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GRANADA COMMUNITY ANALYSIS REPORT NO. 2

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GRANADA COMMUNITY ANALYSIS REPORT NO. 2

Instructions from the Director to all Project Directors issued on May 15 urged attention to resistances to relocation. One of the first tasks undertaken by the ^{Granada} Community Analysis Section as soon as it had been established was to undertake an examination into the causes of such resistances. After considerable discussion, and some preliminary training and trials of several methods of securing information on this topic, the Community Analysis Section decided that the most adequate and reliable technique was to make up and secure replies to a simple questionnaire on the subject. This questionnaire was carefully formulated, with especial attention to the following points:

Type of information obtainable by questionnaire (and those types of information better obtainable by other means were secured by those means, employed as supplementary to the questionnaire)

Language: Terminology was carefully tested to make sure that the meanings intended were universal--that is, that each idea used was understood by everyone to mean practically the same thing.

The completed questionnaire in English was translated into Japanese language by an able translator, then submitted to two other persons who were adjudged competent, to check the translation for accuracy and for terminological identity with the meanings intended.

Instructions: The instructions placed on each questionnaire were carefully phrased and selected, with several revisions after successive field tests.

A considerable number of interviews were held prior to completion of the questionnaire to determine what points should be included for quantitative measurement, and how they should be measured. After the questionnaire was fairly well set up, field tests were taken and two questions and the instructions were revised in the light of the results. A retest indicated that the difficulties were overcome.

A trial tabulation of the field-tested preliminary forms was made to develop tabulation forms and check on the tabulability of the several questions included.

Copies of the completed questionnaire are appended. It should be noted that they were bi-lingual--English on one side, Japanese on the other--so that everyone could use whichever language he preferred. It is interesting to note that 50.6 of all answers were on the side written in Japanese language.

(The percentage varied from 67.5% to 18.1% Japanese language in the 29 blocks.) This may indicate roughly the percentage of residents of the center 18 years old or older who use Japanese with greater facility and ease than they do English. (It does not indicate that this percentage do not understand or use English. Many of them do, but this percentage may be assumed to understand and use Japanese more easily.) (See Table I) The population 18 years old and older were approximately 50% issei and 50% nisei, but the replies indicated that a considerable number of nisei answered in Japanese language, and an equal number ^{of} issei used the English language side of the questionnaire.

The questionnaire was launched as carefully as it was constructed. To begin with, it was made a cooperative enterprise--suggestions and criticisms were solicited from everyone, and incorporated in the questionnaire. Only one suggestion made was not incorporated after thorough discussion because it was adjudged liable to provoke undesirable rumors which would increase the difficulties of the Employment Office. The whole matter was presented to the Community Council which was asked whether it felt that such a questionnaire was desirable, and requests for suggestions were made. Approval and suggestions were both forthcoming. A similar presentation to the Block Managers' Association produced hearty approval and several suggestions. Block managers circulated the mimeographed questionnaires, and collected them after they had been filled out. An estimated total of between 4000 and 4100 persons eighteen years of age or over were in the Center at the time. This number has been later more accurately estimated on the basis of returns on a schedule used by the Employment Office on June 30 to be 4225. (Total number of persons in the Center was approximately 6300 at the time.) Completed usable returns numbered 2587.

Table II shows the returns by blocks, classified according to sex, and nativity. ^{from persons over 18}

The usable returns were thus approximately 61% of the total possible returns/
we are
assuming that persons under eighteen are not usually free agents in the matter

PLEASE DO NOT DESTROY

In order to find out the various opinions of the evacuees concerning the resettlement question, the Amache Community Analysis Section would like to have you answer these seven simple questions. This is merely to find out the general public opinion concerning this problem, so please do not write your name, address, or reference on this sheet. Please fill out your answers and return to the Block Information Office by June 21, 1943.

Please check the following:

Male _____ Female _____

Issei _____ Nisei _____

Age classification:

In which group do you belong? Check one:

☐ 18 to 20 yrs.

☐ 30 to 38 yrs.

☐ 45 to 64 yrs.

☐ 21 to 29 yrs.

☐ 39 to 44 yrs.

☐ 65 and older

1. At the present time are you employed within the center?

Check one: No ☐ Yes ☐ Attending High School? ☐ Night School For Adult? ☐

2. Are you interested in leaving the center?

Check one: No ☐ Yes ☐

If YES, when?

☐ Right now

☐ Within a few months

☐ After the war ends

☐ Not until we must leave

☐ Undecided

3. Why are you hesitant about resettlement?

Please check each reason that makes you hesitate.

☐ Lack of enough money

☐ Lack of proper living quarters

☐ Uncertainty of public sentiment outside

☐ Lack of ability to use English well enough

☐ Family ties and responsibilities

☐ Lack of information regarding cost of living, living conditions, kind of opportunities, etc.

☐ Lack of confidence in making a reasonably satisfactory living

☐ Lack of confidence in establishing a secure future

☐ Due to poor health condition

☐ Old age

If you have any other reasons, please write in this space:

4. What was your occupation previous to evacuation?

(Please be specific)

What business or occupation do you have in mind for the future?

5. Do you have property or business connections in California or elsewhere that would help you get started in this line in the future?

Check one: No ☐ Yes ☐

Are you interested in setting up your business in a new locality?

If so, where? (state and place)

In what kind of a community? city ☐ town ☐ country ☐

If not, why not?

6. If legal restrictions and Army regulations could be removed, would you return to the state or community in which you used to live?

Check one: No ☐ Yes ☐

If YES, when?

☐ Right now

☐ Within a few months

☐ After the war

7. Would you like to stay in a center like this for the rest of your life?

Check one: No ☐ Yes ☐

Any Remarks or Suggestions:

PLEASE DO NOT SIGN

居住民の協力を要請

今回新に當館府内に設置された「亜町社會解剖部」では左の如き簡單なる七つの質問を發した。之は單に居住民一般の再轉住に対する意見の蒐集であつて住所姓名は書き入れず全部の質問に答を書き入れて来る六月二十一日までに各ブランク事務所に届出る様要請してゐる。

男

女

一世

二世

年齢

(何組の組に属するや)

○十八才より

二十才まで

○二十一才より

二十九才まで

○三十才より

三十八才まで

○三十九才より

四十四才まで

○四十五才より

六十四才まで

○六十五才以上

一、現在センター内に従業してゐるや

□イエス

□ノー

□通学

二、外部に移住する計畫ありや

□イエス

□ノー

三、ありとすれば其の時期は?

□直ちに

□四五ヶ月以内に

□どうしても出なければならぬ時

三、何故外部移住を躊躇してゐるか

躊躇の理由

□金銭の不足

□住家の不足

□外部の輿論不安

□英語の知識の不足

□家庭に対する責任上

□生活費・生活状態及び就職に對する不安

満足する生活に自信がない

□將來の生活樹立に自信がない

□不健康

□老年の爲

●其の他の理由があれば左の余白に記入を願ふ。

四、移住前の職業(正確を要す)

●將來如何なる事業又は就職口を望んでゐるか

戦後

未決定

五、加州又は他に財産があり、それに依つて

將來の方針樹立が出来得るや

□イエス

□ノー

未知の場所に於いて事業の計畫ありや

ありとすれば

州

□都市

□町

□田舎

ないとするれば其の理由如何

六、若し法律上の制束及軍部の取締令が解除されたとするれば、直ちに退去場所に戻る

□イエス

□ノー

あるとすれば其の時期は

□直ちに

□四五ヶ月以内

□戦後

七、生現在の如き館府生活を欲するや

□イエス

□ノー

その他各自に意見があれば左の余白に記入され度し。

以上

TABLE I - 2587 REPLIES TO AMACHE RELOCATION QUESTIONNAIRE, JUNE 24, 1943,
SHOWING WHETHER WRITTEN IN JAPANESE OR ENGLISH LANGUAGE, BY BLOCKS

BLOCK	NUMBER IN ENGLISH	NUMBER IN JAPANESE	PERCENTAGE IN ENGLISH	PERCENTAGE IN JAPANESE
ALL	1277	1310	49.4	50.6
6E	22	42	34.4	65.6
6F	31	37	45.6	54.4
6G	55	50	52.4	47.6
6H	51	60	45.9	54.1
7E	45	74	37.8	62.2
7F	34	56	37.8	62.2
7G	50	54	48.1	51.9
7H	36	33	52.2	47.8
7K	31	34	47.7	52.3
8E	25	29	46.3	53.7
8F	30	32	48.4	51.6
8G	29	38	43.3	56.7
8K	25	52	32.5	67.5
9E	56	59	48.7	51.3
9H	42	70	37.5	62.5
9K	57	38	60.0	40.0
9L	53	48	52.5	47.5
10E	36	66	35.3	64.7
10H	45	43	51.1	48.9
11E	30	31	49.2	50.8
11F	95	21	85.9	18.1
11G	80	43	65.0	35.0
11H	51	63	44.7	55.3
11K	53	50	51.5	48.5
12E	40	45	47.1	52.9
12F	42	29	59.2	40.8
12G	53	29	64.6	35.4
12H	28	52	35.0	65.0
12K	52	32	61.9	28.1

TABLE II
USABLE RETURNS FROM RELOCATION QUESTIONNAIRES
CIRCULATED JUNE 18-27, 1943, GRANADA RELOCATION
CENTER, BY BLOCK, SEX AND NATIVITY.

BLOCK	MALE		FEMALE		TOTAL				
	<u>Issei</u>	<u>Nisei</u>	<u>Issei</u>	<u>Nisei</u>	<u>Issei</u>	<u>Nisei</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Fem.</u>	<u>All</u>
6E	26	11	15	12	41	23	37	27	64
6F	24	11	17	16	41	27	35	33	68
6G	30	29	23	23	53	52	59	46	105
6H	38	18	23	32	61	50	56	55	111
7E	35	28	28	28	63	56	63	56	119
7F	27	18	23	22	50	40	45	45	90
7G	53	13	23	15	76	28	66	38	104
7H	27	12	10	20	37	32	39	30	69
7K	25	7	19	14	44	21	32	33	65
8E	19	10	10	15	29	25	29	25	54
8F	23	11	16	12	39	23	34	28	62
8G	18	6	19	24	37	30	24	43	67
8K	27	8	30	12	57	20	35	42	77
9E	39	22	28	26	67	48	61	54	115
9H	39	17	31	25	70	42	56	56	112
9K	27	17	29	22	56	39	44	51	95
9L	29	15	25	32	54	47	44	57	101
10E	36	17	29	20	65	37	53	49	102
10H	30	15	22	21	52	36	45	43	88
11E	26	9	12	14	38	23	35	26	61
11F	44	20	28	24	72	44	64	52	116
11G	33	21	35	34	68	55	54	69	123
11H	35	19	24	36	59	55	54	60	114
11K	30	19	26	28	56	47	49	54	103
12E	31	91	22	23	53	32	40	45	85
12F	17	14	17	23	34	37	31	40	71
12G	20	16	18	28	38	44	36	46	82
12H	28	10	23	19	51	29	38	42	80
12K	27	16	17	24	44	40	43	41	84
	863	438	642	644	1505	1082	1301	1286	2587

of relocation.) Some blocks made much more adequate returns than others, but the populations of the various blocks differed. Table III shows the percentage of each population group which replied to the relocation questionnaire by blocks. These percentages are based upon estimates of each population group derived from all readily available information including the more complete returns of the Employment Schedule. It shows the variation in representativeness of the sample in details. In spite of some weak spots, the sample secured is apparently both validly representative and also adequate to reflect public opinion and community attitudes concerning the topic. The male nisei are somewhat under-represented, (with 16.9% of all replies) and the male issei somewhat overrepresented, (with 33.4% of all replies.) This reflects the preponderance of male nisei among the resettlers, but it also indicates a tendency on the part of the male issei to assume responsibility for making known the family attitudes on public questions, and the hesitance of the male nisei to assume such responsibilities when the father is present as the head of the family. It also results from lack of interest on the part of some nisei males. The females were equally balanced between issei (24.3%) and nisei (24.9%). Since the males are slightly preponderant in the entire population, it may be that the females are slightly over-represented, but if so the degree is very small. All in all the replies and their distribution among the various age, sex, and nativity groups differed only slightly from the distribution of the total population eighteen years old and over--- by not more than 20% in the most extreme cases and less than 5% deviation in the great majority. It is felt therefore that the sample of replies secured is fairly representative of the entire population, subject to the limitations mentioned.

Taking each question in turn, we may describe and analyze the returns briefly. In answer to the first question "Are you employed in the center?" 28%, chiefly housewives and older issei, answered that they were not, while 67% replied that

TABLE IV. ANSWERS TO QUESTIONNAIRE ON RESETTLEMENT, RETURNED BY 2587 AMACHE RESIDENTS
JUNE 24, 1943, BY AGE, SEX, AND NATIVITY, IN PERCENTAGE.

