for the people to come to them. There should be at least the faintest of ink, there should be written statements of what they are proposing, that the evacuees can look over. There should be arrangements that some one can be on hand representing the project, so as to be sure no statements are made that cannot be carried out, and the project is not put in the position of having commitments made by somebody else that won't be fulfilled. You heard them say at the Arkansas projects that they were committing to the evacuees that the medical bills would be paid by

WRA, and that type of thing. . . If anybody gets off base on that, and starts breaking those procedures, we should make no bones about it. We'll just say, "Sorry, gentlemen, you go on the outside of the project and stay out until you can guarantee us you will have representatives in here that can stay in line with policy."

One other. Evacuees cannot be employed within the project at wage scales different than those on our projects.

Mr. Holland: Also the item about closing down on group leave.

Mr. Myer: Yes, all those things we discussed here.

Mr. McIntyre: I recall one more thing that was said during the course of the meetings, that there would be no more commuting to outside jobs.

Mr. Myer: Oh, yes. I raised the question in each case whether we could make the rule stick if we did lay it down, and to my great amusement, Minidoka and some of those who would be most affected said they thought they could make it stick. So I would like to have that put into the 27 or the revisions, because I believe we should get it out before the middle of February, and have that understood.

Mr. Sabin: What was Robertson's reaction?

Mr. Myer: He said it would be a little tough, but he thought they could do it. What we would do is this: if they go outside the center to work, they would live outside during the period they are working outside, which would get us away from all the administrative problem of deduction of meals, subsistence, the problem of coming back in and jingling money, and so on. They all felt they could work it out some way. I asked them about Senator Thomas at Minidoka, who lives about six miles from the project and has been hiring some, and they said, no, they thought they could handle it. -- Any other items?

Mr. Glick: Unless you want to mention industry and construction.

Mr. Provinse: I might throw in two or three when you get through.

Mr. Myer: Go ahead.

Mr. Provinse: One is the rental on the cooperatives. I'd like to meet the people interested in that on Monday. I found out that Arkansas, who were setting up 60 cents a square foot, can get similar space in McGehee at 9 cents a foot.

Mr. Barrows: McGehee is a town of 2,000, and the project is 10,000. Those rates are supposed to pay for utilities as well as space,

but I'll bet my shirt that is not comparable. I also defend the fact that this thing was worked out in cooperation with Mr. Richardson. . . .

Mr. Myer: We adopted a principle here while back, when putting in new administrative instructions of that type, if there was time to do so -- and I think there was in this case -- we would draw them up tentatively and submit them to the field as tentative instructions, and ask for their reactions before we finally signed them. We didn't do it on that, and I think we should have.

Mr. Barrows: There were certain reasons for haste, involving the General Accounting Office.

Mr. Clear: If we don't hurry up, we're not going to have any.

Mr. Myer: I think we should change them.

Mr. Barrows: They have been suspended.

Mr. Glick: There was a storm of protest. This was the only case where they spoke with heat, and that was unanimous.

Mr. Myer: I thought they looked awfully high to me, and I might say, if I was out there, I'd be protesting too.

Mr. Clear: I made a study of that afterwards, based on a survey by the National Cash Register Company on a general store idea, based on the line of business Richardson said they were doing, and it amounted to about a third of their gross business that they are paying, that the average general store is.

Mr. Barrows: At Tule Lake where they are crying about the cost of rent, rent is supposed to cover utilities, which they are not furnishing. They probably didn't read the instruction. They didn't read utilities to mean heat.

Mr. Myer: Don't get defensive on this thing.

Mr. Barrows: When the order is out, we have to defend it . . .

Mr. Myer: John wants the store ---

Mr. Provinse: We won't have any cooperatives if we charge that rent.

Mr. Barrows: Why?

Mr. Provinse: Because it's too high.

Mr. Glick: They feel let down because that was made retroactive. They say if you can retroactively charge us rent, why can't you retroactively take this, that and the other thing from us. So it is quite an issue.

Mr. Barrows: We made it retroactive in order to take care of a legal point brought up by the Solicitor's Office. These either were going to be private enterprises, or they weren't. . . .

Mr. Glick: We have legal authority to forgive past rent.

Mr. Barrows: Provision was made for that in the administrative instruction, wasn't it?