	MALES											FEMALES											TOTAL				
	ISSEI					NISEI						ISSEI					NISEI						ISSEI	NISEI	MALE	FEMALE	ALL
AGE	'21- 29	'30- 38	'39- 44	'45- 64	'65- 74	'18- 20	'21- 29	'30- 38	'39- 44	'45- 64	'18- 20	'21- 29	'30- 38	'39- 44	'45- 64	'65- 74	'18- 20	'21- 29	'30- 38	'39- 44	'45- 64	ISSEI	NISEI	MALE	FEMALE	ALL	
TOTAL BY AGE	.1	1.9	4.4	19.9	7.0	3.6	7.9	4.2	1.1	.5	.3	.3	2.5	5.8	14.6	1.7	5.0	14.7	4.1	.5	.3	58.2	41.8	50.3	49.7	100.0	
1. NOT EMPLOYED IN CENTER		10.4	5.2	12.6	33.5	12.8	9.3	11.4	14.3	8.3		71.4	36.9	31.1	48.4	79.1	22.5	41.3	55.7	46.2	50.0	28.6	28.0	14.2	42.6	28.3	
EMPLOYED IN CENTER	66.7	89.6	87.8	81.6	58.8	78.7	85.3	81.9	71.4	100.0		28.6	53.8	66.2	44.4	14.0	72.9	57.4	48.1	38.5	50.0	65.4	68.2	79.9	53.1	66.6	
ATTENDING SCHOOL		2.1	5.2			1.2	2.0	2.9			11.1							1.3		7.7	12.5	2.5	3.6	1.9	4.0	3.0	
2. ARE YOU INTERESTED IN LEAVING THE CENTER?																											
NO	33.3	31.3	37.4	42.3	42.3	13.8	15.2	27.6	17.9	25.0	11.1	42.9	52.3	46.4	46.3	53.5	17.8	19.2	27.4	23.1	25.0	43.9	19.5	33.4	33.9	33.7	
YES	66.7	62.5	60.9	55.5	39.6	81.9	81.4	68.6	67.9	41.7	11.1	57.1	41.5	53.0	48.1	44.2	82.9	79.7	72.6	69.2	50.0	51.3	77.5	61.4	63.2	62.3	
IF YES, WHEN?																											
RIGHT NOW	3.3	4.2	2.6	1.0		10.6	12.3	11.4	21.4			14.3	3.1	2.0	1.3		9.3	11.1	7.5	7.7		1.5	10.7	4.9	5.8	5.3	
AFTER A FEW MONTHS	33.3	6.3	1.7	1.6	.5	23.4	10.3	8.6	3.6		11.1		1.5	.7	1.3	2.3	17.8	11.8	6.6			1.6	11.8	5.2	6.5	5.9	
AFTER THE WAR ENDS		33.3	31.3	39.0	35.7	11.7	21.6	12.4	7.1	25.0		14.3	18.5	34.4	31.7	27.9	14.7	16.8	20.8	30.8	37.5	34.2	17.1	32.1	24.0	27.1	
UNDECIDED		20.8	36.5	25.0	22.5	36.2	41.2	41.9	32.1	33.3	11.1	28.6	30.8	37.5	30.2	16.3	41.9	43.2	39.6	38.5	37.5	27.6	40.9	30.5	35.8	33.2	
NOT UNTIL WE MUST LEAVE		16.7	9.6	8.3	8.2	4.3	3.9	8.6	10.7	8.3	11.1	14.3	9.2	10.6	2.1	9.3	4.7	4.7	9.4	15.4		7.4	5.6	7.8	5.5	6.7	
3. WHY ARE YOU HESITANT ABOUT RESETTLEMENT?																											
A. LACK OF ENOUGH MONEY	66.7	76.5	69.5	61.0		53.2	64.2	67.6	67.9	41.7	44.4		70.8	71.5	65.1	51.2	58.9	68.7	67.0	76.9	62.5	67.8	64.6	66.5	66.4	66.4	
B. LACK OF PROPER LIVING QUARTERS	45.8	43.5	43.3	35.7		38.3	42.2	45.7	50.0	25.0		71.4	47.7	51.0	45.5	30.2	41.1	47.9	52.8	38.5	75.0	43.7	45.2	42.0	46.7	44.5	
C. UNCERTAINTY OF PUBLIC SENTIMENT	79.2	80.0	76.3	65.4		57.4	62.3	74.3	71.4	75.0	11.1	71.4	69.2	78.8	68.3	53.5	58.9	62.1	67.0	76.9	87.5	72.6	63.6	71.5	66.4	68.8	
D. DIFFICULTY IN USING ENGLISH	33.3	36.5	38.8	39.6		4.3	10.3	10.5	7.1	8.3		14.3	36.9	53.0	49.2	39.5	5.4	8.9	17.0	7.7	12.5	35.7	8.3	23.4	20.1	28.5	
E. FAMILY TIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES	33.3	47.9	49.6	42.3	28.6	35.1	44.1	54.3	46.4	33.3	11.1	57.1	47.7	61.6	39.9	20.9	38.0	41.1	43.4	30.8	12.5	48.6	32.6	41.5	42.4	38.1	
F. LACK OF INFORMATION	56.3	64.3	62.7	50.0		38.3	39.7	50.5	50.0	33.3	11.1	57.1	61.5	68.2	56.3	53.5	38.8	41.6	52.8	69.2	62.5	53.1	43.1	46.3	51.5	52.8	
G. LACK CONFIDENCE IN MAKING A LIVING	52.1	51.3	50.9	47.3		39.4	31.9	42.9	57.1	41.7		42.9	52.3	57.0	48.9	30.2	31.8	35.5	50.0	30.8	75.0	50.0	38.2	45.8	44.3	44.8	
H. LACK CONFIDENCE IN ESTABLISHING A SECURE FUTURE	25.0	46.1	47.4	46.2		41.5	28.4	35.2	39.3	41.7		28.6	46.2	49.7	46.0	32.6	23.3	27.1	37.7	46.2	62.5	45.7	30.9	41.7	37.2	39.5	
I. POOR HEALTH		7.0	20.8	30.2		6.4	3.4	5.7	14.3		11.1		7.7	18.5	29.1	46.5	.8	5.3	7.5	23.1	25.0	22.2	5.3	14.8	15.4	15.1	
J. OLD AGE		1.7	23.3	61.0		1.1	.5			25.0		14.3	1.5	3.3	25.4	62.8		.3		37.5		24.1	.8	18.3	10.4	14.4	
OTHER REASONS DESCRIBED BELOW*																											
4. WILL FOLLOW LATER																											
5. HAVE PROPERTY OR BUSINESS CONNECTIONS TO START OVER IN THIS LINE?																											
NO	33.3	75.0	59.1	58.8	61.5	77.7	67.6	62.9	67.9	50.0	22.2	71.4	67.7	64.2	64.0	65.1	74.4	74.2	52.8	76.9	75.0	62.3	69.5	63.2	67.5	65.3	
YES		8.3	24.3	23.9	26.9	16.0	27.9	22.9	25.0	8.3		28.6	15.4	21.9	20.4	20.9	9.3	15.5	22.6	23.1		22.3	18.7	23.7	17.8	20.7	
CITY		14.6	5.2	4.9	2.7	9.6	13.2	15.2	14.3	25.0		14.3	1.5	1.3	5.0	7.0	3.1	8.9	10.4		25.0	4.6	10.2	7.8	6.0	6.9	
TOWN	33.3	6.3	3.5	1.2	1.1	4.3	3.9	7.6	3.6				1.5	2.0	1.1	2.3	3.1	2.6	5.7	7.7		1.7	3.9	2.8	2.3	2.6	
COUNTRY		2.1	8.7	6.3	9.9	3.2	7.8	9.5	10.7				7.7	6.0	4.5	9.3	3.1	5.0				6.6	5.5	7.4	4.8	6.1	
6. IF RESTRICTIONS & ARMY REGULATIONS COULD BE REMOVED WOULD YOU RETURN TO YOUR FORMER COMMUNITY?																											
NO	2.1	3.5	5.0	7.1		6.4	10.8	5.7	10.8		11.1		3.1	6.0	2.9	2.3	8.5	12.6	6.6			4.5	9.5	6.2	7.0	6.6	
YES	66.7	89.6	93.9	90.7	72.5	84.0	77.5	91.4	71.4	66.7	11.1	100.0	89.2	93.4	86.5	95.3	84.5	81.8	93.4	100.0	50.0	88.2	82.9	85.5	86.4	86.1	
RIGHT NOW		16.7	13.9	9.5	6.0	25.5	25.0	21.0	28.6	8.3		14.3	7.7	7.3	10.6	16.3	12.4	16.8	17.0	38.5	12.5	9.8	19.4	14.6	13.1	13.8	
IN A FEW MONTHS	33.3	12.5	10.4	3.7	2.7	8.5	11.8	17.1	3.6	8.3		14.3	7.7	2.6	4.8	4.6	10.1	11.8	17.9	15.4		4.9	12.1	7.3	8.5	7.9	
AFTER THE WAR		56.3	64.3	76.3	59.9	44.7	39.2	49.5	32.1	50.0	100.0	71.4	64.6	73.5	67.2	67.4	52.7	51.8	50.0	46.2	50.0	68.2	47.8	58.9	60.5	59.7	
7. WOULD YOU LIKE TO STAY IN A CENTER LIKE THIS THE REST OF YOUR LIFE?																											
NO	100.0	93.8	94.8	89.1	80.2	92.6	87.7	94.3	100.0	75.0	100.0	100.0	90.8	90.7	88.4	93.7	92.2	94.7	96.2	100.0	75.0	89.3	92.6	89.5	91.9	90.7	
YES				.4	1.6	1.1	2.0	1.0						1.3	2.1	2.3	.8	.8	.9			1.1	1.0	.8	1.2	1.0	

* OTHER REASONS GIVEN UNDER QUESTION 3:

FN 30-38 SINCE WE HAVE MANY SMALL CHILDREN, IF WE ARE NOT GUARANTEED A LIVING OUTSIDE IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO LEAVE.
MI 45-64 I HAVE MANY SMALL CHILDREN. WE HAVE NO GUARANTEE OVER SAFETY.
FI 45-64 AM WIFE OF INTERNEE NOW, HELD IN NEW MEXICO. HAVE SIGNED TO JOIN HIM IN TEXAS.
MN 18-20 I AM AN INVALID.
MI 30-38 DUE TO THE FACT THAT JAPANESE AREN'T TREATED EQUALLY AS THE OTHER MINORITY RACES.
MN 18-20 TOO MANY PEOPLE TAKE ADVANTAGE OVER US BY WORKING US TOO CHEAP.
MN 21-29 BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDES TOO LITTLE SECURITY TO THOSE WHO GO OUT AND BECAUSE JOBS SEEM ALMOST ALWAYS TO BE THOSE OF THE DOMESTIC CLASS.
MN 21-29 HAVE OWN RANCH IN CALIFORNIA: ANYTIME I AM ALLOWED TO GO BACK I WILL LEAVE THE CENTER.

FN 21-29 I THINK AS THE GOVERNMENT THOUGHT FIT TO PUT US HERE, NOW IT IS UP TO THEM TO HELP US TO ESTABLISH OURSELVES AS BEFORE.
MN 18-20 DUE TO JOBS OF LOW PAY--COST OF LIVING IS TOO HIGH.
MN 21-29 WITH THE VARIOUS TAXES AND THE HIGHER COST OF LIVING, IT IS RELATIVELY HARD TO MAINTAIN A STANDARD OF LIVING EQUIVALENT TO ONE BACK HOME WITH THE EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES OFFERED SO FAR.
MI 30-44 IN ORDER TO START A SUCCESSFUL FARM, ONE MUST TEST THE SOIL FOR AT LEAST 2 OR 3 YEARS AND DURING THAT TIME ONE MUST LIVE; THEREFORE I AM LACKING IN CAPITAL.
MI 45-64 DUE TO EVACUATION, I HAVE LOST EVERYTHING I BUILT UPON SWEAT AND BLOOD; THEREFORE I HAVE LOST MY FAITH AND CONFIDENCE IN MAKING A LIVING FOR THE FUTURE.
REPLIES TO QUESTION: "WHY CAN YOU NOT TRANSFER YOUR BUSINESS TO A NEW LOCALITY?"
MN 21-29 WITH CONDITIONS AS THEY ARE, THE RISK OF ONE'S CAPITAL ARE TOO GREAT TO THINK OF INVESTING IN NEW LOCALITIES AND BUSINESS.
MN 21-29 I HAVE PLANS TO START A BUSINESS BUT I AM LACKING IN CAPITAL, AND DUE TO EVACUATION, I LOST MOST OF MY PROPERTY. I WOULD LIKE THE GOVERNMENT TO GUARANTEE SAFETY.
MN 30-38 LACK OF PROPER EQUIPMENT AND NOT ENOUGH CAPITAL TO FINANCE BUSINESS.
FN 30-38 AFTER LEAVING ALL THAT WE OWNED WITH FRIENDS, I WOULD RATHER GO BACK WHERE WE CAME FROM.
MI 39-44 LACK OF KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING UNFAMILIAR PLACES.

TABLE V. ANSWERS TO QUESTIONNAIRE ON RESETTLEMENT, RETURNED BY 2587 AMACHE RESIDENTS
JUNE 24, 1943, BY AGE, SEX, AND NATIVITY.

AGE	MALES										FEMALES										TOTAL					
	ISSEI					NISEI					ISSEI					NISEI					ISSEI	NISEI	MALE	FEMALE	ALL	
	'21- 29	'30- 38	'39- 44	'45- 64	'65- 20	'18- 29	'30- 38	'39- 44	'45- 64	'18- 20	'21- 29	'30- 38	'39- 44	'45- 64	'65- 20	'18- 20	'21- 29	'30- 38	'39- 44	'45- 64						
TOTAL BY AGE	3	48	115	515	182	94	204	105	28	12	9	7	65	151	378	43	129	380	106	13	8	1505	1082	1301	1286	2587
1. NOT EMPLOYED IN CENTER																										
EMPLOYED IN CENTER		5	6	65	61	12	19	12	4	1		5	24	47	183	34	29	157	59	6	4	430	303	185	548	733
ATTENDING SCHOOL	2	43	101	420	107	74	174	86	20	12		2	35	100	168	6	94	218	51	5	4	984	738	1039	683	1722
2. ARE IN INTERESTED IN LEAVING THE CENTER?		1	6			11	4	3			1		21	1	8		14	5		1	1	38	39	25	52	77
NO																										
YES	1	15	43	218	77	13	31	29	5	3	1	3	34	10	175	23	23	73	29	3	2	660	211	435	436	871
IF YES, WHEN?	2	30	70	286	72	77	166	72	19	5	1	4	27	80	182	19	107	303	77	9	4	773	839	799	813	1612
RIGHT NOW																										
AFTER A FEW MONTHS	1	2	3	5		10	25	12	6			1	2	3	5		12	42	8	1		22	116	64	74	138
AFTER THE WAR ENDS	1	3	2	8	1	22	21	9	1		1		1	1	5	1	23	45	7			24	128	68	84	152
UNDECIDED		16	36	201	65	11	44	13	2	3		1	12	52	120	12	19	64	22	4	3	515	185	391	309	700
NOT UNTIL WE MUST LEAVE		10	42	129	41	34	84	44	9	4	1	2	20	49	114	7	54	164	42	5	3	415	443	397	461	858
3. WHY ARE YOU HESITANT ABOUT RESETTLEMENT?		8	11	43	15	4	8	9	3	1		1	6	16	8	4	6	18	10	2		112	61	102	71	173
A. LACK OF ENOUGH MONEY																										
B. LACK OF PROPER LIVING QUARTERS		32	88	358	111	50	131	71	19	5	4	5	46	108	246	22	76	261	71	10	5	1020	699	865	854	1719
C. UNCERTAINTY OF PUBLIC SENTIMENT		22	50	223	65	36	80	48	19	3		5	31	77	172	13	53	182	56	5	6	658	494	552	600	1152
D. DIFFICULTY IN USING ENGLISH		38	92	393	119	54	127	78	20	9	1	5	45	119	258	23	76	236	71	10	7	1093	688	930	851	1781
E. FAMILY TIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES		16	42	200	72	4	21	11	2	1			24	80	186	17	7	34	18	1	1	638	100	369	369	738
F. LACK OF INFORMATION	1	23	57	210	52	33	90	57	13	4	1	4	31	93	151	9	49	156	46	4	1	632	453	540	545	1085
G. LACK CONFIDENCE IN MAKING A LIVING		27	74	323	91	36	81	53	14	4	1	4	40	103	213	23	50	158	56	9	5	899	466	703	662	1365
H. LACK CONFIDENCE IN ESTABLISHING A SECURE FUTURE		25	59	262	86	37	65	45	16	5		3	34	86	185	13	41	135	53	4	6	753	407	600	560	1160
I. POOR HEALTH		12	53	244	84	39	58	37	11	5		2	30	75	174	14	30	103	40	6	5	688	334	543	479	1022
J. OLD AGE			8	107	55	6	7	6	4		1		5	28	110	20	1	20	8	3	2	334	57	193	198	391
OTHER REASONS DESCRIBED BELOW*			2	120	111	1	1			3		1	1	5	96	27		1			3	363	9	238	134	372
4. WILL FOLLOW LATER																										
5. HAVE PROPERTY OR BUSINESS CONNECTIONS TO START OVER IN THIS LINE?																										
NO	1	36	68	303	112	73	138	66	19	6	2	5	44	97	242	28	96	282	56	10	6	938	752	822	868	1690
YES		4	28	123	49	15	57	24	7	1		2	10	33	77	9	12	59	24	3		335	202	308	229	537
CITY		7	6	25	5	9	27	16	4	3		1	1	2	19	3	4	34	11		2	59	110	102	77	179
TOWN	1	3	4	6	2	4	8	8	1				1	3	4	1	4	10	6	1		25	42	37	30	67
COUNTRY		1	10	35	18	3	16	10	3				5	9	17	4	4	19	4			99	59	96	62	158
6. IF RESTRICTIONS & ARMY REGULATIONS COULD BE REMOVED WOULD YOU RETURN TO YOUR FORMER COMMUNITY?																										
NO		1	4	26	13	6	22	6	3		1		2	9	11	1	11	48	7			68	103	81	90	171
YES	2	43	108	467	132	79	158	96	20	8	1	7	58	141	327	41	109	311	99	13	4	1327	897	1113	1111	2224
RIGHT NOW		8	16	49	11	24	51	22	8	1		1	5	11	40	7	16	64	18	5	1	148	210	190	168	358
AFTER A FEW MONTHS	1	6	12	19	5	8	24	18	1	1		1	5	4	18	2	13	45	19	2		73	131	95	109	204
AFTER THE WAR		27	74	367	109	42	80	52	9	6	9	5	42	111	254	29	68	197	53	6	4	1027	517	766	778	1544
7. WOULD YOU LIKE TO STAY IN A CENTER LIKE THIS THE REST OF YOUR LIFE?																										
NO	3	45	109	459	146	87	179	99	28	9	9	7	59	137	334	36	119	360	102	13	6	1344	1002	1164	1182	2346
YES			2	3	1	4	1						2	8	1	1	3	11				16	11	11	16	27
* OTHER REASONS GIVEN UNDER QUESTION 3:																										
MN 18-20 VERY DISCOURAGED																										
FI 45-64 MY ONLY SON IS IN COLLEGE NOW, I CANNOT DECIDE ANYTHING ABOUT THE FUTURE TIL HE GRADUATES.																										
MN 18-20 AMERICA, A MELTING POT OF ALL RACES IS A DEMOCRATIC NATION. WHY IN THE WORLD DO THEY HAVE TO PICK ON A SMALL MINORITY (JAPANESE). THE POLITICIANS ARE OUT TO RUIN THE NAMES OF THE JAPANESE. IT IS THEY, THE POLITICIANS WHO ARE WRECKING THE LIVES OF INNOCENT LOYAL JAPANESE AMERICANS. UNTIL THESE THINGS COULD BE STOPPED, THIS COUNTRY IS NOT A TRUE DEMOCRATIC NATION.																										
MN 21-29 I WAS OUT ON AN INDEFINITE LEAVE BUT I HAD TO RETURN TO CAMP BECAUSE OF MY WIFE'S CONDITION-- EXPECTING SOON. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO FIND A SUITABLE HOUSING FOR MY FAMILY.																										
MN 21-29 OUR STATUS AS AN AMERICAN CITIZEN HAS NOT BEEN RESTORED TO US FULLY BY THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES.																										
MN 21-29 LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY--DON'T CARE TO BE KICKED AROUND AND DRIVEN OUT AGAIN FROM NEW LOCALITY, WHEN RESETTLED.																										
MN 30-38 I'VE NURSED AND PREPARED MY FUTURE WELL BEING FOR 13 YEARS IN ONE ORGANIZATION. INCIDENTALLY, AN ESSENTIAL INDUSTRY IN OUR PRESENT WAR EFFORT. NOW, I HAVE TO START STUDYING TO PREPARE MYSELF FOR ANOTHER FUTURE, SINCE WE ARE NOT ACCEPTED.																										
MI 45-64 THE GOVERNMENT IS ALWAYS CHANGING ITS POLICIES, AND THE MINORITY IS GIVEN BAD PUBLICITY BY THE NEWSPAPERS: THEREFORE, I DO NOT BLAME THE PUBLIC IN THEIR ATTITUDE AND SYMPATHY TOWARDS US.																										
MI 45-64 THE REAL REASON BEHIND MY HESITANCY IS THAT WE HAVE NO GUARANTEE OF SAFETY FOR OUR LIFE. I CANNOT SEE THROUGH THE SITUATION TO MAKE A SATISFACTORY LIVING.																										
MN 30-38 BECAUSE WE ARE GETTING TOO MUCH PUBLICITY AS JAPS AND NOT AS AMERICANS.																										
REPLIES TO QUESTION: "WHY CAN YOU NOT TRANSFER YOUR BUSINESS TO A NEW LOCALITY?"																										
FN 21-29 I AM UNABLE TO SET UP MY OWN AGENCY UNDER THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.																										
MN 30-38 SINCE I AM FROM CALIFORNIA, I DON'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THE CLIMATE OR SOIL OF ANY OTHER PLACE. I DON'T THINK I CAN MAKE A GO OF IT.																										
FI 30-38 I DON'T WANT TO SUFFER THE HARDSHIP WE WENT THROUGH DURING EVACUATION AGAIN.																										
FN 30-38 LACK OF MONEY, CHILDREN TOO YOUNG.																										
MI 45-64 I'D RELOCATE ANYWHERE, JUST SO THE CLIMATE AND SOIL IS GOOD.																										
GENERAL COMMENTS:																										
MI 39-44 THE PRESENT CAMP LIFE WITH ITS SURROUNDING ENVIRONMENT IS UNFITTING FOR THE WOMEN AND CHILDREN.																										
NF 21-29 IF THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDES SUFFICIENT SUM IN ORDER FOR RESETTLEMENT, WE WILL BE GLAD TO RESETTLE INTO NORMAL LIFE.																										
MI 45-64 GOD WILL DO JUSTICE.																										
MI 65- WE ARE SPENDING MEANINGLESS DAYS IN CAMP. I AM PRAYING FOR THE DAY OF PEACE TO ARRIVE.																										

Figure 1. Percentage of 2587 Amache Residents Who Answered That They were Interested in Leaving the Center, By Age Groups, Nativity, and Sex.




Figure 2. Percentage Of 2587 Amache Residents
Who Answered When They Wanted To Leave the
Center For Resettlement.




Figure 3. Percentage Of 2587 Amache Residents
Who Answered When They Wanted To Leave the
Center For Resettlement, By Nativity.





Figure 4. Percentage Of 2587 Amache Residents Who
 Answered When They Wanted To Leave the
 Center For Resettlement By Sex.



group seem to feel the urge.

The highest percentage of "not interested in leaving" replies occurred among the issei females, probably due to the fact that many of them want security for their minor children. In the 30-38 years group 52.3% were not interested in leaving, and in all female issei groups except those below 20, more than 42% were not interested in leaving.

Although the great majority of Center residents are interested in leaving the Center, comparatively few of them (5.3%) are interested in leaving at the present time, or even within a few months (5.9%). Only 11.2% or 290 are ready to go at once or shortly, and most of these 240 are nisei. 23.5% of the nisei, as compared with 3.1% of the issei declared themselves ready to go out at once or within a few months. Moreover, only 27.1% of the total report that they will leave after the war ends. 33.2% reported themselves as undecided whether or when to leave. On the other hand, only 6.7% stated that they would not leave the Center until they had to, whether that were after the war ends or before it closes. 21.8% did not commit themselves on this point. Apparently they were less reluctant to take a definite stand for or against relocation as a general principle (96% answered "yes" or "no") than to specify a certain date or even a state of undecidedness. About ten percent more nisei than issei were willing to commit themselves, the percentage being higher in each class of reply except the one "not until we must leave." In this issei males 30-38 years old exceeded all groups, (16.7%) with nisei females 39-44 years a close second (15.4%) and issei females 21-29 years a close third (14.3%). All three of these groups are small in number and the high percentages may be due to mere chance, however. Significantly more of the females are undecided than of the males (36% vs. 30.5%), but fewer females recorded themselves as satisfied to wait until the end of the war (24% of females, 32% of males), and more want to leave at once or soon (12.3% vs. 10.1% of the males). Perhaps this desire to leave is

prompted by the fact that brothers and husbands of a number of females are already out. They may still be here because they lack finances or confidence and initiative, because they are burdened with small children, or because they are held back by their parents who consider that it would be unladylike or unsafe for them to go out alone, or because the parents want to keep the comfort of some of their children around them, when the boys have gone out.