Mr. Glick: Yes.

Mr. Myer: Take a look at it again, John, and all the facts of what happened in these meetings.

Mr. Provinse: I'd like to arrange for a meeting for Monday, because I think it is pretty fundamental as to what is going to happen in the stores.

Another thing. We had quite a few questions asked about the surplus property, as to whether or not it had been frozen.

Mr. Barrows: It has never been frozen.

Mr. Provinse: We froze it on December first for appraisal and inventory, remember?

Mr. Barrows: I beg your pardon.

Mr. Provinse: The thing is, they don't understand it that way.

Mr. Myer: Whether it is written that way or not, at least half a dozen people read it carefully and read it that way, so it is evidently not clear. They also read into it that an appraisal committee would come out from Washington to appraise it before they could release it.

Mr. Barrows: I grant you that it was read incorrectly, even by Mr. Provinse. We sent this out as a proposed order -- we propose to issue it, what do you think? We didn't order anything except what had been ordered prior to that memorandum going out, and since then we have sent out a subsequent telegram telling them it has not been frozen.

Mr. Myer: To one person?

Mr. Barrows: I think that went to everybody. I couldn't prove it, but I think it did.

Mr. Myer: Merritt wasn't straight on it.

Mr. Barrows: Even after he got the telegram?

Mr. Myer: Yes, after he got the telegram. But that was the first tip-off we got, and as we came through the country, we got it elsewhere.

Mr. Provinse: One other thing to be straightened out, and that is charges for administrative personnel treated at the hospital.

Mr. Sigler: Do we have a policy on that, John?

Mr. Provinse: Our only policy was that we would allow only treatment for emergency situations, and in emergency cases we would have a schedule of rates, but that schedule of rates has never been set up.

Mr. Myer: And the chances are we need something more than an emergency treatment now, because the attitude is that with the shortage of doctors in other places, that it may take four or five hours for a key person to go to the doctor to get a throat painted, for example -- that isn't quite right, he can do that at home -- but you have to wait to see the doctor nowadays, and it is a question of whether it isn't bad business. Consequently the recommendation generally is coming up that we do need a schedule of charges, and it should be left reasonably open, where they are isolated, as most of these people are, for the administrative people to utilize medical centers, except for fairly obvious things such as obstetrical cases, etc., and anticipated major operations they know about, and so on. I don't think we need to discuss it further, but I think it does need to be reviewed.

Mr. Sabin: While we are speaking about this medical thing, it ties in with this recruitment regulation you want us to write. We would like to propose that all of the people who go out on group leave particularly be checked over before they go out, by the medical staff on the project.

Mr. Myer: The only question I have about that is whether or not it is physically possible to do that where they are recruiting large numbers, with all the other work the staff has to do, because of the work load. If the medical people feel they can do it, it is all right with me, but I don't want to load them with anything that is impossible.

I have a few additional comments that I can run through very quickly. I'd like to go back to reports, and Frank, I wish you would make notes on these, in case I forget to give them to John. The question was raised at Jerome, not in the meeting, but after the meeting, with me, regarding the printing

of the project newspaper. They put it on this basis: we think we can get it printed almost as cheaply as mimeographed. Can we at least put in what it costs to mimeograph to help get it printed? I told them I didn't think so, but I'd review it, and we told them it should go on a community enterprise type of program, but I told them I would have the whole matter reviewed. I think they spoke to Toz about it, and it will be coming up. Johnston and Taylor are both interested in that.

I would like to have you make a note to ask John Baker to get in shape a statement to go to all projects on methods of reporting under different conditions that were discussed before we left, and on which we had a rough draft on the different types of reports we want, major and minor items, the matter of keeping the reports officer free, and so on. John, I think, will know that story, and I guess John understood from Provinse's discussion that we wanted to go ahead and try out the Director's weekly news letter.

We did discuss in each one of these meetings the problem of communications at centers between the administrative group and the evacuees, and how to get information down to the last block and to the last home in the block, and particularly to the Issei, regarding things that were going on, administrative procedures, and why they were in existence, such things as this army recruitment, and so on. I find them groping around, and some of them finding pretty good answers. The Tule Lake weekly meeting is one of them. The committee of 108 at Manzanar is meeting regularly with Merritt when he is there, and discussing problems. So we discussed that quite in some detail, and nearly all of them felt we could give more thought and more attention to getting out well organized and well developed material that could be utilized throughout the center for evacuee education than we have done up to date.