"Why Are You Hesitant About Resettlement?"

The third question asked "Why are you hesitant about resettlement?" This effort to draw out the reasons for staying in the center elicited some informative replies, enabling us to measure the relative strength of several listed obstacles to resettlement. These obstacles were carefully selected from among all those known, as probably the most frequently and strongly felt, on the basis of a series of preliminary interviews. Space was left for writing in additional reasons, and some of the comments written in this space are exceedingly revealing of attitudes--perhaps more so than are the checked answers. The charts which follow this page show clearly the relative frequency with which each reason was checked, for the total population, by sex, by nativity, and by sex and nativity combined. It should be noted that in general, the pattern of the total population is followed by the subdivisions mentioned, with certain outstanding exceptions.

Uncertainty of Public Sentiment

69% of the total are hesitant because of their uncertainty concerning public sentiment outside. This factor is largely one of re-education. Letters received from resettlers in the eastern United States, and newspaper reports and editorials in that area, indicate, as Mr. Myer reported in his speech here, that attitudes almost without exception are favorable to resettlers. No untoward incidents have been authentically reported which would indicate that evacuees have

Figure 5. Percentage Of 2587 Amache Residents Replying to the
Questionnaire on Relocation Who Checked Each of The Following Reasons
For Their Hesitation About Resettlement.




Figure 6. Percentage Of 2587 Amache Residents Replying to the Questionnaire
On Relocation Who Checked Each Of The Following Reasons For Their
Hesitation About Resettlement (#3) By Nativity.




Figure 7. Percentage Of 2587 Amache Residents Replying to the Questionnaire
On Relocation Who Checked Each Of The Following Reasons For Their
Hesitation About Resettlement (#3) By Sex.




Figure 8. Percentage of 2587 Amache Residents Replying to the Questionnaire on Relocation Who Checked Each of the Following Reasons for Hesitation About Resettlement (#3) by Nativity & Sex




FIGURE 9. PERCENTAGE OF 2587 AMACHE RESIDENTS REPLYING TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE ON RELOCATION WHO CHECKED EACH OF THE STATED REASONS FOR THEIR HESITATION ABOUT RESETTLEMENT, BY AGE.

UNCERTAINTY OF PUBLIC SENTIMENT



LACK OF MONEY



LACK OF INFORMATION



LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN MAKING A LIVING



LACK OF PROPER LIVING QUARTERS



FAMILY TIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES



LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN ESTABLISHING A SECURE FUTURE



DIFFICULTY IN USING ENGLISH



POOR HEALTH



OLD AGE




Table VI. Percentage of Each Age Group of Amache Residents
Who Checked Each Given Reasons for Hesitation to Resettle, June 24, 1943

Age Groups	18-20	21-29	30-38	39-44	45-64	64--
1. Lack of Money	56.0	66.8	67.9	73.3	67.3	59.1
2. Lack of Proper Living Quarters	38.4	46.0	48.5	51.1	44.4	34.7
3. Uncertainty of Public Sentiment	56.7	62.0	71.6	78.5	79.0	63.1
4. Difficulty in Using English	4.7	9.4	21.3	40.7	41.3	39.5
5. Family Ties and Responsibilities	35.8	42.3	48.5	54.4	40.1	27.1
6. Lack of Information	37.5	40.9	52.7	65.1	59.7	50.7
7. Lack of Confidence in Making a Living	33.6	34.2	48.5	54.6	50.2	44.0
8. Lack of Confidence in Establishing a Secure Future	29.7	27.2	43.2	47.2	47.0	43.6
9. Poor Health	3.4	4.5	5.9	14.0	24.0	33.3
10. Old Age	.4	.5	.4	2.3	24.3	61.3

Table VII. Percentage of 2587 Amache Residents Who Checked Each
Of the Stated Reasons For Hesitating About Resettlement, By Sex and Nativity.

	Male		Female		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Issei</u>	<u>Nisei</u>	<u>Issei</u>	<u>Nisei</u>	
1. Lack of Money	68.3	62.3	66.0	65.7	66.4
2. Lack of Proper Living Quarters	41.7	43.3	45.6	46.9	44.5
3. Uncertainty of Public Sentiment	74.4	65.0	69.1	62.1	68.8
4. Difficulty in Using English	38.2	8.8	47.2	9.6	28.5
5. Family Ties and Responsibilities	39.7	44.5	44.3	38.2	38.1
6. Lack of Information	59.7	42.6	58.8	43.2	52.8
7. Lack of Confidence in Making a Living	50.0	37.9	49.2	37.1	44.8
8. Lack of Confidence in Establishing a Secure Future	45.5	33.9	45.2	28.6	39.5
9. Poor Health	19.7	5.2	25.1	5.3	15.1
10. Old Age	27.0	1.1	19.9	.6	14.4

anything more to fear there than here, or anything more to fear than has the rest of the populace. These facts must be brought to the favorable attention of the evacuees. It is a relief to note that the factor which looms largest in the minds of the evacuees is one on which WRA has found valid grounds for believing that the fears are not founded on fact, and hence subject to treatment by an educational process. It may help in this process to know that males are more sentiment-conscious than are females (72% vs. 67%), probably because they have been up against competition and discrimination more than the females. Only 64% of the nisei, as compared with 73% of the issei, checked this reason. Either the nisei are less concerned about sentiment, or are better informed about sentiment in the relocation areas east of the Rockies than are their elders. (This is entirely possible. There are no Japanese language newspapers east of Denver, while the Utah Nippo, the Colorado Times (Kakushu Jiji), and the Rocky Shimpō of Denver, mirror faithfully the scare stories of the Denver Post and Los Angeles Times, etc. These papers the issei read at least as frequently as they do the English language newspapers, but the nisei read the latter much more frequently.) The nisei know the American way of life better, and feel much greater confidence in their ability to make their way through the present troublous scenes outside the centers.

Lack of Money

The second highest ranking reason for hesitation is not so easily treated. 67% of the total checked "lack of money" as a reason, and comments written in here and at the end of the questionnaire emphasize this factor. The loss of money and property during evacuation is reflected in these remarks and in the cases of individuals. The problem is general. Among both issei and nisei a high percentage felt the effects of financial need (68% and 65% respectively.) 66% of males and females alike marked this reason. In nearly every age group

at least half checked this as a reason for hesitating about resettlement. Among the nisei, the 18-20 and over 45 year old groups are the lowest, while the 21-45 year groups are highest, reaching 76.9% among the nisei females 39-44 years. Among the issei the 18-20 and 65 or over groups are low, while the 21 to 45 year groups are highest (about 71%) among the issei females, and the 39 to 65 groups are highest (about 71% also) among the issei males.

Some of the persons interviewed elaborated on their financial problems sufficiently to give insight into the nature of the problem and the requisites of any successful solution. A typical case is one in which the head of the family had a modest business or owned or rented a small farm, owned a home, furniture, and equipment. But due to evacuation from the coast, he had to sell or relinquish at a considerable loss his stock of goods, his tools and machinery, his home, and furniture. What money he realized from these forced sales he has consumed in supplementing the assembly center and relocation menus, in buying clothing, shoes, medicine, toilet goods, household articles, and other daily needs. His savings are depleted if not wholly gone, and he is no longer in touch with sources of credit who know him and who can arrange with him for proper security on loans. Meanwhile if he does go out, he needs money to supply himself and his family with food, clothing, a new outfit of household goods, kitchen utensils, etc. If he starts farming he needs enough money to be able to keep his family until he can market his crops. If he sets up a business, such as he had before, in order to purchase goods, he has to secure priorities and get his previous business activities reference transferred to a new location. He has to secure credit for some goods, and have enough money to keep his family fed, clothed and sheltered until he can get his business running profitably. All this must be done in a wartime economy, under various restrictions, at a time when goods are fought for in strong competition, and

the buyer needs cash on the line if he wants a chance to get as good a stock and as adequate a supply as do his competitors. Fortunately there are a few persons who still own property on the west coast, who have leased or rented it to others to run for the duration. Most of these people are deriving some income from such sources, although several have found it difficult to keep sufficient control of their property to prevent waste and loss. These have less difficulty, but still are faced with the same problems.

Solutions are fortunately available, however, and several suggestions may be made. To begin with, credit is unusually easy to secure from banks and business houses. There are limits on the time credits can run, because of the efforts to channel all excess funds into war bonds and stamps, and out of the market for consumers' goods. These regulations are highly necessary to prevent inflation, but since a years credit is obtainable under some exceptionable circumstances, they should present no insoluble obstacles. The farm operator usually does well to start out for a year as farm laborer so that he does not risk his own capital until he has learned the ins and outs of farming in the new locality and^{of} the new crops he will be producing. After that he will already^{be} established and have contacted sources of credit for the next year's operations. If he is sufficiently^{well} informed to begin at once on his own account, the Farm Security Administration has a department devoted to filling his needs and to helping him in many other respects. If he cannot rent a suitable house, he can secure a loan to purchase one from the Home Owners' Loan Corporation. These federal agencies operate throughout the United States and make absolutely no discrimination in rendering help to Americans who need it, whether they be aliens or citizens. War Relocation Authority field officers might do a good job in each locality by serving as sponsors for evacuees, taking them to possible sources of credit, and giving them a favorable introduction

to the persons who are in a position to extend credit facilities. Adequate use of English is essential in such operations, and nisei may well operate as interpreters or spokesmen for a group of ^{of Japanese ancestry} Americans in such negotiations. Information concerning all these possible sources of credit need to be given all evacuees, in personal interviews, in written suggestions, and in as many other ways as possible. The employment office carries its responsibility well for those who come in contact with it, but many evacuees do not take advantage of this opportunity because they feel it is of no use to talk relocation so long as they cannot get adequate funds. Solution of this problem is basic to a successful relocation program for the issei. Some of their experiences has discouraged them, they have family responsibilities, ^{they} and lack the energy and confidence to tackle apparently insoluble problems with vim and vigor--and solve them as they did the problems they encountered when they first came to the United States. Determination to get out of the center is not engendered by flag-waving, but by clear demonstration of the possibility of keeping the family fed, comfortable and healthy to the head who is responsible for the family's welfare. If we can show him that he can improve the condition of ^{family will} living of his family by going out, he and his and quickly, but not otherwise.

Lack of Information

The third reason in order of frequency checked is lack of information concerning jobs, wages, housing conditions, cost of living, standard of living, climate, soil, and any other thing which is essential to success and comforts. Ignorance often makes a new place seem strange and forbidding. This reason is not nearly so frequently operative as the first two are, however, for the percentage listing it drops to 49% of the total. The issei are more interested in information (53%) than are the nisei (43%). This is perhaps due to the fact

that they are more interested in going out to find a place to settle down, rather than looking around at this brave but confused new world. They do not seem to be imbued with the desire to move around from place to place, as some of the nisei are. The nisei as a whole feel more confidence in being able to meet any sort of conditions they encounter, although this feeling is far less intense than it was in the issei who came to the United States from across the Pacific--probably because the nisei are used to the American way of life and expect to live in accordance with it. The nisei usually secure quite a bit of information from friends who have preceded them to or who were already living in some of the large cities of the East, and spread out from such centers after "getting the dope" from their friends on the public sentiment, costs of living, housing, etc.

More females (52%) apparently want information on housing, costs of living, and living conditions than do males (46%). Perhaps this is due to the fact that in the ordinary Japanese^{American} family the wife comes in closer contact with costs of food, housing, and other items than does the husband, and has to put up with more inconvenience if housing conditions are poor than he does. Suitable jobs, and living conditions which are acceptable to their parents and relatives are also of considerable importance to females, even among the younger nisei. However, the nisei women are far less concerned about this than are the issei women or the issei men, for that matter. Conservatism, a desire to keep the family together and to see that the girls, especially are well cared for and protected from immoral and other undesirable influences characterize the issei, while the nisei are much more imbued with the American way of self-dependence and ability to take care of themselves.

Lack of Confidence in Making a Reasonably Satisfactory Living

Lack of confidence in making a reasonably satisfactory living was checked by 45% of all those who returned the questionnaires. The issei have a high

percentage on this score--50% as contrasted with 38% of the nisei. The advanced age of the issei has much to do with this. It is pretty difficult for them to go out and work under other people after having been independent for many years. Most of them have been used, moreover, to working in small business or farm units, each of which was operated almost wholly by a single family. Because of prejudice on the part of other competitors, and jealousy on the part of other members of the Japanese-American communities on the coast, they kept their businesses and knowledge about them pretty much to themselves. It is not easy for the issei to take places in large-scale enterprises where they form only a single cog in^a vast establishment, where they must constantly cooperate with others whom they understand and who understand them only partially. However, they have in significant numbers been able to do this, although they evidently do not prefer to do so. The nisei, on the other hand, were accustomed to working under direction, and as part of a going concern in which the chief responsibility was not theirs, but wherein much responsibility for getting the work done did rest on their shoulders. They can step into a large-scale business and feel less friction and disturbance from their usual mode of working than can the issei. Males show a slightly higher percentage (46%) than do the females, (44%), but the difference is statistically negligible.

Lack of Proper Living Quarters

Fifth in order of frequency was the obtainability of proper living quarters. In this the two generations did not differ noticeably. 43.7% of the issei checked this reason, while 44.3% of the nisei indicated it. The females showed greater concern (47%) than did the males, however (42%). Peculiarly enough, age was significant, but in the case of issei, the younger the person, the more concern he felt about housing conditions, while among the nisei the opposite

was true, with a few exceptions. This may be explained partly on the basis of accustomation and partly on the basis of experience. The older issei (particularly the farm laborers) have been used to living in quite a variety of living quarters, and have learned to adjust to a variety of such conditions and think less of the effort than have the younger issei and the nisei. (This is not saying that the issei enjoy living in shacks; they are merely more inclined to accept it as an unavoidable condition.) The older nisei are perhaps more aware of the difference in housing conditions than are the younger nisei, who have had less experience in trying to make a specific house meet their needs. The older nisei are also more likely to have children than are the younger ones, while the older issei's children are usually pretty well grown up, with notions and plans of their own.

This is a real problem, but one which is not confined only to the Japanese. Information on housing conditions in war areas, if properly disseminated to center residents, might bring about consciousness that many Americans are living in trailers, in hovels, in "Hooverville" type shacks for the duration, because they can get no better and still do the work necessary to win the war. The quality of the houses in a few cities is bad, but in practically no cases is the housing worse or even as bad as the conditions we are putting up with in the various centers. Housing problems are strictly local, of course, and this fact can be taken into consideration by evacuees when they relocate, and by persons who advise them. Transportation problems seem to fall within this same sort of category. In considering jobs, evacuees need to take into consideration the possibility of securing quarters near enough to the work to make walking feasible, or to have some feasible plan for transportation worked out, including the cost and time factors. In large cities rapid transit subway and elevated systems offer ^{an} economical and practical solution. In the small towns

distances are usually not too great for walking. In the medium-sized cities and large towns the problem may need careful attention. Usually intelligence and persistence combined will achieve an acceptable solution, even under trying circumstances.

Family Ties and Responsibilities

Traditionally the issei thinks a lot of his family ties and responsibilities. Nisei, too, have found value in the cohesive family group. It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that only 42% of all replies had this as a reason making them reluctant to resettle. Among the issei the percentage was 49. Among the nisei, only 33. Many nisei have family responsibilities, but think that these responsibilities are a reason for getting out and getting established as soon as possible, rather than a reason for staying in the Center. As many females (42.4%) report this to be a factor in their remaining as do males, (42%) and the highest percentages recorded are among the issei females 39-44 years old (62%). The 21-44 year old groups are highest among the both males and females, issei and nisei. 38% of nisei women under 21 reported this reason for their delay in leaving the Center. The experience of the employment office corroborates this testimony, but would indicate that this percentage is rather lower than might be expected from individual testimony regarding the matter. Interviews with prospective relocators also indicate that the families of girls 18-20 years old are usually not very favorable to their relocating alone, but approval is usually forthcoming if the girls go out in groups or as members of families, or with brothers, or other relatives.

Lack of Confidence in Establishing a Secure Future

Many issei react to job offers with the statement, "That's enough money just to live on now, but what about the future? I cannot save any money out

of a salary like that, to take care of accidents, and to take care of myself when I have to retire. I might just as well stay here without giving up my right to food and shelter." This question was an effort to find out how many issei and nisei have such a belief. 40% of the total checked this item, but the issei were far ahead of the nisei in considering the necessity for future savings, 46% of them checking this reason, as compared with 31% of the nisei. Males were somewhat more concerned than females, to a tune of 42% to 37%.

Among the nisei, the older the group, the higher the percentage who checked this reason, but among the issei the peak is at the age of 39-44 (48%), with slightly lower percentages at higher and lower age levels (about 40 to 43%).

The psychological considerations underlying this particular reason are not easy to counteract, although there is a reasonable basis for doing so. The Japanese feel in many cases that rounding them up and putting them into assembly centers and relocation centers just when everyone else was getting raises in pay, better jobs, war wages tremendously high prices for farm produce and for labor on the farm was an unjust and injurious denial of the economic benefit of democracy. This, on top of all the losses of property and invested capital which were a part of evacuation, and the uncertainty of receiving any of the money deposited in the American branches of Japanese banks, after the freezing and custodianship orders were put into effect, seemed to mean to the Japanese that all the hard work and diligence with which they had painfully accumulated a reserve for illness and old age was wasted effort and useless privation. Since many of the issei gathered these possessions at great cost to their physical comfort and enjoyment of life, and because they feel that any future attempt to save money for a rainy day will be subject to the same hazard, they are rather inclined to insist on comforts plus enough to enable

them to save something for the future.

The fact of the matter is, of course, that the Japanese have been subjected to unusual deprivations in the process of dislocation. It would be idle and false to say that they were not. But, on the other hand, so were a good many other persons. Gas and service station operators, automobile salesmen, and others have had their businesses cut out from under them by war-time conditions and regulations. These other persons are having and will have an easier time getting into highly paid war-work than the Japanese Americans, it is true. But there are many war-paid jobs open to Japanese, in which they are paid exactly the same wage as other Americans, are given the same working conditions, and are helped in finding living quarters and other facilities necessary to their comfort and health in the same way. All the agencies and aids in American society are available and open to their use and working for their benefit the same as they are for other Americans. In this respect particularly the Federal Social Security Board and its program for social security of all kinds, its provisions for Old-Age and Survivors' Insurance for Unemployment insurance, and its program for retirement payments on the basis of contributions from employer, employee and government, is important. Where individuals find it hard to survive under unusual conditions, mutual assistance in the form of group insurance and the pooling of resources through private or government-administered funds helps them tremendously, as the Japanese Americans have well demonstrated in their use of tanomoshi, kobai kumiai; and other forms of mutual aid. The present situation seems to call for real assistance from, and reliance upon, the Federal Social Security program, where private resources are inadequate. This will take the place of the lost savings, to a considerable extent. It is evident that no Japanese should feel that he is accepting charity under these circumstances when

he receives aid from a federal or state agency to help care for him. He is merely receiving the help due him to take the place of the savings and resources he lost because of the needs of the nation as a whole in wartime. Finally, it is again necessary to remember that the fortunes of war in many cases do not take into account justice, virtue, or loyalty. We may even feel thankful that we were not living in a place overrun by armies, blasted to bits by bombs, shells, and machine guns, and that we are all alive, that members of so many families are still together, alive and well, that they have something to eat, wear, and a place to stay warm and dry in rough weather. Many millions of persons in England, Germany, Italy, Poland, China, Burma, Russia, France, Belgium, and France just as loyal, just as virtuous, and equally innocent of harm or blame have not been so fortunate. Many more people in Europe and the Far East will not be so fortunate in the future. So, however badly the war may have shattered the plans of the Japanese Americans for the future, it is well to remember that the damage is not irreparable, that assistance is available whereby at least some of the handicaps may be overcome, and that it is very unlikely that such a catastrophe will repeat itself in the near future. In other words, present good wages available, future jobs in post-war reconstruction work, and federal agencies to aid individuals whose savings have been depleted, all help to make less necessary a large surplus over current living expenses. Convincing evacuees of this fact may depend upon several things in addition to just information, however. For instance, faith in the impartiality of governmental agencies established to supply Old-Age Assistance, Unemployment Insurance, etc., would be greatly increased if the California Unemployment Insurance Compensation would live up to its legal obligations. However, the operation of California's governmental agencies is fortunately a different matter from the operation of

federal governmental agencies. These are on the whole impartial, and few if any practice discrimination. The Federal Civil Service Commission could also be helpful in this regard by checking all its regulations and practices to make sure that none of them impose a handicap upon the certification for employment by agencies of the Government of the United States of persons otherwise qualified, on the basis of race, ancestry, or religion.

Furthermore, faith in future equalitarian treatment can be produced convincingly and rapidly by the War Relocation Authority itself. One of the most effective means of doing this will also meet a growing shortage of skilled manpower on the projects. As the relocation process goes on a large majority of the most qualified, skilled, and able persons will leave the Centers, in growingly large proportions, leaving the less able, the unskilled, the unwilling, and those who lack initiative in the Centers. It will be increasingly difficult to get the necessary work done as time goes on. In order to secure the carrying out of necessary functions, appointments of present well-trained and qualified evacuees on United States Civil Service ratings similar to those of the present appointed staffs should be made. Such service would provide a background of experience, adequate financial recognition, and treatment of the evacuees as equals to all other Americans—demonstrating by practice right where the evacuees can not help seeing it, that WRA believes what it preaches. (It is obvious to anyone who visits the WRA field offices and Washington office that WRA does practice what it preaches, there, but the evacuees in the centers do not see the field offices or the Washington office. Nor have any significant proportion of executive positions been filled with evacuees.) The shortsighted opposition of some evacuees to appointment of other evacuees in regular paid jobs with regular tenure which took place during the early stages of the evacuation

process can be assumed to be corrected at this stage of developments, and such attitudes need not be anticipated in the future, at least at Granada Relocation Center. Doctors and dentists who are sorely needed to take care of the health of the evacuees in the centers cannot be expected to forego excellent opportunities forever while working long hours at considerable cost to themselves. Regular salaries and living conditions, and recognition as equals will do much to help them to maintain themselves professionally and economically, and reduce the exodus of irreplaceable trained professionals from the centers, until their services can be spared. The same is true of social workers, engineers, accountants, and other workers who perform functions which require long training and skill in order to safeguard the health and welfare of the evacuees during the remainder of the relocation process.

There may be some other means whereby WRA can lead the way in re-instilling in evacuees confidence in equal and non-discriminatory treatment by Americans. For example, several sources report that other centers enforce rather strict segregation of evacuees and non-evacuees. If such practices exist, they cannot help but undermine the evacuees' confidence in receiving equal treatment at the hands of Americans outside the centers. WRA is recognized by the evacuees as being a relatively benevolent and protective agency which is sincerely interested in their welfare. If WRA itself practices discrimination to a noticeable though limited degree, then, in the eyes of many an evacuee, it is probable that exceedingly great discrimination will be practiced by other less sympathetic agencies and individuals. WRA policies in all cases should take into account the very obvious fact that deeds speak more convincingly than words, and avoid practices which oppose or contradict in any obvious way the advice given the evacuees to relocate. Where such conflicts are absolutely unavoidable, they can of course

be justified only on the basis that governmental policies and programs in general prevent more completely equalitarian treatment, and the moral pointed out that it is improbable that completely equalitarian treatment can be hoped for because of the general disturbance of the world at the present time, and the influence of long-standing prejudices which can only be eliminated by patient work for many years to come. Such segregation, if it exists, also reduces the processes of assimilation to a minimum, and thus puts another obstacle in the way of a successful relocation program.