We did discuss property at each one of the meetings excepting at San Francisco, and they were pretty close in touch, but Firth was at both Denver and Little Rock, and did take up the general procedure outlined here, and told them the procedure was on the way. I presume those have gone out.

We discussed equipment in all, I think, except Arkansas, and the item that Pop Utz had outlined suggesting that your group, somebody be detailed, along with somebody from his group, to make this inventory, was generally accepted as a fine idea, and they would like to have it proceed immediately, because it would be helpful to all the projects.

I think I have covered all the other points in general, but there are a few points on discussions with individual project directors that I'd like to cover as a matter of information.

At Manzanar, some of you will be interested to know that Dr. Goto has been moved out and sent to Delta, which I didn't know until I got out there. They almost had an incident over it at Manzanar. He and Dr. Little got into an impasse, but Goto has gone, and it is causing a real problem for Ernst.

I went over the personnel list in general that Merritt -- I don't know that I should announce to the whole group the details. I will just say briefly, Tom, that he feels there should be a new employment officer.

Mr. Holland: We felt that since last May.

Mr. Myer: I told him that. So it should be worked out with Merritt. Campbell has gone to San Francisco in the Property Division, and is no longer at Manzanar. Merritt wants Robert Brown, who is now acting as Assistant Project Director. I have some reservations about it, not because he isn't a good boy, but because I question whether he is mature enough to handle the job, administratively and otherwise, but we may go along with that. He needs a new reports officer, and would like suggestions on it. Brown has been reports officer, and hasn't been acting.

Reed, make a note of this, and tell Pop or Hoffman. They only have one fire engine, and would like to have another.

Temple is out, and Lucy Adams is acting as community service head.

I'd like to talk with Utz when he comes back something about the lease arrangement out there.

On Poston, I wish you would make a note to tell John Baker, which I haven't done, that I discussed the James situation with Head, and he'd like James to stay there at least to February 20, before he comes into Washington. If James doesn't come back to Poston, they would like suggestions on a new reports officer, and would like to look into the matter of Mr. Simms, who formerly was at Albuquerque, and wondered whether he is still available.

Tule Lake. Harvey called me after we had been at San Francisco, and said he had a little trouble developing. They have about 750 people working on construction at Tule Lake, and there are two different evacuee engineers, one of whom is incurring favor with the administration and the other with the workers. I guess it is not too serious, I have had no further report on it. About last Thursday he called me, they were having meetings intermittently, and things were looking a little black, but he thought they had the thing under control, and evidently they have, because it did not develop and spread any place else, but it was causing some difficulty.

I haven't anything important to report on Gila.

Heart Mountain. Phil Barber, who has been head of community services, is leaving Heart Mountain, and for the time being will come in here on assignment with Mr. Provinse. There has been no final action on his replacement as yet. They have just hired a new security man for Heart Mountain who will go on the job in spite of the fact that Guy Robertson would just as leave not have any security officer other than evacuees. The school contract at Heart Mountain is to be changed, as well as Granada, and that was discussed thoroughly out there.

The only other main item, at Delta, had to do with contraband. I found they had submitted a long list of contraband, mostly all knives. . . We did discuss contraband, and the matter of search and seizure, and so on. This was about what was said: WRA, through its internal security program, should take the same responsibility of enforcement of any edicts or laws in relation to contraband that they would to any other laws or things that had the effect of laws, if people were breaking them. However, it was not our responsibility to search mails or packages, or even suitcases, assuming that people had contraband. That was made the responsibility of the FBI, under General DeWitt's order, and also under the Justice order. However, if we knew there was contraband, it was up to us to either confiscate it or to report it. I made it clear that we were not in the searching business. It was further made clear that it was our opinion that if you were going to make a search, you should take the same cautions and procedures you would in anybody's home, having some kind of warrant or authority from the director or whoever was responsible, rather than walking in on people. That was pretty generally accepted, I think, as good, sound procedure.

Mr. Glick: You remember I said we were doubtful as to our legal authority to authorize, by the project director's order, any kind of procedure, but we have the matter under investigation, and will issue an opinion as soon as possible.