Lack of Ability To Use English Well Enough

28.5% of all those who returned questionnaires checked the lack of ability to use English as a reason for their hesitating to relocate. The issei are of course much more greatly concerned than are the nisei about this factor. 36% of the issei checked this reason, whereas only 8.3% of the nisei checked it. The female issei scored higher than any other group, 47.2%, as compared with 38% for the issei males, 9.6% for the nisei females, and 8.8% for the nisei males. Females and males were equal in this regard—28% in both cases. The nisei who felt this difficulty were to a large extent kibeï who have either had no time or taken no opportunity to learn the language thoroughly. Some of the nisei who attended segregated oriental schools also show the influence of such social handicaps to assimilation. The efficiency and fluency with which the vast majority of nisei use the English language, however, is eloquent testimony that the Japanese-Americans can and do become thoroughly and completely assimilated if given an opportunity. The old argument that persons of Japanese ancestry are not assimilable is clearly proven by the facts to be untrue, but is again being used as propaganda to achieve objectives which cannot be attained by sticking to the truth. The effectiveness of the denial of equal opportunities at education, and free communication with Americans of ancestry other than Japanese during the

educational process, in preventing assimilation which would otherwise take place, is also well demonstrated by the facts regarding facility in the use of the English language. These facts point unmistakably to the fact that if democracy is to be furthered and maintained in the United States, our educational processes and practices must remain democratic. Segregation must be eliminated, and adequate school facilities must be provided for all minorities, including the Americans of Japanese ancestry. The first step in this process must be the provision of adequate educational facilities within the centers for those children who must, for some reason, stay there. This is highly necessary as an immediate relief of a very pressing need, but is not a real solution to the problem, for the children in the centers are thoroughly isolated. They seldom see or talk with any children other than those of Japanese ancestry—usually only a few children of WRA staff members. Practically their only contacts with persons not of Japanese ancestry are with adults—teachers, WRA staff members, and visitors. The unconscious interplay of ideas, the unconscious acceptance of and mastery of American customs from fellows of similar age and with similar interests and abilities, are missing. A marked difference is already discernible between children who grew up with such contacts to the age of high school juniors and seniors and those who have been deprived of them during the last year and a half—a period exceedingly important in the growth, development, and formation of the personalities of most of the center children because it has occurred at a time when they were still highly flexible, open to lasting impressions from the social environment, and sensitive to many influences in that environment. The next step is therefore the completion of a successful relocation program, so that children and adults alike will be able to get out of the segregated centers, and into the general stream of American society again, so that they can mingle and communicate with other Americans freely and without discrimination. Unless those two steps are taken, it/

assimilation of Americans of Japanese ancestry is going to be greatly handicapped and slowed down. Many parents object that the center life, carefully kept separate from any but a slight trickle of contacts with other Americans, is slowing down Americanization to the point where the process is reversed at times, and their children learn Japanese language and customs more than they do the English language and American customs. This complaint has been checked and found to be true in some cases. The school system, laboring under a tremendous handicap of inadequate facilities and enormously excessive work, makes Herculean and intelligent efforts to counteract such tendencies to further and quicken Americanization, with results which are really admirable, considering handicaps imposed. Devoted and well-trained teachers, able administrators, and willing students all, cooperate to do all they can, but the teacher's load is greater and the facilities on the average much less^{adequate} in quantity and variety than in any like-sized school system in the United States—and the job harder and highly important to the^{better lighting} of democracy. Additional teachers, ^{sufficient} and other facilities in elementary school buildings, and ^{adequately} equipment to care for the needs of all the students ^{and} are all vitally necessary. Relocation and an end to segregation ~~of~~ all kinds are still more important ^{and} vital.

Another task which needs doing is the general education of the Americans of Japanese ancestry to a realization of the importance of assimilation. Both issei and nisei have made enormous strides forward in this regard, but a great deal still remains for them to accomplish. Their reluctance to accept the opportunities provided for them, in the form of adult education classes in English, stems from three things: (1) their lack of self-confidence, or diffidence at exposing their lack of training and the injury to their pride possibly involved in learning situations (this feeling is common to all immigrants, who do not wish to become the laughing stock of their fellows by parading their mistakes before them in class-room work or other public occasions); (2) their feeling

that **they** have managed to get along pretty well so far, so a further mastery of English is not particularly essential; (3) the general vacation-like atmosphere of life in the assembly and relocation centers, which (a) emphasizes the happy-go-lucky, leisurely feeling of a camp-life (where formality and economic motives to work hard are both missing) and (b) provides practically no privacy for serious study at home. The first is the most difficult of these factors to overcome, and will require careful psycho-sociological analysis for successful treatment. The second is subject to treatment through an informational campaign and the reports back of relocators. The third is a natural consequence of the past year and a half of events, but is none the less in dire need of solution. Nisei are too busy, too engaged in work during the day, and too occupied with a busy round of social festivities (usually informal and not organized by the WRA staff) in the evenings, to have the time to study. Close observation of several nisei who were really trying to carry serious courses in adult education on the college level led to the inescapable conclusion that (1) they have practically no privacy conducive to serious study and intellectual accomplishment, (2) most of them have lost the habits of diligent study and thought which they possessed before the war, and have developed habits of procrastination, or enjoyment of friendly gatherings, church services, recreational activities, games, or movies. All these facts are symptoms of the deterioration which occurs in any situation wherein activity has become largely non-functional—that is, where the result is the same regardless of the effort expended. However hard they try, the Americans of Japanese ancestry seem to find that they are still deprived of the usual benefits of devoted effort. So why try? It's much easier just to enjoy life! This attitude must be combatted, and can be combatted successfully by demonstration that the result does depend on the efforts of the person and the social group involved. Although there are limits

to the variation in results--narrower limits for the Americans of Japanese ancestry than for some others, but still narrower limits for less well-established minorities in the United States--the effort expended does make a considerable difference. ^{the Americans of Japanese ancestry} ~~If~~ sit down, the world will be content to let them sit there-- forever, for all it cares, if they don't pitch in and work now. ^{if they} But bestir themselves, the world will say: "I want him to work with me, to live with me. He may be a Jap, but he's all right. He does the job better than the other fellow, he tends to business better, and he makes more money for me than anyone else in his place would do." Such statements will not come without effort, and such preferences will have to rest upon diligent work, application, and intelligence. Americans of Japanese ancestry have all of those--or have had them-- and they can make use of them to secure ^{themselves} ~~for~~ rightful privileges and compensations in the future, and in many more kinds of occupations than they ever could in California. In spite of discriminatory attitudes, the economic motive of gain by employers and businessmen will do a lot to secure for the Americans of Japanese ancestry a secure place in the life of the nation--if they make use of it. Developing habits of procrastination of passing the buck, of taking it easy, of carelessness will get only more and worse discrimination and deprivation of rights. That is, the easy way to complete subjugation is a rigid caste system. These facts can be brought home to the Americans of Japanese ancestry only by constant, repeated, and systematic efforts, through every possible agency of publicity.

Poor Health

15% of the total checked poor health as an obstacle to relocation. As might be expected the older the group the greater the concern with this problem. Only 3.5% of the 18-20 year olds checked this factor, and the percentage rose

to 4.5%, 5.9%, 14%, 23.9% and 33.3% in the successively older age groups. 22.2% of the issei, contrasted with only 5.3% of the nisei were concerned about this problem. Males and females were about even. The older age of the issei accounts almost entirely for the difference between the two generations.

Poor health is always a deterrent to any new venture, to moving, and to taking on added responsibility. Worry about poor health can be reduced considerably by adequate information about health aids in the ordinary American community—public health nurses, hospitals and hospital insurance by the Blue Cross Hospital Association Plan) clinics, and medical services of various types and kinds, all these should be adequately discussed in pre-relocation advice to evacuees. Knowledge of how to make use of aids existent and available will reduce much of the fear of possible illness and accident.

Old Age

In all, 14% of the total recorded old age as an encumbrance which made them reluctant to resettle. However, of this number, five individuals under 39 years of age checked this (and other items) in a spirit of frivolity rather than seriousness. 7 persons in the 39-44 year old group checked it. These too could be considered old only in attitude or frame of mind—humorously inclined. 222 in the 45-64 year old group and 138 in the 65 and over group checked this reason—leaving 691 in the first, and 87 in the second who felt that their age was no serious handicap to them. Roughly one-fourth of those 45-64 years old and 61% of those over 65 years checked this reason. Age is, of course, a comparative matter, and one which is based upon mental as well as physical conditions. Many an issei who thinks of normal life as a hard grind of work from the earliest day-light to the latest sun-light in the dusk of the evening feels that he is too old, worn-out and stiff to undertake such a life again. On the other

hand, however, the same persons would probably be able to perform without strain certain other jobs which call for less strenuous physical exertion, and yet are simple enough to make it possible for the older issei to learn to do them well. Industrial plants and business offices frequently have such jobs, and no one to do them. Hence it might well be a fruitful enterprise for relocation officers to look for some positions of this type, and to describe in detail what the duties involved would be. An easy job, decent living conditions, and moderately good pay may well attract even the most reluctant issei, if the possibilities are well presented. There will always be some who really are unable to do work of any regular nature because of lack of vigor, energy, and teachability. These will have to be provided for. Several alternatives exist. They may be permitted to stay in the centers and the latter changed into old folks' homes to accomodate them. The obvious unfitness of the dusty, unhealthy centers rules out this possibility. They may be called for and supported by their children, if they have any, and if the children are able to earn enough money to do this. Some will be cared for in this way. Regular social agencies may be called on to take care of the remainder. If the children are unable to support such aged parents, they may be able to care for them if the usual financial support is given by the United States Social Security Board or by state departments of public or social welfare, in the form of old age assistance, pensions, and, when necessary, hospital and other institutional care. Maintaining the centers for such old people after the vast majority of the other evacuees have left to relocate would obviously be so detrimental to their health and welfare, and expensive to do, that it is outside the realm of practical possibility. The regular agencies can do a much better job at much less cost, and with greater satisfaction to all. If and when Americans of Japanese ancestry return to the West

Coast in appreciable numbers, the old people will doubtless go there too. Since the West Coast, and especially California, has benefitted from their labor when they were vigorous, it is no more than right that those states care for them in their old age, as they do their other aged citizens and residents. It would be well for the United States Social Security offices to keep careful supervision of such care, however, to make sure that it is given adequately and in time, and to see that it is received as needed.

Comments written on the questionnaires in the space provided revealed several very valuable clues to attitudes. Some of the more typical of these comments are reproduced below Tables IV and V. Many of these reiterated in other words the reasons checked, but others added ideas not included in the ten suggested reasons. Each statement is preceded by letters which show whether the writer was a male (M) or female (F), issei (I) or Nisei (N), and the age group of which he or she was a member (for example, 30-38 (year old group)). Some of the statements indicated an attitude which protests against the whole war situation in general, some against the restrictions and regulations resulting from the war, some against the discrimination in the treatment of Americans of Japanese ancestry as contrasted with Americans of other ancestry. The latter are the most frequent of these three types. Frequently such statements indicate deep resentment and demand equality of treatment as a prerequisite to further participation, service, and cooperation in the nation's economic, social, and political organization. Others indicate apathy and lack of ability to overcome the shock of dislocation. Several kinds of escape responses can be noted—a hope for peace, for divine aid, and for other forms of assistance which indicate a feeling that the problem is too big for the individual and his social group to cope with so he tries to turn to some superior force for a solution.

Many deal with factual matters--too many children, illness, loss of property, pregnancy, and similar conditons which simply indicate a matter-of-fact concern about the necessities of everyday living. A considerable number reflect deep-seated fears. These fears were not characteristic of the Americans of Japanese ancestry prior to evacuation. The effects of the war situation, including the boycott of "goods made in Japan" (which injured heavily the trade of merchants of Japanese ancestry), the freezing of credits, the several alarms of air raids and invasion rumors, uncertainty concerning evacuation, the losses and confusion of evacuation itself, the experiences of assembly center life, the new journey to the relocation centers, and life there in desolate, dust desert spots, without the comforts or conveniences of American culture to which they were used, all undermined their morale, robbed them of confidence as to what might be next, and left them feeling hopelessly insecure except for the three meals a day, the dust, the army cots and blankets, the ramshackle house with its sometimes leaky roof, and rainflooded floors. The physical needs of these people were cared for on a pretty primitive level. The psychological needs on a still more elementary plane. The difference between these circumstances and those they were living in prior to 1937--or even 1941--is so great that it would be quite unintelligent to assume that they could feel secure enough to be able to muster any appreciable amount of confidence, initiative, and self-reliance. It will take months and years of re-assuring experiences before the effects of these experiences are wholly overcome. Any efforts to "crack down on" the evacuees will meet with still greater resistance to relocation--simple because they will be forced to undergo another experience which takes from them what little sense of security and self-confidence which they have been able to accumulate painfully during the relatively secure life they have experienced in the relocation centers. The segregation program was certainly no help to the success of the relocation program, for this very reason.

Reports concerning attitudes of persons transferring from one center to another, and studies of the attitudes of others who felt there might be a possibility that they would be transferred indicate clearly the revival of many old fears along with the new fear of diminished security involved in making the transfer. All possible efforts should be made to avoid any appearance of penalizing evacuees in order to get them out of the centers, for the effect will be the reverse. Cutting down on privileges, eliminating leisure-time programs, making leaves harder to get, decreasing the quality and quantity of food, housing, or medical facilities will all make it harder for the average evacuee to feel that the world is safe for him. So long as he has a minimum of security in the center, he will cling to it ever more tenaciously if his rights and privileges in the center are decreased. If they are expanded in accordance with his development of confidence, still further expansion will occur until he is able to muster the necessary courage and resolution to leave the quiet protected life of the center for the turmoil and uncertainty of life "outside." This principle of social psychology has been proved by demonstration and experiment so often that cannot be questioned. It is a corollary, of course, that responsibility as well as freedom should increase as self-confidence is built up. But care must be taken to make sure that such increase in responsibility does not take the appearance of persecution, or months of good work can be undone in a brief space of time. After all, getting evacuees out of centers is not the objective of the relocation program. Getting them re-established in the processes and problems of normal life in a free society is the goal, and it will not be attained by undermining the self-confidence and sense of security of the evacuees which is absolutely indispensable as a foundation of such adjustment and re-establishment.