Mr. Barrows: Did the question specifically come up about what they've been doing at Delta?

Mr. Myer: We discussed it privately, and have a full report in here on that.

Mr. Barrows: We just got a personnel action today, transferring a man whose full time job has been searching packages, to other work. We are not clear from the action whether they are really promoting him, which they are, or if they intend to fill his job.

Mr. Myer: They don't intend to fill his job, I can tell you that.

Mr. Barrows: They were told repeatedly in writing that they had no authority to do that in the first place. They were told in writing by San Francisco on a couple of occasions, and were

told in person, but still they did it.

Mr. Myer: I think Mr. Ernst thoroughly understands the policy now, because we discussed it in great detail, at his request.

Mr. Barrows: Did you also discuss it at Little Rock?

Mr. Myer: Oh, yes.

Mr. Barrows: Did Mr. Baker get satisfied on that point?

Mr. Myer: Oh, yes.

Mr. Barrows: He wrote us about it, and we never answered his letter.

Mr. Myer: I didn't know that.

Mr. Barrows: I have one other little sidelight on this point. I had a call from a postal inspector a week or so ago, complaining that the Army was insisting on searching the mail in the post office on the centers, and the Post Office Department would not permit it. They said it was against the law. At any rate, they finally got switched off on the Army, and I don't know what they did about it.

Mr. Myer: My attitude was like yours, I told them it was between them and the Army.

Mr. Stauber: Did you decide what to do about the contraband the MP's bring in to them?

Mr. Myer: If the MP's search for contraband, we simply store them for General DeWitt. He has general authority on that in the four western projects.

Mr. Stauber: Delta?

Mr. Myer: No, Delta is not in that group.

Mr. Stauber: When I was there, I talked with the internal security officer, and he was very much concerned about what to do with the contraband the MP's bring in.

Mr. Barrows: That they bring in to the project, or what?

Mr. Rowalt: The MP's search the Caucasian's baggage down in Utah.

Mr. Myer: Most of the contraband, so-called contraband, has been picked up there. There isn't any contraband in it, with two exceptions, I think. I looked over the list. One was a short wave radio, and one other thing, but the rest of it was

all knives, butcher knives, and that sort of thing, and certain types of chemicals which they call poisons in general, most of which they didn't know what it was.

Mr. Stauber: The MP's pick these things up and bring them in to the internal security office, and don't know what to do with them. I was there when a couple of MP's walked in and they brought this beautiful sword about this long (indicating), as I ever hope to see, which had been sent to one of the evacuees from Daddy. On the outside case was written, "From Daddy". It was sheathed in a wooden sheath.

Mr. Myer: Daddy probably was in the army.

Mr. Stauber: Daddy, I think, was interned. I don't know how he got it, but there she was. The internal security officer said, "What do I do with it?"

Mr. Myer: Well, let's not spend any more time on that.

Mr. Glick: Do you think we ought to have a memorandum or something that would clarify the whole subject of contraband, and get it reduced to writing?

Mr. Myer: I think perhaps we should.

Minidoka. I raised the question about the dangerous group, and they said they would be glad to have them. Mr. Stafford, as already indicated, was recently married, which was news to us, and I guess Philip told you that.

At Granada. We spent a lot of time on schools with Mr. Rippy and others. I won't go into details, except to say we are not building anything but high schools at Granada and Heart Mountain, and if you want all the gory details about that, Philip Glick sat in on all the meetings as legal counsel. Mr. Bennison, who has been our agricultural man, will probably be in the employment setup. I discussed broom factories and so on briefly, and I will talk that over with you. Some of you may have seen a report regarding Lieut. Smith in the hospital setup at Granada. He is no longer in the hospital setup, but has been moved out. There was a report sent in, that he said if any of them wanted to strike --

Col. Wilson: What was he connected with?

Mr. Myer: He was formerly a lieutenant in connection with the CCC. He's one of our employees on the project.

Mr. Clear: He was in transportation or supply, I think.

Mr. Myer: They had a little difficulty at the hospital, and he got up and made a very ill-advised speech, and I checked with Little about it, and he was moved out immediately, and that was cleared up.