Occupation

The fourth question in the questionnaire asked "What was your occupation previous to evacuation?" A second part of the question asked "What business or

occupation do you have in mind for the future?" The replies to these questions are valuable chiefly when related to the replies to the other questions, to indicate what kind and how much influence occupation has in determining attitudes. It has as yet been impossible to analyze the data adequately enough to justify a discussion of this influence. The replies indicate that a minority (44.%) of the population have made specific plans for future occupations, and that a considerable part of this minority (47.5%) are planning to take up occupations which they did not participate in before evacuation. A careful examination of the block tabulations shows that about every other person indicated both previous and future intended occupations. Of this sample of 1144 persons, 51% stated that they intended to continue their previous occupation, while almost as many (47.5%) indicated that they wanted to adopt an entirely new occupation. Only 1.4% selected a future occupation similar to, but not the same as, their previous occupation. Apparently any changes made will be major changes into new and untried occupations widely different from former work. This is partly due to the war-time economy, no doubt, but it also reflects the desire of persons long frustrated in their efforts to enter certain occupations (particularly skilled and semi-skilled ones) which they have been barred from entering by social barriers in the West Coast states. In some instances, it is impossible for them to continue in the same occupation, and a radical change is necessary to secure work of some sort. The proportions influenced by these three (and, no doubt, other) factors is unknown.

Issei are much less ready than are Nisei to plan to enter a new occupation. 62% of the issei who answered this question intend to stay with their previous occupations. 1.2% intend to shift to a similar one and 37% plan to shift into a different kind of work among the nisei, the proportions are reversed, 40% plan to stay in their previous occupations, 1.7% to shift to similar work, and

58% to go into new fields of activity. This difference is due almost wholly to the effect of age, apparently, for the issei were habitually trying out new lines of work on the West Coast, during the era when they were young and recently arrived in the United States.

Data on the actual occupations previous to evacuation can be secured much accurately and completely from the registration and employment files, and are not pertinent to this investigation.

"Do You Have Property or Business Connections That
Would Help You Get Started In This Line In The Future?"

The fifth question made an attempt to measure the influence of property holding and other vested interests which might deter evacuees from trying to make a new start elsewhere. 21% of the total answered "yes" to this question. Only five percent of the total indicated whether they thought they could set up their business in a new locality, and these principally by indicating what place they preferred to transfer to. Of these five percent, two thirds stipulated California, 13% specified Los Angeles, 8% indicated Chicago, 4% indicated anywhere in the United States, 4% specified the Middle West, and another 4% indicated Colorado. 2% indicated New England, and the same number named Arizona. (Since these figures are based upon a preliminary analysis of about one-third of the total returns, a greater variety or diversity may be expected in reality, but the small percentage of specifications of probable future locations among those who have property or business connections in California, is unquestionably typical of the whole population.)


The question, "In what kind of a community (city, town or country) would you like to set up your business?" was answered by 16% of the total. 7% of the total specified some city, 3% specified "town", while 6% preferred the country.

The question "Why are you not interested in transferring your business to a new locality?" was answered by a considerable number of written-in replies.

The most frequent reply was "lack of capital", next most frequent was "unfamiliar climate, soils, etc." and "old age." While many of the replies were similar to the reasons checked or written in answer to the third question on reasons for hesitation to resettle, a number of distinctly different ones were noted. One of these stated that it is impossible to secure the machinery and equipment needed to set up the business elsewhere. Some point out that it is difficult to move a farm (although it is not impossible to sell one farm in California, let us say, and buy another with the receipts, in Ohio, Michigan or Massachusetts). One issei female 39-44 years old stated "I am confident I could support myself economically." This is typical of many replies. Others point out the danger to capital invested, and reinforce those fears with stories of farmers who were forced to move out just when their crops were ready to harvest, businesses closed down by government regulation, or forced to close by boycotts or lack of saleable merchandise. One nisei male 21-29 years old said "With conditions as they are, the risks to one's capital are too great to think of investing in new localities and business." Another said "I have plans to start business but I am lacking in capital, and due to evacuation, I lost most of my property. I would like the government to guarantee safety."

In explanation of this last sentence, several interviewees have suggested that military police guard units of a squad or so each should be maintained in and near all places where evacuees are relocated, since local police are not able to provide adequate safety to persons and property of minority racial groups, if the Los Angeles, Detroit, New Orleans, Harlem, Beaumont, and other recent race riots are any indication. However this suggested solution to ineffective police protection might do the Americans of Japanese ancestry more harm than good, since it might induce otherwise tolerant American communities to regard evacuee relocators with suspicion on the ground that they are being

Figure 10. Percentage of 2537 Amache Residents Who Answered to the Question of Having Property or Business Connections Indicating The Type of Community in Which They Would Prefer to Start.



watched by the army. The most effective solution would be a decided improvement in police methods and philosophy where the treatment of social difficulties involving minority groups is concerned. Since this is a long-term project which will take some time to effect, it may be wise to have a special WRA representative familiar with police methods and attitudes visit each community in which Americans of Japanese ancestry relocate, in order to impart to them a point of view and basic information which will give this process a flying start with respect to the Japanese-Americans—citing the law-abiding habits of the Japanese-Americans, their excellent record on the coast and in the centers, acquainting them with the real story of the evacuation, and making suggestions as to the best way to treat them under various conditions and the best way to treat persons who might disturb them. If the police officers of each community have this information, they are much more likely to give just treatment and adequate protection to Japanese-American relocators than if they have the stereotyped conception that "A Jap's a Jap and you can't trust 'em." This special public relations work will not be necessary in all communities, but it is better to be over-prepared than to have police officers and relocators misunderstand each other. Protection from arbitrary governmental actions should be less necessary as the possibility of successful invasion of the United States by enemy forces diminished. This fact can and should be brought home to the evacuees, illustrated by the decisions of the Federal courts with regard to such questions.


On Returning to the West Coast

The sixth question attempted to measure the strength and frequency of the desire to return to the West Coast. It asked: "If legal restrictions and Army regulations could be removed, would you return to the state or community in which you used to live?" 7% answered "No," but 86% answered "Yes," while


7% failed to answer this question. As might be expected, the issei were more favorably inclined to a return than were the more adjustable, curious nisei to a tune of 88% yes among issei to 83% yes among nisei. Males and females were about even. Written-in comments noted on the part of the nisei were more frequently of the type of "To hell with California," "If they don't want us back there, to hell with 'em." Many nisei, of course, shared the feeling characteristic of the great majority, but especially of the issei, that they know California, but that other places are pretty much of a strange place. As one issei of about 50 years of age expressed it, "I know the people back in my old community. I know who I can do business with, and I know that the same people will rent me their farm or building, sell me my supplies, and buy my produce or goods just like they did before the war. They know me and I know them. I know I can make a go of it there. But somewhere else, where there are strange people who don't know me, who may refuse to do business with me, where I don't know where to go for what I want, or who to ask, or how to get it, or who to try to sell to, or what the weather is, or how the soil acts, or what the rainfall is, or what crops will do best, or anything like that, I can't see how I can go out there and support my family while I am trying to learn all that. I am old, and it will take several years to become acquainted somewhere else. By that time I will be too old to make use of my knowledge. I do not like to start over as a laborer, and if I do probably I would have to leave my family here for sometime till I save up some money to make a new start. Even then I cannot save much and it will take a long time to save up money enough and be able to start out for myself. So it looks like I better stay here till after the war, and then go back to California."

There are some indications that this argument is based on valid assumptions, and other indications that the difficulties envisioned in starting over in a new


Figure 11. Percentage of 2587 Amache Residents Who Indicated Whether They Would Return to Their Former Communities, If the Army Regulations and Restrictions Could be Removed, and, ~~if~~ So, When They Would Return.



Right Now




In a Few Months



After the War



Not Indicated



community are greater than they really are, and that resuming economic relationships in West Coast communities as they were before Pearl Harbor will not be as easy as some evacuees expect. Acceptability of Americans of Japanese ancestry in California differs in various localities. Placer County, for instance, is quite hostile, while Los Angeles County is not. Public opinion is not unanimous in this regard, in spite of appearances in the press, according to Dr. Carey McWilliams. Even within the pressure groups who have been most vociferous to oppose the return of the Americans of Japanese ancestry, there is definite dissent and outspoken (but unpublished) opposition to the general policies made public. However, it is well to remember that conditions have changed in California, that industrialism has set in, and the persons who bought the wholesale produce and large-scale businesses of the Americans of Japanese ancestry were frequently their former competitors; that they are now in a position of local monopoly, and are making large profits; and that consequently they would not be pleased to have the evacuees return and bring back the former conditions of competition and lower profits. There will be opposition to the return of the evacuees on economic as well as ideological grounds, but there will be, and is, a demand for the return of the Americans of Japanese ancestry by the consumers who can no longer buy the excellent produce and efficient services which were formerly provided by the Americans of Japanese ancestry. New Californians have taken over many of the niches in the economic order which the evacuees once filled, and many of them are unacquainted with the background of the Americans of Japanese ancestry. Little Tokios are filled by these new immigrants, from the deep South and elsewhere, and competition for residential space and for business locations may develop. Certainly California is no longer just as it was, and many adjustments would have to be made by the evacuees if and when they returned. However, they might have to make still more adjustments and work under

greater handicaps in some ways if they relocate elsewhere. It is most probable, however, that economic opportunities elsewhere would be greater, in the long run, than in California, since many social barriers existing in California, which prevent Americans of Japanese ancestry from entering certain occupations, are not present in the Middle West, East, and New England areas. Their adjustments there would be of less precarious durability.

Reverting to the lack of information of evacuees concerning new areas, it would seem that it would be easiest for them to relocate first as employees, and in this capacity learn the ins and outs of the new situation. It would be less risky, with greater promise of success and less chance of loss, to start out as workers for a year or two until the relocater can become familiar with the new situation. After that he could start up his own business, or operate a farm of his own, much more safely and successfully. It would not take very long to do this in most instances. Most issei could look forward to four or five years, perhaps even ten, of successful operations after getting settled. They would have the additional satisfaction of seeing their children in much better position to advance economically and socially than they could do in the same amount of time in California if they return there in the near future. Additional information on this subject seems to be essential at present, and discussion of the issues at stake and of the facts and policies which could be carried out are vitally needed. In other words, this whole matter needs to be carefully gone over by the evacuees in the light of all the information obtainable.

It must, of course, be remembered that the desire to return to California is not wholly based upon economic considerations. Most evacuees have a thoroughly human attachment to their former homes. Since living in centers, they appreciate their former homes more than ever, and often have strong nostalgic feelings for them. This evidence of loyalty to their birthplaces and "home

towns" is as commendable as it is natural. It is evidence of the fact that they will form new and abiding attachments wherever they go, but just at present it makes resettlement elsewhere a bit more difficult for them, since they have to look past the advantages of their old communities to other advantages in other communities which will appeal to them when once they have experienced them to a point of familiarity.

This question also called for an expression of attitude about the time when the return to the former community would be carried out if permitted. It is interesting to note that the great majority were not planning to return at once, either because they thought conditions on the Coast would be too unsettled to be comfortable just at present. 60% of the total stated that they would like to return after the war; 8% said within a few months; and 14% wanted to go at once, 4% who said they wanted to return did not specify a particular time. Nisei are slightly more inclined to go at once than are issei—19% as contrasted with 10% for the issei. Similarly, 12% of the nisei, and only 5% of the issei wanted to return within a few months. On the other hand only 48% of the nisei wanted to return after the war, while 68% of the issei indicated this desire. Males and females were about identical in their attitudes.

The influence of the ownership of property upon the desire to return to the Coast is not as great as might have been expected. Many of these who own property or have business connections on the Coast did not indicate a desire to return there right away, and an even greater number and proportion who have no property there indicated a desire to return at once. In all, less than two thirds of those who stated that they have property or business connections in their former communities which would help them get started again indicated a desire to return to those communities at once or within a few months. Perhaps if the question had been divided to differentiate between property and business

connections the result would have been more valuable and clear. Interviews with those who have property have failed to reveal any who do not intend to try to go back sometime to either liquidate their interests or renew their operation or oversight of the property. Some of course are deriving regular income from rentals, and do not feel a need to return while their property is being well cared for. Others feel decidedly aggrieved at not being permitted to return to take care of their interests. Since abuse of property and failure to make payments of rentals or installments on the purchase price by present operators are by no means unheard of, there is a real foundation for this attitude. Its validity and justice can be questioned only on the basis of the conditions enforced by war. At the end of the war, that basis will no longer exist, and this fact has its influence upon the thinking of the evacuees. A considerable number of nisei interviewees associate in their thinking the right to enjoy the benefit of owning and using property with their responsibilities and duties of citizenship. Denial of their rights to operate or supervise their properties seems to them grossly unjust in view of the fact that they are called upon to assume voluntarily and readily the duties of defending a political and social order which claims to make possible and to safeguard those rights. It would appear to be the responsibility of the entire people of the United States to see that those rights are guaranteed and made good as soon as the exigencies of military necessity make it possible to do so. Meanwhile, property rights do seem to influence the thinking of evacuees on a possible return to the Coast, though not to the extent that they might be supposed to do.

Do the Evacuees Want To Stay in the Centers at
Government Expense for the Rest of Their Lives?

Question seven attempted to measure the number of evacuees who want to retire in the centers at government expense for the rest of their lives. Certain witnesses in congressional hearings before the Dies Committee alleged that the

WRA is pampering and coddling evacuees to the point that they would be only too glad to stay where they are forever, with food, shelter, clothing, and other commodities provided for them at Government expense. The answers to this question clearly prove that this allegation is false. 91% answered "NO". Only 1% answered yes--approximately the same number as the number of persons under 45 who indicated a sense of humor by alleging that old age was an obstacle to their relocation. 8% did not answer the question. This answer is just what we might expect. The record of the Americans of Japanese ancestry on the West Coast is singularly free of dependence on public assistance. There is a decided resistance on their part of anything that savors of public support. However, in the present circumstances, most persons were deprived suddenly of their sources of livelihood, and most have absorbed a considerable part or all of their savings in supplementing the goods provided by WCCA and WRA in the assembly and relocation centers. It would be reasonable for the Americans of Japanese ancestry to expect public support in restitution for the private resources which they have lost during the process of evacuation. The evacuation and the losses entailed thereby by the great majority, who are loyal Americans, was carried out for the benefit of the entire country, and the cost should be shared by it, and not put on the shoulders of the Americans of Japanese ancestry alone. However, most of the latter would prefer compensation to public support, and their feeling of independence and responsibility prompts them to ask for assistance to enable them to resume a competitive life rather than a haven in which to retire from it. It is true that a considerable number of elderly issei who were on the point of retiring find the centers a convenient place to do so, since they are surrounded by friends and relatives and at home in a relatively friendly and tolerably comfortable environment. Ordinarily, their own resources or those of their families would have enabled them to retire on a private maintenance basis. Their losses have made this impossible, but most of them would still prefer compensation and independence

to a life of dependence on governmental appropriations and subjection to administrative control, as the answers to this question and a considerable number of interviewees' statements indicate clearly. In any case, the care of these persons will now devolve upon the agency established for meeting this need among the entire population, namely, the Social Security Administration. It is charged with providing them, as everyone else, with the security in old age which is the right of every citizen who has worked or wanted to work to maintain our society during the years when he was able. The Americans of Japanese ancestry have contributed more than their share to the prosperity of our country by the hard work and painstaking effort which they expended in the Pacific Coast states and elsewhere, and they have certainly earned any assistance which they need in their old age. This right, however, does not alter the fact that 91% or more of the evacuees in the Center are determined to refuse to live in the Center at Government expense after the emergency is over, and that only 1% stated that they would be willing to stay if they had the opportunity. The written-in comments reveal a great deal of resentment at the very suggestion--indeed, at the idea of even asking such a question. There is no need to fear a tendency on the part of the Americans of Japanese ancestry to become parasites on the economy of the United States.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The facts revealed by this study of evacuee attitudes concerning relocation point unmistakably to certain changes which are needed in order to make possible a more effective and successful relocation program. The need is particularly great for helping the issei and their minor dependents--approximately two-thirds of the population of the centers--to relocate. This can be accomplished with the desired degree of success only if several policies are put into effect or strengthened at an early date.

First, it will be necessary to work out some way of settling several families together, to relocate the evacuees in small communities, rather than as more or less isolated individuals or families scattered widely about. This is necessary because most of the evacuees, and the issei in particular, feel that they cannot brave the world alone. They will have to be settled in communities in order to give them a feeling of security, and to enable them to satisfy their needs for fellowship, understanding, congenial social interaction, and a social environment which will enable them to maintain their mental health and to achieve social solidarity sufficient to make them willing to accept it in place of the highly satisfying social life of the centers. Each community must be large enough to provide these basic requisites, without which the issei are not going to relocate voluntarily. However, as few as four or five families within daily visiting distance will be sufficient in most cases. The communities should of course be kept as small as is required to avoid arousing the apprehension of the residents of the locality, which means that they can vary in size from four or five families to fifty or more, depending upon the density of population and public sentiment in the locality. Such communities can be founded in many different places. Probably we will find that they will spread out from the most active foci of relocation in all directions until almost all the United States east of the Rocky Mountains is dotted with such small communities.

Second, the lack of capital on the part of most evacuees must be overcome. This can best be done, in all probability, by extending long-term loans to resettlers. While WRA, as a temporary agency, cannot assume such a function, it can and should take definite action to see that this need is met promptly and effectively by some other suitable agency. It should even go so far as to request and arrange for the continuous presence in the centers of authorized representatives of such other agencies so that evacuees can make direct, complete, and con-

clusive arrangements so that they will know that they have resources upon which to rely. In that case they will feel much more confidence in setting out afresh. Without such provision most issei will have a hard time to persuade themselves that they are taking a warranted risk. Such loans are practically certain to be paid, if the past financial record of the Americans of Japanese ancestry is any indication. But even if 10% were never paid, such loans, even if given in the amount of \$5000 per family, would still be less expensive to the taxpayers than the maintenance of the centers for even one half a year more. The responsibility and cost of caring for the aged and disabled, which ^{will} have to be met under any system, can be taken over by the Federal Social Security Administration. More comfortable and healthful places and ways of caring for the aged can be provided than most of the centers can provide, at no greater cost. It would be undesirable as well as expensive to perpetuate the centers for such purposes. There is no valid reason, therefore, to hesitate in spending money to help the evacuees to get out and on their own feet again, and to close the centers at the earliest opportunity. It is absolutely essential, however, that the basic prerequisites which will enable the evacuees to do this confidently and successfully be made available to them. Capital is one of the most important of these prerequisites--capital enough to start a venture and to keep the family provided for until the proceeds can become adequate to meet its needs.

Third, it will be necessary to re-establish the self-confidence of the evacuees. The psychological shocks of the war, of evacuation, and of assembly center and relocation center experiences are here. They cannot be overcome by refusing to recognize them, but they can be overcome by accurate, clear thinking, careful planning, and patient work. The most important effects result from repeated frustration, from denial in practice of our axiomatic American

philosophy of equalitarian treatment of citizens, from the denial of freedom from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment without trial, from the imposition of arbitrary and sometimes unjust and unreasonable treatment in assembly and relocation centers, from loss of property and disruption of plans for economic, social, and educational progress. The results manifest themselves clearly in the apathy and lack of interest in advancement and relocation by the issei particularly, and by numerous nisei, in the loss of faith on the part of great numbers of evacuees in personal worth, integrity, and effort as a means to security and recognition--in a word, in the symptoms of shattered self-confidence and defeatism. Social demoralization is not evident as yet, but may be expected to appear under such conditions.

These results can be overcome most easily and rapidly by constantly and repeatedly demonstrating to the evacuees that they have all the freedom they want and that they will get all the support and assistance they need to achieve security, in every effort they make. In so doing, they will gain confidence enough to undertake greater and greater ventures until they feel capable of complete independence again. Obviously, criticism, coercion, threats, and punitive measures will have just the opposite effect, and delay the growth of self-confidence seriously. The patent and obvious demonstration by WRA and all other governmental agencies of equal recognition of equal abilities, great care in administration to see that justice is done in all particulars and that discrimination in all its forms is avoided, and that individual merit and conscientious effort is recognized and rewarded, these tactics will be most effective in making possible a better and more successful relocation program. By such treatment alone it will be possible to build up again the self-confidence of the family which has seen its savings from a lifetime of hard labor and economical husbanding swept away in a year and a half. As a result of clear demonstration

that individual effort does matter, that merit, effort, and integrity are recognized and rewarded, that WRA, other governmental agencies, and private citizens are ready and willing to give equal recognition for equal performance, the evacuees will be able to convince themselves that the experiences they have gone through in the last year and a half are not an indication of what they may expect in the future--that they can safely go out and build anew without risk of danger or loss in excess of that of the ordinary citizen. An excellent possible demonstration of this sort would be the appointment of key evacuee administrative and professional personnel who exercise skills which are difficult to replace to United States Civil Service status. Refusal to accord such equal recognition, to guarantee freedom of speech and action, and to deal justly and without discrimination, or attempts to deal harshly with evacuees in an effort to make them feel that they want to escape from persecution in the center, all will result in slowing down and reducing the effectiveness of the relocation program. The evacuees will cling ever more tightly to what little security they feel that they already possess if any effort appears to reduce that security. The objective is, after all, not to throw persons out of the center, but to help them start over in a new place in such a way that they can succeed, that they can become an integral, valuable, and accepted part of their new community. It is impossible to secure this objective without helping the evacuees to rebuild their self-confidence to the point where they feel both desirous and capable of going out and establishing themselves as respected and successful members of some American community.

Fourth, even with friends as company, with capital, and self-confidence, it is vital that the evacuees be fully informed concerning conditions in various areas outside the centers. This is not a new policy, for WRA has long maintained the need for complete, efficient school systems, and has expended considerable

sums in providing education for adults as well as children. It has tried also to provide information, to supply money to permit evacuees to go out and look over the situation before selecting a job or starting a new business venture. Redoubling of efforts in this direction is highly imperative, however. Systematic representation by every possible means of information on the economic, social, physical, climatic, agronomic, and other conditions in each part of the United States must be carried out even more intensively than heretofore to remove the feeling of complete and baffling ignorance of the strange new location, to impart the confidence born of acquaintanceship and dependable knowledge. Motion pictures and slides such as those now being shown in the various centers in the relocation information series are excellent for the purpose, and should be utilized to the utmost. Visits of relocation officers to centers are exceedingly helpful. Literature from governmental and private agencies, well advertised and distributed in the centers, will also be helpful. Systematic instruction in subjects which relocators should know should be worked up by evacuee committees, and taught as prerelocation courses. A course of this sort is taught in Granada Center schools and as part of the relocation committee program of adult education program in several centers. Issei and nisei alike who are shown an outline of a course of this sort state definitely and with conviction that that sort of instruction should be made compulsory as a prerequisite to leaving the center. It may not be the wisest thing to make such a requirement strictly compulsory, but there is no question as to its usefulness and desirability for each evacuee. One of the most effective media of giving such instruction is the personal contact between administrative individuals, visitors, and evacuees. Anything which tends to keep apart evacuees and staff can be definitely considered to be a factor hindering the relocation program. The present practice of arranging for serious and capable representatives of evacuee groups to go out

and survey an area or situation in which they might wish to relocate is also effective and should be continued and expanded.

The informational program will take care of several factors which are now holding up the relocation program seriously. The misinformation and uncertainty now existing concerning public opinion in the communities of prospective settlement, lack of confidence in making a living, lack of confidence in establishing a secure future, and lack of information concerning living conditions, cost of living, wages, job opportunities, etc., will all be removed to a very large extent by the intensification and improvement of the processes of giving evacuees all available information. Lists of desirable literature and outline of courses have been prepared for submission to the proper authorities, and requests have been made for such aids to relocation. Much progress has been made in this field since the returns from the questionnaire were received.

Fifth, various processes have been outlined and suggested to help care for other difficulties felt by the evacuees to be hindrances to their relocation. The psychological treatment which has already been suggested for increasing the self-confidence of the evacuees will be of value also in overcoming diffidence and lack of facility in speaking English, lack of desire to put in conscientious efforts to overcome existing handicaps, or to perform necessary work in maintaining the centers until relocation can make it possible to close them. While the Community Analysis staff does not labor under the illusion that its suggestions and recommendations will perfect the world overnight, or even achieve complete relocation without difficulty, it is convinced that these suggestions will materially assist the effort to make the relocation program a definite success within a relatively short time. Actually carrying out the program is the responsibility and duty of every resident on the United States, in order that we may again resume a more perfect democracy, and regain the happiness and

satisfaction of a loyal, capable, and valuable group of Americans who have always given their best services to their country, cheerfully and willingly.

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