I spent some time with Cozzens and Ralph Merritt particularly on the California situation regarding the general public relations, and it was agreed that they would go together and see the Governor, and see that he understood our problems and program. In view of the fact that Ralph Merritt had to have an emergency operation on the way back to Manzanar, that was not possible, so Cozzens is presumably in conference with the Governor today at Sacramento, hoping that by direct information we can get the Governor at least to understand some of our problems. There was introduced in the California legislature, and passed the Senate while we were out there, I guess, a bill to investigate us, I think it did, or passed the House, I'm not sure.

Mr. Glick: It passed one house.

Mr. Myer: Federal investigation isn't enough, so they will investigate us, evidently tied in with the American Legion approach. I had a meeting for about three quarters of an hour with a group Mr. Merritt arranged for, interested in so-called fair play, throughout the West Coast -- California, Washington, Oregon -- consisting of Fisher, Paul Taylor, Mr. _____ and _____. They wanted background information, and to tell us what they are doing. They are trying to set up the organization in each of the States that will presumably take the opposite point of view from that the American Legion is taking in California, are becoming quite active, and we may see a little action on that front. I have asked Mr. Cozzens to spend a fair proportion of his time in the next sixty days on the public relations problem in those Coastal States, seeing that key people understand the situation, especially in connection with legislation.

There are just a few items that came out of the conferences that I made notes on that I want to mention, and I am through. I got a complaint or two that there has been some tendency to overlook the regular channels of correspondence to projects, and write letters to people down the line, not personal letters, but letters to them personally about problems. I think we should be careful about it. There is going to be a tendency to do that where we know people well.

The question was up -- John Baker isn't here, but I wish you would make a note and ask him to check with me on the matter of cameras, identification cards, whether they are to be issued, and what that situation is. There was also a question on the part of one or two directors about how their reports are being used in putting information more or less confidential

in the review that goes out to all projects. Paul Taylor particularly raised the question about some material in his report of January 22, material that went to all projects; said if he knew that, he wouldn't have put that in.

We need to get a policy settled, Ralph, that I want to discuss with you, and probably two or three others, as to how many times we are going to recanvass people who want to be repatriated. Some have been recanvassed two or three times, and are getting pretty sore about it.

I made a note of some things directors want more information on, and one is, they want to know more about Moab. The Western group wanted to know whether we had General DeWitt's approval for the use of cameras, and I told them I understood we had, but they hadn't gotten it yet.

Mr. Glick: You mean they finally broke down and gave us that approval?

Mr. Rowalt: They gave it to us the first time we asked for it.

Mr. Glick: The third or fourth time we asked for it.

Mr. Myer: One of the things the Arkansas men wanted was comparative statistics. They said they could come on a confidential basis, such things as food costs at the different centers, number of people on the payroll at different levels.

Mr. Barrows: Why shouldn't that get to be a part of the weekly report?

Mr. Myer: Well, it should be, but however it goes, they would like to get it. They would like to have a map showing the different defense commands in the United States.

Col. Wilson: I have one in my desk.

Mr. Myer: Probably we can get additional ones. They would like to have previous notice when aliens are returned from either prisons or detention camps.

Mr. Stauber: I think we are getting that under control.

Mr. Myer: I think that pretty well covers the items. I have already covered the San Francisco group, probably, covered the report.

Elmer, I will be glad to review with you some of the things you missed here. Unless there are other comments by those who were at the meetings, or other questions -- I'd like to say this. I don't know whether I feel quite like Philip does, I probably can't express it as well as he can. From my standpoint, the meetings accomplished exactly what I visualized they should

accomplish, and that is saying a good deal, because we had a lot of territory to cover. We spent about two days and a half all told in most of the sections. We just worked right through, with very excellent associations, from my standpoint, and I think it will clarify matters.

I came back with more confidence than I have ever had since I have been with WRA, regarding project administration in particular. I feel we have a good group of people that are becoming mature generally, they are beginning to understand the problems, they are becoming veterans, and I almost told them they were becoming experts; they are just beginning to pass over into that field as far as the general public is concerned. They agree they do not know all the answers, but they are beginning to get some confidence that they do know some of the answers. And I feel, having passed over January with no further blowups, they are pretty confident generally. They are not smug, they feel if they stay on top of their jobs, and everybody keeps geared up, they can handle the situation. I looked around the group several times, and felt pretty darned proud of the bunch we have to work with.